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  "chapter": {
    "num": 8,
    "slug": "08-book-viii",
    "title": "Book VIII",
    "of": 12,
    "words": 16880,
    "text": "> **Translation:** John Patrick Rowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961). Verbatim public-domain scholarly text — quotable.\n>\n> **Public-domain basis:** Public domain (U.S.): published 1961, copyright not renewed (NYPL CCE searched 1988-1990). US public domain. Full copyright-clearance evidence: [/about/translations/#pd-evidence](/about/translations/#pd-evidence).\n>\n> **Latin source:** Vivès edition (Paris, 1871–1880), provided as a parallel Latin edition (OCR-derived — for reading and search, not verbatim quotation).\n\n## Book VIII\n\nLESSON 1 Sensible Substances Have Different Kinds of Matter ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 1: 1042a 3-1042b 8 691. It is necessary, then, to argue from the points which have been made, and after making a summary, to bring our investigations to a close. 692. It has been stated that it is the causes, principles and elements of substances which are being sought (564). 693. Now some substances are admitted by all; but there are others about which some thinkers have expressed views peculiar to themselves. Those which are admitted by all are physical substances, such as fire, earth, water and the other simple bodies; plants and their parts; animals and the parts of animals; and finally the heaven and its parts. But certain other thinkers make the peculiar claim that the Forms and the objects of mathematics are substances (566). 694. From other arguments it also follows that there are other substances, i.e., the essence and the underlying subject. Again, from another point of view a genus is substance to a greater degree than species, and a universal to a greater degree than singular things (568). And the Ideas have a connection with the universal and the genus, for they seem to be substances on the same grounds. 695. Further, since the essence is substance, and the definition is the intelligible expression of the essence, for this reason we have examined both the definition and everything that is predicated essentially (576-597). And since the definition of a thing is its intelligible expression, and the intelligible expression has parts, then concerning the notion of part it was also necessary to consider what things are parts of substance and what are not, and whether these are necessary to the definition (625-649). Further, neither the universal nor the genus is substance (650-681). Related questions concerning the Ideas and the objects of mathematics must be examined later on; for some say that these are substances in addition to sensible ones. But now we must treat those things which all admit to be substances, and these are sensible substances. 696. All sensible substances have matter. And the underlying subject is substance; in one sense the matter (by matter I mean that which is not a particular thing actually but potentially); and in another sense the intelligible structure or form, which is a particular thing and is separable in thought; and in a third sense the thing composed of these, which alone is subject to generation and corruption, and is separable in an absolute sense. For according to the intelligible structure of substances, some are separable and others are not. 697. Now it is evident that matter is substance; for in every process of change between contraries there is something which underlies these changes. For example, in change of place, there is something which is now here and afterwards somewhere else; and in change of size, that which is now of such a size and afterwards smaller or greater; and in change of quality, that which is now healthy and afterwards diseased. And similarly in change of substance there is something which is now in the process of generation and afterwards in the process of corruption, and which is now a subject and this particular thing and afterwards a subject of privation. 698. And the other changes follow upon this change, but this change does not follow upon one or two of the others. For if a thing has matter which is subject to change of place, it is not necessary that it also have matter which is generable and corruptible. The difference between coming-to-be in an absolute sense and coming-to-be in a qualified sense has been explained in the Physics . COMMENTARY 1681. Having dealt with substance by means of the dialectical method in Book VII, i.e., by examining the definition and its parts and other things of this kind which are considered from the viewpoint of dialectics, the Philosopher now intends in Book VIII to deal with sensible substances through their proper principles, by applying to those substances the things that were investigated above by means of the dialectical method. This is divided into two parts. In the first (691:C 1681), he links up this discussion with the preceding one; and in the second (696:C 1686), he carries out his intention (“All sensible substances”). In regard to the first he does three things. First, he states in a general way what he intends to do. Second (692:C 1682), he repeats some of the statements which have been made (“It has been stated”). Third (695:C 1685), he links up the foregoing discussion with the one that is to come (“Further, since the essence”). He says first (691), then, that since many of the statements made about substance in Book VII belong to the consideration of dialectics, we must reason from the statements which have been made in order that the things stated from the viewpoint of dialectics may be applied to things existing in reality. And “after making a summary,” i.e., after bringing these together again in a brief and summary way, we must bring our investigation to a close by completing the treatise on substance. He does this by discussing those things which were omitted from the foregoing treatise. 1682. It has been stated (692). Here he repeats some of the statements which have been made, because it was stated in Book VII (564:C 1260) that the principal objects of our search in this science are the causes, principles and elements of substances. For since this science investigates as its proper subject being in general, and this is divided into substance and the nine classes of accidents, and a knowledge of accidents depends upon substance, as was shown in Book VII (585-6:C 1342-50), it follows that this science is principally concerned with substances. And since we know each thing only when we know its principles and causes, it also follows that this science must be principally concerned with the principles, causes and elements of substances. The way in which these three differ has been shown above in Book V (403-12:C 751-807). 1683. Now some substances (693). Then he repeats one of the points discussed above, i.e., the various senses in which substance is used. First, he gives the things which are said to be real substances. Among these there are some whose existence is admitted by all thinkers, namely, sensible substances, such as earth, water and the other elements; and above these, in the order of their nobility and perfection, plants and animals and their parts; and lastly the heaven and its parts, as the orbs and the stars, which surpass in nobility the other sensible substances. However, there are some substances whose existence is not admitted by all but only by certain particular thinkers, who claim that the Forms and the objects of mathematics have separate existence. They adopted this position because they thought that for every abstraction of the intellect there is a corresponding abstraction in reality. Thus, because the intellect considers the universal apart from particular things, as “man” apart from Socrates and Plato, they held that the Forms have separate existence of themselves. And since the intellect considers some forms apart from sensible material things, as curvature (whose concept does not contain nose as does the concept of pugnose) and a line and other things of this kind, which we call the objects of mathematics, they also held that the objects of mathematics have separate existence. 1684. From other arguments (694). Here he gives the different ways in which substance is considered from the viewpoint of its intelligible structure; and there are two of these. The first is that substance means the quiddity of any natural substance, and this is merely the whatness of a natural being. In the second way substance is considered in a different sense, that is, in the sense that a genus is said to be substance to a greater degree than species, and a universal to a greater degree than singular things, as some men held according to what was treated in the questions in Book III (220-234:C 423-442). And with this way of considering substance, according to which both a genus and a universal are called substances, is connected the theory of Ideas, or Forms as Aristotle called them above (693:C 1683); for this theory maintains that both Ideas and universals are substances on the same grounds. 1685. Further, since the essence (695). He links up this discussion with the preceding one by stating what has been solved and what remains to be solved. He says that, since the essence is substance, and the intelligible expression which signifies it is the definition, for this reason it was necessary in the preceding book to deal with definition. And since a definition is composed of those attributes which are predicated of a thing essentially, for this reason it was also necessary in that book to settle the issue about essential predication (576-597:C 1299-1380). Further, since the definition of a thing is its intelligible expression, and this is made up of parts, then concerning the parts of a definition it was also necessary to determine what parts are parts of the thing defined and what are not; and whether the parts of the definition and those of the thing defined are the same (625-649:C 1482-1565). Another text has “Whether the parts of the definition must be defined,” but the first version is better. In Book VII (650-681:C 1566-1647) it was shown also that neither the universal nor the genus is substance. Thus the entire study which may be made of definitions and substance was carried out in Book VII. But of those substances which exist in reality, it will be necessary to examine later the Ideas and the objects of mathematics, which one school of thinkers claim to subsist by themselves apart from sensible substances. This is done in the last books of this work. But now it is necessary to treat at once of those substances which all men admit to exist, namely, sensible substances, so that we may proceed from what has been made evident to what as yet remains unknown. Sensible substance is matter, form, composite. 1686. All sensible substances (696). Having linked up the foregoing discussion with the one that is to come, the Philosopher begins here to treat of sensible substances by investigating their principles. This is divided into two parts. In the first (1686) he establishes what is true concerning matter and form , which are the principles of sensible substances . In the second (1755) he considers the way in which they are united to each other (“It seems that we must”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that matter and form are principles of sensible substances. Second (1705), he deals with those points which must be investigated about each of these principles (“And we must not”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that matter is a principle of sensible substances; and second (1691), that the same is true of form (“But since that which has the character of a subject”). In regard to the first he does three things. First he shows what matter is by distinguishing it from the other ways in which substance is considered. Hence he says that all sensible substances have matter; and the reason is that all are in motion, and motion does not exist without matter. 1687. But it must be noted that in one sense substance means (1) matter, and in another (2) form, and in still another (3) the thing composed of these. For matter is called substance, not as though it were a being considered to have actual existence in itself, but as something capable of being actual (and this is said to be a particular thing). And form , which is also termed the intelligible structure because the intelligible structure of the species is derived from it, is called substance (1) inasmuch as it is something actual , and (2) inasmuch as it is separable from matter in thought but not in reality. And the thing composed of these is called substance inasmuch as it is something “separable in an absolute sense,” i.e., capable of existing separately by itself in reality; and it alone is subject to generation and corruption. For form and matter are generated and corrupted only by reason of something else. And although the composite is separable in an absolute sense, yet some of the other things which are called substances are separable in thought and some are not. For a form is separable in thought because it can be understood without understanding individuating sensible matter; but matter cannot be understood without understanding form, since it is apprehended only inasmuch as it is in potentiality to form. Or the, statements can mean that “according to the intelligible structure of substances,” i.e., of forms, some are separable in their intelligible structure, as the objects of mathematics, and some are not, as natural forms. Or again it may mean that there are certain separate forms existing without matter, about which he will establish the truth later on (2447-2454). 1688. Now it is evident (697). Second, he says that in sensible substances we must posit matter as substance and subject . For in every change between contraries, there must be a subject common to the termini of the change. For example, in change of place there is a common subject which is now here and afterwards somewhere else; and in growth there is a common subject which now has so much quantity and afterwards is smaller (if the change is decrease) or greater (if it is increase). And in alteration there is a common subject which is now healthy and afterwards diseased. Hence, since there is substantial change , that is, generation and corruption, there must be a common subject which underlies the opposite changes of generation and corruption. And this is the subject for the termini that have been given, i.e., form and privation, so that sometimes this subject is actual by reason of a form, and sometimes it is the subject of the privation of that form. 1689. Now from this argument of Aristotle it is clear that substantial generation and corruption are the source from which we derive our knowledge of prime matter. For if prime matter by nature had a form of its own, it would be an actual thing by reason of that form. Hence, when an additional form would be given [to prime matter], such matter would not exist in an absolute sense by reason of that form but would become this or that being; and then there would be generation in a qualified sense but not in an absolute sense. Hence all those who held that this first subject is a body, such as air or water, claimed that generation is the same as alteration. But it is clear from this argument what we must hold prime matter to be; for it is related to all forms and privations as the subject of qualitative change is to contrary qualities. 1690. And the other changes (698). Here he shows that matter is not present in the same way in all sensible substances. He says that the other changes follow upon matter which is subject to generation and corruption; for if matter is subject to generation and corruption, it follows that it is subject to alteration and change of place. But this matter, i.e., one which is subject to generation and corruption, does not follow upon all the other changes, especially change of place. For if something has “matter which is subject to change of place,” i.e., by which it is potentially in a place, it does not follow that it also has “matter which is generable and corruptible,” namely, one which is subject to generation and corruption. For this kind of matter is lacking in the celestial bodies, in which there is a kind of alteration inasmuch as they are illuminated and deprived of light, but neither generation nor corruption. Hence he said one” because of change of place, or two” because of the kind of alteration just mentioned, although this is really not alteration, because illumination is not motion but the terminus of motion. Thus we must posit matter for every change according as there is in everything that changes a coming-to-be either in an absolute sense or in a qualified one. The difference between coming-to-be in an absolute sense and in a qualified one has been explained in the Physics , Book 1; 4 for coming-to-be in an absolute sense belongs to substance, and coming-to-be in a qualified sense belongs to accidents. LESSON 2 Form Inferred from Accidental Differences in Sensible Substances. Threefold Definition of All Things ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 1042b 9-1043a 28 699. But since that which has the character of a subject or matter has been admitted by all to be substance, and this is what is in potentiality, it remains to explain what it is that constitutes the substance of sensible things in the sense of actuality. 700. Now Democritus is like one who thinks that there are three differences in things. For he holds that the underlying body, as matter, is the same for all things, but that it differs in contour, which is shape; or in disposition, which is position; or in distribution, which is arrangement. 701. However, there seem to be many differences inasmuch as some things are said to be by reason of the way in which their material parts are combined; for example, some things are combined by mixture, as honey-water; others by a binding, as the binding around a head; others by birdlime, as a book; others by a nail, as a chest; and others in several of these ways. Others differ by position, as a threshold and a lintel, for these differ in a sense according to their position; others differ in point of time, as dinner and breakfast; others with respect to place, as the air currents; others by reason of sensible properties, as hardness and softness, density and rarity, dryness and moistness. And some things differ by some of these differences and others by all taken together; some by excess and others by defect. 702. For this reason it is evident that being is also used in the same number of ways; for a threshold is such because it is placed in this particular position, and to be a threshold means to be placed in such and such a position; and to be ice means to be congealed in such and such a way. However, the being of some things will be defined in all of these ways: one by being mixed; others by being combined; others by being tied together; others by being condensed; and others by other differences, as a hand and a foot. 703. Further, we must consider the classes of differences, for these will be the principles of being of things, as differences in degree, or in density and rarity, and others such as these; for all are instances of excess and defect. Indeed, if [anything differs] either in figure or in smoothness and roughness [these are reducible to differences] in straightness and curvature. Further, the being of some things will consist in being mixed, and their non-being will consist in the opposite state. 704. It is evident, then, from these instances that, if substance is the cause of the being of each thing which is composed of these differences, we must look for the cause of the being of each one of these among these differences. Now substances is none of these differences nor any combination of them; yet it is found analogously in each. And just as in the case of substance that which is predicated of matter is the actuality itself, in a similar way this is most true in the case of other definitions. Thus if a threshold has to be defined, we shall say that it is a piece of wood or stone placed in such and such a position; and we shall say that a house is bricks and timbers placed in such and such a position. (Or again in some cases there is also the final cause). And if ice is to be defined, we shall say that it is water frozen or condensed in such and such a way; and we shall say that a harmony is such and such a combination of high and low notes. [And we must proceed] in the same way too in other things. 705. From these instances, then, it is evident that different matters have a different actuality and intelligible structure; for of some things it is combination, of others mixing, and of others some of those differences mentioned above. 706. Therefore, among those who give definitions, those who state what a house is by saying that it is stones, bricks and timbers, are speaking of a potential house; for these are its matter. But those who say that it is a shelter for protecting goods and bodies, or by adding some other such property, speak of its actuality. And those who speak of both of these together speak of the third kind of substance, which is the thing composed of these. For the intelligible structure which is expressed by means of differences seems to be that of the form or actuality of a thing, but that which is expressed by a thing’s intrinsic parts is rather that of its matter. The same thing is true of the definitions of which Archytas approved, for they are both of these together. For example, What is stillness? Rest in a large expanse of air, where air is as matter and rest as actuality or substance. What is a calm? Smoothness of the sea, where the sea is as subject or matter, and smoothness as actuality or form. 707. From what has been said, then, it is evident what sensible substance is and how it exists; for in one sense it has the character of matter, and in another the character of form (because it is actuality), and in a third sense it is the thing composed of these. COMMENTARY 1691. Having investigated the material principle in sensible substances, the Philosopher examines their formal principle. First (699:C 1691), he links up this discussion with the foregoing one, saying that, since all recognize substance in the sense of matter and subject (for even the oldest philosophers held that matter is the substance of material things), and this kind of substance is something potential, it now remains to explain what form is, which is the actuality of sensible things. 1692. Now Democritus is like one (700). Then he carries out his intention; and in regard to this he does two things. First (700:C 1692), he examines the differences in sensible things which indicate a formal principle. Second (705:C 1699), he draws some conclusions (“From these instances”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he examines certain accidental differences of sensible things. Second (704:C 1696), he shows how these differences are related to substantial differences (“It is evident”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he investigates the accidental differences of sensible things. Second (702:C 1694), he shows how these differences are related to those things whose differences they are (“For this reason”). In regard to the first he does two things. First (700), he gives Democritus’ opinion about the differences of things. He says that Democritus is like one who thinks “that there are three differences in things,” i.e., according to the principles which he gives he seems to think that all differences of things are reduced to three classes. For he held that the material principles of things are indivisible bodies, which, being of the same nature, are similar to each other; but that they constitute a diversity of things because they differ in position, shape and arrangement. Thus he seems to hold that the underlying body, as a material principle, is one and the same in nature even though it is divided into an infinite number of parts, and that it differ’s, i.e., is divided into different things, because of differences in shape, position and arrangement. For things differ in figure by being straight or curved; in position by being above or below, right or left; and in arrangement by being before or after. 1693. However, there seem to be (701). Second, he shows that the position of Democritus is unsatisfactory, because there seem to be many other differences of things which are not reducible to the foregoing ones. For some things differ by reason of the different way in which their material parts are combined: in some things the material parts are combined by being mixed, as honey-water; in others, by being tied together by some bond, as the binding around a woman’s’ head; in others by glue or birdlime, as occurs in books; in others by a nail, as occurs in a chest; and in others the parts are united in several of the aforesaid ways. On the other hand, some things differ from each other by their position, as a lintel and a threshold, which differ because they are placed in such and such a way-one being above and the other below. Again, some differ in point of time, as dinner, which is the late meal, from breakfast, which is the early morning meal. Others differ with respect to place, as “the air currents,” i.e., the winds, of which the Aquilonian comes from the north, the Favonian from the west, the Austerian from the south, and the Subsolian from the east. Others differ “by reason of the qualities of sensible bodies,” i.e., by hardness or softness and other characteristics of this kind; and some things differ in several of these ways, and others in all of them. And some differ by excess and some by defect. He adds this because the ancient philosophers held that all qualities of sensible bodies are reduced to excess or defect. 1694. For this reason (702). He shows the way in which these differences are related to those things whose differences they are. In regard to this he does two things. First (702), he shows that these differences constitute the being of the things whose differences they are. Second (703:C 1695), he concludes that in order to grasp the principles of being we must reduce these differences to certain primary classes of differences (“Further, we must consider”). First, then, he says that, because these differences are constitutive of the things we have mentioned above, it is evident that the being of the aforesaid realities is diversified according to these differences; for a difference completes the definition, which signifies the being of a thing. Thus a threshold is this particular thing “because it is placed in such and such a position,” and its being, i.e., its proper intelligible structure, consists in being placed in such and such a position. Similarly, being ice is being condensed in such and such a way. And by each of the differences mentioned the being of things of a certain type is differentiated: some by being mixed; others by being combined; and others by other differences, as a hand and a foot and other parts of this kind which have peculiar differences of their own inasmuch as they are directed to certain definite operations. 1695. Further, we must consider (703). He concludes that, since the being of things consists in their differences and has to be known in this way, it will be worth our while to grasp the classes of differences by reducing the secondary differences of a class to the primary differences; because common and proper differences of this kind will be the principles of being of a whole class. This is evident in differences of degree, of rarity and density, and in other things of this kind; for density and rarity and the like are reduced to the class of the great and small, because all these signify excess and defect. Similarly, if things differ in figure or in roughness or smoothness, these are reduced to differences of straightness and curvature, which are the primary differences of figure. Again, it is necessary that some be reduced to being mixed or not being mixed; for the being of some things consists in the fact that they are mixed, and their non-being in just the opposite state. 1696. It is evident, then (704). He shows how these differences are related to the substances of things. He says that it is now evident from the foregoing that we must try to discover in these differences the formal cause of the being of each thing, if it is in this way that substance in a formal sense, or the whatness of a thing, is the cause of the being of each thing, as was clear in Book VII (682-90:C 1648-80). For these differences signify the form or whatness of the above-mentioned things. However, none of these differences are substance or anything akin to substance, as though belonging to the genus of substance; but the same proportion is found in them as in [the genus of] substance. 1697. For just as in the genus of substance the difference , which is predicated of the genus and qualifies it in order to constitute a species, is related to the genus as actuality or form , so also is this true in other definitions. (~) For we must not understand that difference is form or that genus is matter, since genus and difference are predicated of the species but matter and form are not predicated of the composite. (+) But we speak in this manner because a thing’s genus is derived from its material principle, and its difference from its formal principle. The genus of man, for example, is animal, because it signifies something having a sensory nature, which is related as matter to intellectual nature from which rational, the difference of man, is taken. But rational signifies something having an intellectual nature. It is for this reason that a genus contains its differences potentially, and that genus and difference are proportionate to matter and form, as Porphyry says. And for this reason too it is said here that “actuality,” i.e., difference, is predicated “of matter,” i.e., of the genus; and the same thing occurs in other genera. 1698. For if one wishes to define a threshold, he shall say that it is a piece of stone or wood placed in such and such a position; and in this definition stone or wood is as matter and position as form. Similarly, in the definition of a house stones and timbers are as matter, and being combined in such and such a way as form. And again in the definitions of some things there is also added its end, on which the necessity of the form depends. And similarly in the definition of ice, water is as matter and being frozen is as form. So too in the definition of a harmony the high and low notes are as matter and the way in which they are combined is as form. The same thing applies in all other definitions. 1699. From these instances (705). He draws two additional conclusions from the above. First, there are different actualities or forms for different matters. For in some things the actuality consists in being combined; in others in being mixed, or in some of the aforesaid differences. 1700. Therefore, among those who (706). He states the second conclusion; since in a definition one part,is related to the other as actuality to matter, some people in defining things give an inadequate definition by stating only their matter, as those who define a house by means of cement, stones and timbers, which are the material of a house; because such a definition does not signify an actual house but a potential one. Those who say that a house is a shelter for goods and living bodies state the form of a house but not its matter. However, those who state both define the composite substance, and therefore their definition is a complete definition. But the conceptual element which is derived from the differences pertains to the form, whereas that which is derived from the intrinsic parts pertains to the matter. 1701. The definitions which Archytas accepts are similar to these. E.g., stillness, which signifies the state of the atmosphere when it is windless, is rest in a large expanse of air; for if only the smallest amount of air in a vessel is at rest we do not speak of stillness. In this definition air is as matter and rest as form. Similarly, when a calm is defined as the smoothness of the sea, the sea is as matter and smoothness as form. Now in these definitions the matter is substance and the form is an accident; but in the definition of a house the matter is its parts and the actuality is the form of the whole. 1702. From what (707). He summarizes the things said about form. The text is clear here. LESSON 3 The Nature of Form as Part of a Thing’s Essence. The Resemblance between Numbers and Forms ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 3: 1043a 29-1044a 14 708. And we must not disregard the fact that sometimes it is not apparent whether a name signifies the composite substance or the actuality or form; for example, whether house signifies both the form and the matter together, i.e., a shelter composed of bricks, timbers and stones arranged in such and such a way, or whether it signifies the actuality or form—a shelter; and whether line signifies twoness in length or twoness; and whether animal signifies a soul in a body or a soul, for the latter is the substance or actuality of some body. 709. Now animal will also apply to both, not in the sense that both are expressed by one meaning, but insofar as they are related to some one thing. 710. These distinctions make a difference with regard to something else, but not to the investigation of sensible substances, because the essence of this other thing consists of form or actuality. For a soul and the essence of a soul are the same, but a man and the essence of a man are not the same, unless a man is also called a soul. And in some things essence and thing are identical and in others not. 711. Accordingly, to those who make investigations it does not seem that a syllable consists of letters and their combination, nor does a house consist of bricks and their combination. And this is true, because a combination or mixture does not consist of the things of which it is the combination or mixture. Nor likewise do any of the other differences. If a threshold, for example, is constituted by its position, the position is not constituted by the threshold, but rather the latter by the former. Nor is man animal and two-footed, but there must be something else in addition to these, if these are matter. Now this is neither an element nor a combination of the elements, but the substance; but omitting this they speak only of matter. Therefore, if this is the cause of a thing’s being, and this is its substance, they will not be stating its substance. 712. Now this must be either eternal or corruptible without being in the process of corruption, and generated without being in the process of generation. But it has been demonstrated and made clear elsewhere (611) that no one produces a form, nor is it generated; but it is this particular thing which is produced and comes to be from these principles. 713. But whether the substances of corruptible things are separable or not is not yet clear. 714. It is evident, however, that this may not occur in the case of some things, i.e., in the case of all those that are incapable of existing apart from particular things, for exatnple, a house or a vessel. 715. Indeed, perhaps neither these particular things nor any of the others which are not produced by nature are substances. For at least one might hold that only the nature of corruptible things is substance. 716. For this reason the problem which confronted Antisthenes and other uninstructed people is applicable here, i.e., that one cannot define what a thing is (for according to them the definition is a lengthy statement), but one can say what it is like; for example, one cannot say what silver is, but one can say that it is like tin. Hence, of one kind of substance there can be a limit or definition, i.e., of the composite, whether it be sensible or intelligible. But this cannot be true of the primary parts of which it is composed, since the definitive concept designates something as determining something else, and one of these must have the character of matter and the other that of form. 717. Further, it is also clear that if numbers are in any sense substances, they are such in this way and not (as groups) of units, as some claim. For a definition is like a number and is divisible into indivisible parts, because definitions are not made up of an unlimited number of parts; and this is also true of numbers. 718. And just as when any part constituting a number is subtracted or added it is no longer the same number that remains but a different one, even though the minimum is subtracted or added, so too neither the definition nor the essence will any longer be the same when anything is subtracted or added. 719. And there must be something by reason of which a number is one thing, although they cannot say what makes it to be one thing; i.e., if it is one thing. For either it is not one thing but like a heap, or if it is one thing it is necessary to state what makes it to be one thing out of many. And a definition is one thing; but they are also unable to say what makes it to be one thing; and this follows as a natural consequence. For by the same argument substance is also one thing in the way we have explained, but not, as some claim, as being a kind of unit or point, but as an actuality and a kind of nature. 720. And just as number does not admit of more or less, neither does substance in the sense of form; but if this were the case [it would be that substance which is joined] to matter. 721. In regard to the generation and corruption of the foregoing substances, in what way this is possible and in what way it is impossible, and in regard to the likeness which they have to numbers, we have established these things this far. COMMENTARY 1703. Having investigated the principles of sensible substances~ and having shown that sensible substances are composed of matter and form, the Philosopher’s aim here is to establish the truth about the formal and material principles of things by investigating the points which must be considered about each. This is divided into two parts. In the first (708:C 1705), he investigates the things which must be considered about the formal principle. In the second (722:C 1729), he investigates the things which must be considered about the material principle (“Concerning material substances”). 1704. And since Plato was the one who devoted special treatment to the formal principle, therefore Aristotle deals with the formal principle in reference to those things which Plato posited. Now Plato claimed that species [i.e., separate Forms or Ideas] and numbers are the forms of things. Hence the first part is divided into two sections. In the first (708:C 1705), he deals with the formal principle in relation to the species [or Ideas]; and in the second (717:C 1722), in relation to numbers (“Further, it is also clear”). Now Plato held four things about forms in relation to the species [or Ideas]. The first of these is that specific names signify form alone and not form with matter. The second is that form is something besides the material parts. The third is that form can neither be generated nor corrupted. The fourth is that forms are separate from sensible things. The first part is divided into four sections inasmuch as Aristotle investigates the four points just mentioned. The second (711:C 1712) begins where he says “Accordingly, to those.” The third (712:C 1715) begins where he says “Now this must.” The fourth (713:C 1717) begins where he says “But whether.” 1705. In regard to the first he does three things. First (708) he raises a question. We must understand, he says, that for some men there is the problem whether a specific name signifies the composite substance or only the form or something having the status of actuality; for example, whether the word house signifies both matter and form together so that a house means a shelter made of bricks and stones properly arranged (for shelter is as form, and bricks and stones as matter), or whether this word signifies only the actuality or form, a shelter. 1706. Similarly, there is the problem whether the word line signifies twoness and length or twoness alone. He mentions this because the Platonists claimed that numbers are the forms of continuous quantities; for they said that a point is merely the number one having position, so that position is a sort of material principle, and the number one a formal principle. They likewise claimed that the number two is the form of a line, so that a line is merely twoness in length. Therefore the Philosopher asks whether the word line signifies twoness alone as form, or twoness grounded in length as form in matter. And again, there is the problem whether the word animal signifies a soul in a body as a form in matter, or only a soul, which is the form of an organic body. 1707. Now animal will also apply (709). He shows what follows if one says that specific names are used in both senses, so that they sometimes signify form alone and sometimes form in matter. And the result is that animal will be taken of either in either meaning, not univocally, as though it were predicated with one meaning, but analogically, as happens in the case of those things which have one name because they are related to one thing. For the specific name will be predicated of the composite only by reason of relationship to that which is predicated according to form alone, as the Platonists held. For they maintained that man, who is a composite of matter and form, is so named because he participates in the Idea man, which is only a form. 1708. These distinctions (710). Then the Philosopher shows the result to which the aforesaid search leads. He says that, while the question whether a specific name signifies the composite substance or only the form, (+) makes a difference in regard to something else, (~) it makes no difference to the investigation of sensible substance. For it is evident that a sensible substance is composed of matter and form. 1709. (+) Now to what kind of thing it makes a difference, whether to those in this state or in another, he makes clear next. For it is obvious that if there is something which is only form or actuality, its essence “consists of this,” i.e., the thing and its essence will be identical, as a soul is identical with its essence, or is its own quiddity. But if a thing is composed of matter and form, then in this case the thing itself and its essence will not be the same; for example, a man and the essence of a man are not the same, unless perhaps a man is said to be only a soul, as was held by those who say that specific names signify only the form. Thus it is evident that something does exist whose essence is the same as itself, namely, whatever is not composed of matter and form but is only a form . 1710. The reason for this position is that essence is what the definition signifies, and the definition signifies the nature of the species. But if there is something which is composed of matter and form, then in that thing there must be some other principle besides the nature of the species. For since matter is the principle of individuation, then in anything composed of matter and form there must be certain individuating principles distinct from the nature of the species. Hence such a thing is not just its own essence but is something in addition to this. But if such a thing exists which is only a form, it will have no individuating principles in addition to the nature of its species . For a form that exists of itself is individuated of itself. Therefore this thing is nothing else than its own essence. 1711. It is clear, then, that if the specific name signifies only the form , the essence of anything will be (+) the same as its being, as a man will be his essence, and a horse its essence, and so also will all other things of this kind. But if specific names signify things composed of matter and form, then such things will (~) not be the same as their essence. 1712. Accordingly, to those who (711). Here he deals with the second point mentioned above, namely, that the form is something in addition to the material parts. He says that for the Platonists, in raising this question, it does not seem that a syllable consists of its elements and their combination, as if combination, which is the form of a syllable, were a material part of a syllable like its elements or letters. Nor does it seem to them that a house consists of stones and their combination, as if a house were constituted of these as material parts. 1713. And on this point their remarks are true, because, if the form were one of the material parts, it would depend on matter. But we see that this is false; for combination or mixture, which are formal principles, are not constituted of those things which are combined or mixed; nor is any other formal principle constituted of its matter, but the reverse. For a threshold is constituted by position, which is its form, and not the reverse. 1714. Therefore, if one holds that animal and two-footed are the matter of man, man will not be animal and two-footed but will be something else in addition to these. And this will not be an element or anything composed of the elements but will be only a form as the Platonists claim, who omit matter from definitions. But it seems that we must hold, in opposition to this position, that, if form alone apart from matter is the substance or principle of being of a thing, they will not be able to say that this particular thing is that separate substance; i.e., they will not be able to say that this man as a sensible entity is composed of matter and form, but that man is only a form 1715. Now this must (712). He considers the third point mentioned above, namely, the Platonists’ position that forms are eternal and Incorruptible. Hence he concludes, from what has been said, that either a form must be eternal, as the Platonists held when they claimed that the Ideas, which they called the forms of things, are eternal; or a form must be corruptible by reason of something else without being corrupted in itself, and similarly it must come to be by reason of something else without coming to be in itself. This is in agreement with the position of Aristotle, who does not hold that forms are separate but that they exist in matter. 1716. Further, the statement that forms can neither be corrupted nor generated in themselves (710-12:C 1708-15), on which each of the aforesaid points depends, Aristotle proceeds to demonstrate by reason of what was shown above, namely, that no one makes or produces a form, nor is a form generated or produced in itself; but it is this particular thing which comes to be or is generated in itself. And the reason is that everything which comes to be comes to be from matter. Hence, since this particular thing is composed of matter and form, it comes to be or is generated “from these principles,” i.e., from its material and individuating principles. But it was stated above (71I:C 1714) that a form is not an element or anything composed of the elements. Therefore it follows that a form neither comes to he nor is generated in itself. 1717. But whether the substances (713). He examines the fourth point given above, namely, Plato’s position that forms are separate from matter. In regard to this he does three things. First, he exposes what the problem is in this position, saying that it is not clear whether “the substances,” i.e., the forms, of corruptible things are separable as the Platonists claimed. 1718. It is evident, however (714). Second, he indicates what seems to be evident on this point. He says that it is evident that the forms of some corruptible things are not separate, namely, “all those” which are incapable of existing apart from their matters, as house or vessel, because neither the form of a house nor that of a vessel can exist apart from its proper matter. 1719. Indeed, perhaps (715). Third, he precludes an objection, saying that perhaps the forms of artifacts are not substances or anything in their own right, and so cannot have separate existence. Nor similarly can other artificial forms, which have no natural existence, because in artifacts the matter alone is held to be substance, whereas the forms of artifacts are accidents. Natural forms, however, belong to the class of substance; and this is why Plato did not hold that the forms of artifacts exist apart from matter but only substantial forms. 1720. For this reason (716). He advances arguments that are clearly opposed to Plato’s position. He says that if one holds that there are separate forms, as the Platonists maintained, the problem which the followers of Antisthenes raised, even though they seem to be uninstructed, may be used against the Platonists. For they argued that it is impossible to define a thing by means of a definition which signifies its quiddity, since a thing’s quiddity is simple and is not fittingly expressed by a statement composed of many parts. For we see that “the limit,” or definition, which is given to a thing, is a lengthy statement made up of many words. Therefore it does not signify what a thing is but “what it is like,” i.e., something to which it is similar; as if one were to say that the definition of silver does not signify silver but signifies something like lead or tin. 1721. Hence in order to solve this problem we must say that the substance which is defined, whether it be intellectual or sensible, must be one that is composite. But since the primary parts of which a definition is composed are simple, they are incapable of definition. For it was stated above (706:C 1700) that the definitive statement joins one part to another, one of which is as form and the other as matter, because genus is derived from matter and difference from form, as was pointed out above (704:C 1696-8). Hence, if the species of things were forms only, as the Platonists held, they would be indefinable. 1722. Further, it is also clear (717). Having determined what is true of forms in relation to the Ideas introduced by Plato, Aristotle now ‘determines what is true of forms in relation to numbers. For Plato held that numbers are the forms and substances of things by establishing a kind of likeness between forms and numbers. This is divided into four parts inasmuch as there are four ways in which he likens forms to numbers. First, he says that, if numbers are in any sense the substances or forms of things, it is evident that they are such in this way, as can be understood from the foregoing, but not as numbers of units as the Platonists said. Now a number of units is called a simple and absolute number [i.e., an ab9tract number], but the number applied to things is called a concrete number, as four dogs or four men; and in this way the substances of things, which are Signified by a definition, can be called numbers. For a definition is divisible into two parts, one of which is as form and the other as matter, as was pointed out above (706:C 1700). And it is divisible into indivisible parts; for since definitions cannot proceed to infinity, the division of a definition must terminate in certain indivisible parts. For example, if the definition of man is divided into animal and rational, and the definition of animal into animated and sensible, this will not go on to infinity. For it is impossible to have an infinite regress in material and formal causes, as was shown in Book II (152:C 299). Hence he explains that the division of a definition is not like the division of a continuous quantity, which is divisible to infinity, but is like the division of a number, which is divisible into indivisible parts. 1723. And just as when (718). He gives the second way in which the substance that the definition signifies is like number. He says that, if anything is added to or subtracted from any number, even if it is a bare minimum, the resulting number will not be specifically the same. For in the case of numbers the minimum is the number one, which, when added to the number three, gives rise to the number four, which is a specifically different number; but if it is subtracted from the same number, the number two remains, which is also a specifically different number. And this is true because the ultimate difference gives to a number its species. 1724. And it is similar in the case of definitions and of the essence, which the definition signifies; because, howsoever small a part has been added or subtracted, there results another definition and another specific nature. For animated sensible substance alone is the definition of animal, but if you also add rational to this, you establish the species man. And in a similar way if you subtract sensible, you establish the species plant, because the ultimate difference also determines the species. 1725. And there must be (719). He gives the third way in which forms are like numbers. He says that a number is one thing. For a number is an essential unity inasmuch as the ultimate unity gives to a number its species and unity, just as in things composed of matter and form a thing is one and derives its unity and species from its form. And for this reason those who speak about the unity of a number as though a number were not essentially one cannot say what makes it to be one thing, i.e., if it is one. For since a number is composed of many units, either it is not one thing in an absolute sense but its units are joined together in the manner of a heap, which does not constitute a unity in an absolute sense, and therefore not a being in any class of things (and thus number would not be a class of being); or if it is one thing in an absolute sense and a being in itself, it is still necessary to explain what makes it one thing out of a plurality of units. But they are unable to assign a reason for this. 1726. Similarly, a definition is one thing essentially, and thus they do not have to assign anything which makes it one. This is understandable, because the substance which the definition signifies is one thing for the very same reason that a number is, i.e., essentially, because one part of it is related to the other as form [to matter]. And it is one, not as being something indivisible such as a unit and a point, as some men claimed, but because each of them is one form and a kind of nature. 1727. And just as number (720). He gives the fourth way in which forms are like numbers. He says that just as a number does not admit of (~) more or less, neither does substance in the sense of form, although perhaps substance in the sense of matter does admit of such difference. For just as the concept of number consists in some limit to which neither addition nor subtraction may be made, as has been pointed out (1723), so also does the concept of form. But things admit of (+) more or less because of the fact that matter participates in a form in a more or less perfect way. Hence too whiteness does not differ in terms of more or less, but a white thing does. 1728. In regard to the generation (721). He summarizes the points discussed. He says that he has dealt with “the generation and corruption of such substances,” or forms, both as to the way in which this is possible, namely, by reason of something else; and as to the way in which this is impossible, i.e., essentially; and also with the likeness which forms have to numbers, i.e., by reducing them to numbers by way of a likeness. LESSON 4 What We Must Know about Matter. How Matter Is Found in All Things ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 4 & 5: 1044a 15-1045a 722. Concerning material substance we must not remain ignorant of the fact that, even though all things come from the same first [principle] or from the same [principles] or first [causes], and even though the same matter is the first principle of things which come to be, still there is some proper matter of each thing; for example, the first matter of phlegm is the sweet or the fat, but of bile the bitter or something else. But perhaps these come from the same matter. 723. Further, there are several matters of the same thing when one comes from another, as phlegm comes from the fat and the sweet, if the fat comes from the sweet. And something comes from bile by dissolving bile into its first matter. For one thing comes from another in two ways: either because it is prior to the other [in the process of development] or because it comes from the dissolving of a thing into its first principle. 724. Now when there is one matter it is possible for different things to come into being by virtue of the cause of motion, as a chest and a bed come from wood. But of certain things the matter is necessarily different when the things are different; e.g., a saw cannot be made from wood, and it is not within the power of the cause of motion to do this; for he is incapable of making a saw from wool or from wood. But if the same thing can be made from different matters, it is clear that the art and the principle which acts as a mover are the same. For if both the matter and the cause of motion are different, so also will be the thing that is made. 725. Hence, when one asks what the cause of anything is, it is necessary to mention all the causes concerned, since causes are spoken of in several senses. For example, What is a man’s material cause? The menstrual fluid. What is his moving cause? The seed. What is his formal cause? His essence. What is his final cause? His end. But perhaps both of these are the same. 726. It is necessary also to give the proximate causes. What is the matter of man? Not earth or fire, but his proper matter. 727. Indeed, concerning natural substances which are generable it is necessary to proceed in this way, if one is to proceed correctly, granted that these are the causes, that they are of this number, and that it is necessary to know the causes. 728. In the case of natural substances which are eternal there is another procedure. Perhaps some of them do not have matter or do not have this kind of matter but only that which is subjected to change of place. 729. Thus all those things which are by nature but are not substances do not have matter, but the underlying subject is their substance. For example, What is the matter of an eclipse? There is none, but it is the moon that is the patient. What is the efficient cause destroying the light? The earth. What is the final cause? Perhaps there is none. What is the formal cause? The definition. But this will not be clear if it does not include the [efficient] cause. For example, What is an eclipse? A privation of light. And if one adds, as a result of the earth intervening, this definition is one which includes the [efficient] cause. However, in the case of sleep it is not clear what the primary subject is, although it is clear that the animal is also a primary subject. But it is such in a qualified sense. And what is the primary subject, the heart or some other part? Then, by what [is this modification produced]? And what is this modification which pertains to that [part] and not to the whole? Is this a special kind of immobility? It is, but it belongs [to the animal] by reason of some primary subject. Chapter 5 730. But since some things are and are not, without generation and corruption, such as points, if they do in fact exist, and in general the forms and specifying principles of things, then all contraries do not come from each other. For whiteness does not come to be but white wood does; and everything which comes to be comes from something and becomes something. And white man comes from black man and white from black in different ways. Nor do all things have matter but only those which may be generated and changed into each other. There is no matter in those things which are and are not without undergoing change. 731. Again, there is the problem how the matter of each thing is related to contraries. For example, if the body is potentially healthy and the opposite of health is disease, is the body potentially both? And is water potentially wine and vinegar? Or is it related to one as matter to its form or actuality, and to the other as the privation and natural corruption [of its form or actuality] ? 732. Now this raises the problem why wine is not the matter of vinegar, even though vinegar comes from it, and why the living is not the potentially dead; or whether this is not the case, but the corruptions of these occur in virtue of something else. As a matter of fact the matter of a living body is by corruption the potency and matter of a dead body, and water is the matter of vinegar; for they come from each other as night comes from day. Hence whatever things are changed into each other in this way must return to their matter. For example, if a living body is to come from a dead one [the latter must return] to its first matter, and then a living body comes into being. And vinegar [must return] to water, and then wine comes into being. COMMENTARY 1729. Having treated those points which had to be considered about the formal principle of substance, Aristotle now establishes what is true regarding the material principle. This is divided into three parts. First (7:22:C 1729), he deals with the material principle in relation to the things which come from matter; second (724:C 1733), in relation to the other causes (“Now when there is one matter”); and third (730:C 1746), in relation to the change of generation and corruption, whose subject is matter (“But since some things”). In regard to the first he does two things. First (722), he shows whether there is one or several kinds of matter that there are several matters of the for all things. And in regard to the material principle he says that one must not remain ignorant of the fact that, even though all things come from the same first material principle, namely, first matter, which has no form of its own, or from the same material principles “or first [causes],” (which is added because of the four elements, the material principles common to all generable and corruptible things), and even though the same matter is “the first principle of things which come to be,” (which he adds because of the fact that matter is not only a principle of being but also of coming-to-be), i.e., even though first matter and the elements are universally related to things composed of the elements, there is still some proper matter of each thing. For example, the proper matter of phlegm (not in an absolute sense but generically) is the fat and the sweet, since these have a certain relationship to phlegm by reason of their moistness. But the first matter of bile is bitter things or certain others of this kind; for in bitter things heat seems to have absolute dominion over moistness even to the extent of destroying it. Thus by reason of dryness and warmth the bitter has a relationship to bile. But perhaps these two matters, namely, the bitter and the sweet, come from some prior material principle. He adds “perhaps” because certain things have different matters, since their matters are not reducible to any prior matter, for example corruptible and incorruptible bodies. 1730. From the things which are said here then it is evident that there is one first matter for all generable and corruptible things, but different proper matters for different things. 1731. Further, there are several matters (723). Second, he points out how in an opposite sense there are several matters for one and the same thing. He says that there are several matters of the same thing when one of these is the matter of another, as the matter of phlegm is the fat and the sweet, if the fat comes from the sweet. For the savor of fat is reckoned among the intermediate savors, and these are produced from extremes, which are the sweet and the bitter. But the fat is nearest to the sweet. Now in these examples we must bear in mind that he takes as the matter of each thing that from which the thing comes to be, even though it is not permanent but transitory. 1732. Therefore, lest someone should think that a thing is always said to come from a material principle, and not the reverse, he adds that something is also said to come from bile by the dissolution of bile into its first matter, and in reverse order bile is said to come from first matter. For one thing is said to come from another in two ways: either because the thing from which it comes is naturally its starting point in the process of generation (for this kind of thing is a material principle); or because the process of coming-to-be is the dissolving of a thing into its material principle, namely, in the sense that a material principle is said to come from a composite by dissolution. For a mixed body comes from the elements by the process of composition, whereas the elements come from a mixed body by the process of dissolution. 1733. Now when there is one matter (724). He establishes what is true of matter in relation to the other causes. First, in relation to the agent cause alone, which produces something from matter; and this relationship pertains to matter according as it is a principle of coming-to-be. Second (725:C 1737), in relation to all the causes, according as matter constitutes a principle of knowing (“Hence, when one asks”). But since he had said above (722:C 1729) that there was one first matter of all things, one can inquire how a diversity of things could come from one common matter. For the ancient Philosophers of nature attributed this to chance when they disregarded the agent cause and claimed that the diversity of things comes from one matter by a process of rarefaction and condensation. 1734. Therefore in rejecting this the Philosopher says, first (724), that when there is one matter it is possible for different things to come into being by reason of the cause of motion, either because there are different causes of motion, or because one and the same cause of motion is disposed in a different way for producing different effects. This is most evident in the case of things made by art. For we see that a chest and a bed are made from wood by one craftsman in virtue of the different art-forms which he himself possesses. 1735. But even though there is a first matter common to all things, nevertheless the proper matters of different things are different. Therefore, lest someone should attribute the diversity of things in their entirety to the cause of motion and in no way to the material principle, he adds that in some of the things that are different the matter is necessarily different, namely, the proper matter. For not anything at all is naturally disposed to come into being from any matter, as a saw does not come from wood. Nor is it within the power of the craftsman to bring this about; for he never assigns one matter to each work, because he is unable to make a saw either from wood or from wool, which, on account of their softness, are not suitable for the work of a saw, which is to cut. 1736. It is evident, then, that the diversity of things is a result of the efficient cause and of matter. Hence, if it is fitting that something specifically the same should be produced from a different matter, as a bowl from gold and from silver, it is obvious that the efficient principle, i.e., the art, must be the same. For if both the matter and the cause of motion were different, the thing produced would have to be different. 1737. Hence, when one asks (725). He deals with matter in relation to the other causes according as matter is a principle of knowing. In regard to this he does two things. First (725), he shows that in the case of generable and corruptible things we must assign matter along with the other causes. Second (728:C 1740), he shows how matter is found in natural substances which are eternal (“In the case of natural substances”). Third (729:C 1743), he explains how matter is ascribed to accidents (“Thus all those things”). In regard to the first he does three things. For, first (725), since the ancient philosophers of nature assigned only the material cause, he says that when one asks what the cause of anything is, it is necessary to state all the causes “concerned,” i.e., all which contribute to the being of the thing in question, since causes are spoken of in several senses. For not all things have all the causes, although natural beings, and especially generable and corruptible ones, have all the causes. For example, in the generation of man his material cause is the menstrual fluid; his active cause is the seed, in which the active power is contained; his formal cause is his essence, which is signified by the definition; and his final cause is his end [or goal]. But perhaps these two causes, namely, the end and the form, are numerically the same. He says this because in some things they are the same and in some not. For the goal of a man’s generation is his soul, whereas the goal of his operations is happiness. 1738. It is necessary also (726). Second, he shows that it is not only necessary to assign all the causes but also to state the proximate causes, so that by beginning with the first causes we may reach the proximate ones. For the knowledge had of a thing through first causes is only a general and incomplete knowledge, whereas that had of a thing through proximate causes is a complete knowledge. For example, if one asks about the material cause of man, one should not assign as his cause fire or earth, which are the common matter of all generable and corruptible things, but should state his proper matter, such as flesh and bones and the like. 1739. Indeed, concerning natural substances (727). Third, he summarizes the foregoing. He says that it is necessary to proceed thus in regard to natural and generable substances if one is to consider the causes correctly, giving all the causes including the proximate ones. This is necessary in view of the fact that the causes are of this number, as has been explained (725:C 1737). And it is necessary to grasp the causes of a thing in order that it may be known scientifically, because science is a knowledge of the cause. 1740. In the case of natural substances (728). He shows how there is matter in natural substances which are eternal, namely, in the celestial bodies. He says that the matter in natural substances which are eternal, namely, in the celestial bodies, is not the same as that in bodies subject to generation and corruption. For perhaps such substances do not have matter, or if they do have matter, they do not have the sort that generable and corruptible bodies have, but only that which is subjected to local motion. 1741. For, as was said above (725:C 1737), in the case of generable and corruptible things generation and corruption bring us to a knowledge of matter; because in the process of generation and corruption there must be one subject common to both privation and form. Hence, since in a celestial body there is no potentiality for privation of form but only for different places, it does not have a matter which is in potentiality to form and privation but one which is in potentiality to different places. 1742. However, a body is related to place not as matter to form but rather as subject to accident. And although in one respect a subject is related to an accident as matter is to form, still a subject is not to be identified with matter, as is stated below (729:C 1743). Thus a celestial body as such does not have matter in any way, if subject does not imply matter; or it has matter as regards place, if subject implies matter. Matter 1743. Thus all those (729). He shows how matter is ascribed to accidents . He says that those things which exist by nature yet are not substances but accidents, (~) do not have a matter from which they come to be, but (+) they have a subject , which is the substance. Now a subject bears some likeness to matter inasmuch as it is receptive of an accident. But it differs from matter in this respect, that while matter has actual being only through form, a subject is not constituted in being by an accident. 1744. Therefore, if one asks what is the cause of an eclipse, one cannot give its (~) matter , but the moon is the (+) subject undergoing this modification. And the efficient cause which extinguishes the light is the earth placed directly between the sun and the moon. But perhaps it is impossible to give the final cause; for those things which pertain to defect do not exist because of some end but are rather a result of natural necessity or of the necessity of the efficient cause. However, he says “perhaps” because an investigation of the causes of particular events which take place in celestial movements is especially difficult. And the formal cause of an eclipse is its definition. But this definition is not clear unless the [efficient] cause is given therein. Thus the definition of a lunar eclipse is the privation of light in the moon. But if one adds that this privation is caused by the earth being placed directly between the sun and the moon, this definition will contain the [efficient] cause. 1745. This is evident also in regard to the accident sleep. But in the case of sleep it is not clear what the primary subject is that undergoes this modification, although it is clear that the animal is the subject of sleep. However, it is not clear to what part of the animal sleep primarily belongs-whether to the heart or some other part; for some men hold that the primary organ of sensation is the brain and some the heart. However, sleep is the cessation of sensory operation. Then, having come to an agreement on the subject of sleep, it is necessary to consider from what, as its efficient cause, sleep comes—whether from the evaporation of food or physical labor or something of this kind. Next we must consider what modification sleep is, [defining] its primary subject, which will be some part of the animal and not the whole animal. For sleep is a kind of immobility. But it belongs primarily to an animal by reason of some part which is the subject of such a modification. Now in the definition of sleep we must state this primary subject, just as in the definition of every accident we must state its primary and proper subject. For color is defined by surface but not by body. 1746. But since some things (730). He deals with matter in relation to the process whereby one thing is changed into something else. Therefore, first (730), he shows how change comes about in different ways in different things. Second (731:C 1748), he proposes certain problems (“Again, there is the problem”). He says, first (730), that certain things sometimes are and sometimes are not but “without generation and corruption,” i.e., without being gencrated and corrupted in themselves, for example, points and all specifying principles and forms generally, whether substantial or accidental. For properly speaking, white does not come to be, but white wood does; for everything which comes to be comes “from something,” i.e., from matter, and comes to be that in which the process of coming to be is terminated, which is form. Thus everything which comes to be is composed of matter and form. Hence those things which are forms only cannot come to be in themselves. Therefore, when it is said that contraries come to be from each other, this has one meaning in the case of composite things and another in the case of simple things. For white man comes from black man in a different way than white from black, because white man signifies a composite and can therefore come to be in itself. But white signifies a form only, and therefore it comes to be from black only by reason of something else. 1747. From the above, then, it is clear that matter does not exist in everything but only in those things which are generated or transformed essentially into each other. However, those things which sometimes are and sometimes are not, without being changed essentially, are such that their matter is not that from which they come, but they have as their matter the subject in which they exist. 1748. Again, there is the problem (731). He raises two questions in regard to the above. The first of these pertains to the way in which matter is related to contraries, namely, whether in all things which seem to have contrariety or opposition matter is in potentiality to each contrary equally and in the same order. For health is a certain equality of humors, whereas disease is their inequality. But both inequality and equality are related to their subject in the same order. Therefore it seems that water, which is the matter of humors, is in potentiality to wine and vinegar as contraries, and is disposed equally to both. 1749. But in solving this problem the Philosopher says that this is not true. For the form of wine is a certain positive state and nature, whereas the form of vinegar is the privation and corruption of wine. Hence matter is disposed first to wine as a positive state and form, but to vinegar as the privation and corruption of wine. And thus it is related to vinegar only through the medium of wine. 1750. Now this raises the problem (732). He proposes a second problem, which is as follows. That from which a thing comes to be seems to be the matter of that thing; for example, mixed bodies come to be from the elements, which constitute their matter. Therefore, since vinegar comes from wine and a dead body from a living one, the problem arises why wine is not the matter of vinegar and a living body the matter of a dead one, since one is related to the other as potentiality is to actuality. 1751. But the answer to this is that vinegar is the corruption of wine itself, and a dead body the corruption of a living one. Hence vinegar does not come from wine as matter, or a dead body from a living one; but one is said to come from the other in virtue of something else inasmuch as it comes from its matter. Hence the matter of a bowl is not a goblet but silver. Similarly, a living body is not the matter of a dead body, but the elements are. 1752. But because a dead body is said to come from a living one or vinegar from wine, this preposition from will signify order if reference is made to the form itself of wine or living body; for in the same matter after the form of wine there is vinegar, and after the form of a living body there is a dead one. An(] it is in this way that we say that night comes from day. Therefore, in all things that come from each other in this way, as vinegar from wine and a dead body from a living one, the process of change is reversed only when these things are dissolved into their matter. For example, if a living body must come from a dead one, the latter must first be dissolved into its primary matter inasmuch as a dead body is dissolved into the elements; and from the elements again in due order a living body is constituted. It is the same in regard to vinegar and wine. 1753. The reason for this is that, whenever matter is disposed to different forms in a certain order, it cannot be brought back from a subsequent state to one that is prior in that order. For example, in the generation of an animal, blood comes from food; and the semen and menstrual fluid, from which the animal is generated, come from blood. But this order cannot be reversed so that blood comes from semen and food from blood, unless these are resolved into their first matter; because for each thing there is a definite mode of generation. And it is the same [in the other case], because the matter of wine is related to vinegar only through the medium of wine, namely, inasmuch as it is the corruption of wine. The same is also true of a dead body and a living one, of a blind man and one who has sight, and so on. Therefore from such privations there can be a return to a prior form only when such things are dissolved into first matter. 1754. However, if there is some privation to which matter is immediately disposed, and this signifies nothing else than the non-existence of form in matter which lacks a disposition for form, then the process of reverting from such a privation to a [prior] form, as from darkness to illumination, will be possible because this [i.e., darkness] is nothing else than the absence of light in the transparent medium. LESSON 5 Why Definitions and Matters Are Unities. The Union of Matter and Form ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1045a 7-1045b 23 733. It seems that we must discuss next the problem which was mentioned with regard to definitions and numbers: what it is that causes them to be one. For all things which have several parts, and of which the whole is not a kind of heap but is something over and above the parts, have some cause that makes them one. For in some bodies contact is the cause of their unity, and in others stickiness or some other such quality. But a definition is one intelligible structure not by the connection of its parts, like the Iliad , but by being one thing. What is it, then, that makes man to be one; and why is he one thing and not many, for example, animal and two-footed? 734. And if, in a different way, as some claim, there is an animal-itself and a two-footed-itself, why is man not these two things? And if this were the case, men would not be such by participating in man, i.e., by participating in one thing, but in two, namely, in animal and two-footed. Hence in general man will not be one thing but many, i.e., animal and two-footed. 735. It is evident, then, that those who accept this position and discuss and define things in the way they have been accustomed to do, cannot find an answer or solution to this problem. But if (as we say) one part is as matter and the other as form, or one is in potency and the other in act, the problem with which we are dealing will no longer appear to be a difficulty. 736. For this problem is just the same as we should have if the definition of cloak were round bronze. Now let us suppose that this term is the sign of this definition. Then when one asks what causes round and bronze to be one thing, there will no longer be a problem, because one is as matter and the other as form. What is it, then, apart from the efficient cause, that causes the potential to become actual in the case of things which are generated? For there is no other cause of the potential sphere being an actual sphere; but this was the essence of each. 737. Further, some matter is intelligible and some sensible. And one part of a definition is always as matter and the other as actuality; for example, a circle is a plane figure. 738. But each of those things which do not have matter, either intelligible or sensible, is at once one thing, just as it is a being: a particular thing, a quality, or a quantity; and for this reason neither being nor unity is expressed in their definitions. And their essence is at once one thing just as it is also a being. For this reason there is not some other cause of each of these being one or of being something; for each is at once a being and a unity, not as belonging to the class of being or unity, nor because these distinctions exist separately from singular things. 739. And it is because of this difficulty that some men speak of participation, and raise the question as to what causes participation and what it is to participate. For some speak of the coexistence of the soul, as Lycophron, who says that knowledge is the coexistence of the act of knowing and the soul; and others say that life is the composition or connection of soul with body. 740. The same argument applies in all cases. For being healthy will be either the coexistence or conjunction or composition of soul and health; and being a bronze triangle will be the composition of bronze and triangle; and being white will be the composition of surface and whiteness. 741. Now the reason for this position is that these thinkers are looking for some unifying principle and difference of potentiality and actuality. But, as we have pointed out (736), both the ultimate matter and form are the same, one potentially and the other actually. Hence to ask what the cause of their unity is, is the same as to ask what makes them one; for each particular thing is a unity, and what is potential and what is actual are in a sense one thing. Hence there is no other cause except that which causes motion from potentiality to actuality. And all those things which do not have matter are simply one. COMMENTARY 1755. Having dealt with the material and formal principles, Aristotle now intends to settle the question about the way in which they are united to each other; and in regard to this he does three things. First (733:C 1755), he raises the question. Second (735:C 1758), he answers it (“It is evident”). Third (739:C 1765), he rejects the false opinions about this question (“And it is because”). In regard to the first, he gives two reasons for saying that this question involves a difficulty. He says (733) that, in regard to the question which was touched on above about definitions and numbers as to what makes each of them one, it must be noted that all things which have several parts (and of which the whole is not merely a heap of parts but is something constituted of parts and is over and above the parts themselves) have something that makes them one. For in some bodies which have unity in this way, contact is the cause of their unity, and in others stickiness or something else of this kind. 1756. Now it is evident that, while a defining concept is one thing composed of many parts, it is not one thing merely by the addition of its parts, “like the Iliad ,” i.e., the poem written about the history of the Trojans, which is one thing only by way of aggregation. But a definition is one thing in an absolute sense, for it signifies one thing. It is reasonable, then, to ask what makes both the definition of man to be one thing, and man himself, whose intelligible structure is the definition. For since man is animal and two-footed, and these seem to be two things, it is reasonable to ask why man is one thing and not many. 1757. And if, in a different way (734). Then he gives the reason why this question is a problem. For if what some men claim is true, i.e., if animal itself is a particular thing which exists of itself and is separate, and the same is true of two-footed, as the Platonists held, then it is reasonable to ask why man is not these two things connected together, so that particular men are such only by participating in man, and not by participating in one thing but in two, animal and two-footed. And according to this man will not be one thing but two, namely, animal and two-footed. 1758. It is evident (735). He solves the above problem; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he offers an explanation that seems to provide a solution to the problem. He says that, if some men accept the things which have been said about Plato’s position, and change the natures of things in this way because they hold that universals are separate as the Platonists were accustomed to define and speak of them, it will evidently be impossible to give the cause of a man’s unity or solve the foregoing problem. But if, as is stated above (706:C 1700), one holds that in definitions one part is as matter and the other as form, i.e., one as potentiality and the other as actuality, then it will be easy to solve the question, because there does not seem to be a problem. 1759. For this problem (736). Second, he solves this problem in the aforesaid way. First, he solves it in the case of natural substances which are generated and corrupted. He says that this problem would be the same as if we were to ask why bronze is round. For let us assume that the definition of the term cloak is round bronze, and that this term signifies this definition. Then when one asks why the definition round bronze is one, there does not seem to be any problem, because bronze is as matter and round as form. For there is no other cause of these being one except that which makes what is in potency to become actual. And in everything in which there is generation this is the agent. Hence, since this (what is in potentiality to become actual) is the essence signified by the definition, then in the case of things subject to generation and corruption it is evidently the agent which causes the definition of the essence to be one. 1760. Further, some matter (737). Then he solves the above problem in regard to the objects of mathematics . He says that matter is of two kinds, sensible and intelligible. Sensible matter is what pertains to the sensible qualities, hot and cold, rare and dense and the like; and with this matter natural bodies are concreted. Now the objects of mathematics abstract from this kind of matter. But intelligible matter means what is understood without sensible qualities or differences, for example, what is continuous. And the objects of mathematics do not abstract from this kind of matter. 1761. Hence, whether in the case of sensible things or in that of the objects of mathematics, their definitions must always contain something as matter and something as form; for example, in the definition of a mathematical circle, a circle is a plane figure, plane is as matter and figure as form . For a mathematical definition and a natural definition are each one thing on the same grounds (even though there is no agent in the realm of mathematical entities as there is in the realm of natural entities), because in both cases one part of the definition is as matter and the other as form. 1762. He solves the above problem in regard to the things that are wholly separate from matter . He says that in the case of all those things which do not have intelligible matter, as the objects of mathematics have, or sensible matter, as natural bodies have, that is to say, in the case of the separate substances, each one of these is at once one thing [individuated by form]. For each of those things which have matter is not at once one thing, but they are one because unity comes to their matter. But if there is anything that is only a form, it is at once one thing, because it is impossible to posit in it anything prior in any order whatever that must await unity from a form. 1763. He gives this example: the ten categories do not derive being by adding something to being in the way that species are established by adding differences to genera, but each is itself a being. And since this is true, it is evident that being does not await something to be added to it so that it may become one of these, i.e., either a substance or quantity or quality; but each of these from the very beginning is at once either a substance or quantity or quality. This is the reason why neither unity nor being is given as a genus in definitions, because unity and being would have to be related as matter to differences, through the addition of which being would become either substance or quality. 1764. Similarly, that which is wholly separate from matter and is its own essence, as was stated above (1708), is at once one thing, just as it is a being; for it contains no matter that awaits a form from which it will derive being and unity. In the case of such things, then, there is no cause that makes them one by means of motion. However, some of them have a cause which supports their substances without their substances being moved [separate simple substances depend on God for existence], and not as in the case of things subject to generation, which come to be through motion. For each of them is at once a particular being and a one, but not so that being and unity are certain genera or that they exist as individuals apart from singular things, as the Platonists held. 1765. And it is because (739). Then he rejects the false opinion which some men held about this question; and in regard to this he. does three things. First, he states their position. He says that it is because of this problem that some, namely, the Platonists, posited participation, by which inferior beings participate in superior ones; for example, this particular man participates in man, and man in animal and two-footed. And they asked what the cause of participation is and what it is to participate, in order that it might become clear to them why this thing which I call two-footed animal is one thing. And others held that the cause of a man’s unity is a certain consubstantiality or coexistence of the soul with the body, as if soul’s being with body were signified in the abstract; as if we were to speak of animation as Lycophron said that knowledge is a mean between the soul and the act of knowing; and others said that life itself is the mean whereby soul is joined to body. 1766. The same argument (740). He rejects these positions. He says that if the statement made about the soul and the body is correct, i.e., that there is some mean uniting them, the same argument will apply in all things which are related as form and matter. For, according to this, being healthy will be a mean as a kind of consubstantiality or a kind of connection or bond between the soul, by which the animal subsists, and health. And being a triangle will be a mean combining figure and triangle. And being white will be a mean by which whiteness is connected with surface. This is obviously false. Hence it will be false that animation is a mean by which the soul is joined to the body, since animation means merely being ensouled. 1767. Now the reason (740). He gives the reasons for the error in the above positions. He says that the reason why these thinkers held such views is that they sought for some principle which makes potentiality and actuality one thing, and looked for the differences of these as though it were necessary for them to be brought together by some one mean like things which are actual and diverse. But, as has been stated, both the ultimate matter, which is appropriated to a form, and the form itself are the same; for one of them is as potentiality and the other as actuality. Hence to ask what causes a thing is the same as to ask what causes it to be one, because each thing is one to the extent that it is a being. And potentiality and actuality are also one in a certain respect, for it is the potential that becomes actual; and thus it is not necessary for them to be united by some bond like those things which are completely different. Hence there is no other cause that produces the unity of things which are composed of matter and form except that cause which moves things from potentiality to actuality. But those things which simply do not have matter are some one thing of themselves just as they are something existing. These explanations will suffice for Book VIII.",
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        "text": "Postquam determinavit Philosophus in septimo de substantia modo logico, considerando scilicet definitionem et partes definitionis, et alia hujusmodi quæ secundum rationem considerantur; in hoc libro octavo intendit de sensibilibus substantiis determinare per propria principia, applicando ea quæ superius inquisita sunt logice, ad substantias illas. Et dividitur in duas partes. In prima continuat se ad pracedentia. In secunda pro-sequitur suam intentionem, ibi, « Sensibiles autem substantiae omnes materiam habent. » Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit in generali suam intentionem. Secundo repetit quædam quæ dicta sunt, ibi, « Dictum est autem. » Tertio ponit continuationem dictorum ad dicenda, ibi, « Quoniam autem quod quid erat esse substantia, » Dicit ergo primo quod, cum multa dicta sint in septimo logica consideratione circa substantiam, oportet syllogizare ex his quæ dicta sunt, ut applicentur quæ secundum considerationem logicam dicta sunt, ad res naturales existentes. Et oportet « colligentes ea, » idest summarie et recapitulatim recolligentes quæ dicta sunt, imponere finem complendo tractatum de substantia: quod fiet tractando ea quæ superius tractatis desunt.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « dictum est » Resumit quædam eorum quæ dicta sunt: quia dictum est in septimo quod in hac scientia principaliter quæruntur et principia et elementa substantiarum. Cum enim hæc scientia consideret ens commune sicut proprium subjectum, quod quidem dividitur per substantiam et novem genera accidentium, accidentium vero cognitio ex substantia dependeat, ut in septimo probatum est, relinquitur quod principalis intentio hujusmodi scientia sit circa substantias. Et quia scire unum-quodque non contingit nisi cognitis principiis et causis ejus, sequitur quod ad hanc scientiam pertineat in-quirere principia et causas et elementa substantiarum. Quæ tria qualiter different, superius in quinto ostensum est.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « substantia vero » Resumit aliquid superius dictorum; scilicet modos quibus accipitur substantia. Et primo ponit quæ dicuntur substantia in rerum natura existentes, quarum quasdam omnes conflentur esse, scilicet substantias sensibiles, ut terra et aqua et alia elementa: et ulterius secundum ordinem nobilitatis et perfectionis, et plantæ et animalia et partes eorum, et ultimo cælum, et partes cæli, sicut sunt orbes, et sidera quæ transcendunt alias substantias sensibiles in nobilitate. Quasdam vero substantias non omnes conflentur in rerum natura subsistere. Sed quidam posuerunt singulariter eas esse, qui ponunt species et mathematica separata secundum esse, volentes quod cuilibet abstractioni intellectus respondeat abstractio in esse rerum. Et quia intellectus abstrahit universale a particularibus ut hominem a Socrate et Platone, posuerunt species separatim per se subsistere. Quia vero intellectus abstrahit aliquas formas a materiis sensibilibus, utputa curvum, de cujus intellectu non est nasus sicut de ratione simi, et linea et alia hujusmodi, quæ mathematica dicuntur, posuerunt mathematica separata.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « alius vero » Ponit modos accipiendi substantias secundum rationis acceptionem. Et ponit duos modos: quorum unus est quod substantia dicitur quidditas alicujus substantia naturalis; quæ quidem nihil aliud est quam ipsum quid est rei naturalis. Alio modo dicitur substantia secundum aliam acceptanceem, secundum quam genus dicitur magis substantia quam species, et universale magis quam singularia, ut quidam posuerunt, prout in tertio libro in quæstionibus tractatum est. Et huic acceptancei substantia secundum quam universale et genus substantia dicuntur, conjuncta est ratio de ideis quas supra dixit species. Eadem enim ratione ponuntur ideæ esse substantia et universalia.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « quoniam autem » Continuat se ad pracedentia; dicens quid determinatum sit, et quid determinandum restat. Dicit ergo: Quia quod quid erat esse est substantia, et ratio significativa ejus est definitio; propter hoc in præcedenti libro determinatum est de definitione. Et quia definitio constat ex his quæ prædicantur perse, propter hoc etiam ibi determinatum est de eo quod secundum se. Et quia definitio ratio est partes habens, necessarium fuit determinare de partibus definitionis, quæ scilicet sint partes rei definitæ, et quæ non; et utrum eædem sint definitionis partes et definiti. Et secundum aliam Litteram « Utrum partes definitionis oporteat definiri. » Et primum melius est. Item in septimo ostensum est quod neque universale nec genus est substantia. Et sic tota consideratio quæ accipitur de rationibus et de substantia, in septimo libro pertractata est. Inter has substantias vero quæ in rerum natura existunt, de ideis et mathematiciis posterius est perscrutandum, quas quidam dicunt per se singulariter subsistere præter substantias sensibilies. De hoc enim agetur in ultimis libris hujus doctrinæ. Nunc autem immediate oportet tractare de illis substantiis quas omnes conflentur esse, scilicet de sensibilibus, ut ex manifestis ad immanifesta procedatur.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « sensibilies autem » Posita continuitate dictorum ad dicenda, hic incipit Philosophus tractare de substantiis sensibilibus inquirendo principia earum. Et dividitur in partes duas. In prima determinat de materia et forma, quæ sunt principia substantiarum sensibilium. In secunda de unione earum ad invicem, ibi, « De dubitatione. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod materia et forma sunt principia substantiarum sensibilium. Secundo determinat ea quæ sunt consideranda circa utrumque, ibi, « Oportet autem non ignorare. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo manifestat quod materia sit principium substantiarum sensibilium. Secundo manifestat hoc idem de forma ibi, « Quoniam autem et quæ quidem. » Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quid sit materia, dividens eam contra alias acceptiones substantiae. Unde dicit quod omnes substantiae sensibilies habent materiaiam; quod ideo est quia omnes sunt in motu, et motus non est sine materia. Sed sciendum est quod materia aliter dicitur substantia, et aliter forma, et aliter compositum. Materia enim dicitur substantia non quasi ens aliquid actu existens in se considerata, sed quasi in potentia ut sit aliquid actu hæc dicitur esse hoc aliquid.\n\nForma vero, quæ et ratio nominatur, quia ex ipsa sumitur ratio speciei, dicitur substantia quasi ens aliquid actu, et quasi ens separabile secundum rationem a materia, licet non secundum rem. Compositum vero ex his dicitur esse substantia quasi « separabile simpliciter, » id est separatim per se existere potens in reum natura; et ejus solius est generatio et corruptio. Neque enim forma neque materia generantur aut corrumpuntur nisi per accidens. Et licet compositum sit separabile simpliciter, tamen secundum rationem aliorum, quæ dicuntur substantia, quædam sunt separabilia, et quædam non. Forma enim est separabilis ratione, quia potest intelligi sine materia sensibili individuante; materia vero non potest intelligi sine intellectu formæ, cum non apprehendatur nisi ut ens in potentia ad formam. Vel potest esse sensus quod « substantiarum secundum rationem, » idest formarum, quædam sunt ratione separabiles, ut mathematicae, quædam non, ut formæ naturales. Vel iterum quod quædam sunt formæ separatæ absque materia existentes, de quibus inferius determinabit.\n\nSecundo ibi, « quia vero » Dicit quod necesse est in substantiis sensibilibus ponere materiam quasi substantiam et subjectum. In omni enim mutatione oportet esse subjectum commune terminis mutationis in contrariis mutationibus; sicut in mutatione secundum locum est aliquod commune subjectum, quod nunc est hic, et iterum alibi. Et in augmento est aliquod subjectum commune, quod nunc habet tantam quantitatem, et iterum minorem, quantum ad decrementum, et majorem quantum ad augmentum. Et in alteratione est aliquod subjectum, quod nunc est sanum, et nunc infirmum. Cum igitur sit quædam mutatio secundum substantiam, scilicet generatio et corruptio: oportet esse aliquod commune subjectum, quod subjiciatur contrariis mutationibus secundum generationem et corruptionem; et hoc positis terminis, qui sunt forma et privatio; ita scilicet quod quando sit actu per formam, et quando sit subjectum privationis illius formæ.\n\nEx hac autem Aristotelis ratione apparet, quod generatio et corruptio substantialis sunt principium veniendi in cognitionem materiae primæ. Si enim materia prima de se haberet aliquam formam propriam, per eam esset aliquid actu. Et sic, cum superinducetur alia forma, non simpliciter materia per eam esset, sed fieret hoc vel illud ens. Et sic esset generatio secundum quid et non simpliciter. Unde omnes ponentes primum subjectum esse aliquod corpus; ut aerem et aquam, posuerunt generationem idem esse quod alterationem. Patet autem ex hac ratione qualiter accipiendus sit intellectus materiae primæ; quia ita se habet ad omnes formas et privationes, sicut se habet subjectum alterabile ad qualitates contrarias.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « et hanc sequuntur » Ostendit quod materia non eodem modo est in omnibus substantiis sensibilibus; dicens quod materiam existentem subjectum generationis et corruptionis sequuntur aliæ mutationes. Sequitur enim, si sit generabile et corruptibile, quod sit alterabile et secundum locum mutabile. Sed ipsa, scilicet materia subjecta generationi et corruptioni, non sequitur ad quascumque alias mutationes; et præcipue ad illam, quæ est loci mutatio. Non enim sequitur, si aliquid habeat « materiam localem, » idest per quam sit in potentia ad ubi, quod habeat materiam « generabilem et corruptibilem, » idest subjectam generationi et corruptioni. Deficit enim hoc in corporibus cælestibus, in quibus etiam est alteratio aliqualis secundum illuminationem et obscurationem, non tamen generatio et corruptio. Et ideo dixit « unam » propter loci mutationem, « vel duas » propter talem alterationem, quæ tamen non vere est motus alterationis, quia illuminatio non est motus, sed terminus motus. Sic autem secundum quamlibet mutationem oportet accipere materiam, sicut in qualibet mutatione est aliquis modus fiendi simpliciter vel secundum quid. Quæ autem est differentia ejus quod fieri simpliciter, et secundum quid, dictum est primo Physicorum: quia simpliciter fieri est secundum substantiam; fieri secundum quid, est secundum accidens.\n\nPostquam Philosophus inquisivit in substantiis sensibilibus materiale principium, inquirit de principio formali. Et primo continuat se ad pracedentia; dicens quod, quia substantiam quæ est ut materia et subjectum confitentur omnes, cum etiam antiquissimi naturalium substantiam rerum ponerent esse materiam, hujusmodi vero substantia est in potentia restat igitur de forma, quæ est sensibilium per modum actus, dicere quid sit.\n\nSecundo ibi « Democritus quidem » Prosequitur suam intentionem: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo investigat differentias in rebus sensibilibus, quæ formale principium demonstrant. Secundo quædam corollaria concludit, ibi, « Palam itaque ex his quia actus. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat quasdam differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, « Palam ititur ex his quia si substantia. » Circa primum duo facit. 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Quædam enim different secundum diversum modum compositionis partium materialium. In quibusdam enim partes materiæ composuntur per modum mixtionis, sicut mellicratum: in quibusdam vero, quia ligantur aliquo vinculo, sicut est ligatura capitis mulieris; in quibusdam etiam conjunguntur aliqua colla vel visco, sicut fit in libris: in quibusdam vero adunantur partes clavo, sicut fit in arca: in quibusdam vero fit adunatio partium pluribus prædictorum modorum. Alio vero different ab invicem sicut positione, sicut liminare superius et liminare inferius; quæ quidem different ab invicem, ex eo quod sic ponuntur, scilicet supra vel infra. Quædam vero different tempore, ut cœna, quæ est comestio serotina, et prandium quod est comestio matutina. Alia differunt loco, ut « spiritus, » idest venti, quorum Aquilo a septentrione flat, Favonius ab occidente, Auster a meridie, Subsolanus ab oriente. Alia vero different « sensibilium passionibus, » idest duritie et mollitie et aliis hujusmodi; et quædam in aliquibus horum, et quædam his omnibus. Alia per superabundantiam et defectum. Hoc autem addit, quia secundum antiquos philosophos omnes hujusmodi sensibilium passiones ad superabundantiam et defectum reducuntur.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « quare palam » Ostendit qualiter prædictæ differentiæ se habent ad ea quorum sunt. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quod in his differentiis consistit esse eorum quorum sunt differentiæ constitutivæ. Secundo concludit quod ad cognoscendum principia essendi, oportet reducere differentias in aliqua prima genera, ibi, « Sumenda igitur sunt. » Dicit ergo primo quod quia prædictæ differentiæ sunt constitutivæ rerum de quibus supradictum est, manifestum quod ipsum esse prædictarum rerum toties dicitur quot sunt differentiæ. Differentia enim complet definitionem significantem esse rei. Limen enim est hujusmodi, « quia ita ponitur. Et ipsum sic poni est esse ipsius, » idest propria ejus ratio. Et similiter esse crystalli, est ipsum taliter inspissari. Et ex omnibus prædictis differt esse quarum-dam rerum. Hoc quidem in eo quod com-miscentur, alia quidem in eo quod com-plectuntur, et alia aliis differentis utuntur, sicut manus et pes, et aliæ hujusmodi partes, quæ habent proprias differentias secundum quod ordinatur ad determinatas operationes.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « sumenda autem » Concludit quod ex quo in differentiis consistit esse rerum, et sic intendenda est earum cognitio, utile est sumere genera differentiarum, reducendo scilicet posteriores differentias generis in primas, quia differentiæ hujusmodi communes et propriæ erunt principia esse totius generis, ut patet in differentiis quæ sunt secundum magis et minus, et secundum rarum et spissum, et alia hujusmodi: nam rarum et densum et similia reducuntur ad magnum et parvum: omnia enim hæc significant superabundantiam et defectum. Et similiter si quid pertinet ad figuram, aut asperitatem et lenitatem, omnia reducuntur ad rectum et curvum quæ sunt primæ differentiæ ad figuram pertinentes. Et similiter oportet quod aliqua reducantur ad esse mixtum vel non esse mixtum; quia quædam sunt quorum esse est in eo quod miscetur, non esse vero eorum, in eo quod opposito modo se habent.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « palam itaque » Ostendit quomodo prædictæ differentiæ se habeant ad substantias: et dicit: ex prædictis jam manifestum est quod in prædictis differentiis est quærendum quæ sit causa formalis essendi cujuslibet prædictorum, quorum sunt differentiæ, si ita est quod substantia formalis vel quod quid est est causa cujuslibet essendi, ut in septimo manifestum fuit. Prædictæ enim differentiæ significant formam, et quod quid est prædictarum rerum. Nulla autem differentiarum prædictarum est substantia, neque aliquid substantia affine, quasi pertinens ad genus substantia. Sed eadem proportio inventur in eis, quæ est in substantia.\n\nSicut enim in genere substantia, differentia, quæ prædicatur de genere, et advenit ei ad constitutionem speciei, comparatur ad ipsum ut actus et forma, ita etiam in aliis definitionibus. Non enim est intelligendum quod differentia sit forma, aut genus sit materia, cum genus et differentiæ prædicentur de specie, materia autem et forma non prædicentur de composito: sed hoc dicitur, quia genus sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re, differentia vero ab eo quod est formale. Sicut genus hominis est animal, quia significat aliquis habens naturam sensitivam; quæ quidem materialiter se habet ad naturam intellectivam a qua sumitur rationale, quæ est differentia hominis. Rationale vero significat aliquid habens naturam intellectivam. Et inde est quod genus habet differentias potestate, et quod genus et differentia proportionatur materiæ et formæ, ut Porphyrius dicit. Et propter hoc etiam hic dicitur « quod actus, » id est differentia, prædicatur « de materia, » idest de genere; et similiter est in aliis generibus.\n\nSi quis enim velit limen definire, dicet quod est lapis vel lignum taliter positum: in qua definitione lapis vel lignum est ut materia, positio vero ut forma. Et similiter in definitione domus, lapides et ligna sunt materia, et talis modus compositionis est ut forma. Et etiam ulterius in quibusdam additur finis, a quo necessitas formæ dependet. Et similiter in definitione crystalli, aqua est sicut materia, congelatio vero ut forma. Et in definitione symphoniæ acutum et grave ut materia, et modus commixitionis ut forma; et ita est in omnibus aliis.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « palam itaque » Concludit ergo ex prædictis duo corollaria: quorum primum est quod diversa-rum materiarum diversi sunt actus et formæ. In quibusdam enim est actus compositio, in quibusdam commixtio, aut aliquid dictorum.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « propter quod » Secundum ponit. Et est, quod, cum in definitione unum comparetur ad aliud ut actus ad materiam, quidam definientes res per materiam tantum insufficienter definiunt. Sicut definientes domum per cæmentum et lapides et ligna, quæ sunt materia domus; quia talis definitio non notificat domum in actu, sed in potentia. Qui vero dicunt, quod domus est cooper-tura pecuniarum et corporum, dicunt formam domus sed non materiam. Qui vero dicunt utrumque, definiunt compositam substantiam. Et ideo eorum definitio est perfecta ratio. Ratio vero, quæ sumitur ex differentiis, pertinet ad formam. Quæ vero ex partibus intrinsecis, pertinet ad materiam.\n\nEt similes his definitionibus sunt illæ, quas Architas approbat. Sicut Venemia, quod significat dispositiones aeris, quando est sine vento, est quies in multo aere: non enim si modicum de aere in aliquo vase incluso quiescat, dicitur serenitas. In hac autem definitione aer est ut materia, et quies ut forma. Similiter cum dicitur: tranquillitas est planities maris, mare est materia, et planities, ut forma. Materia autem in his definitionibus est subjectum, forma vero est actus. In definitione autem domus materia sunt partes, actus autem forma totius.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « palam itaque » Epilogat quæ de forma dicta sunt. Et est planum in Littera.\n\ncirca utrumque. Et dividitur in duas partes. In prima inquirit ea quæ sunt consideranda circa principium formale. In secunda, ea quæ sunt consideranda circa principium materiale, ibi, « De materiali autem substantia. »\n\nEt, quia Plato præcipue principium formale tetigit, ideo determinat de principio formali secundum ea quæ Plato posuit. Ponit autem Plato, formas rerum esse species et numeros. Unde prima pars dividitur in duas partes. In prima determinat de principio formali per comparisonem ad species. In secunda per comparisonem ad numeros, ibi, « Palam autem. » Ponebat autem Plato quatuor de formis per comparisonem ad species. Quorum primum est, quod nomina specierum significent tantum formam, non autem formam cum materia. Secundum, quod forma est aliquid præter partes materiae. Tertium est, quod est ingenerabilis et incorruptibilis. Quartum est, quod formæ sunt separatæ a sensibilibus. Unde prima pars dividitur in quatuor, secundum quod Aristoteles de quatuor prædictis inquirit. Secunda pars incipit: ibi, « Non videtur. » Tertia, ibi, « Necessarium itaque etc. » Quarta, ibi, « Si autem sunt corruptibilium. »\n\nCirca primum tria facit. Primo movet quæstionem; dicens quod necessarium est scire quod apud aliquos dubium est: Utrum nomen speciei significet substantiam compositam, aut formam tantum, sive aliquid, quod est loco actus. Ut hoc nomen domus, utrum significet communiter materiam et formam, puta quod domus significet tegumentum constitutum ex cæmento et lapidibus ordinatum ut decet (nam tegumentum est sicut forma, cæmentum et lapides ut materia) aut prædictum nomen significet tantum actum et speciem, scilicet tegumentum.\n\nSimiliter, utrum hoc nomen linea significet dualitatem et longitudinem, aut dualitatem tantum. Hoc autem ideo dicit, quia Platonici posuerunt numeros esse formas magnitudinum. Dicebant enim quod punctus nihil aliud est quam unitas positionem habens; ita quod positio sit quasi materiale. Et similiter ponebant quod dualitas erat forma lineæ, ita quod linea nihil aliud est quam dualitas in longitudine. Quærit ergo Philosophus utrum hoc nomen linea significet dualitatem tantum, quasi formam, aut dualitatem in longitudine, sicut formam in materia. Et similiter, utrum hoc nomen animal si-agnificet animam in corpore, quasi formam in materia; aut animam tantum, quæ est forma corporis organici.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « erit autem » Ostendit quid sequatur si quis dicit quod nomina specierum utroque modo se habent in significando: ut scilicet quando significent formam tantum, quando autem formam in materia: et est quod de utroque in utraque significatioe animal accipietur non univoce, quasi una ratione dictum; sed analogice, sicut est in illis quæ habent nomen unum, propter hoc quod referuntur ad unum. Nomen enim speciei non dicetur de composito, nisi secundum ordinem ad hoc, quod dicitur secundum formam tantum, sicut Platonici posuerunt. Ponebant enim quod homo, qui est compositus ex materia et forma, dicitur per participationem hominis idealis, qui est forma tantum.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « verum et hæc » Ostendit Philosophus ad quid tendit prædicta quæstio; dicens quod si nomen speciei significet substantiam compositam, aut significet formam tantum, hoc facit differentiam quantum ad aliquid; sed ad quæstionem substantiae sensibilis nullam differentiam facit. Manifestum enim est quod substantia sensibilis composita est ex materia et forma.\n\nAd quid autem differat, utrum sic vel sic se habent, consequenter manifestat. Manifestum est enim quod si aliqua res est, quæ sit forma tantum et actus, quod quid erat esse «existit ei,» idest quod quid erat esse ejus, idem erit cum ea: sicut idem est « anima et animæ esse, » idest anima est quidditas animæ. Si vero aliquid est compositum ex materia et forma, non erit idem in ipso quod quid erat esse et res ipsa; sicut non idem est homini esse, et homo. Nisi forte homo dicatur anima tantum, secundum illos qui dicunt quod nomina specierum significant formam tantum. Et sic patet quod aliqua res est cui idem est quod quid erat esse suum; scilicet quæ non est composita ex materia et forma, sed forma tantum.\n\nEt hujus ratio est, quia quod quid erat esse est id quod significat definitio. Definitio autem significat naturam speciei. Si autem aliqua res est, quæ sit composita ex materia et forma, oportet quod in illa re sit aliquid præter naturam speciei. Cum enim materia sit individuationis principium, oportet quod in quolibet composito ex materia et forma sint principia indivi- duantia, quæ sunt præter naturam speciei. Unde hujusmodi res non tantum est quidditas sua, sed aliquid præter hoc. Si qua vero res est, quæ sit forma tantum, non habet aliqua principia individuantia præter naturam speciei, cum ipsa forma per se existens per seipsam individuetur. Et ideo ipsa res nihil aliud est quam quod quid esse suum.\n\nSic igitur patet quod si nomen speciei significet formam tantum, cujuslibet rei idem est quod quid erat esse et esse suum; sicut homo erit quod quid est esse suum, et equus, etomnia hujusmodi. Si autem nomina speciei significant compositum ex materia et forma, tunc non idem erit rebus quod quid erat esse earum.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « non videtur » Prosequitur secundum prædictorum, scilicet quod forma sit aliquid præter partes materiae; dicens quod Platonicis moventibus istam quæstionem non videtur quod syllaba sit ex elementis et ex compositione; quasi compositio, quæ est forma syllabæ, sit pars materialis syllabæ, sicut elementa vel litteræ. Neque videtur eis quod domus sit cæmentum et compositio, quasi domus constituatur ex his quasi ex partibus materiae.\n\nEt in hoc recte dicunt; quia si forma esset una de partibus materiae, dependeret ex materia. Et hoc videmus esse falsum; quia compositio et mixtio, quæ sunt formalia principia, non constituunturex his quæ componuntur aut miscentur, sicut nec aliud aliquid aliud formale constituitur ex sua materia, sed e converso. Subliminare enim constituitur ex compositione, quæ est forma ejus, et non e converso.\n\nErgo, si ponatur quod animal et bipes sint materia hominis, homo non erit animal et bipes, sed erit aliquid aliud præter hoc. Nec erit elementum neque ex elementis, sed erit tantum forma, ut dicunt Platonici, qui auferunt materiam a definitionibus. Sed contra hanc positionem videtur esse dicendum, quod si id quod est forma tantum præter materiam est substantia et principium essendi, non poterunt dicere quod hoc particulare sit illa substantia separata, scilicet quod homo sensibilis sit compositus ex materia et forma, homo autem sit forma tantum.\n\nUnde concludit ex dictis quod necessarium est formam aut esse sempiternam, ut Platonici posuerunt ponentes ideas quas dicebant formas rerum esse sempiternas: aut necesse est formam esse corruptibilem per accidens, sine hoc quod corrumpatur per se. Et similiter, facta per accidens, sine hoc quod fiat per se. Quod conceditur secundum sententiam Aristotelis, qui non posuit formas separatas, sed in materia existentes.\n\nQuod autem formæ non possint corrumpi per se, nec generari, ex quo utrumque prædictorum dependet, monstrat consequenter per hoc quod superius probatum est quod nullus facit formam, neque forma generatur neque efficitur per se, sed per se efficitur et generatur hoc particulare. Et ratio est, quia omne quod fit, fit ex materia. Unde hoc particulare, cum sit compositum ex materia et forma, fit et generatur « ex his », scilicet principiiis materialibus et individuantibus. Supra autem dictum est quod forma non est elementum, neque ex elementis. Unde sequitur quod forma nec fit nec generatur per se.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « si autem » Prosequitur quartum prædictorum; scilicet quod Plato ponebat formas separatas a materia. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quid sit dubium circa hanc positionem; dicens quod non est manifestum si substantia, idest forma rerum corruptibilium sint separabiles, ut Platonici posuerunt.\n\nSecundo « attamen quia » Ostendit quid manifestum esse videtur circa hoc: et dicit manifestum esse quod quorumdam corruptibilium formas non contingit separari, « quæcumque » scilicet non possibile est esse præter materias suas, sicut domus aut vas, quia forma domus aut vasis non potest esse sine propria materia.\n\nTertio « forsan quidem » Excludit obviationem; dicens quod formæ artificialium forsan non sunt substantia, nec ipsæ sunt aliquid per se, unde separari non possunt. Et similiter nullum aliorum artificialium, quæ non sunt secundum naturam; quia solum materia in rebus artificialibus ponitur esse substantia, formæ autem artificiales accidentia sunt. Formæ vero naturales sunt de genere substantia. Et propter hoc Plato non posuit formas artificiales esse separatas materia, sed solum formas substantiales.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « quare dubitatio » Ostendit quid manifeste sit contra positionem Platonis; dicens quod si quis ponat esse formas separatas, ut Platonici posuerunt, dubitatio, quam Antisthenici dubitaverunt, licet viderentur indocti, habebit locum contra Platonicos. Dicebant enim quod non est aliquid definire definitione significante quidditatem rei. Quia, cum quidditas rei sit simplex, non convenienter significatur per orationem compositam ex multis. Videmus enim quod « terminus, » id est definitio, quæ assignatur rei, est oratio longa ex multis composita; unde non significat quid est, sed « quale quid, » id est cui simile est aliquid, sicut si aliquis dicat, quod definitio argenti non significat argentum, sed significat tale quale est plumbum vel stannum.\n\nUnde ad solvendum istam dubitationem oportet dicere quod substantia quæ definitur, sive sit intellectualis, sive sit sensibilis, oportet quod sit composita. Ea vero ex quibus primo compositur, cum sint simplicia, non contingit definiri. Dictum est enim supra quod ratio definitiva adjungit aliquid alteri, quorum unum est ut forma, aliud ut materia. Nam genus sumitur a materia, et differentia a forma, ut dictum est supra: unde, si species rerum essent tantum forma, ut Platonici posuerunt, non contingeret definiri.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « palam autem » Postquam determinavit de formis secundum quod comparantur ad ideas introductas a Platone, nunc determinat de formis per comparisonem ad numeros. Plato enim ponebat formas et substantias rerum, reducendo per modum cujusdam assimilationis formas ad numeros. Et dividitur in quatuor, secundum quod quatuor modis assimilat formas numeris. Dicit ergo primo quod manifestum est quod si numeri aliquo modo sint substantiae rerum et formæ, sic sunt, sicut ex præmissis accipi potest; non autem sunt numeri unitatum sicut Platonici dicunt. Dicitur autem numerus unitatum, numerus simplex et absolutus. Numerus autem non applicatus ad res, dicitur numerus simplex et absolutus. Numerus autem applicatus ad res, dicitur numerus rerum, sicut quatuor canes vel quatuor homines; quo quidem modo substantiae rerum, quas significant definitiones, possunt dici numeri. Est enim definitio divisibilis in duo: quorum unum se habet ut forma, aliud ut materia, ut superius dictum est. Et iterum est in indivisibilia divisibilis. Divisio enim definitionis oportet, quod per aliqua indivisibilia terminetur: non enim definitiones procedunt in infinitum. Puta, si definitio hominis dividatur in animal et rationale, definitio animalis in animatum et sensibile; non procedet hoc in infinitum, cum non sit procedere in infinitum in causis materialibus et formalibus, ut in secundo probatum est. Et sic definitionis divisio non assimilatur divisioni quantitatis continuæ, quæ est in infinitum; sed divisioni numeri, qui est divisibilis in indivisibilia.\n\nPonit secundam assimilationem substantiæ, quam significat definitio, ad numeros. Et dicit, quod si aliquid adda-tur vel subtrahatur alicui numero, etiam si sit minimum, non erit idem numerus secundum speciem. Minimum enim in numeris est unitas; quæ si addatur in ternario, surgit quaternarius, quæ est alia species numeri: si vero abstrahatur ab eodem, remanet binarius, qui est etiam alia species numeri. Et hoc ideo quia illa ultima differentia dat speciem numero.\n\nEt similiter est in definitionibus, et in quod quid erat esse, quod significat definitio; quia quocumque minimo addito vel ablato, est alia definitio, et alia natura speciei. Sic enim substantia animata sensibilis tantum, est definitio animalis: cui si addas et rationale, constituis speciem hominis: si autem subtrahas sensibile, constituis speciem plantæ, quia etiam ultima differentia dat speciem.\n\nPonit tertiam assimilationem; et dicit quod numerus est id quod est unum. Est enim per se unum numerus, inquantum ultima unitas dat numero speciem et unitatem; sicut etiam in rebus compositis ex materia et forma, per formam est aliquid unum, et unitatem et speciem sortitur. Et propter hoc lo-quentes de unitate numeri, ac si numerus non esset unus per seipsum, non possunt dicere quo est unus, si est unus. Cum enim componatur ex multis unitatibus, aut non est unus simpliciter, sed unitates aggregantur in eo per modum coacervationis, quæ non facit simpliciter unum, et per consequens nec ens in aliqua specie constituunt, et sic numerus non est aliqua species entis; aut si numerus est unus simpliciter, et non per seipsum, dicendum est quid facit eum unum ex multis unitatibus: quod non est assignare.\n\nEt similiter definitio est una per seipsam: et sic non habent aliquid assignare per quod fiat unum. Et hoc rationabiliter accidit: quia per eamdem rationem substantia, quam significat definitio, est ita unum sicut et numerus, scilicet per se, ex hoc quod una pars ejus est ut forma alterius. Et non est una ut indivisibile, sicut unitas ac punctum, sicut quidam dixerunt; sed quia unaquæque earum est una forma et natnra quædam.\n\n« Et quemadmodum » Ponit quartam assimilationem; et dicit quod sicut numerus non suscipit magis aut minus, ita nec substantia quæ dicitur secundum speciem, licet forte illa quæ dicitur secundum materiam. Sicut enim ratio numeri in aliquo determinato consistit, cui non est addere nec subtrahere, ut dictum est, ita et ratio formæ. Sed magis et minus contingit ex hoc quod materia perfectius vel minus perfecte formam participat. Unde etiam albedo non suscipit magis et minus, sed album.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « de generatione » Epilogat quæ dicta sunt; dicens quod dictum est « de generatione et corruptione talium substantiarum, » scilicet formalium, quomodo contingit, quia per accidens; et quomodo est impossibile, quia per se; et de analogia, id est reductione earum ad numerum per viam assimilationis.\n\nPostquam Aristoteles prosecutus est ea quæ consideranda erant circa female principium substantia, nunc determinat de principio materiali: et dividitur in partes tres. Primo enim determinat de principio materiali per comparisonem ad ea quæ sunt ex materia. Secundo per comparisonem ad alias causas, ibi, « Contingit autem una materia « existente. » Tertio per comparisonem ad transmutationem generationis et corruptionis, cujus subjectum et materia, ibi, « Quoniam vero quædam sine generatione. » Circa primum duo facit. Primo manifestat utrum omnium sit una vel plures species materiae. Et dicit quod oportet non latere circa materiale principium, quia licet omnia sint ex eodem primo materiali principio, quod est materia prima de se nullam habens formam, aut ex eisdem materialibus principiis « aut primis » (quod dicitur propter quatuor elementa, quæ sunt principia materialia communiter omnibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus) et licet sit eadem materia, ut « principium his quæ fiunt, » (quod dicit propter hoc, quod materia non est tantum principium in esse, sed etiam in fieri) licet etiam prima materia et elementa communiter se habeant ad elementa: tamen cujuslibet rei est aliqua materia propria. Ut materia propria phlegmatis non simpliciter, sed in genere, sunt dulcia et pinguia: hæc enim habent quamdam affinitatem cum phlegmate ratione suæ humiditatis. Choleræ vero prima materia sunt amara, aut alia quædam hujusmodi: in amaris enim videtur calor omnino habere dominium super humiditatem usque ad ejus consumptionem. Et sic ratione siccitatis et caliditatis, affinitatem habet cum cholera. Sed hæ duæ materiae, scilicet amara et dulcia, forsan sunt ex aliquo principio materiali priore. Addit autem « forsan » quia quorumdam est sic diversa materia, quod eorum materiae non reducuntur in aliquam priorem, sicut corpora corruptiibilia et incorruptibilia. Ex his igitur, quæ hic dicuntur, accipitur quod prima materia est una omnium generabilium et corruptibilium; sed propriæ materiae sunt diversæ diversarum.\n\nFiunt autem » Secundo dicit quomodo e contrario unius sunt plures materiae; dicens quod ejusdem rei sunt plures materiae, quando una earum est alterius materia. Sicut materia phlegmatis sunt pingue et dulce, si pingue est ex dulci. Pinguis enim sapor inter medios sapores computatur; medii autem sapores fiunt ex extremis, qui sunt dulce et amarum. Sed pingue est proximum dulci. Considerandum vero est quod in istis exemplis materia alicujus posuit ex quod aliquid fit, licet non sit permanens, sed transiens.\n\nNe igitur aliquis existimaret, quod sem-per aliquid fieri diceretur ex materiali principio et non e converso, subjungit quod etiam ex cholera dicitur aliquid fieri per resolutionem choleræ in primam materiam; et e contra cholera fit ex prima materia. Quia dupliciter dicitur aliquid fieri ex altero: aut quia illud ex quo fit est ei principium naturaliter in via generationis; hujusmodi enim est ma- teriale principium: aut quia factio est resolutio in principium materiale, ita scilicet quod ex composito per resolutionem, materiale principium fieri dicatur. Fit enim corpus mixtum ex elementis per compositionem, elementa vero ex corpore mixto per resolutionem.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « contingit autem » Determinat de materia per comparationem ad alias causas. Et primo per comparationem ad agentem tantum, qui ex materia aliquid facit: quæ quidem comparatio pertinet ad materiam secundum quod est principium fiendi. Secundo per comparationem ad omnes causas, prout materia est principium cognoscendi, ibi, « Quando itaque aliquis quæsierit. » Quia vero superius dixerat quod una erat prima materia omnium, posset aliquis dubitare quomodo ex materia una omnium, diversitas rerum procederet. Antiqui euim naturales attribuebant hoc casui, tollentes causam agentem, et ponentes per raritatem et densitatem ex una materia rerum diversitatem produci.\n\nHoc ergo removens Philosophus dicit primo quod contingit, una materia existente, fieri diversa propter moventem causam: aut quia est alia et alia causa movens; aut quia eadem causa movens habet se ad operandum diversa diversi-mode. Quod maxime in artificialibus patet. Videmus enim ex ligno fieri arcam et lectum ab uno artifice, secundum diversas formas artis, quas apud se habet.\n\nQuia vero, licet materia prima sit communis omnibus, tamen materiæ propriæ sunt diversæ diversorum: ideo ne aliquis totam diversitatem rerum attribueret moventi, et nullo modo materiali principio, subjungit quod in quibusdam diversorum ex necessitate est diversa materia, propria scilicet. Non enim quod-libet natum est fieri ex qualibet materia; sicut serra non fit ex ligno; neque est in potestate artificis ut hoc faciat, nunquam enim unam materiam attribuit cuilibet operi: non enim potest facere serram ex ligno vel lana, quæ propter mollitiem suam non sunt apta ad opus serræ, quod est secare.\n\nPatet igitur, quod diversitas rerum est ex movente et materia. Si ergo conveniat aliquid idem secundum speciem fieri ex alia materia, sicut phialam ex auro et argento, manifestum est quod principium movens oportet esse idem, scilicet artem. Si enim esset diversa et movens diversum, necesse esset quod et factum esset diversum.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « quando itaque » Determinat de materia per comparationem ad alias causas, secundum quod materia est cognitionis principium. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quod oportet reddere materiam cum aliis causis in generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Secundo ostendit quomodo se habet materia in substantiis naturalibus perpetuis, ibi, « In naturalibus quidem. » Tertio quomodo se habet in accidentibus, ibi, « Neque quæcumque ita quidem natura. » Circa primum tria facit. Primo enim, quia antiqui naturales assignabant tantummodo causam materialem, dicit quod quando aliquis de aliquo quærit quid est causa ejus? cum pluribus modis dican-tur causæ, oportet omnes causas assignare « contingentes, id est quæ contingant esse illius rei. Non enim habent omnes causas omnia. Naturalia tamen, et maxime generabilia et corruptibilia, omnes causas habent. Ut hominis causa quasi materia in generatione ipsius sunt menstrua. Causa movens « sperma, » in quo est virtus activi. Causa formalis « quod quid erat esse, » id estillud quod significatur per definitionem ejus. Sed finis est cujus causae. Hæc autem duæ causæ, scilicet finis et forma, forte sunt idem numero. Quod quidem dicit, quia in quibusdam sunt idem, in quibusdam non. Finis enim generationis hominis est anima. Finis vero operationis ejus est felici-tas.\n\nSecundo ibi « oportet autem » Ostendit quod non solum oportet assignare omnes causas, sed oportet etiam dicere causas proximas, ut incipiendo a causis primis perveniamus ad causas proximas. Per causas enim primas habetur cognitio de re aliqua solum in universali et imperfecte. Per causas autem proximas habetur cognitio rei et perfecta. Sicut si quis quærat causam materialem hominis, non debet assignari pro causa, ignis aut terra quæ sunt materia communis omnium generabilium et corruptibilium; sed debet assignari propria materia, ut et caro, et os, et hujus-modi.\n\nTertio ibi « circa naturales » Epilogat quod dictum est; et dicit quod circa naturales substantias et generabilies necesse est sic versari, si quis recte consideret causas, ut scilicet omnes assignentur et proximæ. Et hoc est necesse ex eo quod hæ causæ sunt tot, ut dictum est. Et oportet causas cognoscere ad hoc quod aliquid sciatur, quia scire est causam cognoscere.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « in naturalibus » Ostendit quomodo sit materia in substantiis naturalibus et perpetuis, scilicet in corporibus cælestibus; dicens quod in naturalibus et perpetuis substantiis scilicet corporibus cælestibus, non est similiter materia sicut in corporalibus, generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Forsan quidem enim tales substantiæ non habent materiam; aut si habent, non habent talem qualem habent generabilia et corruptibilia, sed solum secundum potentiam quæ est in motu locali.\n\nUt enim supra dictum est, in rebus generabilibus et corruptibilibus generatio et corruptio inducit in cognitionem materiæ, quia in generatione et corruptione oportet esse unum subjectum commune ad privationem et formam; unde, cum in corpore cælesti non sit potentia ad privationem formæ, sed solum ad diversa loca, non habet materiam quæ sit in potentia ad formam et privationem, sed quæ est in potentia ad diversa loca.\n\nCorpus autem comparatur ad locum non sicut materia ad formam, sed magis sicut subjectum ad accidens. Et licet comparatio subjecti ad accidens sit quodammodo ut materiæ ad formam, non tamen subjectum est omnino materia, sicut infra dicetur. Et sic corpus cæleste universaliter nullo modo habet materiam, si subjectum materiam non dicit; vel habet materiam ad ubi, si subjectum dicatur materia.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « neque quæcumque » Ostendit quomodo materia attribuitur accidentibus; et dicit quod illa, quæ sunt secundum naturam, non tamen sunt substantiæ, sed accidentia, non habent materiam ex qua sint, sed substantia est eis subjectum. Subjectum autem habet aliquid simile materiæ, inquantum est receptibile accidentis. Differt autem a materia, inquantum materia non habet actu esse nisi per formam; subjectum autem non constituitur in esse per accidens.\n\nSi ergo quæratur quæ sit causa eclipsis, non est assignare quæ sit materia; sed luna est subjectum patiens talem passionem. Causa autem movens, quæ corrumpit lumen, est terra interpo-sita diametraliter inter solem et lunam. Causam vero finalem forsitan non est assignare. Ea enim, quæ ad defectum pertinent, non sunt propter finem, sed magis provenient ex necessitate naturæ, vel causæ agentis. Dicit autem « forsan, » quia consideratio causarum circa singula quæ contingunt in motibus est valde difficilis. Causa vero formalis eclipsis est definitio ejus. Sed hæc definitio non est manifesta, nisi in ea ponatur causa; ut ratio eclipsis lunæ est privatio luminis in luna. Sed, si addatur, quod ista privatio est a terra in medio objecta inter solem et lunam diametraliter, hæc definitio erit cum causa.\n\nSimiliter hoc patet in hoc accidente quod est somnus. Sed in somno non est manifestum quid est primum subjectum patiens hanc passionem; sed hoc est manifestum quod animal est subjectum somni. Sed secundum quid primo somnus insit animali, utrum sit cor, vel aliquid aliud tale, non est manifestum; cum quidam ponant primum instrumentum sensus esse cerebrum, quidam vero cor. Somnus autem est quies operationis sensibilis. Deinde oportet considerare, habito subjecto somni, aquo sicut a causa agente sit somnus; utrum ab evaporatione alimenti, aut labore, aut aliquo hu-jusmodi. Deinde oportet considerare quæ passio sit somnus, illius scilicet secundum quod primo inest somnus animali, et non totius animalis; quia somnus est quædam immobilitas; sed ea competit animali per aliquod primum, quod est subjectum talis passionis. Et illud primum oportet poni in definitione somni, sicut et quodlibet accidentes definitur per proprium suum primum subjectum. Color enim definitur per superficiem et non per corpus.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « quoniam vero » Determinat de materia per comparationem ad transmutationem unius ad alterum. Et ideo primo ostendit quomodo diversimode fit transmutation in diversis. Secundo movet quasdam dubitationes, ibi, « Habet autem dubitationem. » Dicit ergo primo, quod quædam quando sunt et quando non sunt « sine generatione et corruptione, » idest sine hoc quod ipsa per se generentur et corrup-tantur; sicut puncta, et universaliter omnes species et formæ, sive sint substan-tiales sive accidentales. Non enim album per se loquendo fit, sed lignum album: omne enim quod fit, fit « ex aliquo, » scilicet materia, et fit aliquid, ad quod terminatur generatio, quod est forma: et sic omne quod fit, est compositum ex materia et forma. Unde ea quæ sunt formæ tantum, per se fieri non possunt. Cum ergo dicitur quod contraria fiunt ex invicem, diversimode intelligendum est in compositis et simplicibus. Aliter enim fit albus homo ex nigro homine, et aliter nigrum ex albo: quia albus homo significat aliquid compositum, et ideo per se potest fieri: sed album significat formam tantum, unde non fit nisi per accidens ex nigro.\n\nPatet ergo ex prædictis quod non cujuslibet rei est materia, sed illorum quæ per se generantur et transmutantur in invicem. Illa vero, quæ quando sunt et quando non sunt sine hoc quod transmutentur per se, ita se habent quod eorum materia non est ex qua sint; sed habent subjectum, in quo sunt, pro materia.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « habet autem » Movet duas quæstiones circa prædicta. Quarum prima est, quomodo materia se habeat ad contraria: utrum scilicet, ita sit, quod in omnibus quæ videntur contrarietatem aut oppositionem habere, materia æqualiter vel eodem ordine sit in potentia ad utrumque oppositorum. Sicuti sanitati opponitur infirmitas, et subjectum unum in potentia ad utrumque æqualiter est, et eodem ordine. Est enim sanitas æqualitas quædam humorum. Infirmitas vero inæqualitas. Inæqualitas vero et æqualitas eodem ordine se habent ad suum subjectum. Videtur ergo quod ad vinum et acetum sicut ad contraria, aqua, quæ est materia humorum, sit in potentia, et æqualiter se habeat ad utrumque.\n\nSed Philosophus dicit solvendo quod hoc non est ita. Forma enim vini se habeut ut habitus quidam et species, forma autem aceti est ut privatio quædam et corruptio vini. Sic igitur materia se habeet per prius quidem ad vinum sicut ad habitum et ad speciem, ad acetum autem sicut ad privationem et corruptionem vini. Et ita non comparatur ad acetum nisi mediante vino.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « dubitatio autem » Secundam dubitationem movet, quæ talis est: Illud ex quo fit aliquid videtur esse materia illius; sicut ex elementis fiunt corpora mixta, et sunt eorum materia. Cum igitur ex vino fiat acetum, et ex vivo fiat mortuum, dubitatur, quare vinum non sit materia mortui, cum ordinentur ad ea, sicut potentia ad actum.\n\nSed ad hoc respondetur, quod acetum est corruptio ipsius vini, mortuum vero corruptio vivi: non ergo acetum fit ex vino sicut ex materia, neque mortuum ex vivo: sed secundum accidens dicitur ex eo fieri, in quantum fit ex materia ejus. Unde scyphus non est materia phialæ, sed argentum. Similiter vivum non est materia mortui, sed sunt elementa.\n\nQuod autem ex vivo dicitur fieri mortuum, vel ex vino acetum, si referantur ad ipsam formam vini vel animalis, hæc præpositio Ex, significabit ordinem; quia scilicet in eadem materia, post formam vini, est acetum, et post formam animalis est mortuum. Per quem modum dicimus quod ex die fit nox. Et ideo quæcumque sic transmutantur ad invicem, sicut ex vino fit acetum, et ex animali mortuum, non fit conversio transmutationis nisi redeatur ad materiam. Sicut si ex mortuo debet fieri animal vivum, oportet quod redeatur ad materiam primam, inquantum corpus mortuum resolvitur in elementa, et ex elementis iterum ordine debito venitur ad constitutionem animalis. Et similiter de aceto et vino.\n\nEt hujus ratio est, quia quandocumque materia se habet ad diversa secundum ordinem, non potest ex posteriori rediri in id quod præcedit secundum ordinem. Sicut in generatione animalis ex cibo fit sanguis, et ex sanguine semen et menstruum, ex quibus generatur animal. Non potest autem mutari ordo, scilicet ut ex semine fiat sanguis, aut ex sanguine cibus, nisi per resolutionem ad primam materiam, ex eo quod cujuslibet rei est determinatus modus generationis. Et similiter, quia materia vini non comparatur ad acetum nisi per vinum, inquantum scilicet est corruptio vini. Similiter est de mortuo et vivo, et de cæco et vidente, et cæteris: et ideo at alibus privationibus non fit reditus ad habitus, nisi per resolutionem in primam materiam.\n\nSi autem sit aliqua privatio ad quam materia immediate ordinatur, quæ scilicet nihil aliud significat nisi negationem formæ in materia sine ordine ad formam; a tali privatione poterit fieri reditus ad formam, sicut a tenebris ad lucem, quia nihil aliud sunt nisi absentia lucis in diaphano.\n\nPostquam Philosophus determinavit de principio materiali et formali, nunc intendit determinare de unione eorum ad invicem; et circa hoc tria facit. Primo enim movet dubitationem. Secundo solvit, ibi, « Palam itaque, quia sic quidem acceptantibus. » Tertio excludit falsas opiniones circa prædictam quaestionem, ibi, « Propter hanc vero dubitationem. » Circa primum duas ponit rationes, ex quibus ostenditur quaestio esse dubitabilis; dicens quod circa hanc quaestionem, quæ superius tacta est circa definitiones et numeros, quid faciat utrumque esse unum, hoc considerandum est quod omnia quæ habent plures partes, et to tum in eis non est solum coacervatio partium sed aliquid ex partibus constitutum quod est præter ipsas partes, habent aliquid quod facit in eis unitatem. In quibusdam enim corporibus sic unitatem habentibus, causa unitatis est contactus, in quibusdam viscositas, aut aliquid aliud hujusmodi.\n\nManifestum autem est quod definitiva ratio est una ex pluribus constans. Nec est una per solam coacervationem partium « sicut Ilias, » id est poema factum de historia Trojana, quod per solam aggregationem est unum. Definitio autem est unum simpliciter. Est enim significativa unius. Unde merito dubitatur quid est quod faciat definitionem hominis esse unam, et hominem cujus ratio est definitio. Cum enim homo sit animal et bipes, quæ videntur esse duo, merito dubitatur quare homo est unum et non plura.\n\nSecundo ibi « aliterque et » Ponit secundam rationem, quæ quaestionem reddit dubitabilem; dicens quod alia ratio dubitationis accidit prædictæ quaestioni. Si enim est verum, quod quidam dicunt, si hoc ipsum quod est animal sit aliquod per se existens et separatum, et similiter hoc ipsum quod est bipes, quod Platonici posuerunt: Si enim sic est, merito quæritur quare homo non est illa duo aggregata, ita quod homines particulares non sunt homines nisi per participationem hominis, nec per participationem alicujus unius, sed per participationem duorum, quæ sunt ani- mal et bipes. Et secundum hoc homo non erit unum, sed duo, scilicet animal et bipes.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « palam itaque » Solvit prædictam dubitationem: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit unde appareat via ad solutionem dubitationis; dicens manifestum esse quod si aliqui acceptent quod dictum est de positione Platonis, et transmutent sic naturas reum quod ponant universalia separata, sicut Platonici determinare et dicere consuverunt, non contingit reddere causam unitatis hominis, et solvere dubitationem prædictam. Sed, si ponatur, sicut dictum est supra, quod in definitionibus sit unum sicut materia, aliud sicut forma, unum sicut potentia, aliud sicut actus; quæstio tam facilis est ad solvendum, quod dubitationem non videur habere.\n\nSecundo secundum viam præmissam solvit propositam dubitationem. Et primo solvit eam in naturalibus, quæ generantur et corrumpuntur; dicens quod prædicta dubitatio est eadem ac si quæratur quare aes est rotundum? Ponamus enim quod definitio hujus nominis, vestis, sit aes rotundum, et quod hoc nomen significet istam definitionem: cum quæritur quae est causa quare ista definition, aes rotundum, sit unum, non videtur esse dubitabilis, eo quod aes est sicut materia, et rotundum sicut forma. Nulla enim alia causa est quare ista sunt unum, nisi illa quæ facit id quod est in potentia esse actu, et hoc est agens in omnibus in quibus est generatio: unde, cum hoc sit quod quid erat esse significatum per definitionem, scilicet id quod est in potentia fieri actu, manifestum est quod agens est causa in rebus generabilibus et corruptibilibus, quare quod quid erat esse est definitio.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « est autem » Solvit prædictam dubitationem in mathematicis: et dicit quod duplex est materia: scilicet sensibilis et intelligibilis. Sensibilis quidem est, quæ concernit qualitates sensibiles, calidum et frigidum, rarum et densum, et alia hujus- modi, cum qua quidem materia concreta sunt naturalia, sed ab ea abstrahunt mathematica. Intelligibilis autem materia dicitur, quæ accipitur sine sensibilibus qualitatibus vel differentiis, sicut ipsum continuum. Et ab hac materia non abstrahunt mathematica.\n\nUnde, sive in sensibilibus, sive in mathematicis, semper oportet quod sit in definitionibus aliquid quasi materia et aliquid quasi forma. Sicut in hac definitione circuli mathematici, circulus est figura superficialis, superficies est quasi materia, et figura quasi forma. Eadem enim est ratio quare definitio mathematica est una, et quare definitio naturalis, licet in mathematicis non sit agens, sicut in naturalibus; quia utrobique alterum est sicut materia, et alterum sicut forma.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « quæcumque vero » Solvit prædictam dubitationem quantum ad ea quæ sunt omnino a materia separata; dicens quod quæcumque non habent materiam intelligibilem, ut mathematica, nec sensibilem, ut naturalia, sunt substantiae separatæ, statim unum-quodque eorum est unum aliquid. In his enim quæ habent materiam, non statim unum-quodque est unum, sed unitas eorum est ex hoc quod unitas advenit materiæ. Sed si aliquid sit quod sit forma tantum, statim est unum; quia non est in eo ponere aliquid quocumque ordine, prius quam expectet unitatem a forma.\n\nEt ponit exemplum: quia cum decem prædicamenta non hoc modo se habeant ex additione ad ens, sicut species se habent ex additione differentiarum ad genera, sed hoc ipsum quod est ens, manifestum est quod ens non expectat aliquid additum ad hoc quod fiat hoc, id est substantia, vel quantum vel quale; sed statim a principio est vel substantia, vel quantitas, vel qualitas. Et hæc est causa quare in definitionibus non ponuntur nec unum nec ens, ut genus; quia oporteret quod unum et ens se haberent ut materia ad differentias, per quarum additiones ens fieret vel substantia vel qualitas.\n\nEt similiter id quod est separatum omnino a materia, quod est suum quod quid erat esse, ut supra dictum est, statim est unum, sicut et statim est ens: non enim est in eo materia expectans formam, a qua habeat unitatem et esse; et ideo in talibus non est aliqua causa movens ad hoc quod sint unum. Habent tamen quædam eorum causam substituentem subs-tantias sine motu substantiarum earum, et non sicut in generabilibus quæ per motum fiunt. Statim enim unumquodque eorum est aliquod ens et aliquod unum, non ita quod ens et unum sint genera quædam, aut sigillatim existentia præter singularia, quæ Platonici ponebant.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « propter hanc vero » Excludit quorumdam falsam opinionem circa prædictam quæstionem: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit eorum positiones: et dicit: propter prædictam dubitationem quidam, scilicet Platonici, posuerunt participationem, qua scilicet inferiora participant superiora, ut hic homo hominem, et homo animal et bipes. Et inquirebant quid est causa participationis, et quid participare; ut eis innotesceret quare est unum, hoc quod dico animal bipes. Alii vero ponunt causam unitatis hominis quamdam consubstantialitatem sive coexistentiam animæ cum corpore; sicut si significaretur in abstracto anima cum corpore; quasi diceremus animationem, sicut Lycophron dixit, quod scientia est medium inter animam et scire. Alii autem dixerunt quod ipsum vivere est medium, per quod conjungitur anima corpori.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « equidem eadem » Excludit dictas positiones: dicens quod si hoc bene dicitur de anima et corpore, quod sit aliquod medium uniens, eadem ratio erit in omnibus, quæ se habent ut forma et materia; quia secundum hoc, convalescere erit medium quasi quædam consubstantialitas, aut quædam conjunctio sive vinculum inter animam, per quam subsistit animal, et sanitatem. Et esse trigonum erit quoddam medium componens figuram trigoni. Et esse album erit quoddam medium, quo componitur albedo superficiei. Quod est manifeste falsum. Unde falsum est quod vivere sit medium, quo componitur anima corpori; cum viere nihil aliud sit quam esse animatum.\n\nDeinde cum dicit « causa vero » Assignat causas erroris prædictorum; dicens quod causa quare talia posuerunt est quia inquirebant quid faciens unum potentiam et actum, et inquirebant differentias eorum, quasi oportet eas colligari per aliquod unum medium, sicut ea quæ sunt diversa secundum actum. Sed sicut dictum est, ultima materia, quæ scilicet est appropriata ad formam, et ipsa forma, sunt idem. Aliud enim eorum est sicutpotentia, aliud sicut actus. Unde simile est quærere quæ est causa alicujus rei, et quæ est causa quod illa res sit una; quia unum quodque inquantum est, unum est; et potentia et actus quodammodo unum sunt. Quod enim est in potentia, fit in actu. Et sic non oportet ea uniri per aliquod vinculum, sicut ea quæ sunt penitus diversa. Unde nulla causa est faciens unum ea quæ sunt composita ex materia et forma, nisi quod movet potentiam in actum. Sed illa quæ non habent materiam simpliciter, per seipsa sunt aliquid unum, sicut aliquid existens. Et hæc de octavo libro dicta sufficiant."
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