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    "num": 13,
    "slug": "13-question-13",
    "title": "Question 13",
    "of": 29,
    "words": 12016,
    "text": "> **Translation:** Robert W. Mulligan, James V. McGlynn & Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952–1954). Verbatim public-domain scholarly text — quotable.\n>\n> **Public-domain basis:** Public domain (U.S.): published 1952–1954, copyright not renewed (NYPL CCE). US public domain. Full copyright-clearance evidence: [/about/translations/#pd-evidence](/about/translations/#pd-evidence).\n>\n> **Latin source:** Vivès edition (Paris, 1871–1880), provided as a parallel Latin edition (OCR-derived — for reading and search, not verbatim quotation).\n\n## Question 13\n\nARTICLE I The question is about rapture. In the first article we ask: What is rapture? [Parallel readings: De ver., 13, 2, ad 9; 2 Cor., c. 12., lect. 1; S.T. , II-II, 175, 1.] The Masters describe it in this way: “Rapture is elevation, by the power of a higher nature, from that which is according to nature to that which is contrary to nature.” Difficulties It seems that rapture is unsuitably described, for 1. Augustine says: “Man’s understanding knows God naturally.” But, in rapture, man’s understanding is raised to a knowledge of God. Therefore, it is not raised to that which is contrary to nature, but to that which is according to nature. 2. A created spirit depends more on the uncreated spirit than a lower body depends on a higher body. But impressions from higher bodies are natural to lower bodies, as the Commentator says. Therefore, elevation of the human spirit, even though it takes place in virtue of a higher nature, is only natural. 3. The Gloss on Romans(11:24), “Contrary to nature [thou] wert grafted into the good olive tree,” reads that God, the author of nature, “does nothing contrary to nature,” since that which each one receives from the source of all rule and order of nature is the nature for it. But the elevation of rapture is from God, who is the creator of human nature. Therefore, it is not against nature but according to it. 4. It was said that it is against nature because it is done in a divine manner and not in the manner of human spirit.—On the contrary, Dionysius says: “We see the justice of God in this that He distributes [His goods] to all things according to the measure of their worth.” But God cannot do anything contrary to His justice. Therefore, He does not give a thing something which is not according to its manner of being. 5. If man’s manner is changed in some respect, it is not changed in such a way that man’s proper good would be taken away. For, as Augustine says, God is not the cause of man’s deterioration. But man’s proper good is to live according to reason and to act in a voluntary way, as is clear in Dionysius. Therefore, since violence is contrary to what is voluntary and does away with the good of reason (for necessity causes sorrow since it is contrary to the will, as is said in the Metaphysics ), it seems that God brings about no violent elevation in man contrary to nature. Now, this is what seems to take place in rapture, as the very name implies, and as the previously mentioned description points out in the words, “by the power of a higher nature.” 6. According to the Philosopher,” excessive intensity of sensible objects destroys the senses, but excessive intensity of intelligible objects does not destroy the understanding. Now, the senses fail of knowledge of intense sensible objects because they are destroyed by them. Therefore, the understanding can know intelligible objects naturally no matter how intense they are. Hence, no matter to what intelligible objects the mind of man is raised up, the elevation will not be contrary to nature. 7. Augustine says that angels and souls have similar natures but dissimilar duties.” Now, it is not contrary to the nature of an angel to know the things to which man is raised in rapture. Therefore, for man, the elevation of rapture is not contrary to nature. 8. If any movement is natural, arrival at the term of the movement will also be natural, since no movement is infinite. But the mind of man is naturally moved toward God. This is clear from the fact that it rests only when it has reached God. Hence, Augustine says: “You made us for Thee, Lord; and our heart is not at rest until it rests in Thee.” Therefore, the elevation by which the mind reaches God, as happens in rapture, is not contrary to nature. 9. It was said that it is not natural for the human mind to be drawn to God by reason of the mind itself, but by reason of an ordination of God. Thus, it is not natural simply.—On the contrary, a lower nature does not engage in activity or tend toward any end except by reason of a divine ordination. It is for this reason that every natural work is called a work of intelligence. Nevertheless, we say that the movements and activities of natural things are simply natural. Therefore, to be drawn toward God should also be judged simply natural if it is natural to the mind by reason of a divine ordination. 10. The soul, in so far as it exists in itself and is thus called a spirit, is prior to the soul as joined to the body and, accordingly, called a soul. But the activity of the soul as a spirit is to know God and the other separated substances. But, in so far as it is joined to the body, its activity is to know corporeal and sensible things. Therefore, the capacity of the soul to know intelligible things is prior to that to know sensible things. Since, therefore, it is natural for the soul to know sensible things, it is also natural for it to know divine intelligible things. Thus, we conclude as before. 11. The ordination of a thing to its final end is more natural than the ordination to the means, for the ordination to the means exists because of the ordination to the final end. But sensible things are the means by which we reach the knowledge of God, as we see in Romans (1:20): “For the invisible things of him... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” But the knowledge of sensible things is natural to man. Therefore, knowledge of intelligible things is also natural. We conclude as before. 12. Nothing that takes place by a natural power can be said to be unconditionally contrary to nature. But certain things, as herbs or stones, have natural powers to release the mind from the senses, so that wonderful visions are beheld. This is what seems to happen in rapture. Therefore, rapture is not an elevation contrary to nature. To the Contrary The Gloss on the passage in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:2), “I know a man in Christ,” says: “Rapture, that is exaltation contrary to nature...” Therefore, rapture is an elevation contrary to nature. REPLY just as everything else has a certain activity which is natural to it in so far as it is this thing, fire or a stone, for example; so, too, man as man has a certain activity which is natural to him. Now, in physical reality the natural activity of a thing may be modified in two ways. In one, the change arises from a deficiency of its proper power, whatever be the source of such a deficiency, whether an extrinsic or an intrinsic cause. Thus, an abnormal fetus is produced because of a lack of formative power in the seed. In the other way, the change arises from the activity of the divine power, whose will all nature obeys. This happens in miracles, as when a virgin conceives or a blind man is made to see. Similarly, man’s natural and proper activity can be modified in two ways. Man’s proper activity, however, is to understand through the mediation of sense and imagination. For the activity by which he fixes on intellectual things alone, passing over all lower things, does not belong to man as man, but in so far as something divine exists in him, as is said in the Ethics. Moreover, the activity by means of which he grasps only sensible things apart from understanding and reasoning does not belong to him as man, but according to the nature which he has in common with the brute animals. Therefore, when man is transported out of his senses and sees things beyond sense, his natural mode of knowing is modified. Sometimes, this change takes place because of some deficiency in man’s proper power, as happens with insane people and others who are mentally deranged. This kind of transport out of their senses is not an elevation but rather a debasing of man. Sometimes, however, such transport takes place through the divine power, and then it is properly an elevation. For, since the agent makes that which is passive like itself, the transport which takes place by the divine power, and which is above man, has an ordination to something higher than that which is natural to man. Thus, in the foregoing description of rapture, which defines it as a movement, “elevation” gives its genus, and “by the power of a higher nature” gives the efficient cause. “From that which is according to nature to that which is contrary to nature” gives the starting point and the term of the movement. Answers to Difficulties 1. One can know God in many ways: through His essence, through sensible things, or through intelligible effects. We have to make a similar distinction about that which is natural to man. For something is contrary to nature and according to nature for one and the same thing according to its different states, because the nature of the thing is not the same when it is in the state of becoming and when it has complete existence, as Rabbi Moses says. Thus, full stature and other things of the kind are natural to man when he has reached maturity, but it would be contrary to nature for a boy to have full stature at birth. Thus, it must be said that to know God in some fashion is natural for the human intelligence according to any state. But in the beginning, that is, in this life, it is natural for it to know God through sensible creatures. It is also natural for it to reach the knowledge of God through Himself when it reaches its full perfection, that is, in heaven. Thus, if in this life it is raised to the knowledge of God which it will have in heaven, this will be contrary to nature, just as it would be contrary to nature for a baby boy to have a beard. 2. Nature can be taken in two ways: in particular, as proper to each thing, and in general, as embracing the whole order of natural causes. For this reason a thing is said to be according to nature or contrary to nature in two ways: in one, with reference to nature in particular; in the other, with reference to nature in general. Thus, every deficiency, decay, and the weakness of old age is contrary to nature in particular, but, according to nature in general, it is natural for everything which is composed of contraries to decay. Therefore, since the universal order of causes is so ordained that lower things should be moved by those which are higher, all movement which takes place in lower nature because of the impressions of what is higher, whether this be in physical or in spiritual things, is natural according to universal nature, but not according to particular nature unless the impression made on the lower nature by the higher nature is such that the very impression is its nature. Thus, it is clear how the effects which God brings about in creatures can be called according to nature or contrary to nature. 3. The answer to the third difficulty is clear from this. Or else we should say that that elevation is called contrary to nature because it is contrary to the ordinary course of nature, as the Gloss explains. 4. Although God never acts contrary to justice, He sometimes does do something beyond justice. For a thing is contrary to justice when something one deserves is taken away from him. This is clear in human dealings when someone robs another. But, if out of liberality one gives what is not deserved, this is not contrary to justice, but beyond it. Accordingly, when in this life God raises a human mind above its proper level, He does not act contrary to justice, but beyond it. 5. By the very fact that a man’s work has a meritorious value it must be under the direction of reason and the will. But the good which is imparted to a work in rapture is not of this sort. Hence, it is not necessary that it proceed from the human will, but only from the divine power. Nevertheless, we cannot call it violence in every respect, unless in the sense that we say there is violent movement when a stone is thrown down faster than it would fall by its natural motion. Nevertheless, properly speaking, “that is violent in which that which is passive contributes nothing,” as is said in the Ethics. 6. Understanding and sense have this in common, that both fail of perfect perception of an excessively intense object, although both perceive something of it. The difference lies in this, that sense is destroyed by an excessively intense sensible object, so that afterwards it cannot know lesser sensibles, but understanding is strengthened through reception of an excessively intense intelligible object, so that afterwards it can know lesser intelligible objects better. Hence, the authoritative statement of the Philosopher cited above is not to the point. 7. Angels and souls are said to be equal in nature only in relation to the state of final perfection in which men will be like angels in heaven, as is said in Matthew (22:30), or in so far as they share in intellectual nature, although it is more perfect in the angels. 8. Arrival at the term of natural movement is natural, not in the beginning or middle of the movement, but at the end. Hence, the argument does not follow. 9. Activities of physical things which come from a divine ordination are said to be natural when the sources of these activities are implanted in things in the way in which their natures are. However, God does not ordain the elevation of rapture for man in this way. Hence, they are not alike in this respect. 10. That which is prior in the intention of nature is sometimes subsequent in time, as actuality relates to potentiality in the same receiving subject, for to be in act is prior in nature, although in time one and the same thing is first in potentiality before it is in actuality. In like manner, the activity of the soul, in so far as it is a spirit, is prior, relative to the intention of nature, but subsequent in time. Hence, if one activity takes place at the time for another activity, this is contrary to nature. 11. Although the ordination to the means is because of the ordination to the final end, it is only through the means that one arrives naturally at the final end. If it happens otherwise, the arrival is not natural. And it is thus in the case in question. 12. The transport out of the senses which is brought about by the power of physical things is classified with that transport which takes place because of a deficiency of the proper power. For the nature of those things is such that they can effect a transport out of the senses only in so far as they deaden the senses. Hence, it is clear that such transport from sense is foreign to rapture. Q. 13: Rapture ARTICLE II In the second article we ask: Did Paul see God through his essence when he was enraptured? [Parallel readings: IV Sent. , 49, 2, 7, ad 5; 2 Cor. , c. 12, lect. 1-2; S.T. , I, 12, 11, ad 2; II-II, 175,3.] Difficulties It seems that he did not, for 1. The Gloss on Ephesians (4:18), “Having their understanding darkened... “ says: “Everyone who understands is enlightened with an inner light.” Therefore, if the understanding is raised up to see God, it must be enlightened by some light proportionate to this kind of sight. But the only such light is the light of glory, of which Psalms (35:10) says: “In thy light we shall see light.” Therefore, God can be seen through His essence only by an intellect enjoying beatitude. And, since Paul was not glorified when he was enraptured, he could not see God through His essence. 2. It was said that in that state Paul did enjoy beatitude.—On the contrary, perpetuity is of the nature of beatitude, as Augustine says. But that state did not remain in Paul forever. Therefore, he did not enjoy beatitude in that state. 3. From the glory in the soul glory overflows into the body. But Paul’s body was not glorified. Therefore, neither was his mind enlightened by the light of glory. And, so, he did not see God through His essence. 4. It was said that by seeing God through His essence in that state he was made blessed, not without qualification, but only in a qualified way.—On the contrary, all that is needed for one to be blessed in all respects is the act of glory and the gift of glory, which is the principle of that act. Thus, Peter’s body would have been glorified if, along with being held up on the water, he had also had within him agility, which is the principle of this act. But splendor, the principle of the vision of God, which is the act of glory, is the gift of glory. Therefore, if Paul’s mind saw God through His essence and was enlightened by the light which is the source of this vision, he was glorified without qualification. 5. While he was enraptured, Paul had faith and hope. But these are incompatible with the vision of God through His essence, for faith concerns things that appear not, as is said in Hebrews (11:1), and: “What a man seeth, why doth he hope for? “ as is said in Romans (8:24). Therefore, he did not see God through His essence. 6. In heaven, charity is not a principle of merit. But in his rapture Paul was capable of meriting, since his soul had not yet been separated from the corruptible body, as Augustine says. Therefore, he did not have the charity proper to heaven. But where there is the vision proper to heaven, which is perfect, there also is the charity proper to heaven, which is perfect, for one loves God to the extent that he knows about God. Therefore, Paul did not see God through His essence. 7. The divine essence cannot be seen without joy, as Augustine says. Therefore, if Paul saw God through His essence, he took delight in that sight. Accordingly, he did not wish to be separated from it, nor, on the other hand, did God cut him off from it against his wishes. For, since God is most generous, He does not on His part withdraw His gifts. Therefore, Paul would never have been cut off from that state. But he was cut off. Therefore, he did not see God through His essence. 8. No one who has a good because of merit loses it without sin. Therefore, since to see God through His essence is a good which one has because of merit, no one who sees God through His essence can be cut off from this sight unless he should happen to sin. But this cannot be said of Paul, who says in Romans (8:38, 39): “For I am sure that neither death, nor life... shall... separate us...” We conclude as before. 9. When Paul is said to be enraptured, there is also question of the difference between his rapture and the deep sleep of Adam and the rapture of John the Evangelist, in which he says he “was in the spirit” (Apocalypse 1:10), and the “ecstasy of mind” which Peter had (Acts 11:5). To the Contrary From what Augustine says and from the Gloss” we see clearly that Paul saw God through His essence when he was enraptured. REPLY Concerning this, some have said that Paul, when he was enraptured, did not see God through His essence, but with a vision midway between the vision had in this life and the vision had in heaven. We can take this intermediate vision to mean the kind of vision which is natural to an angel, such that he would see God, not, indeed, through His essence with natural knowledge, but through intelligible species, in so far as he considers his own essence, which is an intelligible likeness of the uncreated essence, according to the saying of The Causes that an intelligence knows what is above it in so far as it is caused by it. According to this, Paul, when enraptured, is conceived of as having seen God through the refulgence of some intelligible light in his mind. However, the knowledge of this life, which is through the mirror and obscurity of sensible creatures, is natural to man. And the knowledge of heaven, by which we see God through His essence, is natural only to God. But this opinion is contrary to what Augustine says, for he states expressly that, when Paul was enraptured, he saw God through His essence. Nor is it likely that a minister of God to the Jews of the Old Testament would see God through His essence, as appears from Numbers (12:8): “Plainly and not by riddles and figures doth he see the Lord,” and that this would not be granted to the minister of the New Testament, the Teacher of the Gentiles. This is especially true since the Apostle himself argues in this way: “For if the ministration of condemnation be glory, much more the ministration of justice aboundeth in glory” (2 Cor 3:9). Still, he did not have beatitude without qualification, but only in some respects, although his mind was enlightened with supernatural light to enable it to see God. This will become clear from the example of physical light. For, in some things, we find the light from the sun as an abiding form, as though it had become connatural to them, as in the stars, rubies, and things of this sort. But, in other things, the light from the sun is received as a passing impression, as light in the air. For the light does not become a form abiding in the air, as though connatural to it, but passes when the sun leaves. In like fashion, also, the light of glory is infused into the mind in two ways. In one, it follows the mode of a form which becomes connatural and abiding. This makes the mind blessed without qualification, and is the manner in which it is infused in the blessed in heaven. In the other way, the mind receives the light of glory as a passing impression. It was in this way that Paul’s mind was enlightened with the light of glory when he was enraptured. The very name shows that this took place quickly ( raptim ) and in passing. Hence, he was not glorified without qualification, nor did he have the gift of glory, since that splendor did not become a property in him. For this reason it did not flow down from the soul to the body, nor did he remain in this state permanently. Answers to Difficulties 1-4. The response to the first four objections is clear from what has been said. 5. When full vision comes, faith leaves. Hence, in so far as Paul had the vision of God through His essence, he did not have faith. Now, he had the vision of God through His essence by way of act, not according to the habit of glory. Consequently, he had faith not in act but habitually, and hope likewise. 6. Although Paul was then in a state in which he could merit, he did not actually merit, for, just as he had the act of vision possessed by those in heaven, so he had the act of charity possessed by those in heaven. Nevertheless, some say that, although he had the vision of those in heaven, he did not have the act of charity of those in heaven. For, although his understanding was rapt, his affections were not. But this is clearly contrary to what the Gloss on “He was caught up into paradise” (2 Cor 12:4), says: “That is, into that tranquility which those who are in the heavenly Jerusalem enjoy.” But enjoyment takes place through love. 7. That the vision did not remain in Paul was due to the nature of the light which illumined his mind, as is clear from what has been said. 8. Although in the blessed the vision of God is due to merit, at that time it was not given to Paul as a reward of merit. Hence, the reasoning does not follow. However, it should be noted that these last two objections bring no better argument against the fact that Paul saw God through His essence than against the fact that he saw Him in any way which surpassed the common manner of sight. 9. In the Scriptures, transport of mind, ecstasy, and rapture are all used in the same sense and indicate some raising up of the mind from sensible things outside of us toward which we naturally turn our attention, to things which are above man. This takes place in two ways. For, at times, this transport from things outside is taken to refer to attention only, as when someone makes use of the external senses and things about him, but his whole attention is engaged in contemplating and loving things divine. Such is the state of anyone who contemplates and loves things divine in transport of the mind, whether ecstasy or rapture. For this reason Dionysius says: “Divine love brings about ecstasy.” And Gregory, speaking of contemplation, says: “One who is rapt in order that he may understand the things within closes his eyes to visible things.” Ecstasy or rapture or transport of the mind take place in another way, and the names are more generally used in this sense, when one is also deprived of the use of his senses and sensible things in order to see certain things supernaturally. Now, a thing is seen supernaturally when it is seen beyond sense, understanding, and imagination, as we said in the question on prophecy. Therefore, Augustine distinguishes” two kinds of rapture. There is one in which the mind is carried out of the senses to the vision in the imagination. This is what happened to Peter and to John the Evangelist in the Apocalypse, as Augustine says. There is another in which the mind is at once transported out of the senses and out of the imagination to an intellectual vision. This happens in two ways. In one, the intellect understands God through certain intelligible communications, and this is proper to angels. Adam’s ecstasy was of this sort, as the Gloss on Genesis(2:21)says: “The correct interpretation of this ecstasy is that it was given so that Adam’s mind might become a member of the heavenly court and, entering into the sanctuary of God, might understand the last things.” In the other way, the understanding sees God through His essence. It was for this that Paul was enraptured, as we have said. Q. 13: Rapture ARTICLE III In the third article we ask: Can one in this life have his understanding raised to see God through his essence without being carried out of his senses? [Parallel readings: De ver. , 10, 11; IV Sent., 49, 2, 7, ad 4; Quodl. , I, 1; 2 Cor. , c. 12, lect. 1; S.T. , II-II, 175, 4; 180, 5; In Ioan. , c. 1, lect. 11.] Difficulties It seems that he can, for 1. Man’s nature is the same in this life and after the resurrection. For, if it were not specifically the same, numerically the same man would not arise. But after the resurrection the saints will see God mentally through His essence and no transport out of the senses will take place. Therefore, the same thing is possible for those in this life. 2. But it was said that, since the body of one in this life is corruptible, it weighs down the understanding so that it cannot be drawn freely to God unless it is carried out of the senses of the body. And this corruption will be gone after the resurrection.—On the contrary, nothing is hindered, just as nothing suffers, except through the activity of its contrary. But bodily corruption does not seem to be opposed to the act of understanding, since understanding is not an act of the body. Therefore, corruption of the body does not prevent the understanding from being drawn freely to God. 3. It is certain that Christ took on our mortality and the corruption which is a punishment for us. But His understanding enjoyed the sight of God continuously, although He was not always transported out of his external senses. Therefore, corruption does not make it impossible for the understanding to be drawn to God without being transported out of the senses. 4. After Paul had seen God through His essence, he remembered the things which he had seen in that vision. Otherwise, if he had not remembered them, he would not have said: “He heard secret words, which it is not granted to man to utter” (2 Cor. 12:4). Therefore, while he saw God through His essence, something was being imprinted on his memory. But memory belongs to the sensitive part of man, as the Philosopher plainly shows. Therefore, when in this life someone sees God through His essence, he is not entirely transported out of his bodily senses. 5. The sensitive powers are closer to each other than the intellective powers are to the sensitive powers. But the imagination, which is one of the sensitive powers, can actually grasp any of its objects whatever without being cut off from the external senses. Therefore, the understanding, too, can actually see God without being cut off from the sensitive powers. 6. That which is according to nature does not require for its existence anything which is contrary to nature. But it is natural for the human understanding to see God through His essence, since it was created for this. Therefore, since transport out of the senses is contrary to nature for man, inasmuch as sensitive cognition is natural to him, it seems that he does not require transport from the senses as a prerequisite to see God through His essence. 7. Only those things which are joined together can be cut off from each other. But intelligence, whose object is God, as is said in Spirit and Soul , does not seem to be joined to the bodily senses but rather seems extremely distant from them. Therefore, for man to see God through His essence by means of intelligence he does not need to be cut off from the senses. 8. Paul seems to have been raised up to the sight of God so that there would be a witness of the glory which is promised to the saints. Hence, Augustine says: “Why should we not believe that it was God’s wish to show to this great Apostle, the Teacher of the Gentiles, that life which is to be lived forever after this life? [God did this] while Paul was raised in rapture to that most lofty sight.”But, after the resurrection, in that vision of the saints which will be given to those who see God in the next life, there will be no transport out of the bodily senses. Therefore, it seems that this kind of transport did not take place in Paul either, when he saw God through His essence. 9. During their sufferings and torments the martyrs inwardly perceived something of the divine glory. Hence, Vincent says: “Behold, I am already raised on high, and from above the world I look down on all your distinguished men, O tyrant.”And in other records of the sufferings of the saints we read many passages which seem to have the same tenor. But it is obvious that there was no withdrawal from the senses in these people. Otherwise, they would not have felt the pain. Therefore, there is no transport out of the senses in order for one to share in the glory by which God is seen through His essence. 10. The practical understanding is closer than the speculative understanding to the activity which has sensible things as its object. But, as Avicenna says,, it is not necessary for the practical understanding always to pay attention to manis operations which are concerned with sensible objects. Otherwise, the best harpist Would seem to be the worst if it Were necessary for him to give artistic reflection to each stroke of the strings. For, in such a case, there would be too much interruption of the sounds, which would hurt the proper melody. Therefore, it is far less necessary for the speculative understanding to pay attention to man’s operations which concern sensible things. Thus, it remains free to be drawn to any act of understanding, even to the divine essence itself, while the sense powers are engaged in sensible activities. 11. While Paul saw God through His essence, he still had faith. But it belongs to faith to see darkly through a mirror. Therefore, while Paul saw God through His essence, at the same time he saw darkly through a mirror. But this obscure knowledge is through a mirror and through sensible things. Therefore, while he saw God through His essence, he also gave his attention to sensible things. The conclusion is the same as before. To the Contrary 1. As Augustine says, and is quoted in the Gloss on the second Epistle to the Corinthians(12:2): “No man who sees God, as He is in Himself, lives the mortal life which we live in the bodily senses. But unless one in some way dies to this life, either leaving the body completely, or so turning away and cutting himself off from the bodily senses that with good reason he does not know whether he is in the body or outside of it, he is not enraptured and transported to that vision.” 2. The Gloss on the second Epistle to the Corinthians (5:13), “Whether we be transported in mind, it is to God,” says: “He calls ecstasy that by which the mind is raised to an understanding of heavenly things, so that in some sense lower things drop from the memory. All the saints to whom secrets of God which surpass this world have been revealed were in this ecstasy.”Therefore, it is necessary for everyone who sees God through His essence to be withdrawn from the consideration of lower things, and, consequently, also from the use of the senses with which we see only lower things. 3.The Gloss on Psalms (67:28), “There is Benjamin, a youth in ecstasy of mind,” says: “Benjamin, (that is, Paul), in ecstasy, that is, with his mind unconscious of the bodily senses, as when he was carried up into the third heaven.” But the third heaven means vision of God through His essence, as Augustine says. Therefore, the vision of God through His essence requires loss of consciousness of the bodily senses. 4. The activity of an understanding which is raised to see the essence of God is more effective than any activity of the imagination. But, sometimes, a man is transported out of the bodily senses because of the intensity of the activity of the imagination. Therefore, he should be transported out of them with much greater reason when he is lifted up to the vision of God. 5. Bernard says: “Divine consolation is sensitive and will not be given to those who admit any other.” So, for the same reason, the divine vision does not tolerate sight of anything else along with it. Therefore, neither does it tolerate the use of the senses along with it. 6. The greatest cleanness of heart is needed to see God through His essence, according to Matthew (5:8): “Blessed are the clean of heart.” But the heart is sullied in two ways, namely, by the contamination of sin, and by phantasies of material things. This is clear from what Dionysius says: “Those [celestial essences] should be considered pure, not in the sense that they are free of unclean stains and defilements (in which he refers to uncleanness because of guilt, which never existed in the blessed angels), nor in the sense that they are receptive of phantasies of material things” (in which is included the uncleanness which comes through phantasies, as is clear from Hugh of St. Victor.) Therefore, the mind of one who sees God through His essence must be transported not only out of the external senses, but also out of the internal phantasms. 7. In the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:10) we read: “When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be put away.” But, here, “perfect” refers to the vision of God through His essence, and “imperfect” refers to vision through a mirror darkly, which is through sensible things. Therefore, when one is raised to the vision of God through His essence, he must be deprived of the vision of sensible things. REPLY As is clear from the authoritative statement of Augustine, a man living in this mortal body cannot see God through His essence, unless he is made unconscious of the bodily senses. We can see the reason for this from two things. First, from that which is common to the understanding and the other powers of the soul, for with all the powers of the soul we find that, when the act of one power becomes intense, the act of another is either weakened or entirely suppressed. Thus, it is clear that, when one is giving very close attention to the activity of sight, his hearing does not perceive the things which are being said, unless, perhaps, their force attracts the sense of the hearer to them. The reason for this, as Augustine proves, is that attention is needed for the act of any cognoscitive power. Moreover, one’s attention cannot be given to many things at once, unless they are related to one another in such a way that they can be taken as one, just as the motion or activity of a thing cannot have two termini not related to each other. Hence, since there is one soul, in which all cognoscitive powers are rooted, the attention of one and the same soul is needed for the acts of all the cognoscitive powers. Therefore, when the soul gives complete attention to the act of one power, the man is cut off from the act of another power. But for the understanding to be raised up to the vision of the divine essence, the whole attention must be concentrated on this vision, since this is the most intensely intelligible object, and the understanding can reach it only by striving for it with a total effort. Therefore, it is necessary to have complete abstraction from the bodily senses when the mind is raised to the vision of God. Second, we can find a reason for this in that which is proper to the understanding. For, since we know things in so far as they are in act, and not in so far as they are in potency, as is said in the Metaphysics, the understanding, which holds the highest place in knowledge, properly deals with immaterial things, which are most in act. Hence, every intelligible thing is either free from matter or separated from it by the activity of the understanding. Therefore, the freer the understanding is of contact, as it were, with material things, the more perfect it is. For this reason, the human understanding, which reaches material things by considering phantasms; from which it abstracts intelligible species, has less efficacy than the angelic understanding, which always considers purely immaterial forms. Nevertheless, in so far as the purity of intellectual knowledge is not wholly obscured in human understanding, as happens in the senses whose knowledge cannot go beyond material things, it has the power to consider things which are purely immaterial by the very fact that it retains some purity. Therefore, if it is ever raised beyond its ordinary level to see the highest of immaterial things, namely, the divine essence, it must be wholly cut off from the sight of material things at least during that act. Hence, since the sensitive powers can deal only with material things, one cannot be raised to vision of the divine essence unless he is wholly deprived of the use of the bodily senses. Answers to Difficulties 1. After the resurrection the beatified soul will be joined to the body in a different way from that in which it is now united to it. For, in the resurrection, the body will be entirely subject to the spirit to such an extent that the properties of glory will overflow from the spirit into the body. Hence, they will be called spiritual bodies. Moreover, when two things are united and one of them has complete control over the other, there is no mixture there, since the one falls completely under the power of the other which rules it. Thus, if one drop of water is poured into a thousand jars of wine, the purity of the wine is not at all impaired. Therefore, in the resurrection there will be no defilement of the understanding and its power will not be weakened in any way by any union whatsoever with the body. Hence, even without transport out of the bodily senses, it will contemplate the divine essence. However, the body is not now subject to the spirit in this way, and, therefore, the reasoning does not have the same force. 2. Our body is corruptible because it is not fully subject to the soul. For, if it were fully subject to the soul, immortality would also overflow into the body from the immortality of the soul, as will happen after the resurrection. It is for this reason that the corruption of the body oppresses the understanding. Although in itself it is not directly opposed to the understanding, its cause impairs the purity of the understanding. 3. From the fact that Christ was God and man, He had full power over all the parts of His soul and over His body. Hence, as Damascene says,by the power of the Godhead He permitted each power of the soul to do that which is proper to it in so far as it fitted in with our redemption. Thus, it was not necessary for Him to have an overflow from one power to another, nor for one power to be deprived of its act because of the intensity of the act of another power. Consequently, the fact that His understanding saw God did not necessitate any transport out of the bodily senses. However, it is different with other men, in whom redundance or interference of one power with another necessarily follows from the intimate connection of the powers of the soul with one another. 4. After Paul had stopped seeing God through His essence, he remembered what he had known in that vision by means of certain species which remained in his understanding and were relics, so to speak, of the previous vision. For, although he saw the very Word of God through His essence, and from the vision of that essence knew many truths, (and thus neither for the Word Himself nor for the things which he saw in the Word did this vision take place through any species, but only through the essence of the Word), nevertheless, by reason of the vision of the Word, certain likenesses of the things which he saw were imprinted on his understanding. And with these likenesses he could see afterwards the things which he had previously seen through the essence of the Word. Later, by applying these intelligible species to the individual intentions or forms which were stored in his memory or imagination, he could remember the things which he had seen previously, and this even through the activity of memory, which is a sensitive power. Thus, it is not necessary to hold that in the act of seeing God something took place in his memory, which is part of the sensitive power, but only in his mind. 5. Although transport from the external senses does not arise from every act of imaginative power, the transport mentioned above does take place when the act of the imagination is very intense. Similarly, it is not necessary that transport out of the senses take place because of every act of understanding; nevertheless, it does come about through the most intense act, which is the vision of God through His essence. 6. Although it is natural for the human understanding at some time to reach the vision of God through His essence, it is not natural for it to reach this in the conditions of this life, as we have said. For this reason the conclusion does not follow. 7. Although our intelligence, with which we grasp things divine, does not combine with the senses in the process of perception, it does combine with them in the process of judging. Hence, Augustine says: “Through the light of our intelligence we judge even of the lower things and we perceive things which are neither bodies nor bear forms like those of bodies.”“ Therefore, our intelligence is said at times to abstract from the senses when it does not make judgments concerning them, but focuses its attention on the vision of heavenly things alone. 8. The essence of the beatitude of the saints consists in the vision of the divine essence. Hence, Augustine says: “Vision is the whole reward.” For this reason one could be a suitable witness of that beatitude because he had seen the divine essence. Still, it would not be necessary for him to experience all the privileges which belong to the blessed. But, from that which he did experience, he could also know the other things. For he was not enraptured to become blessed, but to be a witness of beatitude. 9. In their sufferings the martyrs perceived something of divine glory, not as if they drank it at its source, as do those who see God through His essence, but, rather, they were refreshed by a sprinkling of that glory. Hence, Augustine says: “There,” where God is seen through His essence, “the blessed life is drunk from its source. From that source some of it is sprinkled on this human life, so that in the temptations of this world that life may be lived temperately, justly, bravely, and prudently.” 10. The speculative understanding is not forced to turn its attention to the activities in which one is occupied with sensible things, but it can busy itself with other intelligible things. Moreover, the intensity of the act of speculation can be so great that it is altogether abstracted from sensible activity. 11. Although in that act Paul had the habit of faith, he did not have the act of faith. Q. 13: Rapture ARTICLE IV In the fourth article we ask: How great an abstraction is required for our understanding to be able to see god through his essence? [Parallel readings: De ver. , 10, 11; Quodl. , I, 1; 2 Cor. , c. 12, lect. 1; S.T. , I, 12, 11; II-II, 17, 5; In loan. , c. 1, lect. 11.] Difficulties And it seems that there has to be an abstraction from the very union by which the soul is united to the body as its form, for 1. The powers of the vegetative soul are more material than the powers of the sensitive soul. But for our understanding to see God through His essence it must abstract from the senses, as has been said., Therefore, abstraction from the acts of the vegetative soul is much more urgently required for the purity of that vision. But this abstraction cannot take place where there is brute life as long as the soul is united to the body as its form. For, as the Philosopher says: “In animals the process of nutrition is always going on.” Therefore, for the vision of the divine essence there must be an abstraction from the union by which the soul is united to the body as its form. 7. The gloss of Augustine on Exodus (33:20), “For man shall not see me and live,” says: “This shows that God cannot appear as He is to this life of corruptible flesh. But He can in the other life, which one can live. only by dying to this life.” The gloss of Gregory reads: “He who sees the wisdom which is God dies entirely to this life.” But death is the result of the separation of the soul from the body to which it was united as its form. Therefore, there has to be a complete separation of the soul from the body in order to see God through His essence. 3 “For a living thing, its act of life is its act of existence,” as is said in The Soul . But the act of existence of a man who is alive arises from the union of his soul with his body as its form. But Exodus (33:20) says: “For man shall not see me and live.” Therefore, as long as the soul is united to the body as its form, he cannot see God through His essence. 4. The union by which the soul is united to the body as its form is stronger than that by which it is united to the body as a mover. From this latter union arise the activities of the powers and the activities which are carried on through bodily organs. But this latter union hinders the vision of the divine essence, for which there must be abstraction from the bodily senses. Therefore, the first union will interfere with it much more, and thus it will be necessary to dissolve it. 5. Since powers flow from the essence and are rooted in it they are not raised to a level higher than that of their essence. Therefore, if the essence of the soul is united to a material body as its form, it is not possible for the power of understanding to be raised to things which are altogether immaterial. We conclude as before. 6. Greater contamination results in the soul from its connection with the body than from its union with a bodily likeness. But for the mind to see God through His essence, it must be purified of bodily likenesses, which are perceived through imagination and sense, as has been said. Therefore, for the soul to see God through His essence, it must with much greater reason be separated from the body. 7. In the second Epistle to the Corinthians (5:6, 7) we read: “While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord. (For we walk by faith, and not by sight.) “ Therefore, as long as the soul is in the body, it cannot see God as He is in Himself. To the Contrary 1. The gloss of Gregory on the passage from Exodus (33:20), “For man shall not see me and live,” says: “The splendor of the eternal God can be seen by some who live in this flesh, but who are growing in priceless virtue.”“ But the splendor of God is His essence, as the same gloss says. Therefore, it is not necessary to have complete separation of soul from body to see the essence of God. 2. Augustine says: “The soul is enraptured not only to the vision of imagination, but also to the vision of understanding, through which the truth itself is clearly seen. Meanwhile, it has been carried out of its senses less than in death, but more than in sleep.” Therefore, to see the uncreated truth of which Augustine is speaking there is no need to dissolve the union whereby the soul is united to the body as its form. 3. The same thing is clear from these words of Augustine: “It is not beyond belief that even that lofty degree of revelation”—to see God through His essence—“was given to some holy men before they were dead and their corpses ready for burial.” Therefore, while the soul is still united to the body as its form, it can see God. REPLY To see the divine essence, which is the most perfect act of understanding, there must be an abstraction from those things which of their nature interfere with the excessive intensity of the act of understanding and which are hindered by this same intensity. This happens in some things because of something intrinsic to the act itself, and in others merely for some extrinsic reason. The activities of sense and understanding interfere with each other by reason of the acts themselves, inasmuch as attention is needed for both activities, and also because the understanding in some fashion enters into the sensible activities since it receives something from the phantasms. Thus, the purity of the understanding is contaminated to some extent by sense activities, as we have said. But no attention is needed for the union of the soul to the body as its form, since this union does not depend on the will of the soul, but on nature. In the same way, the purity of the understanding is not directly contaminated by such a union. For the soul is not joined to the body as its form through the mediation of its powers, but through its essence, since nothing stands as a medium between matter and form, as is proved in the Metaphysics . Furthermore, the essence of the soul is not united to body in such a way that it follows the condition of the body completely, as other material forms, which are, as it were, completely engulfed in matter to such an extent that only material power or activity can proceed from them. Now, from the essence of the soul there proceed not only the forces and powers which are in some sense bodily, as the existent acts of the bodily organs, that is, the sensitive and vegetative powers, but also the powers of understanding, which are completely immaterial and not the existent acts of any body or part of a body, as is proved in The Soul. From this it is clear that the powers of our understanding do not proceed from the essence of the soul in so far as it is united to the body, but, rather, in so far as it stays free of the body and is not entirely bound down to it. In this sense the union of the soul with the body does not extend to the activity of the understanding and so cannot interfere with its purity. Hence, if we consider what is intrinsic to the acts, the dissolution of the union by which the soul is united to the body as its form is not a necessary condition for the activity of the understanding, no matter how intense. In like manner, there is no need for the suppression of the activities of the vegetative soul. For the activities of this part of the soul are really natural, as is clear from the fact that they are brought to full perfection by the power of the active and passive qualities, namely, the warm and the cold, the moist and the dry. For this reason they obey neither reason nor will, as is clear in the Ethics. Thus, it is plain that attention is not needed for actions of this kind, and so it is not necessary to turn our attention from intellectual activity because of the acts of these qualities. In like manner, the activity of the understanding has nothing to do with the activities of this sort, since it receives nothing from them, because they are not related to knowledge and because the understanding does not use any bodily instrument which would have to be sustained through the activities of the vegetative soul, as is the case with the organs of the sensitive powers. Thus, the purity of our understanding is in no wise impaired through the activities of the vegetative soul. From this it is clear that, if we consider merely what is intrinsic to the acts themselves, the activity of the vegetative and the activity of the intellectual soul do not hinder each other. Nevertheless, one of these can interfere with the other for some extrinsic reason; for example, in so far as the understanding receives something from the phantasms, which are in bodily organs, which must be nourished and sustained through the activity of the vegetative soul. Thus, because of the acts of the nutritive power variation may occur in the disposition of the organs, and, consequently, in the activity of the sensitive power from which the understanding receives something. Thus, the activity of the understanding itself is hindered for an extrinsic reason. This is plain during sleep and after eating. On the other hand, also, the activity of understanding interferes with the activity of the vegetative soul in this way, inasmuch as the activity of the power of imagination is needed for the activity of understanding. And intensity of the imagination requires the co-operation of heat and the [animal] spirits. Thus, the act of the nutritive power is hindered by the intensity of contemplation. But this plays no part in the contemplation by which God’s essence is seen, since such contemplation does not need the activity of the imagination. From this it is clear that abstraction from the acts of the vegetative soul or any impairment of those acts is not in any way required for the vision of God through His essence. All that is required is abstraction from the acts of the sensitive powers. Answers to Difficulties 1. Although the powers of the vegetative soul are more material than the powers of the sensitive soul, still, along with this they are more remote from the understanding and so are less able to interfere with the intensity of the understanding or be hindered by it. 2. “To live” can be taken in two senses. In one, it means the very act of existence of that which is living, which rests on the union of the soul to the body as its form. In the other sense, “to live” is taken to mean the activity of life. Thus the Philosopher distinguishes living into understanding, sensing, and the other activities of the soul. Similarly, since death is the loss of life, we must distinguish it in like manner. Thus, sometimes it means the loss of that union by which the soul is joined to the body as its form, and sometimes it means the loss of the vital activities. For this reason Augustine says: “One dies to this life to some extent whether he leaves the body entirely, or whether he is transported out of the senses of the body and made unconscious of them.”.Death is thus understood in the glosses which have been cited,” as is plain from the words following the quotation from the gloss of Gregory: “He who sees the wisdom which is God dies entirely to this life, so that he may not be held back by love of it.” 3. The solution to the third difficulty is clear from what has just been said. 4. Since the union by which the soul is united to the body as its form is stronger, it follows that it is less possible to withdraw from it. 5. The reasoning would conclude correctly if the essence of the soul were so united to the body that it were entirely bound down to the body. But we have already said that this is false. 6. Although the bodily likeness which is necessary for the activity of the imagination and the senses is more immaterial than the body itself, it has a closer relation to the activity of the understanding. Thus, it is more able to hinder it, as we have said. 7.What the Apostle says should be applied to our existence in the body not only by reason of the union of the soul with the body as its form, but also by reason of our use of the bodily senses. Q. 13: Rapture ARTICLE V In the fifth article we ask: What did the apostle know and not know about his rapture? [Parallel readings: 2 Cor. , c. 12, lect. 1; S.T. , II-II, 175,6; 180, 5.] Difficulties It seems that he knew whether his soul was in the body, for 1. He knew this better than any of those who followed, But many commonly agree that during the rapture Paul’s soul was united to his body as its form. Therefore, with much greater reason Paul knew this. 2. In the rapture Paul knew what he saw and with what vision he saw it. This is clear from the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:2), because he says: “I know a man... caught up to the third heaven.” Therefore, he knew what that heaven was, whether it was something corporeal or spiritual, and he knew whether he saw it spiritually or corporeally. But it follows from this that he knew whether he saw it while in the body or out of it. For bodily vision cannot take place except through the body, and the vision of understanding is always without the body. Therefore, he knew whether he was in the body or out of it. 3. As Paul himself says, he knew “a man [who was] caught up to the third heaven” (2 Cor. 12:2). But man means that which is made up of the union of the body and the soul. Therefore, he knew that the soul was united to the body. 4. He himself knew that he was enraptured, as is clear from what he says. But dead people are not said to be enraptured. Therefore, he knew that he was not dead. Therefore, he knew that his soul was joined to his body. 5. As Augustine says, in the rapture he saw God with that vision with which the saints in heaven see God. But the souls of the saints in heaven know whether they are in the body or out of it. Therefore, the Apostle also knew this. 6. Gregory says: “What is there that they do not see who see Him who sees everything?” This seems to refer especially to the things which pertain to those who are seeing. But whether it is united to the body or not has very special pertinence to the soul. Therefore, the soul of Paul knew whether it was united to the body or not. To the Contrary In the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:2) it says: “I know a man in Christ above fourteen years ago, whether in the body, I know not, or out of the body, I know not; God knoweth.” Therefore, he did not know whether he was in the body or out of the body. REPLY There are many opinions on this point. For some have understood the Apostle to say that what he did not know was not whether he was in the body or not, but whether the rapture was one of the soul and the body together, so that he was carried bodily to heaven, as we read in Daniel (14:35) that Habakkuk was transported, or whether it was a rapture of the soul alone, that is, in the visions of God, as is said in Ezechiel (40:2): “In the visions of God he brought me into the land of Israel.” And Jerome adopts this interpretation of a certain Jew when he says: “Finally, our Apostle, too, did not dare to assert that he was caught up in body, but said: “Whether in body or out of the body, I know not....” Augustine, however, disapproves of this interpretation. For it is clear from the words of the Apostle that he himself knew that he was caught up to the third heaven. Therefore, it is clear that that heaven to which he was transported was truly heaven, and not some likeness of heaven. For, if he had wanted to mean that, when he said he was caught up to heaven, he was transported in order to see a likeness of heaven in his imagination, he could have asserted in the same way that he was transported in the body, that is, to a likeness of this body. Thus, it would not have been necessary to distinguish between what he knew and what he did not know, since he would know both equally, that is, that he was in heaven and that he was transported in the body, that is, to a likeness of the body, as happens in dreams. Therefore, he knew for certain that that to which he was transported was really heaven. Therefore, he knew whether it was a body or something incorporeal. For, if it was a body, he was transported to it bodily, but, if it was something incorporeal, he could not be transported to it bodily. Therefore, it remains that the Apostle did not doubt whether he was enraptured bodily or only spiritually, but knew that he was transported to that heaven only in his understanding. However, he did have doubts whether in that rapture his soul was in his body, or not. Some others concede this, but say that, although during the rapture the Apostle did not know this, he did, nevertheless, know it afterwards, surmising it from the vision which he had had. For in the rapture his whole mind was given over to things divine, and he did not perceive whether his soul was in his body or not. But this opinion, too, is openly opposed to what the Apostle says. For, as he distinguishes what he knew and did not know, so he distinguishes the present from the past. And he speaks of the man enraptured, as in the past, fourteen years before, but he admits, as in the present, that he knows something and does not know something. Therefore, fourteen years after that rapture he still did not know whether he was in the body or not when the rapture took place. Hence, others have said that he did not know either during the rapture or after it whether his soul was in the body to some extent and not completely. For they say that he knew both then and afterwards that his soul was united to the body as its form, but did not know whether it was so united to it that it could receive something from the senses. Or, according to others, he did not know whether the nutritive powers exercised their activities by means of which the soul takes care of the body. But this, too, does not seem to fit the words of the Apostle, for he said with no reservations that he did not know whether he was in the body or out of it. Furthermore, it would not seem very much to the point to say that he did not know whether the soul was in the body in this way or that way, when these did not cut the soul off entirely from the body. Therefore, we have to say that he simply did not know whether his soul was united to the body or not. This is the conclusion which Augustine reaches after a long investigation, when he says: “Perhaps, then, we should conclude that he was ignorant of this matter: while he was transported to the third heaven, was he in the body—that is, as the soul of one awake, or asleep, or in ecstasy and completely unconscious of the bodily senses, is in the body when the body is said to be alive—or did he leave the body completely so that the body lay dead until, the vision finished, the soul returned to the dead members, and he was not as one awaking from sleep or returning to his senses from the transport of ecstasy, but as one completely dead returning to life? Answers to Difficulties 1. As Augustine says: “The Apostle doubts whether he was in the body or out of it. Hence, if he is in doubt, which of us dares to be certain?” Thus, Augustine leaves the question undecided. When later writers take a stand on this question, they are speaking with probability rather than with certitude. For, since it could happen that one would be enraptured in the way the Apostle says he was enraptured while his soul remained united to the body, as is clear from what has been said, it is more probable that it did remain united to the body. 2. The reason given here holds against the interpretation of the words of the Apostle first given, in which he is considered to have doubted not about the state of the one enraptured, that is, whether the soul was united to the body, but of the manner of the rapture, namely, whether the rapture was bodily or only spiritual. 3. Through synecdoche, sometimes only a part of man is called man, especially the soul, which is the more noble part of man. Yet this can also be taken to mean that the one who he says was enraptured was not a man during the rapture, but was a man fourteen years later, that is, when the Apostle said this. 4. Granted that in that state the soul of the Apostle was separated from the body, that separation was not due to any natural mode of acting, but to the divine power which transported the soul out of the body, not to have it remain separated permanently, but for a time, and to this extent one can be said to be enraptured, although not every dead person can be said to be enraptured. 5. As Augustine says: “When the Apostle was carried out of the senses of the body to the third heaven and paradise, he certainly fell short of the full and perfect knowledge of things which the angels have, in so far as he did not know whether he was in the body or outside of it. And, so, this will not be lacking when this corruption puts on incorruption in the resurrection of the dead.” Thus, it is clear that his vision was to some extent more imperfect than the sight of the blessed, although in some respects it was like theirs. 6. Paul was not transported to see God in order to have beatitude without qualification, but to be a witness of the beatitude of the saints and of the divine mysteries which were revealed to him. Consequently, he saw in the vision of the Word only those things the knowledge of which the rapture was ordained to communicate. Thus, he did not see everything as the blessed do, especially after the resurrection. For, then, as Augustine adds to the words already cited: “All things will be plain, and there will be no falsity nor ignorance.”",
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        "text": "Quid sit raptus. Quæstio est de raptu; et primo quæritur quid sit raptus. Describitur autem a Magistris sic: « Raptus est ab eo quod est secundum naturam, in id quod est contra naturam, vi superioris naturæ elevatio; » et videtur quod inconvenienter. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, II De lib. arb., capit. 1x, « intelligentia hominis naturaliter præcognoscit Deum. » Sed in raptu elevatur hominis intellectus ad Dei cognitionem. Ergo non elevatur in id quod est contra naturam, sed quod est secundum naturam.\n\n2. Præterea, magis dependet spiritus creatus ab increato quam corpus inferius a superiori. Sed impressiones superiorum corporum sunt inferioribus corporibus naturales, ut dicit Commentator in III Cæli et mundi, comm. xx a med. Ergo nec elevatio spiritus humani, quamvis fiat vi superioris naturæ, est nisi naturalis.\n\n3. Præterea, Roman. 11, superill ud: Contra naturam insertus est in bonam sentiam sine hoc quod abstrahatur a sensibus; 4° utrum abstractio requiratur ad hoc quod intellectus possit videre Deum per essentiam; 5° quæritur, quid est illud quod Apostolus circa raptum suum scivit, et quid non scivit. olivam, dicit Glossa ordin., quod Deus auctor naturæ nihil contra naturam facit; quia hoc est unicuique naturale quod ab eo accipit a quo est modus omnis et ordo naturæ. Sed elevatio raptus fit a Deo qui est conditor humanæ naturæ. Ergo non est contra naturam, sed secundum naturam. 4. Sed dicendum quod dicitur esse contra naturam, quia fit divinitus, non per modum spiritus humani. — Sed contra, Dionysius dicit, De divin. nomin., cap. vIII, § VII, -5, quod justitia Dei in hoc attenditur, quia omnibus rebus distribuit secundum suum modum et dignitatem. Sed Deus non potest aliquid facere contra suam justitiam. Ergo nulli rei aliquid tribuit quod non sit secundum modum ejus.\n\n5. Præterea, si modus hominis quantum ad aliquid mutetur, non mutatur hoc modo quod hominis bonum auferatur; quia Deus non est causa quare sit homo deterior, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. LXXXIII Quæst. Sed bonum hominis est secundum rationem vivere et voluntarie operari, ut patet per Dionysium, De divin. nomin., cap. iv, § II, Cum ergo violentia sit contraria voluntario, et donum rationis evacuet, ex hoc enim necessitas est contristans quod est contraria voluntati, ut dicitur V Metaph., com. vi; videtur quod divinitus non fiat in homine aliqua violenta elevatio contra naturam; quod esse videtur in raptu, ut ipsum nomen importat, et descriptio prædicta designat in hoc quod dicit, « vi superioris naturæ. »\n\n6. Præterea, secundum Philosophum in III De anima, com. vii, excellentiæ sensibilium corrumpunt sensum, non autem excellentiæ intelligibilium intellectum. Sed ideo sensus deficit a cognitione excellentium sensibilium, quia ab eis corrumpitur. Ergo intellectus naturaliter potest quantumcumque excellentia intelligibilia cognoscere. Ad quæcumque igitur intelligibilia mens hominis elevetur, non erit elevatio contra naturam.\n\n7. Præterea, Augustinus (alius Auctor) dicit in lib. De spiritu et anima, quod « Angelus et anima natura sunt pares, officio dispares. » Sed non est contra naturam Angeli cognoscere ea ad quæ homines elevantur in raptu. Ergo nec elevatio raptus est homini contra naturam.\n\n8. Præterea, si aliquis motus sit naturalis; et perventio ad terminum motus est naturalis; cum nullus motus sit infinitus. Sed mens hominis movetur naturaliter in Deum; quod patet ex hoc quod non quiescit nisi ad eum pervenerit; unde Augustinus in I Confessionum, cap. i ante med.: « Fecisti nos, Domine, ad te; et inquietum est cor nostrum donec quiescat in te. » Ergo elevatio illa qua mens pertingit ad Deum, ut est in raptu, non est contra naturam. 9. Sed dicebat quod ferri in Deum non est naturale humanæ menti ex se ipsa, sed ex præstitutione divina; et sic non est simpliciter naturale. — Sed contra: inferior natura non operatur nec tendit in aliquem finem nisi ex præstitutione divina; ratione cujus dicitur omne opus naturale, opus intelligentiæ; et tamen rerum naturalium dicimus esse naturales motus simpliciter, et operationes. Ergo et ferri in Deum, si sit naturale menti ex præstitutione divina, debet judicari simpliciter naturale.\n\n10. Præterea, prius est anima in se, secundum quod spiritus dicitur, quam prout est conjuncta corpori, secundum quod dicitur anima. Sed animæ, inquantum est spiritus quidam, actus ejus est cognoscere Deum, et alias substantias separatas; inquantum vero est corpori conjuncta, actus ejus est cognoscere res sensibiles. Ergo per prius est animæ cognoscere intelligibilia quam sensibilia. Cum igitur cognitio sensibilium sit animæ naturalis; et cognitio divinorum intelligibilium est ei naturalis; et sic idem quod prius.\n\n11. Præterea, naturalius ordinatur aliquid ad ultimum terminum quam ad medium, cum per medium ordo sit ad ultimum. Sed res sensibiles sunt quædam media quibus pervenitur ad cognitionem Dei, Rom. i, 20: Invisibilia Dei, per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. Sed cognitio sensibilium est homini naturalis. Ergo et cognitio intelligibilium; et sic idem quod prius.\n\n12. Præterea, nihil quod fit virtute aliqua naturali, potest dici simpliciter esse contra naturam. Sed quædam res, ut herbæ vel lapides, habent naturales virtutes evocandi mentem a sensibus ut quædam mirabilia cernantur; quod vide-tur esse in raptu. Ergo raptus non est elevatio contra naturam.\n\nSed contra est quod II Corinth. xii, super illud: Scio hominem, dicit Glossa ordin.: « Raptum, idest contra naturam elevatum. »\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod sicut cujuslibet alterius rei est quædam operatio naturalis rei, inquantum est hæc res, ut ignis aut lapidis; ita etiam hominis est quædam operatio inquantum est homo, quæ est ei naturalis. In rebus autem naturalibus dupliciter contingit transmutari rem aliquam a sua operatione naturali. Uno modo ex defectu propriæ virtutis, undecumque talis defectus contingat, sive ex causa extrinseca, sive ex intrinseca; sicut est cum ex defectu virtutis formativæ in semine generatur fetus monstruosus. Alio modo ex operatione divinæ virtutis, cui omnis natura ad nutum obedit; sicut fit in miraculis; ut cum virgo concipit, vel cæcus illuminatur. Et similiter etiam homo a sua naturali et propria operatione dupliciter immutari potest '. Est autem hominis operatio propria intelligere mediante imaginazione et sensu: operatio enim ejus qua solis intellectualibus inhæret, omnibus inferioribus prætermissis, non est ejus inquantum est homo, sed inquantum aliquid in eo divinum existit, ut dicitur X Ethic., capit. vii a med.; operatio vero qua solis sensibilibus inhæret præter intellectum et rationem, non est ejus inquantum est homo, sed secundum naturam quam cum brutis habet communem. Tunc igitur a naturali modo suæ cognitionis transmutatur, quando a sensibus abstractus aliqua præter sensum inspirit. Hæc igitur transmutatio quando fit ex defectu propriæ virtutis, sicut accidit in phreneticis, et aliis mente captis; et hæc quidem abstractio a sensibus non est elevatio hominis, sed potius depressio. Aliquando vero talis abstractio fit virtute divina: et tunc proprie elevatio quædam est: quia cum agens assimilet sibi patiens, abstractio quæ fit virtute divina, quæ est supra hominem, est in aliquid altius quam sit naturale homini. Sic ergo in descriptione raptus, qua definitur ut quidam motus, tangitur ejus genus in hoc quod dicitur « elevatio » causa efficiens in hoc quod dicitur « vi superioris naturæ; » et duo termini motus « a quo, » et « in quem, » cum dicitur, « ab eo quod est secundum naturam in id quod est contra naturam. »\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod cognoscere Deum contingit multipliciter: scilicet per essentiam suam, et per res sensibiles, aut etiam per effectus intelligibles. Similiter etiam distinguendum est de eo quod est homini naturale. Uni enim et eidem rei est aliquid contra naturam et secundum naturam, secundum ejus status diversos; eo quod non est eadem natura rei dum est in fieri, et dum est in perfecto esse, ut dicit Rabbi Moyses; sicut quantitas completa est naturalis homini cum ad perfectam pervenit αtatem; esset autem contra naturam puero, si in perfecta quantitate nasceretur. Sic igitur dicendum est quod intelligentiæ humanæ secundum quem-libet statum est naturale aliquo modo cognoscere Deum; sed in sui principio, scilicet in statu viæ, est ei naturale quod cognoscit Deum per creaturas sensibiles. Est etiam ei naturale quod perveniat ad cognoscendum Deum per se ipsum in sui consummatione, scilicet in patria; et si in statu viæ elevetur ad hoc quod cognoscat Deum secundum statum patriæ, hoc erit contra naturam, sicut esset contra naturam quod puer mox natus haberet barbam.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod duplex est natura; scilicet particularis, quæ est propria uniuscujus rei; et universalis, quæ complectitur totum ordinem causarum naturalium. Ex hoc dicitur esse dupliciter aliquid secundum naturam vel contra naturam: uno modo quantum ad naturam particularem; alio modo quantum ad universalem; sicut omnis defectus et corruptio et senium est contra naturam particularem; sed tamen naturale est secundum naturam universalem ut omne compositum ex contrariis corrumpatur. Quia igitur ordo universalis causarum hoc habet ut inferiora a suis superioribus moveantur; omnis motus qui fit in inferiori natura ex impressione superioris, sive in corporalibus sive in spiritualibus, est quidem naturalis secundum naturam universalem, non autem secundum naturam particularem; nisi quando a superiori sic imprimitur in naturam inferiorem, ut ipsa impressio sit ejus natura. Et sic patet quomodo ea quæ a Deo in creaturis fiunt, possunt dici secundum naturam, vel contra. Unde et patet responsio ad tertium. Vel dicendum quod ista elevatio dicitur esse contra naturam, quia est contra solitum cursum naturæ, sicut Glossa exponit Rom. 11.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod Deus, quamvis nunquam contra justitiam faciat, tamen aliquid præter justitiam facit. Tunc enim est aliquid contra justitiam, cum subtrahitur alicui quod sibi debetur; ut patet in humanis, cum quis alteri furatur. Si vero ex liberalitate quadam tribuat quod non est debitum, hoc non est contra justitiam, sed præter. Sic igitur cum Deus mentem humanam in statu viæ elevat supra modum suum, non facit contra justitiam, sed præter.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod opus hominis, ex hoc quod habet bonitatem meriti, exigit ut sit secundum rationem et voluntatem. Sed bonum quod ei conferitur in raptu, non est hujusmodi; unde non oportet quod procedat ex voluntate humana, sed sola virtute divina. Nec tamen potest dici omnino violentia, nisi sicut dicitur motus violentus quando lapis projicitur deorsum velocius quam sit dispositio motus naturalis: proprie tamen violentum est in quo nihil confert vim patiens, ut dicitur, Ethic., cap.1, circa med.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod hoc est commune intellectui et sensui quod uterque deficit a perfecta perceptione excellentis objecti, etsi uterque de eo aliquid accipiat. Sed in hoc est differentia: quod ex hoc quod sensus ab excellenti sensibili movetur, corrumpitur, ut non possit postmodum minora sensibilia cognoscere; sed per hoc quod intellectus accipit de intelligibili excellenti, confor-tatur, ut melius postmodum possit minora intelligibilia cognoscere: unde auctoritas Philosophi non est ad propositum.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod Angelus et anima non dicuntur esse pares natura nisi quantum ad statum ultimæ consumationis, in quo homines erunt sicut Angeli in cœlo, ut dicitur Matth. xxii. Vel dicendum quod communicant in natura intellectuali, quamvis in Angelis invenia-tur perfectior.\n\nAd octavum dicendum quod perventio ad terminum motus naturalis est naturalis, non quidem in principio vel medio, sed in fine motus; et propter hoc non se-quitur.\n\nAd nonum dicendum quod operationes rerum naturalium, quæ sunt ex præstitu-tione divina, dicuntur naturales quando principia illarum operationum sunt rebus indita, sicut sunt earum naturæ; non autem sic a Deo præstituitur homini elevatio raptus.\n\nAd decimum dicendum quod illud quod est prius in intentione naturæ, est posterius tempore, sicut se habet actus ad potentiam in eodem susceptibili: quia esse in actu est prius a natura, quamvis una et eadem res prius tempore sit in potentia quam in actu. Et similiter operatio animæ, inquantum est spiritus, est prior quantum ad intentionem naturæ, sed posterior tempore; unde, si una operatio fiat in tempore alterius, hoc erit contra naturam.\n\nAd undecimum dicendum quod quam-vis ordo ad medium sit propter ordinem ad ultimum, tamen ad ultimum non pervenitur naturaliter nisi per medium: et si aliter fiat, erit perventio non naturalis; et sic est in proposito.\n\nAd duodecimum dicendum quod illa abstractio a sensibus quæ fit virtute naturalium rerum aliquarum, reducitur in illam abstractionem quæ fit ex defectu propriæ virtutis: non enim illæ res habent naturam a sensibus abstrahendi, nisi inquantum obstupefaciunt sensus; unde patet quod talis abstractio a sensu est aliena a raptu.\n\nSecundo quæritur utrum Paulus in raptu viderit Deum per essentiam; et videtur quod non. Eph. viii, super illud: Tenebris obscuratum habentes intellectum, Glossa: « Omnis qui intelligit, quadam luce minori illustratur. » Si ergo intellectus elevetur ad videndum Deum, oportet quod illustretur aliqua luce ad hujusmodi visionem proportionata. Sed lux talis non est nisi lux gloriæ, de qua dicitur in Psal. xxxv, 10: In lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Ergo Deus per essentiam vi-deri non potest nisi ab intellectu beato; et 1 Paulus in raptu cum glorificatus non esset Deum per essentiam videre non potuit. 2. Sed dicendum quod Paulus ut tunc beatus fuit. — Sed contra: perpetuitas est de ratione beatitudinis, ut dicit Augustinus, De civitate Dei, lib. XI, cap. 11, circa med. Sed status ille non mansit in Paulo in perpetuum. Ergo in statu illo non fuit beatus.\n\n5. Præterea, Paulus in raptu habuit fidem et spem. Sed ista non possunt simul stare cum visione Dei per essentiam; quia fides est de his quæ non apparent, ut dicitur Hebr. xi, et quod videt quis, quidsperat? ut dicitur Rom. viii, 24. Ergo 2 non vidit Deum per essentiam.\n\n6. Præterea, caritas patriæ non est principium merendi. Sed Paulus in raptu fuit in statu merendi, quia ejus anima non-dum erat a corpore corruptibili soluta, ut dicit Augustinus, XII Super Genes. ad litteram, cap. v. Ergo non habuit caritatem patriæ. Sed ubi est visio patriæ, quæ est perfecta, ibi est caritas patriæ, quæ est perfecta: quia quantum de Deo quisque cognoscit, tantum diligit. Ergo non vidit Deum per essentiam.\n\n7. Præterea, divina essentia sine gaudio videri non potest, ut dicit Augustinus, I De Trinit. Si ergo Paulus vidit Deum per essentiam, in ipsa visione delectabatur; non ergo volebat ab ea separari; nec iterum Deus eum separavit invitum, quia, cum ipse sit summe liberalis, sua bona, quantum in se est, non subtrahit. Ergo Paulus ab illo statu nunquam separatus fuisset; quod falsum est; ergo non vidit Deum per essentiam. 8. Item, nullus habens aliquod bonum ex merito, amittit illud sine peccato. Cum igitur videre Deum per essentiam sit quoddam bonum quod habetur ex merito, nullus Deum per essentiam videns potest ab hac visione removeri, nisi forte contingeret ipsum peccare; quod de Paulo dici non potest, qui de se dicit Roman. viii, 38: Certus sum quod neque mors neque vita, neque Angeli neque Principatus neque Virtutes, neque instantia neque futura, neque fortitudo neque altitudo neque profundum, neque creatura alia poterit nos separare a caritate Dei; et sic idem quod prius. Item quæritur, cum Paulus dicatur raptus, in quo differt ejus raptus a sopore Adæ, et raptu Joannis Evangelistæ, secundum quem dicit se in spiritu fuisse, Apocal. i, et ab excessu mentis in quo fuit Petrus, Act. ii.\n\nSed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XII Super Genes. ad litteram, cap. xxviii, et ad Paulinam De videndo Deum, epistol. cxLVII, olim. cxII, cap. xII, et quod habetur in Glossa II Corinth. xii; ex quibus omnibus habetur quod Paulus in raptu vidit Deum per essentiam.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod circa hoc quidam dixerunt quod Paulus in raptu non vidit Deum per essentiam, sed quadam visione media inter visionem viæ et visionem patriæ; quæ quidem visio media potest intelligi talis qualis est Angelo naturalis, ut scilicet videat Deum non quidem per essentiam cognitione naturali, sed per aliquas species intelligibiles, utpote considerando essentiam suam, quæ est quædam similitudo intelligibilis essentiæ increatæ, prout dicitur in libro De causis, quod intelligentia scit quod est supra se inquantum est creata ab eo; ut sic intelligatur Paulus in raptu vidisse Deum per resultantiam alicujus luminis intelligibilis in mente ipsius. Cognitio vero viæ, quæ est per speculum et aenigma sensibilium creaturarum, est homini naturalis; sed cognitio patriæ, qua Deus per suam essentiam videtur, est soli Deo naturalis. Sed hæc positio repugnat dictis Augustini, qui expresse dicit in supradicis locis, quod Paulus in raptu vidit Deum per essentiam. Nec est probabile ut minister veteris testamenti ad Judæos Deum per essentiam viderit, ut habetur ex hoc quod dicitur Num. xii, 8: Palam, et non per ænigmata, videt Deum; et ministro novi testamenti, Doctori Gentium, hoc concessum non fuerit; præcipue cum ipse Apostolus sic argumentetur, II Corinth. Ⅲ, 9: Si ministratio damnationis fuit in gloria, multo magis abundat ministerium justitæ in gloria. Nec tamen beatus fuit simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid, quamvis mens ejus illustrata fuerit supernaturali lumine ad Deum videndum. Quod quidem apparere potest exemplo luminis corporalis. In quibusdam enim inventur lumen a sole, ut quædam forma manens quasi connaturalis effecta, sicut in stellis, et in carbunculo, et hujusmodi. In quibusdam vero recipitur lumen a Sole sicut quædam passio transiens, sicut in aere; non enim efficitur lumen forma permanens in aere quasi connaturalis, sed transit abeunte sole. Similiter et lumen gloriæ dupliciter menti infunditur. Uno modo per modum formæ connaturalis factæ, et permanentis; et sic facit mentem simpliciter beatam; et hoc modo infunditur beatis in patria. Alio modo contingit lumen gloriæ mentem humanam sicut quædam passio transiens; et sic mens Pauli in raptu fuit lumine gloriæ illustrata. Ipsum etiam nomen raptim et transeundo ostendit hoc esse factum. Unde non fuit simpliciter glorificatus, nec habuit dotem gloriæ, cumilla claritas non fuerit effecta proprietas ejus; et propter hoc non fuit derivata ab anima in corpus, nec in statu perpetuo man-sit. Unde patet responsio ad quatuor primas rationes.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod adveniente plena visione recedit fides. Unde secundum hoc quod in Paulo fuit visio Dei per essentiam, non fuit ibi fides; fuit autem ibi visio Dei per essentiam secundum actum, non secundum habitum gloriæ. Unde e contrario fuit ibi secundum habitum fides, non secundum actum; similiter spes.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod quamvis Paulus tunc fuerit in statu merendi, non tamen in actu tunc merebatur; quia sicut habuit actum visionis patriæ, ita habuit actum caritatis patriæ. Quidam tamen dicunt quod quamvis habuit actum visionis patriæ, non tamen habuit actum caritatis patriæ; quia si intellectus fuit raptus, non tamen fuit raptus ejus affectus. Sed hoc est expresse contra id quod habetur II Corinth. xii: Raptus est in paradisum; Glossa. interlin.: « idest in eam tranquillitatem qua fruuntur illi qui sunt in Hierusalem. » Fruitio autem est per amorem.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod hoc fuit ex ipsa conditione luminis mentem illustrantis, quod visio illa in Paulo non permansit, ut ex dictis, in corp. art., patet.\n\nUtrum intellectus alicujus viatoris elevari possit ad videndum Deum per essentiam, præter hoc quod a sensibus abstrahatur. — II-II, qu. clxxv, art. iv. Tertio quæritur utrum intellectus alicujus viatoris possit elevari ad videndum Deum per essentiam, sine hoc quod a sensibus abstrahatur; et videtur quod sic. Eadem enim est natura hominis in statu viæ et post resurrectionem; non enim idem numero resurgeret, nisi etiam idem spiritus esset. Sed post resurrectionem Sancti videbunt mente Deum per essentiam sine hoc quod a sensibus aliqua abstractio fiat. Ergo in viatoribus idem possibile erit. 2. Sed diceres quod corpus viatoris, quia corruptibile est, aggravat intellectum, ne libere in Deum ferri possit, nisi XV. a corporis sensibus abstrahatur; quæ quidem corruptio post resurrectionem non est. — Sed contra: nihil impeditur, sicut nec patitur, nisi a suo contrario. Sed corruptio corporis non videtur contrariari actui intellectus, cum intellectus non sit corporis actus. Ergo corruptio corporis non impedit quin intellectus libere possit ferri in Deum.\n\n3. Præterea, constat quod Christus nostram mortalitatem et corruptionem pœnæ assumpsit. Sed intellectus ejus continue Dei visione fruebatur, cum tamen in eo non fieret semper abstractio ab exterioribus sensibus. Ergo corruptio non facit ut intellectus ferri non possit in Deum sine hoc quod a sensibus abstrahatur.\n\n4. Præterea, Paulus postquam Deum per essentiam viderat, memor fuiteorum quæ in illa visione conspexit; alias non diceret II Cor. xii, 4, quod audivit arcana verba quæ non licet homini loqui, si eorum immemor esset. Ergo dum Deum per essentiam videbat, videbat aliquid quod in ejus memoriam imprimebatur. Sed memoria ad partem sensitivam pertinet, ut patet per Philosophum in lib. De memoria et reminiscentia, cap. 1 non procul a fin. Ergo cum quis in statu viæ videt Deum per essentiam, non omnino abstrahitur a corporeis sensibus.\n\n5. Præterea, propinquiores sunt potentiæ sensitivæ sibi invicem quam intellectivæ sensitivis. Sed imaginatio, quæ est de potentiis sensitivis, potest esse in actu comprehensionis quorum-cumque imaginabilium sine abstractione ab exterioribus sensibus. Ergo et intellectus potest esse in actu visionis divinæ sine abstractione a potentiis sensitivis.\n\n6. Præterea, illud quod est secundum naturam non exigit ad sui præxistentiam aliquid eorum quæ sunt contra naturam. Sed naturale est intellectui humano quod Deum per essentiam videat, cum ad hoc creatus sit. Cum ergo abstractio a sensibus homini sit contra naturam, cum sensitiva cognitio sit ei connaturalis; videtur quod ad videndum Deum per essentiam, abstractione a sensibus non indigeat.\n\n7. Præterea, abstractio non est nisi unitorum. Sed intelligentia, cujus objectum est Deus, ut dicitur in lib. De spiritu et anima, cap. xii, non videtur corporeis sensibus esse conjuncta, sed maxime distans. Ergo ad hoc quod Deum per essentiam videat homo per intelligentiam, non indiget abstractione a sensibus.\n\n8. Præterea, ad hoc videtur Paulus ad Dei visionem esse elevatus, ut testis existeret illius gloriæ quæ Sanctis repromittitur: unde Augustinus dicit, X Super Genes. ad litteram, lib. XII, cap. xxviii circa med.: « Cur non credamus quod tanto Apostolo, Doctori gentium, rapto usque ad ipsam excellentissimam visionem, voluerit Deus demonstrare vitam in qua post hanc vitam vivendum est in aternum? » Sed in illa Sanctorum visione quæ post hanc vitam erit in videntibus Deum, non fiet abstractio a sensibus corporeis pos resurrectionem. Ergo nec in Paulo hujusmodi abstractio facta fuisse videtur, cum Deum per essentiam vidit.\n\n9. Præterea, martyres in ipsis tormentorum suppliciis interius aliquid de divina gloria percipiebant: unde Vincentius in sua Legenda: « Ecce jam in sublime agor, et omnes principes tuos sæculo altior, tyranne, despicio; » et Laurentius: « Mea nox obscurum non habet, sed omnia in luce clarescunt; » et in aliis Sanctorum passionibus multa leguntur quæ hoc sonare videntur. Sed constat quod in eis non fiebat abstractio a sensibus: alias sensum doloris non habuissent. Ergo ad hoc quod aliquis sit particeps gloriæ, qua Deus per essentiam videtur, non requiritur abstractio a sensibus.\n\n10. Præterea, propinquior est operationi quæ circa sensibilia versatur intellectus practicus quam speculativus. Sed non est necessarium quod intellectus practicus semper intendat his quæ homo circa sensibilia operatur, ut Avicenna dicit in Sufficientia sua: alias contingeret quod optimus cytharedus imperfectissimus videretur, si ad singulas chordarum percussiones oporteret eum artis consideratione uti: fieret enim nimia sonorum interruptio, quæ impediret debitam melodiam. Ergo multo minus intellectus speculativus cogitur intendere his quæ homo circa sensibilia operatur; et sic liberum ei remanet in quamlibet intelligentiam ferri, etiam in ipsam divinam essentiam, dum sensitivæ vires circa operationes sensibiles occupantur.\n\n11. Præterea, Paulus dum vidit Deum per essentiam, adhuc fidem habebat. Sed fidei est videre per speculum in aenigmate. Ergo Paulus simul dum videbat Deum per essentiam, videbat per speculum in aenigmate. Sed aenigmatica cognitio est specularis, et est per sensibilia. Ergo simul dum videbat Deum per essentiam, sensibilibus intendebat; et sic idem quod prius.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex auctoritate Augustini, in argum. patet, homo in hoc mortali corpore constitutus non potest Deum per essentiam videre, nisi a sensibus corporeis alienetur. Cujus ratio ex duobus potest sumi. Primo quidem ex hoc quod est commune intellectui et aliis animæ potentiis: hoc enim in omnibus animæ potentiis invenimus, quod quando una potentia in suo actu intenditur, alia vel debilitatur in suo actu, vel ex toto abstrahitur; sicut patet in illo in quo operatio visus fortissime intenditur, quod auditus ejus non percipit ea quæ dicuntur, nisi forte sua vehementia ad se trahant sensum audientis. Cujus ratio est, quia ad actum cujuslibet cognoscitivæ potentiæ requiritur intentio, ut probat Augustinus in lib. De Trin. X, cap. iv et vi. Intentio autem unius non potest ferri ad multa simul, nisi forte illa multa hoc modo sint ad invicem ordinata, ut accipiantur quasi unum; sicut nec alicujus motus vel operationis possunt esse duo termini non ad invicem ordinati. Unde, cum sit una anima, in qua omnes cognoscitivæ potentiæ fundantur; unius et ejusdem intentio requiritur ad omnium potentiarum cognoscitivarum actus: et ideo, cum totaliter anima intendat ad actum unius potentiæ, abstrahitur homo ab actu alterius potentiæ. Ad hoc autem quod intellectus elevur ad videndum divinam essentiam, oportet quod tota intentio in hanc visionem colligatur, cum hoc sit vehementisimum intelligibile, ad quod intellectus pertingere non potest, nisi toto conanime in illud intendat: et ideo oportet quando mens ad divinam visionem elevatur, quod omnino fiat abstractio a corporeis sensibus. Secundo vero potest ejusdem ratio assignari ex eo quod intellectui proprium 3 est. Cum enim cognitio de rebus lium phantasiarum, quia omnino materiales phantasias non recipiunt, et propterea ab eis purgari non indigent, quia omnino eas non habent; sed potius ita puras, quasi mundas et alienas ab omni diminutione et imperfectione. » 3 habeatur secundum quod sunt in actu, et non secundum quod sunt in potentia ut dicitur in X Metaph. IX, comm. xx: intellectus qui summam cognitionis tenet, proprie immaterialium est, quæ sunt maxime in actu. Unde omne intelligibile vel est in se a materia immune, vel est actione intellectus a materia abstractum: et ideo, quanto intellectus purior est a materialium contactu tanto perfectior est. Et inde est quod intellectus humanus, quia materialia contingit ad phantasmata intuenda, a quibus intelligibiles species abstrahit, est minoris efficaciæ quam intellectus angelicus, qui semper ad formas pure immateriales intuetur. Nihilominus tamen, inquantum in intellectu humano puritas intellectualis cognitionis non penitus obscuratur, sicut accidit in sensibus quorum cognitio ultra materialia ferri non potest, ex hoc ipso quod in eo de puritate remanet, inest ei facultas ad ea quæ sunt pure immaterialia contuenda. Et ideo oportet, si aliquando præter communem modum ad summum immaterialium videndum, scilicet divinam essentiam, elevetur, quod saltem in illo actu positus ab intuitu materialium abstrahatur. Unde, cum sensitivæ vires non nisi circa materialia versentur, non potest aliquis ad divinam essentiam videndam elevari nisi ab usu corporeorum sensuum penitus abstrahatur.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod alia ratione conjungetur anima beata corpori post resurrectionem, et alia nunc conjungitur. In resurrectione enim corpus erit omnino spiritui subditum, intantum quod ex ipso spiritu proprietates gloriæ redundabunt in corpus, unde et spiritualia corpora appellantur. Quando autem duo adjunguntur quorum unum super alterum totaliter dominium obtinet, non est ibi mixtio, cum alterum totaliter transeat in potestatem dominantis; sicut cum una gutta aquæ in mille amphoras vini infunditur, in nullo puritati vini præjudicatur. Et ideo in resurrectione ex conjunctione ad corpus qualicumque, nulla erit impuritas intellectus, nec in aliquo virtus ejus debilitabitur: unde et sine abstractione a corporeis sensibus divinæ essentiae contemplandæ intendet. Nunc autem corpus non est hoc modo spiritui subditum; et ideo non est similis ratio.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod ex hoc corpus nostrum corruptibile est, quod ipsum corpus non est plene animæ subditum: si enim plene animæ subderetur, ex immortalitate animæ redundaret immortalitas etiam in corpus, sicut post resurrectionem erit: et exinde est quod corruptio corporis aggravat intellectum: quamvis enim secundum se intellectui non contrarietur, tamen cum sit ejus causa, intellectus puritati præjudicat.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod Christus ex hoc quod erat Deus et homo, habebat plenariam potestatem super omnes partes animæ suæ, et super corpus; unde ex virtute Deitatis, secundum quod nostræ reparationi competebat, permittebat unicuique potentiarum animæ agere id quod est ei proprium, ut dicit Damascenus, lib. III, cap. xv, inter med. et fin. De fid. orth.,; et sic non erat necessarium in ipso neque quod fieret redundantia ex una potentia in aliam, neque quod una potentia a suo actu abstraheretur per vehementiam actus alterius; unde per hoc quod intellectus ejus videbat Deum, non oportebat aliquam abstractionem a corporeis sensibus fieri. Secus autem est in aliis hominibus, in quibus ex quadam colligantia potentiarum animæ ad invicem sequitur de necessitate quod fiat redundantia vel impedimentum ex una potentia in aliam.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod Paulus postquam cessavit videre Deum per essentiam, memor fuit eorum quæ in illa visione cognoverat, per aliquas species in intellectu ipsius remanentes, quæ erant quasi quædam reliquiæ præteritæ visionis. Quamvis enim ipsum Dei Verbum per essentiam viderit, et ex ipso viso multa cognoverit, et sic illa visio nec quantum ad ipsum Verbum, nec quantum ad ea quæ videbantur in Verbo, fuerit per species aliquas, sed per solam essentiam Verbi; tamen ex ipsa aspectione Verbi imprimebantur in intellectu quædam rerum visarum similitudines, quibus postmodum cognoscere poterat ea quæ prius per essentiam Verbi viderat; et ex illis speciebus intelligibilibus per quamdam applicationem ad particulares intentiones vel formas in memoria vel in imaginatione conservatas, postmodum poterat memorari eorum quæ prius viderat, etiam secundum actum memoriae quæ est potentia sensitiva. Et sic non oportet ponere, quod in ipso actu divinæ visionis aliquid fieret in ejus memoria quæ est pars potentiæ sensitivæ, sed solum in mente.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod quamvis non per quemlibet actum imaginativæ virtutis fiat abstractio a sensibus exterioribus, fit tamen abstractio prædicta quando actus imaginationis est vehemens; et similiter non oportet quod per quemlibet actum intellectus fiat abstractio a sensibus; fiet tamen per actum vehementissimum, qui est visio Dei per essentiam.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod quamvis naturale sit intellectui humano quod quando ad visionem divinæ essentiæ perveniat; non tamen est sibi naturale quod ad hoc perveniat secundum statum viæ hujus, ut dictum est, in corp. art.; propter hoc ratio non sequitur.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod intelligentia nostra, qua divina apprehendimus, quamvis non commisceatur sensibus per viam apprehensionis, admiscetur tamen eis per viam judicii. Unde dicit Augustinus, XII Super Genesim ad litteram, cap. xxiv in princ., quod « per intelligentia lumen etiam ista inferiora dijudicantur, et ea cernuntur quæ neque sunt corpus, neque ullas gerunt formas similes corporum; » et ideo intelligentia quando a sensibus abstrahi dicitur, cum de eis non judicat, sed solis supernis inspiendis intendit.\n\nAd octavum dicendum quod substantia beatitudinis Sanctorum in visione divinæ essentiæ consistit; unde dicit Augustinus, I De Trinit., cap. viii, a med. et cap. xiii, quod visio est tota merces. Unde ex hoc quod divinam essentiam vidit, potuit esse illius beatitudinis idoneus testis; nec tamen oportuit quod omnia in se experiretur quæ beatis inerunt; sed ut ex his quæ experiebatur, etiam alia scire posset: non enim rapiebatur ut esset beatus, sed ut esset beatitudinis testis.\n\nAd nonum dicendum quod martyres in tormentis existentes percipiebant aliquid de divina gloria, non quasi eam in suo fonte bibentes, sicut illi qui Deum per essentiam vident; sed aliqua illius gloriæ aspersione refrigerabantur; unde dicit Augustinus, XV Super Genesim ad litteram, cap. xvi, a med.: « Ibi, » scilicet ubi Deus per essentiam videtur, « beata vita in suo fonte bibitur: unde aspergitur aliquid huic humanæ vitæ, ut in tentationibus hujus sæculi temperanter, juste, fortiter prudenterque vivatur. »\n\nAd decimum dicendum quod intellectus speculativus non cogitur ut attendat his quæ circa sensibilia aliquis operatur; sed potest circa alia intelligibilia negotiari. Tanta tamen potest esse in actu speculationis vehementia, quod omnino a sensibili operatione abstrahatur.\n\nAd undecimum dicendum quod quamvis in illo actu Paulus habuit habitum fidei, non tamen habuit actum.\n\nQuænam abstractio requiratur ad hoc quod intellectus Deum per essentiam videre possit. Quarto quæritur quanta abstractio requiratur ad hoc quod intellectus Deum per essentiam videre possit; et videtur quod requiratur abstractio ab ipsa unione qua anima corpori unitur ut forma. Vires enim animæ vegetabilis sunt magis materiales quam vires sensibilis animæ. Sed ad hoc quod intellectus videat Deum per essentiam, oportet quod fiat abstractio a sensibus, ut dictum est, in præc. art. Ergo multo fortius ad puritatem illius visionis requiritur quod fiat abstractio ab actibus animæ vegetabilis. Sed hæc abstractio non potest fieri in statu animalis vitæ, quamdiu anima corpori unitur ut forma; quia, ut dicit Philosophus, II Top., cap. ii a med., « nutriuntur animalia semper. » Ergo ad visionem divinæ essentiæ requiritur quod fiat abstractio ab unione qua anima corpori unitur ut forma.\n\n2. Præterea, Exod. xxxiii, super illud: Non videbit me homo et vivet, dicit Glossa Augustini: « Ostendit huic vitæ corruptibilis carnis, Deum, sicut est, aparere non posse. In illa tamen vita potest, ubi, ut vivatur, huic vitæ morien-dum est. » Et Glossa Gregorii, ibidem: « Qui sapientiam, quæ Deus est, videt, huic vitæ funditus moritur. » Sed mors est per separationem animæ a corpore, cui uniebatur ut forma. Oportet ergo fieri separationem omnimodam a corpore, ad hoc quod Deus per essentiam videatur.\n\n3. Præterea, vivere viventibus est esse, ut dicitur I De anima, com. xxxvii. Esse autem hominis viventis est per hoc quod anima corpori unitur ut forma. Sed Exod. xxxiii, 20, dicitur: Non videbit me homo et vivet. Ergo quamdiu anima corpori unitur ut forma, non potest per essentiam Deum videre.\n\n4. Præterea, fortior est unio qua unitur anima corpori ut forma, quam illa qua unitur ei ut motor, ex qua unione proveniunt operationes potentiarum per organa corporea operantes. Sed hæc secunda unio impedit visionem divinæ essentiæ, ratione cujus oportet quod fiat abstractio a sensibus corporeis, ut dictum est, art. præced. Ergo multo fortius hæc prima unio impediet; et sic oportebit ab ea abstractionem fieri.\n\n5. Præterea, potentia non elevatur supra modum essentiæ; cum potentia ab essentia fluat, et in ipsa radicetur. Si ergo essentia animæ fuerit corpori materiali unita ut forma, non poterit esse quod intellectiva potentia ad ea quæ sunt omnino immaterialia, elevetur; et sic idem quod prius.\n\n6. Præterea, major impuritas contrahitur in anima ex conjunctione ipsius ad corpus quam ex conjunctione similitudinis corporalis ad ipsam. Sed ad hoc quod mens Deum per essentiam videat, oportet eam depurari a similitudinibus corporeis, quæ apprehenduntur per imaginationem et sensum, ut dictum est, artic. præced. Ergo multo fortius oportet animam a corpore separari ad hoc quod Deum per essentiam videat.\n\n7. Præterea, II Corinth. v, 6, dicitur: Quamdiu sumus in hoc corpore, peregrinamur a Deo: per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem. Ergo quamdiu est anima in corpore, non potest Deum in sua specie videre.\n\nSed contra, Exod. xxxiii, dicit Glossa Gregorii, Moral., lib. XVIII, super illud: Non videbit me homo et vivet: « A ' quibusdam in hac carne viventibus, sed inæstimabili virtute crescentibus, potest æterna videri clæritas Dei. » Sed claritas Dei est ejus essentia, ut in eadem Glossa dicitur. Ergo ad hoc quod essentia Dei videatur, non oportet quod fiat omnimoda separatio animæ a corpore. Præterea, Augustinus, IX Super Genesim ad litteram, XII, cap. VII, et per plura, dicit quod anima rapitur non solum ad visionem imaginariam, sed ad intellec-tualem, qua ipsa veritas perspicue cernitur, facta aversione a sensibus minus quam in morte, sed plusquam in somno. Ergo ad videndum veritatem increatam de qua Augustinus ibi loquitur, non requiritur quod fiat abstractio ab unione qua anima corpori unitur ut forma. Præterea, hoc idem patet per Augustinum in Epistola ad Paulinam de videndo Deum, epist. cxLVII, olim cxII, cap. XII. « Non est, » inquit, « incredibile quibusdam Sanctis, nondum ita defunctis ut sepelienda cadavera remanerent, etiam istam excellentiam revelationis fuisse concessam, » ut scilicet Deum per essentiam viderent. Ergo anima potest Deum videre adhuc corpori unita ut forma.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod ad visionem divinæ essentiæ, quæ est actus perfectis-simus intellectus, requiritur abstractio ab illis quæ vehementiam intellectivi actus nata sunt impedire, et per eam impediuntur. Hoc autem in quibusdam contingit per se, in quibusdam per accidens. Per se quidem impediunt se invicem intellectivæ et sensitivæ operationes, tum per hoc quod in utrisque operationibus oportet intentionem esse; tum etiam quia intellectus quodammodo sensibilibus operationibus admiscetur, cum a phantasmatibus accipiat; et ita ex sensibilibus operationibus quodammodo intellectus puritas inquinatur, ut prius, art. præced., dictum est. Sed ad hoc quod anima corpori uniatur ut forma, non requiritur aliqua intentio; cum hæc unio non dependeat ex voluntate animæ, sed magis ex natura. Similiter ex tali unione puritas intellectus directe non inquinatur. Anima enim non unitur corpori ut forma mediantibus suis potentiis, sed per essentiam suam; cum nihil sit medium inter materiam et formam, ut probatur in VIII Metaphysic., com. xvi. Nec tamen essentia animæ ita corpori unitur quod totaliter corporis conditionem sequatur, sicut aliæ formæ materiales, quæ sunt omnino in materia quasi submersæ, instantum quod nulla virtus aut actio ex eis prodire potest nisi materialis. Ab essentia vero animæ non solum procedunt quæ-dam vires seu potentiæ quæ sunt quodammodo corporales, utpote corporeorum organorum actus existentes, scilicet vires sensitivæ et vegetativæ; sed vires intellectivæ, quæ sunt penitus immateriales, 1 « A quibusdam potest in hac adhuc carne... nullius corporis aut partis corporis actus existentes, ut probatur III De anima, com. vi. Unde patet quod vires intellectivæ non procedunt ex essentia animæ ex illa parte qua est corpori unita; sed magis secundum hoc quod remanet a corpore libera, utpote ei non totaliter subjugata; et sic unio animæ ad corpus non pertingit usque ad operationem intellectus, ut possit ejus puritatem impedire. Unde, per se loquendo, ad operationem intellectus, quantumcumque intenditur, non requiritur abstractio ab illa unione qua anima corpori unitur ut forma. Similiter nec requiritur abstractio ab operationnibus animæ vegetabilis. Operationes enim hujus partis animæ sunt quasi naturales; quod patet ex hoc quod complentur virtute qualitatum activarum et passivarum, scilicet calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci. Unde nec rationi sive voluntati obediunt, ut patet in I Ethic., cap. ult. Et sic patet quod ad hujusmodi actiones non requiritur intentio; et ita per earum actus non oportet intentionem averti ab operativa. Similiter nec operatio intellectiva aliquo modo hujusmodi operationibus admiscetur; cum neque ab eis accipiat, propter hoc quod non sunt cognoscitivæ; neque instrumento aliquo corporeo utatur intellectus, quod oporteat per operationes animæ vegetabilis sustentari, sicut accidit de organis potentiarum sensitivarum; et sic puritati intellectus nihil præjudicatur per operationes animæ vegetabilis. Unde patet quod per se loquendo, operatio animæ vegetabilis et operatio animæ intellectivæ non se impediunt. Per accidentes tamen potest ex altera alteri impedimentum provenire; inquantum scilicet intellectus accipit a phantasmatibus, quæ sunt in organis corporalibus, quæ oportet per actum vegetabilis animæ nutriri et conservari; et sic per actus nutritivæ potentiæ eorum dispositio variatur, et per consequens operatio potentiæ sensitivæ, a qua intellectus operatio impeditur, sicut patet in somno et post cibum; et e converso per hunc modum operatio intellectus impedit operationem animæ vegetabilis, inquantum ad operationem intellectus requiritur operatio imaginativæ virtutis, ad cujus vehementiam oportet caloris et spirituum concursum fieri; et sic impeditur actus virtutis nutritivæ per vehementiam contemplationis. Sed hoc non habet locum in illa contemplatione qua Dei essentia videtur cum talis contemplatio imaginationis operatione non egeat. Et sic patet quod ad videndum Deum per essentiam nullo modo requiritur abstractio ab actibus animæ vegetabilis, nec aliqua eorum debilitatio; sed solum ab actibus sensitivarum potentiarum.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod quamvis potentiæ animæ vegetabilis sint magis materiales quam potentiæ sensitivæ, ta men cum hoc sunt magis ab intellectu remotæ, et sic minus possunt impedire vehementiam intellectus, vel impediri ab ea.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod vivere dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo ipsum esse viventis, quod relinquitur ex hoc quod anima unitur corpori ut forma. Alio modo ponitur vivere pro operatione vitæ; et sic distinguit Philosophus in II De anima, com. xiii, vivere per intelligere et sentire, et alias animæ operationes. Et similiter, cum mors sit privatio vitæ, oportet quod similiter distinguatur; ita quod quandoque designet privationem illius unionis qua anima corpori unitur ut forma, aliquando vero privationem operum vitæ. Unde Augustinus Super Genes. ad litteram, lib. XII, cap. xxvii, circa fin.: « Ab hac vita, » inquit, « quisque quodammodo moritur, sive omnino exiens de corpore, sive aversus et alienatus a carnalibus sensibus: » et sic accipitur « mori » in Glossis inductis: quod patet ex hoc quod subjungitur in Glossa Gregorii: « Qui sapientiam, » inquit, « qui Deus est, videt, huic vitæ funditus moritur, ne ejus amore teneatur. » Et per hoc patet solutio ad tertium.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod illa unio qua anima unitur ut forma, est fortior, sequitur quod ab ea minus possit fieri abstractio.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod ratio illa recte concluseret, si essentia animæ ita corpori uniretur quod esset omnino corpori subjugata; quod falsum esse jam diximus.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod similitudo corporalis, quæ requiritur ad operationnem imaginationis et sensus, licet sit immaterialior quam ipsum corpus, tamen est vicinius se habens ad operationem intellectus; et ita magis eam impedire potest, ut dictum est.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod verbum Apostoli intelligendum est secundum quod dicimur esse in corpore, non solum ex hoc quod anima corpori unitur ut forma, sed etiam ex hoc quod corporeis sensibus utimur.\n\nQuinto quæritur quid est illud quod Apostolus circa raptum suum scivit, et quid nescivit; et videtur quod sciverit an anima ejus esset in corpore. Ipse enim melius hoc scivit quam aliquis sequentium. Sed communiter a multis determinatur quod anima Pauli in isto raptu corpori ejus uniebatur ut forma. Ergo multo fortius Paulus hoc scivit.\n\n2. Præterea, Paulus in illo raptu scivit quid viderit et qua visione viderit: quod patet ex hoc quod dicit, II Cor. xii, 2: Scio hominem... raptum usque ad tertium cælum. Scivit ergo quid esset illud cælum, utrum res corporalis vel spiritualis; et an illud spiritualiter vel corporaliter viderit. Sed ad hoc sequitur eum scivisse utrum in corpore an extra viderit: quia corporalis visio non potest fieri nisi per corpus, intellectualis vero semper est sine corpore. Ergo ipse scivit an esset in corpore, an non.\n\n3. Præterea, sicut ipsemet dicit, ipse scivit hominem raptum usque ad tertium cælum. Sed homo nominat conjunctum ex anima et corpore. Ergo scivit animam corpori esse conjunctam.\n\n4. Præterea, ipse scivit se esse raptum, ut ex verbis suis patet. Sed mortui non dicuntur rapti. Ergo scivit se non esse mortuum; et ita scivit animam esse corpori conjunctam.\n\n5. Præterea, ipse vidit Deum in raptu illa visione qua Sancti in patria vident Deum, ut dicit Augustinus IX Super Genes. ad litteram, XII, cap. xxviii, et in Epistola de videndo Deum. Sed Sanctorum animæ quæ sunt in patria, sciunt an sint in corpore, vel extra corpus. Ergo et Apostolus hoc scivit.\n\n6. Præterea, Gregorius dicit IV Dialog., cap. xxxiii, in fin.: « Quid est quod non videat qui videntem omnia videt? » quod præcipue pertinere videtur de his quæ ad ipsos videntes pertinent. Sed hoc maxime pertinet ad animam, utrum sit corpori conjuncta vel non. Ergo etc.\n\nSed contra est quod dicit I Cor. xii. 2: Scio hominem in Christo ante annos qua-tuordecim (sive in corpore nescio, sive extra corpus nescio, Deus scit) raptum hujusmodi usque ad tertium cælum. Ergo nescivit utrum esset in corpore, vel extra corpus.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod circa hoc est multiplex opinio. Quidam enim intellexerunt quod Apostolus diceret se nescire non quidem an anima esset corpori conjuncta in illo raptu an non; sed an esset raptus secundum animam et corpus simul, ut corporaliter portaretur in cælum, sicut Habacuc portatus legitur, Daniel. ult.; an secundum animam tantum, idest in visionibus Dei, sicut dicitur Ezech. xl, 2: In visionibus Dei adduxit me in terram Israel; et hunc intellectum cujusdam Judæi exprimit Hieronymus in Prologo super Daniel., vers. fin., ubi dicit 2: « Denique et Apostolum nostrum non fuisse ausum affirmare se raptum in corpore; sed dixisse: Sive in corpore etc. » Hunc autem intellectum Augustinus reprobat XII Super Genes. ad litteram, cap. 111, in princ. Constat enim ex verbis Apostoli, quod ipse scivit se esse raptum usque in tertium cælum. Constat ergo illud cælum in quod raptus est, esse vere cælum, non aliquam cæli similitudinem. Si enim hoc voluisset intelligere, cum dixit se raptum in cælum, idest ad videndum imaginariam similitudinem cæli; eodem modo poterat affirmare se raptum esse in corpore, idest in similitudinem corporis hujus; et sic non fuisset necessarium discernere quid sciret et nescire: quia utrumque aequaliter sciret; scilicet et se esse in cælo, et se raptum esse in corpore, idest in similitudine, ut accidit in somniis. Scivit ergo pro certo quod illud in quod raptus fuit, vere erat cælum; ergo scivit an esset corpus vel res incor- 1 2 Non Hieronymus ipse, sed « quidam de praeceptoribus Judæorum. » porea. Si enim erat corpus, in illud rapiebatur corporaliter; si vero erat res incorporea, in eam corporaliter rapi non poterat. Restat ergo quod Apostolus non dubitavit an raptus ille esset corporalis vel spiritualis tantum; sed scivit solo intellectu se in illud cœlum esse raptum; dubitavit autem an in ipso raptu anima ejus esset in corpore, an non: et hoc quidam alii concedunt; sed dicunt quod quamvis in illo raptu Apostolus hoc nesciverit, scivit tamen illud postea, conjiens ex ipsa visione quam prius habuerat. In illo enim raptu tota mens ejus in divina conferebatur, nec hoc percipiebat an anima esset in corpore, an non. Sed hoc etiam expresse contrariatur verbis Apostoli. Sicut enim distinguit quid sciverit et quid nesciverit, ita distinguit præsens a præterito: quasi præteritum narrat raptum hominem ante annos quatuordecim; sed quasi præsens confitetur se scire aliquid, et aliquid nescire. Ergo post annos quatuordecim ab illo raptu adhuc nesciebat an in corpore an extra corpus fuerit, quando raptus fuit. Et ideo alii dicunt quod nec in raptu scivit, nec post, an anima esset in corpore, secundum aliquem modum, et non simpliciter. Dicunt enim quod scivit, et tunc et postea, quod anima uniebatur corpori ut forma; sed nescivit utrum hoc modo corpori uniretur ut ejus anima aliquid a sensibus acciperet: vel secundum alios, utrum vires nutritivæ essent in suis actibus, secundum quas anima corpori administrat. Sed hoc etiam non videtur consonum verbis Apostoli, qui dicebat se nescire an in corpore fuerit, an extra corpus, simpliciter: et præterea hoc non multum ad rem pertinere videbatur, ut diceret se nescire utrum tali vel tali modo in corpore fuerit, ex quo anima omnino a corpore separata non erat. Et ideo dicendum quod simpliciter nescivit an anima esset corpori conjuncta vel non: et hoc est quod Augustinus, XII Super Genes. ad litteram, cap. v, a med., post longam inquisitionem concludit, dicens: « Restat ergo fortasse ut hoc ipsum eum intelligamus ignorasse, utrum quando in tertium cœlum raptus est, in corpore fuerit, quomodo est anima in corpore cum corpus vivere dicitur, sive vigilantis sive dormientis, sive in extasi a sensibus corporis alienata, an omnino de corpore exiret, ut mortuum corpus jaceret, donec peracta illa demonstratione, membris mortuis anima redderetur, et non quasi dormiens evigilaret, aut extasi alienatus rediret in sensus, sed mortuus omnino revivisceret. »\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, XII Super Genes. ad litteram, cap. 111, a med., « utrum in corpore, an extra corpus, dubitat Apostolus. Unde, illo dubitante, quis vestrum certus esse audeat? » Unde Augustinus hoc indeterminatum reliquit. Quod autem posteriores aliquid de hoc determinent, magis loquuntur ex probabilitate quam ex certitudine. Ex quo enim fieri potuit quod anima illa adhuc unita remanens hoc modo raperetur, sicut se raptum dicit Apostolus, ut ex dictis, in corp. art., patet, probabilius est quod unita remanserit.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit contra intellectum verborum Apostoli primo positum, quo intelligitur ipsum dubitasse non de conditione rapti, idest utrum anima corpori fuerit unita; sed de modo raptus, scilicet utrum raptus fuerit corporaliter, vel spiritualiter tantum.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod per synec-dochen quando pars hominis homo nominatur, et præcipue anima, quæ est hominis eminentior pars. Quamvis etiam possit intelligigi, eum quem raptum dicit, non tunc fuisse hominem quando raptus fuit; sed post annos quatuordecim, quando scilicet hoc dicebat: Scio hominem in Christo; non autem dicit hominem raptum usque ad tertium cœlum.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod dato quod fuerit in illo statu anima Apostoli a corpore separata, illa tamen separatio non fuit per aliquem naturalem modum; sed per virtutem divinam ipsam animam a corpore abstrahentem, non ad hoc quod simpliciter separata remaneret, sed ad tempus; et pro tanto raptus dici potuit, etsi non omnis mors raptus dici possit.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, XII Super Genesim ad litteram, cap. 11, circa fin.: « Apostolo arrepto a carnis sensibus in tertium cœlum et paradisum, hoc ipsum certe defuit ad plenam perfectamque cognitionem rerum quæ in Angelis est, quod sive in corpore sive extra corpus esset, nesciebat. Hoc itaque non deerit cum receptis corporibus in resurrectione mortuorum corruptibile hoc induct incorruptionem. Et sic patet quod, licet ejus visio quantum ad aliquid fuerit similis visioni beatorum, tamen quantum ad aliquid fuit imperfection.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod Paulus non fuit raptus ad videndum Deum, ut beatus esset simpliciter; sed ut testis esset beatitudinis Sanctorum, et divinorum mysteriorum, quæ ei revelata sunt. Unde illa tantum vidit in visione Verbi propter quæ cognoscenda rapiebatur, non au'em omnia, sicut erit in beatis, præcipue post resurrectionem. Tunc enim, ut Augustinus præmissis verbis subjungit, « omnia erunt evidentia, sine ulla falsitate et sine ulla ignorantia. » QUÆSTIO XIV. DE FIDE."
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