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  "chapter": {
    "num": 12,
    "slug": "12-question-12",
    "title": "Question 12",
    "of": 29,
    "words": 32423,
    "text": "> **Translation:** Robert W. Mulligan, James V. McGlynn & Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952–1954). Verbatim public-domain scholarly text — quotable.\n>\n> **Public-domain basis:** Public domain (U.S.): published 1952–1954, copyright not renewed (NYPL CCE). US public domain. Full copyright-clearance evidence: [/about/translations/#pd-evidence](/about/translations/#pd-evidence).\n>\n> **Latin source:** Vivès edition (Paris, 1871–1880), provided as a parallel Latin edition (OCR-derived — for reading and search, not verbatim quotation).\n\n## Question 12\n\nARTICLE I This question concerns prophecy, and in the first article we ask: Is prophecy a habit or an act? [Parallel readings: Quodl. , XII, 17, 26; C.G. , III, 154; 1 Cor. , c. 14, lect. 6; Q.D. de pot. , 6, 4; S.T. , I-II, 68, 3, ad 3; II-II, 171, 2; 176, 2, ad 3.] Difficulties It seems that it is not a habit, for 1. As the Commentator says, a habit is that by which one performs an activity when he wants to. But the prophet cannot make use of prophecy when he wants to, as is clear of Eliseus in the fourth Book of Kings (3:14, 15), who, on being questioned by the king, could not give him an answer without calling the minstrel, so that the hand of the Lord might come upon him. Therefore, prophecy is not a habit. 2. Whoever has a cognitive habit can consider the subject matter of that habit without receiving anything from another. For one who needs an instructor for this does not yet have the habit. But a prophet cannot examine the subject matter of prophecy unless each event is revealed to him. Hence, in the fourth Book of Kings (4:27) Eliseus said of the woman whose son was dead: “Her soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me, and hath not told me.” Therefore, prophecy is not a cognitive habit. Nor can it be a different habit, for prophecy belongs to cognition. 3. It was said that the prophet needs a habit to be able to know those things which are divinely shown him.—On the contrary, divine speech is more efficacious than human speech. But no habit is needed for one to understand from human speech that something will take place. Therefore, there seems much less need of a habit to perceive the revelation by which God speaks to the prophet. 4. A habit suffices for the knowledge of the whole subject matter of that habit. But by the gift of prophecy one is not taught everything that can be prophesied. For, as Gregory says and proves by examples: “Sometimes the spirit of prophecy inspires the mind of the one prophesying for present events and not at all for the future, and sometimes touches it for the future and not for the present.” Therefore, the gift of prophecy is not a habit. 5. It was said that the subject matter of the gift of prophecy is not everything which can be prophesied but only that for the revelation of which the gift is given.—On the contrary, an inpouring can be limited only by that which gives it or by that which receives it. But the one receiving the inpouring of the gift of prophecy imposes no limitation to prevent it from extending to everything which can be prophesied, for the human intellect is capable of knowing all that can be prophesied. Nor is it limited by the one who gives it, for His liberality is infinite. Therefore, the gift of prophecy extends to everything which can be prophesied. 6. The affective part of the soul is so constituted that the one influx of grace frees the soul from all guilt. Therefore, the intellective part, also, is such that the influx of the one light of prophecy will cleanse the soul from all ignorance of things that can be prophesied. 7. A freely given habit is more perfect than an acquired habit. But an acquired habit extends to many acts. Therefore, if prophecy is a freely given habit, it, too, will extend not to only one of the things which can be prophesied, but to all of them. 8. If we had one habit for each conclusion, those habits would not be joined together in the habit of one complete science, unless the conclusions had somz connection in so far as they are deduced from the same principles. But future contingents of this sort and other things which prophecy concerns, do not have any interconnection, as the conclusions of a single science have. Therefore, it follows that, if prophecy is a habit, and if the gift of prophecy extends to only one of the things prophesied, there will be in one prophet as many habits of prophecy as there are things which he knows can be prophesied. 9. It was said that the habit of prophecy, once infused, extends to all that can be prophesied, but still a new revelation is needed to disclose certain species.—On the contrary, the infused habit of prophecy ought to be more perfect than the habit of an acquired science, and the prophetic light ought to be more perfect than the natural light of the agent intellect. But with the power of the light of the agent intellect and with the habit of a science, plus the added assistance of the power of imagination, we can form as many species as we need for the actual consideration of those things to which the habit extends. Therefore, if a prophet has a habit, he can do this much more readily without a new disclosure of any species. 10. As the Gloss reads: “Prophecy is a divine inspiration, which announces the outcomes of things with immutable truth. But inspiration does not signify a habit, but an act. Therefore, prophecy is not a habit. 11. According to the Philosopher seeing is a kind of passivity. Therefore, sight is a passive operation. But prophecy is a kind of sight, for, according to the first Book of Kings (9:9): “He that is now called a prophet, in times past was called a seer.” Therefore, prophecy is not a habit, but rather a passive operation. 12. According to the Philosopher, a habit is “a quality which is hard to change.” But prophecy is easily changed, since it does not remain in the prophet at all times but only now and then. As the Gloss on Amos (7:4), “ am not a prophet,” says: “The spirit does not give prophecy to the prophets at all times, but only now and then. And when they are enlightened, they are rightly called prophets.” Gregory also says: “Sometimes the spirit of prophecy fails prophets and it is not always at the service of their minds, for, when they do not have it, they know that it is a gift when they do have it.” Therefore, prophecy is not a habit. To the Contrary 1. According to the Philosopher, there are three things in the soul: powers, habits, and passive operations. But prophecy is not a power, for, then, everyone would be a prophet, since the powers of the soul are common to all. Similarly, it is not a passive operation, for they exist only in the sensitive part of the soul, as is said in the Physics. Therefore, it is a habit. 21. Everything which is known is known through some habit. But the prophet knows the things which he declares; he does not know them, however, by reason of a natural or an acquired habit. Therefore he knows them by some infused habit, which we call prophecy. 3. If prophecy is not a habit, this is so only because the prophet can. not see everything else which can be prophesied, unless he receives a new inspiration. But this does not prevent it from being a habit, for one who has a habit of common principles cannot consider the particular conclusions of some particular science unless he receives in addition some habit of the particular science. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent prophecy from being a common habit, which still demands a new revelation for the knowledge of the individual things to be prophesied. 4. Faith is the habit of everything which must be believed, yet one who has the habit of faith does not immediately have distinct knowledge of each matter of belief, but needs instruction to know the articles of faith distinctly. Therefore, although prophecy is a habit, there still is need of divine revelation, as a kind of speech, for the prophet to know distinctly what is to be prophesied. REPLY As is said in the Gloss: Prophecy is called sight, and the prophet is called seer.” This is clear from the first Book of Kings (9:9), as was mentioned earlier.” Still, not every sight can be called prophecy, but only the sight of those things which are far beyond our ordinary knowledge. As a result, the prophet is said to be not only one who speaks from afar ( procul fans ), that is, one who announces, but also one who sees from afar ( procul videns ), from the Greek phanos, which is an appearing. However, since everything which is revealed is revealed under some light, as can be seen in Ephesians (5:13), those things which are revealed to man beyond the ordinary course of knowledge must be made manifest by a higher light. This is called the prophetic light and by receiving it one is made a prophet. However, we must bear in mind that a thing can be received in someone in two ways. In one, it is received as a form which remains in the subject; in the other, it is received after the manner of a transient impression. Thus, pallor exists as a quality in one who has this color naturally or from some serious accident, but exists as a transient impression in one who suddenly turns white from some fear. Similarly, physical light is in the stars as a quality of the stars, since it is a form remaining in them. But it is in air as a transient impression, since air does not retain light, but only receives it by being placed in the path of a shining body. Accordingly, in human understanding there is a light which is a quality or permanent form, namely, the essential light of the agent intellect, by reason of which our soul is called intellectual. But the prophetic light in the prophet cannot be this. For whoever knows certain objects by means of intellectual light, which has become a property in him, existing there as a form, must have stable knowledge of those things. And this cannot be unless he sees them in a principle in which they can be known. For, as long as the things known are not reduced to their principles, the knowledge is not established as certain, but is apprehended by him as having some probability, inasmuch as it has been spoken by others. Hence, for each thing he must receive word from others. Thus, if someone did not know how to deduce the conclusions of geometry from the principles, he would not have the habit of geometry, but would apprehend whatever he knew of the conclusions of geometry as one who believes his teacher. Hence, he would have to be instructed on each point, for he would not be able securely to proceed from some points to others without making a resolution to first principles. Now, God Himself is the principle in which we can know future contingents and other things which exceed natural knowledge and with which prophecy deals. Hence, since the prophets do not see God’s essence, they cannot know the things which they see prophetically by a light which is a kind of habitual form inhering in them, but they have to be taught each thing individually. Thus it is that the prophetic light must not be a habit, but must exist in the soul of the prophet in the manner of a transient impression, as the light of the sun exists in the air. And, as the light remains in the air only when the sun is shining, so the previously mentioned light remains in the mind of the propliet only when it is actually being divinely inspired. And thus it is that the saints, when they talk about prophecy, speak of it as a transient impression and call it an inspiration or a kind of touch by which the Holy Spirit is said to touch the heart of the prophet. They also speak of prophecy with other words of this kind. And thus it is clear that, as far as the prophetic light is concerned, prophecy cannot be a habit. But we must remember that in bodily things, after something has undergone a transient impression, even after the impression has left, it is rendered more apt to undergo the impression, as water, once warmed, is warmed more easily afterwards when it has become cold, and a man, after he has been sad many times, is saddened more easily. Hence, the mind, when it has been under the influence of a divine inspiration, even after that inspiration has gone, remains more fit to receive it again, just as the mind remains more devout after devout prayer. It is for this reason that Augustine says: “Lest the mind which begins to grow lukewarm from cares and occupations become altogether cold and its fire die out completely, unless it is frequently enkindled, at set hours we call our mind back to the business of prayer.” Hence, the mind of the prophet, after it has received a divine inspiration one or more times, remains more apt to receive the inspiration again, even after the actual inspiration has ceased. And this aptitude can be called the habit of prophecy, just as Avicenna says that in us habits of science are nothing but certain aptitudes of our soul ordained for the reception of the illumination of the agent intelligence and the intelligible species flowing forth from it into our soul. However, it cannot properly be called habit, but an aptitude or disposition by reason of which one is called a prophet even when he is not actually being inspired. Nevertheless, lest an argument be built on the strength of the word, habit, we will uphold both sides and answer both sets of reasons. Answers to Difficulties 1. The definition given fits habit in the strict sense, and in this sense the previously mentioned aptitude of prophesying cannot be called a habit. Nevertheless, taken in this way, the aptitude of our soul to receive something from the agent intelligence can also be called a habit, according to Avicenna, for in his opinion that reception is natural. Thus, according to him, one who has an aptitude has the power to receive when he so wishes, for a natural influx does not fail when the matter is disposed. But the influx of prophecy depends on the divine will alone; hence, it is not in the power of a prophet to use prophecy, no matter how great an aptitude he has for it in his mind. 2. If prophetic light existed in the mind as a habit of knowledge about things to be prophesied, a prophet would not need new revelation to know anything that can be prophesied. But he does need new revelation, because that light is not a habit. The aptitude itself to perceive the light is like a habit and without this light things to be prophesied cannot be known. 3. Beyond the perception of the divine speech by which God talks interiorly to the prophet, and which is nothing but the enlightening of his mind, no habit is needed to perceive interiorly what has been said. But an aptitude seems to have a greater effect toward the perception of this speech, the more noble the speech is and the more its perception surpasses the natural powers. 4. The solution to the fourth difficulty is clear from what has been said. 5. The prophetic light, once infused, does not give knowledge of all that can be prophesied, but only of those things for the knowledge of which it is given. This limitation does not come from lack of power in the giver, but from the ordination of His wisdom, which distributes to each as He wishes. 6. All mortal sins have this in common, that through any one of them man is separated from God. Hence, grace, which joins man to God, frees him from every mortal sin, but not from every venial sin, for venial sins do not separate him from God. But things which can be prophesied have a connection among themselves only in the order of God’s wisdom. Hence, one can be seen without another by those who do not see divine wisdom completely. 7. An infused habit is more perfect than an acquired habit according to its genus, namely, by reason of its origin and by reason of the object which it is given to attain, which is higher than that to which an acquired habit is ordained. But nothing prevents an acquired habit from being more perfect in the manner in which it is possessed or perfected. Thus, it is clear that through the infused habit of faith we do not see the matters to be believed as perfectly as we see the conclusions of the sciences through the acquired habit of a science. Similarly, although the prophetic light is infused, still it does not exist as perfectly in us as the acquired habits. This also attests to the dignity of infused habits, for, since they are so excellent, human weakness cannot fully possess them. 8. The reasoning would conclude correctly if the light with which the mind of the prophet is flooded were a habit, but not if we hold that this habit or quasi habit is an aptitude for perceiving the aforesaid light, since this one thing could render a man apt to be enlightened about anything. 9. We will treat later of the way in which the species have to be formed anew for prophetic revelation. 10. Although inspiration does not signify a habit, it cannot be proved from this that prophecy is not a habit. For it is customary to define habits through their acts. 11. According to the Philosopher, to see can be taken in two ways: actually and habitually. Hence, sight can mean the act or the habit. 12. Prophetic light is not a quality which is hard to change, but something transient. It is in this sense that the authoritative citations mentioned speak. But that aptitude which remains for perceiving the illumination again is not easily changed; in fact, it remains a long time unless there is a great change in the prophet, through which such an aptitude is taken away. Answers to Contrary Difficulties 1. Since acts arise completely from habits, they are therefore reduced to habit in that division of the Philosopher. Or they are also reduced to passive operations, since passive operations are acts of the soul, as to be angry or to desire. But prophecy, in so far as it refers to the sight of the prophet, is an act of the mind; in so far as it refers to the light, which is received suddenly and in a passing manner, it is like a passive operation, inasmuch as a reception in the intellective part is called a passive operation, for to understand is a kind of passivity, as is said in The Soul . Or it can be said that, if the members of the division are taken strictly, that division of the Philosopher does not adequately comprehend everything which is in the soul, but only that which relates to moral matters, about which the Philosopher is thinking, as is clear from the examples with which he there explains himself. 2. Not everything which is known is known by some habit, but only that of which we have perfect knowledge. For there are in us imperfect acts, which do not come from habits. 3. In the demonstrative sciences there are certain general things in which particular conclusions are contained virtually, as it were in embryo. Hence, one who has the habit of those general things is only in remote potency to the particular conclusions, and this potency needs a mover to reduce it to act. But in things to be prophesied there is no such connection requiring that some knowledge be deduced from other prior knowledge in such a way that one possessing the knowledge involved in the prior habits would possess in a confused way the knowledge involved in the subsequent habits. Hence, the argument does not follow. 4. Our understanding is perfected in different ways by prophecy and by faith. For prophecy perfects understanding in itself, and thus it is necessary that the prophet be able to see distinctly those things for which he has the gift of prophecy. But faith perfects our understanding in the affective order, for the act of faith is an act of the understanding commanded by the will. Hence, through faith the understanding is only prepared to assent to those things which God orders to be believed. It is for this reason that faith is likened to hearing, but prophecy to sight. And thus it is not necessary for one who has the habit of faith to know all the matters of belief distinctly, as one who has the habit of prophecy must know distinctly all that is to be prophesied. Q. 12: Prophecy ARTICLE II In the second article we ask: Does prophecy deal with conclusions which can be known scientifically? [Parallel readings: C.G. , III, 154; In Isaiam, I; S.T. , II-II, 171, 3; In Psalm. 50; Ad Rom. , c. 12, lect. 2.] Difficulties It seems that it does not, for 1. Prophecy is “the inspiration which announces the outcomes of things with immutable truth.” But the outcomes of things are called future contingents, and the conclusions of the demonstrative sciences do not concern matters of this sort. Therefore, there cannot be prophecy about such things. 2. Jerome says that prophecy is “a sign of divine foreknowledge.” But foreknowledge refers to the future. Since, therefore, futures, especially future contingents, which prophecy seems mainly to deal with, cannot be the conclusions of any science, it seems that prophecy cannot deal with conclusions scientifically knowable. 3. Nature does not provide superfluities nor fail in necessary matters. Much less does 6od, whose activity is most wisely disposed. But to know the conclusions of the demonstrative sciences man has another way than prophecy, namely, through self-evident principles. Therefore, if things of this sort were known through prophecy, it would seem to be superfluous. 4. A different manner of generation is an indication of diversity of species. Thus, as the Commentator says, mice begotten from seed cannot be of the same species as mice begotten from decaying matter. But men naturally reach conclusions of the demonstrative sciences from self-evident principles. Therefore, if there are some men who receive knowledge of the demonstrative sciences in another way, as through prophecy, they will be of another species and will be called men equivocally, which seems absurd. 5. The demonstrative sciences deal with those things which relate indifferently to every time. But prophecy does not have a similar relation to every time, in fact, “sometimes the spirit of the prophets stirs the heart of a prophet for the present and not for the future, and sometimes just the opposite,” as Gregory says. Therefore, prophecy does not deal with those things about which there is scientific knowledge. 6. The mind of the prophet and the mind of anyone else do not relate in the same way to those things which are known through prophecy. But in things which are known through demonstration the judgment of the prophet and of anyone else who knows it is the same, and neither is preferred to the other, as Rabbi Moses says. Therefore, prophecy does not deal with those things which are known through demonstration. To the Contrary 1. We believe the prophets only in so far as they are inspired by the spirit of prophecy. But we have to give belief to those things written in the books of the prophets even though they treat of conclusions of scientific knowledge, as in Psalms (135:6): “Who established the earth above the waters,” and whatever else there is of this sort. Therefore, the spirit of prophecy inspires the prophets even about conclusions of the sciences. 2. As the grace of miracles relates to the performance of deeds which are beyond the power of nature, so the gift of prophecy relates to the knowledge of things which surpass natural knowledge. But through the grace of miracles there take place not only things which nature cannot do, as to give sight to the blind and to raise the dead, but also things which nature can do, as to cure those with fevers. Therefore, through the gift of prophecy one can know not only those things to which natural knowledge does not extend, but also things to which natural knowledge does extend, and conclusions of the sciences are among these latter. Thus, it seems that prophecy can treat of them. REPLY In all things which exist for the sake of an end the matter is determined according to the exigency of the end, as is clear in the Physics . But the gift of prophecy is given for the use of the Church, as is clear in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:7): “And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit.” The letter adds many examples among which prophecy is numbered. Therefore, all those things the knowledge of which can be useful for salvation are the matter of prophecy, whether they are past, or future, or even eternal, or necessary, or contingent. But those things which cannot pertain to salvation are outside the matter of prophecy. Hence, Augustine says: “Although our authors knew what shape heaven is, [the spirit] wants to speak through them only that which is useful for salvation. And to the Gospel of St. John (16:13), “But when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will teach you all truth,” the Gloss adds: “necessary for salvation.” Moreover, I say necessary for salvation, whether they are necessary for instruction in the faith or for the formation of morals. But many things which are proved in the sciences can be useful for this, as, for instance, that our understanding is incorruptible, and also those things which when considered in creatures lead to admiration of the divine wisdom and power. Hence, we find that mention of these is made in Holy Scripture. However, we should bear in mind that, since prophecy is knowledge of things which are far away, it does not have the same relation to all the things we have mentioned. For some things are far from our knowledge because of the things themselves and some are such because of something in us. Future contingents are beyond us because of the things themselves, for they are unknown because they lack existence, since they neither exist in themselves nor are determined in their causes. But the things beyond us because of something in us are those which we have difficulty knowing because of our own inadequacy and not because of the things themselveg, since they are the most knowable and the most perfect beings, such as things which are intelligible by nature, and especially things which are eternal. Now, what belongs to a thing in itself belongs to it more truly than that which belongs to it by reason of something else. Hence, since future contingents are more truly beyond our knowledge than anything else, they seem, therefore, to belong especially to prophecy. And they pertain to it so much that, in the definition of prophecy, they are given as the special matter of prophecy. Thus: “Prophecy is a divine inspiration which announces the outcomes of things with immutable truth.” And even the name of prophecy seems to be taken from this. Thus, Gregory says: “Prophecy is so called because it predicts the future. When it speaks of the present or the past, it loses the character of its name.” Now, among those things which are beyond us because of something in us there is likewise a difference which we must consider some things are beyond us because they surpass all human knowledge, as that God is three and one, and other such things. These are not conclusions of the sciences. Some things, however, are beyond us because they surpass the knowledge of some men, but not human knowledge simply. In this class there are those things which the educated know through demonstration, but which the uneducated do not grasp with natural knowledge, although they are sometimes elevated to them by divine revelation. These things do not belong to prophecy simply, but with reference to men of this type. Thus, conclusions which are demonstrated in the sciences can belong to prophecy. Answers to Difficulties 1. The outcomes of things are put in the definition of prophecy as the most proper matter of prophecy, but not as the whole matter of prophecy. 2. Similarly, prophecy is called a sign of foreknowledge by reason of its principal matter. 3. Although conclusions of the sciences can be known in another way than through prophecy, it is not superfluous for them to be shown by prophetic light, for through faith we cling more firmly to what the prophets say than we do to the demonstrations of the sciences. And in this, too, the grace of God is praised and His perfect knowledge is shown forth. 4. Natural causes have determinate effects, since their powers are finite and limited to one type of effect. Therefore, it is necessary that those things which are brought into being by different natural causes according to different ways of generation be specifically different. But, since the divine power is infinite, it can without the work of nature produce effects specifically the same as those which nature produces. Hence, if those things which can be known naturally are divinely revealed, it does not follow that those who receive knowledge in a different way are specifically different. 5. Although prophecy sometimes concerns things which are separated as belonging to different divisions of time, it sometimes concerns those things which are true for all times. 6. Rabbi Moses does not mean that a revelation could not be made to a prophet of those things which are known through demonstration, but that, as soon as they are known by a demonstration, it makes no difference whether there is prophecy about them or not. Q. 12: Prophecy ARTICLE III In the third article we ask: Is prophecy natural? [Parallel readings: S.T. , III, 154; S.T. , I, 86, 4; II-II, 172, 1.] Difficulties It seems that it is, for 1. The cognition of one who is awake is preferable to that of one who is sleeping. But it is natural for people who are asleep to foresee the future, as is clear in the divinations of dreams. Therefore, with much greater reason some can see the future naturally while awake. But this is the office of the prophet. Therefore, one can naturally be a prophet. 2. But it was said that the cognition of one who is awake is better for judgment, but the cognition of one who is asleep is better for reception.—On the contrary, the cognoscitive power can judge of something in so far as it receives its species. Therefore, judgment follows reception and, where the reception is better, the judgment is also more perfect. Thus, if one who is asleep is better in receiving, he ought also to be better in judging. 3. Our understanding is hampered in sleep only from without, namely in so far as it depends on sense. But the judgment of our understanding does not depend on sense, since the operation of our understanding depends on sense in so far as it receives from sense. But judgment follows reception. Therefore, the judgment of our understanding is not hampered in sleep. Hence, the distinction given seems to be of no importance. 4. What belongs to something because it is kept free from something else belongs to it by reason of its nature, just as brightness, which is natural to iron, comes to it because the iron is kept free from rust. But, as Augustine shows by many examples, it belongs to the soul to see the future in so far as it is cut off from the senses of the body. Therefore, it seems natural for the human soul to foresee the future. Thus, we conclude as before. 5. Gregory says: “Sometimes the very power of souls foresees something by its subtlety, for sometimes souls about to leave the body know through revelation things to come.” But the things which the soul can see because of its subtlety it sees naturally. Therefore, the soul can naturally know future things, and so naturally have prophecy, which consists especially in foreknowledge of the future. 6. It was said that the futures which the soul foresees by natural knowledge are those which have fixed causes in nature, but that prophecy deals with other futures.—On the contrary, those things which depend on free will do not have fixed causes in nature. But those things which the soul foresees from its subtlety depend altogether on free will, as is clear from the example of Gregory, who tells of a man who, when he was sick and his burial in a certain church had been arranged for, arose as he neared death, dressed, and predicted that he wanted to go by the Appian Way to the Church of St. Sixtus. When he died a short while later, as his funeral procession was going out along the Appian Way, they suddenly decided to bury him in the Church of St. Sixtus, since it was a long way to the church where they were supposed to bury him. And they did this without knowing what he had said. As Gregory adds, he would not have been able to predict this if the power and subtlety of his soul had not foreseen what would happen to his body. Therefore, man can naturally foresee those futures which are independent of non-free causes. The same conclusion follows as before. 7. From natural causes we cannot perceive the meaning of those things which do not take place naturally. But astrologers perceive the meanings of prophecies from the movements of the heavenly bodies. Therefore, prophecy is natural. 8. In natural science the philosophers discuss only those things which can happen naturally. But Avicenna discusses prophecy. Therefore, prophecy is natural. 9. For prophecy, as Avicenna says, only three things are needed: clearness of intelligence, perfection of the imaginative power, and power of soul so that external matter obeys it. But these three things can be had naturally. Therefore, one can naturally be a prophet. 10. But it was said that our understanding and imagination can naturally be brought to the point where they have foreknowledge of natural future events, but that prophecy does not deal with these. On the contrary, those things which depend on lower causes are said to be natural. But Isaiah (38:1) foretold that Ezechias would die, and lie did this on the basis of [the expected outcome of ] the order of created causes, as the Gloss on that passage states. Therefore, prophecy is the foreknowledge of natural future events. 11. To the things which are brought into existence divine providence grants the possession of those things without which they could not be preserved in existence, as in the human body it put members with which food can be taken and digested, without which mortal life would not be maintained. But the human race cannot be maintained without society, for one man is not sufficient unto himself in the necessities of life. Hence, man is “naturally a political animal,” as is said in the Ethics. But society cannot be maintained without justice, and prophecy is the rule of justice. Therefore, human nature is endowed with the ability naturally to arrive at prophecy. 12. In any class there is that which is most perfect in that class. But among men the most perfect is the prophet, who transcends the others in that which is higher in man, his intellect. Therefore, man can naturally arrive at prophecy. 13. The properties of God are farther from the properties of creatures than the properties of future things are from present things. But man can reach the knowledge of God by natural knowledge through the properties of creatures, according to Romans (1:20): “For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world,...” Therefore, from the things which now exist man can arrive at the knowledge of future things. Thus, he can be a prophet naturally. 14. It was said that future things are more remote in knowledge although God is more remote in being.—On the contrary, the principles of being and of knowing are the same. Therefore, that which is more remote in being is more remote in knowledge. 15. Augustine distinguishes9 three kinds of goods: “insignificant, important, and ordinary.” But prophecy is not numbered among the insignificant goods, for the goods of this sort are bodily goods. Nor is it classed among the most important goods, for these are those by which we live rightly and which no one can abuse. And this does not seem to fit prophecy. Therefore, it remains that prophecy belongs to the ordinary goods, which are the natural goods of the soul. Thus, prophecy seems to be natural. 16. Boethius says that in one sense all that “can act or be acted upon” is called nature. But for someone to be a prophet he must undergo some spiritual change, which consists in the reception of the prophetic light, as was said above. Therefore, it seems that prophecy is natural. 17. If to act is natural for the agent and to receive is natural for that which is acted upon, the act of receiving must be natural. But it is natural for God to infuse the perfection of prophecy into men. For by His very nature He is good, and it is natural for the good to communicate itself. Likewise, it is natural for the human mind to receive things from God, since its nature is made up only of those things which it receives from God. Therefore, the reception of prophecy is natural. 18. There is a natural active potency corresponding to every natural passive potency. But in the human soul there is a natural potency for the reception of the light of prophecy. Therefore, there is also some natural active potency through which one is brought to the act of prophecy. Therefore, it seems that prophecy is natural. 19. Naturally, man has more perfect knowledge than other animals. But some animals are naturally prescient of those future things which especially concern them. This is clear of ants, who have foreknowledge of future rains, and of some fishes, which foretell future storms. Therefore, man, also, ought to be naturally prescient of those things which concern him. Thus, it seems that man naturally can be a prophet. To the Contrary 1. In the second Epistle of St. Peter (1:21) is said: “For prophecy came not by the will of man at any time: but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit.” 2. That which depends on an external cause does not seem to be natural. But prophecy depends on an external cause, for the prophets read in the mirror of eternity. Therefore, it seems that prophecy is not natural. 3. Those things which are in us naturally are within our power. “But it was not in the power of a prophet to possess the spirit of predicting the future,” as is clear from the Gloss on the second Epistle of St. Peter (1:19): “We have the more firm prophetical word.” Therefore, prophecy is not natural. 4. Things which are natural happen as the more common occurrence. But prophecy exists in very few men. Therefore, it is not natural. REPLY A thing is called natural in two ways. In one it is so called because its active principle is natural, as it is natural for fire to be borne aloft. It is so called in another way when nature is the source not of any of its dispositions whatever, but of those which are a necessity for such a perfection. In this way, the infusion of the rational soul is called natural, inasmuch as through the activity of nature the body is given a disposition which is a necessity for the reception of the soul. Some, then, were of the opinion that prophecy is natural in the first sense, for they said: “The soul had in itself a power of divination,” as Augustine relates. But in the same place he rejects that, for, if that were so, then the soul would be able to have foreknowledge of the future whenever it so wished. And this is clearly false. Furthermore, the falsity of this is manifest because the nature of the human mind cannot naturally be the source of any knowledge to which it cannot arrive by means of self-evident principles, which are the prime instruments of the agent intellect. It cannot arrive at a knowledge of future contingents from these principles, except, perhaps, by studying some natural signs, as the doctor foresees that health or death will come, or a meteorologist foresees the storm or fair weather. But such knowledge of future things is not ascribed to divination or prophecy, but to technical knowledge. Hence, some. have said that prophecy is natural in the second sense. For nature can bring man to such a state that he will have to receive foreknowledge of futures through the action of some higher cause. Indeed, this opinion is true of a certain type of prophecy, but not, however, of that type which the Apostle numbers among the gifts of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. 12:10). And so, to see the difference between these types we should keep in mind that, before they exist, future contingents pre-exist in two ways, that is, they are contained in the divine foreknowledge and in the created causes, by whose power they will be brought into existence. In these two the futures pre-exist in a doubly different manner. The first difference is this, that all that pre-exists in created causes pre-exists in the divine foreknowledge, but not conversely. For God holds within Himself the principles which will determine some future things without infusing them into created things. An example of this is the principles which will determine those things which happen miraculously by the divine power alone, as Augustine says. The second is this, that some things pre-exist in created causes changeably, since the power of the cause which is directed to bringing about such an effect can be hindered by some event. But all future things are in the divine foreknowledge unchangeably, for futures are objects of the divine foreknowledge not only as regards the order of their causes to those futures, but also as nards the outcome of that order or the event. Accordingly, there are two ways in which foreknowledge of the future can be caused in the human mind. One is derived from the preexistence of futures in the divine mind. It is this prophecy that is called a gift of the Holy Spirit, and it is not natural. For those things which are executed by the divine power without natural intermediary causes are not said to be natural, but miraculous. Now the revelation of futures of this sort takes place without intermediary natural causes, for they are not revealed in so far as the principles which determine future things exist in created causes, but in so far as they exist in the divine mind, from which they flow into the mind of the prophet. In the second way it is derived from the power of created causes, in so far as certain movements can be impressed on the human imaginative power, for instance, by the power of the heavenly bodies, in which there pre-exist some signs of certain future events. And, in so far as it is natural for the human understanding, as inferior, to receive instruction from the illumination of the separated intellects, and to be raised up to the knowledge of other things, prophecy can be called natural in the sense which was mentioned. But this natural prophecy differs in three ways from that about which we are now speaking. It differs, first, in this, that the prophecy of which we speak gets its foreknowledge of future things immediately from God, although an angel can be an intermediary, inasmuch as he acts in virtue of the divine light. But natural prophecy is due to the proper activity of second causes. Second, it differs in this that natural prophecy extends only to those future things which have determinate causes in nature, but the prophecy of which we speak relates indifferently to all things. Third, they differ in this, that natural prophecy does not foresee infallibly, but predicts those things which are true for the most part, whereas the prophecy which is a gift of the Holy Spirit foresees the future infallibly. Hence, it is called a sign of the divine foreknowledge, since it foresees with that infallibility with which future things are foreseen by God. This threefold difference can be noted in the definition of Cassiodorus. The first difference is in the word “divine”; the second is in the general phrase, “outcomes of things”; and the third in the words, “which announces with immutable truth.” But two of the differences, the first and second, remain in prophecy in so far as it deals with things which are necessary, as those which can be known with scientific knowledge. For by natural prophecy man does not receive immediately from God the knowledge of the things which are known scientifically, but gets it through the mediation of second causes, and through the activity of second causes acting with their natural power. Nor, again, does such knowledge extend to things which are necessary, but only to those which can be known through first principles. For the power of the light of the agent intellect does not extend any farther and is not naturally elevated to other things as divine prophecy is raised to certain things which are beyond natural knowledge, such as that God is three and one and other things of this sort. In this matter the third difference has no place, for both kinds of prophecy give the prophet knowledge of necessary conclusions of this kind as unchangeably and certainly as if they were known through the principles of demonstration. Furthermore, the mind of man is elevated by both prophecies so that it understands in a way similar to the separated substances, who understand the principles and the conclusions with the utmost certainty in a simple intuition without deducing one from the other. Again, both prophecies differ from dreams and visions, in so far as we call a dream an apparition which comes to a man who is asleep and a vision one which comes to a man who is awake but carried out of his senses, because in both the dream and the simple vision the soul is fettered completely or partially by phantasms which are seen in such a way that the soul completely or partially clings to them as to things which are true. But, although in both prophecies some phantasms may be seen in sleep or in a vision, the soul of the prophet is not under the control of those phantasms, but knows through the prophetic light that the objects which it sees are not things, but likenesses of them with some meaning. And it knows their meaning for, as is said in Daniel (10:1): “There is need of understanding in a vision.” Thus it is clear that natural prophecy is midway between dreams and divine prophecy. Hence it is that a dream is said to be a part of or an instance of natural prophecy, as also, that natural prophecy is an imperfect likeness of divine prophecy. Answers to Difficulties 1. There are two things to be considered in knowledge: reception and judgment about that which is received. Accordingly, in the matter of judgment the cognition of one who is awake is preferable to that of one who is asleep, for the judgment of one who is awake is free, whereas the judgment of one who is asleep is fettered, as is said in Sleeping and Wakefulness . But the cognition of one who is asleep is preferable for reception, because internal impressions from external movements can be received better when the senses are at rest. This is so whether they come from the separated substances or from the heavenly bodies. Thus we can understand in this sense that which is said of Balaam in Numbers (24:16): “who falling,” that is, sleeping, “hath his eyes opened.” 2. Judgment does not depend only on the reception of the species, but also on the examination of the matter to be judged with reference to some principle of knowledge, just as we judge about conclusions by analyzing them back to principles. Therefore, when the exterior senses are bound in sleep, the interior powers are, as it were, free from the bustle of the external senses and can better perceive the internal impressions made on the understanding or the imagination by a divine or angelic light, or by the power of the heavenly bodies, or by anything else, just as it seems to one who is asleep that he is eating something sweet when thin phlegm flows across his tongue. But, since the senses are the first source of our knowledge, we must in some way reduce to sense everything about which we judge. Hence, the Philosopher says” that the sensible visible thing is that at which the work of art and nature terminates, and from which we should judge of other things. Similarly, he says that the senses deal with that which is outermost as the understanding deals with principles. He calls outermost those things which are the term of the resolution of one who judges. Since, then, in sleep the senses are fettered, there cannot be perfect judgment so that a man is deceived in some respect, viewing the likenesses of things as though they were the things themselves. However, it sometimes does happen that one who is asleep knows that some of these are not things, but the likenesses of things. 3. The judgment of our understanding does not depend on sense in such a way that the act of understanding takes place by means of a sensible organ. However, it does need the senses as that which is last and outermost to terminate its analysis. 4. Some have held that the rational soul “has within itself some power of divination,” as Augustine says. But he himself rejects this in that same place, for, if this were so, the soul would be prepared to foresee futures when it so desired. And this is obviously false. For the soul at times sees the future when it is carried out of its senses, not because this belongs to it by reason of its natural power, but because it is thus rendered more fit to perceive the impressions of those causes which can give some foreknowledge of the future. 5. Subtlety of soul, which Gregory says is a cause of foreknowledge of futures, should be taken to mean that aptitude of the soul to receive something from the separated substances, not only in the order of grace, in so far as things are revealed to holy people by angels, but also in the order of nature, in so far as lower intellects in the order of nature are naturally fitted to receive perfection from the higher intellects, and in so far as human bodies are subject to the impressions of the heavenly bodies, in which there is a provision for some future events. The soul by its subtlety foresees these events through certain likenesses left in the imagination by the impression of the heavenly bodies. 6. Although free choice is not subject to natural causes, natural causes sometimes do facilitate or hinder the things which are done by free choice, as in the case mentioned rain or excessive heat could engender weariness in those who were carrying the bier, so that they would not carry it to the assigned place. And we could get foreknowledge of these happenings by means of the heavenly bodies. 7. Since human bodies are under the influence of the heavenly bodies, from the movements of the heavenly bodies we can perceive some indication of any disposition of the human body. Since, therefore, a certain constitution or disposition of the human body is a kind of prerequisite for natural prophecy, it is not inappropriate that an indication of natural prophecy be received from the heavenly bodies. But no indication of the prophecy which is a gift of the Holy Spirit is thus received. 8. Those philosophers who have treated of prophecy were not able to treat of the prophecy about which we are now speaking, but only of natural prophecy. 9. One of those three things cannot naturally belong to the soul, namely, that it have such power that external matter would be under its control, since, as Augustine says: “The matter in bodies is not subject to the arbitrary will even of the angels themselves.” Thus, on this point, what Avicenna or any other philosopher says cannot be held. The other two things which the objection deals with, in so far as they arise naturally in man, can cause natural prophecy, but not the prophecy of which we are talking. 10. Although only those things which fall under the influence of natural causes can be revealed through natural prophecy, nevertheless, not only other things but those, too, can be known through divine prophecy. 11. The society of men, in so far as it is ordained to eternal life as its end, can be preserved only through the justice of faith, of which prophecy is the source. Hence, Proverbs (29:18) says: “When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad.” But, since this end is supernatural, the justice, which is ordained to this end, and the prophecy, which is its source, will both be supernatural. But the justice through which human society is ruled in its ordination to the civil good can be had adequately through natural principles implanted in man. Hence, it is not necessary for prophecy to be natural. 12. By reason of the nobility of man there can be found in the human race a perfection so becoming that it could be produced only by a supernatural cause. But irrational creatures are not capable of such perfection. Therefore, it is not necessary that that which is most perfect in the human race should be obtained by the power of nature. This is necessary only for that which is most perfect according to the order of nature, not for that which is most perfect according to the order of grace. 13. A thing can be known in two ways: with reference to its existence, and to its quiddity. But, since the properties of creatures from which we get our knowledge are extremely remote from the properties of God, thence it is that we cannot have quidditative knowledge of God. However, since creatures depend on God, by looking at creatures we can know that God exists. But, since the things which now exist do not depend on future things, but do have similar properties, we cannot therefore know from present things whether certain future things will follow from them. However, we can know what their nature and properties will be if they should exist. 14. God is more remote from creatures than one creature is from another in His manner of existing, but not in the relation which exists between the principle of existing and that which has existence from such a principle. Therefore, by means of creatures we can know that God exists, but we cannot know His quiddity. It is just the opposite with the knowledge of future contingents by means of present or past things. 15. Prophecy is classified among the greatest goods, since it is a free gift. For, although it does not act as an immediate principle of meritorious action to make one live properly, the whole of prophecy is directed to the virtuous life. Nor, again, does one misuse prophecy in such a way that the misuse itself is an act of prophecy, as when someone misuses a natural power. For one who uses prophecy to seek gain or the favor of men has, indeed, a good act of prophecy, which is to know hidden things and to announce them, but the abuse of this good is an act of cupidity or some other vice. Nevertheless, although one does not misuse prophecy as a principle of action, he does misuse it as an object. In a similar way, those who are proud of their virtues misuse them, although the virtues are counted among the greatest goods. 16. We do not say that something is natural if it comes from nature taken in any sense, but taken in the third meaning which Boethius gives it there, namely, inasmuch as nature is “the principle of motion” and rest in the thing in which it is, and the essential, not the accidental, principle. Otherwise it would be necessary to say that all activities, receptions, and properties are natural. 17. To communicate His goodness is natural for God in the sense that it is in harmony with His nature and not in the sense that He communicates it because of some necessity of His nature. For such communication is made by the divine will in keeping with the order of wisdom which distributes Hi’s goods to all in an orderly way. It is also natural for a creature to receive from God not any goodness, but that which belongs to its nature, as to be rational belongs to man but not to a stone or an ass. Hence, if some perfection is received in man by reason of divine power, it is not necessary for it to be natural to man when it exceeds what is due to human nature. 18. In human nature there is a passive potency for the reception of prophetic light, which is not natural but only obediential, like the potency which is in physical nature for those things which happen miraculously. Hence, it is not necessary to have a natural active potency corresponding to such a passive potency. 19. Brute animals can be prescient only of those future events concerning them which depend on the movement of the heavens. And by the impressions of the heavens their imagination is stirred to do something which is an appropriate sign of the future. This kind of imprint has more place in brutes than in men because, as Damascene says, brutes “are more acted upon than acting.”Hence, they follow the impressions of the heavenly bodies completely. Man, however, who has free will, does not act in this way. Nor should a brute be called prescient of the future on this account, although a sign of some future event can be drawn from its activity. For it does not act to give any sign of the future, as though it knew the reason for its activity; rather, it is led on by a natural instinct. Q. 12: Prophecy ARTICLE IV In the fourth article we ask: is some natural Disposition needed for prophecy? [Parallel readings: S.T. , II-II, 172, 3.] Difficulties It seems that it is, for 1. Every perfection which in its reception must conform to the disposition of the receiver requires some definite disposition in the receiver. But prophecy is such a perfection, as is clear from Amos (1:2), “The Lord will roar from Sion,” on which the Gloss says: “It is natural, he says, for all who want to compare one thing to another to use comparisons taken from those things which they have experienced and among which they have been brought up. For example, sailors compare their enemies to storms, and loss to shipwreck. And shepherds liken their fear to the roaring of a lion, and call their enemies lions, bears, and wolves. Thus, the prophet, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to the roaring of a lion.” Therefore, prophecy requires some definite disposition in human nature. 2. Perfection of the imagination is needed for prophecy, since prophecy operates through the sight of imagination. But to have perfection of the power of imagination its organ must be in good condition and properly disposed. Therefore, a natural disposition is needed for prophecy. 3. A natural hindrance is stronger than one which comes from without. But some passions which are aroused from without interfere with prophecy. Thus, Jerome says: “At that time when the marital act is performed the presence of the Holy Spirit will not be given, even though the one who fulfills the duty of procreation seems to be a prophet.” Nor is this due to guilt, for there is no guilt in the marital act, but to the passion of the concupiscence connected with it. Therefore, an indisposition of the natural constitution is a much greater hindrance, tending to make it impossible for one to become a prophet. 4. Nature has an ordination to grace as grace has to glory. But the perfection of grace in one who would arrive at glory is a prerequisite for glory. Therefore, a natural disposition is prerequisite for prophecy and the other free gifts. 5. The contemplation in prophecy is higher than that in acquired scientific knowledge. But the contemplation in acquired scientific knowledge is hindered if the natural constitution lacks the proper disposition, for some are so unfit by reason of their natural constitution that they can hardly, if ever, progress far enough to acquire scientific knowledge. Therefore, if the natural constitution lacks the proper disposition, it is a much greater hindrance to the contemplation in prophecy. 6. As is said in Romans (13:1): “The things which are from God have order in them.” But the gift of prophecy is from God. Therefore, He dispenses it in an orderly manner. But there would be no orderly distribution if it were given to someone who had not the proper disposition to possess it. Therefore, prophecy requires a natural disposition. To the Contrary 11. That which depends solely on the free choice of the giver does not require any disposition in the receiver. But prophecy is such a gift, as is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:11), which, after it has listed prophecy and other gifts of the Holy Spirit, adds: “But all these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to everyone as he will.” And the Gospel of St. John (3:8) says: “The Spirit breatheth where he will.” Therefore, a natural disposition is not needed to have prophecy. 2. The Apostle says in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (1:27-28): “The weak things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the strong. And the base things of the world and things that are not, that he might bring to naught things that are.” Therefore, no disposition in the subject is a necessary prerequisite for the gifts of the Holy Spirit. 31. Gregory says: “The Holy Spirit fills the boy harpist and makes him a prophet; He fills the shepherd who is railing at the sycamore trees and makes him a prophet.”Therefore, the gift of prophecy does not require any disposition in him to whom it is given, but its bestowal depends on the divine will alone. REPLY There are two things to be considered in prophecy: the gift of prophecy itself, and the use of such a gift once received. The gift itself of prophecy, which exists beyond the capacity of man, is given by God and not through the power of some created cause, although natural prophecy is produced in us by the power of some created cause, as has been said earlier. But between the operation of a creature and that of God there is this difference, that, to bring about an effect, God’s activity does not need matter or any material disposition, for by His activity He produces not only the form but also the matter. However, He does not make the form without matter or without a disposition, but He can make matter and form together in one operation, or He can transform the matter, however unfit, to the proper disposition which is needed for the perfection which He gives. This is clear in resuscitation of a dead man, for the dead body is altogether unfit to receive the soul. Yet by the one divine action the body receives the soul and the disposition for the soul. But matter and the disposition of the matter are required for the activity of a creature, for a created power cannot make whatever it wishes from anything. It is clear, then, that natural prophecy requires the proper disposition of the natural constitution, but the prophecy which is the gift of the Holy Spirit does not need this. However, it does require that the natural disposition which is suitable for prophecy be given with the gift of prophecy. But the use of any prophecy is within the power of the prophet. It is in keeping with this that the first Epistle to the Corinthians (14:3 2) says: “And the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets.” Therefore, one can prevent himself from using prophecy. And the proper disposition is a necessary requirement for the proper use of prophecy, since the use of prophecy proceeds from the created power of the prophet. Hence, a definite disposition is also required. Answers to Difficulties 1. Certain dispositions are unconnected with prophecy, and these are not changed in the prophet by the divine activity, but prophecy proceeds in harmony with these dispositions. For it is indifferent to prophecy, whether the thing prophesied be represented under one likeness rather than another. However, God takes away from the prophet the dispositions which oppose prophecy and gives, him the dispositions which are necessary. 2. Perfection of the imagination is needed for prophecy, but it is not necessarily needed beforehand. For God Himself, who infuses the gift of prophecy, can improve the constitution of the organ of the imaginative power, as He can make blear eyes see clearly. 3 Strong passions of this sort draw the attention of reason completely to themselves and, consequently, withdraw it from the study of spiritual things. Therefore, strong passions of anger or sorrow or pleasure hinder the use of prophecy in one who has received the gift of prophecy. Thus, the unfitness of the natural constitution would be a hindrance, unless it were somehow remedied by the divine power. 4. The application of the proposed likeness is limited to this, that as grace is added to nature, so glory is added to grace. But there is no likeness in all respects, for grace merits glory, but nature does not merit grace. Therefore, the merit of grace is prerequisite for glory, but the disposition of nature is not prerequisite for the reception of grace. 5. In some sense, acquired scientific knowledge is caused by us. But it is not in our power to improve the constitution of the organs of the soul, as it is within the divine power, which infuses the gift of prophecy. So, they are not alike. 6. The gift of prophecy is dispensed by God in a most orderly way. The orderly distribution of this gift also entails conferring it at times on those who seem least disposed for it, so that it will thus be attributed to the divine power and, as the first Epistle to the Corinthians (1:29) says: “That no flesh should glory in his sight.” Q. 12: Prophecy ARTICLE V In the fifth article we ask: Is moral goodness required for prophecy? [Parallel readings: S.T. , II-II, 17., 4; In Ioan. , c. 11, lect. 7.] Difficulties It seems that it is, for 1. In Wisdom (7:27) we read: “Through prophecies [she] conveyeth herself into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets.” But only those who have moral goodness are the friends of God. As the Gospel of St. John (14:2 3) says: “If anyone love me, he will keep my word.” Therefore, one who does not have moral goodness is not appointed a prophet. 2. Prophecy is a gift of the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit does not dwell in a sinner. As Wisdom (1:5) says: “For the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful.” Therefore, the gift of prophecy cannot exist in a sinner. 3. That which one cannot put to an evil use cannot exist in a sinner. But no one can put prophecy to an evil use for, since the act of Prophecy is from the Holy Spirit, if someone put it to an evil use, sin and the Holy Spirit would be causes of the same act. And this cannot be. Therefore, prophecy cannot exist in a sinner. 4. The Philosopher says: “If prophecy through dreams comes from God, it is unfitting for Him to give it to any but the best men.” But it is clear that the gift of prophecy is from God alone. Therefore, it is unfitting to say that it is given to any but the best men. 5. Plato says that it belongs to that which is best to produce what is best. But prophecy is more suitable in a good man than in a bad one. Therefore, since God is best, He will never give the gift of prophecy to evil men. 6. We find a likeness of the divine activity in the activity of nature. Hence, Dionysius compares3 the divine goodness to the light of the sun, because of the similarity of their effects. But natural activity gives more perfections to the things which are more disposed, as the more permeable bodies receive more light from the sun. Therefore, since the good man is more disposed to receive the gift of prophecy than the evil man, it seems that it should be given much more to good men than to evil men. But it is not given to all good men. Therefore, it should not be given to any evil man. 7. Grace is given to elevate nature. But nature should be elevated more in good men than in evil men. Therefore, the grace of prophecy should be given to good men rather than to evil men. We conclude as before. To the Contrary 1. Balaam is said to have been a prophet, yet he was evil. 2. In the Gospel of St. Matthew (7:22), this statement is put in the mouth of the damned: “Lord, have not we prophesied in thy name...?” Therefore, prophecy can exist in evil men. 3. Whoever does not have charity is evil. But prophecy can exist in one who does not have charity, as is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:2)which says: “And if I should have knowledge and should know all mysteries... and have not charity... Therefore, prophecy can exist in a sinner. REPLY Man’s goodness consists in charity, through which he is united to God. Therefore, whatever can exist without charity, can be found indifferently in good men and in evil men. For the divine goodness is held in high esteem chiefly for this, that it uses both good and evil men to implement its designs. Therefore, it gives to both good and evil those gifts which do not have a necessary dependence on charity. Now, prophecy does not have any necessary connection with charity for two reasons. First, because prophecy is in the understanding and charity is in the affections. But the understanding has priority over the affections, and, thus, prophecy and the other perfections of the understanding do not depend on charity. And for this reason faith, prophecy, knowledge, and everything else of this sort can exist in good men and in evil men. The second reason is that prophecy is given to a person for the profit of the Church and not for himself. But it does happen that someone who is not good in himself and united to God by charity can be of profit to the Church in some fashion. Thus, prophecy, the working of miracles, ecclesiastical ministries, and all the other things of this sort, which contribute to the benefit of the Church, are sometimes found apart from charity, which alone makes men good. However, we must bear in mind that some of the sins by which charity is lost hinder the use of prophecy, and some do not. For, since sins of the flesh draw the mind entirely away from things spiritual, by the very fact that one is given to sins of the flesh he is rendered unfit for prophecy. For the mind must have supreme competence in things spiritual to have the revelation of prophecy. But spiritual sins do not to the same extent interfere with the mind’s competence in spiritual things. Therefore, it happens that one who is a slave to spiritual sins, but not to those of the flesh, or even to the endless cares of this life, which withdraw the mind from its spiritual competence, can be a prophet. And, therefore, Rabbi Moses says that entanglement in the pleasures and cares of this world is a sign that one is a false prophet. And this agrees with what we read in the Gospel of St. Matthew (7:15): “Beware of false prophets,” and a little later (7:16): “By their fruits you shall know them.” The Gloss on this passage reads that this must be understood of those sins “which are in plain sight,” and the foremost of these are the sins of the flesh, for spiritual sins lie hidden within. Answers to Difficulties 1. Wisdom enters the soul in two ways. In one way, it so enters that the very wisdom of God dwells in the soul. This makes the man holy and a friend of God. In the other way, it enters only in its effects. In this way it does not have to make the man holy or a friend of God. It is in this second way that it enters the minds of the evil men whom it makes prophets. 2. Although prophecy is a gift of the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit is not given with the gift of prophecy, but only with the gift of charity. Hence, the reasoning does not follow. 3. There is never an evil use of prophecy in the sense that the act itself of prophecy, in so far as it comes from prophecy, is evil. For, when someone directs the act of prophecy toward some evil end, the act itself of prophecy is good and comes from the Holy Spirit, but the direction of that act toward an improper end does not come from the Holy Spirit, but from the perverse will of man. 4. The Philosopher intends to say that those things which are given by God depend on the will of the giver, and this will cannot be unreasonable. Hence, if the foreknowledge of the future which takes place in dreams were from God, some discrimination would appear in its infusion. But there is no discrimination there, since such divination takes place in anybody, and this shows that divination of dreams comes from nature. But we find discrimination in the gift of prophecy, for it is not given to everybody, even though they have this or that disposition, but only to those whom the divine will chooses. Nevertheless, these are not apt subjects or the best subjects simply in themselves. They are, however, apt subjects in so far as they perform the function of the prophet to the extent which the divine wisdom judges to be fitting. 5. That God is best appears in this, that He knows how to make good use not only of good men, but also of evil men. Hence, if he makes evil prophets perform the good functions of prophecy, this in no wise detracts from His supreme goodness. 6. Not every good man is more fit to become a prophet than every sinner. For some who lack charity have minds more fit to perceive spiritual things, since they are free from carnal affections and wordly cares and are gifted with a natural clarity of understanding. And, on the other hand, some who have charity are occupied with worldly business, are busy begetting children, and do not have a naturally acute understanding. Therefore, because of these and similar conditions, the gift of prophecy sometimes is given to some evil men and denied to some good men. 7. Through the grace of prophecy man’s nature receives an elevation ordained not directly to the participation of glory, but to the utility of others. However, in good men, nature rather receives an elevation ordained to the obtaining of glory from the grace which makes its recipient pleasing to God. Hence, the reasoning does not follow. Q. 12: Prophecy ARTICLE VI In the sixth article we ask: Do the prophets see in the mirror of eternity? [Parallel readings: In Isaiam , cc. 1, 6; S.T. , II-II, 173, 1.] Difficulties It seems that they do, for 1. The Gloss on Isaiah (38:1), “Take order with thy house,” says: “Prophets read in the book of the foreknowledge of God, in which all things are written.” But the book of the foreknowledge of God seems to be nothing else but the mirror of eternity, in which all the forms of things shine forth from eternity. Therefore, the prophets see in the mirror of eternity. 2. But it was said that the prophets are not said to read in the book of foreknowledge or see in the mirror of eternity in a material sense, as if they saw the mirror or the book itself, but in a causal sense, for their knowledge of prophecy is derived from that book or mirror. On the contrary, the prophets are said to see in the mirror of eternity or in the book of foreknowledge in this sense, that a kind of privileged knowledge is attributed to these prophets. But no privilege of knowledge is signified by saying that some knowledge is derived from the eternal mirror or from the book of divine foreknowledge, since all human knowledge is derived from that source, as Dionysius clearly shows. Therefore, the prophets are not said to see in the mirror of eternity in the sense that they derive knowledge from it, but in the sense that when they see the mirror itself, they see other things in it. 3. Nothing can be seen except where it is. But future contingent things, according to the unchangeable truth with which they are seen by the prophets, exist only in the divine foreknowledge. Therefore, the prophets see them only in the foreknowledge of God. Thus, we reach the same conclusions as before. 4 It was said that future contingent things are indeed in God as their source, but flow thence through certain species to the human mind, where they are seen by the prophet.—On the contrary, whatever is received in a thing exists there according to the manner of that which receives it and not according to its own manner. But the mind of the prophet is changeable. Therefore, future contingent things cannot be received in it in their unchanging truth. 5. That which is proper to the divine knowledge can be known only in God. But to know futures is proper to God, as is clear from Isaiah (41:23): “Shew the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall say that ye are gods.” Therefore, future contingent things can be seen by the prophets only in God. 6. Avicenna says that sometimes the mind of man is elevated so high that it is united to the world of foreknowledge.But the human mind has its highest elevation in the knowledge of prophecy. Therefore, it seems that it is so united to the world of foreknowledge that future things are seen in the very foreknowledge of God. 7. As the philosophers tell us, the end of human life is the union of man’s mind with a higher world, which is the world of the intelligible substances. But it would hardly fit in with what we know if man did not reach his end. Therefore, at some time man’s mind will be united with.the intelligible substances, the highest of which is the divine essence, in which everything shines forth. Therefore, the prophet, who among men has the mind which receives the loftiest elevation, will have his mind united with the divine essence, which seems to be the mirror of eternity. The same conclusions follow as before. 8. If there should be two mirrors, one higher and the other lower, and the likenesses come into the lower from the higher, one who sees the species in the lower mirror is not said to see them in the higher, although his sight is in a way derived from the higher mirror. But the species of future things come into the mind of the prophet from the divine mind, as into a lower mirror from a higher mirror. Therefore, the fact that the prophet sees in his own mind species received from the divine mind does not force us to say that he sees them in the divine mind, but rather in his own mind. But his own mind is not the mirror of eternity, but a mirror dependent on time. Therefore, if the prophets see only in their own minds, as has just been said, we should not say that they see in the mirror of eternity, but in a mirror which is dependent on time, although derived from the eternal mirror. 9. But it was said that someone is said to see not only in the thing illumined by the sun, but also in the sun itself, in so far as he sees by reason of the illumination of the sun.—On the contrary, the likenesses of visible things do not exist in the sun, yet this seems to pertain to the nature of a mirror. Therefore, it seems that to see something in the sun does not mean the same as to see it in a mirror. 10. The sight by which we see God as the object of beatitude is more lofty than that by which we see Him as an intentional likeness of things, for the former makes one blessed, and the latter does not. But a man living in this life can be raised up to see God as the object of beatitude by a loftier elevation, namely, that by which the mind is altogether transported out of the senses, as happens in rapture. Therefore, the mind of a prophet can be raised up to see the divine essence as the intentional likeness of things by a lesser elevation without rapture. Thus, the prophet can see things in the mirror of eternity. 11. The difference between the divine essence as considered in itself and as the likeness of something else, is greater than the difference between the divine essence as the likeness of one thing and as the likeness of another. For God is farther from any creature than one creature is from another. But one can see God in so far as He is the intentional likeness of one thing without seeing Him in so far as He is the likeness of something else. Otherwise, it would be necessary for all who saw God to know everything. Therefore, one can see God as the intentional likeness of some things without seeing His essence in itself. Therefore, those who do not see God through His essence can see in the mirror of eternity. And this seems especially to belong to the prophets. 12. Augustine says that the minds of some are elevated in such a manner that they look at the unchangeable intelligible natures in the highest citadel of all reality. But the minds of the prophets seem to have the most lofty elevation. Therefore, it seems that those things which they see prophetically they see in the very citadel of all reality, that is to say, in the divine essence. The same conclusion follows as before. 13. A thing can be judged only by that which is superior to it, as is clear from Augustine. But the prophets judge about the unchangeable truths of reality. Therefore, it is not possible for them to judge of these things through anything transitory and changeable, but through the unchangeable truth, which is God Himself. Thus, we reach the same conclusion as before. To the Contrary 1. The Gloss on the Gospel of St. Luke (10:24), “Many kings and prophets...” says” that the prophets and just men saw the glory of God from afar, through a mirror darkly. But one who sees in the eternal foreknowledge of God does not see darkly. Therefore, prophets did not see in the divine foreknowledge, which they call the mirror of eternity. 2. Gregory says: “As long as we live in this mortal flesh, no one advances so far in the power of contemplation that he fixes the eyes of his mind on that incomprehensible beam of light. For we do not now see the omnipotent God in His brightness, but the soul does observe something beneath that brightness. Strengthened by this sight, it advances and later reaches the glory of His sight. It was thus that the prophet Isaiah (6:1), when he confessed that he had seen the Lord, said immediately: ‘I saw the Lord sitting...’ and added: ‘and the things beneath him filled the ternple,’ because, as has been said, when the mind advances in contemplation, it does not fix its gaze on what He is, but on that which is below Him.” From this it is clear that Isaiah and the other prophets did not see anything in the eternal mirror. 3. No evil man can see in the eternal mirror, for Isaiah (26:10) says, according to a variant reading: “Let the wicked man be carried away, lest he see the glory of God.” But some evil men are prophets. Therefore, prophetic vision does not take place in the eternal mirror. 4. The prophets have distinct knowledge of the things which they see prophetically. But, since the eternal mirror is entirely uniform, it does not seem to be the kind of thing in which one could perceive many things separately. Therefore, there is no prophetic sight in the eternal mirror. 5. We do not see something in a mirror which is in contact with the sense of sight, but in a mirror which is at a distance. But the mirror of eternity is in contact with the mind of the prophet, since God is in everything by His essence. Therefore, the mind of the prophet cannot see in the eternal mirror. REPLY Properly speaking, a mirror exists only in material things. But in spiritual things something is called a mirror in a transferred sense, because of the likeness taken from the material mirror. Thus, in spiritual things we call that a mirror in which other things are represented, just as the forms of visible things appear in a material mirror. Therefore, some” say that the divine mind, in which all the intelligible characters of things shine forth, is a kind of mirror, and that it is called the mirror of eternity because it is eternal, inasmuch as it has eternity. Accordingly, they say that that mirror can be seen in two ways. It can be seen either through its essence, as the object of beatitude, and in this way it is seen only by those who have beatitude in its fullness or in some respect, as those in a rapture. Or it can be seen in so far as the likenesses of things are reflected in it, and in this way it is properly seen as a mirror. And they say that the mirror of eternity was seen in this way by the angels before they received beatitude, and by the prophets. But this opinion seems unreasonable on two scores. First, these intentional likenesses of things reflected in the divine mind are not really anything different from the divine essence itself. But the likenesses and intelligible natures of this sort are distinguished in it in so far as it is related differently to different creatures. Therefore, to know the divine essence and the intentional likenesses reflected in it is nothing else than to know the divine essence in itself and in relation to other things. But one knows something in itself before knowing it as related to something else. Hence, the vision by which God is seen as the intentional likeness of things presupposes that vision by which He Himself is seen as an essence, in so far as He is the object of beatitude. Thus, it is impossible for someone to see God as the species of things and not to see Him as the object of beatitude. Second, the intentional likeness of one thing is found in another in two ways. In the first way, it is there as pre-existing before the thing of which it is the likeness, and, in the second, as arising from the thing itself. Accordingly, that in which the likenesses of things appear as existing before the things cannot properly be called a mirror, but, rather, an exemplar. But that in which likenesses of things are caused by the things themselves can be called a mirror. Accordingly, it has never been said by the saints that God is the mirror of things, because there are in God the intentional likenesses or intelligible natures of things, but that created things themselves are the mirror of God, according to the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:12): “We see now through a glass in a dark manner.” And it is thus, too, that the Son is called the mirror of the Father, inasmuch as the species of Divinity is received in Him from the Father, according to Wisdom (7:2 6): “For she is the brightness of eternal light and the unspotted mirror of God’s majesty.” But when the Masters say that the prophets see in the mirror of eternity, we should not take this to mean that they see the eternal God Himself in so far as He is the mirror of things, but that they see something created, in which the eternity of God is portrayed. Thus, we understand that the mirror of eternity is not itself eternal, but represents eternity. For it belongs to God to have the same certain knowledge of the future as He has of the present, as Boethius says, because His sight is measured by eternity, in which everything is simultaneous. Hence, all times and all that take place in them are present to His sight at once. Accordingly, in so far as the knowledge of the future is reflected in the mind of the prophet from that divine sight by means of the prophetic light and through the species in which the prophet sees, those species together with the prophetic light are called the mirror of eternity, since they represent the divine sight in so far as in eternity it sees all future events as present. Therefore, we must concede that the prophets see in the mirror of eternity, but not that they see the eternal mirror as the first set of difficulties seemed to show. Therefore, we must answer them in order. Answers to Difficulties 1. The metaphor which says that the prophets read in the book of foreknowledge means that the book of divine foreknowledge is a source of the knowledge of the future in the mind of the prophet, just as reading a book is the source of knowledge in the mind of the reader of the things which are written in the book. It does not mean that the prophet sees the very foreknowledge of God as one who reads a material book sees the material book. Or we can say that the knowledge which is caused in the mind of the prophet is called the mirror of eternity, that is, something which represents eternity. Thus, it can be called the book of foreknowledge in a material sense, since the foreknowledge of God is to some extent copied in that knowledge. 2. Although all knowledge is derived from the divine foreknowledge, not all knowledge represents it in such a way that its eternity makes us see even future things as present. Hence, not any knowledge can be called a mirror of eternity. But in this we see the privileged nature of the knowledge of the prophets. 3. The intelligible natures of future contingent things exist according to unchangeable truth in the divine mind as in their source, but they flow thence to the mind of the prophet. Hence, in the revelation which he receives the prophet can have unchangeable knowledge of future things. 4. A form which is received follows the manner of the receiver in some respects, in so far as it has existence in the subject. For it is there materially or immaterially, uniformly or variably, according to the requirements of the subject receiving it. But the form which is received does in some respects draw the subject to its own mode of being, in so far as, for instance, the excellences which belong to the nature of the form are communicated to the receiving subject. For in this way the subject is perfected and ennobled through the form. And in this way the corruptible body is made immortal by reason of the glory of immortality, and similarly, by the light of unchangeable truth the mind of the prophet is raised up to see changeable things in their unchangeable truth. 5. Since knowledge of the future is proper to God, it therefore can be received only from God. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for everyone who learns the future from God to see God Himself. 6. According to that philosopher, the mind of the prophet is united to the world of the intelligences or foreknowledge, not in the sense that it sees these intelligences themselves, but in the sense that it shares in their foreknowledge from their illumination. 7. According to the faith, too, the end of human life is for man to be united with a higher world. But man reaches this end only in heaven, not in this life. 8. Although the mirror in which the prophet sees is dependent on time, it represents the eternal foreknowledge of God. And in this sense he sees in the mirror of eternity. 9. Although the sun cannot be called the mirror of visible things, visible things can in some way be called the mirror of the sun, in so far as the brightness of the sun shines in them. Thus, too, the knowledge caused in the mind of the prophet is called the mirror of eternity. 10. The sight by which God is seen as the intentional likeness of things is more peffect than that by which He is seen as the object of beatitude. For the latter presupposes the former and shows that it is more perfect. For one who can see the effects in the cause sees better than one who sees only the essence of the cause. 11. The relation by which God is referred to one creature does not presuppose the relation by which He is referred to another the way the relation by which He is referred to a creature presupposes the essence of God taken absolutely. Thus, the argument does not follow. 12. We should not apply Augustine’s words to the sight of the prophets, but to the vision of the saints in heaven, or of those who, in this life, see in the manner of heaven, as Paul did when enraptured (2 Cor. 12:1-13). 13 Prophets judge about the unchangeable truth of future events by means of uncreated truth, not because they see it, but because they are enlightened by it. Answers to Contrary Difficulties We concede the reasons to the contrary in so far as they state that the prophets do not see the eternal God Himself, although they do see in the mirror of eternity, as we have said. But the last two arguments do not concludecorrectly, for, although there is complete uniformity in God, nevertheless, in Him things can be known distinctly inasmuch as He is the proper exemplar of each one. Similarly, although mirror is transferred from material to spiritual things, in this transfer we do not apply all the conditions of the material mirror, so that all of these conditions have to be found in the spiritual mirror. Rather, we take it only according to the act of representing. Q. 12: Prophecy ARTICLE VII In the seventh article we ask: Does God in the revelation made to a prophet imprint on the mind of the prophet new species of things or only intellectual light? [Parallel readings: 1 Cor. , c. 14, lect. i; In Isaiam , 1; S.T. , II-II, 173, 2.] Difficulties It seems that He imprints only intellectual light without the species, for 1. The Gloss on the first Epistle to the Corinthians (14:2): says that one is called prophet because of intellectual sight alone. But intellectual sight does not refer to things through likenesses of the things, but through their very essences, as is said in the same Gloss. Therefore, in prophetic sight no species are imprinted on the mind of the prophet. 2. Our understanding abstracts from matter and material conditions. If, therefore, in the intellectual sight which constitutes prophecy some likenesses are produced, those likenesses will not be involved with matter or material conditions. Therefore, through them the prophet will not be able to know particular things, but only universals. 3 Prophets have in their minds some species of those things which are revealed to them. Thus, Jeremiah, who prophesied the burning of Jerusalem, had in his soul a species of that city received from sense, and, similarly, he had a species of fire burning, which he had frequently seen. If, then, other species of the same things are imprinted by God on the mind of the prophet, it follows that there would be in the same subject two forms with the same specific nature. But this is incorrect. 4. The sight by which one sees the divine essence is more powerful than the sight by which one sees the species of anything else whatever. But the sight by which one sees the divine essence is not enough to acquire knowledge of all things whatever. Otherwise, those who saw the divine essence would see everything. Therefore, no matter what species are imprinted on the mind of the prophet, they will not be able to cause the prophet to know reality. 5. It is not necessary for the divine action to produce in the prophet that which anyone can do of his own power. But through the power of imagination, which joins and divides the images received from things, anyone can form in his mind the species of anything whatever. Therefore, it is not necessary for the species of things to be impressed by God on the soul of the prophet. 6. Nature works through the shortest way possible; much more so does God, whose works have even better order. But the shorter way is to bring the prophet to some knowledge of things by means of the species which are in his soul, rather than by other newly imprinted species. Therefore, it does not seem that any species are imprinted anew. 7. The gloss of Jerome on Amos(1:2) reads: “Prophets use likenesses of things with which they are familiar.”But this would not be so if their visions took place through newly imprinted species. Therefore, no new species, but only the prophetic light, is imprinted on the soul of the prophet. To the Contrary 1. It is not through light, but through a species of something visible, that sight receives the determination to know some definite visible object. Likewise, it is not through the light of the agent intellect, but through an intelligible species, that the possible intellect receives the determination to know intelligible objects. Therefore, since the knowledge of the prophet receives a determination to some things which he did not know before, it seems that the infusion of light without the impression of species is not sufficient. 2. Dionysius says: “It is impossible for the divine radiance to shine on us unless it is shrouded with a variety of sacred veils.”But for him figures are veils. Therefore, intelligible light is showered on the prophet only with figurative likenesses. 3. The infusion of light is uniform in all the prophets. But not all the prophets receive uniform knowledge, since some prophesy of the present, some of the past, and some of the future, as Gregory says. Therefore, there is not only the infusion of prophetic light but the impression of certain species by which the knowledge of the various prophets is distinguished. 4. The prophet receives the prophetic revelation through internal speech made to him by God or by an angel. This is clear to anyone who looks at the writings of all the prophets. But all speech takes place through some signs. Therefore, prophetic revelation takes place through some likenesses. 5. The sight of the imagination and of the understanding are higher than bodily sight. But when bodily sight takes place supernaturally, a new bodily species is shown to the eyes of the one who sees, as is evident in the case of the hand of one writing on the wall which appeared to Baltassar (Daniel 5:5). Therefore, it is much more necessary for new species to be imprinted on the sight of the imagination and the understanding when these take place supernaturally. REPLY Prophecy is a kind of supernatural knowledge. But two things are required for knowledge: reception of the things known, and judgment of what is received, as we have said previously. Accordingly, knowledge is supernatural sometimes only in reception, sometimes only in judgment, and sometimes in both. However, one is not called a prophet if this knowledge is supernatural only in reception, just as Pharaoh, who supernaturally received a sign of abundance and famine under the figures of oxen and ears of corn (Genesis 41:25-36), was not called a prophet. But, if someone has supernatural judgment or judgment and reception together, he is called a prophet. Now, supernatural reception can take place only through the three kinds of sight: through bodily sight , when certain things are shown to the bodily eyes by the divine power, as the hand of one writing was shown to Baltassar (Daniel 5:5); through the sight of imagination, when by the divine power some figures of things appear to the prophets, as the boiling cauldron appeared to Jeremiah (1:13) and horses and mountains to Zacharias (6:1-6); and through intellectual sight , when something is shown to the understanding in a way which surpasses its natural capacity. But, since the human understanding is in natural potency to all the intelligible forms of sensible things, no matter what intelligible species arise in the understanding, there will be no supernatural reception; as there was supernatural reception in bodily vision when it saw things which were not formed naturally, but only by the divine power in order to reveal something. Similarly, there was supernatural reception in the sight of imagination when it saw some likenesses not received from the senses, but fashioned through some force of the soul. But our understanding receives supernaturally only when it sees through their essence the intelligible substances themselves, such as God and the angels. For it cannot reach this by virtue of its nature. But the last of these three supernatural receptions surpasses the mode of prophecy. Hence, we read in Numbers (12:6-8): “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream. But it is not so with my servant Moses... and plainly, and not in riddles and figures doth he see the Lord.” But to see God in His essence, as He is seen in rapture or by the blessed, or to see other intelligible substances through their essence, surpasses the mode of prophetic sight. But the first supernatural reception, which takes place through bodily sight, is lower than prophetic reception. For in this reception the prophet is not given preference over anyone else, since all can equally see a species which God fashions for sight. Therefore, the supernatural reception which is proper to prophecy is the reception of the sight of imagination. Thus, every prophet has either only supernatural judgment of those things which are seen by another, as Joseph did about the things which Pharaoh saw (Genesis 41:25-36), or reception through the sight of imagination together with judgment. Therefore, supernatural judgment is given to the prophet through the light infused in him which gives his understanding strength to judge. For this no species are required, but for reception there must be a new formation of species, whether to produce in the mind of the prophet species which were not there previously, as the species of colors might be imprinted on one born blind, or by the divine power to set in order and join the pre-existing species in a way which is capable of signifying the things which should be shown to the prophet. We must concede that revelation is made to the prophet in this way not only through the light, but also through species; but sometimes it is according to the light alone. Answers to Difficulties 1. Although only he who has intellectual sight is called a prophet, yet, not only intellectual light pertains to prophecy, but also the sight of imagination, in which suitable species can be formed to represent singular things. 2. The solution to the second difficulty is clear from the first response. 3. The prophet does not need a new infusion of the species of those things which he has seen, but only an orderly grouping of the species retained in the storehouse of the imaginative power, which can suitably designate the thing to be prophesied. 4. The divine essence, in so far as it exists in itself, represents all things whatsoever more explicitly than any species or figure does. But, since the sight of the one who looks at it is overcome by the loftiness of that essence, the one who sees the essence does not see all that it represents. But the species imprinted on the imagination are proportioned to us; hence, from them we can come to knowledge of things. 5. just as one who receives knowledge from signs reaches the things themselves by way of the signs, so, conversely, one who uses signs to express something must know the thing represented before he can form the symbol. For one cannot use fitting signs for things which he does not know. Therefore, although any man can by his natural power form any images whatever, only one who knows the future events to be symbolized can form figures to represent them properly. This formation of images in the sight of imagination takes place supernaturally in the prophet. 6. The species pre-existing in the imaginative power of the prophet, in so far as they exist there, are not capable of signifying future things. Therefore, they must be reshaped into something else by the divine power. 7. The species pre-existing in the imagination of the prophet are, as it were, the elements of that sight of imagination which is revealed by the divine power, since it is somehow made up of them. Thus it is that the prophet uses the likenesses of things with which he is familiar. Answers to Contrary Difficulties But, since prophetic revelation does not always take place through species, as has been said, we must answer the arguments given to the contrary. 1. Although the knowledge of the prophet receives no determination to some particular thing from the intellectual light when he receives supernatural judgment alone, his knowledge does receive its determination from species seen by someone else, as Joseph’s knowledge received its determination from the species seen by Pharaoh, or from any species seen by Joseph himself without supernatural aid. 2. When the rays of divine light shine on the prophet, they are always veiled in figures, not in the sense that species are always infused, but that these rays are always combined with the pre-existing species. 3. The revelation which the prophets receive is also differentiated by reason of the intellectual light, which some perceive more fully than others, and by reason of the species, which either exist beforehand or are received anew by the prophet himself or by another. 4. As Gregory says: “God speaks to the angels by the very act by which He shows His invisible secrets to their hearts,” and he adds that He speaks to holy souls by infusing certainty in them. Thus, in speech with which God is said to have spoken to the prophets in Holy Scripture, we consider not only the species of things which are imprinted, but also the light which is given, by which the mind of the prophet is made certain of something. 5. Since the sight of understanding and imagination are higher than bodily sight, through them we know not only things which are present, but even things which are absent, whereas with bodily sight we perceive only things which are present. Therefore, the species of things are stored in the imagination and the understanding, but not in the senses. Consequently, for bodily sight to be supernatural new bodily species must always be formed. But this is not needed for the sight of imagination or understanding to be supernatural. Q. 12: Prophecy ARTICLE VIII In the eighth article we ask: Does all prophetic revelation take place through the mediation of an angel? [Parallel readings: In Matth. , 2; C.G. , III, 154; In Isaiam , 6; S.T. , II-II, 172, 2.] Difficulties It seems that it does not, for 1. As Augustine says, the minds of some are so elevated that they do not see the unchangeable natures through an angel, but in the highest citadel of reality itself. But this seems especially to belong to the prophets. Therefore, their revelation does not take place through the mediation of an angel. 2. The gifts of the Holy Spirit and the infused habits come directly from God. But prophecy is a gift of the Holy Spirit, as is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:10). It is also a kind of infused light. Therefore, it is from God without the mediation of an angel. 3. The prophecy which proceeds from a created power is natural prophecy, as has been said. But an angel is a creature. Therefore, prophecy which is not natural but the gift of the Holy Spirit is not produced through the mediation of an angel. 4. Prophecy takes place through the infusion of light and the imprinting of species. But it seems that neither of these can take place through an angel. For the angel would have to be the creator either of the light or of the species, since these cannot be made from anything pre-existing. Therefore, prophetic sight does not take place through the mediation of an angel. 5. In the definition of prophecy we read that prophecy is a divine revelation or inspiration. But, if it took place through the mediation of an angel, it would be called angelic and not divine. Therefore, itdoes not take place through the mediation of angels. 6. Wisdom (7:27) says that the divine wisdom, “through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets.” Therefore, one is made a prophet directly by God Himself, and not through an angel. To the Contrary 1. Moses seems to have been higher than the other prophets, as is clear in Numbers (11:16-17,25; 12:3,-8) and Deuteronomy (34:10). But God made the revelation to Moses through the mediation of angels. Hence, it is said in Galatians (3:19): “(the law) being ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator:” and in Acts (7:3 8) Stephen said of Moses: “This is he that was in the Church in the wilderness, with the angel who spoke to him on Mount Sinai, and with our fathers.” Therefore, the other prophets with much greater reason received their revelation through the mediation of an angel. 21. Dionysius says: “Our glorious fathers received divine visions through the mediation of the celestial powers.” 3. Augustine says that all appearances made to the fathers in the Old Testament took place through the ministration of the angels. REPLY Two things concur in effecting prophetic revelation: the illumination of the mind and the formation of the species in the imaginative power. Therefore, the prophetic light itself, by which the mind of the prophet is enlightened, comes from God as its primary source. Nevertheless, the human mind is strengthened and to some extent prepared for its proper reception by the angelic light. For, since the power of the divine light is most simple and most universal, there is no proportion between it and reception of it by the human soul in this life, unless it is limited and specified through union with the angelic light, which is narrower, in scope and more commensurate with the human mind. But the formation of the species in the imaginative power must be attributed properly to the angels, since the whole of bodily creation is under the direction of the spiritual creation, as Augustine proves. Now, the imaginative power uses a bodily organ; hence, the formation of species in the imaginative power is part of the work proper to the angels. Answers to Difficulties 1. As has been said earlier, Augustine’s words are to be taken as referring to the vision of heaven or to the sight of rapture, but not to prophetic sight. 2. Prophecy is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit by reason of the prophetic light, which, it is true, is directly infused by God. Still, the ministration of the angels assists in its proper reception. 3. That which a creature performs by its own power is in some way natural, but that which a creature performs not of its own power, but in so far as it is moved by God or is an instrument of the divine activity, is supernatural. Hence, the prophecy which takes its origin from an angel according to the natural knowledge of the angel is natural prophecy. But that which takes its origin from an angel in so far as the angel receives revelation from God is supernatural prophecy. 4. An angel does not create light in the human understanding or species in the imaginative power. But God uses the activity of the angel to strengthen the natural light in the human understanding. In this way an angel is said to illuminate man. Also, since an angel has the power to move the organ of phantasy, it can fashion the sight of imagination in the way which befits prophecy. 5. Activity is not attributed to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as a bench is not called the effect of the saw, but of the carpenter. Similarly, since an angel is the cause of prophetic revelation only as a divine instrument using the revelation received from God, the prophecy should not be called angelic, but divine. 6. The divine wisdom, in transferring itself to the soul, brings about some effects without the mediation of the ministration of the angels, as the infusion of grace, through which one is made a friend of God. But nothing hinders it from bringing about some other effects through the mediation of the aforesaid ministration. And, transferring itself to holy souls in this way, it makes prophets through the mediation of an angel. Q. 12: Prophecy ARTICLE IX In the ninth article we ask: Does a prophet always lose sense-consciousness when he is under the influence of the spirit of prophecy? [Parallel readings: S.T. , II-II, 173, 3.] Difficulties It seems that he does, for 1. Numbers (12:6) says: “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear in a vision or I will speak to him in a dream.” But as the Gloss says, prophecy takes place “through dreams and visions” when it takes place “through those things which seem to be said or done.” But when there is an appearance of those things which seem to be said or done and they are not actually said or done, a man is transported out of his senses. Therefore, the sight of prophecy is always in a prophet who is transported out of his senses. 2. When one power is applied intensely to its activity, another power must be withdrawn from its activity. But in the sight of prophecy the interior powers, that is, the intellect and the imagination, are intensely applied to their activities, since prophetic sight is the most perfect thing which they can reach in this life. Therefore, in prophetic sight the prophet is always withdrawn from the activity of the exterior powers. 3. Intellectual sight is more noble than the sight of imagination, and this latter is more noble than bodily sight. But combination with that which is less noble detracts somewhat from the perfection of the more noble. Therefore, intellectual sight and the sight of imagination are more perfect when they are not combined with bodily sight. Therefore, since they reach their highest perfection in this life in prophetic sight, it seems that they are not at all combined with bodily sight in such a way that the prophet would make use of bodily sight together with them. 4. The senses are more remote from the understanding and the imagination than lower reason is from higher reason. But the consideration of higher reason, by which one devotes himself to the contemplation of eternal things, withdraws man from the consideration of lower reason, by which man employs himself in things temporal. With much more reason does the prophetic sight of the understanding and the imagination withdraw man from bodily sight. 5. One and the same power cannot apply itself to many things simultaneously. But, when one is using his bodily senses, his understanding and imagination are occupied with those things which are seen bodily. Therefore, one cannot at the same time occupy himself with this and with those things which appear in prophetic sight apart from the senses of the body. To the Contrary 1. The first Epistle to the Corinthians (14:32) says: “The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets.” But this would not be so if the prophet lost sense-consciousness, for then he would not have control over himself. Therefore, prophecy does not take place in a man who has lost sense-consciousness. 2. Through the sight of prophecy one receives certain and inerrant knowledge of things. But in those who are transported out of their senses, either in a dream, or in some other way, the knowledge is mixed with error and is uncertain. For they hold fast to likenesses of things as if they were the things themselves, as Augustine says. Therefore, prophecy does not take place when one loses sense-consciousness. 3. If we posit this, we seem to fall into the error of Montanus, who said that the prophets spoke as insane people who did not know what they were saying. 4. As the Gloss says, prophecy sometimes takes place through words and deeds: “Through deeds, as the ark of Noe signified the Church, and through words, as those which the angels spoke to Abraham.” But it is clear that Noe, when building the ark, and Abraham, when conversing with angels and serving them, were not transported out of their senses. Therefore, prophecy does not always take place through transport out of the senses. REPLY Prophecy has two acts: one is principal, namely, sight, and the other is secondary, namely, announcing. The prophet does the announcing either by words or even by deeds, as is clear in Jeremiah (13:5), inasmuch as he put his girdle near the river to rot. But in whichever of the two ways the prophetic announcing is made, it is always made by a man not transported out of his senses, for such an announcing takes place through certain sensible signs. Hence, the prophet doing the announcing has to use his senses for his announcement to be perfect. Otherwise, he would make the announcement like an insane person. But in the sight of prophecy two things concur, as we have said earlier, namely, judgment and the proper reception of the prophecy. Now, when the prophet is divinely inspired, so that only his judgment is supernatural, and not his reception, such inspiration does not require transport out of the senses, for the judgment of the understanding is more perfect according to its nature in one who has the use of his senses than in one who does not have the use of them. But the supernatural reception proper to prophecy is in the sight of imagination, and in order to see this vision human power is enraptured by some spirit and transported out of the senses, as Augustine says. The reason for this is that the power of imagination is mainly intent on the things which are received through the senses, as long as one uses his senses. Hence, its primary attention can be transferred to those things which are received from another source only when the man is transported out of his senses. Hence, whenever prophecy takes place according to the sight of imagination, the prophet must be transported out of his senses. But this transport happens in two ways. In one it is from some cause in the soul, and in the other, from a physical cause. It comes from a physical cause when the external senses become dull either because of sickness or because of the vapors occurring in sleep, which ascend to the brain and deaden the organ of touch. It comes from a cause in the soul when a man, from too much attention to the objects of the understanding or the imagination, is altogether abstracted from the external senses. However, transport from the bodily senses never takes place in a prophet through sickness, as happens in epileptics and those who are mad, but only through a properly disposed physical cause, as through sleep. Therefore, prophecy which takes place with the sight of imagination always comes either in a dream, when one is deprived of sense-consciousness through a properly disposed physical cause, or in a vision, when the transport comes from some cause in the soul. Nevertheless, between the prophet in his transport out of the senses, whether it be through a dream or through a vision, and all others who are carried out of their senses, there is this difference, that the mind of the prophet is enlightened about those things which are seen in the sight of imagination. Consequently, he knows that they are not things, but in some way, the likenesses of things about which his judgment is certain because of the light of the mind. Therefore, it is clear from this that the inspiration of prophecy takes place sometimes with transport out of the senses and sometimes without it. Hence, we must answer both sets of difficulties. Answers to Difficulties 1. In those words our Lord wanted to show the pre-eminence of Moses over the other prophets in supernatural reception. For Moses was raised to the sight of the very essence of God in itself. But everything which the prophets have received they have received only in the likenesses belonging to dreams or visions. Nevertheless, the judgment of the prophet is not by means of the likenesses belonging to dreams or visions. Hence judgment of prophecy takes place without transport out of the senses. 2.When an interior power applies itself to the sight of its object, if there is perfect attention, it is cut off from exterior sight. But no matter how perfect the judgment of the interior power is, it does not withdraw from exterior activity, for it is the duty of the internal power to judge of the external. Hence, the judgment of that which is higher is ordained to the same thing as the exterior activity. Therefore, they do not hinder each other. 3. This argument follows for the sight of the intellect and the imagination according to reception, but not according to judgment, as has been said. 4. The powers of the soul hinder each other in their operations because they are rooted in the one essence of the soul. Hence, the closer the powers are to each other, the more they naturally hinder each other if they are directed toward different objects. Hence, the argument does not follow. 5. This argument follows for supernatural reception of the imaginative or intellectual power, but not for judgment. Answers to Contrary Difficulties 1. The Apostle is speaking of the announcing of prophecy, for it is in the power of free choice to announce or not to announce those things about which he is inspired. However, as concerns the revelation, the prophet himself is subject to the spirit, for the revelation does not take place as the prophet wishes, but as the revealing spirit wishes. 2. It is from the light of prophecy that the mind of the prophet is so enlightened that even in the transport out of his senses he has a true judgment about those things which he sees in the dream or vision. 3. Montanus erred on two points. First, he took away from the prophets the light of mind by which they have true judgment about the things which they have seen. Second, he said that, when they were announcing, they were carried out of their senses, as happens with those who are mad, or with those who talk in their sleep. But this does not follow from the above position. 4. The fact that prophecy is said to take place through words or deeds is to be referred more to the announcing of prophecy than to prophetic sight. Q. 12: Prophecy ARTICLE X In the tenth article we ask: Is prophecy suitably divided into prophecy of predestination, foreknowledge, and threats? [Parallel readings: In Matth. , 1i; In Ierem. , 18; S.T. , II-II, 174, 1.] Difficulties It seems that it is not, for 1. When the Gloss divides prophecy, it says: “One type of prophecy cy is according to foreknowledge, and this must be fulfilled in every way according to the meaning of the words. ‘Behold a virgin shall conceive’ (Isaiah 7:14) belongs to this type. The other kind of prophecy is a threat, as: ‘Yet forty days, and Ninive shall be destroyed’ (Jonas 3:4). This is not fulfilled in the superficial meaning of the words, but in the meaning of a tacit construction put on the words.” Therefore, it seems that the third division which Jerome made of prophecy of predestination is superfluous. 2. That which is a property of all prophecy should not be set down as a member dividing prophecy. But to be according to divine foreknowledge is a property of all prophecy, for, as the Gloss reads: “The prophets read in the book of foreknowledge.” Therefore, prophecy according to foreknowledge should not be set down as a division of prophecy. 3. Since foreknowledge is a more general term than predestination, inasmuch as it is part of its definition, foreknowledge can be divided from predestination only with reference to those things in which the extension of foreknowledge is greater than that of predestination. But it is with respect to evil things that the extension of foreknowledge is greater than that of predestination, for there is foreknowledge of these and not predestination. But there is both foreknowledge and predestination of good things. Therefore, when there is said to be one prophecy of predestination and another of foreknowledge, this means that one concerns good acts and the other evil. But as far as dependence on free will is concerned, there is no difference between good and evil. Therefore, there is no difference at all between these two kinds of prophecy which Jerome distinguishes when he says: “The prophecy of predestination is that which is fulfilled without our free choice, but the prophecy of foreknowledge is that in which our free choice is involved.” 4. As Augustine says, predestination concerns goods connected with salvation. But our merits, also, which depend on free choice, are numbered among these goods. Therefore, our free choice is involved in prophecy of predestination. Thus, Jerome made a poor division. 5. Only three things can be considered in prophecy: that from whom it is, that in which it is, and that about which it is. But there is no distinction in that from whom it is, for all prophecy is from one source, the Holy Spirit. Nor is there any difference in that in which it is, for the human spirit is the subject of prophecy. And those things which prophecy concerns are only good and evil things. Therefore, prophecy should be divided only into a division with two members. 6. Jerome says6 that the prophecy, “Behold a virgin shall conceive” (Isaiah 7:14; Matthew1:23), is a prophecy of predestination. But, for the fulfillment of that prophecy, free choice played a part in the assent of the Blessed Virgin. Therefore, the prophecy of predestination has free will involved in it, and, thus, it does not differ from the prophecy of foreknowledge. 7. Every declaration about something future which we do not know will exist, is either false or doubtful to the one making the declaration. But through the prophecy containing a threat one predicts that something will exist, as for example, the destruction of some city. Since this declaration is neither false nor doubtful because there is neither falsity nor doubt in the Holy Spirit, who is the author of the prophecy, this has to be foreknown at least by the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the prophecy containing a threat is not distinct from the prophecy of foreknowledge. 8. When something is predicted according to the prophecy containing a threat, the prediction should be interpreted conditionally or unconditionally. If conditionally, it is not said to belong to prophecy, which consists in a kind of supernatural knowledge, for even natural reason can know that some things will happen if certain conditions are fulfilled. Therefore, it must be interpreted unconditionally. Accordingly, either the prophecy is false, or the outcome is as predicted. And this must be known beforehand by God. Therefore, prophecy containing a threat should not be distinguished from the prophecy of foreknowledge. 9. In Jeremiah (17:18, 24-27) there is a similar rule for the fulfillment of divine promises and threats, for the threats are recalled when the nation against whom the threat was made repents of its sins, and similarly the promise ceases when the nation to whom it was made leaves the path of justice. Therefore, just as one makes the prophecy containing a threat a division of prophecy, he ought to make the prophecy containing a promise a fourth division. 10. Isaiah (38:1) spoke prophetically to Ezechias: “Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die...” This is not a prophecy of predestination, for that kind must be fulfilled in every way even apart from our free choice. Again, it is not a prophecy of foreknowledge because God did not have foreknowledge of this future event, otherwise there would have been falsity in His foreknowledge. Similarly, it does not belong to prophecy containing a threat, since the event was predicted unconditionally. Therefore, there must be a fourth class of prophecy. 11. It was said that this was predicted to happen according to the lower causes, and thus was a prophecy containing a threat.—On the contrary, by the art of medicine man can know the lower causes of the death of a sick man. Therefore, if Isaiah predicted this only according to lower causes, either he did not predict it prophetically, or prophetic prediction does not differ from the prediction of a doctor. 12. Every prophecy deals with things either by viewing the higher causes or by viewing the lower causes. If we take the previously mentioned prophecy as conditional, since it is according to some causes, namely, lower causes, there is equal reason to say that all prophecy is conditional. Thus, all prophecy will have the same character as the prophecy containing a threat. 13. Although the prophecy of threatening is not fulfilled “in the superficial meaning of the words, nevertheless it is fulfilled in the meaning of the tacit construction put on the words,” as Cassiodorus says..Thus, Jonas’ words, “Niniveh shall be destroyed” (Jonas 3:4), were fulfilled according to Augustine, for, “although the walls of Niniveh remained standing, its evil ways were wiped out.” But the fulfillment of prophecy, not according to the exterior superficial meaning of the words, but according to their spiritual sense, takes place in the prophecy of predestination and of foreknowledge. We see this in Isaiah (54:11) “I will lay thy foundations with sapphires, Jerusalem,” and in Daniel (2:45): “the stone was cut out of the mountain without hands, and broke in pieces the statue,” and in many other similar passages. Therefore, prophecy containing a threat should not be distinguished from the prophecy of foreknowledge and predestination. 14. If likenesses of future things are shown to someone, he still is not called a prophet unless he understands the things signified through these likenesses. Thus, Pharaoh was not called a prophet when he saw the ears of corn and the cattle, “for there is need of understanding in a vision,” as Daniel (10:1) says. But those through whom the divine threats are made understand what they declare only according to the superficial meaning of the words, for they are not enlightened about the things which are signified through the words. This is clear in the case of Jonas, who understood that Ninive was to be overturned materially. Hence, he grieved as though his prophecy were not fulfilled when the city was not overturned but mended its ways. Therefore, one should not on this account be called a prophet, and, thus, threatening should not be made a species of prophecy. Hence, the distinction previously mentioned seems no distinction at all. To the Contrary The opposite appears from the Gloss on Matthew(1:23): “Behold a virgin shall conceive.” Here, the above division is given and explained. REPLY Prophecy is derived from the divine foreknowledge, as has been said above. But we must bear in mind that God knows futures differently from all others who have foreknowledge of them. For there are two things to consider in the knowledge of the future: the order of the causes to the future effects and the outcome or execution of this order in the actual procession of the effects from their causes. Accordingly, no matter what created power has some knowledge of the future, its knowledge reaches only the order of the causes. Thus, a doctor is said to foreknow future death in so far as he knows that natural principles have an ordination to death. And a meteorologist is said to foresee future rains and winds in the same way. Hence, if these causes are such that their effects can be impeded, the event which is thus foreseen to happen does not always come to pass. But God knows the future not only by reason of the order of the causes, but also in the very outcome or execution of that order. The reason for this is that His vision is measured by eternity, which comprehends all times in one indivisible present. Thus, in one simple glance He sees that to which the causes are ordered and how that order is fulfilled or obstructed. But this is impossible for a creature whose gaze is limited to a determined time. Hence, He knows those things which exist at that time. And at the time when futures are still future they exist only in the order of their causes, and hence, we can know them only in this way. Consequently, it is clear to all who consider it correctly that when we are said to foresee the future we have knowledge more of present things than of the future. And, so, it remains proper to God alone to have true foreknowledge of future events. Therefore, prophecy is derived from divine foreknowledge sometimes by reason of the order of the causes and sometimes by reason of the execution or fulfillment of that order. Therefore, when prophetic revelation concerns only the order of the causes, it is called prophecy containing a threat. For, then, all that is revealed to the prophet is that according to the things which now exist such a person is ordained to this or that. The fulfillment of the order, however, takes place in two ways. Sometimes it comes from the activity of the divine power alone, as the resuscitation of Lazarus, the conception of Christ, and things of this sort. And the prophecy of predestination follows this divine activity, for, as Damascene says: “Those things which God predestines are not in our power.” Hence, predestination is called a kind of preparatory action on the part of God. Now, preparatory action concerns that which one will do himself and not what someone else will do. Some things, however, are brought to completion by the operation of other causes, whether natural or voluntary. These things, in so far as they are accomplished through other causes, are not predestined, but they are nevertheless foreknown. Hence, prophecy of these things is said to be according to foreknowledge. However, since prophecy takes place for the sake of men, the prophecy of foreknowledge especially concerns those things which men do by their free will. For this reason Jerome puts aside other created causes and makes mention only of free will when referring to the prophecy of foreknowledge. Answers to Difficulties 1. The threefold division which Jerome makes is reduced to a twofold division, as has been said, because one division looks to the order of causes and the other to the outcome of that order. This is the division which Cassiodorus held. But Jerome subdivided the second member; thus, Cassiodorus gave two members of the division and Jerome three. Cassiodorus also took foreknowledge in its generality, for it refers to all existing things, whether they come about through created or uncreated power. But Jerome took foreknowledge with a certain restriction, inasmuch as it concerns only those things about which there is no predestination by reason of themselves, that is to say, those things which come to pass by created power. 2. Every prophecy has divine foreknowledge as its root. But, since there is knowledge of the order and the outcome in divine foreknowledge, one kind of prophecy is derived from the one of these and one from the other. However, the foreknowledge of God is properly called foreknowledge in so far as it looks to an outcome which is future. For the order to the outcome is in the present; hence, of it there is knowledge rather than foreknowledge. Thus, not that prophecy which looks to the order, but only that which deals with the outcome, is said to take place according to foreknowledge. 3. Foreknowledge is taken here in contrast with predestination in so far as foreknowledge has a broader extension than predestination. Now, foreknowledge has a broader extension than predestination not only in evil things, if predestination be taken strictly, but also in all good things which do not take place exclusively by the divine power. Hence, the argument does not follow. 4. Our merit is from grace and from free will. However, it belongs to predestination only in so far as it comes from grace, which is from God alone. Hence, that which is from our free will is said to belong to predestination for some extrinsic reason. 5. Here, prophecy is distinguished according to the things of which it treats. This is not according to good and evil, for differences of this sort are related by some extrinsic reason to the future thing which is known through prophecy, but rather according to that which concerns the order or the outcome of the order, as has been said. 6. The consent of the Blessed Virgin intervened in the conception of Christ as something which removed a hindrance and not as an operative cause. For it was not fitting that so great a benefit be given to one who was unwilling. 7. We can say that something will exist not only from the fact that it will exist in this way, but also from the fact that it is so ordained in its causes that it will thus exist. For it is in this way that a doctor says: “That man will be cured or will die.” And, if the event prove otherwise, he does not speak falsely. For at that time this was about to take place from the order of the causes, although it was possible for this to be impeded. Then, that which beforehand was going to take place in the event will not take place. For this reason the Philosopher says: “One who is about to enter will not enter.” And according to this the threat of the prophet is neither false nor doubtful, although what he has predicted does not come to pass. 8. If the prophecy containing a threat is referred to the ordination of causes to which it directly looks, it is consequently free from all condition. For it is absolutely true that it is so ordained in the causes that this happen. But, if it is referred to the event to which it looks indirectly, it must be understood under this condition: if the cause acts. Nevertheless, it is supernatural, because we cannot know by natural knowledge that precisely such or such a punishment is deserved according to divine justice, even if the cause does exist, namely, if the wickedness remain. 9. We take the prophecy containing a promise as belonging to the prophecy containing a threat because both have the same intelligible nature. However, this nature is better expressed in prophecy containing a threat, because threats are more frequently revoked than promises, for God is more inclined to be merciful than to punish. 10. That prophecy was a prophecy containing a threat, and although the condition was not stated explicitly, that threat should be interpreted under the implicit condition: if such an order of things continues. 11. Lower causes include not only natural causes, which doctors can know beforehand, but also meritorious causes, which are known from divine revelation alone. Likewise, the natural causes of health or death can be known much more perfectly by divine revelation than by human ingenuity. 12. Higher causes, which are the intelligible natures of things [represented] in the divine foreknowledge, never fail of fulfillment of their effects, as lower causes do. Therefore, the outcomes of things are known absolutely in the higher causes, but only conditionally in lower causes. 13. Although in the prophecy of predestination and of foreknowledge the truth to be fulfilled is presented under some likenesses, no literal sense is understood by reason of those likenesses, but the literal sense is grasped according to those things which are signified through the likenesses, as happens in all metaphorical expressions. Hence, in such prophecies we find no truth in the likenesses, but only in those things which are declared through the likenesses. But, in the prophecy containing a threat, the literal sense of the words of the prophet is considered according to those likenesses of the things which will come to pass, because those likenesses are not given only as likenesses but as things. Hence, that which will come to pass and is represented through likenesses of this sort does not belong to the literal sense, but to the mystical sense. Thus, when it is said that Ninive will be destroyed, material destruction belongs to the literal sense, but destruction of evil ways belongs to the moral sense. By reason of the order of causes we see some truth in the literal sense itself, as has been said. 14. The ears of corn and the cattle were not shown in Pharaoh’s dream as things, but only as likenesses. Therefore, Pharaoh, who saw only those likenesses, had no understanding of any thing and for this reason was not a prophet. But Jonas, to whom it was said: “Ninive shall be destroyed,” had some understanding of a thing, namely, of the ordination of merits to destruction, even though, perhaps, he had no foreknowledge of the other thing, namely, the conversion. Thus, he was not a prophet in that which he did not understand. Nevertheless, Jonas and the prophets who threatened knew that the prophecy they foretold was not a prophecy according to foreknowledge, but according to threat. Hence, it is said in Jonas (4:2): “Therefore I went before to flee into Tharsis: for I know that thou art a gracious and merciful God.” Q. 12: Prophecy ARTICLE XI In the eleventh article we ask: Is there unchangeable truth in prophecy? [Parallel readings: C.G. , III, 154; S.T. , II-II, 171,6; 172, 5, ad 3; 172, 6, ad 2.] Difficulties It seems that there is not, for 1. Since unchangeable truth is put in the definition of prophecy, if it belongs to prophecy at all, it must belong to it for some intrinsic reason. But future contingent things, about which we have prophecy, are not unchangeable for any intrinsic reason, but only in so far as they are referred to the divine foreknowledge, as Boethius says. Therefore, unchangeable truth should not be attributed to prophecy as part of its definition. 2. That which is fulfilled only if some changeable condition exists does not have unchangeable truth. But there is a prophecy, that containing a threat, which is fulfilled only if there exists a changeable condition, namely, persistence in justice or wickedness, as we see this in Jeremiah (18:8). Therefore, not all prophecy possesses unchangeable truth. 3. The Gloss on Isaiah (38:1) reads: “God reveals His sentence ( sententia ) but not His chosen plan ( consilium ) to the prophets.” But His sentence is changeable, as is said in the same place. Therefore, prophecy does not possess unchangeable truth. 4. If prophecy contains unchangeable truth, this happens because of the prophet who sees it, or because of the thing which is seen, or because of the eternal mirror by reason of which it is seen. But its source is none of these. Not the seer, for human knowledge is changeable. Not the thing which is seen, for that is contingent. Finally, not the divine foreknowledge or mirror, for this does not impose necessity on things. Therefore, prophecy in no way contains unchangeable truth. 5. It was said that divine foreknowledge does not impose a necessity which makes it impossible for the outcome to be different, but nevertheless the outcome which was foreknown will not be different, and that in this way prophecy contains unchangeable truth. For, according to the Philosopher, that is called unchangeable which cannot be changed, or is changed with difficulty, or simply does not change.—On the contrary, granted the occurrence of what is possible, nothing impossible follows. If, therefore, that which is foreknown and prophesied can vary, then, if we assume that it does vary, nothing impossible follows. But it does follow that prophecy possesses changeable truth. Therefore, prophecy does not necessarily contain unchangeable truth. 6. The truth of a proposition follows the condition of the thing, for: “A statement is true or false as the thing is or is not,” as the Philosopher says. But the things about which there is prophecy are contingent and changeable. Therefore, the prophetic statement contains changeable truth. 7. An effect is called necessary or contingent from the proximate cause, not from the first cause. But the proximate causes of the things of which we have prophecy are changeable causes, although the first cause is unchangeable. Therefore, prophecy does not possess unchangeable, but changeable, truth. 8. If prophecy possesses unchangeable truth, it is impossible for something to be prophesied and not happen. But it is impossible for what has been prophesied not to have been prophesied. Therefore, if prophecy has unchangeable truth, that which has been prophesied must necessarily happen. Thus, prophecy will not concern future contingent things. To the Contrary l. The Gloss says: “Prophecy is divine inspiration or revelation which announces the outcomes of things with immutable truth.” 2. “Prophecy is a sign of divine foreknowledge,” as Jerome says. But things which are foreknown are necessary in so far as they are subjects of foreknowledge. Therefore, the things prophesied are also necessary in so far as there is prophecy about them. Therefore, prophecy has unchangeable truth. 3. God’s knowledge about changeable things can be unchangeable, for He does not obtain it from things. But in the same way prophetic knowledge is not received from the things themselves. Therefore, Prophecy has unchangeable truth about changeable things. REPLY In prophecy there are two things to consider, the things prophesied and the knowledge which is had of those things. And the order of the causes in these two is different. For the things prophesied come immediately from changeable causes as from their proximate cause, but from the unchangeable causes as from their remote cause. Prophetic knowledge, on the other hand, comes from the divine foreknowledge as its proximate cause and depends on the things prophesied not as a proximate cause, but only as a sign of these things. Moreover, the necessity and contingency of every effect depends on the proximate cause and not on the first cause. Hence, the things prophesied are changeable, but the prophetic knowledge is unchangeable, just as is the divine foreknowledge from which it is derived as a copy from the pattern. For, just as the necessity of the truth of the understanding causes necessary truth in the statement which is a sign of understanding, so also the immutable divine foreknowledge causes unchangeable truth in the prophecy which is its sign. But the way in which God’s foreknowledge can be unchangeably true about changeable things is explained in another question, on God’s knowledge. Consequently, it is not necessary to repeat it here, since the whole immutability of prophecy depends on the immutability of the divine foreknowledge. Answers to Difficulties 1. Nothing prevents something from being in another thing for an extrinsic reason, if that thing is taken in itself, and yet being in the thing for an intrinsic reason, if it is taken together with something else. Thus, to be moved belongs to man for an extrinsic reason, but, in so far as he is running, it belongs intrinsically to a man. So also, to be unchangeable does not belong intrinsically to the thing which is prophesied, but belongs to it only inasmuch as it is prophesied. Therefore, it is fittingly included in the definition of prophecy. 2. The prophecy containing a threat fully possesses unchangeable truth, for it does not deal with the outcomes of things, but with the order of the causes to the outcomes, as has been said. And this order, predicted by the prophet, must necessarily be, although sometimes the events do not follow. 3. That eternal disposition of God which never changes we call the chosen plan of God. For this reason Gregory says: “God never changes His chosen plan.” Sentence, however, is that to which some causes are ordained. Moreover, sentences are handed down in trials according to the merits of the cases ( causae ) . However, sometimes that to which the causes ( causae ) are ordained is arranged by God from eternity. And, then, God’s chosen plan and sentence are the same. But, sometimes, causes are ordained to something which is not arranged by God from eternity. Then, God’s chosen plan and sentence are directed to different things. Therefore, there is mutability in the sentence which looks to lower causes, but there is always immutability in the chosen plan. Sometimes, then, a sentence which is in conformity with the chosen plan is revealed to the prophet. In this case, the prophecy possesses unchangeable truth even with reference to the outcome. Sometimes, however, there is revealed a sentence which is not in conformity with the chosen plan. In this case, there is unchangeable truth with reference to the order, but not with reference to the outcome, as we have said. 4. The eternal mirror gives immutability to prophecy, not because it imposes necessity on the things prophesied, but because it makes the prophecy about contingent things necessary just as it itself is necessary. 5. Given that something has been prophesied according to foreknowledge, although in itself it is possible for it to fail to exist, still, granted that it is said to be foreknown, it is then impossible for it not to exist. For, from the fact that it is established as foreknown, it is established that it will be so, since foreknowledge looks to the outcome. 6. The truth of a proposition follows the condition of the thing when the knowledge of the one proposing the truth has its origin from things. However, this is not so in our case. 7. Although the proximate cause of the thing prophesied is changeable, the proximate cause of the prophecy itself is unchangeable, as has been said. Therefore, the argument does not follow. 8. We should pass like judgment on the failure of what is prophesied to come to pass and on the failure of what is foreknown to come to pass. To what extent this should be conceded and to what extent it should be denied is treated in the question on God’s knowledge. Q. 12: Prophecy ARTICLE XII In the twelfth article we ask: Is the prophecy which is according to the sight of understanding alone higher than that which has the sight of understanding together with imagination? [Parallel readings: S.T. , II-II, 174, 2-3; III, 30, 3, ad 1.] Difficulties It seems that it is not, for 1. Prophecy which has the sight of understanding along with imagination includes that which has the sight of understanding alone. Therefore, the prophetic sight which has both is better than that which has only one. For that which embraces something surpasses that which it embraces. 2. The more abundantly the light of understanding is in a prophecy, the more perfect it is. But, because of the fullness of the light of understanding in prophecy, there is an overflow from the understanding into the imagination, so that the sight of imagination is produced there. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of imagination added to it is more perfect than that which has the sight of understanding alone. 3 It is said of John the Baptist that he is a prophet and “more than a prophet” (Mat 11:9). But this is stated because he saw Christ not only through his understanding or imagination, as the other prophets did, but also physically pointed him out. Therefore, prophecy with which bodily sight is combined is the most noble, and for the same reason that to which the sight of imagination is added is more noble than that which has the sight of understanding alone. 4. The more fully a thing contains the differences which make up the intelligible nature of the species, the more perfect it is. But the differences which constitute prophecy are sight and declaration. Therefore, the prophecy which includes declaration seems to be more perfect than that which does not have it. But the declaration cannot take place without the sight of imagination, because the one who declares a prophecy must have in his imagination the words he is going to speak. Therefore, the prophecy which includes the sight of imagination and of understanding is more perfect. 5. The Gloss on “Yet by the Spirit he speaketh mysteries” (1 Cor. 14:2) says: “One who by spirit alone sees the likenesses of the things signified is less a prophet, and one who is granted only the understanding of them is more a prophet, but he is most a prophet who excels in both.” Thus, we conclude as before. 6. As Rabbi Moses says, prophecy begins in the understanding and is completed in the imagination. Therefore, prophecy which has the sight of imagination is more perfect than that which has only the sight of understanding. 7.Weakness of the light of understanding betrays an imperfection of the prophecy. But the fact that prophetic sight does not overflow into the imagination seems to come from weakness of the light of understanding. Therefore, prophecy which has the sight of imagination seems to be more perfect. 8. To know a thing as it is in itself and as the sign of something else is more perfect than to know it only in itself. Therefore, for the same reason it is more perfect to know a thing as it is represented in a sign than to know it only in itself. But, in the prophecy which has the sight of imagination and that of understanding, the thing prophesied is known not only in itself but also as it is represented by the images. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of imagination is more noble than that which contains only the sight of understanding, in which one understands the things prophesied only in themselves and not as represented in a sign. 9. Dionysius says: “It is impossible for the divine radiance to shine on us unless it is shrouded with a variety of sacred veils.”s But, for him veils are the imagery of the imagination, in which the purity of the light of understanding is, as it were, shrouded. Therefore, in every prophccy there must be imagery of the imagination either formed by man or introduced by God. Now, the imagery introduced by God seems to be more noble than that formed by man. Therefore, those prophecies seem to be most noble in which God at the same time infuses the light of understanding and the imagery of the imagination. 10. As Jerome says, the prophets are distinguished from the writers of sacred books. But, of those whom he calls the prophets, all, or almost all, received revelation under the imagery of imagination. But many of those whom he calls writers of sacred books received revelation without imagery. Therefore, those to whom revelation is given according to the sight of understanding and imagination are more properly called prophets than those to whom revelation is given according to the sight of understanding only. 11. According to the Philosopher, our understanding is related to the first causes of things, which naturally are most knowable, “just as the eye of the owl is related to the light of the sun.” But the eye of the owl can look at the light of the sun only when it is darkened to some extent. Therefore, our understanding, too, understands divine things when they are dimmed to some extent, and therefore seems to understand them in this way under certain likenesses. Consequently, the sight of understanding will not be more certain than that of imagination, since both take place under likenesses. Hence, it seems that the addition of the sight of imagination to that of understanding does not lessen the nobility of the latter. Thus, that prophecy which takes place under both sights is either of greater dignity or at least of equal dignity. 12. That which can be understood is related to the understanding as that which can be imagined is related to the imagination. But that which can be imagined is apprehended by the imagination only through the mediation of a likeness. Therefore, what can be understood is apprehended by the understanding only in the same way. Thus, we conclude as before. To the Contrary 1. The Gloss says: “There is another kind of prophecy which is of greater dignity than the others, that in which one prophesies by means of the inspiration of the Holy Spirit alone and apart from every outside help of action or word or vision or dream.”But the prophecy which has the sight of imagination joined to it takes place with the help of a dream or a vision. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of understanding alone is more noble. 2. Everything which is received into a thing is received there according to the manner of the receiver. But the understanding, in which something is received by the sight of understanding, is more noble than the imagination, in which it is received by the sight of imagination. Therefore, prophecy which takes place according to the sight of understanding is more noble. 3. Where there is sight of understanding there can be no deception, for one who is mistaken does not understand, as Augustine says. However, the sight of imagination contains a great mixture of falsity. Hence, in the Metaphysics it is given as a kind of source of falsity. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of understanding is more noble. 4. When one power of the soul recedes from its activity, another is strengthened in its activity. Therefore, if the power of imagination is completely inactive in some prophecy, the sight of understanding will be stronger. Therefore, the prophecy will also be more noble. 5. The acts of the powers are related to each other just as the powers are. But understanding not joined to imagination, as in the angels, is more noble than understanding joined to imagination, as in men. Therefore, the prophecy which contains the sight of understanding without the sight of imagination is more noble than that which has both. 6. Assistance in an action shows imperfection in the agent. But the sight of imagination is given in the Gloss as a help to prophecy. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of imagination is more imperfect. 7. The more remote light is from darkness or clouds, the brighter it is. But the imagery of imagination is, as it were, clouds which darken the light of understanding. For this reason Isaac says that human reason, which abstracts from phantasms, has its origin in the shadow of intelligence. Therefore, prophecy which has the light of understanding without images is more perfect. 8. The whole nobility of prophetic knowledge consists in this, that it imitates God’s foreknowledge. But prophecy which has no sight of imagination imitates divine foreknowledge, in which there is no imagination, more than that which has the sight of imagination. Therefore, that which does not have the sight of imagination is more noble. REPLY Since the nature of a species is made up of the nature of the genus and the nature of the difference, the dignity of the species can be estimated from either of these. Likewise, according to these two considerations; certain things sometimes surpass each other in dignity. In so far as the nature of the species is concerned, that in which the difference formally constituting the species exists more nobly, always participates more perfectly in the nature of the species. But, absolutely speaking, sometimes that in which the nature of the genus is more perfect is more noble and sometimes that in which the nature of the difference exists more perfectly is more noble. For, since the difference adds some perfection to the nature of the genus, the excellence which comes from the difference makes the thing more noble absolutely. Thus, just as in the species of man, who is a rational animal, he is more noble absolutely who is more gifted in rationality than one who is more gifted in the things which refer to the animal nature, as the senses, movement, and other things of this sort. However, when the difference implies a certain imperfection, then that which has the nature of the genus more completely is more noble absolutely. This is clear in faith, which is an obscure knowledge, namely, of things which are not seen. For one who has a large share of the nature of the genus of faith and is deficient in the difference (as one of the faithful who has some understanding of matters of belief and in a way already sees them) has a faith simply more noble than one who has less knowledge. Nonetheless, as far as the nature of faith is concerned, he has it more properly who does not at all see the things which he believes. The same is true in prophecy. For prophecy seems to be a knowledge which is shadowy and mixed with darkness, as the second Epistle of St. Peter (1:19) has: “We have the more firm prophetical word: whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place.” This, too, the very name prophecy shows, for prophecy is called a kind of sight from afar. And things which are seen clearly are seen, as it were, from nearby. Therefore, if we compare the types of prophecy on the basis of the difference which completes the essence of prophecy, we find that the prophecy in which there is admixture of the sight of imagination possesses that nature of prophecy more perfectly and more properly. For in this the knowledge of prophetic truth is darkened. But if we compare prophecies according to the attributes of the nature of the genus, namely, knowledge or sight, we see that we have to make a distinction. For all perfect knowledge has two elements, reception and judgment about that which is received. Now, in prophecy, judgment about that which is received is according to the understanding alone, but reception is according to the understanding and the imagination. Sometimes, therefore, there is no supernatural reception in prophecy, but only supernatural judgment. Thus, the understanding alone is enlightened without any sight of imagination. Perhaps Solomon’s inspiration was of this nature, since by a divine impulse he made more certain judgments than the rest of us about human actions and the natures of things, which we perceive naturally. But, sometimes, there is also supernatural reception, and this takes place in two ways. For there is either reception by the imagination, as when images of things are formed by the divine power in the spirit of the prophet, or reception by the understanding, as happens when the understanding is so clearly flooded with knowledge of the truth that it does not grasp the truth from the likeness of any images, but in fact can form images for itself from the truth it has seen. And it uses these because of the nature of our understanding. But there can be no prophecy in which there is reception without judgment. Hence, no one can have sight of imagination without that of understanding. Thus, it is clear that the pure sight of understanding, which has judgment alone without supernatural reception, is inferior to that which has judgment and the reception of imagination. But the sight of understanding which has judgment and supernatural reception is more noble than that which has judgment and the reception of imagination. In this respect we must concede that prophecy which contains the sight of understanding alone is more worthy than that which has sight of imagination joined to it. Answers to Difficulties 1. Although the prophecy which consists of both sights does also have sight of understanding, it does not include the prophecy which consists of the sight of understanding alone, because the latter has the sight of understanding more nobly than the former, since in it the perception of the light of understanding is sufficient for reception and judgment, whereas in the other it is sufficient only for judgment. 2. In both types of prophecy the prophetic light descends from the understanding to the imagination, but in different ways. For in the type of prophecy which is said to contain the sight of understanding alone we perceive the whole fullness of the prophetic revelation in the understanding. Thereupon, because of the nature of our understanding, which cannot understand without phantasms, images are suitably formed in the imaginative power as the one who understands wishes. But in the other type of prophecy the whole fullness of prophetic revelation is not received in the understanding, but partly in the understanding, in so far as there is judgment, and partly in the imagination, in so far as there is reception. Hence, the sight of understanding is more complete in the prophecy which contains only the sight of understanding. For the deficiency of the light received in the understanding causes it, in a sense, to fall to some extent from the intelligible purity into the imagery of imagination, as happens in dreams. 3. That John pointed out Christ physically does not belong to prophetic sight in the way we are now speaking about the comparison of prophecy. Rather, it belongs to the declaration of prophecy. Also, that he saw Christ bodily did not give him prophecy of a more perfect nature, but was a concession greater than prophecy given him by God. Hence, Luke (10:24) says: “Many prophets and kings have desired to see the things that you see...” 4. Declaration through words or deeds is common to both kinds of prophecy, for even the prophecy which has the sight of understanding alone can be declared according to images which [the prophet] freely forms. 5. That Gloss speaks of one who in his understanding has only judgment about those things which are received by another, as Joseph had only judgment about the things which Pharaoh had seen and he himself did not receive [knowledge of] what would happen. Thus, the argument does not reach any conclusion about the prophecy which has the sight of understanding alone. And it is of this that we are now speaking. 6. On this point we do not follow the opinion of Rabbi Moses, for he holds that the prophecy of David was below that of Isaiah and Jeremiah, which is the opposite of what holy men say. Still, there is some truth in what he says, because the judgment is not completed unless the things about which we are to judge are brought forward. Hence, in the prophecy in which the light of understanding is perceived only in order to make a judgment, there is only the light itself, which does not cause determinate knowledge of anything until some things about which we must judge are put before it, whether these are received either from the light itself or from another. Thus, the sight of understanding is perfected through the sight of imagination as what is common is determined through that which is particular. 7. It is not always weakness of the light of understanding which is the source of prophecy according to the sight of understanding alone. But sometimes it is caused by a very complete reception of the understanding, as we have noted.” Therefore, the argument does not follow. 8. A sign as such is a cause of knowledge. The thing which is represented is that which is known through something else. But, just as that which is known in itself and makes other things known is known in a more noble way than that which is known only in itself, so also, on the other hand, that which is known through itself and not through something else is known in a more noble way than that which is known through something else. Thus, principles are known in a more noble way than conclusions, and therefore, the case is just the opposite with the sign and the thing signified. Hence, the argument does not follow. 9. Although images imprinted by God are more noble than images formed by a man, the reception of knowledge which is in the mind from God is more noble than that which takes place through the forms of imagination. 10. Those who have prophecy according to visions of imagination are more especially called prophets in the above-mentioned distinction, for in them there is a fuller character of prophecy even by reason of the difference. They, however, are called sacred writers who had only intellectual visions supernaturally, whether in judgment alone or in judgment and reception together. 11. Although our intellect understands divine things through certain likenesses, still, because these are immaterial, they are more noble than the likenesses of imagination. Hence, the sight of understanding, also, is more noble. 12. A thing cannot be imaginable through its essence as it can be intelligible through its essence, for the imagination concerns only material things. Yet, it cannot receive anything except without matter. Consequently, it is always necessary for the imagination to attain an object not through its essence, but through its likeness. But understanding receives things immaterially, and so, knows not only material things, but also immaterial things. Hence, it knows some things through their essence and some through likenesses. Answers to Contrary Difficulties The response to the difficulties to the contrary is easily seen, in so far as they conclude to something false. Q. 12: Prophecy ARTICLE XIII In the thirteenth article we ask: Are the grades of prophecy distinguished according to the sight of imagination? [Parallel readings: IV Sent., 49, 2, 7, ad 2; 1 Cor. , c. 13, lect. 4; S.T. , II-II, 174, 3.] Difficulties And it seems that they are, for 1. Prophecy is more noble where the reception of the thing prophesied is more noble. But, sometimes, the reception of the thing prophesied takes place through the sight of imagination. Therefore, grades of prophecy can be distinguished according to the sight of imagination. 2. A more perfect medium of knowing produces more perfect knowledge. It is for this reason that scientific knowledge is more perfect than opinion. But the likenesses of imagination are a medium of knowing in prophecy. Therefore, where the sight of imagination is more noble, the grade of prophecy will be higher. 3. In all knowledge which takes place through a likeness the knowledge is more perfect where the likeness is more explicit. But in prophecy the imagery of imagination is made up of the likenesses of the things about which there is revelation of prophecy. Therefore, where the sight of imagination is more perfect, the grade of prophecy is higher. 4. Since the prophetic light descends from the understanding to the imagination, when the light in the understanding of the prophet is more perfect, the sight of imagination is the more perfect. Therefore, different grades of the sight of imagination show different grades of the sight of understanding. But where the sight of understanding is more perfect, the prophecy is more perfect. Therefore, grades of prophecy are distinguished according to the sight of imagination. 5. It was said that diversity of the sight of imagination does not distinguish species of prophecy and, therefore, grades of prophecy are not distinguished according to it.—On the contrary, every warm element is of the. same species, but doctors distinguish warmth into first, second, third, and fourth grades. Therefore, the distinction of grades does not require the distinction of species. 6. Greater and less do not constitute distinct species. But even the sight of understanding is distinguished in prophecy only according to the more or less perfect reception of the prophetic light. Therefore, difference in the sight of understanding does not constitute distinct species of prophecy and so it does not constitute distinct grades of prophecy according to the response just given. Thus, there would not be grades in prophecy if it were distinguished neither according to the sight of understanding nor the sight of imagination. Therefore, it remains that grades of prophecy are distinguished according to the sight of imagination. To the Contrary 1. Only the sight of understanding, and not the sight of imagination, makes one a prophet. Therefore, neither are grades of prophecy distinguished according to the sight of imagination. 2. That which is distinguished by reason of something intrinsic is distinguished according to that which is formal to it. But in prophecy the sight of understanding is formal and the sight of imagination is, as it were, material. Therefore, grades of prophecy are distinguished according to the sight of understanding and not according to the sight of imagination. 3. The visions of imagination frequently vary in the same prophet, for sometimes he apprehends revelation in one way and sometimes in another. Therefore, it does not seem possible to distinguish grades of prophecy according to the sight of imagination. 4. Prophecy is related to the things prophesied just as scientific knowledge is related to the things known. But the sciences are distinguished according to the things known, as is said in The Soul . Therefore, prophecy is distinguished according to the things prophesied and not according to the sight of imagination. 5. According to the Gloss, prophecy consists in “words and deeds, dreams and visions.” Therefore, grades of prophecy should not be distinguished more according to the sight of imagination to which visions and dreams belong than according to words and deeds. 6. Miracles also are needed for prophecy. Hence, when Moses was sent by the Lord (Exodus 3:11-13), he sought a sign. And in Psalms (73:9) we read: “Our signs we have not seen, there is now no prophet...” Therefore, grades of prophecy should not be distinguished according to the sight of imagination rather than according to signs. REPLY When two things combine to make up something, and one of them is more important than the other in the composite which they constitute, we can consider grades of comparison according to that which is primary and according to that which is secondary. But a high degree of that which is primary shows an absolute pre-eminence, whereas a high degree of that which is secondary shows a pre-eminence in some respect and not absolutely, unless the high degree of that which is secondary is a sign of a high degree of that which is primary. Thus, for human merit, charity, as that which is primary, unites with an external work, as that which is secondary. However, absolutely speaking, that is to say, with reference to the essential reward, we judge merit to be greater when it proceeds from greater charity. And the magnitude of the work makes for greater merit in so far as it refers to some accidental reward, but not absolutely, except in so far as it shows intensity of charity, according to what Gregory says: “Love of God, if it exists, does great things.” Therefore, since prophecy is achieved through the joint activity of both the sight of understanding and that of imagination, the former functioning as the principal factor, and the latter in a secondary capacity, it follows that pre-eminence of the sight of understanding should be the basis for judging one grade of prophecy as absolutely superior. However, pre-eminence of the sight of imagination shows a grade of prophecy to be higher in some respect, and not absolutely, unless to the extent that perfection of the sight of imagination exhibits perfection of the sight of understanding. But we cannot perceive determinate grades of the sight of understanding, because the fullness of the light of understanding is displayed only through certain signs. Hence, we must distinguish grades of prophecy according to those signs. And in this way there are four bases on which we can distinguish grades of prophecy. The first is according to the elements which are necessary for prophecy. Now, prophecy has two acts: sight and declaration. For sight, however, two things are needed: judgment, which is in the understanding, and reception, which is sometimes in the understanding and sometimes in the imagination. But for declaration something is needed in the one declaring, namely, a certain boldness so that he will not be afraid to speak the truth because of the opponents of the truth. In this sense the Lord said to Ezechiel (3:8-9): “Behold I have made thy face stronger than their faces: and thy forehead harder than their foreheads..., fear them not, neither be thou dismayed at their presence.” And something else is needed in the thing to be declared, namely, a sign through which the truth of the thing declared is made known. Thus, Moses received a sign from God in order that he might be believed. But, since the place of declaration in prophecy is not primary but only secondary, the lowest grade of prophecy exists in one in whom there is a certain boldness or readiness to say or do something without having a revelation. This would be the case if we say that there was a grade of prophecy in Samson, taking prophecy in a broad sense in which every supernatural influx is reduced to prophecy. The second grade will be that in which the prophet has the sight of understanding only according to judgment, as in Solomon. The third grade is that in which one has the sight of understanding together with that of imagination, as in Isaiah and Jeremiah. The fourth is that in which the prophet has the very fullness of the sight of understanding in judgment and reception, as in David. A second basis on which grades of prophecy can be distinguished is the disposition of the one prophesying. Thus, since prophecy takes place in a dream or in a vision when one is awake, as we read in Numbers (12:6), the grade of prophecy which takes place when one is awake is more perfect than that which takes place in a dream. This is so both because the understanding is better disposed for judging when one is awake and because the transport from sensible things does not take place naturally, but comes from the perfect concentration of the inner powers on the things which God is disclosing. A third basis is the manner of perceiving these things, for the more distinctly the things prophesied are signified, the higher is the grade of prophecy. Rut no signs portray anything more distinctly than words. Therefore, when one perceives words expressly indicating the thing prophesied, as we read of Samuel in the first Book of Kings (3:11), the grade of prophecy is higher than when certain figures which are likenesses of the things are shown to us, as the boiling caldron which was shown to Jeremiah (1:13). From this it is clearly shown that the prophetic light is better grasped in its power when the things to be prophesied are exhibited according to more distinct likenesses. The fourth basis is the one who makes the revelation. For the grade of prophecy is higher when he who speaks is seen than when one only hears the words, whether in a dream or in a vision. For this shows that the prophet approaches closer to the knowledge of him who reveals. And the grade of prophecy is higher when he who speaks is seen under the guise of an angel than when he is seen in the form of a man, and even higher if he should be seen in the image of God, as in Isaiah (6:1) “I saw the Lord sitting....” For, since revelation of prophecy descends from God to an angel and from the angel to man, the reception of prophecy is manifestly fuller, the more it approaches the first source of prophecy. Answers to Difficulties We must concede the arguments which show that grades of prophecy are distinguished according to sight of imagination in the manner we have explained. And we must not say that diversity of grade requires distinction of species. Answers to Contrary Difficulties 1. The answer to the first difficulty is clear from what has been said. 2. When something is distinguished according to species, the distinction must be made according to that which is formal. But if there is distinction of grades within the same species, it can be according to that which is material, as animal is distinguished according to male and female, which are material differences, as is said in the Metaphysics. 3. Since prophetic light is not something abiding in the prophet, but a kind of transient impression, it is not necessary for the prophet always to possess the same grade of prophecy. In fact, revelation comes to him sometimes according to one grade and sometimes according to another. 4. Since some things which are more noble are at times known less perfectly, as when there is opinion about things divine and scientific knowledge about creatures, we cannot derive grades of prophecy from the things prophesied. This is especially true when the things which are to be declared are revealed to the prophet according to the demands of the disposition of those for whose sake the prophecy is given. Still, it can be said that grades of prophecy are distinguished according to the things prophesied, but, because of their great diversity, we cannot thus assign definite grades of prophecy, except perhaps in a general way, as if we should say that the grade is higher when something about God is revealed than when something about creatures is revealed. 5. The words and deeds treated in this objection do not belong to the revelation of prophecy, but to the declaration which takes place according to the disposition of those to whom it is declared. Consequently, we cannot distinguish grades of prophecy according to this. The grace of working miracles differs from prophecy, yet it can be reduced to prophecy inasmuch as the truth of the prophet is shown forth through miracles. Hence, in this respect the grace of working miracles is better than prophecy, just as scientific knowledge which gives the reason is better than scientific knowledge which gives the fact. For this reason the grace of working miracles is put before the grace of prophecy in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:10). Therefore, he is the most distinguished prophet who has prophetic revelation and also works miracles. However, if he works miracles without prophetic revelation, he is not more noble in what belongs to the nature of prophecy, although, perhaps, all things considered, he is more noble. But such a one is numbered among those in the lowest grade of prophecy, just as one who has only the boldness to do something. Q. 12: Prophecy ARTICLE XIV In the fourteenth article we ask: Was Moses more outstanding than other prophets? [Parallel readings: De ver. , 12, 9, ad 1; In Isaiam , 6; S.T. , II-II, 174,4.] Difficulties It seems that he was not, for 1. Gregory says:. “As there has been a growth age by age, there has been an increase in the knowledge about God.” Therefore, the later prophets were more outstanding than Moses. 2. The Gloss reads: “David was the most outstanding of the prophets. Therefore, Moses was not the most outstanding. 3. Greater miracles were worked through Joshua, who made the sun and the moon stand still (Joshua 10:13), than through Moses. Greater miracles were also worked through Isaiah, who made the sun go backward (Isaiah 38:8). Therefore, Moses was not the greatest prophet. 4. In Sirach (48:4-5) there is this said of Elijah: “Who can glory like to thee who raisedst up a dead man from below... ? “ Thus, we conclude as before. 5. In Matthew (11:11), we read of John the Baptist: “There hath not risen among them that are born of women a greater than John the Baptist.” Therefore, Moses was not greater than he. Thus, we conclude as before. To the Contrary 1. Deuteronomy (34: 10) says: “And there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses.” 2. Numbers (12:6-7) says: “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream. But it is not so with my servant Moses who is most faithful in all my house.” From this it is clear that he is given preference over the other prophets. REPLY Among the prophets, eminence can, according to various criteria, be attributed to some in a qualified way, but speaking without qualification, Moses was the greatest of them all. For in him the four things necessary for prophecy were present in a most outstanding manner. First, the sight of understanding was most eminent in him, and through this he was lifted up to see the very essence of God, as is said in Numbers (12:8): “And plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the Lord.” Moreover, this sight of his did not take place through the mediation of an angel, as it did in other prophetic visions. Hence, in the same place in Numbers (12:8) we read: “For I speak to him mouth to mouth.” And Augustine says this plainly. Second, the sight of imagination existed in Moses most perfectly because he had it, as it were, at will. Hence, we read in Exodus (33:10: “And the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend.” We can also note in this another excellence with reference to the sight of imagination, that he not only heard the words of the one revealing, but saw Him, and this not in the shape of a man or an angel, but as God Himself; not in a dream, but when awake. We read this of none of the other prophets. Third, his declaration was most outstanding because all who were before him taught their families as one teaches a lesson, but Moses was the first who spoke for the Lord, saying: “The Lord says this.” And he spoke to the whole people and not to one family. Nor did he declare something for the Lord in such a way that his hearers should give heed to what another previous prophet said, as the prophets by their preaching led the people to observe the law of Moses. Hence, the preaching of previous prophets was a preparation for the law of Moses, and this law was the foundation of the preaching of subsequent prophets. Fourth, he was more outstanding in the matters which refer to the declaration of prophecy. For, as regards miracles, he worked signs for the conversion and teaching of a whole race, whereas other prophets worked particular miracles for special persons and special tasks. Hence, we read in Deuteronomy (34:10): “And there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses whom the Lord knew face to face”. as for pre-eminence of revelation: “In all the signs and wonders, which he sent by him to do in the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, and to all his servants” (Deuteronomy 34:11); and “Great miracles, which Moses did before all Israel” (Deuteronomy 34:12). He also showed himself most outstanding in boldness, for with only a rod he went down into Egypt, not only to preach the words of the Lord, but also to scourge Egypt and to free his people. Answers to Difficulties 1. We should take what Gregory says as referring to the things which pertain to the mystery of the Incarnation. Later prophets received more explicit revelations about these than Moses did. However, they did not receive more explicit revelations of the Divinity, about which Moses was most fully taught. 2. David is called the most outstanding of the prophets because he prophesied most clearly about Christ without any vision of imagination. 3. Although those miracles were greater than the miracles of Moses in the substance of what was done, the miracles of Moses. were greater in the manner in which they were performed because they were performed for the whole people and for the instruction of the people in a new law and for their liberation. These other miracles were for particular tasks. 4. The pre-eminence of Elijah is noted especially in this, that he was preserved from death and was more outstanding than many other prophets in boldness, by reason of which he did not fear the rulers of his times, and in greatness of miracles, as appears from the same place in Sirach (48:4). 5. When Moses is put before the other prophets, we should understand this as referring to prophets of the Old Testament, for, at that time especially, when the world awaited the coming of Christ, to whom all prophecy was ordained, prophecy was in its proper environment. John, however, belongs to the New Testament. Hence, Matthew (11:13) has: “For all the prophets and the law prophesied until John.” However, there is a clearer revelation in the New Testament; the second Epistle to the Corinthians (3:18) has: “But we all, beholding the glory of the Lord with open face...” Here, the Apostle distinctly puts himself and the other apostles ahead of Moses. Nevertheless, granted that no man was greater than John the Baptist, it does not follow from this that no prophet had a higher grade of prophecy than he, for one can be greater in prophecy and less in merit, since prophecy is not a gift of sanctifying grace.",
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        "text": "Quarto quæritur utrum ad prophetiam habendam requiratur dispositio naturalis; « Natura est motus principium, secundum se, non per accidens. »\n\n2. Præterea, quicumque habet aliquem habitum cognitivum, potest ea quæ subsunt illi habitui considerare sine hoc quod ab alio accipiat: qui enim ad hoc quod consideret, indiget instruente, non-dum habet habitum. Sed Propheta non potest inspicere prophetabilia nisi sigillatim ei revelentur: unde IV Regum Ⅳ, 27, dicit Elisæus de muliere cujus erat filius defunctus: Anima ejus in amari-tudine est; et Dominus celavit a me, et non indicavit mihi. Ergo prophetia non est habitus cognoscitivus; nec alius esse potest, cum ad cognitionem prophetia pertineat. 3. Sed dicendum quod ad hoc habitu aliquo Propheta indiget, ut ea quæ sunt divinitus indicata cognoscere possit. — contra: divina locutio est efficacior quam humana. Sed ad hoc quod aliquis ex humana locutione intelligat aliquid esse futurum, nullo habitu indiget. Ergo videtur quod multo minus ad percipien-dam revelationem qua Deus Prophetæ loquitur.\n\n4. Præterea, habitus sufficit ad omnia cognoscenda quæ subsunt habitui. Sed per donum prophetia aliquis non instruitur de omnibus prophetabilibus; ut enim dicit Gregorius in I Homil. super Ezech., non remote a princ., et exemplis probat, « Aliquando spiritus prophetia ex præ-senti tangit animum prophetantis, et ex futuro nequaquam tangit; et aliquando ex futuro tangit, et ex præ-senti non tangit. » Ergo donum prophetia non est habitus. 5. Sed diceres quod dono prophetia non subsunt omnia prophetabilia, sed illud tantum ad cujus revelationem datur. — Sed contra: influentia aliqua coarctari non potest nisi vel ex parte influentis, vel ex parte recipientis. Sed influentia prophetici doni non recipit coarctationem, quo minus ad omnia prophetabilia se extendat, ex parte recipientis: quia intellectus humanus est capax cognitionis omnium prophetabilium; nec ex parte influentis, cujus est largitas in-finita. Ergo donum prophetia ad omnia prophetabilia se extendit.\n\n6. Præterea, ex parte affectivæ ita se habet, quod per unum gratiae influxum ab omni culpa anima liberatur. Ergo et ex parte intellectus ita erit quod ex influentia unius prophetici luminis, ab omni ignorantia prophetabilium anima purgabitur.\n\n7. Præterea, habitus gratuitus est perfectior quam acquisitus. Sed acquisitus se extendit ad plures actus. Ergo et prophetia, si sit habitus gratuitus, non se extendet ad unum tantum prophetabile, sed ad omnia.\n\n8. Præterea, si de singulis conclusionibus singuli habitus habeantur, illi habitus non unientur in unius totalis scientiæ habitu, nisi conclusiones illæ connexionem habeant secundum quod ex eisdem principiis deducuntur. Sed hujsmodi futura contingentia, et alia de quibus est prophetia, non habent aliquam connexionem ad invicem, sicut habent conclusiones unius scientiæ. Ergo sequitur quod, si donum prophetia ad unum tantum prophetarum se extendit, in uno Propheta tot sunt prophetia habitus quot prophetabilia cognoscit, si prophetia sit habitus. 9. Sed diceres quod habitus prophetia semel infusus, ad omnia prophetabilia se extendit; requiritur tamen nova revelatio quantum ad specierum aliqua-rum ostensionem. — Sed contra: habitus prophetia infusus debet esse perfectior quam habitus scientiæ acquisitæ; et lumen propheticum quam lumen naturale intellectus agentis. Sed ex virtute luminis intellectus agentis, et habitu scientiæ, adjuncto etiam ministerio imaginativæ virtutis, possumus formare tot species quot sunt nobis necessariæ, in actualem considerationem eorum ad quæ habitus se extendit. Ergo multo fortius hoc potest Propheta, si habitum aliquem habet, sine hoc quod ei aliquæ species de novo ostendantur.\n\n10. Præterea, sicut habetur in Glossa in principio Psalterii, Super prologum Hieron. præpositum Psalterio, « prophetia est divina inspiratio, rerum eventus immobili veritate denuntians. » Sed inspiratio non nominat habitum, sed actum. Ergo prophetia non est habitus.\n\n11. Præterea, videre est quoddam pati, secundum Philosophum. Ergo et visio passio. Sed prophetia est visio quædam; I Reg. ix, 9: Qui nunc dicitur Propheta, vocabatur olim Videns. Ergo prophetia non est habitus, sed magis passio.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod sicut dicit Glossa in principio Psalteriii, (in arg. x citata,) prophetia visio dicitur, et Propheta videns, ut patet I Reg. ix, ut supra dictum est. Non tamen quælibet visio prophetia dici potest; sed visio eorum quæ sunt procul a cognitione; ut sic dicatur esse Propheta non solum «procul fans, » idest annuntians; sed etiam «procul videns, » a « phanos» quod est apparitio. Cum autem omne quod manifestetur, sub lumine quodam manifestetur, ut etiam haberi potest ab Apostolo Ephes. v, oportet ut ea quæ manifestantur homini supra communem cognitionem, quodam altiori lumine manifestentur, quod lumen propheticum dicitur, ex cujus receptione aliquis Propheta constituitur. Sciendum est autem quod aliquid recipitur in aliquo dupliciter: uno modo ut forma in subjecto consistens; alio modo per modum passionis: sicut pallor in eo qui naturaliter vel ex aliquo forti accidente hunc colorem habet, est ut quædam qualitas; in eo vero qui subito ex aliquo timore pallescit, est ut quædam passio. Similiter etiam et lumen corporale est quidem in stellis ut stellarum qualitas, utpote quædam forma in eis permanans; in aere vero, ut quædam passio, quia lumen non retinet, sed recipit tantum per oppositionem corporis lucidi. In intellectu igitur humano lumen quoddam est quasi qualitas vel forma permanens, scilicet lumen essentiale intellectus agentis, ex quo anima nostra intellectualis dicitur. Sic autem lumen propheticum in Propheta esse non potest. Quicumque enim aliqua cognoscit intellectuali lumine, quod est ei effectum quasi connaturale ut forma in eo consistens, oportet quod de eis fixam cognitionem habeat; quod esse non potest, nisi ea inspiciat in principio in quo possunt cognosci: quamdiu enim non fit resolutio cognitorum in sua principia, cognitio non firmatur in uno, sed apprehendit ea quæ cognoscit secundum probabilitatem quamdam utpote ab aliis dicta: unde necesse habet de singulis acceptionem ab aliis habere. Sicut si aliquis nesciret geometriæ conclusiones ex principiis deducere, habitum geometriæ non haberet; sed quæcumque de conclusionibus geometriæ sciret, apprehenderet quasi credens docenti, et sic indigeret ut de singulis instrueretur: non posset enim ex quibusdam in alia pervenire firmiter, non facta resolutione in prima principia. Principium autem in quo possunt cognoscifutura contingentia, et alia quæ cognitionem naturalem excedunt, de quibus est prophetia, est ipse Deus: unde cum Prophetæ, Dei essentiam non videant, non possunt ea quæ prophetice vident, cognoscere aliquo lumine quod sit forma habitualis eis inhærens: sed oportet quod de singulis sigillatim instruantur. Unde oportet quod lumen propheticum non sit habitus, sed magis sit in anima Prophetæ per modum cujusdam passionis ut lumen solis in aere. Unde, sicut lumen non remanet in aere nisi apud irradiationem solis; ita nec lumen prædictum remanet in mente nisi quando actualiter divinitus inspiratur. Et inde est quod sancti de prophetia loquentes, de ea per modum passionis loquuntur, dicentes eam inspirationem vel tactum quemdam, quo Spiritus sanctus dicitur tangere cor Prophetæ; et aliis hujusmodi verbis de prophetia loquuntur. Et sic patet quod quantum ad lumen propheticum prophetia non potest esse habitus. Sed sciendum quod sicut est in rebus corporalibus, quod aliquid post passionem, etiam passione abeunte, effici tur habilius ad patiendum, sicut aqua calefacta prius, facilius postmodum post infrigidationem calefiet, et homo post frequentes tristitias facilius ad tristitiam provocatur; ita etiam quando mens aliquo divina inspiratione tangitur, etiam illa inspiratione abeunte remanet habilior ad iterato recipiendum, sicut post devotam orationem remanet mens devotior: unde propter hoc dicit Augustinus in lib. De orando Deum: « Mens quæ curis et negotiis tepescere cæperit, omnino refrigescit, et penitus extinguitur, nisi crebrius inflammetur; et ideo certis horis ad negotium orándi mentem revocamus. » Unde et mens Prophetæ postquam fuerit semel vel pluries divinitus inspirata, etiam actuali inspiratione cessante remanet habilior ut iterum inspiretur; et hæc habilitas potest dici habitus prophetia; sicut etiam Avicenna dicit, VI De naturalibus, quod habitus scientiarum in nobis nihil aliud sunt quam habilitates quædam animæ nostræ ad hoc quod recipiat illuminationem intelligentiæ agentis, et species intelligibiles ab ea in se effluentes. Sed tamen non proprie dici potest habitus, sed magis habilitas vel dispositio quædam, a qua aliquis nominatur Propheta, etiam quando actu non inspiratur. Sed tamen ne fiat vis in vocabulo habitus, sustinentes utramque partem, utriusque rationibus respondeamus.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod definitio illa inducitur de habitu proprie accepto; et sic habilitas prædicta prophetizandi habitus dici non potest; per quem tamen modum potest dici habitus secundum modum Avicennæ etiam habilitas animæ nostræ ad recipiendum ab intelligentia agente, quia illa receptio est naturalis secundum ejus opinionem. Unde secundum eum, qui habet habilitatem, habet potestatem recipere cum vult; quia influentia naturalis non deest materiæ dispositæ. Sed influentia prophetiae dependet ex sola divina voluntate; unde, quantacumque sit habilitas in mente Prophetæ, non est in ejus potestate ut prophetia utatur.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod si lumen propheticum inesset menti ut habitus quidam essentiæ de rebus propheticis, non indigeret Propheta ad quælibet prophetabilia cognoscenda, nova revelatione; indiget autem, quia illud lumen non est habitus. Sed habilitas ipsa ad lumen percipiendum, similitudinem habitus habens, habitus dicitur, sine quo lume prophetabilia cognoscci non possunt.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod post perceptionem divinæ locutionis, qua Prophetam alloquitur interius, quæ nihil est aliud quam mentis illustratio; non requiritur aliquis habitus quo interius audita percipiantur; sed ad hanc locutionem percipiendam tanto magis videtur habilitas aliqua operari, quanto ista locutio est excellentior, et ejus perceptio vires naturales excedit. Ad quartum patet solutio ex dictis,\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod lumen propheticum semel infusum non facit cognitionem de omnibus prophetabilibus, sed solum de illis propter quorum cognitionem datur. Hæc autem arctatio non provenit ex impotentia largientis, sed ex ordine sapientiae ipsius, quidividit singulis prout vult.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod omnia pecata mortalia habent in hoc convenientiam quamdam, quod per eorum quodlibet homo separatur a Deo; unde gratia, quæ hominem Deo conjungit, ab omni peccato mortali liberat, non autem ab omni veniali; quia venialia a Deo non separant. Res autem prophetabiles non habent ad invicem connexionem nisi in ipso ordine divinæ sapientiæ; unde ab his qui divinam sapientiam totaliter non intuentur, potest unum sine alio videri.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod habitus infusus est perfectior quam acquisitus secundum genus suum, scilicet ratione originis et ratione ejus propter quod datur, quod est altius eo ad quod ordinatur habitus acquisitus; sed quantum ad modum habendi vel perficiendi, nihil probibet habitum acquisitum perfectiorem esse; sicut patet quod per habitum fidei infusum non ita perfecte videmus credibilia sicut per habitum scientiæ acquisitum conclusiones scientiarum; et similiter lumen propheticum quamvis sit infusum, non tamen ita perfecte existit in nobis sicut habitus acquisiti; quod etiam dignitati habituum infusorum attestatur, quia ex eorum altitudine contingit ut humana infirmitas eos plene possidere non possit.\n\nAd octavum dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si lumen quo perfunditur mens Prophetæ, esset habitus; non autem si ponamus habilitatem ad percipientum lumen prædictum esse habitum, vel quasi habitum; cum ex eodem possit esse aliquis habilis ut illuminetur de quocumque.\n\nAd nonum dicendum quod qualiter formatio specierum de novo requiratur ad propheticam revelationem, infra, art. VII, dicetur.\n\nAd decimum dicendum quod licet inspiratio habitum non nominet, tamen ex hoc non potest probari quod prophetia non sit habitus; consuetum est enim quod habitus per actus definiantur.\n\nAd undecimum dicendum quod videre, secundum Philosophum, II Topic., capit. XIII, dupliciter dicitur, scilicet habitu et actu; unde et visio actum et habitum nominare potest.\n\nAd duodecimum dicendum quod lumen propheticum non est qualitas difficile mobilis, sed aliquid transiens; et secundum hoc loquuntur auctoritates inductæ; sed habilitas illa quæ remanet ad illustrationem denuo percipiendam, non est facile mobilis; immo diu permanet, nisi in Propheta fiat magna transmutatio, per quam talis habilitas tollitur.\n\nAd primum vero eorum quæ sunt in contrarium, dicendum quod quia actus totaliter ab habitu oritur, ideo in illa Philosophi divisione actus ad habitum reducitur, vel etiam ad passionem, eo quod passio actus quidam est animæ, ut irasci et concupiscere. Prophetia autem quantum ad ipsam visionem Prophetæ est actus quidam mentis; quantum vero ad lumen, quod raptim, et quasi per modum pertranseuntis, recipitur, est similis passioni, prout in intellectiva parte receptio passio dicitur; quia intelligere quoddam pati est, ut dicitur in III De anima, com. XII. Vel potest dici, quod illa divisio Philosophi, si membra divisionis proprie accipiantur, non sufficienter comprehendit omnia quæ in anima sunt, sed ea tantum quæ ad materiam moralem pertinent, de qua Philosophus intendit; sicut patet per exempla, quibus ibidem Philosophus se exponit.\n\nSecundo quæritur utrum prophetia sit de conclusionibus scibilibus; et videtur quod non. Quia prophetia est « inspiratio, rerum eventus immobili veritate denuntians. » Eventus autem rerum dicuntur futura contingentia, cujusmodi non sunt conclusions scientiæ demonstrativæ. Ergo de talibus non potest esse prophetia.\n\n2. Præterea, Hieronymus dicit in Gl. ord. Matth. 1, super illud: Ecce virgo concipiet, quod prophetia est signum divinæ præscientiae. Præscientia autem de futuris est. Cum igitur futura, præcipue contingentia, de quibus maxime videtur esse prophetia, non possint esse conclusions alicujus scientiæ, videtur quod non possit de conclusionibus scibilibus esse prophetia.\n\n3. Præterea, natura non abundat in superfluis, nec deficit in necessariis; et multo minus Deus, cujus actio est ordinatissima. Sed homo ad sciendum conclusiones scientiarum demonstrativarum, habet aliam viam quam prophetiam, scilicet per principia per se nota. Ergo videtur quod superfluum esset, si hujusmodi per prophetiam cognoscerentur.\n\n4. Præterea, diversus modus generationis est indicium diversitatis speciei; unde mures generati ex semine non possunt esse ejusdem speciei cum illis qui generantur ex putrefactione, ut Commentator dicit VIII Phys. VII, Met., com. xxvii et xxxi, et lib. XII, com. xiii et xviii. Sed homines naturaliter conclusiones scientiarum demonstrativarum ex principiis per se notis accipiunt. Si igitur sunt aliqui homines qui alio modo scientias demonstrativas accipiunt, utpote per prophetiam, erunt alterius speciei, et aequivoce homines dicentur; quod est absurdum.\n\n5. Præterea, scientiæ demonstrativæ sunt dc his quæ se habent indifferenter ad omne tempus. Sed prophetia non similiter se habet ad omne tempus; immo quando spiritus Prophetarum tangit cor Prophetæ de præsenti et non de fu-turo, quando e contrario, ut Gregorius dicit Super Ezechielem, homil. 1, Pat. lat. t. LXXVI, cap. 788. Ergo prophetia non est de illis de quibus est scientia.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod in omnibus quæ sunt propter finem, materia determinatur secundum exigentiam finis, ut patet in II Phys., com. lxxxviii et sequent. Donum autem prophetiae datur ad utilitatem Ecclesiæ, ut patet I ad Cor. xii 1: Unicuque datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem; et subjungit multa, inter quæ connumerat prophetiam. Unde omnia illa quorum cognitio potest esse utilis ad salutem sunt materia prophetiae, sive sint præterita sive futura sive eterna, sive necessaria sive contingentia. Illa vero quæ ad salutem pertinere non possunt, sunt extranea a materia prophetiae; unde Augustinus dicit II Super Genesim: « Unicuque datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem » et subjunad litteram., capit. ix parum a princ., quod « quamvis Auctores nostri scive-rint cujus figuræ sit cælum; tamen per eos dicere noluit Spiritus veritatem, nisi quæ prodest saluti; » et Joan. xv, 43, dicitur: Cum venerit ille Spiritus veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem; Glossa interlin., « saluti necessariam. » Dico autem necessario ad salutem, sive sint necessaria ad instructionem fidei, sive ad informationem morum. Multa autem quæ sunt in scientiis demonstrata, ad hoc possunt esse utilia; utpote intellectum esse incorruptibilem, et ea quæ in creaturis considerata in admirationem divinæ sapientia et potestatis inducunt; unde et de his invenimus in sacra Scriptura fieri mentionem. Sciendum tamen quod cum prophetia sit cognitio rerum quæ sunt procul, non eodem modo se habet ad omnia prædicta. Quædam enim sunt procul a nostra notitia ex parte ipsorum, quædam vero ex parte nostra. Ex parte quidem ipsorum sunt procul futura contingentia, quæ per hoc non cognoscuntur, quia ab esse deficiunt, cum nec in se sint, nec in suis causis determinentur. Sed ex parte nostra sunt procul illa in quorum cognitione accidit difficultas propter nostrum defectum, non propter ipsa, cum sint maxime cognoscibilia et perfectissime entia, sicut res intelligibles, et præcipue aternæ. Quod autem competit alicui secundum se, verius competit ei quam quod competit sibi ratione alterius; unde, cum futura contingentia verius sint procul a cognitione quam quæcumque alia, ideo præcipue ad prophetiam videntur pertinere, intantum quod quasi præcipua prophetia materia in definitione prophetia ponantur in hoc quod dicitur: « Prophetia est divina inspiratio, rerum eventus immobili veritate denuntians. » Ex quo etiam nomen prophetia videtur esse acceptum; unde dicit Gregorius Super Ezechielem, homil, I, Pal. lal. t. LXXVI, col. 786, quod « Cum ideo prophetia dicta sit quod futura prædicat; quando de præterito vel præsenti loquitur, rationem sui nominis amittt. » Eorum vero quæ sunt procul ex parte nostra est consideranda similiter quædam distinctio. Quædam enim sunt procul utpote omnem cognitionem humanam exceedentia, ut Deum esse trinum et unum, et alia hujusmodi; et non sunt conclusiones scientiarum. Quædam vero sunt procul utpote exceedentia cognitionem alicujus hominis, non cognitionem humanam simpliciter; utpote quæ a doctis per demonstrationem sciuntur, sed indocti naturali cognitione ad ea non pertingunt, sed quandoque elevantur ad ea revelatione divina; et hujusmodi non sunt prophetabilia simpliciter, sed respectu hujusmodi; et sic possunt subesse prophetia conclusiones demonstratæ in scientiis.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod eventus rerum ponuntur in definitione prophetia quasi materia maxime propria prophetia, non autem ita quod sint tota prophetia materia. Et similiter dicendum ad secundum, quod ratione principalis suæ materiae prophetia signum præscientiae dicitur.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod quamvis conclusiones scientiarum possint sciri alio modo quam per prophetiam, non tamen est superfluum ut lumine prophetia ostendantur, quia firmius adhæremus Prophetarum dictis per fidem quam demonstrationibus scientiarum; et in hoc etiam Dei gratia commendatur, ut ipsius perfecta scientia ostendatur.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod causæ naturales habent determinatos effectus, cum earum virtutes sint finitæ et limitatae ad unum; et ideo quæ a diversis causis naturalibus producuntur in esse secundum diversum generationis modum, oportet esse specie diversa. Sed virtus divina, cum sit infinita, potest producere eosdem effectus in specie sine opere naturæ quos natura producit; unde non sequitur quod, si ea quæ naturaliter cognosci possunt, divinitus revelentur, illi qui diversimode cognitionem accipiunt, specie differant.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod licet prophetia interdum sit de his quæ diversis temporibus distinguuntur, interdum tamen est de illis quæ per omne tempus sunt vera.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod Rabbi Moyses non intelligit quin de his quæ per demonstrationem sciuntur possit fieri revelatio Prophetæ: sed quia ex quo per demonstrationem sciuntur, non differt an de his habeur prophetia, vel non.\n\nUtrum prophetia sit naturalis. II-II, quæst, clxxii, art. I. Tertio quæritur utrum prophetia sit naturalis; et videtur quod sic. Potior enim est cognitio vigilantis quam dormientis. Sed dormientibus naturaliter contingit ut futura prævideant, sicut patet in divinationibus somniorum. Ergo multo fortius in vigilando aliqui naturaliter possunt futura prævidere. Hoc autem est Prophetæ officium. Ergo aliquis naturaliter potest esse Propheta. 2. Sed dicebat quod vigilantis cognitio est potior quantum ad judicium, sed dormientis quantum ad receptionem. — Sed contra: secundum hoc vis cognoscitiva potest de aliquo judicare quod speciem ejus recipit. Judicium ergo receptionem sequitur; ergo ubi est potior receptio, est etiam perfectius judicium; et sic, si dormiens est potior in recipiendo, debet esse potior in judicando.\n\n3. Præterea, intellectus non ligatur somno nisi per accidens, scilicet inquantum dependet a sensu. Sed judicium intellectus non dependet a sensu, cum intellectus operatio secundum hoc a sensibus dependeat quod a sensibus accipit; judicium autem est post receptionem. Ergo intellectus judicium non est ligatum in somno; et ita videtur distinctio posita nulla esse.\n\n4. Præterea, illud quod convenit alicui ex hoc ipso quod ab alio separatur, convenit ei secundum naturam suam; sicut ex hoc ipso quod ferrum a rubigine separatur accidit ei claritas, quæ est ei naturalis. Sed ex hoc ipso quod anima a sensibus corporis abstrahitur, competit ei futura prævidere, ut Augustinus ostendit, XII Super Genesim ad litteram, multis exemplis. Ergo videtur quod prævidere futura, sit ipsi animæ humanæ naturale; et sic idem quod prius.\n\n7. Præterea, ex causis naturalibus non potest accipi significatio super ea quæ naturaliter non fiunt. Sed astrologi accipiunt significiones super prophetiam ex motibus corporum cælestium. Ergo prophetia est naturalis.\n\n8. Præterea, philosophi in scientia naturali non determinaverunt nisi de his quæ naturaliter possunt accidere. Determinavit autem Avicenna in libro VI de prophetia. Ergo prophetia est naturalis.\n\n9. Præterea, ad prophetiam non requiruntur nisi tria; scilicet claritas intelligentiæ, et perfectio virtutis imaginativæ, et potestas animæ, ut ei materia exterior obediat, ut Avicenna ponit in VI De naturalibus. Sed hæc tria possunt accidere naturaliter. Ergo naturaliter potest aliquis Propheta esse. 10. Sed dicebat quod naturaliter potest intellectus et imaginatio perfici ad præcognoscendum futura naturalia; sed de his non est prophetia. — Sed contra: ea quæ dependent ex causis inferioribus dicuntur esse naturalia. Sed Isaias prævidit et prædixit Ezechiam fore moriturum, Isa. xxxiv; et hoc secundum rationes inferiores, ut per Glossam ibidem habetur. Ergo præcognitio naturalium futurorum est prophetia.\n\n11. Præterea, divina providentia rebus 1 Autem exituræ de corpore animæ. » in esse productis tribuit ut in se habeant ea sine quibus in esse servari non possunt; sicut in humano corpore posuit membra quibus sumitur et decoquitur cibus, sine quo mortalis vita non conservatur. Sed humanum genus non potest sine societate conservari: unus enim homo non sufficit sibi in necessariis ad vitam, unde naturaliter est animal politicum, ut dicitur Ethic. iv VIII, cap. xii. Societas autem conservari non potest sine justitia; justitiae vero regula est prophetia. Ergo naturæ humanæ est inditum ut ad prophetiam naturaliter homo pervenire pessit.\n\n12. Præterea, in quolibet genere inventur illud quod est perfectissimum in genere illo. Sed perfectissimum in genere hominum est Propheta, quia secundum id quod est in homine potius, scilicet intellectum, alios transcendit. Ergo naturaliter potest homo ad prophetiam pervenire.\n\n13. Præterea, plus distant proprietates Dei a proprietatibus creaturarum quam proprietates rerum futurarum a rebus præsentibus. Sed naturali cognitione homo per proprietates creaturarum in cognitionem Dei pervenire potest: Rom. 1, 20: Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. Ergo et naturaliter ex his quæ sunt, homo potest in cognitionem futurorum pervenire; et sic naturaliter potest esse Propheta. 14. Sed dicendum quod quamvis Deus magis distet in essendo, tamen futura magis distant in cognoscendo. — Sed contra, eadem sunt principia essendi et cognoscendi. Ergo illud quod est magis distans secundum esse, est etiam magis distans secundum cognitionem.\n\n15. Præterea, Augustinus in lib. De libero arb. II, cap. xvii et xix, distinguit tria genera bonorum; scilicet parvum, magnum, et medium. Sed prophetia non computatur inter parva bona, quia hujusmodi sunt bona corporalia; nec iterum inter bona maxima, quia hujusmodi sunt quibus recte vivitur, et quibus nullus abuti potest; quæ prophetia competere non videntur. Ergo restat quod prophetia ad media bona pertineat, quæ sunt bona naturalia animæ; et sic videtur quod sit naturalis.\n\n16. Præterea, Boetius dicit in lib. De duabus naturis, non procul a princ. lib., cap. 1: —, quod uno modo natura dicitur omne illud quod potest agere vel pati. Sed ad hoc quod aliquis sit Propheta, requiritur quædam spiritualis passio, scilicet receptio luminis prophetici, ut supra, art. 1 hujus quæst., dictum est. Ergo videtur quod prophetia sit naturalis.\n\n17. Præterea, si agenti naturale est agere, et patienti naturale pati, oportet quod passio sit naturalis. Sed ipsi Deo naturale est quod perfectionem prophetia hominibus infundat; quia ipse secundum suam naturam bonus est, et bono naturalis est sua communicatio: similiter etiam humanæ menti naturale est quod a Deo recipiat, cum ejus natura non consistat nisi ex his quæ a Deo recipit. Ergo prophetia susceptio est naturalis.\n\n18. Præterea, cuilibet potentiae naturali passivæ respondet alia naturalis activa potentia. Sed in anima humana est naturalis potentia ad recipiendum lumen prophetia. Ergo est etiam aliqua potentia naturalis activa, per quam aliquis in actum prophetiae adducitur; et ita videtur quod aliqua prophetia sit naturalis.\n\n19. Præterea, homo naturaliter est perfectioris cognitionis quam alia animalia. Sed quædam alia animalia naturaliter sunt præscia eorum futurorum quæ ad ea maxime pertinent; sicut patet de formicis, quæ præsciunt pluvias futuras; et pisces etiam quidam prænuntiant tempestates futuras. Ergo etiam homo debet naturaliter esse præscius eorum quæ ad ipsum pertinent; et sic videtur quod homo naturaliter possit esse Propheta.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur naturale dupliciter. Uno modo, quia ejus principium activum est natura; sicut naturale est igni ferri sursum. Alio modo, quia natura est principium dispositionum ipsius, non quarumlibet, sed earum quæ sunt necessariæ ad talem perfectionem; sicut dicitur quod infusio animæ rationalis est naturalis, inquantum per operationem naturæ corpus efficitur dispositionum dispositione quæ est necessitans ad animæ susceptionem. Fuit igitur opinio quorumdam quod prophetia esset naturalis primo modo: quia dicebant animam habere in se vim quamdam divinationis, ut Augustinus narrat, XII Super Genes. ad litteram. Sed hoc ipse ibidem improbat; quia si hoc esset, tunc in potestate haberet anima quandocumque vellet futura præcognoscere; quod manifeste apparet esse falsum. Et præterea hoc apparet esse falsum; quia natura mentis humanæ nullius cognitionis naturaliter potest esse principium, in quam non posset pervenire per principia per se nota, quæ sunt prima instrumenta intellectus agentis; ex quibus principiis in cognitionem futurorum contingentium perveniri non potest, nisi forte per inspectionem aliquorum signorum naturalium; sicut medicus præcognoscit sanitatem vel mortem futuram, vel astrologus tempestatem vel serenitatem. Talis autem futurorum cognitio non dicitur esse divinationis vel prophetia, sed magis artis. Unde alii dixerunt quod prophetia est naturalis secundo modo; quia scilicet natura ad talem dispositionem potest hominem perducere, quod erit in necessitate ad recipiendum per actionem alicujus superioris causæ præscientiam futurorum. Quæ quidem opinio est vera de quadam prophetia, non autem de illa quæ inter dona Spiritus sancti ab Apostolo computatur. Unde ad earum distinctionem habendam, sciendum est quod futura contingentia in duobus præexistunt antequam sint; scilicet in præscientia divina, et in causis creatis, quarum virtute futura illa educuntur in esse. In his autem duobus futura præexistunt diversimode quantum ad duo. Primo quantum ad hoc quod omnia quæ præexistunt in causis creatis, præexistunt etiam in divina præscientia, sed non e converso, cum quorumdam futurorum rationes Deus in se retinuerit, rebus creatis eas non infundendo, sicut eorum quæ miraculose fiunt sola divina virtute, ut Augustinus dicit Super Genes. ad litteram. Secundo quantum ad hoc quod futura quædam præexistunt in causis creatis mobiliter, eo quod virtus causæ quæ est ordinata ad talem effectum inducendum, potest aliquo eventu impediri. Sed in divina præscientia omnia futura sunt immobiliter; quia futura subduntur divinæ præscientia non solum secundum ordinem causarum suarum ad ipsam, sed etiam secundum exitum ordinis vel eventum. Præcognitio igitur futurorum potest causari in mente humana dupliciter. Uno modo ex hoc quod futura præexistunt in mente divina; et secundum hoc prophetia donum Spiritus sancti ponitur, et hæc non est naturalis: illa enim quæ fiunt divinitus sine causis naturalibus mediis, non dicuntur esse naturalia, sed miraculosa; hujusmodi autem futurorum revelatio fit absque mediis causis naturalibus; cum non hoc modo revelentur prout rationes futurorum sunt in causis creatis, sed prout sunt in mente divina, a qua derivantur in mentem Prophetæ. Alio modo ex virtute causarum creatarum; prout scilicet in virtutem imaginativam humanam possunt aliqui motus fieri ex virtute cælestium corporum, in quibus præexistunt quædam signa futurorum quorumdam; et secundum quod intellectus humanus ex illuminatione intellectuum separatorum, utpote inferior, natus est instrui, et ad alia cognoscenda elevari; et hæc prophetia modo prædicto potest dici naturalis. Differt autem hæc prophetia naturalis ab ea de qua nunc loquimur, in tribus. Primo in hoc quod futurorum prævisionem habet immediate a Deo illa de qua loquimur, quamvis Angelus possit esse minister, prout agit in virtute divini luminis; naturalis vero ex propria actione causarum secundarum. Secundo in hoc quod prophetia naturalis non se extendit nisi ad illa futura quæ habent causas determinatas in natura; sed prophetia de qua loquimur, indifferenter se habet ad omnia. Item in hoc quod naturalis prophetia non infallibiliter prævidet, sed sicut prædicuntur illa quæ sunt vera ut in majori parte; prophetia vero quæ est Spiritus sancti donum, prævidet infallibiliter; unde dicitur esse divinæ præscientia signum, quia secundum illam infallibilatem prævidet secundum quam futura sunt a Deo præscripta. Et hæc triplex differentia in definitione Cassiodori in Psalter. Præfat. cap. 1, notari potest in Prologo super Psalm., et habetur in Gloss. ordin. Super prologum D. Hieron. psalterio præfixum. Prima in hoc quod dicit « divina; » secunda in hoc quod dicit generaliter, « rerum eventus, » tertia in hoc quod dicit, « immobili veritate denuntians. » Sed quantum ad hoc quod prophetia est de rebus necessariis vel de scibilibus, manet duplex differentia; scilicet prima et secunda; quia per prophetiam naturalem non accipit homo immediate a Deo cognitionem illorum scibilium; sed mediantibus causis secundis, et per operationem causarum secundarum in sua virtute naturali agentium. Nec iterum talis cognitio ad omnia necessaria se extendit, sed solum ad illa quæ possunt esse nota per prima principia; quia ultra illa virtus luminis intellectus agentis non se extendit, nec naturaliter in alia elevatur, sicut prophetia divina elevatur in quædam quæ sunt supra naturalem cognitionem, utpote Deum esse trinum et unum, et alia hujusmodi. Sed tertia differentia removetur in hac materia; quia utraque prophetia ita immobiliter et certissime facit scire hujusmodi scibilia necessaria, sicut si scirentur per principia demonstrationis. Per prophetiam etiam utramque elevatur mens hominis, ut quodammodo conformiter substantiis separatis intelligat, quæ sicut principia, ita et conclusiones simplici intuitu, sine deductione unius ex altero, certissime vident. Utraque etiam prophetia differt a somnio et visione; ut somnium dicamus apparitionem quæ fit homini in dormiendo, visionem vero quæ fit in vigilando, tamen homine a sensibus abstracto; quia tam in somnio quam in visione simplici anima detinetur phantasmatibus visis, vel totaliter vel in parte, ut scilicet inhæreat eis tamquam veris rebus, vel totaliter vel in parte; sed in utraque prophetia etsi aliqua phantas-mata videantur in somno vel in visione, tamen anima Prophetæ illis phantasmatibus non determinatur; sed cognoscit per lumen propheticum ea quæ videt non esse res, sed similitudines aliquid significantes; et earum significationem cognosci; quia intelligentia opus est in visione, ut dicitur Danielis x, 1. Sic patet quod prophetia naturalis media est inter somnium et prophetiam divinam; unde et somnium dicitur esse pars vel casus prophetiae naturalis; sicut et prophetia naturalis est quædam deficiens similitudo prophetiae divinæ.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod in cognitione duo est considerare; scilicet receptionem, et judicium de receptis. Quantum igitur ad judicium de receptis, potior est vigilantis cognitio quam dormientis; quia judicium vigilantis est liberum, sed judicium dormientis ligatum, ut dicitur in lib. De somno et vigilia, cap iv. Sed quantum ad receptionem, cognitio dormientis est potior, quia quiescentibus sensibus ab exterioribus motibus interiores impressiones magis recipiuntur, sive sint ex substantiis separatis, sive ex corporibus cælestibus. Unde sic potest intelligi quod dicitur Num. xxiv, 16, de Balaam: qui cadit, scilicet dormiendo, et sic aperiuntur oculi ejus.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod judicium non dependet tantum a receptione speciei, sed ex hoc quod ea de quibus judicatur examinantur ad aliquod principium cognitionis, sicut de conclusionibus judicamus eas in principia resolvendo. In sommo igitur ligatis exterioribus sensibus, interiores vires quasi quietatæ ab exteriorum sensuum tumultibus magis percipere possunt interiores impressiones factas in intellectu vel imaginatione ex illustratione divina vel angelica, vel ex virtute cælestium corporum, aut quorumque; sicut tenui phlegmate decurrente ad linguam videtur dormienti quod dulcia comedat. Sed quia primum principium nostræ cognitionis est sensus oportet ad sensum quodammodo resolvere omnia de quibus judicamus; unde Philosophus dicit in III Cæli et mundi, quod complementum artis et naturæ est res sensibilis visibilis, ex qua debemus de aliis judicare; et similiter dicit in VI Ethic., cap. viii in fin., quod « sensus sunt extremi, sicut intel- « Prophetia est aspiratio divina, quæ eventus rerum, aut per facta, aut per dicta quorumdam lectus principiorum; » extrema appellans illa in quæ fit resolutio judicantis. Quia igitur in somno ligati sunt sensus, non potest esse perfectum judicium nisi quantum ad aliquid, cum homo decipiatur intendens rerum similitudinibus tamquam rebus ipsis; quamvis quando dormiens cognoscat de aliquibus quod non sunt res, sed similitudines rerum.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod judicium intellectus non dependet a sensu hoc modo quod actus iste intellectus per organum sensibile exerceatur; indiget autem sicut extremo et ultimo, ad quod resolutio fiat.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod anima rationalis habet in se vim quamdam divinationis, ut Augustinus dicit, XII Super Genes. ad litteram, cap. xiii. Sed hoc ipse ibidem improbat; quia si esset hoc, in promptu esset ei cum vellet futura præcognoscere; quod patet esse falsum, sicut in responsione, in corp. art., dictum est. Non enim propter hoc, a sensibus abstracta, futura prævidet interdum, quia hoc ei secundum naturalem virtutem competat; sed quia per hujusmodi abstractionem efficitur habilior ad percipiendum impressiones illarum causarum ex quibus potest fieri aliqua præcognitio futurorum.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod in verbis Gregorii est accipienda subtilitas animæ, quam ponit causam præcognitionis futurorum, pro ipsa habilitate animæ ad recipiendum a substantiis superioribus non solum secundum ordinem gratia, prout Sanctis ab Angelis quædam revelantur, sed etiam secundum ordinem naturæ, prout inferiores intellectus secundum ordinem naturæ nati sunt perfici a superioribus; et prout corpora humana subduntur impressionibus corporum cælestium, in quibus est præparatio ad aliquos futuros eventus, quos anima sua subtilitate prævidet per aliquas similitudines ex impressione corporum cælestium in imaginazione relictas.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod quamvis liberum arbitrium naturalibus causis non subdatur, tamen ad ea quæ libero arbitrio aguntur, naturales causæ facilitatem vel impedimentum interdum præstant; sicut potuit in proposito vel pluvia vel nimius æstus tædium facere his qui portabant funus, ne ad locum destinatum deferrent, quorum præcognitio fieri poterat per corpora cælestia.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod cum corpora humana corporibus cælestibus subdantur, ex motibus cælestium corporum potest accipi significatio super qualibet dispositione corporis humani. Cum igitur aliqua complexio vel dispositio humani corporis sit quasi necessitas ad naturalem prophetiam, non est inconveniens, si ex cælestibus corporibus significatio super naturali prophetia accipiatur: non autem super prophetia quæ est Spiritus sancti donum.\n\nAd octavum dicendum quod illi philosophi qui de prophetia determinaverunt, non potuerunt determinare de prophetia de qua nunc loquimur, sed solum de naturali.\n\nAd nonum dicendum quod illorum unum non potest naturaliter animæ competere, ut scilicet sit tantæ virtutis, quod ei materia exterior subdatur cum etiam nec ipsis Angelis ad nutum deserviat materia corporalis, ut Augustinus dicit, De Trinit., cap. viii. Et sic in hoc non est sustinendum dictum Avicennæ, vel cujuslibet alterius philosophi. Ex aliis vero duobus quæ tangit objectio secundum quod naturaliter homini proveniunt, causatur prophetia naturalis, non illa de qua loquimur.\n\nAd decimum dicendum quod quamvis per prophetiam naturalem non possint revelari nisi ea quæ naturalibus causis subduntur, tamen per prophetiam divinam possunt non solum alia, sed et ista cognosci.\n\nAd undecimum dicendum quod societas hominum secundum quod ordinatur ad finem vitæ æternæ, non potest conservari nisi per justitiam fidei, cujus est principium prophetia; unde dicitur Proverb. xxix, 18: Cum defecerit prophetia, dissipabitur populus. Sed cum hic finis sit supernaturalis; et justitia ad hunc finem ordinata, et prophetia, quæ est ejus principium, erit supernaturalis. Justitia vero per quam gubernatur societas humana in ordine ad bonum civile, sufficienter potest haberi per principia naturalia homini indita; et sic non oportet prophetiam esse naturalem.\n\nAd duodecimum dicendum quod hoc est ex nobilitate hominis, quod in genere humano posit inveniri tam digna perfectio quæ ex nulla causa produci possit nisi supernaturali; talis autem perfectionis creaturæ irrationales capaces non sunt; et ideo non oportet quod id quod est perfectissimum in genere hominum, virtute naturæ acquiratur; sed id tantum quod est perfectissimum secundum statum naturæ, non autem quod est perfectissimum secundum statum gratiae.\n\nAd decimumtertium dicendum quod res aliqua dupliciter potest cognosci: scilicet an est, et quid est. Quia vero proprietates creaturarum ex quibus cognitionem accipimus, maxime distant a proprietatibus Dei, inde est quod de Deo cognoscere non possumus quid est; sed ex hoc quod creaturæ dependent a Deo, ex creaturis inspectis cognoscere possumus Deum esse. Sed quia præsentia a futuris non dependent, proprietates autem habent similes, idcireo ex rebus præsentibus non possumus scire si aliqua futura sint. Possumus autem scire, si futura sunt, quid vel qualia sint.\n\nAd decimumquartum dicendum quod Deus magis distat a creaturis quam una creatura ab alia quantum ad modum essendi; non autem quantum ad habitudinem quæ est inter principium essendi et id quod habet esse ex tali principio; et ideo per creaturas cognoscimus Deum esse, sed non quid est. E contrario autem est de cognitione futurorum contingentium per præsentia vel præterita.\n\nAd decimumquintum dicendum quod prophetia reducitur ad maxima bona, cum sit quoddam donum gratuitum. Quamvis enim ea non recte vivatur ut immediato principio rectæ operationis meritoriae, tamen tota prophetia ad rectitudinem vitæ ordinatur. Nec iterum prophetia aliquis abutitur, ita quod abusus ipse sit prophetia actus, sicut aliquis abutitur potentia naturali. Qui enim prophetia utitur ad quærendum lucrum, vel favorem hominum, habet quidem actum prophetia bonum, qui est cognoscere multa et denuntiare; sed abusus hujus boni est actus cupiditatis, vel alterius vitii. Abutitur tamen aliquis prophetia etsi non ut principio actus, tamen ut objecto; sicut etiam virtutibus abutuntur qui de eis superbiunt, quamvis virtutes inter bona maxima computentur.\n\nAd decimumsextum dicendum quod non dicimus aliquid esse naturale a natura quolibet modo accepta, sed secundum tertiam acceptanceem, quam Boetius, ibidem, ponit: prout scilicet natura est principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est, per se, et non secundum accidens; alias oporteret dicere, omnes actiones et passiones et proprietates esse naturales.\n\nAd decimumseptimum dicendum quod communicare bonitatem est Deo naturale, idest naturæ ejus conveniens, non quod ex necessitate naturæ communicet, cum talis communicatio voluntate divina fiat secundum ordinem sapientia, quæ sua dona distribuit omnibus ordinate. Creaturæ etiam naturale est quod a Deo recipiat bonitatem, non quamlibet, sed eam quæ suæ naturæ debetur: sicut homini debetur esse rationale, non lapidi aut asino. Unde si aliqua perfectio divinitus recipiatur in homine, non oportet quod sit homini naturalis, quando debitum humanæ naturæ excedit.\n\nAd decimumoctavum dicendum quod in humana natura est potentia passiva ad recipiendum lumen propheticum, non naturalis, sed tantum potentia obedientia, sicut est in natura corporali ad ea quæ mirabiliter fiunt; unde non oportet quod tali potentiæ passivæ respondeat potentia activa naturalis.\n\nAd decimumnonum dicendum quod animalia bruta non possunt esse præscia futurorum nisi illorum quæ ex motu cæli dependent: ex cujus impressione movetur eorum imaginatio ad aliquid agendum, quod competit significationi futurorum. Et magis talis impressio in brutis habet locum quam in hominibus; quia « Bruta, ut Damascenus dicit lib. II, cap. xxvii, De fid. orth., magis aguntur quam agant; » unde impressiones corporum cælestium sequuntur totaliter; non autem homo, qui est liberæ voluntatis. Nec ex hoc debet dici brutum præscium futuri, quamvis ex actu ejus alicujus futuri significatio accipi possit; quia non agit ad significationem futuri, quasi rationem sui operis cognoscens, sed magis ductum ab instinctu naturæ.\n\net videtur quod sic. Omnis enim perfectio quæ non recipitur in aliquo nisi secundum dispositionem recipientis, requirit aliquam determinatam dispositionem. Sed prophetia est talis perfectio, ut patet per Amos 1: Deus de Sion rugiet, ubi dicit Glossa Hier., In Amos cap. 1,: « Naturale est ut omnes qui volunt rem rei comparare, ex eis rebus sumant comparationes quas sunt experti, et in quibus sunt nutriti; verbi gratia, nautæ suos inimicos comparant ventis, damnum, naufragio; sicut pastores timorem suum rugitui leonis assimilant, inimicos dicunt leones, ursos, lupos: et sic iste, qui fuit pastor pecorum, timorem Dei rugitui leonis assimilat'. » Ergo prophetia aliquam determinatam præexigit dispositionem innatura humana.\n\n2. Præterea, ad prophetiam requiritur bonitas imaginationis, cum etiam per visionem imaginariam prophetia fiat. Sed ad bonitatem imaginativæ virtutis requiritur bona disposition et complexio organi. Ergo ad prophetiam præexigitur disposition naturalis.\n\n3. Præterea, impedimentum naturale est fortius quam id quod accidentaliter supervenit. Sed aliquæ passiones accidentaliter supervenientes impediunt prophetiam; unde dicit Hier. Super Matth.: « Tempore illo quo conjugales actus geruntur, præsentia Spiritus sancti non dabitur, etiam si Propheta esse videatur qui officio generationis obsequitur. » Nec hoc est propter culpam, quia actus matrimonialis culpa caret; sed propter concupiscentiæ passionem annexam. Ergo multo fortius indispositio naturalis complexionis impedit aliquem ne possit fieri Propheta.\n\n4. Præterea, natura ordinatur ad gratiam, sicut gratia ad gloriam. Sed gloria præexigit gratia perfectionem in eo qui debet ad gloriam pervenire. Ergo et prophetia, et alia dona gratuita præexigit naturalem dispositionem.\n\n5. Præterea, speculatio prophetia est altior quam scientiæ acquisitæ. Sed speculatio scientiæ acquisitæ per indispositionem naturalis complexionis impeditur: cum quidam sint ita indispositi ex naturali complexione, quod vix aut nunquam ad scientias acquirendas pertingere possint. Ergo multo fortius indispositio natu-ralis complexionis speculationem prophetiae impedit.\n\n6. Præterea, quæ a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt, ut dicitur Rom. xiii, 4. Sed donum prophetiae est a Deo. Ergo ordinate ab eo distribuitur. Sed non esset ordinata distributio, si daretur ei qui non est ad eam habendam dispositus. Ergo prophetia præexigit naturalem dispositionem.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod in prophetia est duo considerare: scilicet ipsum prophetiae donum, et hujusmodi donijam percepti usum. Ipsum igitur prophetiae donum supra facultatem hominis existens, a Deo datur, non virtute alicujus causæ creatæ; quamvis prophetia naturalis ex virtute alicujus causæ creatæ efficiatur in nobis, ut dictum est, art. præc. Hoc autem differt inter operationem creaturæ et operationem divinam: quod quia Deus sua operatione non solum formam, sed etiam materiam producit; non præexigit ejus operatio, sicut nec materiam, ita nec materialem dispositionem ad effectum perficiendum: nec tamen formam sine materia aut sine dispositionem facit, sed simul potest materiam et formam condere unica operatione; vel etiam materiam quantumcumque indis- Sensus est et abbreviatio quædam Hieronymi, non ipsius textus. « Et Psalmistam facit. » positam ad debitam dispositionem reducere, quæ competit perfectioni quam inducit: sicut patet in suscitatione mortui; corpus enim mortuum est omnino indispositum ad animam recipiendam; et tamen unico divino opere corpus et animam, et dispositionem ad animam recipit. Sed ad operationem creaturæ præexigitur et materia, et materiæ dispositio; non enim potest virtus creata ex quolibet quodlibet facere. Patet ergo quod prophetia naturalis præexigit dispositionem debitam naturalis complexionis; sed prophetia quæ est Spiritus sancti donum, non exigit eam; exigit tamen quod simul cum dono prophetia detur etiam dispositio naturalis quæ sit ad prophetiam conveniens. Usus autem prophetia cujuslibet est in potestate Prophetæ; et secundum hoc dicitur I Cor. xiv, 32: Spiritus Prophetis subjecti sunt; et ideo ab usu prophetia aliquis potest se ipsum impedire, et ad debitum prophetia usum de necessitate dispositio debita requiritur, cum prophetia usus ex virtute Prophetæ creata procedat. Unde et determinatam dispositionem præexigit.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod quædam dispositiones sunt indifferentes ad prophetiam; et hæ divina operatione non mutantur in Propheta; et secundum earum convenientiam prophetia procedit. Indifferens enim est ad prophetiam, quibuscumque similitudinibus res prophetia figuretur. Dispositiones vero contrariæ divina virtute auferuntur a Propheta, et dispositiones necessariae conferuntur.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod ad prophetiam requiritur bonitas imaginationis, non autem de necessitate præexigitur; quia ipse Deus, qui donum prophetia infundit, potens est complexionem organi imaginativæ virtutis in melius reformare, sicut et oculos lippos, ut clare videre possint.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod hujusmodi vehementes passiones ad se trahunt totaliter rationis attentionem, et per consequens eam avertunt a spiritualium inspectione: et ideo vehementibus passionibus vel iræ vel tristitiæ, aut delectationis, usus prophetia impeditur in eo qui prophetia donum percipit; et sic etiam naturalis complexionis indispositio impediret, nisi divina virtute quodammodo curaretur.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod similitudo proportionata quantum ad hoc verificatur, quod, sicut gratia superadditur naturæ, ita gloria gratiae; non est autem similitudo quantum ad omnia; quia gratia meretur gloriam, non autem natura gratiam; et ideo præexigitur meritum gratiae ad gloriam habendam, non autem dispositio naturæ ad gratiam obtinendam.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod scientia acquisita causatur ex nobis quodammodo; non est autem in nostra potestate complexionem organorum animæ meliorare, sicut est in potestate divina, quæ donum prophetia infundit; et ideo non est simile.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod donum prophetia a Deo ordinatissime dividitur; et hoc etiam ad hujus distributionis ordinationem pertinet, ut aliquando conferatur illis qui videntur ad hoc maxime indispositi, ut sic divinæ virtuti attribuatur, et non glorietur omnis caro coram illo; I Corinth. 1, 29.\n\nQuinto quæritur utrum ad prophetiam requiratur bonitas morum; et videtur quod sic. Quia Sapient. vii, 7, dicitur: Per vaticinationes in animas sanctas se transferens, amicos Dei et Prophetas constituit. Sed amici Dei non sunt nisi illi in quibus bonitas morum viget; Joan. xiv, 23: Si quis diligit me, sermonem meum servabit. Ergo ille qui non est bonorum morum, Propheta non constituitur.\n\n2. Præterea, prophetia est donum Spiritus sancti. Sed Spiritus sanctus non inhabitat aliquem peccatorem; Sap. 1, 5: Spiritus sanctus disciplinæ effugiet fictum. Ergo prophetia donum non potest esse in aliquo peccatore.\n\n3. Præterea, illud quo quis male uti non potest, non potest esse in aliquo peccatore. Sed prophetia nullus male uti potest; cum enim actus prophetia sit a Spiritu sancto, si aliquis prophetia male uteretur, esset idem actus a peccato, et a Spiritu sancto; quod esse non potest. Ergo prophetia non potest esse in aliquo peccatore.\n\n4. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in lib. De somno et vigilia (De divinat. per somnium, parum a princ.,) quod « si divinatio somniorum est a Deo, inconveniens est eam immitere quibuslibet, et non optimis viris. » Sed constat prophetiæ donum esse tantum a Deo. Ergo inconveniens est dicere quod detur nisi optimis viris.\n\n5. Præterea, sicut Plato dicit in Timæo, circa fin., « optimi est optima adducere. » Sed prophetia convenientius est in homine bono quam in malo. Ergo cum Deus sit optimus, nunquam malis donum prophetiæ dabit.\n\n6. Præterea, in operatione naturæ similitudo divinæ operationis invenitur; unde et Dionysius capite iv De divin. nomin., § iv, divinam bonitatem radio solari comparat propter similitudinem effectus. Sed operatione naturali magis dispositis aliquæ perfectiones magis dantur; sicut a sole corpora magis pervia magis illustrantur. Cum ergo ad recipiendum donum prophetiæ magis sit dispositus bonus quam malus, videtur quod multo amplius bonis quam malis dari debeat. Sed non omnibus bonis datur. Ergo nulli malo ' debet dari.\n\n7. Præterea, gratia ad hoc datur ut natura elevetur. Sed natura magis debet elevari in bonis quam in malis. Ergo gratia prophetiæ magis debet dari bonis quam malis.\n\nSed contra, Balaam fuisse prophetia dicitur, qui tamen malus fuit. Præterea, Matth. vii, 22, dicitur ex persona damnatorum: Domine, nonne in nomine tuo prophetavimus? Ergo prophetia potest esse in hominibus malis. Præterea, quicumque non habet caritatem, malus est. Sed prophetia potest esse in non habente caritatem, ut patet I ad Cor. xiii, 2: Si habuero prophetiam... caritatem autem non habuero, nihil sum. Ergo prophetia potest esse in aliquo peccatore.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod bonitas hominis in caritate consistit, perquam homo Deo unitur. Quæcumque ergo sine caritate esse possunt, communiter inveniri possunt in bonis et malis. In hoc enim divina bonitas præcipue commendatur, quod tam bonis quam malis utitur ad suum propositum implendum; et ideo utrisque, tam bonis quam malis, illa dona largitur quæ ad caritatem neces- 1: « Ergo prophetia potest esse in hominibus malis. »: « Ergo prophetia potest esse in aliquo peccatore. » XIV. sariam dependentiam non habent. Prophetia autem non habet aliquam necessariam colligantiam cum caritate, propter duo. Primo, quia prophetia est in intellectu, caritas in affectu; intellectus autem est prior affectu; et sic prophetia et aliæ intellectus perfectiones non dependent a caritate; et hac ratione fides et prophetia et omnia alia hujusmodi in bonis et malis esse possunt. Secundo, quia prophetia datur alicui ad utilitatem Ecclesiæ, et non propter se ipsum. Contingit autem aliquem utiliter quantum ad aliquid deservire Ecclesiæ qui in se bonus non est, quasi Deo per caritatem conjunctus; unde prophetia et operatio miraculorum et ecclesiastica ministeria et alia hujusmodi, quæ ad utilitatem Ecclesiæ conferuntur, inveniuntur quando sine caritate, quæ sola homines bonos facit. Sciendum tamen quod inter peccata quibus caritas amittitur, quædam sunt quæ usum prophetia impediunt, quædam quæ non. Quia enim carnalia peccata mentem a spiritualitate omnino retrahunt, ex hoc ipso quod aliquis peccatis carnalibus est subditus, ineptus ad prophetiam redditur, ad cujus revelationem summa spiritualitas mentis requiritur: peccata vero spiritualia spiritualitatem mentis non ita impediunt; et ideo contingit aliquem esse prophetam spiritualibus peccatis subditum; non autem carnalibus, vel etiam immensis sæculi solicitudinibus, quibus mens a sua spiritualitate retrahatur. Et ideo dicit Rabbi Moyses, quod hoc est signum quod aliquis sit falsus Prophetia, quando voluptatibus et solicitudinibus sæculi detinetur. Et hoc consonat ei quod habetur Matth. vii, 45: Attendite a falsis Prophetis; et infra: A fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos; quod de manifestis oportet intelligi, ut ibi dicit Glossa ordin. 4 ex Greg. Moral. in B. Job., lib. XV, cap. LVI, n. 66, quæ maxime sunt peccata carnalia; spiritualia enim peccata interius latent.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod sapientia se transfert in animam dupliciter. Uno modo ut ipsamet Dei sapientia animam inhabitet; et sic hominem sanctum facit et Dei amicum. Alio modo solum Et Moral. lib. XXXI, cap. viii, n. 43, t. LXXVI, col. 579: « neque enim nec pensanda sunt quæ ostendunt in imagine, sed quæ servant in actione. » quantum ad effectum; et sic non oportet quod sanctum faciat vel Dei amicum; et sic transfert se in mentem malorum quos prophetas constituit.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod quamvis prophetia sit Spiritus sancti donum, non tamen cum dono prophetiae Spiritus sanctus datur, sed solummodo cum dono caritatis datur; unde ratio non sequitur.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod prophetia non contingit male uti, ita quod ipse prophetiae actus, inquantum a prophetia egreditur, sit malus. Cum enim aliquis prophetiae actum ad aliquod malum ordinat, tunc quidem ipse prophetiae actus bonus est, et a Spiritu sancto; sed ordinatio illius actus ad finem indebitum non est a Spiritu sancto, sed a perversa hominis voluntate.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod intentio Philosophi est dicere quod ea quae divinitus dantur, ex voluntate datoris dependent, quae non potest esse irrationabilis; unde, si praescientia futurorum quae est in somniis, a Deo immitteretur, apareret in ista immissione aliqua discretio. Nunc autem non apparet, cum in quibuslibet talis divinatio fiat; per quod ostenditur divinationem somniorum esse a natura. In dono autem prophetiae invenimus discretionem: quia non omnibus dator, etiam qui sic vel sic dispositi sint; sed illis solis quos divina voluntas elegerit: qui tamen simpliciter non sunt boni vel optimi quantum ad se ipsos; sunt tamen boni vel optimi quantum ad hoc quod per eos Prophetæ officium exerceatur, secundum quod competere judicat sapientia divina.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod in hoc Deus optimus ostenditur, quod non solum bonis sed etiam malis novit bene uti: unde nihil summæ bonitati derogatur, si per malos prophetas bonum prophetæ officium administrari facit.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod non qui cumque bonus est magis aptus ad prophetiam habendam quam quilibet pecator; cum aliqui caritate carentes magis habeant aptas mentes ad spiritualia percipienda, utpote a carnalibus et terrenis vacantes, et naturali intellectus præditi claritate; quibusdam e contrario caritatem habentibus terrenis negotiis implicitis, et carnali dantibus operam genera-tioni, nec intellectum habentibus naturaliter perspicacem. Et ideo quandoque propter has similes conditiones datur prophetiae donum aliquibus malis, quod denegatur aliquibus bonis.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod per gratiam prophetiae elevatur natura hominis non ad gloriam habendam directe, sed ad utilitatem aliorum; in bonis autem est magis elevata per gratiam gratum facientem ad gloriam obtinendam; unde ratio non sequitur.\n\n3. Præterea, nihil potest videri nisi ubi est. Sed futura contingentia non sunt secundum immobilem veritatem, prout a Prophetis videntur, nisi in ipsa præscientiae divina. Ergo Prophetæ in ipsa Non est expresse Gregorii super hunc textum; sed inde colligi potest. (Moral. XII, cap. II, solum præscientia Dei vident; et sic idem quod prius. 4. Sed dicendum quod futura contingentia sunt quidem primordialiter in divina præscientia; sed exinde derivantur per quasdam species ad mentem humanam, ubi a Propheta videntur. — Sed contra: quidquid recipitur in aliquo, est in eo per modum recipientis, et non per modum suum. Sed mens Prophetæ mutabilis est. Ergo non possunt in ea futura contingentia immobiliter recipi.\n\n5. Præterea, illud quod est proprium divinæ cognitioni, non potest nisi in Deo cognosci. Sed futura cognoscere est proprium Dei, ut patet Isa. xLI, 23: Annuntiate quæ ventura sunt, et dicemus quia dii estis vos. Ergo non possunt a Prophetis futura contingentia videri nisi in ipso Deo.\n\n6. Præterea, Avicenna dicit quod quandoque tantum elevatur mens hominis, quod conjungitur speculo præscientia. Sed maxima elevatio mentis humanæ est in cognitione prophetia. Ergo videtur quod conjungatur speculo præscientia, ita quod futura in ipsa Dei præscientia videantur.\n\n7. Præterea, finis humanæ vitæ est, ut philosophi tradunt, ut homo secundum mentem conjungatur speculo altiori, quod est speculum intelligibilium substantia-rum. Sed inconveniens esset, nisi homo ad finem suum perveniret. Ergo homo quandoque perveniet ad hoc quod conjungatur mente substantiis intelligibilibus, quarum suprema est divina essentia, in qua omnia reducent: ergo Propheta, qui inter homines maxime habet mentem elevatam, ad hoc perveniet ut mente conjungatur essentia divinæ, quæ videtur esse speculum æternitatis; et sic idem quod prius.\n\n8. Præterea, si sint duo specula, quorum unum sit superius, et alterum inferius, et a speculo superiori resultent similitudines in inferiori; ille qui in inferiori speculo videt species, non dicitur in superiori videre, quamvis ejus visio quodammodo a speculo superiori derivetur. Sed a mente divina resultant rerum futurarum species in mente Propheta, sicut a speculo superiori in speculum inferius. Ergo ex hoc quod Propheta intuetur in sua mente species receptas a mente divina, non debet dici videre in mente divina, sed in propria mente. Sed mens propria non est speculum æternitatis, sed temporale. Ergo si Propheta non viderent nisi in mente propria, ut prius dictum est, non dicerentur videre in speculo æternitatis, sed in temporali, quamvis ab æterno derivetur. 9. Sed diceres quod aliquis dicitur videre non solum in re illuminata per solem, sed etiam in sole ipso, inquantum per illuminationem solis videt. — Sed contra est quod in sole non resultant rerum visibilium rationes, quod videtur ad rationem speculi pertinere. Ergo videtur quod videre in sole non sic dicatur sicut videre in speculo.\n\n10. Præterea, visio qua videtur Deus ut est objectum beatitudinis, est dignior quam illa qua videtur ut species rerum: quia illa facit beatum, ista non. Sed ad videndum Deum ut est beatitudinis objectum, homo existens in statu viæ potest elevari majori elevatione, qua scilicet mens abstrahitur omnino a sensibus, ut est in raptu. Ergo minori elevatione etiam sine raptu potest elevari mens Prophetæ ad videndum essentiam divinam, ut est species rerum; et sic Propheta potest videre in speculo æternitatis.\n\n11. Præterea, plus distat essentia divina, prout in se consideratur, et prout est similitudo alterius rei quam prout est similitudo alterius et unius rei, quia plus distat Deus a creatura quam una creatura ab alia. Sed aliquis potest videre Deum ut est species unius creaturæ, sine hoc quod videat Deum ut est species alterius; alias oporteret quod omnes videntes Deum omnia cognoscerent. Ergo aliquis potest videre eum ut est species quarumdam rerum, sine hoc quod videat essentiam ejus in se ipsa: ergo qui non vident Deum per essentiam, possunt videre in speculo æternitatis; quod maxime videtur Prophetis competere.\n\n12. Præterea, Augustinus dicit, VI De Trinitate, cap. xII, quod quorumdam mentes ita elevantur, ut in ipsa suprema rerum arce incommutabiles rationes inspiciant. Sed Prophetarum mentes videntur maxime elevatæ. Ergo videtur quod ei quæ Prophetæ vident, in ipsa rerum arce inspiciant, scilicet in divina esssentia; et sic idem quod prius.\n\n13. Præterea, judicium non potest esse de aliquo nisi per id quod est eo superius, ut patet per Augustinum in lib. De vera relig., cap. xxxi. Sed ea de quibus Prophetæ judicant, sunt rerum immortales veritates. Ergo non potest esse quod de eis judicent per aliquod temporale et mortale, sed per immortale, quod est ipse Deus; et sic idem quod prius. 1. Sed contra est quod Luc. x, super illud, Multi Reges et Prophetæ, dicit Glossa ordin.: « Prophetæ, et justi a longe gloriam Dei viderunt per speculum in aenigmate. » Sed qui videt in ipsa aeterna præscientia Dei, non videt in aenigmate. Ergo Prophetæ non viderunt in ipsa præscientia divina, quam speculum aeternitatis appellant.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod speculum, propriie loquendo, non invenitur nisi in rebus materialibus; sed in rebus spiritualibus per quamdam transumptionem dicitur per similitudinem acceptam a speculo materiali; ut scilicet in rebus spiritualibus dicatur esse speculum id in quo alia repræsentantur, sicut in speculo materiali apparent formæ rerum visibilium. Sic ergo dicunt quidam, ipsam mentem divinam, in qua omnes rerum rationes reluctent, esse speculum quoddam, et dici aternitatis speculum ex hoc quod est aternum, quasi aternitatem habens. Dicunt igitur quod istud speculum videi potest dupliciter. Vel per essentiam suam, secundum quod est beatitudinis objectum; et sic non videtur nisi a beatis, vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid, sicut in raptu: vel prout in co resultant rerum similitudines; et sic proprie videi ut speculum. Et hoc modo dicunt speculum aeternitatis visum ab Angelis ante suam beatitudinem, et a Prophetis. Sed hæc opinio non videtur rationabilis, propter duo. Primo, quia ipsæ species rerum in mente divina resultantes non sunt aliud secundum rem ab ipsa essentia divina; sed hujusmodi species vel rationes distinguuntur in ipsa secundum diversos ejus respectus ad creaturas diversas. Cognoscere igitur divinam essentiam et species in ipsa resultantes, nihil est aliud quam cognoscere ipsam in se et relatam ad aliud. Prius est autem cognoscere aliquid in se quam prout est ad aliud comparatum; unde visio qua Deus videtur ut est rerum species, præsupponit illam qua videtur ut est in se essentia quaedam, secundum quod est objectum beatitudinis. Unde impossibile est quod aliquis videat Deum, secundum quod est species rerum, et non videat eum, secundum quod est beatitudinis objectum. Secundo, quia species alicujus rei invenitur in alio dupliciter: uno modo sicut præexistens ante rem cujus est species; alio modo sicut a re ipsa resultans. Illud igitur in quo apparent species rerum ut præexistentes ad rem, non potest proprie speculum dici, sed magis exemplar. Illud autem speculum potest dici in quo rerum similitudines a rebus ipsis resultant. Quia vero in Deo sunt species vel rationes rerum non resultantes a creaturis, nusquam invenitur dictum a Sanctis, quod Deus sit rerum speculum, sed magis quod ipsæ res creatæ sunt speculum Dei, prout diciur I Corinth. xiii, 12: Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate; et sic etiam Filius dicitur esse speculum Patris, prout a Patre in ipso species Divinitatis recipitur, secundum quod habetur, Sap. vii, 26: Speculum sine macula Dei majestatis, et imago bonitatis illius. Quod autem a Magistris dicitur, Prophetas in speculo aternitatis videre, non sic intelligendum est, quasi ipsum Deum aternum videant prout est speculum rerum; sed quia aliquid creatum intuentur, in quo ipsa aternitas Dei repræsentatur; ut sic speculum aternitatis intelligatur non quod est aternum, sed quod est aternitatem repræsentans. Ex hoc enim Deo competit futura certitudinaliter, ut præsentia, cognoscere, ut Boetius dicit V De consol., prosa iv et ult., Patrol. lat. t. XIII, quia ejus intuitus aternitate mensuratur, quæ est tota simul, unde ejus aspectui subjacent omnia tempora, et quæ in eis geruntur. Inquantum igitur ab isto divino aspectu resultat in mente Prophetæ futurorum scientia per lumen propheticum, et per species in quibus Propheta videt, ipsæ species simul cum lumine prophetico speculum aternitatis dicuntur, quia divinum intuitum repræsentant, prout in aternitate futurorum eventus præsentialiter inspicit. Concedendum est ergo quod Prophetæ in speculo aternitatis vident, non ita quod speculum aternum videant, ut objectiones pro prima parte inductæ videbantur ostendere; unde ad eas per ordinem respondendum est.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod Prophetæ in libro præscientia dicuntur legere hac similitudine, quia ex ipso libro divinæ præscientia efficitur rerum futurorum notitia in mente Prophetæ, sicut ex lectione libri efficitur notitia rerum quæ scribuntur in libro, in mente legentis; non autem quantum ad hanc similitudinem quod Prophetæ ipsam Dei præscientiam videat, sicut legens in libro materiali videt librum materialem. Vel potest dici quod sicut notitia quæ fit in mente Prophetæ, dicitur speculum aternitatis, idest aternitatem repræsentans; ita potest dici liber præscientia quasi materiali, quia in ea notitia Dei præscientia quantum ad aliquid describitur.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod quamvis omnis cognitio a divina præscientia derivetur, non tamen omnis cognitio repræsentat eam, ut ratione aternitatis etiam futura præsentialiter intueatur; unde non potest dici quælibet scientia speculum aternitatis; sed in hoc privilegiata ostenditur cognitio Prophetarum.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod rationes fu-turorum contingentium secundum immobilem veritatem originaliter sunt in mente divina, sed exinde effluunt in mente Prophetæ; et sic in revelatione accepta Propheta futura immobiliter cognoscere potest.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod forma recepta sequitur modum recipientis quantum ad aliquid, prout habet esse in subjecto; est enim in eo materialiter vel immaterialiter, multipliciter vel uniformiter, secundum exigentiam subjectirecipientis. Sed quantum ad aliquid forma recepta trahit subjectum recipiens ad modum suum: prout scilicet nobilitates quæ sunt de ratione formæ, communicantur subjecto recipienti; sic enim subjectum per formam perficitur et nobilitatur; et hoc modo per gloriam immortalitatis corpus corruptibile immortale efficitur; et similiter per irradiationem ab immobili veritate elevatur mens Prophetæ ad hoc quod mobilia immobiliter videat.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod quia futurorum notitia Deo est propria, ideo non potest accipi nisi a Deo; tamen non oportet quod ipsum Deum videat quicumque a Deo futura cognoscit.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod mens Prophetæ secundum Philosophum, speculo intelligentiarum sive præscientiarum conjungitur, non quod ipsas intelligentias videat, sed quia ex ipsarum irradiatione, earum præscientia particeps fit.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod etiam secundum fidem finis humanæ vitæ est ut homo speculo altiori conjungatur; sed ad hunc finem pertingitur solum in patria, non in via.\n\nAd octavum dicendum quod speculum in quo videt Prophetæ, quamvis sit temporale, tamen est Dei aternam præscientiam repræsentans; et secundum hoc in speculo aternitatis videt.\n\nAd nonum dicendum quod quamvis sol non possit dici speculum rerum visibilium, tamen res visibiles quodammodo possunt dici speculum solis, inquantum in eis claritas solis refulget: et sic etiam notitia in eis mente effecta dicitur aternitatis speculum.\n\nAd decimum dicendum quod perfectior est visio qua videtur Deus ut est species rerum quam illa qua videtur ut est beati-tudinis objectum: quia hæc illam præ-supponit, et eam perfectiorem esse ostendit: perfectius enim videt causam qui in ea ejus effectus inspicere potest, quam qui solam essentiam causæ videt.\n\nAd undecimum dicendum quod relatio qua Deus refertur ad unam creaturam, non præsupponit relationem qua refertur ad alteram; sicut relatio qua refertur ad creaturam, præsupponit ipsam rei essentiam absolute: et sic ratio non sequitur.\n\nAd duodecimum dicendum quod verbum Augustini non est referendum ad visionem Prophetarum, sed ad visionem sanctorum in patria, vel eorum qui in statu viæ vident secundum modum patriæ. ut Paulus in raptu.\n\nSeptimo quæritur utrum in revelatione prophetica imprimantur divinitus in mente Prophetæ novæ rerum species, vel solum intellectuale lumen; et videtur quod solum lumen sine speciebus. Quia, ut habetur in Glossa II Corinth. xiv, super illud: Spiritus loquitur mysteria, a sola visione intellectuali dicitur aliquis propheta. Sed visio intellectualis non est de rebus per rerum similitudines, sed per ipsas rerum essentias, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo in visione prophetica nullæ species in mente Prophetæ sunt.\n\n2. Præterea, intellectus abstrahit a materia et materialibus conditionibus. Si igitur in visione intellectuali quæ facit prophetiam, fiant aliquæ similitudines, illæ similitudines non erunt admixtæ materiæ vel conditionibus materialibus. Ergo per eas Prophetæ non poterit cognoscere particularia, sed universalia solum; quod 1 est falsum.\n\n3. Præterea, earum rerum de quibus fit Prophetæ revelatio, habent Prophetæ aliquas species in mente sua; sicut Hieremias qui prophetabat combustionem Hierusalem, in anima sua habebat speciem civitatis illius a sensu acceptam; et similiter ignis comburentis, quem frequenter viderat. Si igitur aliæ species earumdem rerum menti Prophetæ divinitus imprimantur, sequitur quod sint duæ formæ ejusdem rationis in eodem subjecto: quod est inconveniens.\n\n4. Præterea, visio qua videtur divina essentia, est potior quam illa qua videntur quæcumque rerum species. Sed visio qua videtur essentia divina, non sufficit ad accipiendam cognitionem de rebus quibuscumque: alias videntes divinam essentiam omnia viderent. Ergo nec species quæcumque menti Prophetæ imprimantur, poterunt Prophetam ducere in rerum cognitionem.\n\n5. Præterea, illud quod quis potest propria virtute efficere, non oportet quod in Propheta divina operatione fiat. Sed quilibet potest rerum quarumlibet in mente sua species formare per virtutem imaginativam, quæ componit et dividit imagines a rebus acceptas. Ergo non oportet quod aliquæ rerum in anima Prophetæ imprimantur.\n\n6. Præterea, natura operatur breviori via qua potest; et multo magis Deus, qui ordinatius operatur. Sed brevior via est ut a speciebus quæ in anima Prophetæ sunt, ducatur in rerum aliqualem cognitionem, quam ex aliis speciebus de novo impressis. Ergo non videtur quod aliquæ species de novo imprimantur.\n\n7. Præterea, dicit Glossa Hieronymi, Amos 1: « Prophetæ utuntur similitudinibus rerum in quibus conversati sunt.» Hoc autem non esset, si eorum visiones fierent per species de novo impressas. 1 A, B, C, » 2 Cf. notulam ad arg. 1 art. iv hujus quæstionis. Ergo non imprimuntur aliquæ species de novo in anima Prophetæ, sed solum lumen propheticum. 1. Sed contra: visus non determinatur ad aliquod determinatum visibile cognoscendum per lumen, sed per species visibles; et similiter intellectus possibilis non determinatur ad intelligibilia cognoscenda per lumen intellectus agentis, sed per species intelligibiles. Cum ergo cognitio Prophetæ determinetur ad quædam quæ prius non cognoscebat, videtur quod non sufficiat luminis infusio, nisi etiam species imprimantur.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod prophetia est quædam supernaturalis cognitio. Ad cognitionem autem duo requiruntur; scilicet acceptio cognitorum, et judicium de acceptis; ut supra dictum est. Quandoqueigitur cognitio est supernaturalis secundum acceptionem tantum, quandoque secundum judicium tantum, quandoque secundum utrumque. Si autem sit secundum acceptionem tantum supernaturalis, non dicetur ex hoc aliquis Propheta; sicut Pharao non est dicendus Propheta, qui supernaturaliter acceptit futuræ fertilitatis et sterilitatis indicium, sub boum et spicarum figuris. Si vero habeat supernaturale judicium, vel simul judicium et acceptionem, ex hoc dicitur esse Propheta. Acceptio autem supernaturalis non potest esse nisi secundum tria genera visionis: scilicet secundum visionem corporalem, quando aliqua corporalibus oculis divinitus demonstrantur, ut manus scribentis Balthassari; et secundum imaginariam visionem, quando divinitus aliquæ rerum figuræ Prophetis ostenduntur, ut olla succensa Hieremiæ, et equi et montes Zachariæ; et secundum intellectualem, quando aliqua intellectui ostenduntur supra naturalem facultatem. Cum autem intellectus humanus sit in potentia naturali ad omnes formas intelligibiles sensibilium rerum, non erit supernaturalis acceptio, quæcumque species intelligibiles in intellectu fiant, sicut erit supernaturalis acceptio in visione corporali quando inspiciuntur res quæ non sunt secundum naturam formatæ, sed solummodo divinitus ad aliquid ostendendum; et sicut erit supernaturalis acceptio in visione imaginaria, quando videntur aliquæ similitudines non a sensibus acceptæ, sed per aliquam vim animæ formatæ. Sed tunc solum intellectus supernaturaliter accipit, quando videt ipsas substantias intelligibiles per essentiam suam, utpote Deum et Angelos; ad quod pertingere non potest secundum virtutem naturæ suæ. Inter has autem tres supernaturales acceptiones hæc ultima excedit modum prophetia; unde dicitur Num. xii, 6: Si quis fuerit inter vos Propheta Domini, in sommio aut visione loquar ad eum. At non talis servus meus Moyses, qui palam, et non per figuras et ægnimata, videt Deum. Videre autem Deum in essentia sua, sicut videtur in raptu, vel sicut videtur a beatis; aut videre alias substantias intelligibiles per essentiam suam, modum propheticæ visionis excedit. Sed prima supernaturalis acceptio, quæ est 4 « Prophetia tempora tria sunt, scilicet præsecundum corporalem visionem, est infra propheticam acceptionem: quia per hanc acceptionem non præfertur Propheta aliis quibuscumque; cum speciem divinitus formatam ad videndum, omnes aqualiter videre possint. Supernaturalis ergo acceptio quæ est propria Prophetæ est acceptio imaginariæ visionis. Sic ergo omnis Propheta vel habet tantum judicium supernaturale de his quæ ab alio videntur, sicut Joseph de visis a Pharaone; vel habet acceptionem simul cum judicio secundum imaginariæ visionem. Judicium igitur supernaturale Prophetæ datur secundum lumen ei infusum, ex quo intellectus roboratur ad judicandum; et quantum ad hoc nullæ species præexiguntur: sed quantum ad acceptionem requiritur nova formatio specierum, sive ut fiant in mente species quæ prius non fuerunt, utpote si alicui cæco nato imprimerentur species colorum; sive ut species præexistentes ordinentur et componantur divinitus tali modo qui competat significati rerum quæ debent Prophetæ ostendi. Et per hunc modum concedendum est, quod Prophetæ revelatio non solum fit secundum lumen, sed secundum species; quando vero secundum lumen tantum.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod quamvis Propheta non dicatur nisi qui habet intellectualem visionem, non tamen sola visio intellectualis ad prophetiam pertinet, sed imaginaria, in qua species formari possunt convenientes etiam ad singularium repræsentationem. Unde patet solutio ad secundum.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod illarum rerum quas Propheta vidit, non oportet ut ei denuo species infundantur; sed ex speciebus reservatis in thesauro virtutis imaginativæ fiat quædam aggregatio ordinata, conveniens designationi rei prophetandæ.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod divina essentia, quantum in se est, expressius repræsentat res quaslibet quam quælibet species vel figura; sed ex hoc quod aspectus intuentis vincitur ab eminentia illius essentia, contingit quod essentiam videns non omnia videt quæ repræsentat. Species vero in imaginatione impressæ, sunt nobis proportionatæ, unde ex eis in rerum cognitionem possumus pervenire.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod sicut in eo qui ex signis scientiam accipit, signo-rum cognitio est via ducens ad res ipsas; ita e converso in eo qui significat aliquid, cognitio rei significandæ præsupponitur ad formationem signorum; non enim potest aliquis rei quam ignorat congrua signa adhibere. Quamvis igitur homo quilibet possit quaslibet imagines formare naturali virtute; tamen quod figuræ formentur convenienter rei significandæ, non potest fieri nisi ab eo qui rerum illarum cognitionem habet; et secundum hoc formatio imaginariæ visionis in Propheta supernaturalis existit.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod species illæ quæ præexistunt in vi imaginativa Prophetæ, prout ibi existunt, non sufficiunt ad significationem rerum futurarum; et ideo oportet quod divinitus aliter transformentur.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod species præexistentes in imaginatione Prophetæ sunt quasi elementa illius visionis imaginariæ, quæ divinitus ostenduntur, cum ex eis quodammodo componatur; et exinde contingit quod Propheta utitur similitudinibus rerum in quibus conservatur. Sed quia non semper per aliquas species fit revelatio prophetica, ut dictum est, in corp. artic.; ideo ad rationes in contrarium adductas respondere oportet.\n\nOctavo quæritur utrum omnis revelatio prophetica fiat Angelo mediante; et videtur quod non. Quia, ut dicit Augustinus, VI De Trin., epist. cxLvii, al. cxII, quorumdam mentes ita elevantur, ut non per Angelum, sed in ipsa summa rerum arce incommutabiles videant rationes. Hoc autem maxime videtur competere Prophetis. Ergo revelatio eorum non fit Angelo mediante.\n\n2. Præterea, dona Spiritus sancti immediate sunt a Deo, et habitus infusi. Sed prophetia est donum Spiritus sancti, ut patet I Cor. xiii; est etiam quoddam lumen infusum. Ergo est a Deo sine Angelo mediante.\n\n3. Præterea, prophetia quæ ex virtute creata procedit, est prophetia naturalis, ut supra, art. iii hujus quæst., dictum est. Sed Angelus est creatura quædam. Ergo prophetia quæ non est naturalis, sed Spiritus sancti donum, non perficitur Angelo mediante.\n\n4. Præterea, prophetia perficitur secundum infusionem luminis, et impressionem specierum. Sed neutrum horum videtur posse fieri per Angelum; quia vel esset creator luminis, vel speciei; cum hæc non possint fieri ex nihilo. Ergo visio prophetica non fit Angelo mediante.\n\n5. Præterea, in definitione prophetia dicitur quod prophetia est divina revelatio vel inspiratio. Si autem fieret Angelo mediante, diceretur esse angelica, non divina. Ergo non fit mediantibus Angelis.\n\n6. Præterea, Sapient. vii, 27, dicitur, quod divina sapientia per nationes in animas sanctas se transfert, et amicos Dei et Prophetas constituit. Ergo ab ipso Deo immediante aliquis Propheta constituitur, non per Angelum.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod in revelatione prophetica duo concurrunt; scilicet mentis illustratio, et formatio specierum in imaginativa virtute. Ipsum ergo propheticum lumen, quo mens Prophetæ illustratur, a Deo originaliter procedit; sed tamen ad ejus congruam suscepitionem mens humana angelico lumine comfortatur, et quodammodo præparatur. Cum enim lumen divinum sit simplicisimum et universalissimum in virtute, non est proportionatum ad hoc quod ab anima humana in statu viæ percipiatur, nisi quodammodo contrahatur et specificetur per conjunctionem ad lumen angelicum, quod est magis contractum, et humanæ menti magis proportionatum. Sed ipsa formatio specierum in imaginativa virtute proprie Angelis est attri- 1 Dei Sermo sit hoc, quod eas (animas) retributionis certitudine inter desideria confirmat. buenda, eo quod tota corporalis creatura administratur per creaturam spiritualem, ut Augustinus probat in III De Trinit., cap. iv. Vis autem imaginativa utitur organo corporali; unde specierum formatio in ipsa ad ministerium proprie pertinet Angelorum.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, verbum illud Augustini referendum est ad visionem patriæ, vel ad visionem raptus, non ad visionem propheticam.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod prophetia inter dona Spiritus sancti computatur ratione luminis prophetici; quod quidem a Deo infunditur immediate, quamvis ad ejus congruam receptionem cooperetur ministerium Angelorum.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod illud quod fit a creatura propria virtute, est quodammodo naturale; sed quod fit a creatura non propria virtute, sed inquantum est mota a Deo, vel ut quoddam divinæ operationis instrumentum, est supernaturale; unde prophetia, quæ habet ortum ab Angelo secundum naturalem Angeli cognitionem, est prophetia naturalis; sed illa quæ habet ortum ab Angelo, secundum quod Angelus revelationem a Deo accipit, est supernaturalis.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod Angelus neque lumen in intellectu humano creat, neque species in vi imaginativa; sed operatione Angeli lumen naturale in intellectu humano divinitus comfortatur, et secundum hoc hominem Angelus illuminare dicitur; ex hoc etiam quod Angelus habet potestatem commovere organum phantasiæ, potest visionem imaginativam formare, secundum quod competit Prophetæ.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod actio non attributur instrumento, sed principali agenti; sicut scamnum non dicitur effectus serræ, sed carpentarii; et similiter cum Angelus non sit causa revelationis propheticæ nisi sicut instrumentum divinum per revelationem a Deo perceptam, prophetia non debet dici revelatio angelica, sed divina.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod sapientia divina in animam se transferens, aliquos effectus facit non mediante ministerio Angelorum, sicut gratiae infusionem, per quam quis amicus Dei constituitur. Nihil autem prohibet quin quosdam alios effectus faciat prædicto ministerio mediante; et sic in animas sanctas se transferens, Prophetas constituit Angelo mediante.\n\nNono quæritur utrum semper quando Propheta a spiritu prophetiæ tangitur, a sensibus alienetur; et videtur quod sic. Quia dicitur Num. xii, 64: Si quis fuerit inter vos Propheta Domini, in somnio et visione loquar ad eum. Sed, ut dicit Glossa in principio Psalterii, Super prologum Hieron. Psalterio præfixum, tunc fit prophetia per somnia et visiones quando fit per ea quæ videntur dici vel fieri. Cum autem apparent ea quæ videntur dici vel fieri, et non dicuntur vel fiunt, homo est a sensibus abstractus. Ergo visio prophetia semper est in Propheta a sensu abstracto.\n\n2. Præterea, quando una virtus multum intenditur in sua operatione, oportet aliam a sua operatione abstrahi. Sed in visione prophetia interiores vires in suis operationibus intenduntur, scilicet intellectus et imaginatio, cum hoc sit perfectissimum ad quod pervenire possint secundum statum viæ. Ergo in visione prophetica semper Propheta ab operatione exteriorum virium abstrahitur.\n\n3. Præterea, intellectualis visio est nobilior quam imaginaria, et hæc quam corporalis. Sed permixtio ignobilioris detrahit aliquid de perfectione nobilioris. Ergo visio intellectualis et imaginaria, quando visioni corporali non permiscentur, sunt perfectiores. Cum igitur in prophetica visione ad summam perfectionem perveniatur secundum statum viæ, videtur quod tunc nullo modo corporali visioni permisceantur, ut scilicet Propheta cum eis simul corporali visione utatur.\n\n4. Præterea, plus distat sensus ab intellectu et imaginatione quam ratio inferior a superiori. Sed consideratio superioris rationis, qua intenditur æternis contemplandis, abstrahit hominem a consideratione inferioris rationis, qua homo temporalibus inhæret. Ergo multo 1 fortius visio intellectualis et imaginaria prophetia abstrahunt a visione corporali.\n\n5. Præterea, una et eadem vis non potest pluribus intendere. Sed quando aliquis sensibus corporalibus utitur, ejus intellectus et imaginatio illis rebus intendit quæ corporaliter videntur. Ergo simul cum hoc non potest intendere illis quæ apparent absque sensibus corporis in prophetica visione. 1. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Cor. xiv, 32: Spiritus Prophetarum Prophetis subjecti sunt. Hoc autem non esset, si Propheta esset a sensibus alienatus; quia sic non esset sui ipsius compos. Ergo prophetia non fit in homine alienato a sensibus.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod prophetia habet duos actus: unum principalem, scilicet visionem: alium secundarium, scilicet denuntiationem. Denuntatio autem fit a Propheta vel verbis, vel etiam factis; sicut patet Hierem. xiii, quod lumbare suum posuit juxta fluvium ad putrescendum. Utrolibet autem modo denuntiatio prophetica fiat, semper fit ab homine non abstracto a sensibus, quia hujusmodi denuntiatio per signa quædam sensibilia fit. Unde Prophetam denuntiantem oportet sensibus uti ad hoc quod ejus denuntiatio sit perfecta; alias denuntiaret quasi arreptus. Sed quantum ad visionem prophetia duo concurrunt, ut ex diciis patet, art. vii; scilicet judicium, et acceptio propria prophetia. Quando igitur Propheta inspiratur divinitus, ut sit tantum judicium ejus supernaturale, et non acceptio, tunc talis inspiratio abstractionem a sensibus non requirit; quia judicium intellectus naturaliter est perfectius in utente sensibus quam in non utente. Acceptio autem supernaturalis propria Prophetæ, est secundum imaginariam visionem, ad quam visionem inspiciendam rapitur vis humana ab aliquo spiritu, et a sensibus abstrahitur, ut Augustinus dicit, XII Super Gen. ad litteram, cap. ix. Cujus ratio est, quia vis imaginaria, dum quis utitur sensibus, principaliter est intenta his quæ per sensus accipiuntur; unde non potest esse quod intentio ejus principaliter transferatur ad ea quæ aliunde accipiuntur, nisi quando homo est a sensu abstractus. Unde quandocumque fit prophetia secundum imaginariam visionem, oportet a sensibus abstractum esse Prophetam. Sed hæc abstractio dupliciter contingit: uno modo ex causa animali; alio modo ex causa naturali. A causa quidem naturali quando exteriores sensus stupescunt vel propter ægritudinem, vel propter vapores somnia ad cerebrum ascendentes, ex quibus contingit organum tactus immobilitari. Ex causa vero animali, sicut quando homo ex nimia attentione ad intellectualia vel imaginabilia omnino a sensibus exteriobus abstrahitur. Nunquam autem fit in Propheta abstractio a sensibus corporalibus per ægritudinem, sicut fit in epilepticis vel furiosis; sed solummodo per causam naturalem ordinatam, scilicet per somnium. Et ideo prophetia quæ fit cum visione imaginaria, semper fit vel in somnio, quando scilicet est abstractio a sensibus per causam naturalem ordinatam, vel in visione, quando fit abstractio a causa animali. In hoc tamen differt Propheta 2 in sua abstractione a sensibus, sive abstrahatur per somnium, sive per visionem, ab omnibus aliis qui abstrahuntur a sensibus, quod mens Prophetæ illustratur de his quæ in visione imaginaria videntur, quoniam 3 cognoscit ea non esse res, sed aliqualiter rerum similitudines, de quibus certum judicium 1 Sic B. 2 habet per lumen mentis. Sic igitur patet quod Prophetæ inspiratio quando fit cum abstractione a sensibus, quandoque non: unde ad utrasque rationes est respondendum.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod in verbis illis Dominus intendit ostendere praeeminentiam Moysi ad alios Prophetas quantum ad acceptionem supernaturalem, quia scilicet Moyses supernaturaliter ad hoc promotus est ut ipsam Dei essentiam in se ipsa videret; sed omnia quæ Prophetæ acceperunt, non acceperunt nisi in similitudinibus somnii vel visionis. Sed tamen judicium Prophetæ non est per similitudines aliquas somnii et visionis; unde judicium prophetæ fit sine abstractione a sensibus.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod quando vis interior intenditur in visione sui objecti, abstrahitur, si sit perfecta attentio, ab exteriori visione. Sed quantumcumque sit perfectum judicium interioris virtutis, non abstrahit ab operatione exteriori, quia ad interiorem virtutem pertinet de exteriori judicare; unde judicium superioris in idem ordinatur cum operatione exteriori; et ideo non mutuo se impediunt.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de intellectuali visione et imaginaria, secundum acceptionem, et non secundum judicium, ut dictum est, in corp. art.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod ex hoc ipso potentiæ animæ mutuo se in suis operationibus impediunt, quod in una essentia animæ sunt fundatæ; unde quanto aliquæ vires animæ sunt sibi magis propinquæ, tanto magis natæ sunt se impedire, si ad diversa ferantur; unde ratio non sequitur.\n\nDecimo quæritur utrum prophetia convenienter dividatur in prophetiam prædestinationis, præscientiæ, et comminationis; et videtur quod non. Quia Glossa in principio Psalterii, Super prologum Hieron. Psalterio præfixum, dividit prophetiam, dicens quod alia est secundum præscientiam, quam necesse est omnibus modis impleri secundum tenorem verborum, ut est illa: Ecce virgo concipiet; alia secundum comminationem, ut: Adhuc quadraginata dies, et Ninive subvertetur; quae non secundum verborum superficiem, sed tacitæ intelligentiæ significatione completur. Ergo videtur super fluere tertium membrum, quod Hieronymus apponit, ibidem, et in Glossa ordin. Matth. 1, scilicet de prophetia secundum prædestinationem.\n\n2. Præterea, illud quod sequitur omnem prophetiam, non debet poni ut membrum dividens prophetiam. Sed omnem prophetiam consequitur esse secunpræscientiam divinam: quia, ut Glossa dicit, Isa. xxxviii, super illud: Dispone domui tuæ, ex Greg., «Prophetæ in libro præscientiae legunt. » Ergo prophetia secundum præscientiam non debet poni membrum dividens prophetiam. Cf. notulam ad 1. argum. art. vi hujus quæst.\n\n3. Præterea, cum præscientia sit superius ad prædestinationem, quasi in ejus definitione posita, non potest præscientia contra prædestinationem dividi, nisi quantum ad ea in quibus præscientia prædestinationem excedit. Sed præscientia excedit prædestinationem in malis: quia de eis est præscientia, et non prædestination; de bonis vero prædestination et præscientia. Ergo cum dicitur quod prophetia alia est secundum prædestinationem, alia secundum præscientiam, hoc est dictu, alia est de bonis, alia de malis. Sed bona et mala indifferenter ex libero arbitrio dependent. Ergo nulla differentia est quam assignat Hieronymus inter has duas prophetias, dicens in Glossa ord. super illud Matth. 1: Ecce virgo concipiet, « prophetiam prædestinationis esse quæ sine nostro impletur arbitrio; prophetiam vero secundum præscientiam, cui nostrum admiscetur arbitrium. »\n\n4. Præterea, prædestination, ut dicit Augustinus, est de bonis salutaribus. Sed inter bona salutaria nostra merita computantur, quæ ex libero arbitrio dependent. Ergo prophetia secundum prædestinationem nostrum admiscetur arbitrium; et sic Hieronymus male distinguit.\n\n5. Præterea, in prophetia non possunt considerari nisi tria: scilicet a quo est, in quo est, et de quo est. Sed penes illud a quo est, non distinguitur; quia omnis prophetia est ab uno principio, scilicet Spiritu sancto: nec iterum penes id in quo est, quia prophetia subjectum est humanus spiritus; ea autem de quibus est prophetia, non sunt nisi bona vel mala. Ergo prophetia non debet dividi nisi divisione bimenbri.\n\n6. Præterea, Hieronymus dicit quod illa prophetia: Ecce virgo concipiet, est secundum prædestinationem. Sed ad impletionem prophetia liberum arbitrium se immiscuit in Virginis assensu. Ergo prophetia secundum prædestinationem habet liberum arbitrium admixtum; et sic non differt a prophetia quæ est secundum præscientiam.\n\n7. Præterea, omnis enuntiatio de futuro quod nescitur esse futurum, vel est falsa, vel saltem dubia annuntianti. Sed per prophetiam comminationis prædicitur aliquid esse futurum, utpote destructionem alicujus civitatis. Cum ergo hæc denuntiatio non sit falsa, nec dubia, quia in Spiritum sanctum, qui est prophetia auctor, nec falsitas nec dubitatio cadit; oportet hoc futurum esse ad minus a Spiritu sancto præscitum. Ergo prophetia secundum comminationem non distinguitur a prophetia secundum præscientiam.\n\n8. Præterea, cum aliquid prædicitur secundum prophetiam comminationis; aut illa prædictio est intelligenda sine conditione, aut sub conditione. Si sub conditione, hoc non dicitur competere prophetia quæ in quadam supernaturali cognitione consistit: futura enim præcognoscere quibusdam conditionibus stantibus, etiam naturalis ratio potest. Ergo oportet ut sine conditione intelligatur. Aut igitur prophetia est falsa, aut eveniet quod prædicitur; et sic oportet a Deo esse præscitum. Ergo prophetia comminationis non debet distinguui contra prophetia præscientia.\n\n9. Præterea, Hierem. xvii, similis regula ponitur de divinis comminationibus et promissionibus adimplendis: quia scilicet comminationes revocantur, quando gens contra quam est facta comminationo pœnitentiam agit a malis; similiter promissio deficit, quando gens cui facta est justitiam derelinquit. Ergo sicut ponit prophetiam comminationis quoddam membrum prophetia, ita debet ponere quartum membrum prophetiam promissionis.\n\n10. Præterea, Isa. xxxviii, 4, Isaias prophetice dixit ad Ezechiam: Dispone domui tuæ, quia morieris. Hæc autem prophetia non est secundum prædestinationem, quia illam necesse est impleri omnibus modis sine nostro arbitrio: nec iterum secundum præscientiam, quia hoc futurum Deus non præsciebat, alias præscientia subesset falsum: nec iterum secundum comminationem, quia sine conditione prædicebatur futurum. Ergo oportet esse aliquod quartum genus prophetia. 11. Sed diceres quod hoc prædicebatur esse futurum secundum causas inferiores, et sic erat prophetia comminationis. — Sed contra: causæ inferiores mortis hominis aegrotantis, possunt homini esse notæ secundum artem medicinæ. Si igitur hoc non prædixit Isaias futurum nisi secundum causas inferiores, vel non prophetice prædixit, vel prophetica prædictio non differt a medici prædictione, quod falsum est.\n\n12. Præterea, omnis prophetia est de rebus, vel intuendo causas superiores, vel intuendo inferiores. Si ergo prædicta prophetia intelligitur conditionalis, quia est secundum aliquas causas, scilicet inferiores; pari ratione omnis prophetia conditionalis est; et sic omnis prophetia erit ejusdem rationis cum comminatoria.\n\n13. Præterea, prophetia comminationis quamvis non impleatur secundum superficiem verborum, impletur tamen tacitæ intelligentiæ significatione, ut Cassiodorus dicit in Prologo super Psal., et refertur in Glossa ordin. præfixa Psalterio; sicut quod dictum est per Jonam: Ninive subvertetur, impletum est, secundum Augustinum in lib. De civitate Dei XXI, cap. xxiv, a med.: quia « quamvis Ninive steterit in mœnibus, corruit tamen pravis moribus. » Sed hoc etiam invenitur in prophetia prædestina-tionis et præscientiæ, quod non impleatur secundum exteriorem verborum superficiem, sed secundum spiritualem sensum: sicut quod dictum est Isa. LIV, II: Fundabo Hierusalem, et Daniel 2, 45: Lapis abscissus de monte sine manibus confregit statuam; et multa alia hujusmodi. Ergo prophetia comminationis non debet distingui contra prophetiam præscientiæ et prædestinationis.\n\n14. Præterea, si alicui demonstrentur aliquæ futurorum similitudines, non dictur Propheta, nisi intelligat ea quæ per illas significantur; sicut Pharao non est dictus Propheta, quia spicas et boves vidit: intelligentia enim opus est in visione, ut dicitur Daniel. x, 4. Sed illi per quos comminationes divinæ fiunt, intelligunt tantum hoc quod proponunt secundum verborum superficiem; non autem illuminantur de his quæ per illa significantur: sicut patet de Jona, qui intellexit Ninive materialiter subvertendam; unde ea non subversa, sed correcta, doluit, quasi sua prophetia non esset impleta. Ergo Propheta ex hoc dici non debuit; et sic comminatio nec debet poni prophetiæ species; unde videtur prædicta distinctio nulla esse. Sed contrarium apparet ex Glossa ord. quæ habetur super illud Matth. I: Ecce virgo concipiet; ubi prædicta divisio ponitur et explanatur.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod prophetia a divina præscientia derivatur, ut supra dic-tum est. Sciendum est autem quod Deus alio modo præscit futura ab aliis qui futura præcognoscunt. Circa futurorum enim cognitionem duo est considerare; scilicet ipsum ordinem causarum ad futuros effectus, et exitum sive executionem hujus ordinis in hoc quod effectus actu procedunt ex suis causis. Quæcumque igitur virtus creata aliquam cognitionem habet de futuris, sua cognitio non fertur nisi ad ordinem causarum; sicut medicus secundum hoc dicitur futuram mortem præscire, inquantum scit naturalia principia esse ordinata ad defectum mortis; et eodem modo astrologus dicitur præcognoscere futuras pluvias aut ventos. Unde, si sint tales causæ quorum effectus impediri possunt, non semper evenit quod sic præscitur esse futurum. Sed Deus non solum cognoscit futura ratione ordinis causarum; sed etiam quantum ad ipsum exitum, vel executionem ordinis. Cujus ratio est quia ejus intuitus aternitate mensuratur, quæ omnia tempora in uno nunc indivisibili comprehendit; unde uno simplici intuitu videt et ad quid causæ sunt ordinatæ, et qualiter ordo ille impleatur. Hoc autem creaturæ est imposibile, cujus intuitus limitatur ad aliquod tempus determinatum; unde cognoscit illa quæ sunt illo tempore; futura vero in tempore quando adhuc sunt futura, non sunt nisi in ordine suarum causarum; unde sic solummodo a nobis præcognosci possunt: ut recte considerantibus appareat, in hoc quod futura præscire dicimur, etiam magis præsentium quam futurorum scientiam habere; et sic remaneat solius Dei proprium vere scire futura. Quandoque igitur a divina præscientia derivatur prophetia ratione ordinis causarum; quando vero ratione executionis vel impletonis illius ordinis. Cum ergo fit prophetia revelatio solummodo de ordine causarum, dicitur prophetia comminationis; tunc enim nihil aliud Prophetæ revelatur nisi quod secundum ea quæ nunc sunt, talis ad hoc vel illud est ordinatus. Impletio vero ordinis causarum fit dupliciter. Quandoque quidem ex sola operatione divinæ virtutis, ut suscitatio Lazari, et conceptio Christi, et hujusmodi; et secundum hoc est prophetia prædestinationis; quia, ut dicit Damascenus, lib. II Orth. fidei, capit. xxx, Pat. Non, ut in Parm. cap. III. græc. lat. t. XCIV, col.971, ea quæ Deus prædestinat, non sunt in nobis; unde et prædestinatio quasi quædam Dei præparatio dicitur. Hoc autem aliquis præparat quod facturus est ipse, non quod alius. Quædam vero explentur operatione causarum aliarum sive naturalium sive voluntariarum; et hæc, inquantum per alias causas complentur, non sunt prædestinata, sunt tamen præscita; unde horum dicitur esse prophetia secundum præscientiam. Quia tamen præscientia propter homines fit; circa ea quæ per homines fiunt libero arbitrio, præcipue prophetia præscientia consistit. Unde prætermissis aliis causis creatis, Hieronymus, in Glossa ordin. super illud Matth. i: Ecce virgo concipiet prophetiam præscientia notificans, de solo libero arbitrio mentionem facit.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod ista trimembris divisio quam Hieronymus ponit reducitur ad bimembrem, ut dictum est; quia quædam respicit ordinem causarum, quædam autem exitum ordinis; et in hac divisione Cassiodorus stetit; Hieronymus vero alterum membrorum subdivisit: et ita Cassiodorus duo membra divisionis posuit; Hieronymus autem tria. Præscientiam etiam Cassiodorus accepit secundum sui communitatem: est enim de omnibus existentibus, sive virtute creata sive increata fiant; sed Hieronymus accepit præscientiam secundum quamdam restrictionem, prout est de illis tantum de quibus non est prædestinatio, per se loquendo, scilicet de his quæ virtute creata provenient.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod omnis prophetia divinam præscientiam habet quasi radicem. Sed cum in divina præscientia sit cognitio ordinis et eventus; quædam prophetia derivatur ex una parte, quædam ex alia. Præscientia vero Dei, secundum hoc proprie præscientia nomen habet, quod ad eventum respicit qui futurus est; ordo enim ad eventum est in præsenti; unde de eo magis est scientia quam præscientia: et sic illa prophetia quæ ordinem respicit, non dicitur secundum præscientiam, sed solum illa quæ est secundum eventum.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod præscientia hic accipitur contra prædestinationem divisa, quantum ad ea in quibus præscientia prædestinationem excedit; non autem excedit præscientia prædestinationem in malis solum, si prædestinatio stricte accipiatur; sed etiam in omnibus bonis, quæ non fiunt sola virtute divina; unde ratio non sequitur.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod meritum nostrum est et ex gratia et ex libero arbitrio; non autem subjacet prædestinationi nisi secundum quod est ex gratia, quæ a solo Deo est; unde id quod ex nostro arbitrio est, prædestinationi subesse dicitur per accidens.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod prophetia hic distinguitur secundum ea de quibus est, non quidem secundum bona et mala; quia hujusmodi differentiæ per accidens se habent ad futurum quod per prophetiam cognoscitur; sed secundum quod est de ordine vel de exitu ordinis, ut dictum est, in corp. art.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod ad Christi conceptionem intervenit consensus Virginis, non quasi operans, sed sicut impedimentum removens; non enim invitæ tantum beneficium præstari debebat.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod aliquid potest dici esse futurum non solum ex hoc quod ita erit, sed quia ita est ordinatum in causis suis ut sic sit futurum; sic enim medicus dicit: Iste sanabitur et iste morietur; et si aliter contingat, non falsum dicit; sic enim tunc futurum erat ex ordine causarum, quod tamen possibile est impediri: et tunc quod prius futurum fuerat, consequenter non erit futurum; unde Philosophus dicit in II De generat., comm. Lxiv, quod « futurus quis incedere, non incedet; » et secundum hoc denuntiatio Prophetæ comminautis nec falsa est nec dubia, quamvis non eveniat quod prædixit.\n\nAd octavum dicendum quod si prophetia comminationis referatur ad ordinem causarum quem directe respicit, sic est absque omni conditione; absolute enim est ita ordinatum esse in causis ut hoc contingat. Si autem referatur ad eventum quem respicit indirecte; sic intelligenda est sub conditione causæ; et tamen supernaturalis est, quia naturali cognitione non potest sciri etiam causa existente, utpote iniquitate remanente, quod talis poena vel talis determinate secundum divinam justitiam debeatur.\n\nAd nonum dicendum quod sub prophetia comminationis intelligitur prophetia promissionis, quia de eis est eadem ratio. Ideo tamen magis exprimitur de prophetia comminationis, quia frequentius inventur revocata comminatio quam promissio; Deus enim pronior est ad miserendum quam ad puniendum.\n\nAd decimum dicendum quod prophetia illa fuit secundum comminationem; et quamvis non esset conditio explicite proposita, est tamen illa denuntiatio sub implicita conditione intelligenda, scilicet tali ordine rerum remanente.\n\nAd undecimum dicendum quod causæ inferiores non solum sunt causæ naturales quas medici præcognoscere possunt, sed etiam causæ meritoriae, quæ ex sola divina revelatione cognoscuntur. Causæ etiam naturales salutis vel mortis multo perfectius divina revelatione quam humano ingenio cognosci possunt.\n\nAd duodecimum dicendum quod causæ superiores, quæ sunt rerum rationes in divina præscientia, nunquam deficiunt ab impletione suorum effectuum, sicut deficiunt causæ inferiores; et ideo in causis superioribus cognoscuntur rerum eventus absolute, sed in inferioribus non nisi sub conditione.\n\nAd decimum tertium dicendum quod in prophetia prædestinationis et præscientia quamvis proponatur veritas adimplenda sub aliquibus similitudinibus, tamen ratione illarum similitudinum non attenditur aliquis sensus litteralis; sed litteralis sensus attenditur secundum ea quæ per similitudines significantur, sicut in omnibus mediate significatis acci-dit; unde in talibus prophetiis nulla veritas inventur quantum ad similitudines, sed solum quantum ad ea quæ per similitudines significantur. Sed in prophetia comminationis sensus litteralis verborum Prophetæ attenditur secundum illas similitudines rerum quæ eveniunt, quia similitudines illæ non tantum proponuntur ut similitudines, sed ut res quædam; unde et illud quod eveniet, significatum per hujusmodi similitudines, non pertinet ad sensum litteralem, sed ad sensum mysticum; sicut cum dicitur: Ninive sub-vertetur, subversio materialis pertinet ad sensum litteralem; sed subversio a pravis moribus pertinet ad moralem: et in ipso sensu litterali attenditur aliqua veritas ratione ordinis causarum, ut dictum est.\n\nAd decimum quartum dicendum quod in somnio Pharaonis spicæ illæ et boves non demonstrabantur ut res quædam, sed solum ut similitudines; et ideo Pharao, qui solum illas similitudines vidit, non habuit alicujus rei intellectum; propter hoc Propheta non fuit. Sed Jonæ, cui dictum est: Ninive subvertetur, ade-rat intelligentia alicujus rei, scilicet ordinis meritorum ad subversionem, etsi forte alterius rei, scilicet subversionis, præscius non fuerit; unde quantum ad hoc quod non intelligebat, Propheta non fuit. Sciebat tamen Jonas, et Prophetæ comminantes, prophetiam quam prædiceant, non esse secundum præscien-tiam, sed secundum comminationem: unde dicitur Jonæ ult. 2: Propter hoc præoccupavi ut fugerem in Tharsis; scio enim quod tu clemens et misericors es.\n\nUndecimo quæritur utrum in prophetia inventur immobilis veritas; et videtur quod non. Cum enim immobilis veritas in definitione prophetia ponatur; si prophetia conveniat, oportet ut per se ei conveniat. Sed futura contingentia, de quibus est prophetia, per se non sunt immobilia, sed solum secundum quod ad præscientiam divinam referuntur, ut dicit Boetius, lib. V De cons., prosa ult. a med., Ergo tmmobilis veritas non debet assignari prophetia quasi in ejus definitione posita.\n\n2. Præterea, illud quod non impletur nisi aliqua variabili conditione existente, non habet immobilem veritatem. Sed aliqua prophetia est, scilicet comminationis, quæ non impletur nisi variabili conditione existente, scilicet perseverantia malitiæ vel iniquitatis, ut habetur Hierem. xviii. Ergo non omnis prophetia habet immobilem veritatem.\n\n3. Præterea, Isai. xxxviii, dicit Glossa super illud: Dispone domui tuæ, quod Deus Prophetis revelat suam sententiam, sed non consilium. Sententia autem ejus est variabilis, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo prophetia non habet immobilem veritatem. Futura quæ ex arbitrii libertate proveniunt, ad intuitum relata divinum, necessaria fiunt, per se vero considerata ab absoluta naturæ suæ libertate non desinunt. »\n\n4. Præterea, si prophetia habet immobilem veritatem; aut hoc est ex parte Prophetæ videntis, aut ex parte rei quæ videtur, aut ex parte speculi a terni a quo videtur. Non autem ex parte videntis, quia humana cognitio variabilis est; nec ex parte rei visæ, quæ contingens est; nec ex parte divinæ præscientia, sive speculi; quia per hoc necessitas rei non imponitur. Ergo prophetia nullo modo habet immobilem veritatem. 5. Sed diceres quod divina præscientia non imponit necessitatem quin aliter evenire possit, sed tamen aliter eveniet quod præscitur; et hoc modo prophetia habet immobilem veritatem. Immobile enim dicitur, secundum Philosophum, V Phys., text. xx, quod non potest moveri, vel quod difficile movetur, vel quod non movetur. — Sed contra: posito possibili, nihil sequitur imposibile. Si igitur possibile est id quod est præscitum et prophetatum, aliter se habere; si ponatur aliter se habere, nullum sequetur imposibile. Sequitur autem prophetiam habere mobilem veritatem. Ergo etc.\n\n6. Præterea, veritas propositionis sequitur conditionem rei; quia ex eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est, ut dicit Philosophus in Prædicamento de substantia, non procul a fin. Sed res de quibus est prophetia, sunt contingentes et mutabiles. Ergo prophetica denuntiatio habet mobilem veritatem.\n\n7. Præterea, effectus denominatur necessarius vel contingens a causa proxima, non a prima. Sed causæ proximæ rerum de quibus est prophetia, sunt causæ mobiles; quamvis causa prima sit immutabilis. Ergo prophetia non habet immobilem, sed mobilem veritatem.\n\n8. Præterea, si prophetia habet immobilem veritatem, imposibile est aliquid esse prophetatum, et illud non fieri. Sed quod est prophetatum, imposibile est non esse prophetatum. Ergo si prophetia habet immobilem veritatem, necesse est evenire illud quod prophetatum est; et sic prophetia erit de futuris contingentibus.\n\nSed contra est quod dicitur in Glossa in principio Psalterii, ordin. in Prologum præfixum Psalterio: « Prophetia est divina inspiratio vel revelatio, rerum eventus immobili veritate denuntians. » Præterea, prophetia est divinæ præscientia signum, ut dicit Hieronymus, loco nunc dicto, Matth. 1, super illud: Ecce virgo concipiet. Sed præscita, inquantum subsunt præscientia, sunt necessaria. Ergo et prophetata, inquantum de illis est prophetia; ergo prophetia habet immobilem veritatem de rebus mobilibus. Præterea, scientia Dei potest esse immobilis de rebus mobilibus, quia a rebus ortum non habet. Sed similiter cognitio prophetica non sumitur a rebus ipsis. Ergo prophetia habet immobilem veritatem de rebus mobilibus.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod in prophetia est duo considerare; scilicet ipsas res prophetatas, et cognitionem quæ de illis habetur; et horum duorum invenitur diversus ordo originis. Ipsæ enim res prophetatæ sunt immediate a causis mobilibus sicut a causa proxima, sed a causa immobilii sicut a causa remota; cognitio vero prophetica e converso est a divina præscientia sicut a causa proxima, a rebus vero prophetatis non dependet sicut a causa proxima, sed solum sicut earum signum. Omnis autem effectus in necessitate et contingentia sequitur causam proximam, et non causam primam; unde res ipsæ prophetatæ mobiles sunt; sed prophetica cognitio est immobilis, sicut et divina præscientia, a qua derivatur ut exemplatum ab exemplari. Sicut enim ex hoc quod veritas intellectus est necessaria, sequitur quod enuntiatio, quæ est signum intellectus, habeat necessariam veritatem; ita ex hoc ipso quod divina præscientia est immobilis, sequitur quod prophetia, quæ est signum ejus, immobilem habeat veritatem. Quomodo autem præscientia Dei possit esse immobiliter vera de rebus mobilibus, dictum est in alia quaestione de scientia Dei, art. xiii; unde non oportet hoc repete; cum immobilitas prophetia tota dependeat ex immobilitate divinæ præscientia.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid inesse per accidens alicui secundum se sumpto, quod eidem per se inest addito alio; sicut homini per accidens inest moveri, per se vero homini inquantum est currens: sic etiam et huic rei quæ prophetatur, non per se competit esse immobilem, sed solum inquantum est prophetata; unde convenient in definitione prophetia ponitur. Non est exactissime Cassiodori, ut videre est, XIV.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod prophetia comminationis omnino habet immobilem veritatem; non enim est de eventibus rerum, sed de ordine causarum ad eventus, ut dictum est, art. praeced. ad vIII argum.; et hunc ordinem esse quem Prophetaprædicit, necessarium est, quamvis eventus quando non sequatur.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod consilium Dei dicitur ipsa æterna Dei dispositio, quæ nunquam variatur; propter quod dicit Gregorius, Moral., lib. XVI, cap. XXVII, quod ' Deus nunquam mutat consilium. Sententia vero dicitur hoc ad quod aliquæ causæ ordinatæ sunt. Sententiæ autem in judiciis ex causarum meritis proferuntur. Quandoque autem hoc ad quod causæ sunt ordinata, est a Deo ab æterno dispositum; et tunc idem est Dei-consilium et sententia: quandoque vero ad aliquid ordinatæ sunt causæ, quod non est a Deo ab æterno dispositum; et tunc Dei consilium et sententia feruntur ad diversa. Ergo ex parte sententiæ, quæ respicit causas inferiores, inventur mutabilitas; sed ex parte consilii inventur semper immutabilitas. Prophetæ vero revelatur quandoque sententia consilio conformis; et tunc prophetia habet immobilem veritatem etiam quantum ad eventum; quandovero revelatur sententia non conformis consilio; et tunc habet immobilem veritatem quantum ad ordinem, et non quantum ad eventum, ut dictum est.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod immobiletas prophetia est ex parte speculi æterni; non quod rebus prophetatis necessitatem imponat; sed quia prophetiam facit necessariam esse de rebus contingentibus, sicut et ipsa est.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod posito quod aliquod sit secundum præscientiam prophetatum, quamvis illud non esse in se sit possibile, tamen incompossibile est posito hoc, scilicet quod dicitur esse præscitum; quia ex hoc ipso quod ponitur præscitum, ponitur ita futurum esse, cum præscientia ipsum eventum respiciat.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod veritas propositionis sequitur conditionem rei, quando scientia veritatem proponentis ex rebus oritur. Sic autem non est in proposito.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod quamvis rei prophetatæ causa proxima sit mobilis, tamen ipsius prophetia causa proxima est immobilis, ut dictum est, in corp. art.; et ideo ratio non sequitur.\n\nAd octavum dicendum quod prophetatum non evenire habet simile judicium, sicut et præscitum non evenire. Quod qualiter debeat concedi et qualiter debeat negari, dictum est in quæstione de scientia Dei, art. xIII.\n\nDuodecimo quæritur utrum prophetia quæ est secundum visionem intellectualem tantum sit eminentior ea quæ habet visionem intellectualem simul cum imaginaria; et videtur quod non. Quia illa prophetia quæ habet intellectualem visionem cum imaginaria, includit eam quæ habet intellectualem tantum. Ergo visio prophetica quæ habet utramque, est potior illa quæ habet unam tantum; quod enim includit aliquid, excedit illud quod ab eo includitur.\n\n2. Præterea, quanto in aliqua prophetia est abundantius lumen intellectuale, tanto perfectior est. Sed ex plenitudine intellectualis luminis contingit quod sit redundantia in prophetia ab intellectu in imaginationem, ut ibi formetur imaginaria visio. Ergo perfectior est prophetia quæ habet imaginarium visionem adjunctam, quam illa quæ habet intellectualem tantum.\n\n3. Præterea, de Joanne Baptista dicitur Matth. xI, quod ipse est Propheta, et plus quam Propheta. Hoc autem dicitur inquantum Christum non solum intellectualiter vel imaginarie vidit, ut alii Propheta, sed etiam corporaliter digito demonstravit. Ergo prophetia cui admisctur corporalis visio, est nobilissima; et eadem ratione illa cui adjungitur visio imaginaria, est nobilior illa quæ habet intellectualem tantum.\n\n4. Præterea, tanto est aliquid magis perfectum, quanto plenius in eo inventur differentiæ rationem speciei constituentes. Sed differentiæ constituentes prophetiam sunt visio et denuntiatio. 1 Cum exterius mutari videtur sententia, interius consilium non mutatur. Ergo illa prophetia quæ habet denuntiationem, videtur esse perfectior ea quæ non habet. Sed enuntiatio fieri non potest sine imaginaria visione; quia oportet eum qui denuntiat, habere imaginatos sermones. Ergo prophetia illa est perfectior quæ fit cum visione imaginaria et intellectuali.\n\n5. Præterea, I Corinth. xii, super illud: Spiritus autem loquitur mysteria, dicit Glossa in prologum D. Hieron. præfixum Psalterio: « Minus est Propheta qui rerum significatarum solo spiritu videt imagines; et magis est Propheta qui solo earum intellectu est præditus; sed maxime Propheta est qui in utrumque præcellit; » et sic idem quod prius.\n\n6. Præterea, prophetia, ut dicit Rabbi Moyses, inchoatur in intellectu, et perficitur in imaginatione. Ergo prophetia quæ habet imaginariam visionem, est perfectior quam quæ habet intellectualem tantum.\n\n7. Præterea, debilitas intellectualis luminis imperfectionem indicat prophetiæ. Sed ex debilitate intellectualis luminis videtur contingere quod visio prophetica non derivetur usque ad imaginationem. Ergo videtur quod illa prophetia quæ habet imaginariam visionem, sit perfectior.\n\n8. Præterea, majoris perfectionis est cognoscere rem aliquam ut in se est, et prout est alterius signum, quam cognoscere eam in se tantum. Ergo eadem ratione, perfectius est cognoscere aliquam rem ut est significata, quam cognoscere eam in se tantum. Sed in prophetia quæ habet imaginariam visionem cum intellectuali, cognoscitur res prophetata non solum in se, sed etiam prout est imaginibus designata. Ergo prophetia quæ habet imaginariam visionem, est nobilior ea quæ habet intellectualem tantum, in qua cognoscuntur res prophetatæ tantum in se, et non prout sunt signatæ.\n\n9. Præterea, sicut dicit Dionysius, cap. I Cœlest. hierarch., §ii, « Impossibile est nobis aliter superlucere divinum radium nisi sacrorum velaminum varietate velatum. » Velamina autem appellat figuras imaginarias, quibus puritas intellectualis luminis quasi velatur. Ergo in omni prophetia oportet esse imaginarias figuras, vel ab homine formatas, vel divinitus immissas. Nobiliores autem videntur esse immissæ divinitus quam formatæ ab homine. Ergo illa videtur esse nobilissima prophetia in qua simul divinitus infunditur lumen intellectuale, et figuræ imaginariæ.\n\n10. Præterea, ut dicit Hieronymus super lib. Reg., Prophetæ contra Agyographas distinguuntur. Sed illi quos nominat Prophetas, omnes, aut fere omnes, revelationem acceperunt sub figuris imaginativis; plures autem eorum quos inter Agyographas nominat, sine figuris revelationem acceperunt. Ergo magis proprie dicuntur Prophetæ illi quibus fit revelatio secundum visionem intellectualem et imaginariam, quam illi quibus fit secundum intellectualem tantum.\n\n11. Præterea, secundum Philosophum, II Metaph., com. 1, intellectus noster se habet ad primas rerum causas, quæ sunt maxime notæ in natura, sicut se habet oculus noctuæ ad lucem solis. Sed oculus noctuæ non potest inspicere solem nisi sub quadam obscuritate. Ergo et intellectus noster divina sub quadam obscuritate intelligit: ergo videtur quod sub aliquibus similitudinibus; et sic intellectualis visio non erit certior quam imaginaria, cum utraque sub similitudinibus' fiat. Unde videtur quod illa visio imaginaria intellectuali adjuncta nihil diminuat de ejus nobilitate; et sic illa prophetia quæ fit sub utraque visione, vel est dignior, vel ad minus æque digna.\n\n12. Præterea, sicut se habet imaginabile ad imaginationem, ita intelligibile ad intellectum. Sed imaginabile non apprehenditur ab imaginatione nisi mediante similitudine. Ergo nec intelligibile ab intellectu; et sic idem quod prius. 1. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Glossa in principio Psalterii, ut sup.: « Illius prophetia modus est ceteris dignior, quando scilicet ex sola Spiritus sancti inspiratione, remoto omni exteriori adminiculo facti vel dicti vel visionis vel somnii, prophetatur. » Illa vero prophetia quæ habet imaginarium visionem annexam, est cum adminiculo somnii vel visionis. Ergo prophetia quæ est cum visione intellectuali tantum, est nobilior.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod cum natura speciei consistat ex natura generis et natura differentiæ; ex utraque dignitas speciei potest pensari; et secundum has duas considerationes inventiuntur aliqua se invicem in dignitate excedere quando. Et quantum pertinet ad rationem speciei, semper illud participat perfectius speciei rationem in quo differentia formaliter speciem constituens nobilius inventur; sed simpliciter loquendo, quando est nobilius id in quo natura ge-neris est perfectior; quando vero id in quo est perfectius natura differentiæ. Cum enim natura differentiæ addit aliquam perfectionem supra generis naturam, praeeminentia quæ est ex parte differentiæ, facit aliquid esse simpliciter nobilius: sicut etiam in specie hominis, qui est animal rationale, simpliciter est dignior ille qui est potior in rationalitate, quam qui est potior in his quæ ad rationem animalis spectant, utpote sensus, et motus, et alia hujusmodi. Quando vero differentia aliquam imperfectionem importat, tunc id in quo est completius natura generis, est simpliciter nobilius; ut patet in fide, quæ est cognitio aenigma-tica, eorum scilicet quæ non videntur. Qui enim abundat in natura generis, et deficit in fidei differentia, utpote fidelis qui jam percipit aliquem intellectum credibilium, et quodammodo jam ea videt, habet simpliciter nobiliorem fidem eo qui minus cognoscit; et tamen quantum ad rationem fidei pertinet, magis proprie habet fidem ille qui omnino non videt illa quæ credit. Et sic etiam est in prophetia. Prophetia enim videtur esse cognitio obumbrata et obscuritati admixta, secundum id quod habetur II Petr. i: Habetis firmiorem propheticum sermonem, cui bene facitis attendentes, quasi lucernæ lucenti in caliginoso loco. Unde hoc etiam ipsum nomen prophetia demonstrat, quia propheta dicitur quasi visio de longinquo: quæ enim clare videntur, quasi de prope videntur. Si igitur comparemus prophetias quantum ad differentiam quæ rationem prophetia complet, illa inventur perfectius rationem prophetia habere, et magis proprie, cui imaginaria visio admiscetur; sic enim veritatis prophetia cognitio obumbratur. Si autem comparemus prophetias secundum id quod pertinet ad naturam generis, scilicet cognitionem vel visionem, sic videtur distinguendum. Cum enim omnis cognitio perfecta duo habeat, scilicet acceptanceem, et judicium de acceptis; judicium quidem de acceptis in prophetia est solum secundum intellectum; acceptio vero est et secundum intellectum, et secundum imaginationem. Quandoque igitur in prophetia non est aliqua supernaturalis acceptio, sed judicium tantum supernaturale; et sic solus intellectus illustratur sine aliqua imaginaria visione: ettalis forte fuit inspiratio Salomonis, inquantum de moribus hominum et naturis rerum, quæ naturaliter accipimus, divino instinctu ceteris certius judicavit. Quandoque vero est etiam acceptio supernaturalis; et hoc dupliciter: quia vel est acceptio ab imaginazione, utpote quando divinitus in spiritu Prophetæ rerum imagines formantur; vel est acceptio ab intellectu, utpote quando ita clare veritatis cognitio intellectui infunditur, ut non ex similitudine aliquarum imaginum veritatem accipiat, immo ex veritate jam perspecta ipse sibi imagines formare possit, quibus utatur propter naturam nostri intellectus. Non autem potest esse aliqua prophetia quæ habet acceptionem sine judicio; unde nec imaginariam visionem sine intellectuali. Sic igitur patet quod visio intellectualis pura, quæ habet judicium tantum sine aliqua acceptione supernaturali, est inferior ea quæ habet judicium et acceptionem imaginariam; illa vero intellectualis visio quæ habet judicium et acceptionem supernaturalem, est ea nobiliar quæ cum judicio habet acceptionem imaginariam. Et quantum ad hoc concedendum est, quod prophetia quæ habet visionem intellectualem tantum, est dignior ea quæ habet imaginariam adjunctam.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod quam vis illa prophetia quæ in utraque visione consistit, habeat etiam intellectualem visionem, non tamen includit illam prophetiam quæ sola in intellectuali visione consistit, eo quod illa habet intellectualem visionem excellentiorem quam ista; cum in illa intellectualis luminis perceptio sufficiat ad acceptionem et judicium, in hac vero ad judicium tantum.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod in utraque prophetia fit derivatio luminis prophetici ab intellectu ad imaginationem, sed diversimode: quia in illa prophetia quæ dicitur tantum visionem intellectualem habere, tota plenitudo propheticæ revelationis in intellectu percipitur, et exinde secundum intelligentis arbitrium in imaginativa congrue formantur imagines propter nostri intellectus naturam, qui sine phantasmatibus intelligere non potest; sed in alia prophetia non tota plenitudo propheticæ revelationis recipitur in intellectu, sed partim in intellectu quantum ad judicium, et partim in imaginativa quantum ad acceptionem. Unde in illa prophetia quæ visionem intellectualem tantum continet, est visio intellectualis plenior: ex defectu enim luminis recepti in intellectu contingit quod exinde quodammodo decidit quantum ad aliquid a puritate intelligibili in imaginarias figuras, sicut in somniis accidit.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod hoc quod Joannes Christum digito demonstravit, non pertinet ad visionem propheticam, prout nunc de prophetiae comparatione loquimur, sed magis ad denuntiationem. Hoc etiam quod Christum corporaliter vidit, non ei dedit prophetiam perfectioris rationis; sed fuit quoddam divinitus concessum amplius quam prophetia; unde dicitur Luc. x, 24: Multi Reges et Prophetæ voluerunt videre quæ vos videtis, et non viderunt.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod denuntiaio per verba vel facta communis est utrique; quia et prophetia quæ tantum visionem intellectualem habet, potest denuntiare secundum imagines quas ad libitum format.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod Glossa illa loquitur de eo qui secundum intellectual non habet nisi judicium de his quæ ab alio accipiuntur; sicut Joseph habuit solummodo judicium de his quæ a Pharaone sunt visa; non quod ipse acceperit quid esset futurum; et sic ratio concludit non de illa prophetia intellectualem visionem tantum habente, de qua nunc loquimur.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod in hoc Rabbi Moysi opinio non tenetur; ipse enim ponit quod prophetia David fuit inferior prophetiae Isaiæ vel Hieremiæ; cujus contrarium dicitur a Sanctis; habet tamen veritatem quantum ad aliquid ejus dictum, quia scilicet judicium non perficitur non propositis his de quibus est judicandum. Unde in illa prophetia in qua percipitur intellectuale lumen solummodo ad judicandum, est ipsum lumen, non determinatam cognitionem alicujus faciens, quousque apponantur aliqua de quibus est judicandum, vel a se vel ab alio accepta; et sic intellectualis visio perficitur per imaginarium, sicut commune determinatur per speciale.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod non semper contingit ex debilitate intellectualis luminis quod sit prophetia secundum visionem intellectualem tantum; sed quando propter acceptionem plenissinam intellectus ut dictum est, in corp., et ad 11 argum.; ideo ratio non sequitur.\n\nAd octavum dicendum quod signum, inquantum hujusmodi, est causa cognitionis; signatum vero est id quod est notum per aliud. Sicut autem nobilius cognoscitur id quod in se notum est et alia cognoscere facit eo quod tantum in se notum est; ita etiam e contrario id quod notum est per se, non per aliud, nobilius cognoscitur quam quod per aliud notum est, sicut principia conclusionibus; et ideo e contrario se habet de signo et signato; unde ratio non sequitur.\n\nAd nonum dicendum quod quamvis imagines impressæ divinitus sint nobiliores imaginibus per hominem formatis, tamen acceptio cognitionis quæ est in intellectu divinitus, est nobiliar illa acceptione quæ fit per imaginarias formas.\n\nAd decimum dicendum quod ideo specialiter Prophetæ nuncupantur in distinctione prædicta qui secundum imaginarias visiones prophetiam habuerunt, quia in eis inventur plenior ratio prophetia, etiam ratione differentiæ. Agyographæ autem dicuntur qui supernaturaliter solum visiones intellectuales habuerunt sive quantum ad judicium tantum, sive quantum ad judicium et acceptionem simul.\n\nAd undecimum dicendum quod quamvis intellectus noster intelligat divina per aliquas similitudines, tamen illæ sunt nobiliores, ex hoc quod sunt immateriales, quam similitudines imaginariæ; unde et visio intellectualis est nobiliar.\n\nAd duodecimum dicendum quod non potest esse quod aliqua res sit imaginabilis per suam essentiam, sicut per suam essentiam intelligibilis; imaginatio enim non est nisi de rebus materialibus. Nec tamen potest imaginatio aliquid recipere nisi sine materia; unde semper necesse est quod imaginatio sit alicujus non per essentiam suam, sed per suam similitudinem. Intellectus vero immaterialiter recipit, et eo cognoscuntur non solum materialia, sed immaterialia; unde et quædam cognoscuntur ab eo per essentiam, quædam autem per similitudinem.\n\nTertiodecimo quæritur utrum gradus prophetæ distinguantur secundum visionem imaginariam; et videtur quod sic. Nobiliar enim est prophetia ubi est nobiliar prophetatæ rei acceptio. Sed quando acceptio rei prophetatæ est per visionem imaginariam. Ergo possunt gradus prophetæ distinguui secundum 1 visionem imaginariam.\n\n2. Præterea, perfectius medium cognoscendi facit perfectiorem cognitionem; et exinde est scientia opinione perfectior. Sed similitudines imaginariæ sunt medium cognoscendi in prophetia. Ergo ubi est nobiliar imrginaria visio, est altior prophetia gradus.\n\n3. Præterea, in omni cognitione quæ est per similitudinem, ubi est expressior similitudo, est perfectior cognitio. Sed figuræ imaginatæ in prophetia sunt similitudines rerum de quibus fit revelatio prophetia. Ergo ubi est perfectior imaginaria visio, est altior prophetia gradus.\n\n4. Præterea, cum lumen propheticum descendat ab intellectu in imaginationem; quanto est perfectius lumen in intellectu Prophetæ, tanto est perfectior imaginaria visio. Ergo diversi gradus imaginariæ visionis demonstrant diversos gradus intellectualis visionis. Sed ubi est perfectior intellectualis visio, est perfectior prophetia. Ergo et secundum imaginariam visionem gradus prophetia distinguitur. 5. Sed dicendum quod diversitas visionis imaginariæ non distinguuit speciem prophetia; et ideo nec secundum ipsam gradus prophetia distinguuntur. — Sed contra: omne calidum elementare est ejusdem speciei; sed tamen apud medicos distinguitur calidum in primo et secundo et tertio et quarto gradu. Ergo distinctio graduum non requirit speciem distinctionem.\n\n6. Præterea, magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Sed intellectualis visio non distinguitur in Prophetis nisi secundum lumen propheticum perfectius et minus perfecte receptum. Ergo differentia visionis intellectualis non diversificat speciem prophetiæ; ergo nec gradus secundum responsionem prædictam; et sic non essent in prophetia aliqui gradus, si nec secundum visionem intellectivam, nec secundum imaginariam distinguuntur. Relinquitur ergo gradus prophetiæ distingui secundum imaginariam visionem. 1. Sed contra: visio imaginaria non facit Prophetam, sed solum intellectualis. Ergo nec secundum eam gradus prophetiæ distinguuntur.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod quando ad aliquid constituentum duo concurrunt, quorum unum est alio principalius; in eo quod ex eis constituitur, potest gradus comparisonis attendi et secundum id quod est principale, et secundum id quod est secundarium. Sed excessus ejus secundum quod est principale, ostendit eminentiam simpliciter; excessus 'vero ejus secundum quod est secundarium, ostendit eminentiam secundum quid, et non simpliciter, nisi secundum quod excessus in eo quod est secundarium, est signum excessus in eo quod est principalius. Sicut ad meritum humanum concurrit caritas quasi principale, et opus exterius quasi secundarium; meritum autem simpliciter loquendo, scilicet respectu præmii essentialis, judicatur majus, quod ex majori caritate procedit; magnitudo vero operis facit majus meritum secundum quod attenditur respectu alicujus præmii accidentalis, non autem simpliciter, nisi in quantum demonstrat magnitudinem caritatis, secundum id quod Gregorius dicit, Homil.xxx in Evang. non longe a princ.:: « Amor Dei operatur magna, si est. » Cum ergo ad prophetiam concurrat intellectualis visio quasi principalis, et imaginaria quasi secundaria; gradus prophetiæ est simpliciter judicandus eminentior ex eo quod visio intellectualis est eminentior: ex eminentia vero imaginaria visionis ostenditur eminentior gradus prophetiæ secundum quid, et non simpliciter, nisi in quantum perfectio imaginaria visionis demonstrat perfectionem intellectualis. Ex parte autem intellectualis visionis non possunt accipi aliqui determinati gradus: quia plenitudo intellectualis luminis non manifestatur nisi per aliqua signa: unde penes illa signa oportet distinguere gradus prophetiæ. Sic ergo possunt distingui gradus prophetiæ secundum quatuor. Primo secundum ea quæ requiruntur ad prophetiam. Est autem duplex actus prophetiæ: scilicet visio et denuntiatio. Ad visionem autem requiruntur duo: scilicet judicium, quod est secundum intellectum, et acceptio, quæ est quando secundum intellectum, quando secundum imaginationem. Sed ad denuntiationem requiritur aliquid ex parte denuntiantis; scilicet quædam audacia, ut aliquis non terreatur loqui veritatem propter adversarios veritatis, secundum id quod Dominus dixit ad Ezechielem, Ezech. III, 8: Dedi faciem tuam valentiorem faciebus eorum, et frontem tuam duriorem frontibus eorum; et sequitur: Ne timeas 1 In solutione hujus articuli B confusione quaeos, neque metuas a facie eorum. Aliud autem requiritur ex parte rei denuntiatæ; scilicet signum, per quod veritas rei denuntiatæ demonstratur; unde et Moyses a Deo signum accepit, ut ei crederetur. Sed quia denuntiatio in prophetia non principaliter, sed consequenter se habet in prophetia, ideo infimus gradus prophetiæ est in eo in quo invenitur quædam audacia vel promptitudo ad aliquid dicendum vel faciendum, sine hoc quod ei revelatio fiat; sicut si dicamus aliquem gradum prophetiæ fuisse in Sampsone, largo modo accipiendo prophetiam, secundum quod omnis supernaturalis influxus ad prophetiam reducitur. Secundus vero gradus erit in eo qui habet visionem intellectualem tantum secundum judicium, ut in Salomone. Tertius vero in eo qui habet intellectualem visionem cum imaginaria, ut in Isaia et Hieremia. Quartus vero in eo qui habet visionem intellectualem plenissimam quantum ad judicium et quantum ad acceptionem, sicut in David. Secundo possunt distingui gradus prophetiæ ex dispositione prophetantis; et sic, cum prophetia fiat in somnio et visione vigiliæ, ut dicitur Numer. xi, perfectior est gradus prophetiæ quæ est in vigilia, quam quæ est in somnio: tum quia intellectus est melius dispositus ad judicandum; tum quia avocatio a sensibilibus non est facta naturaliter, sed ex intentione perfecta inferiorum virium, ad ea quæ divinitus demonstrantur. Tertio ex modo accipiendi: quia quanto expressius significatur res prophetata, prophetiæ gradus est sublimior. Nulla autem signa aliquid expressius significant quam verba; et ideo altior gradus prophetiæ est quando percipiuntur verba expressse designantia rem prophetatam, sicut de Samuele legiitur I Regum III, quam quando demonstrantur aliquæ figuræ, quæ sunt aliarum rerum similitudines, ut olla succensa ostensa est Hieremiæ, Hierem. I: ex hoc enim manifeste ostenditur quod lumen propheticum magis in suo vigore percipitur quando secundum expressiorem similitudinem res propheticæ demonstrantur. Quarto ex parte ejus qui revelationem facit: eminentior enim gradus prophetiæ est quando videtur ille qui loquitur quam quando verba audiuntur tantum; sive sit in somnio, sive sit in visione: quia ostenditur quod magis accedit Propheta ad cognitionem ejus qui revelat. Quando vero videtur ille qui loquitur, altior gradus prophetiæ est quando videtur in specie Angeli, quam quando videtur in specie hominis; et adhuc eminentior, si videatur in figura Dei, sicut, Isai. I, Isaias vidit Deum sedentem. Cum enim prophetiæ revelatio a Deo descendat in Angelum, et ab Angelo in hominem; tanto ostenditur plenior prophetiæ receptio, quanto magis acceditur ad primum principium prophetiæ. Rationes illæ quæ ostendunt quod gradus prophetiæ distinguuntur secundum imaginariam visionem, concedendæ sunt secundum modum prædictum; nec hoc dicendum est quod diversitas gradus distinctionem exigat speciei.\n\nAd rationes vero quæ sunt in oppositum, per ordinem respondendum est. Ad quarum etiam primam patet responsio ex dictis, in corp. art.\n\nQuartodecimo quæritur utrum Moyses fuerit excellentior aliis Prophetis; et videquod non. Quia, ut dicit Gregorius, Homil iv in Ezech., Per successiones et incrementa temporum crevit divinæ cognitionis augmentum. » Ergo prophetæ posteriores fuerunt excellentiores Moyse.\n\n2. Præterea Glossa dicit in principio Psalterii: « David Propheta fuit excellentissimus.» Ergo Moyses non fuit excellentissimus.\n\n3. Præterea, majora miracula facta sunt per Josue, qui fecit stare solem et lunam, Josue x, quam per Moysen; et similiter per Isaiam, qui fecit solem retrocedere, Isaiæ xxxviii. Ergo Moyses non fuit Prophetarum maximus.\n\n4. Præterea, Eccli. xLVIII, 4, dicitur de Elia: Quis poterit tui similiter gloriari, qui sustulisti mortuum ab inferis? etc.; et sic idem quod prius. Præterea, Matth. xi, 11, dicitur de Joanne: Inter natos mulierum non surrexit major Joanne Baptista. Ergo nec Moyses fuit eo major; et sic idem quod prius.\n\nSed contra est quod dicitur Deut. ult., 10: Non surrexit Propheta ultra in Israel sicut Moyses. Præterea, Num. xii, 6, dicitur: Si quis fuerit inter vos Phopheta Domini, in somnio aut visione loquar ad eum; at non talis servus meus Moyses, qui in omni domo mea fidelissimus est. Ex quo patet quod ipse aliis Prophetis præfertur.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod inter Prophetas aliqui secundum aliquid diversimode possunt majores reputari; simpliciter autem loquendo omnium maximus Moyses fuit; in eo enim quatuor quæ ad prophetiam requiruntur, excellentissime sunt inventa. Primo quidem visio intellectualis in eo excellentissima fuit, secundum quam tantum meruit elevari, ut ipsam Dei essentiam videret, secundum quod dicitur Numer. xii, 8: Palam, et non per ænigmata et figuras, Dominum videt. Et hæc quidem ejus visio non est facta Angelo mediante, sicut aliæ visiones prophetales; unde ibidem dicitur: Ore ad os loquor ei. Et hoc expresse dicit Augustinus ad Paulinam De videndo Deum, Epist. cxLVII, al. cxII, cap. xii, et XII Super Genesim ad litteram, cap. xxvii. Secundo imaginaria visio fuit in eo perfectissima, quia eam quasi ad nutum habebat; unde dicitur Exod. xxxiii, 11, quod loquebatur ei Dominus facie ad faciem, sicut homo solet loqui ad amicum suum; in quo etiam alia ejus eminentia quantum ad imaginariam visionem potest notari, quod ipse scilicet non solum audivit verba revelantis, sed vidit, non in figura hominis vel Angeli, sed quasi ipsum Deum, non in somnio, sed in vigilia; quod de nullo aliorum legitur. Tertio ejus denuntiatio fuit excellentissima; quia omnes qui fuerunt ante eum, instruxerunt familias suas per modum disciplinæ; Moyses autem fuit primus qui locutus est ex parte Domini, dicens: Hæc dicit Dominus; et non uni familiæ, sed toti populo; nec denuntiavit ex parte Domini ut attenderetur dictis alterius Prophetæ precedentis, sicut Prophetæ denuntiando inducebant ut observaretur lex Moysi; unde denuntiatio precedentium fuit præ- « Per incrementa temporum crevit scientia spiritualium Patrum. »: « Ergo prophetæ posteriores fuerunt excellentiores Moysse. » paratio ad legem Moysi, quæ fuit fundamentum quoddam denuntiationis sequentium Prophetarum. Quarto fuit eminentior quantum ad ea quæ ordinantur ad denuntiationem. Quantum ad miracula quidem, quia facit signa ad conversionem et instructionem totius generis; alii vero Prophetæ fecerunt particularia signa ad speciales personas, et specialia negotia; unde dicitur Deuter. ult. 10: Non surrexit ultra Propheta in Israel sicut Moyses, quem nos-set Dominus facie ad faciem. Quantum ad eminentiam revelationis, in omnibus signis atque portentis, sicut fecerat in terra Ægypti Pharaoni et omnibus servis ejus, et ita magna mirabilia quæ fecit Moyses coram universo Israel. Quantum etiam ad audaciam apparet eminentissimus, quia in sola virga descendit in Ægyptum, non solum ad denunciandum verba Domini, sed ad flagellandum Ægyptum, et populum liberandum.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Gregorii est intelligendum de his quæ pertinent ad mysterium Incarnationis, de quibus aliqui posteriores expressiores revelationes acceperunt quam Moyses; non autem quantum ad cognitionem Divinitatis, de qua plenissime Moyses instructus fuit.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod David dicitur esse excellentissimus Prophetarum, quia expressissime prophetavit de Christo sine aliqua imaginaria visione.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod quamvis illa miracula fuerint majora miraculis Moysi quantum ad substantiam facti, tamen illa Moysi fuerunt majora quantum ad modum faciendi, quia facta sunt toti populo, et ad populi instructionem in nova lege, et liberationem; illa vero fuerunt aliqua particularia negotia.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod eminentia Eliæ præcipue in hoc attenditur quod a morte immunis conservatus fuit; etiam multis aliis Prophetis eminentior fuit quo ad audaciam et magnitudinem signorum, ut ex verbis Ecclesiastici ibidem habetur.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod cum Moyses aliis præfertur, intelligendum est de Prophetis veteris testamenti; quia tunc præcipue prophetia fuit in suo statu, quando Christus, ad quem omnis prophetia ordinabatur, expectabatur venturus. Joannes autem ad novum pertinet testamentum; unde Matth. 11, 13: Lex et Prophetæ usque ad Joannem. In novo tamen testamento facta est manifestior revelatio: unde dicitur II Corinth. 11, 18: Nos autem revelata facie; ubi expresse Apostolus se et alios Apostolos Moysi præfert. Et tamen non sequitur, si Joanne Baptista nullus fuit major, quod propter hoc nullus fuerit eo excellentior in gradu prophetia: quia, cum prophetia non sit donum gratiae gratum facientis, potest esse potior in prophetia qui est minor in merito."
      }
    ]
  }
}