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  "chapter": {
    "num": 7,
    "slug": "07-question-7",
    "title": "Question 7",
    "of": 29,
    "words": 9053,
    "text": "> **Translation:** Robert W. Mulligan, James V. McGlynn & Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952–1954). Verbatim public-domain scholarly text — quotable.\n>\n> **Public-domain basis:** Public domain (U.S.): published 1952–1954, copyright not renewed (NYPL CCE). US public domain. Full copyright-clearance evidence: [/about/translations/#pd-evidence](/about/translations/#pd-evidence).\n>\n> **Latin source:** Vivès edition (Paris, 1871–1880), provided as a parallel Latin edition (OCR-derived — for reading and search, not verbatim quotation).\n\n## Question 7\n\nARTICLE I This question treats the book of life. In the first article we ask: Is the book of life a created thing? [Parallel readings: S.T. , I, 24, aa. 1-2; I Sent., 40,1, 2, ad 5; III Sent., 3 1, 1, 2, sols. 1-2; In Philip. , c. 4, lect. 1 (P. 13:525b); In Heb., c. 12, lect. 4 (P. 13:780a).] Difficulties It seems that it is, for 1. Explaining that line in the Apocalypse (20:12), “and another book was opened, which was the book of life,” the Gloss says: “The book of life is Christ, who will then appear in His power and give life to His own.”’ Now, at the final judgment, Christ will appear in human form, which is not something uncreated. Consequently, the book of life does not mean anything uncreated. 2. Gregory says: “Our future judge Himself is called the book of life, because whoever sees Him will at once remember all he has done. Now, judgment has been given to Christ as man. This is clear from the words of John (5:2 7): “And he hath given him power to do judgment, because he is the son of man.” Therefore, Christ as man is the book of life, and the same must be said as before. 3. A thing is called a book because it has received writing. But a thing is said to be receptive in so far as it contains material potency, which cannot exist in God. Therefore, nothing uncreated is called the book of life. 4. Since book means a kind of collection, it signifies distinction and difference. But, being most simple, an uncreated nature contains nnoo diversity. Therefore, nothing in such a nature can be called a book. 5. In every book, the writing is something other than the book. Now, the writing in a book is made up of figures, and by means of these we know the things which are read in the book. However, the ideas by which God knows things do not differ from the divine essence. Consequently, His uncreated nature cannot be called a book. 6. But it was said that even though there is no real difference in the divine nature, there is nevertheless a conceptual difference.—On the contrary, a merely conceptual difference exists only in our mind. Consequently, if the difference which this book involves is only a conceptual difference, the book of life must exist only in our intellects, and hence will not be something uncreated. 7. The book of life seems to be God’s knowledge of those who are to be saved. Moreover, the knowledge of the elect is contained in God’s knowledge of vision. Now, since the soul of Christ sees in the Word all the things that God knows with His knowledge of vision, it seems that it also knows the number of the elect and all those who have been chosen. Therefore, the soul of Christ can be called the book of life; hence, the book of life means something created. 8. We read in Sirach (24:32): “All these are the book of life...”; and the Gloss on this passage adds: “That is, the new and old testament.” Now, the Old and New Testament are created. Therefore, the book of life means something created. 9. A book seems to get its name from the fact that something is written in it. Writing, however, involves some imperfection; hence, in its initial purity, our intellect is compared to “a page on which nothing has been written.” But God’s nature is far more pure and simple than our intellect. Hence, it cannot be called a book. 10. A book exists for someone to read. But God’s nature cannot be said to be a book in the sense that He reads it. This is evident from Augustine’s statement that its title, “Book of Life,” does not mean that God has to read it in order to know something which He did not know previously. Similarly, it cannot be called a book in the sense that someone other than God reads it, because no one can read anything unless he finds some diversity of markings—for example, no one can read a blank piece of paper, because it is undifferentiated. Therefore, God’s uncreated nature cannot be called a book. 11. From a book one does not receive knowledge of things as from their cause but as from a sign of them. Now, God does not receive His knowledge of things, as it were, from a sign, but, as it were, from a cause. Therefore, God’s knowledge cannot be called the book of life. 12. Nothing can be merely a sign of itself. Now, a book is a sign of truth. Consequently, since God is truth itself, He Himself cannot be called a book. 13. A book and a teacher are principles of knowledge in different ways. Now, all wisdom is said to come from God as from a teacher. Therefore, it does not come from Him as from a book. 14. A thing is represented differently in a mirror and in a book. Now, Wisdom (7:2 6) calls God a mirror because all things are represented in Him. Consequently, He cannot and should not be called a book. 15. Even those books that are copied from the original are called books. But the minds of men and angels, in some sense, copy God’s mind when they receive knowledge of things from it. Consequently, if the divine mind is called the book of life, created minds should be similarly called; and thus it is not always something uncreated that is called the book of life. 16. The book of life seems to imply a representation of life and an exercise of causality over it. Now, all this belongs to Christ as man, because in Him, as in a pattern, is represented all life, both that of grace and that of glory. For this reason it was said to Moses (Exodus 25:40): “Look and make it according to the pattern that was shewn thee in the mount.” Moreover, Christ merited life for us. Therefore, Christ Himself, as man, can be called the book of life. To the Contrary 1. Augustine says: “We should know that there is a divine force which causes each one to remember his deeds, good or bad. Indeed, this divine power is called a book.” Now, a divine force is something uncreated. Therefore, something uncreated is also called the book of life. 2. In the same work, Augustine says: “The book of life is God’s foreknowledge, which cannot be mistaken.” But His foreknowledge is something uncreated. Therefore, the book of life is also something uncreated. REPLY Applied to God, book can be used only metaphorically; thus, it is in this sense that the representation of life is called the book of life. In this connection, it should be noted that life can be represented in two ways: first, as it is in itself, or, secondly, as it can be participated in by certain individuals. Furthermore, life taken in itself can be represented in two ways. This can be done, first, by means of instruction; and this kind of representation pertains to the sense of hearing, which, as said in The Senses and the Sensed , is the chief sense for learning. Taken in this meaning, therefore, the book of life signifies that which contains instructions on how one should live. Consequently, the Old and New Testaments are called the book of life. The second way of representing life in itself is by giving a model; and this kind of representation pertains to the sense of sight. Consequently, Christ Himself is called the book of life, because, by looking at Him as at a model, we can see how we must live in order to attain eternal life. We are not speaking of the book of life in these senses, however, but only in the sense that the book of life is said to be the representation of those who are to attain eternal life, and whose names, according to a comparison drawn from human affairs, are said to be written down in this book. For, in a state that is wisely ruled, anyone who becomes a citizen must do so according to the ordinances of its ruler. Hence, those who are to be admitted to citizenship are enrolled as being, as it were, participants in the state. By using this enrollment, the ruler of the state is guided in rejecting persons from and in admitting them to the fellowship of the citizens subject to him. Now, the citizens who are ruled most perfectly by divine providence form the society of the Church triumphant, which is also called the City of God in Scripture.8 Hence, the enrollment or representation of those who are to be admitted to that society is called the book of life. This is clear from Scripture’s manner of speaking. For example, Luke (10:20) says: “Rejoice in this, that your names are written in heaven,” that is, in the book of life; Isaiah (4:3): “Everyone... shall be called holy... that is written in life in Jerusalem”; and in the Epistle to the Hebrews (12:22-23) we read: “But you are come... to the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to the company of many thousands of angels, and to the church of the first-born who are written in the heavens.” It is necessary, therefore, to carry out the metaphor—and say that from this enrollment the ruler of the society shall know those who are to be given life. The bestowal of life, of course, belongs to God alone. However, God is not guided by anything created, for He is a rule that is directed by nothing extrinsic to Himself. Consequently, the book of life, in the sense in which we are now using it, means something uncreated. Answers to Difficulties 1-2. Our answer is clear from what we have said above. For the Gloss and Gregory’s statement concern the book of life in another sense, namely, as it means a model for living: anyone who looks at it can tell whether or not he conforms to it. 3. When terms are applied to God, the general rule should be observed that in no respect can imperfection be contained in predicates applied to the divinity. Consequently, whatever implies matter, privation, or time must be removed. Now, that it receives markings from something extrinsic belongs to a book in so far as it is temporal and newly written. These notes are not included in the predicate when it is applied to God. 4. The very notion of book implies a difference existing between the things known by its means, because a book hands down the knowledge of many things. But that a book must have diversity to hand down knowledge of many things is a defect in the book. It would be much more perfect if it could teach by means of one thing all that it now explains by means of many things. Consequently, since God is most perfect, the book of life is such that it shows many things by means of that which is one in the highest degree. 5. That the letters written in a book differ from the pages on which they are written is due to a defect of material books. For, because books are composite things, that which has is not the same as that which is had. Consequently, in God these ideas differ from His essence, not really, but only conceptually. 6. Although the distinction between the writing and that in which it is written is merely conceptual, the representation, which completes the notion of a book, is not only in our mind but also in God. Hence, the book of life is really in God. 7. As indicated above, the book of life directs God, who gives life, in His giving of life. Now, even though the soul of Christ knows all the elect, God is directed, not by Christ’s human knowledge, but by His own uncreated knowledge, which is Himself. Hence, the knowledge possessed by the soul of Christ cannot be called the book of life in the sense in which we are speaking of it. 8. The reply is clear from what has been said. 9. Although there is no diversity but only the greatest purity in God, He is nonetheless compared to a book that has been written in, and not to the blank page to which our intellect has been compared. For our intelligence is compared to a blank page because it is in potency to all intelligible forms, and as yet has none of them actually. In God’s intellect, however, all the forms of things exist in act, and in Him they are one. Consequently, in God the formal character of writing is compatible with His oneness. 10. God Himself reads the book of life, and others can read it in so far as they are allowed to do so. Augustine does not mean to deny that God reads the book of life; he denies only that He reads it in order to know what He previously did not know. Moreover, others can read the book of life, even though it is entirely simple, since it is possible for one and the same reality to be the intelligible character of many things. 11. One thing is a likeness of another in two ways. In the first way, it is the model for the other thing and thus its cause; second, it itself can be modeled upon the other, and thus be its effect and sign. Now, in the case of men, a book conforms to their knowledge, which, in turn, is caused by things. Consequently, they receive knowledge of things from a book, not as from a cause, but as from a sign. However, God’s knowledge is the cause of things, since it contains the archetypes of all things. Hence, knowledge is received from the book of life as from a cause, and not as from as a sign. 12. The book of life is uncreated truth itself as well as a likeness of created truth, just as a created book is a sign of truth. 13. In God, exemplary and efficient causality come to the same thing. Consequently, from the fact that He is an exemplary cause He can be called a book, and from the fact that He is the efficient cause of wisdom He can be called a teacher. 14. The representation a mirror gives differs from that which a book gives, because it refers directly to things while that of a book refers to things through the medium of knowledge. For the letters contained in a book are only signs of words, and these, in turn, are signs of concepts, which are likenesses of things. A mirror, however, reflects the forms of things. Yet in God the species of things are reflected in both ways, because He knows things and He knows that He knows them. Consequently, in God both the notion of mirror and the notion of book can be verified. 15. The minds of the saints can also be called books. This is clear from the Apocalypse (20:12): “And the books were opened”—which Augustine explains as meaning the hearts of the just. However, the saints’ minds cannot be called books of life in the sense in which we are taking this term. This is clear from what has been said. 16. Although Christ as man is an archetype and, in some sense, the cause of life, as man He is not the cause of the life of glory through His authority nor an archetype directing God in His bestowal of life. Consequently, Christ as man cannot be called the book of life. ARTICLE II In the second article we ask: Is the book of life predicated of God personally or essentially? [Parallel readings: S.T. , I, 39, 8. See also readings given for preceding article.] Difficulties It seems that it is predicated personally, for 1. In the Psalms (39:8) we read: “In the head of the book it is written of me...” and the Gloss explains: “That is, in the Father, who is my head.” Now, in God nothing has a head except that which has a principle. But that which has a Principle is a personal predicate in matters pertaining to God. Therefore, the book of life is a personal predication. 2. just as word signifies knowledge proceeding from another, book also signifies this, because the writing in a book proceeds from a writer. Now, for the reason already given, word is predicated personally of God. Consequently, the book of life is also a personal predication. 3. It was said, however, that word implies a real procession, whereas book implies a procession only according to our way of understanding.—On the contrary, we can name God only from the things that exist here below. But, in our experience, a word coming from a speaker is really distinct from him, and so is a book really distinct from its author. For this reason, therefore, both terms imply a real distinction in God. 4. There is greater distance between one who speaks and his oral word than there is between him and the word within his heart; and an even greater distance is between him and a written word signifying the word within his heart. Consequently, if the divine Word, which, as Augustine says, resembles the word within the heart, is really distinct from the one who utters it, much more distinct will be a book, since this implies writing. 5. That which is attributed to a thing should belong to it according to all that belongs to its nature. Now, the notion of a book demands not only that it represent something but also that it be written by someone. Consequently, in matters concerning God, the word book is taken according as a book is something by another. Hence, it is predicated personally. 6. just as the notion of a book includes its being read, so does it also include its being written. But, in so far as it is written, it is by another, and in so far as it is read, it is directed to another. Therefore, it belongs to the notion of a book to be to another and by another. Hence, the book of life is predicated personally. 7. Book of life signifies knowledge expressed by another. But what is expressed by another has its origin in another. Consequently, the book of life implies a relation of origin, and thus is a personal predication. To the Contrary The book of life is predestination itself. This is clear from Augustine4and the Gloss. But predestination is predicated of the divine essence, never of the divine Persons. Consequently, the book of life is similarly predicated. REPLY Some say that the book of life is sometimes a personal, sometimes, an essential predication: in so far as it is used of God according to the notion of writing, it is predicated personally, and in this usage it implies origin from another, for a book has to be written by another; but, in so far as it implies a representation of the things written in the book it is predicated essentially. This distinction, however, does not seem reasonable, because a term used of God is not predicated personally unless its meaning in connection with God implies a relation of origin. Moreover, with regard to words used in a transferred sense, a metaphor is not to be understood as indicating complete resemblance, but only some agreement in a characteristic belonging to the nature of the thing whose name is being applied. For example, the word lion is applied to God, not because of a resemblance between two natures possessing sensation, but because of a resemblance based on one property of the lion. Consequently, the book of life is not predicated of God according to what is common to all products of art, but only according to that which is proper to a book as a book. Now, to come from an author does not belong to a book as a book but only as it is a product of art; and, in a similar manner, a house is from a builder, and a knife is from a cutler. On the other hand, to represent the things written about in the book belongs to the notion of a book as such. Consequently, as long as this representation remains, the book remains a book, even though it is not written by another and is not a product of art. Fro’ m this it is clear that book is applied to God, not in so far as a book is written by another, but in so far as a book represents the things which are written in it. Therefore, since representation is common to the entire Trinity, book is predicated, not personally of God, but only essentially. Answers to Difficulties 1. Words that are predicated essentially of God sometimes stand for the persons. Hence, God sometimes stands for the person of the Father, sometimes for the person of the Son, as when we say “God begets” or “God begotten.” Similarly, even though book is predicated essentially, it can sometimes stand for the person of the Son. In this sense, in matters pertaining to divinity, the book of life can be said to have a head or principle. 2. According to its intelligible character, the term word when used of God implies origin from another. This has already been discussed. But book does not imply the notion of origin when the term is applied to God. Hence, no parallel can be drawn. 3. Although in the case of creatures a book really proceeds from a writer, just as a word does from a speaker, nevertheless, that procession is not implied by book as it is implied by word. For procession from a writer is not implied any more by book than a procession from a builder is implied by house. 4. That argument would hold if the notion of the written word belonged to the very notion of book. This, however, is not true. Hence, the argument proves nothing. 5. That argument holds for words that are used literally. But when words are used metaphorically, as book is used here, it is not necessary that the term predicated express of its subject everything implied by that term taken literally. Otherwise, God, who is called a lion in the metaphorical sense, would have to have claws and a mane. 6. The reply to this difficulty is clear from what has been said. 7. The same holds for the seventh difficulty. ARTICLE III In the third article we ask: Can the book of life be appropriated to the son? [Parallel readings: S.T. , I, 39, 8; III Sent. , 31, 1, 2, sol. 1.] Difficulties It seems not, for 1. The book of life pertains to life. But life is attributed in Scripture to the Holy Spirit, as, for example, in John (6:64): “It is the spirit that quickeneth.” Hence, the book of life should be appropriated to the Holy Spirit, not to the Son. 2. In everything, the beginning is the most important. But the Father is called the head or the beginning of the book, as is clear in the Psalms (39:8), where we read: “In the head of the book it is written of me...” Therefore, the term book should be appropriated to the Father. 3. That in which something is written has the proper nature of a book. Now, a thing is said to be written in the memory; hence, the memory has the nature of a book. But memory is appropriated to the Father, just as intelligence is to the Son, and will is to the Holy Spirit. Consequently, the book of life should be appropriated to the Father. 4. The Father is the head of the book. But, as we read in the Psalms (39:8), in the head of the book there is writing about the Son. Consequently, the Father is the book of the Son. Therefore, the book [of life] should be appropriated to the Father. To the Contrary 1. Augustine says that the book of life is God’s foreknowledge. But knowledge is appropriated to the Son: “...Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Corinthians 1:24). Therefore, the book of life is also appropriated to the Son. 2. Book implies a representation, just as mirror, image, stamp, and, figure. But all these terms are attributed to the Son. Consequently, the book of life should also be appropriated to Him. REPLY To appropriate means nothing else than to contract something common, making it something proper. Now, what is common to the entire Trinity cannot be appropriated to a single Person on the grounds that this belongs more to this Person than it does to another. Such an action would deny the equality of the Persons. However, appropriation may be made on the grounds that what is common nevertheless has a greater resemblance to what is proper to one person than it has to what is proper to another. For example, goodness resembles what is proper to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as love, because goodness is the object of love, and so is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Again, power is appropriated to the Father because power as such is a principle, and being the principle of all divinity is proper to the Father. Similarly, wisdom is appropriated to the Son, because it resembles what is proper to the Son, since the Son proceeds from the Father as His Word, and word describes an intellectual procession. Consequently, because the book of life pertains to knowledge, it should be appropriated to the Son. Answers to Difficulties 1. Although life is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, knowledge of life is appropriated to the Son; and it is this that the book of life implies. 2. The Father is called the head of the book, not because the notion of book has more in common with Him than with the Son, but because the Son, to whom the name of book of life is appropriated, has His origin from the Father. 3. There is no inconsistency in something being appropriated to different persons if this is done under different formalities. For example, the gift of wisdom is appropriated to the Holy Spirit in so far as it is a gift, because love is the reason for all gifts, but it is also appropriated to the Son in so far as it is wisdom. Similarly, memory is appropriated to the Father in so far as it is a principle of understanding; but, in so far as it is a power of knowing, it is appropriated to the Son. Now, it is in the memory as a knowing power that a thing is said to be written in it. Hence, in this sense, memory can have the nature of a book. Consequently, being the book of life is appropriated more to the Son than to the Father. 4. Although being the book of life is appropriated to the Son, this also belongs to the Father, since it is a property of all the Persons, not of only one of them. Hence, there is no inconsistency in saying that something is written in the Father. ARTICLE IV In the fourth article we ask: Is the book of life the same as predestination? [Parallel readings: See readings given for q. 7, a. 1.] Difficulties: It seems that it is, for 1. Augustine says’ that the book of life is the predestination of those to whom eternal life is due. 2.We know God’s attributes through their effects. But the effect of predestination is the same as that of the book of life, namely, final grace and glory. Therefore, predestination and the book of life are the same. 3. Whatever is predicated metaphorically of God should be reduced to what is predicated literally. Now, the book of life is predicated metaphorically of God, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, it should be reduced to something predicated literally of Him. However, it cannot be reduced to anything else except predestination. Therefore, the book of life is the same as predestination. To the Contrary 1. A thing is called a book because something is written in it. But the notion of writing does not pertain to predestination. Consequently, predestination and the book of life are not the same. 2. A book, of its very nature, implies no causality regarding the things to which it is referred. Predestination, however, implies causality. Therefore, it is not the same as the book of life. REPLY As is clear from what has been said previously, the book of life is used of God because of its resemblance to the document which directs a chief of state in admitting persons to and excluding them from citizenship. Now, this document lies between two operations, for it is subsequent to the decision of the head of the state, who selects those whom he wishes to admit in preference to those whom he excludes, and it is anterior to the admission or exclusion. Moreover, this document is merely a kind of representation of his antecedent decision. Similarly, the book of life is also nothing more than an inscription in the divine mind of God’s predestination, for by this act of predestining God predetermines who are to be admitted to the life of glory. Moreover, His knowledge of this predestination is always with Him; and His knowledge that He has predestined some is, as it were, His predestination written in Him as in a book of life. Considered formally, therefore, the book of life and predestination are not the same, even though, considered materially, the book of life is predestination—just as we say that a certain book, considered materially, is the teaching of the Apostle because it contains the Apostle’s teaching. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks when he says that the book of life is predestination. Answers to Difficulties 1. The answer is clear from what was said above in the reply. 2. The book of life and predestination are related to the same effect but not in the same manner. Predestination regards that effect without any intervening medium; the book of life regards it through the medium of predestination. Similarly, the likenesses of things in our soul are direct likenesses; but the words written in a book indicate merely what the soul has received. Hence, a book is only mediately a sign of things. 3. The book of life can be reduced to something predicated literally of God; this something, however, is not predestination but that knowledge of predestination by which God knows that He has predestined certain persons. Answers to Contrary Difficulties 1.-2. It is not difficult to answer these arguments. ARTICLE V In the fifth article we ask: Is the book of life spoken of in relation to uncreated life? [Parallel readings: S.T. , I, 24, 1; III Sent. , 31, 1,2, sol. 2.] Difficulties It seems that it is, for 1. As Augustine says, the book of life is God’s knowledge. But God knows His own life, just as He knows that of others. Consequently, the book of life concerns uncreated life also. 2. The book of life represents life, but not created life; for what is first does not represent what is second, but what is second represents what is first. Consequently, the book of life represents uncreated life. 3. What is predicated of several, but predicated primarily of one and secondarily of the others, is understood simply in its primary predication. Now, life is predicated primarily of God rather than of creatures, because His life, as Dionysius has shown, is the origin of all life. Therefore, since life is used simply in the phrase the book of life, it should be understood as referring to uncreated life. 4. Just as a book implies a representation, so also does a figure, especially when a book represents something by means of figures. But the Son is said to be the figure of the Father (Hebrews 1:3). Therefore He can be said to be a book with respect to the life of the Father. 5. Book is predicated as being in a relation to that about which the book is written. But the Son is written about in the book of life, foi we read in the Psalms (39:8): “In the head of the book it is written of me...” Now, the life of the Son is not created. Hence, the book of life is concerned with uncreated life. 6. A book and the subject treated there cannot be identical in regard to the same thing. Now, a creature is a book revealing God. Therefore, God cannot be a book revealing created life. Hence, the book of life can be spoken of only in relation to uncreated life. 7. Words, like books, pertain to knowledge. Now, Word is predicated primarily of the divine essence rather than of a creature, because, by uttering Himself, the Father utters all creatures. Consequently, the book of life is primarily concerned with uncreated life rather than with created life. To the Contrary 1. According to Augustine, the book of life is predestination, However, predestination regards only creatures. Therefore, the book of life regards only creatures. 2. A book represents a thing only by means of figures and likenesses. Now, God knows Himself, not by means of likenesses, but by means of His own essence. Therefore, He is not a book with respect to Himself. REPLY As is clear from what has been said previously, the book of life is an enrollment which directs the one who confers life in his bestowal of it, in accordance with what has been preordained concerning a certain person. Therefore, the life from which the book of life is named has two aspects. The first is that this life is acquired through someone’s grant; the second is that it follows upon the afore-mentioned enrollment which directs its being granted. Neither of these features is found in uncreated life. God does not acquire His life of glory but has it by His very nature. Moreover, no knowledge precedes His life, but, according to our manner of understanding, His life precedes even His knowledge. Consequently, the book of life cannot be spoken of in relation to uncreated life. Answers to Difficulties 1. Not all of God’s knowledge is called the book of life, but only that concerning the life which the elect are to possess. This can be gathered from the words that follow the section quoted. 2. To represent a thing means to bear its likeness. There are two kinds of likenesses, however. The first kind, like the likeness in the practical intellect, produces a thing. Through a likeness of this kind, what is first can represent what is second. The second kind of likeness comes from the thing whose likeness it is. Through a likeness of this kind, what comes later represents what comes first, and not conversely. However, the book of life represents life, not by means of the second type of likeness, but by means of the first. 3. What is predicated simply is sometimes understood as applying to that about which it is predicated only secondarily, because some qualification has been added. For example, being [with the added qualification] in another is understood as signifying an accident. Similarly, life, because of the added qualification book , is understood as signifying created life, which is life only secondarily. 4. A figure represents its original as its principle, because a figure and an image are drawn from the archetype as from a principle. The book of life, however, represents life as something that it itself has caused. Now, it belongs to God the Father to be the principle of the Son, who is the figure of the Father, but the life of the Father cannot have anything as its principle. Therefore, there is no parallel between life and a figure. 5. That text of the Psalms is understood of the Son according to His human nature. 6. A cause represents its effect, and the effect its cause. This is clear from what has been said. Accordingly, God can be called a book with respect to creatures, and creatures a book with respect to God. 7. By the force of its own proper signification, Word does not denote the principle of that which is expressed by the word; but the book of life as taken here does. Hence, the two are not similar. ARTICLE VI In the sixth article we ask: Is the book of life spoken of in relation to the natural life of creatures? [Parallel readings: S.T. , I, 24, 2; III Sent., 31, 1, 2, sols. 1-2.] Difficulties It seems that it is, for 1. Natural life, as well as the life of glory, is represented in God’s knowledge. Now, God’s knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life. Therefore, His knowledge of natural life should be similarly called. 2. God’s knowledge contains all things according to the manner of life, because we read in John (1:3-4): “What was made, in Him was life...” Therefore, His knowledge should be called the book of life with respect to all things, especially living things. 3. Just as a person is preordained by God’s providence to the life of glory, so is he also preordained to natural life. Now, as mentioned previously, the knowledge of those preordained to the life of glory is called the book of life. Therefore, the knowledge of those preordained to natural life also is called the book of life. 4. In its explanation of that verse in the Apocalypse (3:5), “1 will not blot out his name out of the book of life,” the Gloss reads: “The book of life is God’s knowledge, in which all things are clear.’13 Consequently, the book of life is said to concern all things, hence, even natural life. 5. The book of life is, as it were, knowledge of the life of glory. But the life of glory cannot be known unless natural life is also known. Therefore, the book of life likewise concerns natural life. 6. The word life has been taken from natural life and applied to the life of glory. Now, a thing is said more truly of that of which it is said properly than of that to which it is merely applied. Therefore, the book of life concerns natural life more than it concerns the life of glory. 7. What is more permanent and common is more noble. Now, natural life is more permanent than the life of glory or of grace. Similarly, it is more common, because natural life continues with the life of grace or of glory; but the opposite is not true. Therefore, natural life is more noble than the life of grace and glory. Hence, the book of life concerns the life of nature more than it concerns the life of grace or of glory. To the Contrary 1. As Augustine says, the book of life is, in a sense, predestination. But predestination does not concern natural life. Hence, neither does the book of life. 2. The book of life concerns the life which is given by God directly. Natural life, however, is given by God through the medium of natural causes. Therefore, the book of life is not about natural life. REPLY The book of life, as mentioned previously, is that knowledge which directs the giver of life in His bestowal of it. Now, when we give anything, we need no direction unless it is necessary to separate those to whom bestowal is to be made from those to whom it is not to be made. Hence, the book of life concerns only that life which is to be granted by choice. Natural life, however, like all other natural gooqs, is supplied to all in general, according to each one’s capacity. The book of life, therefore, does not concern natural life but only that life which, according to a choice made by God’s will, is given to some and not to others. Answers to Difficulties 1. Although natural life and the life of glory are represented in God’s knowledge, His knowledge of natural life does not fulfill the notion of the book of life as does His knowledge of the life of glory for the reason given. 2. The book of life gets its name, not from the fact that it has life, but because it is a book about the life to which some are preordained by God’s election, and because the names of these persons are written down in it. 3. In His providence, God gives life to some as a thing due to their nature, but He grants the life of glory only according to the good pleasure of His will. Consequently, He gives natural life to everything which can receive it, but not the life of glory. Hence, there is no book of natural life as there is a book of the life of glory. 4. The Gloss is not to be understood as meaning that all things are clear—that is, all things are contained—in the book of life. It means, rather, that all which is written in it is clear, that is, all is determined. 5. The book of life implies, as has been said, not only knowledge of the life of glory but also God’s choice—not, however, with respect to merely natural life. 6. The life of glory is less known to us than natural life is. Consequently, we come to know the life of glory after knowing natural life. Similarly, we name the life of glory from natural life, even though more of the nature of life belongs to the life of glory than belongs to natural life. This is true of all the names that we give God which are taken from creatures. Consequently, when the word life is used by itself, it need not be understood as necessarily referring to natural life. 7. The life of glory, taken by itself, is more permanent than natural life, because it makes natural life stable. Accidentally, however, natural life is more permanent than the life of grace; that is, it is more closely related to the living thing, to which natural life, but not the life of glory, is due by reason of its essence. Moreover, while natural life is more common in one sense than the life of glory, in another sense it is less common. For a thing is said to be common in two senses. First, it is said to be common through effect or predication; that is, it is found in many things according to one intelligible character. In this sense, that which is more common is not more noble but more imperfect, as animal is, which is more common than man. Now, it is in this sense that natural life is more common than the life of glory. Second, a thing is said to be common after the manner of a cause; that is, it resembles a cause which, while remaining numerically one, extends to many effects. In this sense, what is more common is more noble. For example, the preservation of a city is more noble than the preservation of a family. In this sense, natural life is not more common.,than the life of glory. ARTICLE VII In the seventh article we ask: Does the book of life used without qualification refer to the life of grace? [Parallel readings: See readings given for preceding article.] Difficulties It seems that it does, for 1. As is evident from what Dionysius has written, what is in the effect is found in a nobler manner in the cause. Now, glory is the effect of grace. Consequently, the life of grace is more noble than the life of glory. Hence, the book of life concerns the life of grace more than it does the life of glory. 2. As mentioned earlier, the book of life is the enrollment of those who are predestined. But predestination, in general, is the preparation of grace and glory. Therefore, the book of life concerns, in general, the life of grace as well as the life of glory. 3. The book of life designates certain persons as citizens of that city in which there is life. But, just as some are made citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem through the life of glory, so some are made citizens of the Church militant through the life of grace. Therefore, the book of life concerns the life of grace as well as the life of glory. 4. What is predicated of many is understood as predicated without qualification of that of which it is predicated first. Now, the life of grace is prior to the life of glory. Therefore, when the book of life is mentioned, it is understood as referring to the life of grace. To the Contrary 1. One who is in the state of grace possesses the life of grace without qualification. His name, however, is not said to be written in the book of life without qualification; it is written there only in a certain respect, namely, in so far as he is in the state of grace. Therefore, the book of life is not concerned simply with the life of grace. 2. The end is more noble than the means to the end. But the life of glory is the end of grace. Therefore, it is more noble. Consequently, when used without qualification, life should be understood as referring to the life of glory. Hence, the book of life used without qualification is concerned only with the life of glory. REPLY The book of life means the enrollment of someone who will obtain life as a kind of reward and possession, for men of this sort are customarily enrolled in something. Now, a thing is said to be a possession, properly speaking, when it can be had at one’s command; and such a thing has no defects. Consequently, the Philosopher says that knowledge had about God “is not a human possession” but divine, because only God knows Himself perfectly, while man’s knowledge of God is necessarily defective. Thus, life will be had as a possession when through life all the defects opposed to life are excluded. Now, this is what the life of glory does; it excludes all death, spiritual as well as physical, so that there remains not even the possibility of dying. The life of grace does not do this. Consequently, the book of life does not concern the life of grace without qualification, but only the life of glory. Answers to Difficulties 1. Certain causes are more noble than their effects, namely, the efficient, formal, and final causes. Hence, what exists in these causes exists in a more noble manner than what exists in their effects. On the other hand, matter is less perfect than its effects. Consequently, a thing exists in a material cause in a less noble manner than it does in the effect of this cause; for in matter it is incomplete and potential, but in the effect of the material cause its existence is actual. Now, every disposition that prepares a subject to receive a perfection can be reduced to the material cause; and it is in this way that grace is the cause of glory. Consequently, life exists in glory in a more noble way than it does in grace. 2. Predestination does not concern grace except as grace is ordained to glory. Hence, to be predestined belongs only to those who have final grace, upon which glory follows. 3. Although those who possess the life of grace are citizens of the Church militant, the condition of the Church militant is not one in which life is possessed fully, because the possibility of dying still remains. Hence, the book of life is not spoken of in relation to these individuals. 4. Although in the line of generation, the life of grace is prior to the life of glory, nevertheless, in the line of perfection the life of glory is prior—just as the end is prior to the means to the end. ARTICLE VIII In the eighth article we ask: Can we speak of a book of death as we speak of the book of life? [Parallel readings: S.T. , I, 24, 1; III Sent. , 31,1, 2, sols. 1-2.] Difficulties It seems that we can, for 1. In its comment on Luke (10:20), “Rejoice in this, that your names are written...,” the Gloss reads: “By means of his heavenly or earthly deeds, a person is, as it were, engraved on God’s memory forever.”’ Now, just as a person is ordained to life through heavenly deeds, that is, through works of justice, so is he also ordained to death through earthly deeds, that is, through works of sin. Hence, as there is in God an enrollment of those ordained to life, so is there also in Him an enrollment of those ordained to death. Consequently, just as there is said to be a book of life in God, so should there also be said to be in Him a book of death. 2. The book of life is said to be in God only inasmuch as He has a list of those for whom He has prepared an eternal reward—a list resembling that which a ruler on earth has, containing the names of those whom he has decided to honor. But a ruler on earth has a list of punishments and tortures as well as a list of honors and rewards. Therefore, God also has a book of death. 3. just as God knows the predestination by which He prepares some for life, so does He also know His reprobation by which He prepares others for death. Now, the knowledge which God has of His predestination is called the book of life, as mentioned earlier. Therefore, His knowledge of reprobation should be called the book of death. To the Contrary According to Dionysius, “We should not venture to say anything about God unless we can support what we are saying from Scripture.” Now, we do not find anything in Scripture that refers to a book of death as it refers to the book of life. Therefore, we should not affirm the existence of a book of death. REPLY A person’s knowledge about matters written in a book is superior to his knowledge of other matters. Hence, in connection with God’s knowledge of things, the term book is used of knowledge that is superior in kind to His knowledge of other truths. Now, there are two kinds of knowledge in God, namely, knowledge of simple understanding and knowledge of approval. His knowledge of simple understanding concerns all things, both the good and the evil; but His knowledge of approval concerns only the good. Hence, the good are known to God in a more special way than the others; and for this reason they are said to be written in a book, while the evil are not. Consequently, a book of death is not spoken of as the book of life is. Answers to Difficulties 1. Some explain “heavenly deeds” as meaning the labors of the contemplative life, and “earthly deeds” as meaning the labors of the active life. If a person performs one or the other, however, he is enrolled for life and not for death. Therefore, both enrollments pertain to the book of life and neither to a book of death. Others understand “earthly deeds” as meaning works of sin, which, taken by themselves, simply ordain a person to death, although he may, for another reason, be ordained to life inasmuch as he may rise again after his fall, more cautious and humble. One might also answer—and this is the better explanation—that when a thing is said to be known by means of some other thing, this statement can be understood in two ways. First, by means of may signify the cause of the knowledge on the part of the knower. This cannot be its meaning in the Gloss, however, because the works one does’ whether they be good or bad, are not a cause of God’s foreknowledge ‘ of His predestination, or of His eternal reprobation. Second, by means of may signify the cause on the part of what is known. This is its meaning in the Gloss. For a person is engraved on God’s memory by means of the works he has done, not because his works of the kind described are the cause of God’s knowing him, but because God knows that on account of these works he will possess life or death. It is clear from this that the Gloss is not speaking of that enrollment for life which pertains to the book of life and is on the part of God. 2. Things are written in a book so that they may be known forever. Men who are punished, however, are kept by their very punishments from being known by other men. Hence, their names are written down only. temporarily until the time when their punishment is inflicted upon them. But those who are thought worthy of honors and rewards have their names written down unconditionally in order that they may be kept, as it were, in everlasting memory. 3. God does not have a special knowledge of the reprobate as He has of the predestined. Hence, no comparison can be made.",
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        "text": "Quæstio est de libro vitæ; et primo quæritur utrum liber vitæ sit aliquid creatum. Et videtur quod sic. Quia Apocal. xx, super illud: Alius liber apertus est, qui est liber vitæ, dicit Glossa ordin.: « Idest, Christus, qui tunc apparebit potens, et suis dabit vitam. » Sed Christus in judicio in forma humana erit, quæ non est aliquid increatum. Ergo liber vitæ nihil increatum dicit.\n\n2. Præterea, Gregorius in Moralibus, lib. XXIV, cap. viii, dicit, quod « Liber vitæ dicitur ipse judex venturus: quia quisquis eum viderit, mox cuncta quæ fecit, ad memoriam revocabit.» Sed Christo datum est judicium secundum humanam naturam, ut patet Joan. v, 27: Potestatem dedit ei judicium facere, quia Filius hominis est. Ergo Christus secundum humanam naturam est liber vitæ; et sic idem quod prius.\n\n3. Præterea, liber dicitur ex hoc quod est receptivus scripturæ. Sed receptivum dicitur aliquid ex potentia materiali, quæ in Deo esse non potest. Ergo liber vitæ non dicitur aliquid increatum.\n\n4. Præterea, liber, cum importet quam-dam collectionem, designat distinctionem et differentiam. Sed in natura increata, quæ est simplicissima, nulla diversitas inventur. Igitur liber ibi dici non potest.\n\n5. Præterea, in quolibet libro differt scriptura libri ab ipso libro. Scriptura autem libri dicuntur figuræ, quibus cognoscimus quæ in libro scripta sunt et leguntur. Ideæ autem quibus Deus res cognoscit, non sunt aliud quam divina essentia. Ergo ipsa natura increata liber dici non potest. 6. Sed dicendum quod quamvis in natura divina non sit aliqua realis differentia, est tamen ibi aliqua differentia secundum rationem. — Sed contra, quod est secundum rationem solum, est in intellectu nostro tantum. Si igitur differentia quam liber requirit, est solum secundum rationem, oportet quod sit tantum in intellectu nostro liber vitæ; et ita non erit quid increatum.\n\n7. Præterea, liber vitæ videtur esse cognitio divina de salvandis. Cognitio autem salvandorum sub scientia visionis continetur: cum enim anima Christi omnia in Verbo videat quæ Deus cognoscit scientia visionis, videtur etiam quod numerum electorum cognoscat, et omnes electos. Ergo anima Christi liber vitæ dici potest; et sic est aliquid creatum.\n\n8. Præterea, Eccli. xxiv, 32, dicitur: Hæc omnia liber vitæ. Glossa ordinaria ibi: « Idest novum et vetus testamentum. » Sed hæc sunt quid creatum. Ergo liber vitæ dicitur quid creatum.\n\n9. Præterea, liber videtur ex eo dici quod in eo est aliquid scriptum; scriptura autem aliquam difformitatem requirit; unde et intellectus noster in sui principio propter sui puritatem comparatur tabulæ in qua nihil est scriptum. Sed divina natura multo est purior et simplicior quam intellectus noster. Ergo non potest dici liber.\n\n10. Præterea, liber est ad hoc quod in eo legatur. Sed non potest dici quod divina natura sit liber, quia ipse in se ipso legat; ut per Augustinum patet, qui dicit, quod non dicitur ideo liber vitæ, quia aliquid in se ipso legat ad hoc quod cognoscat in se quæ prius nescivit. Sim-liter nec potest dici liber quia alius in eo legat: nullus enim potest legere aliquid nisi ubi inventur aliqua difformitas, sicut in charta nec scripta nihil legitur propter sui uniformitatem. Ergo divina natura increata liber dici non potest.\n\n12. Præterea, nihil est signum sui ipsius. Liber autem est signum ipsius veritatis. Cum ergo Deus sit ipsa veritas, non potest ipsemet liber dici.\n\n13. Præterea, alio modo est scientia principium liber quam magister. Sed omnis sapientia dicitur esse a Deo tamquam a magistro. Non ergo quasi a libro.\n\n14. Præterea, alio modo præsentatur res in speculo quam in libro. Sed Deus dicitur speculum, Sapientia, vii, propter hoc quod res omnes præsentantur in ipso. Ergo non debet dici liber.\n\n15. Præterea, ab uno libro originali, etiam qui transcribuntur, libri dicuntur. Sed mentes humanæ et angelicæ quodammodo transcribuntur a mente divina, dum ab ea cognitionem de rebus accipiunt. Si ergo mens divina liber vitæ dicitur; et mentes creatæ libri debent dici; et sic liber vitæ non semper dicit quid increatum.\n\n16. Præterea, liber vitæ videtur importare præsentationem vitæ, et quamdam causalitatem ad vitam. Sed hoc totum convenit Christo secundum quod homo; quia etiam in ipso, sicut in exemplari, præsentatur omnis vita gratiae et gloriae, ut dictum est Moysi Exod. xxv, 4: Vade, et fac omnia secundum exemplar quod tibi in monte monstratum est. Similiter ipse nobis vitam promeruit. Ergo ipse secundum quod homo, potest dici liber vitæ.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod liber in divinis non potest dici nisi metaphorice, ut ipsa præsentatio vitæ liber vitæ dicatur. Et ad hoc sciendum quod vita dupliciter præsentari potest: uno modo ipsa vita secundum se; alio modo secundum quod ab aliquibus participabilis est. Vita autem secundum se ipsam præsentari potest dupliciter. Uno modo per modum doctrinæ: quæ quidem præsentatio maxime pertinet ad auditum, qui est maxime sensus disciplinæ, ut dicitur in principio de sensu et sensato; et hoc modo liber vitæ dicitur in quo continetur doctrina de vita consequenda; et sic novum et vetus testamentum liber vitæ dicuntur. Alio modo per modum exemplaris; et hæc quidem præsentatio pertinet ad visum; et sic liber vitæ dicitur ipse Christus, quia in eo sicut in exemplari, possumus aspicere qualiter sit vivendum, ut perveniamus ad vitam æternam. Sic autem nunc non agimus de libro vitæ; sed secundum quod liber vitæ dicitur præsentatio eorum qui ad vitam pervenient, qui dicuntur in libro vitæ conscripti secundum quamdam similitudinem ad res humanas. In qualibet enim multitudine quæ providentia regitur alicujus gubernantis, ad multitudinem illam nullus admittitur nisi secundum gubernantis ordinationem; et ideo illi qui debent admittii ad collegium multitudinis, conscribuntur quasi illius multitudinis consortes; et ex illa conscriptione dirigitur princeps multitudinis in admittendis vel excludendis ad consortium illius multitudinis sibi subjectæ. Multitudo autem quæ convenientissimo modo gubernatur, est collegium Ecclesiae triumphantis, quæ civitas Dei vocatur in Scripturis; et ideo conscriptio illorum qui ad illam societatem sunt admittendi, sive præsentatio, liber vitæ dicitur: quod patet ex modo loquendi in Scripturis; dicitur enim Lucæ, x, 20: Gaudete, quia nomina vestra scripta sunt in cælis, idest in libro vitæ; et Isa. iv, 3: Sanctus vocabitur omnis qui scriptus fuerit in vita in Hierusalem; Heb. xii, 22: Accessistis ad montem Sion, et civitatem Dei viventis Hierusalem cælestem, et multorum millium Angelorum frequentiam, et Ecclesiam primitivorum, qui conscripti sunt in cælis. Oportet igitur, ut similitudinem sequamur, ut ex hac conscriptione dirigatur ad vitam conferendam ille qui tali multitudini præest; quod soli Deo convenit. Ipse autem non dirigitur ab aliquo creato cum sit regula a nulla extrinseco directa. Unde liber vitæ, secundum quod nunc de eo loquimur, aliquid increatum dicit. Ad primum ergo et secundum patet responsio ex dictis in corp. art. Loquitur enim Glossa et auctoritas Gregorii de libro vitæ secundum aliam acceptanceem, secundum quam dicitur exemplar vivendi: quo inspecto quilibet scire poterit, in quo exemplari concordaverit, et in quo discordaverit.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod in illis quæ translative dicuntur de Deo, hoc est generaliter observandum quod secundum nullam imperfectionem in divinam prædicationem assumantur; et ideo auferendum est quidquid ad materialitatem vel privationem vel temporalitatem pertinet. Quod autem sit liber acceptivus alicujus extraneæ impressionis, convenit libro inquantum est temporalis, et de novo conscriptus; et secundum hoc in divinam prædicationem non venit.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod de ratione libri est quod importat differentiam eorum quæ cognoscuntur per librum; quia per unum librum multorum cognitio traditur: sed quod oporteat, ad multorum cognitionem tradendam, in ipso libro esse diversita'em, hoc est ex defectu libri: multo enim esset liber perfectior, si per unum quoddam posset omnia edocere quæ per multa edisserit. Unde cum in Deo sit summa perfectio, ipse talis liber est qui multa demonstrat per id quod est maxime unum.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod hoc est ex defectu libri materialis, quod litteræ in eo scriptæ differunt a charta in qua scribuntur: hoc enim ad ejus compositionem pertinet, ex qua contingit ut habens non sit id quod habetur; et ideo in Deo hujusmodi rationes rerum non differunt ab essentia ejus secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod quamvis diversitas inter scripturam et id in quo scribitur sit in ratione tantum; tamen repræsentatio, quæ complet rationem libri, non est tantum in ratione nostra, sed in Deo; et ideo liber vitæ secundum rem est in Deo.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod liber vitæ, ut dictum est in corp. art., habet dirigere Deum, qui dat vitam, in hoc quod vitam det. Quamvis autem anima Christi habeat in se cognitionem omnium salvandorum, tamen ex hac cognitione non dirigitur Deus, sed ex cognitione intrinseca, quæ est ipse. Unde scientia snimæ Christi non potest dici liber vitæ secundum quod de eo hic loquimur. Ad octavum patet responsio ex dictis.\n\nAd nonum dicendum quod, quamvis in Deo nulla sit diversitas, sed summa puritas; tamen comparatur libro scripto, et non tabulæ non scriptæ, sicut intellectus noster. Intellectus enim noster secundum hoc comparatur tabulæ rasæ quod est in potentia ad omnes formas iutelligibiles, et nulla earum sit in actu; sed in intellectu divino sunt omnes formæ rerum in actu, et omnes in eo sunt unum; et ideo cum uniformitate stat ibi ratio scripturæ.\n\nAd decimum dicendum quod in libro vitæ et ipse Deus legit, et alii legere possunt, secundum quod eis datur; nec Augustinus removere intendit quin Deus in libro vitæ legat; sed quia hoc modo non legit ut cognoscat quæ prius nescivit. Aliii etiam in eo legere possunt, quamvis sit uniformis per totum, inquantum secundum unum et idem est ratio diversorum.\n\nAd undecimum dicendum quod similitudo rei est duplex: una est quæ est exemplaris; et hæc est causa rei; alia quæ est exemplata; et hæc est effectus et signum rei. Liber autem conformatur apud nos scientiæ nostræ, quæ est causata a rebus; et ideo ab eo accipitur cognitio de rebus non sicut a causa, sed sicut a signo. Sed scientia Dei est causa rerum, continens rerum similitudines exemplares; et ideo a libro vitæ accipitur scientia sicut a causa, et non sicut a signo.\n\nAd duodecimum dicendum quod liber vitæ et est ipsa veritas increata, et est similitudo veritatis creatæ; sicut liber creatus est signum veritatis.\n\nAd decimum tertium dicendum quod in Deo exemplaris causa et efficiens incidunt in idem; et ideo ex hoc quod est causa exemplaris, potest dici liber; ex hoc autem quod est efficiens causa sapientia, potest dici magister.\n\nAd decimum quartum dicendum quod repræsentatio speculi in hoc differt a repræsentatione libri, quod repræsentatio speculi immediate refertur ad res, sed liber mediante cognitione; continentur enim in libro figuræ, quæ sunt signa vocum, quæ sunt signa intellectuum, quæ sunt similitudines rerum; in speculo autem ipsæ formæ rerum resultant. In Deo autem resultant utroque modo rerum species, inquantum ipse cognoscit res, et cognoscit se cognoscere eas; et ideo ratio speculi et ratio libri ibi inveniuntur.\n\nAd decimum quintum dicendum quod etiam mentes Sanctorum libri dici possunt, ut patet Apocal. xx, 12: Libri aperti sunt: quod Augustinus exponit de conscientiis justorum; non possunt tamen dici libri vitæ per modum prius dictum; ut ex dictis patet.\n\nAd decimumsextum dicendum, quod licet Christus, secundum quod homo, sit exemplar et causa vitæ aliquo modo; non tamen, secundum quod homo, est causa vitæ gloriæ per auctoritatem, nec est exemplar Deum dirigens ad dandum vitam; unde secundum quod homo, non potest dici libri vitæ.\n\nUtrum liber vitæ dicatur in divinis personaliter, vel essentialiter. — I part., qu. xxxix, art. viii. Secundo quæritur utrum liber vitæ dicatur essentialiter, vel personaliter, in divinis. Et videtur quod personaliter. In Psalm. enim xxxix, 9, dicitur: In capite libri scriptum est de me; Glossa ordinaria ibi: « Apud Patrem, qui est caput mei. » Sed nihil habet caput in divinis nisi quod habet principium; quod autem habet principium, personaliter dicitur in divinis. Ergo liber vitæ dicitur personaliter.\n\n2. Præterea, sicut verbum dicit notitiam ex alio procedentem, ita et liber, quia scriptura libri a scriptore procedit. Sed verbum, ratione prædicta, quæst. præced. art. 11, dicitur personaliter in divinis. Ergo et liber vitæ. 3. Sed dicendum quod verbum importat processum realem, liber autem processionem rationis tantum. — Sed contra, nos non possumus nominare Deum nisi ex his quæ apud nos sunt. Sed sicut apud nos verbum a prolatore procedit realiter distinctum ab eo, ita et liber a scriptore. Ergo eadem ratione utrumque importabit in divinis distinctionem realem.\n\n4. Præterea, verbum vocis magis distat a dicente quam verbum cordis; et adhuc magis verbum scripturæ, quod significat verbum vocis. Si ergo Verbum divinum, quod sumitur ad similitudinem verbi cordis, ut Augustinus dicit XV De Trinit., cap. xi, realiter distinguitur a dicente; multo magis liber, qui scripturam importat.\n\n5. Præterea, illud quod attribuitur ali-cui, oportet quod ei conveniat secundum omnia quæ sunt de ratione ipsius. Sed de ratione libri non solum est quod aliqid repræsentet; sed etiam quod ab aliquo scribatur. Ergo in divinis accipitur nomen libri secundum quod est ab alio; et sic personaliter dicitur.\n\n6. Præterea, sicut de ratione libri est quod legatur, ita quod scribatur. Sed secundum quod scribitur, est ab alio; secundum quod legitur, est ad alium. Ergo de ratione libri est quod sit ad alium et ab alio; et sic personaliter dicitur.\n\n7. Præterea, liber vitæ dicit notitiam expressam ab alio. Sed quod exprimitur ab alio, oritur ab eo. Ergo liber vitæ importat relationem originis, et sic dicitur personaliter.\n\nSed contra est, quod liber vitæ est ipsa divina prædestinatio, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. De civit. Dei XX, cap. xv in fin., et ut habetur in Glossa Apoc. xx ordinaria, et interlin. super illud: Liber apertus est. Sed prædestinatio dicitur essentialiter, et nunquam personaliter. Ergo et liber vitæ.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod liber vitæ quandoque dicitur personaliter, quandoque essentialiter; secundum enim quod transfertur in divina ex ratione scripturæ, dicitur personaliter, et secundum hoc importat originem ab alio, liber enim non nisi ab alio scribitur; secundum autem quod importat repræsentationem eorum quæ in libro scribuntur, dicitur essentialiter. Sed ista distinctio non videtur rationabilis; quia nomen aliquod dictum de Deo non dicitur personaliter nisi de sui ratione originem relationis importet, secundum hoc quod in divinam prædicationem venit. In his autem quæ translative dicuntur, non accipitur metaphora secundum quamcumque similitudinem, sed secundum convenientiam in illo quod est de propria ratione rei cujus nomen transfertur; sicut nomen leonis in Deo non transfertur propter convenientiam quæ est in sensibilitate, sed propter convenientiam in aliqua proprietate leonis. Unde et liber vitæ non transfertur ad divina secundum id quod est commune omni artificiato, sed secundum id quod est proprium libri inquantum liber. Procedere autem a scriptore non convenit libro inquantum est liber, sed inquantum est artificiatum; sic enim et domus est ab artifice, et cultellus a fabro. Sed repræsentatio eorum quæ scribuntur in libro, est de propria ratione libri in quantum hujusmodi; unde tali repræsentatione manente, etiamsi ab alio scriptus non esset, esset quidem liber, sed non esset artificiatus. Unde patet quod liber, non transumitur ad divina ex hoc quod ab alio scribitur, sed ex hoc quod repræsentat ea quæ scribuntur in libro. Et ideo, cum repræsentatio sit communis toti Trinitati, liber in divinis non dicitur personaliter, sed essentialiter tantum.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod ea quæ in divinis essentialiter dicuntur, aliquando pro personis supponunt; unde hoc nomen « Deus » quandoque supponit pro persona Patris, quandoque pro persona Filii, ut cum dicitur Deus generans, vel Deus genitus; et ita etiam liber, quamvis essentialiter dicatur, tamen potest supponere pro persona Filii; et secundum hoc dicitur habere caput vel principium in divinis.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod verbum, secundum suam rationem qua in divinis dicitur, importat originem ex alio, ut in quæst. de Verbo, art. 1 et 11, dictum est; liber autem non importat originem ex sua ratione, secundum quam ad divina transfertur; et ideo non est simile.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod quamvis liber apud nos realiter procedat a scriptore, sicut verbum a prolatore, tamen ista processio non importatur in nomine libri, sicut importatur in nomine verbi; non enim plus importatur in nomine libri processus a scriptore quam in nomine domus processio ab aedificatore.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod ratio illa procedetet, si de ratione libri esset verbum scriptum; hoc autem non est verum; unde ratio non sequitur.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod ratio illa tenet in his quæ propre dicuntur; in his autem quæ metaphorice dicuntur, sicut liber, non oportet quod conveniat ei secundum omnia de quo prædicatur quæ ei conveniunt proprie; alias oporteret quod Deus, qui dicitur leo metaphorice, haberet ungulas et pilos. Ad sextum patet responsio ex dictis, et similiter ad septimum.\n\nTertio quæritur utrum liber vitæ approprietur Filio; et videtur quod non. Liber enim vitæ ad vitam pertinet quæ attributur Spiritui sancto in Scripturis; Joan. vi, 64: Spiritus est qui vivificat. Ergo et liber vitæ Spiritui sancto appropriatur, et non Filio.\n\n2. Præterea, principium in unoquoque potissimum est. Sed Pater dicitur caput sive principium libri, ut patet in Ps. xxxix, 9: In capite libri scriptum est de me. Ergo Patri appropriari debet nomen libri.\n\n3. Præterea, illud in quo aliquid scribitur, habet proprie rationem libri. Sed in memoria dicitur aliquid scribi. Ergo memoria habet rationem libri. Sed memoria appropriatur Patri, sicut intelligentia Filio, et voluntas Spiritui sancto. Ergo liber vitæ debet Patri appropriari.\n\n4. Præterea, caput libri Pater est. Sed in capite libri, ut in Psal. habetur, scribitur de Filio. Ergo Pater est liber Filii, et sic Patri debet appropriari.\n\nSed contra, Augustinus dicit, XX De civit. Dei, cap. xv, in fin., quod liber vitæ, est præscientia Dei. Sed scientia Filio appropriatur, I Corinth. 1, 24: Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam. Ergo et liber vitæ Filio appropriatur. Præterea, liber repræsentationem importat, sicut speculum et imago et character et figura. Sed omnia ista Filio appropriantur vel attribuuntur. Ergo et liber vitæ Filio appropriari debet.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod appropriare nihil est aliud quam commune trahere ad proprium. Illud autem quod est commune toti Trinitati, non potest trahiad proprium alicujus personæ, ex hoc quod magis uni personæ quam alii conveniat; hoc enim aæqualitati personarum repugnaret; sed ex hoc quod id quod est commune, majorem habet similitudinem ad id quod est proprium personæ unius, quam cum proprio alterius; sicut bonitas habet quamdam convenientiam cum proprio Spiritus sancti, qui procedit ut amor (est enim bonitas objectum amoris); et similiter potentia appropriatur Patri, quia potentia inquantum hujusmodi est quoddam principium; Patri autem proprium est esse principium totius Divinitatis: et eadem ratione sapientia appropriatur Filio; quia habet convenientiam cum proprio ejus; procedit enim Filius a Patre ut verbum, quod nominat processionem intellectus. Unde, cum liber vitæ ad notitiam pertineat, Filio appropriari debet.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod quamvis vita appropriatur Spiritui sancto, tamen vitæ cognitio appropriatur Filio: hanc autem liber vitæ importat.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod Pater dicitur caput libri, non quia sibi ratio libri magis conveniat quam Filio; sed quia Filius, cui appropriatur liber vitæ, a Patre oritur.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod non est inconveniens aliquid appropriari diversis personis ratione diversa; sicut donum sapientia appropriatur Spiritui sancto inquantum est donum; omnis enim doni principium est amor; sed appropriatur Filio inquantum est sapientia; et similiter memoria appropriatur Patri inquantum est principium intelligentiæ; secundum autem quod est quædam potentia cognitiva, appropriatur Filio; et hoc modo dicitur in memoria aliquid scribi: et sic memoria potest habere rationem libri; unde et liber magis appropriatur Filio quam Patri.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod quamvis liber appropriatur Filio, tamen etiam convenit Patri, cum sit commune, non proprium; et ideo non est inconveniens, si in Patre aliquid scribi dicatur.\n\nQuarto quæritur utrum liber vitæ sit idem quod prædestinatio; et videtur quod sic. Augustinus enim dicit, XX De civit. Dei, cap. xv, in fin., quod liber vitæ est prædestinatio eorum quibus debetur vita æterna.\n\n2. Præterea, attributa divina per effectus eorum cognoscimus. Sed idem est effectus prædestinationis et libri vitæ, scilicet finalis gratia et gloria. Ergo idem est prædestinatio, et liber vitæ.\n\n3. Præterea, quidquid dicitur metaphorice in divinis, oportet reduci ad aliquid dictum proprie. Sed liber vitæ dicitur metaphorice in divinis. Ergo oportet ad aliquid proprie dictum reduci. Sed non potest ad aliquid magis proprie dictum reduci quam ad prædestinationem. Ergo liber vitæ est idem quod prædestinatio. 1. Sed contra, liber dicitur ex eo quod in eo aliquid scribitur. Sed ratio scripturæ ad prædestinationem non pertinet. Ergo prædestinatio non est idem quod liber vitæ.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis, art. 1 hujus quæst. patet, liber vitæ dicitur in divinis ad similitudinem scripturæ, per quam princeps civitatis dirigitur in admittendis vel excludendis a civitatis suæ consortio. Hæc autem scriptura inter duas operationes media inventur. Sequitur enim determinationem ipsius principis, qui eligit eos quos vult admittere ab his quos excludit, et præcedit ipsam admissionem vel exclusionem: scriptura autem prædicta non est nisi repräsentatio suæ prædestinationis. Ita etiam et liber vitæ nihil aliud est quam quædam conscriptio divina prædestinationis in mente divina: prædestinatio enim prædestinat eos qui sunt ad vitam gloriæ admittendi. Hujusmodi autem autem prædestinationis notitia semper apud Deum manet; et hoc quod est cognoscere se prædestinasse aliquos, est suam prædestinationem in eo esse scriptam quasi in libro vitæ. Liber autem vitæ et prædestinatio, formaliter loquendo, non sunt idem; sed materialiter est liber vitæ ipsa prædestinatio; sicut dicimus, quod liber iste, materialiter loquendo, est doctrina Apostoli, quia doctrina Apostoli in eo conscripta continetur. Et hoc modo loquitur Augustinus cum dicit XX De civit. Dei, cap. xv, in fin., quod liber vitæ est prædestinatio. Unde patet responsio ad primum.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod quamvis eumdem effectum respiciant liber vitæ et prædestinatio, non tamen eodem modo; sed prædestinatio respicit illum effectum — B omittit: « In divinis. » immediate, liber autem vitæ mediante prædestinatione; sicut etiam in anima sunt rerum similitudines immediate; sed in libro conscribuntur signa vocum, quæ sunt notæ passionum in anima; et ita liber mediate est signum rei.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod liber vitæ ad aliquid proprie dictum in divinis reducitur: hoc autem non est prædestinatio, sed prædestinationis cognitio, qua Deus aliquod se prædestinasse cognoscit. Ad ea quæ contra objiciuntur, non esset difficile respondere.\n\nQuinto quæritur utrum liber vitæ dicatur respectu vitæ increatæ; et videtur quod sic. Quia, ut dicit Augustinus, XX De civit. Dei, cap. xiv, liber vitæ est notitia Dei. Sed Deus sicut cognoscit vitam alienam, ita cognoscit suam. Ergo liber vitæ respicit etiam vitam increatam.\n\n2. Præterea, liber vitæ est repræsentatio vitæ. Sed non vitæ creatæ: primum enim non repræsentat secundum, sed e converso. Ergo liber vitæ est repræsentativus vitæ increatæ.\n\n3. Præterea, quod de pluribus dicitur, de uno per prius et de alio per posterius dictum, simpliciter intelligitur de eo de quo per prius dicitur. Sed vita per prius de Deo dicitur quam de creaturis: quia ejus vita omnis vitæ est origo, ut ostendit Dionysius De divin. nomin., cap. VII, Ergo cum in libro vitæ, vita simpliciter nominetur, debet intelligi de vita increata'.\n\n4. Præterea, sicut liber repræsentationem importat, ita et figura; maxime cum liber figuris quibusdam repræsentet. Sed Filius dicitur figura Patris, Heb. I. Ergo et Filius potest dici liber respectu vitæ Patris.\n\n5. Præterea, liber dicitur respectu ejus quod in libro scribitur. Sed in libro scribitur de Filio, juxta illud Psalm. xxxix, 9: In capite libri scriptum est de me. Vita autem Filii est increata. Ergo liber vitæ potest respicere vitam increatam.\n\n6. Præterea, non potest esse idem liber et cujus est liber, respectu ejusdem. Sed creatura est liber respectu Dei. Ergo Deus non potest dici liber respectu vitæ creatæ; ergo restat quod liber vitæ dicitur respectu vitæ increatæ.\n\n7. Præterea, sicut liber ad cognitionem pertinet, ita et verbum. Sed verbum per prius est ipsius divinæ essentiæ quam creaturæ: Pater enim, dicendo se, dicit omnem creaturam. Ergo et liber vitæ per prius respicit vitam increatam quam creatam.\n\nSed contra, secundum Augustinum, XX De civit. Dei, cap. x, in fin., liber vitæ est prædestinatio. Prædestinatio autem non respicit nisi creaturas. Ergo nec liber vitæ. Præterea, liber non repræsentat aliquid nisi per aliquas figuras et similitudines. Sed Deus non cognoscit se ipsum per aliquas similitudines, sed per essentiam suam. Ergo ipse non est liber respectu sui ipsius.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod sicut ex dictis, art. præced. et artic. I, patet, liber vitæ est quædam conscriptio, per quam dirigitur conferens vitam in vitæ collatione, secundum quod de aliquo præordinatum erat; et ideo vita respectu cujus liber vitæ dicitur, duo habet. Unum est, quod est acquisita per collationem alicuus; aliud est, quia consequitur conscriptionem prædictam dirigentem in ipsam. Utrumque autem deest vitæ increatæ: quia vita gloriæ non inest Deo per acquisitionem, sed per naturam; nec aliqua notitia vitam ejus præcedit; sed ipsa Dei vita præcedit, secundum modum intelligendi, etiam ipsius notitiam. Unde liber vitæ non potet dici respectu vitæ increatæ.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod non quælibet notitia dicitur liber vitæ; sed illa quæ est de vita quam habituri sunt prædestinati; ut ex sequentibus verbis in auctoritate haberi potest.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod repræsentare aliquid est similitudinem ejus continere. Duplex autem est rei similitudo. Una quæ est factiva rei, sicut quæ est in intellectu practico; et per modum hujus similitudinis primum potest repræsentare secundum. Alia autem est similitudo accepta a re cujus est; et per hunc modum posterius repræsentat primum, et non e converso. Liber autem vitæ non hoc modo, sed primo, vitam repræsentat. B, Comittunt: « Increata. »\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod simpliciter dictum intelligitur quando de eo quod per posterius dicitur, ratione alicujus adjuncti; sicut ens in alio intelligitur accidens; et similiter vita ratione ejus quod adjungitur, scilicet liber, intelligitur de vita creata, quae per posterius vita dicitur.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod figura representat id cujus est figura, quodammodo ut principium; eo quod figura et imago deducitur ab exemplari sicut a principio; sed liber vita representat vitam ut principiatum ab ipso. Deo autem competit esse principium Filii, qui est figura Patris; sed non competit vita ejus quod aliquid sit ipsius principium; et ideo non est simile de vita et figura.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod illud intelligitur de Filio secundum humanam naturam.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod causa representat effectum, et e converso, ut ex dictis patet; et secundum hoc Deus potest dici liber creaturæ, et e converso.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod verbum non significatur ut principium ejus quod per verbum dicitur, sicut liber vita, prout hic accipitur; et ideo non est simile.\n\nUtrum liber vita respectu vita naturæ in creaturis dicatur. — Ibidem. Sexto quæritur utrum liber vita dicatur respectu vita naturæ in creaturis; et videtur quod sic. Quia sicut vita gloriæ representatur in Dei notitia, ita et vita naturæ. Sed Dei notitia dicitur liber vita respectu vita gloriæ. Ergo etiam debet dici respectu vita naturæ.\n\n2. Præterea, divina notitia continet omnia per modum vita; quia, ut dicitur Joan. 1 3, quod factum est, in ipso vita erat. Ergo debet dici liber vita respectu omnium, et maxime viventium.\n\n3. Præterea, sicut ex divina providentia aliquis præordinatur ad vitam gloriæ, ita et ad vitam naturæ. Sed notitia præordinationis ad vitam gloriæ dicitur liber vita, ut dictum est prius, art. præced. Ergo et notitia præordinationis ad vitam naturæ dici potest liber vita.\n\n4. Præterea, Apoc. 11, super illud: Non delebo nomina eorum de libro vita, dicit Glossa ordin.: « Liber vita est divina notitia, in qua constant omnia. » Ergo liber vita dicitur respectu omnium; et ita etiam respectu vita naturæ.\n\n5. Præterea, liber vita est notitia quædam de vita gloriæ. Sed non potest cognosci vita gloriæ nisi cognoscatur vita naturæ. Ergo liber vita respicit vitam naturæ.\n\n6. Præterea, nomen vita translatum est a vita naturæ ad vitam gloriæ. Sed verius dicitur aliquid de eo quod proprie dicitur quam de eo quod ad hoc transumitur. Ergo liber vita magis respicit vitam naturæ quam vitam gloriæ.\n\n7. Præterea, id quod est permanentius et communius, est nobilius. Sed vita naturæ est permanentior quam vita gloriæ vel gratiae; et similiter communior; quia vita naturæ sequitur ad vitam gratiae et gloriæ, sed non convertitur. Ergo vita naturæ est nobiliar quam vita gratiae et gloriæ; ergo liber vita magis respicit vitam naturæ quam vitam gloriæ vel gratiae.\n\nSed contra, liber vita est quodammodo prædestinatio, ut patet per Augustinum. Sed prædestinatio non est de vita naturæ. Ergo nec liber vita. Præterea, liber vita est de illa vita quæ immediate a Deo datur. Sed vita naturæ datur a Deo mediantibus causis naturalibus. Ergo liber vita non est de vita naturæ.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod liber vita est quædam notitia dirigens datorem vita in vita collatione, ut dictum est supra. In collatione autem aliqua non indigemus directione nisi propter hoc quod oportet discernere eos quibus dandum est, ab eis quibus dandum non est. Unde liber vita non est nisi respectu illius vita quæ cum electione datur. Vita autem naturalis, sicut et alia bona naturalia, communiter omnibus datur, secundum quod unusquisque est capax; et ideo respectu vita naturæ non est liber vita, sed solum respectu illius vita quæ, secundum propositum Dei eligentis, quibusdam datur et quibusdam non datur.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod quam vis vita naturæ repräsentetur in Dei notitia, sicut et vita gloriæ; non tamen notitia vita naturæ habet rationem libri vita, sicut notitia vita gloriæ, ratione prædicta.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod liber vita non dicitur liber vita quia vivit; sed liber qui est de vita ad quam aliqui secundum electionem praeordinantur, qui sunt conscripti in libro.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod providentia Dei vitam aliquibus providet ut debitum naturæ ipsorum; sed vitam gloriæ non providet nisi ex beneplacito suæ voluntatis; et ideo vitam naturæ dat omnibus qui capere possunt, non autem vitam gloriæ; et propter hoc non est aliquis liber vitae naturæ, sicut est vitae gloriæ.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod Glossa illa non est intelligenda hoc modo quod omnia constant, idest contineantur, in libro vitae; sed quia omnia quæ in eo scribuntur, constant, idest firma sunt.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod liber vitae non solum importat notitiam respectu vitae gloriæ, sed etiam quamdam electionem; non autem respectu vitae naturæ, ut dictum est, in corp. artic.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod vita gloriæ est minus nota nobis quam vita naturæ; et ideo ex vita naturæ devenimus in cognitionem vitae gloriæ; et similiter ex vita naturæ gloriæ vitam nominamus, quamvis vita gloriæ plus habeat de ratione vitae; sicut ex his quæ sunt apud nos, nominamus Deum. Unde non oportet quod nomen vita intelligatur de vita naturæ, quando simpliciter profertur.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod vita gloriæ, quantum est in se, est permanentior quam vita naturæ, quia per vitam gloriæ vita naturæ stabilitur; sed per accidens vita naturæ est permanentior quam vita gratiae; inquantum scilicet, est propinquior viventi, cui secundum existentiam suam debetur vita naturæ, non autem vita gloriæ. Communiter autem est quodammodo vita naturæ, et quodammodo non. Dicitur enim dupliciter aliquid commune. Uno modo per consecutionem vel prædicationem; quando, scilicet, aliquod unum invenitur in multis secundum unam rationem; et sic illud quod est communius, non est nobilius, sed imperfectius; sicut animal homine; et hoc modo vita naturæ est communior quam gloriæ. Alio modo per modum causæ; sicut causa quæ, una numero manens, ad plures effectus se extendit; et sic illud quod est communius, est nobilius, ut conservatio civitatis quam conservatio familiæ est nobilius. Hoc autem modo vita naturæ non est communior quam vita gloriæ.\n\nSeptimo quæritur utrum liber vitae dicatur simpliciter respectu vitae gratiae; et videtur quod sic. Quia quod est in effectu, nobilius invenitur in causa, ut patet per Dionysium in lib. De divinis nominibus, cap. II, § vIII, Sed gloria est effectus gratiae. Ergo vita gratiae est nobiliar quam vita gloriæ; ergo liber vitae principalius respicit vitaam gratiae quam vitam gloriæ.\n\n2. Præterea, liber vitae est quædam prædestinationis conscriptio, ut supra, art. I et v hujus quæst., dictum est. Sed prædestination est communiter præparatio gratiae et gloriæ. Ergo et liber vitae utramque vitam communiter respicit.\n\n3. Præterea, per librum vitae aliqui designantur ut cives illius civitatis in qua est vita. Sed, sicut per vitam gloriæ aliqui efficiuntur cives Hierusalem cœlestis, ita per vitam gratiae aliquis efficitur civis Ecclesiæ militantis. Ergo liber vitae respicit vitaam gratiae sicut et gloriæ.\n\n4. Præterea, quod de pluribus dicitur, dictum simpliciter intelligitur de eo de quo per prius dicitur. Sed vita gratiae est prior vita gloriæ. Ergo, cum dicitur liber vitae, intelligitur de vita gratiae.\n\nSed contra, ille qui habet præsentem justitiam, simpliciter habet vitaum gratiae. Non autem dicitur simpliciter scriptus in libro vitae, sed solum secundum quid, idest secundum præsentem justitiam. Ergo liber vitae non respicit simpliciter vitaum gratiae. Præterea, finis est nobiliar his quæ sunt ad finem. Sed vita gloriæ est finis gratiae. Ergo est nobiliar; ergo simpliciter dicta vita intelligitur de vita gloriæ.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod liber vitae significat quamdam conscriptionem alicujus ad vitam obtinendam quasi quoddam præmium, et quasi possessionem quamdam; ad hujusmodi enim homines consueverunt conscribi. Illud autem proprie dicitur haberi ut possessio quod habetur ad nutum; et hoc est illud in quo nullum defectum patitur. Unde Philosophus dicit in principio Metaph., lib. I, cap. n a med., quod scientia quæ est de Deo, non est humana possessio, sed divina; quia solus Deus perfecte se ipsum cognoscit; homo autem ad cognoscendum ipsum deficiens inventur. Et ideo tunc vita habetur ut possessio, quando per vitam omnis defectus vitæ oppositus excluditur. Hoc autem facit vita gloriæ, in qua omnis mors et corporalis et spiritualis penitus absorbebitur, ut nec etiam remaneat potentia moriendi; non autem vita gratiae. Et ideo liber vitæ non respicit simpliciter vitam gratiae, sed gloriæ tantum.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod quædam causæ sunt nobiliores his quorum sunt causæ, scilicet efficiens, formalis, et finalis; et ideo quod est in talibus causis, nobilius est in eis quam in his quorum sunt causæ. Sed materia est imperfectior eo cujus est causa; et ideo aliquid est in materia minus nobiliter quam sit in materiato; in materia enim est incomplete et in potentia, et in materiato est actu. Omnis autem dispositio, quæ præparat subjectum ad aliquam formam vel perfectionem recipiendam, reducitur ad causam materialem; et hoc modo gratia est causa gloriæ; et ideo vita non est nobilius in gloria quam in gratia.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod prædestinatio non respicit gratiam nisi secundum quod ordinatur ad gloriam; unde esse prædestinatum non convenit nisi his qui habent finalem gratiam, quam sequitur gloria.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod quamvis illi qui habent vitam gratiae, sint cives Ecclesiæ militantis, tamen status Ecclesiæ militantis non est status in quo vita plene habetur, cum adhuc remaneat potentia ad mortem; et ideo respectu hujusmodi non dicitur liber vitæ.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod quamvis vita gratiae sit prior in via generationis quam vita gloriæ; tamen vita gloriæ est prior secundum viam perfectionis, ut finis his quæ sunt ad finem.\n\nUtrum sicut dicitur liber vitæ, possit dici liber mortis. Octavo quæritur utrum possit dici liber mortis, sicut dicitur liber vitæ; et videtur quod sic. Luc. x, 20, super illud: Gaudete, quia nomina vestra scripta sunt in cælis, dicit Glossa ordinar.: « Si quis cælestia sive terrestria gesserit, per hoc quasi litteris annotatus apud Dei memoriam æternaliter est affixus. » Sed sicut per opera cælestia, quæ sunt opera justi-tia, aliquis ordinatur ad vitam; ita per opera peccati, ordinatur ad mortem. Ergo sicut in Deo est conscriptio ordinata ad vitam, ita est ibi conscriptio ordinata ad mortem; ergo sicut in Deo dicitur liber vitæ, ita et liber mortis.\n\n2. Præterea, liber vitæ in Deo non po-nitur nisi inquantum apud se conscriptos habet quos ad præmia æterna præparavit ad similitudinem ejus quod princeps terre-nus conscriptos habet illos quos ad aliquas dignitates determinavit. Sed sicut princeps civitatis habet descriptas dignitates et præmia, ita etiam pœnas et supplicia. Ergo et similiter apud Deum debet poni liber mortis.\n\n3. Præterea, sicut Deus cognoscit præ-destinationem suam, qua alios præparavit ad vitam; ita cognoscit reprobationem suam, qua alios præparavit ad mortem. Sed ipsa notitia quam Deus habet de sua prædestinatione, dicitur liber vitæ, ut dictum est art. 1 hujus quæst. Ergo et notitia reprobationis debet dici liber mortis.\n\nSed contra, secundum Dionysium, libro De divinis nominibus, in principio, de divinis non est audendum aliquid dicere nisi quod est per auctoritatem sacræ Scripturæ introductum. Sed liber mortis non invenitur in Scriptura dici de Deo, sicut liber vitæ. Ergo non debemus po-nere librum mortis.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod de eo quod in libro scriptum habetur habet aliquis aliquam notitiam præ aliis privilegiatam; unde et respectu illorum scitorum a Deo liber dici debet de quibus aliquam specialem notitiam præ aliis habet. Est autem in Deo duplex cognitio; scilicet simplicis notitia scientia 1, et scientia approbationis. Scientia simplicis notitia communis est omnibus, bonis et malis; scientia autem approbationis est bonorum tantum; et ideo boni habent aliquam privilegiatam cognitionem in Deo præ aliis, ratione cujus in libro conscribi discuntur; non autem mali. Et ideo non dicitur liber mortis, sicut dicitur liber vitæ.: « Scientia.»\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod qui-dam opera cælestia exponunt de operibus contemplativæ vitæ, opera autem terrestria de operibus activæ. Per utraque autem aliquis conscribitur ad vitam, non ad mortem; et ita utraque conscriptio ad librum vitæ pertinet, et neutra ad librum mortis. Quidam vero per opera terrestria intelligunt opera peccati, per quæ quam-vis aliquis, per se loquendo, ordinetur ad mortem, tamen per accidens aliquis ordinatur ad vitam, inquantum aliquis post peccatum resurgit cautior et humilior. Vel potest dici, et melius, quod cum dicitur aliquid per alterum cognosci, hoc potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo ut præpositio designet causam cognitionis ex parte cognoscentis; et sic non potest intelligi in proposito; quia opera quæ quis facit, bona vel mala, non sunt causa neque divinæ præscientiæ vel prædestinationis, neque reprobationis æternæ. Alio modo ut designet causam ex parte cogniti; et sic intelligitur in proposito; dicitur enim aliquis esse annotatus apud Dei memoriam per opera quæ gessit, non quia hujusmodi opera sint causa quare Deus cognoscat; sed quia Deus cognoscit quod propter hujusmodi opera aliquis habiturus est mortem vel vitam. Unde patet quod Glossa illa non loquitur de conscriptione vitæ quæ pertinet ad librum vitæ, quæ est ex parte Dei.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod aliqua conscribuntur in libro, ut perpetuo in notitia maneant. Illi autem qui puniuntur, per pœnas ipsas exterminantur a notitia hominum; et ideo non conscribuntur, nisi forte ad tempus, quousque eis pœna infligatur. Sed illi qui deputantur ad dignitates et præmia, conscribuntur simpliciter, ut quasi in perpetua memoria habeantur."
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