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  "chapter": {
    "num": 26,
    "slug": "26-question-26",
    "title": "Question 26",
    "of": 29,
    "words": 30276,
    "text": "> **Translation:** Robert W. Mulligan, James V. McGlynn & Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952–1954). Verbatim public-domain scholarly text — quotable.\n>\n> **Public-domain basis:** Public domain (U.S.): published 1952–1954, copyright not renewed (NYPL CCE). US public domain. Full copyright-clearance evidence: [/about/translations/#pd-evidence](/about/translations/#pd-evidence).\n>\n> **Latin source:** Vivès edition (Paris, 1871–1880), provided as a parallel Latin edition (OCR-derived — for reading and search, not verbatim quotation).\n\n## Question 26\n\nARTICLE I The question is about the passions of the soul, and in the first article we ask: How does the soul suffer when separated from the body? [Parallel readings: IV Sent. , 44, 3, 3, sol. 3 (cf. a. 2, sol. 1-3; 47, 2, 1, sol. 2 & 3); S.T. , IV, 95; Quodl. II, (7), 13; III, (10), 23; VIII, (8), 18; De spir. creat ., I ad 20; S.T. , I, 64, 4 ad 1; Q.D. de an. , 6 ad 7; 2 1; Comp. theol. , I, 180.] Difficulties It seems that it does not suffer from a corporeal fire, for 1. Augustine says: “An agent is superior to its corresponding patient.” But the soul is superior to any body whatsoever. Therefore the soul cannot suffer from corporeal fire. 2. It was said in answer that fire acts upon the soul as an instrument of divine vindictive justice.—On the contrary, an instrument accomplishes its instrumental action only by exercising its natural action, as the water of baptism sanctifies the soul by washing the body, and a saw makes a bench by cutting wood. But fire cannot have any natural action upon the soul. It therefore cannot act upon the soul as the instrument of divine justice. 3. The answer was given that the natural action of fire is to burn up, and so it naturally acts upon the soul in so far as the soul has a complement of combustibles.—On the contrary, the combustibles which are said to form the complement of the soul are sins, to which corporeal fire is not contrary. Since all natural action is by reason of contrariety, it therefore seems that the soul cannot suffer from corporeal fire as having a complement of combustibles. 4. Augustine says: “The things by which souls freed of their bodies are affected either for good or for ill are not corporeal but similar to corporeal things. Then the fire by which the separated soul is punished is not corporeal. 5. Damascene says: “The devil and his demons and his man, the Antichrist, and the wicked and sinners will be given over to eternal fire—not a material one such as is familiar to us but one such as God surely knows.” Now all corporeal fire is material. Then the fire from which the separated soul suffers is not corporeal. 6. The answer was offered that such a corporeal fire afflicts the soul inasmuch as it is seen by it, as Gregory says: “The soul suffers from fire by the very fact of seeing it”; and so what immediately afflicts the soul is not something corporeal but the apprehended likeness of something corporeal.—On the contrary, the thing seen, by being seen, is the perfection of the seer. Consequently by being seen it does not give pain to the one seeing but rather pleasure. If, then, something that is seen causes pain, this will be because it is harmful in some other way. But fire cannot afflict the soul by acting upon it in some other way, as has been proved. Then neither does the soul suffer from fire simply by seeing it. 7. Between an agent and its patient there is some proportion. But there is no proportion between an incorporeal and a corporeal being. The soul, therefore, being incorporeal, cannot suffer from corporeal fire. 8. If corporeal fire acts upon the soul in a way that is not natural, this action must be due to some superadded power. Now that power is either corporeal or spiritual. But it cannot be spiritual, because a corporeal being is not susceptible of a spiritual power. If, on the other hand, it is corporeal, fire will still not be able to act upon the soul by this power, since the soul is superior to every corporeal power. The soul therefore cannot suffer either naturally or supernaturally. 9. It was advanced in answer that by sin the soul is made less noble than a corporeal creature.—On the contrary, Augustine says that a living substance is nobler than any non-living substance. But a rational soul, even after sinning, still remains living by its natural life. It therefore does not become less noble than corporeal fire, which is a nonliving substance. 10. If corporeal fire afflicts the soul, it does so only inasmuch as it is apprehended or sensed as harmful. But a thing does harm to another by taking something away from it. Thus Augustine says that evil does harm because it takes good away. Now a corporeal fire cannot take anything away from the soul. Thus it cannot afflict it. 11. It was said that it takes away the glory of the vision of God.On the contrary, children who are damned for original sin alone are deprived of the vision of God. If, then, corporeal fire does not take away from the damned anything more, the pains of those who are being punished in hell for actual sins will be no greater than those of children who are being punished in limbo. But this is against Augustine’s doctrine. 12. Whatever acts upon another impresses upon it a likeness of the form through which the agent acts. But fire acts through heat. Now since the soul cannot be heated, it therefore seems that it cannot be acted upon by fire. 13. God is more ready to show mercy than to punish. But one who deliberately resists, especially an adult, is not helped through the instruments of divine mercy, the sacraments. Then through the instrument of divine justice, corporeal fire, the soul will not undergo punishment against its will. Obviously it does not undergo it voluntarily. Hence the soul is in no way punished through corporeal fire. 14. Whatever suffers anything from another being is in some way moved by it. But under no species of motion can the soul be moved by corporeal fire, as is clear by induction. Consequently the soul cannot suffer anything from corporeal fire. 15. Whatever is made to suffer by another has matter in common with it, as is seen from Boethius. But the soul does not have matter in common with corporeal fire. It therefore cannot suffer from corporeal fire. To the Contrary 1. The rich man buried in hell as to his soul only, says: “I am tormented in this flame.” (Luke 16:24.) 2. Commenting on the words of Job (20:26): “A fire that is not kindled shall devour him,” Gregory says: “Though the fire of hell is corporeal and corporeally burns the reprobates cast into it, it is not kindled by any human effort or fed with wood; but once created, it continues inextinguishable without needing kindling or losing its heat.” 3. Cassiodorus says” that the soul separated from the body “hears and sees with its senses more keenly” than when it is in the body. But while it is in the body it suffers from something corporeal by sensing it. All the more then does it do so when it is separated from the body. 4. Like the soul, demons are incorporeal. But demons suffer from corporeal fire, as is clear from Matthew (25:41): “Depart from me, you cursed...” So too, then, does the separated soul. 5. For the soul to be justified is something greater than for it to be punished. But certain corporeal beings act upon the soul for its justification in so far as they are instruments of divine mercy, as is evident in the case of the sacraments of the Church. Some corporeal beings, then, can likewise act upon the soul for its punishment in so far as they are instruments of divine justice. 6. What is less noble can suffer from what is more noble. But corporeal fire is nobler than the soul of a damned person. Therefore the souls of the damned can suffer from corporeal fire.—Proof of the minor: Any being at all is nobler than non-being. But non-existence is nobler than the existence of the souls of the damned, as is clear from Matthew (26:24): “It were better for him, if that man had not been born.” Then any being at all, and therefore corporeal fire, is nobler than a damned soul. REPLY To clear up this issue and those of the following articles we must understand whit passion or suffering is in its proper sense. It must therefore be home in mind that the term passion is taken in two senses: one general and the other proper. In its general sense passion is the reception of something in any way at all. This usage conforms to the root meaning of the word itself, for passion is derived from the Greek patin , meaning “to receive.” In its proper sense passion is used of motion, since action and passion consist in motion, inasmuch as it is by way of motion that reception in a patient takes place. And because all motion is between contraries, that which the patient receives must be contrary to something given up by the patient. Now conformably with what is received the patient is made like the agent; and hence it is that by passion in the proper meaning of the term the agent is opposed to the patient as its contrary, and every passion removes something from the substance of the patient. Passion in this sense, however, is found only in the motion of alteration. For in local motion nothing is received in the mobile, but the mobile itself is received in a place. But in the motion of increase and decrease what is received or given up is not a form but something substantial, like nourishment, on whose addition or subtraction the greatness or smallness of quantity depends. In generation and corruption there is no motion or contrariety except by reason of a previous alteration. Consequently passion is properly found only in alteration, in which one contrary form is received and the other is driven out. Because passion in its proper sense involves a certain loss, inasmuch as the patient is changed from its former quality to a contrary one, the term passion is broadened in usage, so that whatever is in anyway kept from what belongs to it is said to suffer ( pati ). Thus we should say that something heavy suffers when prevented from moving downward, or that a man suffers if prevented from doing his own will. Taken in the first sense, then, passion is found in the soul and in every creature, because every creature has some potentiality in its composition, and by reason of this every subsistent creature is capable of receiving something. Taken in the second sense, however, passion is found only where there is motion and contrariety. Now motion is found only in bodies, and the contrariety of forms or qualities only in beings subject to generation and corruption. Hence only such beings can properly suffer in this sense. Consequently the soul, being incorporeal, cannot suffer in this sense; for even though it receives something, this does not happen by an exchange of contraries but simply by a communication from the agent, as air is lighted by the sun. But in the third sense, in which the term passion is taken figuratively, the soul can suffer in the sense that its operation can be hampered. Some, aware that passion in a proper sense cannot be in the soul, have asserted that everything said in the Scriptures about the bodily pains of the damned is to be understood metaphorically. Thus by the bodily pains with which we are familiar there would be indicated the spiritual afflictions by which damned spirits are punished; just as on the other hand, by the bodily delights promised in Scripture we understand the spiritual delights of the blessed. Origen and Algazel seem to have been of this opinion. But because, believing in the resurrection, we believe that there will be suffering not only for spirits but also for bodies, and because bodies cannot be punished except by bodily suffering, and because the same suffering is due both to men after the resurrection and to spirits, as is clear from Matthew (25:41): “Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire it is therefore necessary to say, as Augustine proves, that even spirits are affected in some way by bodily pains. Nor is there a [Parallel between the glory of the blessed and the pains of the damned, because the blessed are raised up to a state that surpasses their nature and thus are given beatitude through the enjoyment of the divinity, whereas the damned are pushed down to a state that is below them and thus are punished even with bodily torments. Others have accordingly said that the separated soul will be affected by certain pains, to be sure, which, though not bodily, are nevertheless like bodily pains, something like the pains with which people asleep are afflicted. Augustine seeMS18 to have thought this, and also Avicenna. But this also cannot be true. For such likenesses of bodies cannot be intellectual, because intellectual likenesses are universal and attention to them would not cause affliction of the soul but rather pleasure in the contemplation of truth. This expression must therefore be understood of imaginational likenesses, which can exist only in a bodily organ, as is proved by the philosophers. But there is no such organ, of course, in the separated soul and in the spirits of the demons. Others accordingly say that the separated soul suffers from bodies themselves. How this can be is explained by some in one way and by others in another. Some say that the separated soul uses its senses, and therefore, by sensing a corporeal fire, is punished by fire. This is what Gregory seems to, say when he says: “The soul suffers from fire by the very fact of seeing it.” But that does not seem to be true; first of all because the acts of the sensitive powers cannot be had except by means of bodily organs, for otherwise the sentient souls of the brutes would be incorruptible, as being capable of having their operations by themselves; and in the second place because, granted that the separated souls would sense, they could still not be afflicted by sensible things; for the sensible object is the perfection of the sentient being as such, just as the intelligible object is the perfection of the intelligent being. It is therefore not as sensed or understood that something sensible or intelligible causes pain or sadness, but inasmuch as it is harmful or is so apprehended. Thus it is necessary to find a way in which fire can be harmful to the separated soul. Nor can it be true, as Some say, that, although corporeal fire cannot be harmful to a spirit, yet it can be apprehended as harmful. This seems to agree with what Gregory says: “Because the soul sees itself being burned, it is burned.” For it is improbable that demons, who enjoy sharpness of perception, do not know their own nature and that of corporeal fire much better than we do, so that they could falsely believe it possible for a corporeal fire to harm them. It must therefore be said that really, and not only apparently, souls are afflicted by corporeal fire. This is what Gregory says: “We can gather from the statements of the gospels that the soul suffers burning not only by seeing but also by experiencing it.” To assign the way in which this happens some say that as the instrument of divine justice corporeal fire can act upon the soul, even though it cannot do so according to its own nature. For there are many things that are not sufficient of their own nature to accomplish something which they are nonetheless able to accomplish as the instruments of another agent. Thus the element fire is not sufficient for the generation of flesh except as the instrument of the nutritive power. But this solution does not seem to be adequate, for an instrument does not perform an action which surpasses its own nature except by exercising some action natural to it, as was said in the difficulties. It is therefore necessary to find some other way in which the soul somehow suffers naturally from corporeal fire. This can be under stood as follows. An incorporeal substance may be united to a body in two ways: (1) as a form, inasmuch as it vivifies the body; and (2) as a mover is united to the thing moved or as a thing placed is united to its place, namely, by some operation or some relationship. But because there is one act of existing for the form and that of which it is the form, the union of a spiritual substance to a corporeal one after the manner of a form is a union in the act of existing. Now the existence of no being lies within its own power; and consequently it is not within the power of a spiritual substance to be united to a body or to be separated from it after the manner of a form, but this is accomplished either by a law of nature or by the divine power. But because the operation of a thing which operates voluntarily is within its own power, it is within the power of a spiritual nature, conformably to the order of nature, to be united to a body or to be separated from it after the manner of a mover or of a thing placed; but that a spiritual substance thus united to a body should be confined and hampered and, as it were, fettered by it, that is above nature. The corporeal fire in question, then, acting as the instrument of divine justice, accomplishes something above the power of nature, that is, to confine or fetter the soul; but the union itself in the manner mentioned is natural. The soul accordingly suffers from corporeal fire in the third way proposed above, namely, in the sense in which we say that anything suffers which is obstructed in its proper activity or kept from something which belongs to it. Augustine affirms this sort of passion when he says: “Why should we not say that even incorporeal spirits can be afflicted by the punishment of corporeal fire in true though wonderful ways if the spirits of men, which are also unquestionably incorporeal, both could now be enclosed in bodily members and will in the future be able to be indissolubly bound by the chains of their own bodies? The incorporeal spirits of the demons... will therefore cling to corporeal fires to be tormented, not in such a way that the fires themselves to which they cling will be animated by union with them and become living beings.... but by clinging in marvelous and inexpressible ways they will receive pain from the fires yet not give life to them.” Gregory also proposes this sort of passion, saying: “As long as Truth presents the rich sinner as damned in fire, what man of any wisdom will deny that the souls of the reprobate are held by fires?” Answers to Difficulties 1. The agent does not have to be superior to the patient in every respect, but merely as agent. And so, inasmuch as fire acts upon the soul as the instrument of divine justice, it is superior to the soul, though not in every respect. 2. There is something natural in that passion and action, as has been said. 3. That difficulty is speaking about a passion as used in the second sense, which is had through the contrariety of forms; and this is impossible in the case at hand. 4. On this matter Augustine does not expressly decide anything in the place cited, but he is speaking there by way of inquiry as if proposing a difficulty. Hence he does not say absolutely that the things by which the separated souls are affected are not corporeal but similar to corporeal things, but he is speaking hypothetically: if the things were of this kind, they could still affect the souls with joy or sorrow. In the same way, when he says that the soul is not bome to corporeal places except in company with another body, he says this as part of a disjunction, adding: “or else not locally,” that is, by commensuration to a place. 5. In the pain of a separated soul there are two principles to be taken into account: the first afflicting principle, and the proximate one. The first afflicting principle is corporeal fire itself which confines the soul as explained above. But this would not arouse sadness in the soul unless it were apprehended by the soul. The proximate afflicting principle is therefore the confining fire as apprehended; and this fire is not material but spiritual. In this sense Damascene’s statement can be verified.—Or it can be said in answer that he says it is not material because it does not punish the soul by acting materially, as it punishes bodies. 6. That fire is apprehended as harmful inasmuch as it is confining and fettering. In this sense the sight of it can be the source of affliction. 7. There is no proportion of the spiritual to the corporeal if proportion is taken in its proper sense, according to a definite relationship of quantity to quantity, either of dimensive quantity to dimensive quantity or of virtual quantity to virtual quantity, as two bodies are proportioned to each other in dimension and power; for the power of a spiritual substance is not of the same genus as corporeal power. If, however, proportion is taken broadly as meaning any relationship, then there is some proportion of the spiritual to the corporeal through which the spiritual can naturally act upon the corporeal, though not conversely except by divine power. 8. An instrument performs its instrumental activity inasmuch as it is moved by the principal agent and through this motion shares in some way in the power of the principal agent, but not so that that power has its complete existence in the instrument, because motion is an incomplete act. The difficulty argues as if a complete power were required in the instrument for the performance of the instruniental action. 9. The soul, even when sinful, is simply nobler than any corporeal power as regards its nature; but as regards guilt it is made less noble than corporeal fire, not simply but inasmuch as it is the instrument of divine justice. 10. That fire harms the soul, not in such a way that it takes away from it some form inhering in it absolutely, but in so far as it prevents its free action, confining it, as has been said. 11. In children because of the lack of grace there is only the privat ion of the vision of God without anything contrary actively hampering them. But the damned in hell are not only deprived of the vision of God because of the lack of grace, but are also hampered as by something contrary because they are overwhelmed with bodily pains. The soul does not suffer from fire as if it were altered by it but in the manner explained above. 13. Voluntariness is essential to justice but not to punishment; rather it is contrary to it. Hence the instruments of divine mercy, which are intended to justify, do not act upon a soul which resists; but the instruments of divine justice for punishing do act upon a soul which resists. 14. That difficulty argues on the supposition of a passion properly so called, which consists in motion. But we are not speaking of that now. 15. To have a passion in the proper sense of the term a thing must have matter subject to contrariety, as has been said. And for two things to have a reciprocal passion, they must have a common matter. Yet a thing can suffer from another with which it does not have any matter in common, as an inferior body suffers from the sun. And a thing which does not have any matter at all can suffer in some way, as is evident from what was said above. Answers to Contrary Difficulties Because these in some way come to true conclusions, but not by a true process, they must be answered in order. 1. Augustine shows that that proof is invalid: “I should indeed say that spirits without any body are going to burn, just as that rich man was burning in hell when he said, ‘I am tormented in this flame,’ if I did not see that it would fittingly be answered that that flame was of the same kind as the eyes which he raised to see Lazarus, as the tongue upon which he craved a little water to be poured, as the finger of Lazarus by which he asked that it be done, while they were nevertheless souls without bodies. Thus that flame by which he was burning can be understood to have been incorporeal as well.” From this it is clear that that passage cited in authority is not effective as a proof of the point at issue unless something else is added to it. 2. The fire of hell burns incorporeal substances corporeally from the point of view of the agent, not from that of the patient. But the bodies of the damned it will burn corporeally from the latter point of view as well. 3. The statement of Cassiodorus does not seem to be true if he is speaking of the external senses. For it to be true it must be understood of internal spiritual senses. 4. An answer to that passage of the gospel could be that the fire is spiritual, except for the fact that the bodies of the damned could not be punished by it. That argument, then, does not sufficiently prove the point at issue. 5. The same is to be said of this difficulty, which argues from a parallel. 6. In so far as a damned soul is a real being it is better than nonbeing. But the words of our Lord that it would be better for it not to be, mean: in so far as it is subject to misery and guilt. Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul ARTICLE II In the second article we ask: How does the soul suffer while joined to the body? [Parallel readings: III Sent. , 15, 2, 1 sol. 2; S.T. , I-II, 22, 1.] Difficulties It seems that it does not suffer indirectly, for 1. As is said in the work Spirit and Soul, because of the friendship of the body and soul, the soul while joined to the body cannot be free; and though the soul cannot be destroyed, it can nevertheless fear destruction. But to fear is a sort of suffering. Therefore the soul while joined to the body suffers in itself, because the inability to be destroyed belongs to it in itself. 2. Whatever gives perfection to another is superior to it. But the body gives perfection to the soul, for the soul is united to the body that it may be perfected there. The body is therefore superior to the soul; and so the soul can suffer directly from the body to which it is united. 3. The soul is moved in place indirectly because it is indirectly in the place in which the body is directly. But a form or quality which is in the body directly is not said to be in the soul indirectly. Now, since a passion or suffering is concerned with a form or quality, being of the type of motion which is alteration, it therefore seems that the soul in the body cannot suffer indirectly. 4. Being moved indirectly is distinguished from being moved in part, as is made clear in the Physics. But the soul is part of a composite which is moved directly, as appears from The Soul . The soul should therefore not be said to be moved indirectly, but as a part with reference to the movement of the whole. 5. The direct is prior to the indirect. But in the passions of the soul the role of the soul is prior to that of the body, because the body is transformed by the apprehension and appetency of the soul, as is evident in anger, fear, and so on. It should therefore not be said that by those passions the soul suffers indirectly and the body directly. 6. Whatever is formal in anything is more important than what is material in it. But in the passions of the soul the role of the soul is formal, and that of the body is material. The formal definition of anger is that it is the desire for revenge; its material definition, that it is the boiling of the blood around the heart. In such passions, then, the role of the soul is more important than that of the body. Thus the conclusion is the same as before. 7. Just as joy and sorrow and such passions of the soul do not belong to the soul without the body, neither does sensing. But the soul is not said to sense indirectly. Then neither should it be said to suffer indirectly. To the Contrary 1. Taken strictly passion is a certain motion in the line of alteration, as has been said. But the soul is not altered except indirectly. Then neither does it suffer except indirectly. 2. The powers of the soul are not more perfect than the substance of the soul itself. But according to the Philosopher’ the powers do not grow old directly but only because of the failure of the body. Then neither does~the soul suffer directly but only indirectly. 3. Whatever is moved directly is divisible, as is proved in the Physics . But the soul is indivisible. It therefore is not moved directly, and so neither does it suffer directly. REPLY If passion is taken strictly, it is impossible for anything incorporeal to suffer ( pati ), as was shown above. Then in a passion properly so called it is the body that suff ers directly. Consequently, if such a passion belongs in any way to the soul, this is only inasmuch as it is united to the body, and therefore indirectly. Now the soul is united to the body in two respects: (1) as a form, inasmuch as it gives existence to the body, vivifying it; (2) as a mover inasmuch as it exercises its operations through the body. And in both respects the soul suffers indirectly, but differently. For anything that is composed of matter and form suffers by reason of its matter just as it acts by reason of its form. Thus the passion begins with the matter and in a certain sense indirectly belongs to the form. But the passion of the patient is derived from the agent, because passion is the effect of action. A passion of the body is therefore attributed to the soul indirectly in two ways: (1) In such a way that the passion begins with the body and ends in the soul inasmuch as it is united to the body as its form. This is a bodily passion. Thus, when the body is injured, the union of the body with the soul is weakened; and so the soul, which is united to the body in its act of existing, suffers indirectly. (2) In such a way that the passion begins with the soul inasmuch as it is the mover of the body, and ends in the body. This is called a psychical passion. An example is seen in anger and fear and the like; for passions of this kind are aroused by the apprehension and appetency of the soul, and a bodily transformation follows upon them, just as the transformation of a mobile being follows from the operation of the mover in any one of the ways in which the mobile being is disposed to obey the motion of the mover. Thus, when the body is transformed by an alteration, the soul itself also is said to suffer indirectly. Answers to Difficulties 1. The soul does not fear destruction as if it would be destroyed in itself, but it fears the destruction of the composite through the separation of itself from the body. And even if it should fear its own destruction, this would be only in so far as there is some doubt whether upon the destruction of the body the soul is corrupted indirectly. Not even destruction, then, is compatible with the soul directly, and even the passion of fear is not attributable to it apart from its union with the body. 2. Even though the soul is perfected in the body, it is not perfected by the body, as Augustine proves.But either it is perfected by God or it perfects itself with the assistance of the body working at its command, just as the possible intellect is perfected by the power of the agent intellect with the help of phantasms which are made actually intelligible by this power. 3. Although a quality of the body by no means belongs to the soul, yet the act of being of the composite is common to soul and body, and likewise the operation. The passion of the body therefore overflows into the soul indirectly. 4. A passion happens to the composite of body and soul only by reason of the body. It therefore happens to the soul only indirectly. The argument proceeds, however, as if the passion belonged to the whole composite by reason of the whole and not by reason of one of the two parts. 5. Anger, and any passion of the soul for that matter, can be viewed in two ways: (1) According to the specific characteristic of anger. From this point of view it is primarily in the soul rather than in the body. (2) Inasmuch as it is a passion. From this point of view it is primarily in the body, for there it first gets the character of a passion. We accordingly do not say that the soul becomes angry indirectly, but that it suffers indirectly. 6. The answer to this difficulty is clear from what has just been said. 7. The soul is not said to sense indirectly any more than to rejoice, though it is said to suffer indirectly. Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul ARTICLE III In the third article we ask: Is passion only in the sense appetitive power? [Parallel readings: III Sent. , 15, 2, 1 sol. 2; IV Sent. , 49, 3, 1 sol. 2 ad 1; In De div. nom. , c. 2, lect. 4, n. 191; In II Eth. , 5; S.T. , I, 20, 1 ad 1 & 2; 81, 1; I-II, 22, 2 & 3.] Difficulties It seems not, for 1. Christ suffexed in His whole soul, as appears from the words of the Psalm (87:4): “For my soul is filled with evils,” which are referred to’ the sufferings of His passion in the explanation given in the Gloss) But totality as applied to the soul refers to powers. Consequently there can be passion in any power of the soul, and therefore not only in the sense appetitive power. 2. Every movement or operation which belongs to the soul in itself independently of the body is a function of the intellective, not the sensitive, part. But, as Augustine says, “the soul is not influenced by flesh alone to crave, fear, rejoice, or be distressed; but it can also be stirred up with these movements by itSelf.” Such passions are therefore not only in the sense appetitive part. 3. The will belongs to the intellective part, as is made clear in The Soul . But Augustine says: “There is will in all of these (that is, fear, joy, and the like). They are all, in fact, nothing but acts of the will. For what is craving and joy but the will in its acceptance of the things which we wish? And what is fear and sorrow but the will in its rejection of the things which we do not wish?” Passions of this kind are therefore also in the intellective part. 4. It is not the function of the same power to act and to be acted upon or suffer. But sense seems to be an active power; for the basilisk is said to kill by its gaze, and a menstruating woman ruins a mirror by looking into it, as is explained in the work Sleep and Wakefulness. Hence the passion of the soul is not to be placed in the sensitive part. 5. An active power is nobler than a passive one. But the vegetative powers are active, and the sensitive powers are nobler than they. Therefore the sensitive powers are also active. Thus the conclusion is the same as before. 6. The rational powers are capable of opposite determinations according to the Philosopher. But delight is opposed to sadness. Now, since delight is properly in the intellective part, as is made clear in the Ethics, it seems that sadness is also there. And so passions can be in the intellective part. 7. The answer was advanced that the Philosopher’s statement refers to opposite acts.—On the contrary, knowledge and ignorance, which are opposites, are in the intellective part of the soul, and yet they are not acts. The Philosopher’s statement therefore does not refer only to acts. 8. According to the Philosopher, the same thing by its absence and by its presence is the cause of contraries, as the pilot is the cause of both the saving and the sinking of the ship. But the intelligible object when present causes delight in the intellective part. When absent, therefore, it causes sadness in the same part. Thus the same is to be concluded as before. 9. Damascene says: “Pain is not a passion but the sensing of a passion.” It is therefore in the sensitive power and not in the appetitive; and, for the same reason, so are pleasure and the other things which are called passions of the soul. 10. According to Damascene and the Philosopher” a passion is that which is followed by joy and sadness. The passions of the soul therefore precede joy and sadness. But joy and sadness are in the appetitive part. Then the passions of the soul are in the part which precedes the appetitive. Since it is the apprehensive part which precedes the appetitive, they are therefore in the apprehensive part. The body undergoes change in the operations of the sense apprehensive power just as it does in those of the sense appetitive power. Passions are therefore not only in the appetitive but also in the apprehensive. 12. A passion strictly so called is had through the loss of something and the reception of its contrary. But this happens in the intellective part; for guilt is lost and grace is received, and the habit of lust is lost and the habit of chastity is introduced. Passion is therefore properly in the higher part of the soul. 13. The movement of the sense appetitive power follows the apprehension of sense. But sometimes such passions of the soul are aroused in us by objects which cannot be apprehended by sense, such as shame for a disgraceful action or fear for the future. Such passions therefore cannot be in the sense appetitive part, and so we are left with the conclusion that they are in the rational appetitive part, the will. 14. Hope is listed among the passions of the soul. But hope is in the intellective part of the soul, because the holy fathers while in limbo had hope, and the movement of the sensitive part does not remain in the separated soul. Passions are therefore also in the intellective part. 15. The image [of the Trinity] is in the intellective part. But the soul suffers in the powers of the image, since the powers of the image which are now perfected by grace will be perfected by the glory of enjoyment in the state of glory. Consequently passions are not only in the sense appetitive part of the soul. 16. According to Damascene “passion is a movement from one thing to another.” Now the intellect moves from one thing to another by proceeding from principles to conclusions. Therefore passion is in the intellect. And so the same is to be concluded as before. 17. The Philosopher says that “to understand is in a way to be passive ( pati ). But understanding is in the intellect. Hence there is passion in the intellect. 18. Dionysius says of Hierotheus that “by suffering divine things” he learned divine truths. But he could not undergo or suffer divine things in the sensitive part, which is not proportionate to divine things. Then passion is not only in the sensitive part. 19. No definite power of the soul has to be allotted to that which is in the soul accidentally; for there is neither science of things that exist accidentally nor a definite power for them. But the soul does not suffer except accidentally or indirectly. Passion is therefore not in any definite power of the soul, and so not in the sensitive appetite alone. To the Contrary 1. Damascene says: “A passion is a movement of the appetitive power in imagining good or evil”; and again: “A passion is a movement of the non-rational soul due to the apprehension of good or evil.” Passion is therefore only in the non-rational appetitive part. In the strict sense passion is taken according to the movement of alteration, as has been said..But there is alteration only in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in the Physics . Therefore passion is only in the sensitive part. REPLY Strictly speaking, passion is only in the sense appetitive part, as appears from the definitions of passion quoted from Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa. This is shown as follows. Passion is used in three senses, as was said above. It is taken first in general, in the sense in which all receiving is undergoing or suffering. In this usage passion is in every part of the soul and not only in the sense appetitive part. Understanding passion in this way, the Commentator says that all the powers of the vegetative soul are active; all those of the sensitive soul, passive; and those of the rational soul, partly active (because of the agent intellect) and partly passive (because of the possible intellect). Now, although this sort of passion is compatible with both the apprehensive and the appetitive powers, yet it is more proper to the appetitive. The reason for this is that, since the operation of the apprehensive power is directed to the thing apprehended as it is in the one apprehending, whereas the operation of the appetitive power is directed to the thing as it is in itself, there is less of the individuality of the thing apprehended in what is received into the apprehensive power than there is of the specification of the appetible thing in what is received into the appetitive power. Consequently, truth, which perfects the intellective power, is in the mind, whereas good, which perfects the appetitive, is in things, as is said in the Metaphysics. In the second sense passion is understood strictly, as consisting in the loss of one contrary and the reception of another by way of a transformation. This sort of passion cannot pertain to the soul except because of the body; and this under two aspects: (1) Inasmuch as it is united to the body as its form. In this respect it suffers along with the body suffering by a bodily passion. (2) Inasmuch as it is united to the body as its mover. In this respect a transformation is produced in the body through the operation of the soul. This latter is called a psychical passion, as was said above. The bodily passion just mentioned reaches to the powers of the soul as rooted in its essence, by reason of the fact that the soul in its essence is the form of the body; and thus it pertains first to the essence of the soul. This sort of passion can, however, be attributed to a power in three ways: (1) Inasmuch as it is rooted in the essence of the soul. Since all powers are rooted in the soul’s essence, the passion in question pertains to all powers in this way. (2) Inasmuch as the acts of the powers are hindered by an injury to the body. Thtis the passion in question pertains to all powers using bodily organs, since the acts of all of these are hindered when the organs are injured. But indirectly passion in this sense applies also to the powers which do not use bodily organs, the intellective, in so far as they receive something from powers which do use organs. Thus it happens that when the organ of the imaginative power is injured, the operation of the intellect also is hampered because the intellect has need of phantasms in its own operation. (3) It belongs to some power as apprehending it. In this way it properly belongs to the sense of touch; for touch is the sense of the things from which an animal is composed, and likewise of those by which an animal is corrupted. On the other hand, since by a psychical passion thebody is altered because of an operation of the soul, this kind of passion has to be in a power which is joined to a bodily organ and whose business it is to alter the body. As. a consequence, such a passion is not in the intellective part, which is not the actuality of any bodily organ. Nor again is it in tht sense apprehensive power, because from sense apprehension no movement in the body follows except through the mediation of the appetitive power, which is the immediate mover. According to its manner of operating, then, a bodily organ (the heart) from which motion takes its beginning is at once given a disposition suitable for carrying out that to which the sense appetite inclines. In anger the heart accordingly heats up, and in fear it in a way cools off and tightens up. Thus psychical passion is properly found only in the sense appetitive faculty. For the powers of the vegetative soul, though using an organ, are clearly not passive but active. Moreover passion more properly attaches to the appetitive power than to the apprehensive, as was said in the beginning of this reply. And this is one reason why the sense appetitive faculty is more properly the subject of passion than the sense apprehensive, just as the higher affective power comes closer to the true character of passion than the intellective. In the third sense passion was said to be taken more or less figuratively, in so far as a thing is barred in any way whatsoever from what is suited to it. In this sense the powers of the soul suffer in the same way as they are barred from their proper acts. And this occurs in one way or another in all the powers of the soul, as has been said. But we are now speaking of psychical passion properly so called, which is found only in the sense appetitive power, as has been shown. Answers to Difficulties 1. The whole soul of Christ suffered with a bodily passion; and therefore that passion attached to all the powers, at least inasmuch as they are rooted in the essence of the soul; not, however, in such a way that a psychical passion was in every power of His soul as its proper subject. 2. Augustine is speaking against certain PlatoniStS211 who said that the starting point of all those passions was in the flesh. Augustine shows, however, that even if the flesh were in no respect corrupted, these passions could take their beginning in the soul. He therefore does not say that such passions are brought about apart from the flesh, but that the soul is not moved by these passions because of the flesh alone. 3. Augustine is either taking the term will broadly for any appetite, or he is taking fear and joy and the like as acts of the will similar to passions in the sense appetite. For in some sense joy and sorrow and the like are in the will itself, as was said in the question on sensuality,.but not in the sense that they are passions properly so called.—Or it can be said that Augustine calls these passions acts of the will because man is led into these passions by an act of the will inasmuch as the lower appetite follows the inclination of the higher appetite, as was said in the question on sensuality. Thus Augustine himself afterwards adds: “Just as the will of man is attracted or repelled, so it is changed and turned to these affections or those.” 4. Sense is not an active but a passive power. Not every power that has an act which is an operation is called active, for then every faculty of the soul would be active; but a faculty that is related to its object as an agent to a patient is called active, and that which is related to its object as a patient to an agent is called passive. Now sense is related to the sensible thing as a patient to an agent, because the sensible thing alters the sense; and if the sensible object is sometimes altered by the sense, this is incidental, inasmuch as the organ of sense has some quality by which it is naturally capable of changing another body. Consequently the ruination in question (by which a menstruating woman damages a mirror or a basilisk kills a man by a look) does not contribute anything to the act of seeing; but the seeing is accomplished by the fact that the visible species is received in sight; and this is a sort of passivity or suffering. Sense is therefore a passive power. And even if it were granted that sense acted upon something actively, it would not follow from this that there is no passivity in sense; for nothing prevents the same thing from being active and passive in differcnt respects. And again if it were granted that sense, which designates an apprehensive power, were incapable of any passion, this would not exclude the possibility of passion being in the sensitive appetite. 5. Although what is active is simply and from the same point of view nobler than what is passive, still nothing prevents something passive from being nobler than something active inasmuch as the passive thing suffers by a passion that is nobler than the action by which the active being acts, as is the case with regard to the passion by which the possible intellect is called a passive power. And even sense by receiving something iminaterially is nobler than the action by which the vegetative power acts materially, that is, by means of the qualities of the elements. 6. There is nothing in contrary opposition to that delight which is in the intellective part by reason of its union with a suitable intelligible object, since to have a cause of the contrary passion we should need to have something contrary to that suitable intelligible object. But this is impossible, because nothing is contrary to an intelligible species; for the species of contraries are not contrary in the soul, as is said in the Metaphysics. Man accordingly takes delight not only in understanding good but also in understanding evil, as far as understanding is concerned; for the understanding of evil is a good for the intellect. And so intellectual delight has no contrary. Sadness or pain are nevertheless said to be in the intellective part, broadly speaking, inasmuch as the intellect understands something as harmful to man, to which the will is averse. Because that harmful thing, however, is not harmful to the intellect as understanding it, sadness or pain is not contrarily opposed to the delight of the intellect, which comes from understanding something suitable to the intellect in so far as it understands. 7. The rational power is capable of contrary determinations in its own way and also in a way common to itself and all other powers. To be the subject of contrary accidents is common to the rational and the other powers, because all contraries have the same subject. But to be capable of contrary actions is proper to it alone, for natural powers are determined to one course of action. It is in this sense that the Philosopher is speaking when he says that the rational powers are open to opposites. 8. The absence of the pilot is not the cause of the sinking of the ship except indirectly, inasmuch as it takes away the supervision exercised by the pilot which up to then prevented the sinking of the ship. In the same way the removal or absence of the intelligible object is not the cause of sadness but merely of not being delighted. Effects are proportioned to their causes. Then understanding and not understanding, which are contradictorily opposed, are the cause of being delighted and of not being so, which are likewise contradictories; not of being delighted and of being sad, which are contraries. Furthermore, if we take the contrary of the understanding of truth, namely, error, this cannot be the cause of sadness; for either error is deemed to be truth, in which case it causes delight just as truth does; or it is recognized as error (which can be done only by coming to know the truth), in which case again error causes delight in understanding. 9. Sadness and pain differ in that sadness is a psychical passion, beginning with the apprehension of a source of harm and ending in an operation of the appetite and even further in an alteration of the body, whereas pain is dependent upon a bodily passion. Thus Augustine says that “pain is more commonly said of bodies.” It begins, then, with an injury to the body and ends in an apprehension by the sense of touch, and on this account pain is in the sense of touch as apprehending it, as has been said. 10. That joy and sadness follow upon a passion is said by both Damascene and the Philosopher, but by each with a different meaning. Damascene, as also Gregory of Nyssa, who makes the same statement, is speaking of a bodily passion, which causes joy and sadness when apprehended and pain when experienced by sense. But the Philosopher is without any doubt here speaking of psychical passions, maintaining that joy and sadness follow upon all the passions of the soul. The reason for this is that among all the passions of the concupiscible power joy and sadness, which are caused by the attaining of the agreeable or the harmful, hold the last place; and all the passions of the irascible power terminate in passions of the concupiscible, as was said in the question on sensuality. It remains, then, that all the passions of the soul terminate in joy and sadness. In neither meaning of the words quoted, however, does it follow that passions are in the apprehensive power, because bodily passion is in the very nature of the body, and the other psychical passions are in the same appetitive part in which joy and sadness are found, but only with reference to its previous acts. If, on the other hand, there were no order in the acts of the appetitive part, it would follow from the words of the Philosopher that psychical passions are not in the appetitive part, where joy and sadness are found, but in the apprehensive. 11. Neither sense nor any other apprehensive power moves immediately, but only mediately through the appetitive. Consequently, upon the operation of the sense apprehensive power, the body is changed in its material dispositions only if the movement of the appetitive power supervenes. For the alteration of the body disposing itself to obey follows immediately upon this movement. Accordingly, although the sense apprehensive power is changed together with the bodily organ, passion strictly so called is still not in it, because in the operation of sense the bodily organ undergoes, properly speaking, only a spiritual change, inasmuch as the species of the sensible objects are received into the sense organs “without matter,” as is said in The Soul . 12. Even though something is lost and something else is received in the intellective part, this does not take place by way of a transformation so that reception and loss occur in a continuous succession. In the case of infused habits it comes about through a simple influx; for in an instant grace is infused and by it guilt is instantly expelled. And even an alteration from vice to virtue or from ignorance to knowledge affects theAintellective part only indirectly, while the transformation is directly in the sensitive part, as is made clear in the Ethics . For upon the occurrence of a transformation in the sensitive part there straightway results a perfection in the intellective part, so that the result in the intellective part is the term of the transformation in the sensitive part, just as illumination may be the term of a local motion and generation in an unqualified sense may be the term of an alteration. This is the explanation with regard to acquired habits. 13. From the apprehension of something by the intellect there can follow a passion in the lower appetite in two ways: (1) In so far as that which is understood by the intellect in a universal way is represented in the imagination in particular, thus moving the lower appetite. When, for example, the intellect of a believer assents intelIcctually to future punishment and forms phantasms of the pains, imagining the fire burning and worm gnawing and the like, the passion of fear follows in the sensitive appetite. (2) In so far as the higher appetite is moved by the intellectual apprehension, with the result that the lower appetite also is stirred up by the higher through a kind of overflow or through a command. 14. The hope which remains in the separated soul is not a passion but either a habit or an act of the will, as is clear from what was said previously. 15. From the bestowal of beatitude or the perfecting of the image nothing can be concluded other than that there is passion in the intellective part in the sense in which every reception is called a passion. 16. Passion is said to be a movement from one thing received to another thing received, not from one thing produced to another thing produced. In the former sense there is movement in the intellect from one thing to another. 17.Understanding is said to be passive in the broad use of the term according to which all reception is passivity or passion. 18. The passion of which Dionysius is speaking is nothing but affection for the things of God, which has more of the character of a passion than mere apprehension, as is clear from what has been said above. Por from affection for divine things comes their manifestation, as is written in John (14:21): “And he that loveth me, shall be loved by my Father; and I will love him and will manifest myself to him.” Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul ARTICLE IV In the fourth article we ask: On what grounds are the contrariety and diversity among the passions of the soul based? [Parallel readings: III Sent. , 26, 1, 3; In II Eth. , 5, nn. 291-96; S.T. , I-II, q. 23; 46, 1 ad 2.] Difficulties It seems that it is not on the grounds of good and evil, for 1. Boldness is opposed to fear. But both of these passions regard evil, because boldness tackles the same thing that fear runs away from. The contrariety of the soul’s passions is therefore not based on good and evil. 2. Hope is opposed to despair. But both regard good, which hope expects to attain and despair has no confidence of attaining. The contrariety of the soul’s passions is therefore not based on good and evil. Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa distinguish the passions of the soul on the basis of the present and the future and on that of good and evil. Thus hope and desire have to do with a future good; pleasure, delight, and gladness, with a present good; fear.has to do with a future evil; sadness, with a present one. But the present and the future are accidental as regards good and evil. Consequently the difference in the soul’s passions is not of itself based on good and evil. 4. Augustine distinguishes3 between sadness and pain in that sadness refers to the soul, pain to the body. But again this distinction is not made on the basis of good and evil. The conclusion is therefore the same as before. 5. Exultation, joy, gladness and pleasure, good humor and mirth are somehow different; otherwise it would be useless to couple two of them as is done for example, in Isaiah (35: 10): “They shall obtain joy and gladness.” Now since all of those terms are used with reference to good, it seems that good and evil do not differentiate the passions of the soul. 6. Damascene distinguishes four kinds of sadness: “boredom, distress, envy, and pity,” in addition to which there is also repentance. All of these are used with reference to evil. The same is therefore to be concluded as before. 7. He also distinguishes six species of fear: laziness, bashfulness, shame, awe, astonishment, and anxiety. These again do not involve the difference in question. The conclusion is therefore the same as before. 8. Dionysius ranks jealousy with love, but both of these are passions regarding good. Thus the conclusion is the same as before. To the Contrary l. Acts are distinguished by their objects. But the passions of the soul are acts of the appetitive power, whose object is good and evil. The passions of the soul are therefore distinguished by good and evil. 2. According to the PhilosopherT the passions of the soul are changes from which joy and sadness result. But joy and sadness are distinguished on the basis of good and evil. Good and evil therefore distinguish the passions of the soul. REPLY In the passions of the soul a threefold distinction is found. The first is that by which they differ generically, as belonging to distinct powers of the soul. It is in this way that the passions of the concupiscible power are distinguished from those of the irascible. Now the basis of this distinction is taken from the basis for distinguishing the powers. For since the object of the concupiscible power is something sensuously pleasurable and that of the irascible something arduous or lofty, as was said above in the question on sensuality, those passions belong to the concupiscible power in which there is implied a reference to the sensuously pleasurable in an unqualified sense or to its contrary; whereas those belong to the irascible which are referred to something arduous concerning such an object. Thus the difference between desire and hope becomes evident; for desire denotes that the appetite is attracted to something pleasurable, whereas hope expresses a certain raising of the appetite to some good which is deemed arduous or difficult. And the same is to be said of the other passions. The second distinction of the passions of the soul is that by which they are distinguished in species within the same power. In regard to the passions of the concupiscible power this distinction is made on two different grounds: (1) According to the contrariety of objects. In this way joy, which regards good, is distinguished from sadness, which regards evil. (2) According as the concupiscible power is referred in different ways to the same object, or in other words according to the different stages that can be considered in the course of an appetitive movement. For the pleasurable object is first united psychically with the man who seeks it, by being apprehended as like bini or agreeable to him. From this there follows the passion of love, which is nothing but the specification of the appetite by the form of the appetible object. For that reason love is said to be a sort of union of the lover with the beloved. But what has thus been united psychically is sought further with a view to its being united really, so that the lover enjoys the possession of the beloved. Thus is born the passion of desire, which, when the object has been obtained in reality, begets joy. The first stage, then, in the movement of the concupiscible power is love; the second, desire; and the last, joy. And through the contrary to these the passions bearing upon evil are to be distinguished, with hate opposed to love, aversion to desire, sadness to joy. The passions of the irascible power, as was said in another question, arise from the passions of the concupiscible and end in them. There is accordingly found in them a distinction conformable to that in the concupiscible power; and there is in them furthermore a distinction proper to them based upon the specific character of their proper object. Deriving from the concupiscible there is the distinction of the passions on the basis of good and evil and on that of the oleasurable and its contrary, and again on that of what is really pbssessed and what is not really possessed. But proper to the irascible power is the distinction of its passions on the basis of what exceeds the capacity of the one who has the appetite and of what does not exceed it, and this according to his evaluation of the matter. For these grounds seem to distinguish the arduous as essential differences. A passion in the irascible power can therefore regard either good or evil. If it regards good, this can be a good possessed or one not possessed. Regarding a good possessed there can be no passion in the irascible power, because once a good is possessed it causes no diffi culty to the possessor. Consequently the notion of the arduous is not verified in it. But regarding a good not yet possessed, in which the notion of the arduous can be verified because of the difficulty of obtaining it, if that good is judged to exceed the capacity of the one seeking it, despair ensues; but if it is judged not to exceed that capacity, hope arises. If, on the other hand, the excitation of the irascible power with reference to evil is considered, this will be of two kinds: either with reference to an evil not yet possessed which is regarded as arduous inasmuch as it is difficult to avoid, or with reference to an evil already possessed or joined to oneself, and this again has the character of the arduous inasmuch as it is deemed difficult to get rid of. Now if it is with reference to an evil not yet present, if that evil is regarded as exceeding one’s capacity, then it causes the passion of fear; but if it is regarded as not exceeding one’s capacity, then it causes the passion of boldness. If, however, the evil is present, either it is regarded as not exceeding one’s capacity, and then it arouses the passion of anger; or it is regarded as exceeding that capacity, and then it does not arouse any passion in the irascible power, but in the concupiscible power alone there remains the passion of sadness. The distinction which is based upon the different stages in the appetitive movement is not the cause of any contrariety, because such passions differ as perfect and imperfect, as is seen, for example, in desire and joy. But the distinction which is based on the contrariety of the object properly effects a contrariety in the passions. In the concupiscible power, accordingly, passions are regarded as contrary on the basis of good and evil, as joy and sadness or love and hate. In the irascible power a twofold contrariety can be considered: (1) According to the distinction of the proper object, as exceeding one’s capacity or not. From this point of view hope and despair, boldness and fear are contrary; and this contrariety is the more proper one. (2) According to the difference in the object of the concupiscible power, i.e., according to good and evil. From this point of view hope and fear seem to be contrarily opposed. From neither point of view, however, can anger have a passion contrary to it—not on the basis of the contrariety of good and evil, because there is no passion in the irascible power regarding a present good; and likewise not on the basis of the contrariety of what exceeds one’s capacity and what does not, because an evil which exceeds one’s capacity does not cause any passion in the irascible, as has been said. Hence among the passions anger has as, proper to itself that nothing is contrary to it. There is a third difference of the passions of the soul which is, so to speak, accidental. This can come about in two ways: (1) According to the intensity or mildness of the passion, as jealousy implies an intensity of love, and rage an intensity of anger. (2) According to the material differences of good or evil, like the difference of pity and envy, which are both species of sadness; for envy is sadness about the prosperity of someone else in so far as it is regarded as an evil for oneself, whereas pity is sadness about the adversity of someone else in so far as it is regarded as one’s own evil. Certain other passions also can be considered in the same way. Answers to Difficulties 1. The object of the irascible power is good and evil, not in an unqualified sense, but with the added circumstance of arduousness. There is therefore contrariety in its passions not merely on the basis of good and evil but also on that of the differences which distinguish the arduous both in good and in evil. 2. The answer is clear from what has just been said. 3. Present and future are regarded as differences to distinguish the powers of the soul inasmuch as what is future is not yet really united to the soul and what is present is already united, and the movement of the appetite to what is really united is more perfect than to what is really at a distance. Consequently, although future and present account for some distinction in the passions, like the perfect and the imperfect they cause no contrariety. 4. In its strict sense pain should not be numbered among the passions of the soul, because it involves nothing on the part of the soul bcyond inere apprehension; for pain is the feeling of an injury, but t lie injury itself is in the body. For this reason even Augustine adds in the saine place that he has preferred to use the term sadness rather than pain; for sadness is completed in the appetitive power itself, as appears from what has been said. 5. Pleasure and joy differ in the same way as sadness and pain; for sensible pleasure involves on the part of the body union with something agreeable, and on the part of the soul the feeling of this agreeableness. Similarly spiritual pleasure involves a certain real union of two things that agree with each other, and the perception of this union. Thus in defining sensible pleasure Plato said that pleasure is a sensible process toward a natural state. Aristotle, defining pleasure in general, said that pleasure is the unhampered operation of a habit conformable to nature.” For an agreeable operation is that united agreeable thing which causes pleasure, especially spiritual pleasure. Thus pleasure of either kind begins with a real union and is completed in its apprehension. Joy, however, begins with apprehension and ends in the affections. Thus pleasure is sometimes the cause of joy, just as pain is sometimes the cause of sadness. Joy, on the other hand, differs accidentally from gladness and the rest of the passions mentioned —on the basis of intensity or slackness. For the others express a certain intensity of joy. Either this intensity is considered from the viewpoint of one’s interior disposition; and then it is gladness, which implies an interior expansion or dilation of heart; for gladness ( laetitia ) is spoken of as a sort of expansiveness ( latitia ). Or the intensity of inner joy is considered from the viewpoint of its bursting forth into certain outward signs, and then it is exultation; for exultation is so named from the fact that inner joy in a way outwardly leaps ( exilit ). This leaping is noted either in.a change of countenance, in which the evidences of emotion first appear because of its nearness to the imaginative power; and then the passion is mirth; or it is noted inasmuch as one’s words and deeds are influenced by the intensity of the inner joy; and then it is good humor. 6. The various species of sadness which Damascene lays down are types of sadness which add to it certain accidental differences. These may be regarded from the viewpoint of the intensity of the movement. In that case in so far as the intensity consists in an interior disposition, it is called boredom, which is sadness weighing a man down (that is, his heart) so that he does not care to do anything; or, in so far as the bile proceeds to an external disposition, the passion is distress, which is sadness that takes the voice away. The differences may, on the other hand, be regarded from the viewpoint of the object inasmuch as what is in another is looked upon as one’s own evil. Then if another’s good is considered one’s own evil, the passion will be envy; but if another’s evil is considered one’s own evil, it will be pity. Repentance, however, does not add to sadness in general any specific note, since it concerns one’s own evil taken absolutely. For this reason it is omitted by Damascene. Yet many different types of sadness can be listed if everything that has any accidental bearing upon the evil which causes sadness is taken into account. 7. Since fear is a passion coming from something harmful apprehended as exceeding one’s capacity, the types of fear will be differentiated according to the difference in such harmful things. Now what is harmful can be referred to the one affected in three different respects: (1) With regard to one’s own operation. In this case inasmuch as one’s own operation is feared as laborious, the passion is laziness; and inasmuch as it is feared as disgraceful, the passion is shame, which is fear in a disgraceful action. (2)With regard to knowledge, according as some object of knowledge is apprehended as altogether exceeding cognition. In that case the study of it is looked upon as fruitless and so as harmful. Now its exceeding cognition either is due to its greatness, and then the passion is awe, which is fear from the imagining of something great; or it is due to its unusualness, and then the passion is astonishment, which is “fear from the imagining of something unusual,” as Damascene defines it. (3) With regard to suffering that comes from another. That suffering can be feared either under the aspect of disgrace, and then the passion is bashfulness, which is fear in anticipation of ridicule; or under the aspect of injury, and then the passion is anxiety, by which a man is afraid that some misfortune will befall him. 8. Jealousy adds to love a certain intensity, for it is a vehement love that brooks no sharing of one’s beloved. Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul ARTICLE V In the fifth article we ask: Are hope, fear, joy, and sadness the four principal passions of the soul? [Parallel readings: III Sent. , 26, 1, 4; S.T. , I-II, 25, 4 (cf. aa. 1-3); 84, 4 ad 2; II-II, 141, 7 ad 3.] Difficulties It seems that they are not, for 1. In enumerating the four principal passions, Augustine puts cupidity in place of hope. And the same, it seems, can be gathered from the words of Vergil in which he designates the main passions: “Hence men crave and fear, rejoice and sorrow.” 2. The more perfect a thing is, the more important it seems to be. But the movement of boldness is more perfect than that of hope, since it tends to its object with greater intensity. Boldness is therefore a more important passion than hope. 3. Everything takes its name from the most important in its line. But the irascible power gets its name from anger. Anger should therefore be numbered among the principal passions. 4. There is a passion that looks to the future not only in the irascible power but also in the concupiscible. But the passion looking to the future which is in the concupiscible power, desire, is not included as one of the principal passions. Then neither are fear and hope, which in the irascible similarly look to the future. 5. Principal means coming before the rest; for according to Gregory “to be prince ( principiari ) means to come before the others.” But love comes before the rest of the passions; for from love all the other passions are born. Love should therefore be placed as one of the principal passions. 6. Those passions seem to be the principal ones upon which the others depend. But all the others seem to depend upon joy and sadness; for a passion of the soul is that from which joy or sadness follows, according to the Philosopher.These two passions, joy and sadness, then, are the only principal passions. 7. It was said in answer that joy and sadness are the principal ones in the concupiscible power, but that hope and fear are the principal ones in the irascible.—On the contrary, it is said in Spirit and Soul: “From concupiscibility joy and hope arise; from irascibility, pain and dread.” 8. In accord with the special character of the irascible power hope is opposed to despair, fear to boldness. But on the part of the concupiscible power are listed two chief passions which are contrary on the basis of the special character of the concupiscible power, namely, joy and sadness. Then on the part of the irascible there should be listed as principal passions either hope and despair or fear and boldness. To the Contrary 11. In Spirit and Soul it is said: “Emotion is distinguished into four kinds, since we already take joy in what we love, or we hope for it as something that will be enjoyed; and we already grieve over what we hate or we dread it as something to make us grieve.” Consequently these four are the principal passions: joy, pain or sadness, hope, and fear. 2. Enumerating the main passions, Boethius says: Drive away joy, and drive away fear. Hope put to flight; let grief not stay near. And so the conclusion is the same as above. REPLY There are four principal passions of the soul: sadness, joy, hope, and fear. The reason for this is that passions which come before the others and are their source are called the principal ones. Now, since the passions of the soul are in the sense appetitive part, those passions will come first which arise immediately from the object of the appetitive part; that is, from good and evil. Those which arise through the intermediary of others will be in a sense secondary. For a passion to arise immediately from good or evil two conditions are required. The first is that it arise from good and evil essentially or directly, because what is accidental or indirect cannot be first. The second is that it arise without presupposing any other. A passion is accordingly said to be a principal one for these two. reasons: it does not conit accidentally from the object, which has the role of an active principle, nor does it come subsequently. Now a passion which proceeds from a good inasmuch as it is good, comes from good essentially; but one which proceeds from a good inasmuch as it is evil, comes from good accidentally. And the inverse is to be understood of evil. Good as such attracts and draws to itself. Hence any passion of an appetite tending to good will be a passion essentially and directly dependent upon good. But it is proper to evil as such to repel the appetite. Hence if there is any passion regarding good by which the good is shunned, that passion will not be from good essentially but in so far as it is apprehended as somehow evil. And the contrary is to be understood of evil: a passion which consists in flight from evil comes from evil essentially or directly, whereas one which consists in an approach to evil comes from evil accidentally. It is therefore clear how a passion arises from good or from evil essentially. Because, however, to the extent to which a thing is last in the attainment of the end it is first in intention and in desire, those passions which consist in the attainment of the end therefore arise from good or evil without presupposing), any others, and with these presupposed others arise. Now joy and sadness come from the attainment of good or evil, and that essentially; for joy comes from a good inasmuch as it is good, and sadness comes from an evil inasmuch as it is evil. And all other passions of the concupiscible power likewise come from good or evil essentially. This is so because the object of the concupiscible power is good or evil in an absolute sense. Yet the other passions of the concupiscible power presuppose joy and sadness as their cause; for a good becomes loved and desired by the concupiscible by reason of its being apprehended as pleasurable, and an evil becomes hateful and repulsive by being apprehended as saddening. Thus in the order of appetency joy and sadness are prior,.though in the order of execution and attainment they are posterior. In the irascible power not all the passions follow from good or evil essentially, but some essentially and others accidentally. This is so because good and evil are not the object of the irascible power in their absolute sense, but as they are modified by the condition of arduousness. Under this condition a good is repudiated as being beyond one’s capabilities, and an evil is tended to as able to be driven away or mastered. But in the irascible power there cannot be any passion which follows from good or evil without any other being presupposed; for after the good is possessed, it does not arouse any passion in the irascible power, as was said above.An evil that is present, on the other hand, does arouse a passion in the irascible power not essentially but accidentally, inasmuch as the person tends to something evil that is present as something to be driven away or mastered. This is evident in the case of anger. It is clear, then, from what has been said that there are some passions which first and essentially arise from good and evil, as joy and sadness, and some others that essentially but not first so arise, as the other passions of the concupiscible power and two of those of the irascible, fear and hope, one of which expresses a flight from evil, the other an approach to good. And there are some other passions which neither essentially nor first arise from good and evil, as the others in the irascible power, such as despair, boldness, and anger, which express an approach to evil or a withdrawal from good. The most important passions, therefore, are joy and sadness. But fear and hope are the principal ones in their own class, because they do not presuppose any other passions in the power in which they are found, the irascible. Although the other passions of the concupiscible power, such as love and desire, hate and aversion, are from good or evil essentially, they are nevertheless not the first in their class, since they presuppose others in the same power. Thus they cannot be called the principal passions either simply or in their genus. It remains, then, that there are only four principal passions: joy and sadness, hope and fear. Answers to Difficulties 1. Cupidity or desire is preceded by another passion in the same power, joy, which is the reason for desiring. Desire therefore cannot be a principal passion. Even though hope presupposes another passion, it does not presuppose one in the same power but in the concupiscible. All of the passions of the irascible power, in fact, arise from the passions of the concupiscible, as was said in another question. For this reason it can be one of the principal passions. Augustine, however, lists desire or cupidity in place of hope on account of a certain resemblance between them, because both look to a good not yet possessed. 2. Boldness cannot be one of the principal passions, for it arises from evil accidentally, since it looks to evil with a view to attacking it For a bold man attacks evil inasmuch as he judges victory over evil and its repulse to be a good, and from the hope of such a good boldness arises. When carefully considered in this way, hope is found to be prior to boldness; for the hope of victory or at least of escape causes boldness. 3. Anger too arises from evil accidentally, inasmuch as an angry person considers revenge for an evil done to him a good and seeks it. Thus the hope of revenge to be obtained is the cause of anger. Therefore, when a person is injured by someone upon whom he does not hope to be able to get revenge, he does not become angry, but he merely grows sad or he fears, as Avicenna points out,—if a country bumpkin is injured by a king, for instance. Consequently anger cannot be a principal passion; for it presupposes not only sadness, which is in the concupiscible power, but also hope, which is in the irascible. The irascible power gets its name from anger, however, because it is the last of the passions which are in the irascible. 4. The passions regarding the future which are in the concupiscible power arise in some sense from the passions in the same power regarding the present. But the passions regarding the future in the irascible do not arise from any passions regarding the present in the same power but rather from such passions in another power, that is, from joy and sadness. Hence there is no parallel. 5. In the line of execution and attainment love is the first passion, but in the line of intention joy is prior to love and is the reason for loving, especially in the sense in which love is a passion of the concupiscible power. 6. Joy and sadness are the most Important among the passions, as has been said. Nonetheless hope and fear are the principal ones in their own class, as is clear from what has been said. 7. Since that work is not by Augustine, it does not impose upon us any necessity of accepting its dicta as authoritative. Here especially it is seen to contain a patent error. For hope is not in the concupiscible but in the irascible power; and sadness is not in the irascible but in the concupiscible. Yet if we must uphold its authority, we can say that it is speaking of those powers according to the meaning of their names: concupiscence is concerned with good, and on this basis all passions directed to good can be attributed to the concupiscible power; and because anger is concerned with an evil inflicted, all the passions which regard evil can be attributed to the irascible power. On this basis sadness is attributed to the irascible power and hope to the concupiscible. 8. The contrariety which is proper to the passions of the irascible power, namely, exceeding one’s capacity or not, makes the second passion arise from good or evil accidentally. For something which exceeds one’s capacity leads to withdrawal, whereas something which does not exceed it leads to approach. If these differences are taken with reference to good, then, a passion which follows from something which exceeds one’s capacity will come from good accidentally. If, on the other hand, they are taken with reference to evil, then a passion which follows from something that does not exceed one’s capacity will be accidental. Consequently in the irascible power there cannot be two principal passions which are directly contrary (e.g., hope and despair, or boldness and fear), as are joy and sadness inn the concupiscible. Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul ARTICLE VI In the sixth article we ask: Do we merit by our passions? [Parallel readings: De malo, 12, 1; S.T. , I-II, 24, 1; 3 ad 1; II-II, 158.] Difficulties It seems that we do, for 1. We merit by fulfilling commands. But by divine commandments we are induced to rejoice, to fear, to grieve, and to have other such passions, as Augustine says. We therefore merit by our passions. 2. According to Augustine such passions of the soul are not had without the will. In fact they are nothing but acts of will. But by our acts of will we can merit not only materially but also formally. Then so can we by such passions. 3. Psychical passions come closer to being voluntary than do bodily passions, because the psychical passions are to some extent within our power in so far as the concupiscible and the irascible powers obey reason, whereas bodily passions are not. But bodily passions or sufferings are meritorious, as is evident in the case of martyrs, who merit the aureola of martyrs by their bodily passions. With all the more reason, then, are psychical passions meritorious. 4. The answer was given that bodily passions or sufferings are meritorious in so far as they are willed.—On the contrary, the will to suffer for Christ can also be in one who will never suffer, and yet he will not get the aureola. A bodily passion therefore merits the aureola not only by reason of being willed but by being actually undergone. 5. If from the intensification of a given thing there follows the intensification of reward, that thing is essentially and not just materially meritorious. But from the intensification of bodily passion or suffering there follows the intensification of reward, because the more a person suffers, the more gloriously he will be crowned, as is said. We consequently merit by our passions or sufferings essentially and not just materially. 6. Hugh of St. Victor says: “After the act of will there follows the deed, so that the will is increased in its own work. Thus the external deed contributes something to merit. But the will can similarly be increased in passion. Passion therefore contributes something to merit; and so the conclusion is the same as before. 7. Since merit is situated in the will, that in which the will terminates as formally completing it must pertain to merit as formally completing it. But in so far as a passion is willed, it is the object of the will; and so it determines the will more or less formally. The passion itself therefore pertains formally to merit. 8. Some of the confessors endured more grievous trials than some of the martyrs. It is accordingly said of them that they underwent a protracted martyrdom, though the passion of certain martyrs was finished in a short space of time. Yet the aureola is not due to the confessors. It accordingly seems that the bodily passion of the martyrs in itself directly merits the aureola. 9. Commenting on the words of the Epistle of St. James (1:12: “My brethren, count it all joy...” the Gloss says: “Tribulation increases justice in the present life and the crown in the future.” But it increases these only by meriting. Since tribulation is suffering or passion, passion is meritorious. 10. The same appears from what is said in the Psalm (115:15): “Precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of his saints.” But precious means worthy of a price. Now the price of our labors is the reward which we merit by our labors. We can therefore merit by our passions. assions or sufferings 11. It was said in answer that we merit by our passions or sufferings in so far as they are willed.—On the contrary, there is the truth which St. Lucy expressed: “If you cause me to be violated against my will, my chastity will be doubled in value for my crown. Even the undergoing of rape, then, which she would have suffered in this life, would have been meritorious for a crown. Thus passion or suffering does not merit merely because it is voluntary. 12. Difficulty is a necessary condition for merit. This is clear from what the Master says: in the state of innocence man did not merit, because nothing urged him to evil or drew him away from good. Now since passions or sufferings occasion difficulty, they therefore seem to have a direct influence upon merit. 13. Fear is a type of passion. Now we can merit by it even formally, since it is in the intellective part, as is clear when we fear things that we know only by the intellect, as eternal punishment. We can therefore merit by our passions. 14. Reward corresponds to merit. But the reward of glory will be not only in the soul but also in the body. Then merit too consists not only in the action of the soul but also in the passion of the body. 15. Where there is greater difficulty there is a greater score of merit. But there is greater difficulty regarding sufferings and passions than regarding the operations of the will. Sufferings and passions are therefore more meritorious than the acts of the will, which are, however, formally meritorious. 16. We formally merit by virtues. But certain passions are listed by the saints9 as virtues—pity and repentance, for example. And certain ones are set down by the philosophers as laudable and the mean between extreme vices, as shame and indignation are instanced by the Philosopher. But all this refers to virtue. We therefore merit formally by passions. 17. Merit and demerit, being contraries, are in the same genus. But demerit is found in the genus of passions; for the first movements, which are sins, are passions. Anger and sloth also are passions, and yet they are listed as capital sins. The Apostle (Romans 1:26) calls sins against nature “shameful passions.” Then we also merit by passions. To the Contrary 1. Nothing can be meritorious unless it is within our power, because according to Augustine “it is by the will that one sins or lives rightly.” But passions are not in our power, because, as Augustine says, “we yield to passions unwilfingly.”We therefore do not merit by passions. 2. Whatever is a preamble to willing cannot be meritorious, since merit depends upon the will. But the passions of the soul precede the act of the will, since they are in the sensitive part, whereas the act of the will is in the intellective part; but the intellective part receives its object from the sensitive. The passions of the soul therefore cannot be meritorious. 3. Every meritorious deed is praiseworthy. But according to the Philosopher “we are neither praised nor blamed for passions.” We therefore do not merit by our passions. 4. The ability to merit was greater in Christ than it is in us. But Christ did not merit by His passion. Then neither do we merit by our passions.—Proof of the minor: To merit is to make one’s own something which is not one’s own or at least to make more one’s own what is less one’s own. But Christ was not able to make His own what was not His own or to make more His own what was less so, because from the first instant of His conception everything that comes under the heading of merit was most completely due to Him. Christ therefore merited nothing by His passion. 5. It was answered that He merited by making what was His in one way His in more ways.—On the contrary, a double bond makes the obligation greater. In like fashion a double reason for indebtedness makes a greater debt. Therefore, if Christ was not able to cause something to be more due to Him, neither was He able to make something due to Him in more ways. 6. Difficulty diminishes voluntariness. Since merit must be voluntary, difficulty therefore seems to diminish merit. But passions cause difficulty. They therefore diminish merit rather than contribute to it. REPLY If meriting is taken in the strict sense, we do not merit by our passions directly but, so to speak, indirectly. Since we speak of meriting in connection with recompense, to merit in the proper sense is to acquire something for oneself as a recompense. Now this is not done unless we give something that is equal in value to that which we are said to merit. We cannot give anything, however, unless it is ours and we have dominion over it. But we have dominion over our acts through our will—not only over those which are immediately elicited by the will, such as loving or willing, but also over those which are elicited by other powers at the command of the will, such as walking, speaking, and the like. These actions, however, are not equal to eternal life in value as if they were a price paid for it, except in so far as they are informed by grace and charity. Consequently, in order that an act may be directly meritorious, it must be an act either commanded or elicited by the will, and must moreover be informed by charity. Because the principle of an act consists in the habit and the power and even the object, we are on this account said to merit secondarily, as it were, by our habits and powers and objects. But what is primarily and directly meritorious is a voluntary act informed by grace. Passions, however, do not belong to the will either as commanding or as eliciting them; for the principle of passions as such is not in our power, whereas things are said to be voluntary from the fact that they are in our power. Passions accordingly sometimes even anticipate the act of the will. Directly, then, we do not merit by passions. Yet, in so far as they in some way accompany the will, they somehow have a bearing upon merit so that they can be called meritorious indirectly. Now a passion has a bearing upon the will in three ways: (1) As the object of the will. In this sense passions are said to be meritorious inasmuch as they are willed or loved. That by which we essentially merit in this case will not be the passion itself but the willing of the passion. (2) As arousing or intensifying the act of the will. This can come about in two ways, either directly or indirectly—directly when the passion arouses the will to something like itself, as when the will is inclined by concupiscence to consent to the thing coveted or by anger to will revenge; or indirectly when by furnishing the occasion a passion arouses the will to its contrary, as in the case of a chaste person, when the passion of concupiscence wells up, the will resists with a greater effort; for we try harder in regard to difficult things. Thus passions are said to be meritorious inasmuch as the act of the will aroused by the passion is meritorious. (3) Conversely, when a passion is aroused by the will because the movement of the higher appetite overflows into the lower. For example, when by his will a person detests the filth of sin, the lower appetite is by that very fact moved to shame. In this sense shame is said to be either praiseworthy or meritorious by reason of the act of will which caused it. In the first way, then, passion has a bearing upon the will as its object, in the second as its principle, and in the third as its effect. Thus the first way is more remote from meritoriousness; for with equal reason gold or silver could be called meritorious or demeritorious on the grounds that by willing these we merit or incur demerit. The last way is closer to merit, since the effect receives something from the cause and not the other way about. Thus if merit is taken in its strict sense, we do not merit by our passions except indirectly. Merit, however, can be taken broadly in the sense in which any disposition that confers a fitness to receive something is said to merit it; for example, if we should say that by reason of her beauty a woman merits marriage to a king. In this sense even bodily passions are said to merit inasmuch as those passions make us in some sense fit to receive some glory. Answers must therefore be given to each set of difficulties. Answers to Difficulties 1. By God’s commandments we are admonished to rejoice or to fear in so far as joy and fear and the like consist in acts of the will and are not passions, as is clear from what was said previously, or also in so far as such passions follow from the will. 2. Augustine says that these passions are acts of will because they come about in us from our will. Thus he adds: “In general depending upon the various things sought or shunned, not only is a man’s will attracted or repelled, but it is also changed and turned into these different affections.” Or else he is speaking of these passions in the sense in which the terms designate acts of the will, as has been said. 3. The bodily passion of a martyr has nothing to do with the meriting of the essential reward except in so far as it is willed, but it has bearing upon an accidental reward, the aureola of martyrs, through the kind of merit which confers a certain fitness for the aureola; for it is fitting that one who is conformed to Christ in His passion should be conformed to Him in His glory, as we gather from the Epistle to the Romans (8:17): “Yet so, if we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified with him.” We should bear in mind, however, that the will cannot have the same attitude toward bodily sufferings when a man is not suffering them as it has because of their keenness while he is actually suffering them. In such matters, then, according to the Philosopher it suffices for a brave man not to be saddened. Consequently the bodily passion actually being experienced is both the sign of a firm and constant will and also that which evokes it, because a man makes an effort regarding difficult things. And so the aureola is not due to the confessor, though it is due to the martyr. 4. The answer is clear from what has just been said. 5. An increase in the rewards follows from an intensification of the suffering either because of a certain fittingness or because of the intensity of the will. 6. Even though the will is increased in both a passion and an exernal act, the case is not the same for both; for the act is commanded by the will, but the passion is not. They therefore do not have the same bearing upon merit. 7. The object determines the will as to the species of the act. Strictly speaking, however, merit consists in the act, not from the viewpoint of the species of the act, but from that of its root, which is charity. Thus it is not necessary that we formally merit by a passion even though it does stand as the object. 8. All the toil which a confessor endures over a long, period of time cannot, under the aspect of the genus of the deed, equal the death which a martyr undergoes even in a moment. For by death one is deprived of what is most valued, life and being; and for this reason it is the ultimate among things that strike terror, according to the Philosopher, and in its regard the virtue of bravery is exercised most of all. This appears very clearly from the fact that men worn out with long-continued afflictions shrink away from death, choosing in effect to undergo further afflictions rather than death. The Philosopher accordingly says that a man of virtue exposes himself to death, choosing rather “ one good and great deed than many small ones,” as if that act of bravery in facing death outweighed many other virtuous deeds. Consequently, from the standpoint of the genus of his deed, the least martyr merits more than any confessor whatever. From that of the root of his deed, however, the confessor can merit more to the extent that he acts from greater charity, because the essential reward corresponds to the root, charity, whereas the accidental reward corresponds to the genus of the act. Hence it is that a confessor can surpass a martyr in the essential reward, but the martyr surpasses him in the accidental reward. 9. That comment in the Gloss is speaking of tribulation in so far as it is willed or excites the will. 10. The same is to be said of this difficulty. 11. For a virgin who would be violated for the sake of Christ, that very violation would be meritorious, just like the other sufferings of the martyrs, not because the violation itself would be voluntary, but because its antecedents, her remaining constant in the confession of Christ, from which the violation followed as a consequence, would be voluntary. Thus that violation would be voluntary, not with an absolute will but with a will in some sense conditioned, seeing that the virgin chooses to suffer this disgrace rather than deny Christ. 12. There are two kinds of difficulty: one which comes from the magnitude and excellence of the task, and this kind is required for virtue; another which is from the agent himself to the extent that he is deficient or hampered in his correct operations, and this kind is removed or diminished by virtue. It is in the latter sense that passions cause difficulty. The first kind of difficulty, on the part of the task, has a direct bearing upon merit in the same way as the excellence of the act; whereas the second, from the weakness of the agent, has no bearing upon merit unless perhaps as an occasion, inasmuch as it supplies the occasion for a greater effort. It is not true, however, that in his first state Adam would not have been able to merit—if we grant that he had grace, even though there were nothing drawing him away from good or urging him to evil—because, if he had stood fast, he would have arrived eventually at glory; and it is clear that this would not have been without merit. Nor does the Master say that he would not have been able to merit in the first state, but he does say that he would have been able to avoid sin without meriting; for he could avoid sin without grace because nothing was pushing him to evil, and without grace nothing can be meritorious. 13. That fear of eternal punishment which is directly meritorious is in the will and is not a passion strictly speaking, as is clear from what has alrcady been said. A passion of fear can, however, be aroused in the lower appetite by reason of eternal punishment either because of an overflow from the higher appetite into the lower or because the intellect’s conception of eternal punishment is represented in the imagination, with the consequence that the lower appetite is moved through the passion of fear. But such fear does not have anything to do with merit except indirectly, as has been said. 14. [This answer is missing.] 15. If we are speaking of difficulty on our part, then passions and sufferings involve more difficulty than acts of the will. But in that case the difficulty does not contribute anything to merit except indirectly, as has been said; and similarly neither do passions and sufferings. But if we are speaking of the difficulty which comes from the excellence or goodness of the task, which does contribute to merit directly, then there is greater difficulty in acts of the will. 16. Some passions are called laudable by the philosophers because they are the effects and signs of a good will, as is evident in the example of shame, which shows that the man’s will is averse to the filth of sin, and in that of pity, which is a sign of love. On this account the names of these passions are sometimes used by the saints for the habits which elicit the act of will which is the source of these passions. 17. First movements do not have the complete nature of sin or demerit but are in a way dispositions for demerit just as venial sin is a disposition for mortal sin. The movements of sensuality themselves, then, do not have to be directly meritorious, because what is meritorious cannot be anything but a voluntary act, as has been said. But those passions are sometimes called vices or sins inasmuch as acts of the will or even habits are designated by the names of passions. Moreover, vices against nature are called passions even though they are voluntary acts, inasmuch as by such vices nature is disturbed from its proper order. Answers to Contrary Difficulties l. We yield to passions unwillingly, not as regards consent, since we do not consent to them except by our will, but as regards some bodily alteration such as laughter and weeping and the like. Consequently, in so far as by our will we consent or refuse consent to them, they are meritorious or demeritorious. 2. Though the passions of the lower appetite sometimes anticipate the act of the will, they do not always; for the appetitive powers do not stand in the same relationship as the apprehensive. Our intellect receives its object from sense; consequently there cannot be an operation of the intellect unless there is some previous operation of sense. The will, however, does not receive anything from the lower appetite, but rather moves it; and so it is not necessary that a passion of the lower appetite precede the act of the will. 3. Even though passions are not directly praiseworthy, they can nevertheless be praiseworthy indirectly, as has been said. 4. By His passion Christ merited for Himself and for us. For Himself He merited the glory of His body; for although He merited this through His other merits which preceded it, yet the splendor of the resurrection is by a certain fittingness properly a reward of the passion, because exaltation is the proper reward of humility. He merited for us, moreover, inasmuch as in His passion He gave satisfaction for the sin of the whole human race, but not by His preceding works, though He did merit for us by them. Retribution by way of suffering is required for satisfaction as a sort of compensation for the pleasure of sin. 5. By His passion Christ did not make the glory of His body due after it was not due, nor did He make it more due after it was less due. He did, however, make it due in another way than that in which it was due before. But it does not follow that He made it more due. This would follow if the cause for which it was due were either increased or multiplied, as happens when an obligation is increased by a two-fold promise. But that did not occur in the case of the merit of Christ, because His grace was not augmented. 6. Directly difficulty hampers voluntariness, but indirectly it increases it in so far as a person makes an effort against the difficulty. But the difficulty itself contributes to satisfaction by reason of its penal character. Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul ARTICLE VII In the seventh article we ask: Does a passion accompanying a meritorious act detract from its merit? [Parallel readings: De malo , 3, 11; 12, 1; S.T. , I-II, 24, 3; 77, 6 ad 2.] That is to say, who merits the more, he who helps a poor man with a certain compassion of pity, or he who does it without any passion solely because of a judgment of reason? Difficulties It seems that he who does it solely because of a judgment of reason merits the more, for 1. Merit is opposed to sin. But a man who commits a sin solely by choice sins more than one who sins under the urging of passion; for the first is said to sin out of definite malice, the second out of weakness. Then a man who does a good deed solely because of a judgment of reason also merits more than one who does it with a passion of pity. 2. The answer was given that for something to be meritorious or to be an act of virtue there is required not only a good which is done but also a good manner of doing it, which in this case cannot be had without the emotion of pity.—On the contrary, for an act to be done in a good manner there are three requisites according to the Philosopher: the will choosing the act, reason establishing the mean in the act, and the relation of the act to the due end. Now these requisites can all be met without the passion of pity in one who gives an alms. Without it, then, there can be not only the good which is done but also the good manner of doing it.—Proof of the Minor: All three requisites mentioned are fulfilled by an act of the will and of reason. But an act of the will and of reason does not depend upon a passion, because reason and the will move the lower powers in which the passions are found, and the motion of the mover does not depend upon the motion of the thing moved. The three requisites mentioned can therefore be fulfilled without any passion. 3. For an act ofyirtue the discernment of reason is needed. Thus Gregory says that unless the other virtues do with prudence the things to which they tend, they cannot be virtues at all. All passions, however, hinder the judgment or discernment of reason. Hence Sallust says: “All men who deliberate about doubtful matters ought fittingly to be free of anger, love, hate, and pity; for the spirit does not readily see truth where these emotions hold sway.” Such passions therefore detract from the praiseworthiness of virtue, and so from merit. 4. The concupiscible power hampers the judgment of reason no less than the irascible. But a passion of the irascible accompanying even an act of virtue disturbs the judgment of reason. Thus Gregory says: “By its fervor anger disturbs the eye.” Then pity, which is a passion of the concupiscible, similarly disturbs the judgment of reason. 5. Virtue is “a disposition of a perfect being for what is best,” as is said in the Physics . Then that in which we most closely approach perfect beings is most virtuous in us. But we approach God and the angels most closely when we act without passion from a judgment of reason; for God punishes without anger and alleviates misery without the passion of pity. It is therefore more virtuous to do good without these passions. 6. The virtues of a purified soul are more noble than those of other kinds. But, as Macrobius says, the virtues of a purified soul make one forget passions altogether. An act of virtue performed without passion is therefore more praiseworthy and meritorious. 7. The more the love of charity in us is purified of carnal love, the more praiseworthy it is; “for the affection among us should not be carnal but spiritual,” as Augustine says. But as a passion love is to some extent carnal. Consequently an act of charity is more praiseworthy without the passion of love. And the same holds true of the other passions. 8. Tully says that it is fitting that “benevolence should be characterized not by the ardor of love but by steadfastness” of mind. But ardor is a matter of passion. Passion therefore lessens the praiseworthiness of an act of virtue. To the Contrary 1. Augustine says: “So long as we bear the infirmity of this life, if we have no passions at all, then we do not live correctly; for the Apostle heaped blame and scorn upon some who he said were, among other things, without feeling (Rom. 1:31). The sacred Psalmist found fault with those of whom he said (Psalm 68:2 1): “I looked for one that would grieve together with me, but there was none.” Thus it seems that without passions we cannot live correctly. 2. Augustine says: “To be angry with a sinner that he may reform, to sympathize with an afflicted person that he may be delivered, to fear for one in danger lest he perish.—I do not know whether anyone of sound judgment would find fault with these. The Stoics, indeed, are wont to blame even pity. But Cicero spoke far better and more conformably to human nature and to the feelings of the pious when he said in praise of Caesar: ‘No one of your virtues is either more admirable or more pleasing than your pity.’” And so the conclusion is the same as before. REPLY The passions of the soul can stand in either of two relationships to the will, either as preceding it or as consequent upon it: as preceding it, inasmuch as the passions spur the will to will something; as consequent upon it, inasmuch. as the lower appetite is stirred up with these passions as a result of the vehemence of the will through a sort of overflow, or even inasmuch as the will itself brings them about and arouses them of its own accord. When the passions precede the will they detract from its praiseworthiness, because the act of the will is praiseworthy in so far as it is directed by reason to good in due measure and manner. Now this manner and measure is not kept except when the action takes place from discretion; and discretion is not kept when a man is stirred up to will something, even though good, by the onslaught of passion; for then the manner of the action will depend upon whether the onslaught of passion is great or small; and so it will happen only by chance that the due measure is kept. When the passions are consequent upon the will they do not lessen the praiseworthiness of the act or its goodness, because they will be moderated in conformity with the judgment of reason upon which the act of will follows; but they will rather add to the goodness of the act. This will be done under two aspects: (1) As a sign, because the passion itself consequent in the lower appetite is a sign that the movement of the will is intense. For in a nature subject to passion it is impossible for the will to be strongly moved to anything without some passion following in the lower part. Thus Augustine says: “So long as we bear the infirmity of this life, if we have no passions, we do not live correctly.”And after a few other remarks he adds the cause, saying: “For not to grieve at all while we are in this place of misery... takes place only at the great cost of inhumanity in the soul and stupor in the body.” (2) As a help, because when by a judgment of reason the will chooses anything, it does so more promptly and easily if in addition a passion is aroused in the lower part, since the lower appetitive power is closely connected with a change in the body. Thus Augustine says: “The movement of pity is of service to reason when pity is shown in such a way that justice is preserved.”And this is what the Philosopher also says, bringing in the verse of Homer: “Stir up your courage and rage,”“ because when a man is virtuous with the virtue of courage, the passion of anger following upon the choice of virtue makes for greater alacrity in the act. If it preceded, however, it would disturb the manner requisite for virtue. Answers to Difficulties 1. Praiseworthiness and reprehensibility consist essentially in voluntariness. Consequently whatever detracts from voluntariness diminishes the praiseworthiness in a good and the reprehensibility in an evil. Now a passion which precedes choice diminishes voluntariness, and therefore diminishes the praise of a good act and the blame of a bad one. But a passion which follows is a sign of the greatness of the will, as has been said. Then not only does it add to the praise in the case of a good act, but it also adds to the blame in that of a bad act. A man is said to sin from passion, however, if it is passion which leads him to choose sin. But if because of the choice of a sin he falls into the passion connected with that sin, he is said to sin not from passion but with passion. It is true, then, that acting from passion lessens praise and blame, but acting with passion can increase both of them. 2. The movement of virtue, which consists in a perfect act of will, cannot be had without any passion, not because the act of will depends upon the passion, but because in a nature subject to passion a passion necessarily follows upon a perfect act of will. 3. Both choice and execution are necessary in a virtuous deed. Discernment is required for choice. For the execution of what has been decided upon, alacrity is required. It is not, however, highly necessary that a man actually engaged in the execution of the deed deliberate very much about the deed. This would rather stand in the way than be of help, as Avicenna points out. Take the case of a lute player, who would be greatly handicapped if he had to give thought to each touch of the strings; or that of a penman if he had to stop and think in the formation of each letter. This is why a passion which precedes choice hinders the act of virtue by hampering the judgment of reason necessary in choosing. But after the choice has already been made purely by a rational judgment, a passion that follows helps more than it hurts, because even if it should disturb rational judgment somewhat, it does make for alacrity in execution. 4. The answer is evident from what has just been said. 5. God and the angels are not susceptible of passions, and so in their case no passion follows upon a perfect act of will, though it would follow if they were capable of passions. Consequently, because of a certain resemblance in the operations, in the usage of human speech the names of passions are applied to the angels; it is not because of any infirmity in their affection. 6. Those who have the virtues of a purified soul are in some sense free from passions that incline us to the contrary of that which virtue chooses, and likewise from passions that influence the will, but not from those consequent upon the will. 7. There is question of the carnality of spiritual affection only if the passion of love precedes the affection of the will, but not if it follows. For in the latter event there would be question of the fervor of charity, which consists in the fact that the spiritual affection, which is in the higher part, by reason of its vehemence overflows to the extent of altering the lower part. 8. The answer to this is clear from the above. Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul ARTICLE VIII In the eighth article we ask: Were there any such passions in Christ? [Parallel readings: III Sent. , 13, 1, 2 sol. I ad 2; 15, 2, 1 sol. 3; aa. 2 & 3; 33, expos. text.; In Matt. , c. 26, §5 (P 10:252b, 253a, 254b); In Joan. , c. 12, lect. 5, §1 (P 10:514ab); c. 13, lect. 4, §1 (534a-535b); S.T. , III, 15, 4-9; Comp. theol. , I, 232.] Difficulties It seems that there were not, for 1. According to Augustine, every agent is nobler than a patient. But nothing created is nobler than the soul of Christ. There would therefore not be any passion in the soul of Christ. 2. According to Macrobius, “it is characteristic of the strength of the purified soul to have no experience of passions, not to conquer them.” But Christ had the virtues of the purified soul in the highest degree. There were therefore no such passions in Him. 3. According to Damascene passion is “a movement of the appetitive soul because of a surmise about good or evil. But in Christ there was no surmise, for that implies ignorance. There was therefore no passion of soul in Christ. 4. According to Augustine passion is “a movement of the soul against reason.” But no movement in Christ was against reason. Consequently there was no passion of soul in Christ. 5. Christ was not made less than the angels as to His soul but only as to the infirmity of His body. But there are no passions in the angels, as Augustine says. Then neither were there any in the soul of Christ. 6. Christ was more perfect in soul than man in the first state. But man in the first state was not subject to these passions, because as Augustine says, “it is a part of the infirmity of our present life to undergo emotion of this kind even in every one of our good works.”s But there was no infirmity in the first state. Then neither were there such passions in Christ. 7. According to Augustine pain is “the feeling of dissolution and destruction.”.But in Christ there neither was the feeling of destruction and dissolution (because, as Hilary says, He had “the violence of punishment without the feeling of punishment”), nor was there actual dissolution ind destruction in Him (because from the highest good there can be no loss). Consequently there was no pain in Christ. 8. Where the cause is the same, the effect is the same. But the cause of the absence of passion in the bodies of the blessed will be that they are purified from the “fuel of sin” and united to glorious souls. Now since this was verified in Christ’s body, it therefore seems that there could be in Him no pain of a bodily passion. 9. No wise man grieves or is saddened except at the loss of his own good. For the reason why evil itself is lamentable is that it takes away good. But man’s good is virtue, for only by this is he himself made good. Therefore, since that good was not taken away in Christ’s case, there was no sadness or grief in Him. 10. According to Augustine “when we refuse consent to what happens to us against our will, our state of will is sadness.” But in Christ nothing happened that He Himself did not will. The passion of sadness or grief was therefore not in Christ. 11. No one is reasonably saddened or grieved except for some injury. But, as Chrysostom proves, no one is injured except by himself; and a wise man does not do that. Consequently, since Christ was most wise, there was no sadness in Him. To the Contrary 1. It is written in Mark (14:33): “(Jesus) began to fear and to be heavy and to be sad.” 2. Augustine says that an upright will “has these movements... not only without blame but also laudably.” But there was an upright will in Christ. Then these movements were in Him. 3. In Christ there were the deficiencies of this life which are not inconsistent with the perfection of grace. But such passions are not inconsistent with the perfection of grace but are rather caused by grace, as Augustine brings out: “These movements, these emotions come from the love of good and from holy charity.” Such passions were therefore in Christ. REPLY The passions in question are in sinners in one way; in the just, both the perfect and the imperfect, in another way; in Christ as man in another; and in the first man and the blessed in still another. They are not in the angels or in God at all, because in them there is no sense appetite, of which such passions are movements. For the clarification of the statements quoted it should be borne in mind that such affections of the soul can be distinguished on four different grounds, all concerned with whether these affections have the character of passion more or less properly: (1) According to whether a person is affected with a passion of the soul by something contrary or harmful or by something suited and advantageous. The character of passion or suffering is more fully kept when the affection follows from something harmful than if it should follow from something advantageous, because passion implies an alteration of the patient from its natural state to a contrary one. This is why grief and sadness and fear and other such passions which have to do with evil possess the character of passion or suffering more than do joy and love and other emotions that have to do with good, though in these latter also the character of passion is kept inasmuch as the heart is dilated or stimulated by such things or is in any way modified from its ordinary state, so that it can happen that a man dies from such emotions. (2) According to whether the passion is entirely from the outside or is from some internal principle. The character of passion is better preserved when it is from without than when it is from within. It is from without when the passion is suddenly stirred up from the chance meeting with something suited or something harmful. It is from within when the passions are caused by the will itself in the manner explained, in which case they are not sudden, since they follow the judgment of reason. (3) According to whether a thing is transformed completely or not. We do not so properly say that a thing which is altered to some extent but is not completely transformed suffers, as we say this of one which is completely transformed to the contrary. We more properly say, for example, that a man suffers an illness if his whole body is ill than if a disease attacks some particular part of it. Now a man is completely transformed by such emotions when they do not stay in thelower appetite but carry along the higher appetite as well. When, however, they remain in the lower appetite alone, then the man is changed by them only as it were in part. In this case they are called “propassions,” while in the first case “passions.” (4) According to whether the transformation is slight or intense. Slight transformations are less properly called passions. Thus Damascene says: “Not all passive movements are called passion, but those which are more vehement and become sensible; for those which are slight and insensible are not yet passions.” It should therefore be noted that in men in this present life, if they are sinners, there are passions with regard to good and with regard to evil, not only foreseen but also sudden and intense ones and frequently even complete. These men are accordingly called in the Ethics “followers of passion.” In the just, on the other hand, the passions are never complete, because in such men reason is never led by passions. In the imperfect they are vehement, whereas in the perfect they are weak, with the lower powers kept in check by the habit of the moral virtues. Yet these do have not only foreseen but also sudden passions, and not only regarding good but also regarding evil. In the blessed, however, and in man in the first state, and in Christ as subject to our infirmity, such passions are never sudden, seeing that because of the perfect obedience of the lower powers to the higher no movement arises in the lower appetite except at the dictate of reason. Thus Damascene says: “In our Lord natural tendencies did not precede the will; for he hungered willing it, he feared willing it, etc.” And the same is to be understood of the blessed after the resurrection and of men in the first state. But there is this difference: in Christ there were not only passions with regard to good but also with regard to evil; for He had a passible body, and therefore from the imagining of something harmful the passion of fear and of sadness and the like could naturally arise in Him. But in the first state and in the blessed there cannot be the apprehension of anything as harmful; and therefore there is in them no passion except with regard to good, as love, joy, and the like, but not sadness or fear or anger or anything of the sort. We therefore concede that there were true passions in Christ. Hence Augustine says: “For a very definite providential purpose Christ took these movements upon Himself in His human soul when He willed, just as He became man when He willed.” Answers to Difficulties 1. It is not necessary for the agent to be more noble than the patient absolutely, but it suffices that it be so in a certain respect: in so far as it is an agent. Thus nothing prevents the object of Christ’s soul from being nobler than His soul in so far as the object is active and the soul of Christ has some passive potentiality. 2. According to Augustine there was a dispute on this question between the Stoics and the Pcripatetics which seemed, however, to be more one of words than of fact. The Stoics, who called wise a man perfect in virtue, having the virtue of a purified soul, said that such passions were not found in the soul of a wise man at all. The Peripatetics, on the other hand, say that these passions of the soul do occur even in a wise man, but under control and subject to reason. Now Augustine proves from the admission of a certain Stoic that even the Stoics held that such emotions were in the soul of a wise man, but sudden and without being approved or consented to; and they did not call them passions but appearances or phantasies of the soul. From this it is clear that the Stoics really did not hold anything different from the Peripatetics, but that there was disagreement only in words, because what the Peripatetics named passions the Stoics called by another name. Following the opinion of the Stoics, Macrobius and Plotinus say that passions are not found together with the virtue of a pur e soul, not because there are no sudden movements of passion in those who have this kind of virtue, but because they neither draw reason along with them nor are so vehement as to disturb seriously one’s peace of mind. In agreement with this the Philosopher says that cravings in the temperate are not strong as they are in the self-controlled, though in neither is reason drawn to consent. Or it can be said (and this is better) that, since these passions arise from good and evil, they should be distinguished on the basis of the difference in goods and evils. For there are certain natural goods and evils, such as food and drink, health or sickness of body, and others of the sort; and some not natural, such as wealth, honors, and the like. With these latter civic life is concerned. Now Plotinus and Macrobius distinguish the virtues of the purified soul from political virtues. From this it appears that they place the virtues of the purified soul in those who are entirely removed from civic affairs, giving their time exclusively to the contemplation of wisdom. In them, as a consequence, certain passions do not arise from civic goods and evils; yet they are not immune to those passions which arise from natural goods and evils. 3. Whatever is caused by a weak cause can be caused also by a stronger one. Now a certain judgment is a stronger cause for arousing the passions than a surmise. Damascene accordingly set down that minimum which can cause passion, giving us to understand by this that a stronger passion is caused by a stronger cause. 4. According to Augustine, impassibility is spoken of in two ways: (1) as doing away with emotions that occur against reason and disturb the mind, and (2) as excluding all emotion. In the passage quoted passion is understood as opposed to the first sort of impassibility, not as opposed to the second. Only the first sort was found in Christ. 5. In His intellective soul Christ was superior to the angels. Nevertheless He had sensitive appetite, according to which passions could be in Him, and the angels did not have this. 6. In the first man there were certain passions, such as joy and love, which have to do with good, but not fear or grief, which have to do with evil. The latter are a part of our present infirmity which Adam did not have but Christ voluntarily assumed. 7. In Christ there was a true injuring of the body and a true feeling of the injury. In His divinity He is the highest good from which nothing can be taken away, but not in His body. The statement of Hilary, moreover, was afterward (as some say) retracted by him.Or it can be said that he asserts that Christ did not have the feeling of punishment, not because He did not feel the pains, but because that feeling did not go so far as to affect His reason. 8. By the very fact that a soul has been glorified, the body united to it in the ordinary course of events is made glorious and incapable of suffering injury. Thus Augustine says: “God made the soul of so potent a nature that from its complete happiness, which is promised to the saints at the end of time, there will overflow into man’s lower nature, the body, not the happiness which is proper to one capable of enjoying and understanding, but the fullness of health, namely, the vigor of incorruptibility.” But having in His power His own soul and body in virtue of His divinity, by a dispensation Christ had both happiness in His soul and passibility in His body, since the Word allowed to the body what is proper to it, as Damascene says. It was therefore a singular occurrence in Christ that from the soul’s fullness of beatitude glory did not overflow into the body. 9. The Stoics called the good of man only that by which men are said to be good, the virtues of the soul. Other things, such as those which pertain to the body or to external fortune, they did not call goods but conveniences. These latter the Peripatetics called goods, but the least goods, and virtues they called the greatest goods. The difference was merely one in terminology. Just as from the “least goods” of the Peripatetics, so also from the “conveniences” of the Stoics there arise certain movements in the soul of the wise man, though not such as to disturb reason. It is not true, then, that sadness can arise in the soul of the wise man only from the lack of virtue. 10. Although the injuring of His body did not occur in Christ with His reason unwilling, yet it did occur against the appetitive tendency of sensuality. In this way there was sadness there. 11. Chrysostom is speaking of an injury by which someone is made miserable, i.e., one by which he is deprived of the good of virtue. But the passion of sadness does not arise exclusively from such an injury, as has been said. The conclusion therefore does not follow. p style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 0.125in\"> Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul ARTICLE IX In the ninth article we ask: Was the passion of pain in the soul of Christ as regards higher reason? [Parallel readings: III Sent. , 15, 2, 3 sol. 2; Quodl. VII, (2), 5; S.T. , III, 15, 5; 46, 7; Comp. theol. , I, 232.] Difficulties It seems that it was not, for 1. A man is said to be disturbed and to be led by passion when the turmoil of passion reaches all the way to reason. Now it is not the part of a wise man to be disturbed and led by passion. Therefore, since Christ was most wise, it seems that in His case pain did not reach all the way to higher reason. 2. Every power is said to get pleasure as a result of the appropriateness of its proper object. Pain should therefore not be attributed to any power except by reason of harm which comes from its object. But in regard to eternal things, which are the objects of higher reason, Christ did not suffer any defect or encumberment. The passion o pain was therefore not in Christ’s higher reason. 3. According to Augustine’ pain is one of the bodily passions. It therefore does not apply to the soul except in so far as it is joined to the body. But as regards higher reason the soul is not joined to the body, since according to the Philosopher the intellect is not the act of any body. Pain therefore cannot be in higher reason. 4. It was said in answer that higher reason is not joined to the body by its operation, but it is joined to it as its form.—On the contrary, according to the Philosopher “power and action belong to the same subject.”Consequently, if the action of the intellect belongs to the soul without any participation in it by the body, the intellective power also will belong to the soul independently of its union with the body; and so higher reason will not be joined to the body as its form. 5. According to Damascene4 passion is a movement of the irrational and appetitive soul. But pain and sadness and the like are passions. They were therefore not in the realm of higher reason in Christ. 6. According to Augustine, pain or sadness is among the things which happen to us against our will. But Christ willed His bodily passion in His higher reason, and nothing happened to Him against His will, which was most perfectly conformed to the divine will. Sadness or pain was therefore not in Christ as regards His higher reason. 7. It was said that His higher reason as reason willed the passion of His body, but not as a nature.—On the contrary, reason is the same power considered as reason or as a nature, for a different way of looking at it does not differentiate the substance of the thing. Now if higher reason as reason willed anything and as a nature did not will it, the same power at one and the same time willed something and did not will it. But that is impossible. 8. According to the Philosopher, there is no sadness contrary to the pleasure which is taken in contemplation. But higher reason finds its pleasure in contemplating eternal truths. Consequently there cannot be any pain or sadness in it, for this sadness or pain would be opposed to the pleasure of contemplation. Thus there was no passion of pain or sadness in Christ’s soul as regards higher reason. To the Contrary 1. It is written in the Psalm (87:4): “My soul is filled with evils,” which is interpreted in the Gloss: “Not with vices but with pains.” Pain was accordingly in every part of Christ’s soul, and therefore in higher reason. 2. Atonement corresponds to the fault. But by His passion Christ atoned for the fault of the first man. Now since that fault reached as far as higher reason, the passion of Christ must also have reached to higher reason. 3. As the Gloss says in comment upon the words “My soul is filled with evils” (Psalm 87:4), in feeling pain the soul suffers together with the body to which it is united. But reason as reason implies a reference to the body. This appears from the fact that we do not speak of reason but of intellect in the angels, who do not have a body naturally united to them; whereas we do speak of reason in souls united to bodies. Therefore the pain of Christ’s passion was in higher reason inasmuch as it is reason. 4. According to Augustine “the whole soul is in the whole body.”, Every part of it, then, is united to the body. But higher reason as reason is a part of the soul. It is therefore united to the body, and so suffers pain along with the suffering body. REPLY As is evident from what was said above, there are two kinds of passion by which the soul suffers indirectly, one bodily, which begins with the body and ends in the soul as united to the body, the other psychical, which is caused by the soul’s apprehending something by which the appetite is moved, with a resultant bodily alteration. If we are speaking of the first kind of passion, to which pain belongs according to Augustine, then it must be said that the pain of Christ’s passion was in some sense in higher reason and in some sense not. For there are two elements in pain: an injury, and the experiential perception of that injury. The injury is principally in the body, but resultantly in the soul as united to the body. Now the soul is united to the body by its essence, and in the essence of the soul all its powers are rooted. In ttiis respect, then, that injury in Christ had reference to the soul and to all its parts, even to higher reason in so far as it is grounded in the essence of the soul. The experiential perception of the injury, however, has reference only to the sense of touch, as was said above. If, on the other hand, we are speaking of psychical passion, sadness, which is properly a passion of this kind, can be only in that part of the soul whose object, when apprehended and appetitively attained, begets sadness. Now in Christ’s soul no reason for sadness could derive from the object of higher reason, that is, from the eternal verities of which He was in perfect possession. Consequently psychical sadnes could not have been in the higher reason of Christ’s soul. In Christ, therefore, higher reason suffered with bodily pain in so far as this power is rooted in the essence of the soul, but it did not suffer with psychical sadness in so far as by its proper act it was directed to the contemplation of eternal truths. Answers to Difficulties 1. A man is disturbed and led by passion when reason in its own operation follows the inclination of passion by consenting and choosing. Bodily pain, however, reached the higher reason of Christ’s soul, not by changing its proper operation, but only in so far as it is rooted in the essence, as has been said. Thus the conclusion does not follow. 2. Although pain was not in the higher reason of Christ’s soul with relation to its proper object, it was in it nevertheless as referred to its proper root, which is the essence of the soul. 3. A power can be the act of the body in two ways: (1) Inasmuch as it is a power; and thus it is said to be the act of the body as informing some bodily organ in order to carry out its own act. The visual power, for example, perfects the eye in order to carry out the act of seeing. In this sense the intellect is not the act of the body. (2) By reason of the essence in which it is grounded. In this sense the intellect as well as the other powers are joined to the body as its form inasmuch as they are in the soul which by its essence is the form of the body. 4. That difficulty is speaking of a power under the aspect of its being a power, not under that of its being rooted in the essence of the soul. 5. Damascene is speaking of Psychical passion, which is in the sense appetitive power as its proper subject, but in the apprehensive power causally, so to speak, inasmuch as the movement of passion arises in the appetitive from the apprehended object. There are, however, in the higher appetite certain operations similar to the passions of the lower appetite, and by reason of this similarity the names of the passions are sometimes attributed to the angels or to God, as Augustine says. In this way too sadness is sometimes said to be in higher reason as regards the apprehensive and the appetitive powers. We do not, however, say that pain was in the higher reason of Christ’s soul in this way, but in so far as it is rooted in the essence of the soul, as has been said. 6. This difficulty proves that pain was not in higher reason as referred to its object through its own operation. In that sense nothing occurs against its will. 7. The distinction made between reason as reason and reason as a nature can be understood in two ways: (1) In such a way that “reason as a nature” is used to mean reason in so far as it is the nature of a rational creature, that is, as being grounded in the essence of the soul and giving natural existence to the body; and “reason as reason” is spoken of from the point of view of the distinguishing characteristic of reason inasmuch as it is reason; and that is its act, since powers are defined by their acts. Because, then, pain is not in higher reason as referred to its object on the basis of its proper act but as rooted in the essence of the soul, it is said for this reason that higher reason suffered pain as a nature, not as reason. It is like the case of sight, which is founded on the sense of touch inasmuch as the organ of sight is also an organ of touch. Sight can accordingly suffer an injury in two different ways: through its proper act, as when sight is blurred by too strong a light, in which case this is a passion of sight as sight; or again as founded upon the sense of touch, as when the eye is punctured or dissolved by heat, in which case the passion is one of sight not as sight but as a sort of sense of touch. (2) The distinction mentioned can be understood in such a way that we use “reason as a nature” to mean reason as referred to the things which it naturally knows and tends to, and “reason as reason” to mean reason as directed to an object of knowledge or desire by means of a comparison, since it is the proper function of reason to compare. For there are certain things which are to be shunned when considered in themselves, but are sought because of their relation to something else. Thus hunger and thirst considered in themselves are to be shunned, but to the extent that they are considered useful for the health of the soul or body they are sought. Reason as reason accordingly takes pleasure in them, whereas reason as nature is saddened by them. So too, the bodily passion of Christ considered in itself was something to be shunned, and reason as nature was as a consequence saddened by it and did not want it. But from the point of view of its being destined for the salvation of the human race it was something good and desirable, and so reason as reason willed it and then rejoiced in it. This cannot be referred to higher reason, however, but only to lower reason, which directs its attention to the things of the body as its proper object. Hence it can be directed to bodily passions both absolutely and comparatively. But higher reason is not concerned with the things of the body as its objects, for it is directed in this way only to eternal things. It does, however, look at corporeal things to judge them in the light of eternal standards, to which it directs its gaze not only to look upon them but also to consult them. In Christ, accordingly, higher reason did not look at the passion of His body except with reference to the eternal standards, and in the light of them it rejoiced in the passion as pleasing to God. Hence sadness or pain by no means occurred in higher reason in virtue of its proper operation. Now it is not out of keeping for one and the same power to will in relation to something else the same thing that it does not will in itself, for it is possible for something which is not good in itself to take on a certain goodness from its relation to something else. This did not take place, however, in higher reason in Christ with regard to the passion of His body; for it is not directed to such a passion except as willed [by God], as is apparent from what has just been said. 8. Contemplation can cause pleasure in two different ways: (1) From the standpoint of the operation, that is, contemplating. In this sense there is no sadness contrary to the pleasure which is taken in contemplating, because opposed to this contemplation which is the cause of pleasure there is no contrary contemplation which would be the cause of sadness; for all contemplation is pleasurable. This is not the case, however, on the part of sense, because from the point of view of its operation sense can be both saddened and pained; for example, we take pleasure in touching something suited to the sense, but we experience pain from touching something harmful. (2) Contemplation causes pleasure from the standpoint of the thing contemplated; that is, according as the object is considered as good or as evil. Thus either pleasure or contrary sadness can arise from contemplation; for even failure to understand causes sadness when considered as an evil, though in itself it does not cause anything but the negation of pleasure. Nevertheless it is not in this way that we say that pain was in the higher reason of Christ’s soul, but as being rooted in the essence of the soul. Answers to Contrary Difficulties 1. The Gloss does not say that the soul of Christ was filled with sadness but that it was filled with pains in the sense that it was suffering along with the body. It is accordingly not necessary for the suffering of pain to be ascribed to higher reason except in so far as it is in the essence of the soul; for in that way it is united to the body. 2. Christ’s passion would not have atoned except in so far as it was undertaken voluntarily and from charity. It is accordingly not necessary that, just because the fault was in Adam through the operation of higher reason, pain be in the higher part of Christ’s reason as regards its proper operation; for the sufferer’s movement of charity, which is in the higher part of reason, corresponds for the purpose of atonement to whatever was in the fault from higher reason. 3. In reason there are two aspects to be kept in mind: a certain participation in the power of understanding, and also the clouding or defectiveness of understanding. The defectiveness of the power of understanding is a consequence of the soul’s ordination to union with a body, but the power of understanding is in the soul inasmuch as it is not immersed in the body like other material forms. Consequently, since the operation of reason is in the soul as participating in the power of understanding, such an operation is not exercised by means of the body. 4. “Reason as reason” does not designate a power distinct from reason as a nature, but it designates a way of looking at that power. Now even though, in one way of looking at it, suffering does not apply to some particular power of the soul, that does not prevent the whole soul from suffering. Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul ARTICLE X In the tenth article we ask: Did the pain of the passion which was in Christ’s higher reason prevent the joy of fruition, and conversely? [Parallel readings: De ver. , 10, 11 ad 3; III Sent. , 15, 3 sol. 2 ad 5; Quodl. VII, (2), 5; S.T. , III, 46, 8; Comp. theol., I, 232.] Difficulties It seems that it did, for 1. Blessedness is more properly in the soul than in the body. But the body cannot be said to be blessed an, d glorious while it is suffering, because impassibility belongs to the glory of the body. Then neither could there at the same time be the suffering of pain and the joy of blessed fruition in Christ’s higher reason. 2. The Philosopher says that any pleasure drives out the sadness which is contrary to it, and if it is keen it drives out all sadness. But the pleasure with which higher reason in the soul of Christ enjoyed the divinity, was most keen. It therefore drove from Christ all sadness and pain. 3. Christ’s higher reason was engaged in a more vivid contemplation than Paul in his rapture. But by the force of his contemplation Paul’s soul was carried out of his body not only as regards the operation of reason but also as regards sense operations. Then Christ too did not experience any pain either in reason or in sense. 4. From a strong cause there comes a strong effect. Now the operation of the soul is the cause of bodily change; for example, when terrors or delights are represented in imagination, the body is made cold or hot. Consequently, since there was the keenest joy in Christ’s soul as to His higher reason, it seems that even His body was changed by this joy; and so pain could not have been either in His body or in His higher reason under the aspect of its being united to the, body. 5. The vision of God in His essence is more effective than the vision of God in a creature serving as a medium. But the vision by which Moses saw God in a creature resulted in his not suffering from hunger during his fast of forty days. With all the more reason, then, did the vision of God in His essence, which belonged to Christ in His higher reason, remove all bodily affliction. And so the conclusion is the same as before. 6. Whatever exists in the highest degree of anything but yet can fall off, does not admit of any admixture of the contrary. Thus the heat of fire, which stands at the highest degree of heat, does not admit of any admixture of cold, though that heat is exchangeable. But the joy of fruition was in Christ’s higher reason in the highest degree and unchangeably. There was therefore no pain mixed with it. 7. Man is made blessed in both his soul and his body, and he lost both kinds of blessedness by sin. In Christ, however, human nature was re-established in blessedness of soul, which consists in the enjoyment of the divinity by higher reason. All the more, then, was it re-established in blessedness of body, which is something less; and consequently there was no pain in Him even as to His body, and so neither \\vas there in higher reason in virtue of its union with the body. 8. Not only Christ’s soul but also His flesh was united to the Word. Ilut if His flesh were glorified through union with the Word, there could not be any pain in it. Therefore, since His higher reason is made blessed through union with the Word, there can be no pain in it. 9. According to Augustine joy and pain are in the soul essentially. But joy and pain are contraries. Since contraries cannot be in the same subject cssentially, it therefore seems that the joy of fruition and the pain of the passion could not have been in the higher part of Christ’s reason at the same time. 10. Pain follows from the apprehension of something harmful; joy, from the apprehension of something agreeable. But it is not possible to apprehend simultaneously something harmful and something agreeable, because according to the Philosopher it is possible to understand only one thing. Pain and joy could therefore not have been in Christ’s higher reason at the same time. 11. In uncorrupted nature reason has more power over sensuality than sensuality has over reason in corrupted nature. But in corrupted nature sensuality draws reason along with it. All the more surely, then, in the case of Christ, in whom human nature was uncorrupted, does reason draw sensuality along with it. Thus sensuality shared in the joy of fruition which was in reason. From this it seems that the soul of Christ was altogether free from pain. 12. An infirmity contracted is greater than one assumed; and similarly union in person is stronger than union by grace. But in the three young men,” whose infirmity was contracted, union with God by grace kept their bodies incapable of suffering injury from fire. All the more, then, in the case of Christ, who had only an assumed infirmity, did union with God in the person of the Word and fruition of Him keep His reason free from the pain of the passion. 13. The joy of fruition is in higher reason from its being turned to God, and the pain of suffering from its being turned to the body. But reason, being simple, cannot at the same time be turned to God and to the body, because when anything simple turns to something, it turns as a whole. In Christ’s higher reason, then, there could not have been at the same time the joy of fruition and the pain of the passion. 14. It was said in answer that there was a twofold state in Christ, that of a wayfarer and that of a possessor, and that on the basis of these two states there could be in Him both the joy of fruition and the pain of the passion.—On the contrary, the duality of states in Christ neither removes the contrariety between joy and pain nor differentiates the subject of the joy and of the pain. Now contraries can not be in the same subject. The duality of states in Christ therefore does not make it possible for pain and joy to be in Him as regards higher reason at the same time. 15. The states of a wayfarer and of a possessor are either contrary or not. If they are contrary, they cannot be in Christ at the same time. If, on the other hand, they are not contrary, seeing that contraries have contrary causes, it seems that the duality of states cannot be the cause by which the contraries, joy and pain, were in Christ at the same time. 16. When one power becomes intense in its act, another is withdrawn from its act. With all the more reason, then, when one power is intense in one act, is the very same power withdrawn from another act. But in higher reason there was intense joy. By this fact, then, it was altogether withdrawn from pain. 17. It was said that pain was material with reference to joy, and for this reason joy was not prevented by pain.—On the contrary, the pain was from the suffering of the body, the joy, from the vision of God. The pain of the passion was therefore not material with reference to the joy of fruition. Then pain and joy could not be in Christ’s higher reason at the same time. To the Contrary 1. There is a proportion among effects similar to that among their causes. But the union of Christ’s soul with His body was the cause of pain, whereas its union with the divinity was the cause of joy. But these two unions do not preclude each other. Then neither do pain and joy preclude each other. 2. At the same instant Christ was a true wayfarer and a true possessor. He therefore had the attributes of each. But it is proper to a possessor to rejoice intensely from the divine fruition, and of a wayfarer to feel bodily pains. Therefore in Christ there were at the same time the pain of the passion and the joy of fruition. REPLY In Christ the two dispositions in question, the joy of fruition and the pain of the bodily passion, by no means precluded each other. For the clarification of this matter it should be borne in mind that, in conformity with the order of nature, because of the conjunction of the powers of the soul in one essence and of the soul and body in the one existence of the composite, the higher powers and the lower, and even the body and the soul, let flow from one to the other whatever superabounds in any one of them. And hence it is that because of the soul’s apprehension the body is altered with regard to heat and cold, and sometimes even to the extent of health and sickness and even to death; for it does happen that a person meets with death from joy or sadness or love. For this reason too there occurs an overflow from the very glory of the soul into the body, glorifying it, as is made clear in the passage from Augustine cited above. And contrariwise the alteration of the body overflows into the soul. For a soul joined to a body imitates its make-up in point of insanity or docility and the like, as is said in the work Six Principles. In the same way too there occurs an overflow from the higher powers into the lower, as when a passion in sense appetite follows upon an intense movement of the will, and the animal powers are withdrawn or barred from their acts by intense contemplation. And conversely there occurs an overflow from the lower powers into the higher, as when a man’s reason is clouded because of the vehemence of passions in sense appetite, with the result that it judges as simply good that to which the man is moved by passion. In Christ, however, the situation is quite different. Because of the divine power of the Word the order of nature was subject to His will. It was therefore possible that the above-mentioned overflow, whether from the soul into the body or vice versa, or from the higher powers into the lower or vice versa, should not take place; and the Word saw to this in order that the genuineness of His human nature in all its parts might be clearly proved and that the mystery of our reparation might be fittingly fulfilled in all respects. Damascene thus says: “He was moved in conformity with this nature, while the Word in the manner of a supervisor so willed and permitted, to suffer and to perform all works proper to it, in order that through its works the nature’s genuineness might be believed.” It is therefore evident that, since there was the most complete joy in His higher reason in view of the fact that by its activity His soul was enjoying the possession of God, that joy remained in higher reason and did not flow out to the lower powers of the soul or to the body; otherwise there could not have been any pain or passion in Him. Accordingly too the effect of fruition did not reach to the essence of the soul as the form of the body or as the root of the lower powers. Had it done so it would have reached the body and the lower powers, as happens in the blessed after the resurrection. Conversely also the pain which was in the body itself from the injury of the body and in the essence of the soul as the form of the body and in the lower powers, was not able to reach to higher reason in so far as by its act it turns towards God, in such a way that this turning might thereby be hindered in the least degree. It therefore remains that the pain itself attained higher reason as rooted in the essence of the soul and that the greatest joy was there inasmuch as reason was enjoying the possession of God by its act. Thus the joy belonged to higher reason directly, because by its proper act, whereas pain was there as if indirectly, because by reason of the essence of the soul in which it was grounded. Answers to Difficulties 1. Just as God is the good and the life of the soul, so the soul is the good and life of the body, but not contrariwise so that the body should be the good of the soul. Now the ability to suffer is a sort of barrier or harmful factor as regards the union of the soul with the body. Thus the body cannot be blessed in its own way while still able to suffer, having a barrier to participation in its own good. For this reason impassibility is a part of the glory of the body. The soul’s blessedness, however, consists entirely in the enjoyment of its own good, which is God. Hence the soul which enjoys the possession of God is perfectly happy, even if it happens to be passible from the point of view of its being united to the body, as was the case in Christ. 2. The fact that keen joy drives out all sadness, even that which is not contrary, is due to the overflow of the powers upon one another (which did not take place in Christ), as has been explained. In this way because of the intensity of St. Paul’s contemplation his lower powers were withdrawn from their acts. 3. The answer is clear from that just given. 4 In the same way there results from the operation of the soul some change in the body. From this the answer to this difficulty is obvious. 5. In the same way also Moses suffered from thirst and hunger not at all or little, because of his contemplation of God even though in a creature serving as a medium. Thus the answer to this difficulty is clear. 6. In Christ there was no mingling of joy and pain. For joy was in His higher reason viewed under the aspect of its being the principle of its own act, for it was in this way that it enjoyed the possession of God. Pain, however, was not in it except in so far as the injuring of the body touched it as the act of the body through the essence in which it was rooted, yet in such a way that the act of higher reason was in no wise hampered. Thus there was pure joy and likewise pure pain, and both in the highest degree. 7. It happened by a sort of dispensation that glory of soul, though not that of body, was conferred upon Christ from the first moment of His conception, so that He was conformed to God by the glory of His soul while by the passibility of His body He was like us. Thus He was a fitting mediator between God and man, leading us to glory and offering His passion to God in our name in accordance with the words of the Epistle to the Hebrews (2:10): “For it became him... who had brought many children into glory, to be perfected by his passion.” 8. The soul of Christ was joined to the Word in two ways: (1) by the act of fruition, and this union made it blessed; (2) by union, and this did not furnish the reason for its blessedness but did account for its being the soul of God. Now if one were to suppose that the soul was assumed in a unity of person without fruition, it would not be blessed properly speaking, because not even God Himself is blessed except by the fact that He enjoys the possession of Himself. The body of Christ is therefore not glorious by reason of being assumed by the Son of God in a unity of person, but only because glory came down into it from the soul; but this was not the case before the passion, because it was not glorious then. 9. It is impossible for contraries to be in the same subject directly; yet it does happen that contrary movements are in the same subject in such a way that one of them belongs to it directly and the other indirectly, as when a person walking in a ship is borne in a direction contrary to that in which the ship is moving. So too in the higher reason of Christ’s soul there was joy directly, because by its proper act, but pain indirectly, because through the suffering of the body. It can also be said that that joy and that pain were not contraries since they were not about the same thing. 10. The intellect cannot understand many things at the same time by means of different species, but it can understand many things at once by means of one species or by understanding in any other way many as one. It is in this way that the intellect of Christ’s soul and of any one of the blessed understands many things at once, since in seeing the divine essence it knows other things. Yet granted that the soul of Christ could understand only one thing at a time, the possibility is not thereby removed of its understanding one thing and at the same time sensing something else with a bodily sense. And as a matter of fact from those two different objects of apprehension in Christ’s soul there followed joy from the vision of God and the pain of the passion from the feeling of injury. Granted further that it could not simultaneously understand one thing and sense or imagine another, nonetheless from that one object of understanding higher and lower appetite could be affected in different ways, so that the higher would rejoice and the lower fear or grieve, as happens in one who hopes to get health from some horrible remedy. For considered by reason as health-giving, the remedy begets joy in the will; but because of its horribleness it arouses fear in the lower appetite. 11. That argument proceeds on the assumption of the ordinary course of events. In Christ, however, it occurred by way of exception that there should not take place the overflow from one power into another. 12. The bodies of the three young men were not made impassible in the furnace; but by the divine power it was miraculously brought about that while remaining passible their bodies should not be injured by the fire, as it also could have happened by the divine power that neither Christ’s soul nor His body should suffer anything. But why this was not done has been explained. 13. The turning of a power towards something takes place by means of its act. Thus joy was in Christ’s higher reason by means of it turning to God, to whom it was kept turned entirely, whereas pain was in His higher reason as a result of the inhesion or adherence by which it clung to the essence of the soul as its root. 14. The state of a wayfarer is a state of imperfection, whereas that of a possessor is a state of perfection. Christ therefore had the state of a wayfarer by reason of bearing a body capable of suffering, and likewise such a soul; but He had the state of a possessor by reason of perfectly enjoying the possession of God through the act of higher reason. This was possible in Christ because by the divine power the overflow from one to another was inhibited, as has been said. This is the reason also why joy and sadness could be in Him simultaneously. It is accordingly said that these two feelings were in Him in accordance with His two states because His having two states and His simultaneously experiencing pain and joy came from the same cause. 15. Even though the states of a wayfarer and of a possessor are in a sense contrary, they could still be in Christ at the same time, not in the same respect but in different respects. For the state of a possessor was in Him according as He adhered to God by fruition in higher reason; and the state of a wayfarer, according as His soul was joined to a body capable of suffering and His higher reason joined to the soul itself by a sort of natural conjunction. As a result the state of a possessor has reference to the act of higher reason, and that of a wayfarer to His passible body and its consequent properties. 16. It was something special in Christ, for the reason already explained, that however much one power was intensified in its act, another was not withdrawn from its act or in any way hampered. The joy of higher reason was accordingly hindered neither by the pain which was in sense as a consequence of the act of sensing nor by the pain which was in higher reason itself, because that pain was not in it as a consequence of its act, but it attained it in some manner as a consequence of its being grounded in the essence of the soul. 17. Just as blessed knowledge is principally of the divine essence and secondarily of the things which are known in the divine essence, in the same way the affection and joy of the blessed is principally about God but secondarily about the things that have God as the reason why we rejoice over them. The pain of the passion can accordingly be in some sense material with reference to the joy of fruition, for that joy was principally over God and secondarily over the things which were pleasing to God; and so it was even over the pain in so far as it was acceptable to God as destined for the salvation of the human race.",
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        "text": "4. Præterea, Augustinus dicit, XII Super Genes. ad litteram, cap. xxxii, a med.: « Non sunt corporalia, sed similia corporalibus, quibus animæ corporibus exutæ afficiuntur bene seu male. » Ergo ignis quo anima separata punitur, non est corporeus.\n\n7. Præterea, agentis ad patiens est aliqua proportio. Sed incorporei ad corpus nulla est proportio. Ergo anima non potest ab igne corporeo, cum sit incorporea, pati.\n\n8. Præterea, si ignis corporeus non naturaliter in animam agit, oportet quod hoc fiat per aliquam virtutem superadditam. Aut ergo illa virtus est corporalis, aut spiritualis. Spiritualis esse non potest, quia res corporalis spiritualis virtutis susceptiva non est. Si autem est corporalis; cum omni virtute corporali anima præstantior sit, per hanc virtutem ignis in eam agere non poterit. Ergo nec naturaliter nec supernaturaliter anima pati potest. 9. Sed dicendum quod anima per peccatum redditur ignobilior creatura corporali. — Sed contra: Augustinus dicit in lib. De vera religione, cap. Lv, aliquantulum a princ., quod « substantia vivens est dignior qualibet substantia non vivente. » Sed anima rationalis post peccatum adhuc remanet vivens vita naturali. Ergo non efficitur indignior igne corporali, qui est substantia non vivens.\n\n10. Præterea, si ignis ille corporeus affligit animam, hoc non est nisi inquantum apprehenditur vel sentitur ut nocivus. Sed ex hoc aliquid nocet quod aliquid adimit: unde Augustinus dicit, Enchirid., cap. xxii, quod « malum ideo nocet, quia adimit bonum. » Ignis autem corporeus nihil ab anima potest adimere. Ergo eam affligere non potest. 11. Sed dicendum quod adimit divinæ visionis gloriam. — Sed contra: pueri qui pro solo originali damnantur, carent divina visione. Si ergo nihil aliud ignis corporeus a damnatis adimit, non erit major pœna eorum qui pro peccatis actualibus puniuntur in inferno, quam puerorum qui puniuntur in limbo; quod est nem; 10° utrum per doloris passiones, qui erat in superiori ratione Christi, impediretur gaudium fruitionis, et e converso. contra Augustinum, Enchirid., cap. xcii.\n\n12. Præterea, omne quod agit in alterum, imprimit in ipsum similitudinem suæ formæ, per quam agit. Sed ignis agit per calorem. Cum ergo anima non possit calefieri, videtur quod non possit abigne pati.\n\n13. Præterea, Deus pronior est ad miserendum quam ad puniendum. Sed per instrumenta divinæ misericordiæ, scilicet sacramenta, aliquis involuntarius et resistens non juvatur, præcipue si sit adultus. Ergo per instrumentum divinæ justitiæ, quod est ignis corporeus, anima invita non recipiet pœnam. Constat autem quod voluntarie non recipit. Ergo nullo modo per ignem corporeum anima punitur.\n\n14. Præterea, omne quod patitur ab aliquo, aliquo modo movetur ab eo. Sed secundum nullam speciem motus anima potest moveri ab igne corporeo, ut per inductionem patet. Ergo anima non potest pati ab igne corporeo.\n\n15. Præterea, omne quod patitur ab aliquo, communicat cum eo in materia, ut videtur per Boetium in lib. De duab. naturis et una persona Christi, aliquantulum a med. Sed anima et ignis corporeus non communicant in materia. Ergo non potest pati ab igne corporeo. 1. Sed contra est quod Lucæ xvi, 24, dives in inferno positus secundum animam tantum dicit: Crucior in hac flamma.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod ad evidentiam hujus quaestionis et sequentium scire oportet quid proprie sit passio. Sciendum est igitur quod nomen passionis dupliciter sumitur; communiter et proprie. Communiter quidem dicitur passio receptio alicujus quocumque modo; et hoc sequendo significationem vocabuli: nam passio dicitur a « patin » græce, quod est recipere. Proprie vero dicitur passio secundum quod actio et passio in motu consistunt; prout scilicet aliquid recipitur in patiente per viam motus. Et quia omnis motus est inter contraria; oportet illud quod recipitur in patiente, esse contrarium alicui quod a patiente abjicitur. Secundum hoc autem quod recipitur in patiente, patiens agenti assimilatur; et inde est quod proprie accepta passione, agens contrariatur patienti, et omnis passio abjicit a substantia. Hujusmodi autem passio non est nisi secundum motum alterationis. Nam in motu locali non recipitur aliquid immobile, sed ipsum mobile recipitur in aliquo loco. In motu autem augmenti et decrementi recipitur vel abjicitur non forma, sed aliquid substantiale, utpote alimentum, ad cujus additionem vel subtractionem sequitur quantitatis magnitudo vel parvitas. In generatione autem et corruptione non est motus nec contrarietas, nisi ratione alterationis præcedentis; et sic secundum solam alterationem est proprie passio, secundum quam una forma contraria recipitur, et alia expellitur. Quia ergo actio proprie accepta, est cum quadam abjectione, prout patiens a pristina qualitate transmutatur in contrarium; ampliatur nomen passionis secundum usum loquentium, ut qualitercumque aliquid impediaur ab eo quod sibi competebat, pati dicatur; sicut si dicamus grave pati ex hoc quod prohibetur ne deorsum moveatur; et hominem pati, si prohibeatur suam facere voluntatem. Passio igitur primo modo accepta inventur in anima, et in qualibet creatura, eo quod omnis creatura habet aliquid potentialitatis admixtum, ratione cujus omnis creatura subsistens est alicujus receptiva. Passio vero secundo modo accepta non inventur nisi in corporibus, et contrarietas formarum vel qualitatum in solis generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Unde sola hujusmodi proprie hoc modo pati possunt. Unde anima, cum sit incorporea, hoc modo pati non potest: et si etiam aliquid recipiat, non tamen hoc fit per transmutationem a contrario in contrarium, sed per simplicem agentis influxum, sicut aer illuminatur a sole. Tertio vero modo quo nomen passionis transumptive sumitur, anima potest pati eo modo quo ejus operatio potest impediri. Quidam ergo attendentes passionem in anima proprie esse non posse, dixerunt omnia quæ dicuntur in Scripturis de pœnis corporalibus damnatorum, intelligenda esse metaphorice; ut scilicet per hujusmodi corporales pœnas apud nos notas, significarentur afflictiones spirituales, quibus spiritus damnati puniuntur; sicut e contrario per corporales delectationes repromissas in Scripturis intelligimus spirituales delectationes beatorum. Et hujusmodi opinionis videtur fuisse Origenes, lib. II Periarchon, cap. x, §§ III, IV et VI, Pat. græc. lat. t. Xl, col. 235-40, et Algazel. Sed quia resurrectionem credentes non solum credimus futuram esse pœnam spirituum, sed corporum; corpora vero puniri non possunt nisi corporali pœna, eadem pœna hominibus post resurrectionem et spiritibus debetur, ut patet Matth. xxv, ubi dicitur: Ite maledicti in ignem æternum etc.; ideo oportet dicere, ut Augustinus probat XXI De civit. Dei, cap. x, ipsos spiritus pœnis corporalibus aliqualiter affici. Nec est simile de gloria beatorum et pœna damnatorum: quia beati sublimantur in id quod eorum naturam excedit, unde beatificantur per fruitionem Divinitatis; damnati vero deprimuntur in id quod sub eis est, unde corporalibus tormentis puniuntur. Et ideo alii dixerunt quod anima separata afficietur quidem aliquibus pœnis, quamvis non corporalibus similibus; quibus similes sunt illæ pœnæ per quas affliguntur dormientes. Et hoc modo videtur sensisse Augustinus, XII Super Genesim ad litteram, cap. xxxii, et Avicenna, lib. IX Metaph., cap. ultim. Sed hoc esse non potest. Nam hujusmodi similitudines corporum non possunt esse intelligibiles, quia illæ sunt universales, ex quorum consideratione afflictio animæ non infertur, sed magis jucunditas in consideratione veritatis. Unde oportet quod intelligatur de similitudinibus imaginariis, quæ quidem esse non possunt nisi in organo corporali, ut a Philosopho probatur. Quod quidem et animæ separatæ et spiritibus dæmonum deest. Unde alii dicunt quod ab ipsis corporibus anima separata patitur. Quod quidem qualiter esse possit, a diversis diversimodo assignatur. Quidam enim dicunt quod anima separata suis sensibus utitur: unde ignem corporereum sentiendo, ab igne punitur. Et hoc est quod Gregorius in IV Dialogo, cap. xxxix, dicere videtur, quod ignem eo ipso patitur anima quo videt. Sed istud non videtur verum. Primo quidem, quia actus sensitivarum potentiarum esse non possunt nisi mediantibus organis corporalibus; alias animæ sensibiles brutorum essent incorruptibles, utpote per se suas potentes habere operationes. Secundo, quia, dato quod sentirent animæ separatæ non tamen possent a sensibilibus affligi: nam sensibile est perfectio sentientis in quantum hujusmodi, sicut et intelligibile intelligentis. Unde aliquid sensatum vel intellectum non infert dolorem vel tristitiam inquantum hujusmodi; sed inquantum est nocivum, vel apprehenditur ut nocivum. Unde oportet invenire modum quo ignis animæ separatæ possit esse nocivus. Nec potest esse quod quidam dicunt, quod quamvis ignis ille corporeus non possit esse spiritui nocivus, potest tamen apprehendi ut nocivus: quod vide-tur consonum ei quod Gregorius dicit in IV Dial., cap. xxxi, Pat. lat. t, LXXVII, col. 368 «Quia cremari se inspicit diabolus, crematur. « Non enim est probabile quod dæmones, qui acumine sensus vigent, multo melius suam naturam et ignis corporalis non cognoscant quam nos, ut falso credant ignem corporeum sibi posse nocere. Unde dicendum, quod vere, et non solum secundum apparentiam ab igne corporeo affliguntur: et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit in IV Dial., cap: xxix, a med.: « Colligere ex dictis evangelicis possumus, quod incendium anima non solum videndo, sed etiam experiendo patiatur.» Cujus quidem modum aliqui hoc modo assignant, dicentes ignem corporeum, ut est instrumentum divinæ justitiæ, in animam agere posse, quamvis hoc secundum naturam non possit. Multa enim sunt quæ ad aliquid efficiendum non sufficiunt ex propria natura, quod efficere possunt ut sunt instrumenta alterius agentis; sicut ignis elementaris non sufficit ad generationem carnis, nisi ut instrumentum virtutis nutritivæ. Sed hoc sufficiens non videtur: nam instrumentum non agit illam actionem quæ propriam naturam excedit, nisi exercendo aliquam connaturalem, ut in objiciendo, argum. III, dictum est. Unde oportet invenire aliquem modum per quem aliqualiter naturaliter patiatur anima ab igne corporeo. Quod quidem hoc modo intelligi potest. Substantiam enim corpoream corpori uniri contingit dupliciter: uno modo ut formam, in quantum vivificat corpus; alio modo ut motorem mobili, vel locatum loco, per aliquam operationem, sive per aliquam habitudinem. Quia vero formæ et ejus cujus est forma est unum esse; unio substantiae spiritualis ad corporalem per modum formæ, est unio quantum ad esse. Nullius autem rei esse est suæ potestati subjectum; et ideo est in potestate substantiae spiritualis uniri corpori vel ab eo separari per modum formæ, sed hoc lege naturæ agitur, vel virtute divina. Sed quia operatio rei est in potestate operantis voluntarie, ideo in potestate naturæ spiritualis est uniri corpori per modum motoris aut locati, et separari ab eo, secundum ordinem naturæ; sed quod substantia spiritualis hoc modo corporali unita ab ea detineatur et impediatur, et quasi ligetur, est supra naturam. Ignis ergo ille corporeus agens ut instrumentum divinæ justitiæ, facit aliquid supra virtutem naturæ, scilicet animam detinere, vel ligare; sed ipsa unio per modum prædictum est naturalis. Et sic patitur anima ab igne corporeo, illo tertio modo supradicto, prout dicimus pati omne id quod impeditur a propria actione, vel ab alio sibi competenti; et hunc modum passionis Augustinus ponit in XX lib. De civit. dei, cap. x, sic dicens: « Cur non dicamus, quamvis miris, tamen veris modis etiam spiritus incorporeos posse pœna corporalis ignis afflgi, si spiritus hominum, etiam ipsi profecto incorporei, et nunc potuerunt includi corporalibus membris, et tunc poterunt corporum suorum vinculis insolubiliter alligari? Adhærebunt ergo... incorporei spiritus dæmonum corporeis ignibus cruciandi; non ut ignes ipsi, quibus adhærebunt, eorum junctura inspirentur, et animalia fiant... sed miris et ineffabilibus modis adhærendo, accipientes ex ignibus pœnam, non dantes ignibus vitam. » Hunc modum Gregorius ponit in IV Dial., cap xxxi, sic dicens: « Dum veritas pecatorem divitem damnatum in igne perhibet, quisnam sapiens reproborum animas teneri ignibus neget? »\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod agens non oportet simpliciter esse præstantius patiente, sed secundum quod est agens: et sic ignis, inquantum agit in animam ut instrumentum divinæ justitiæ, est anima præstantior, quamvis non simpliciter.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod in illa passione et actione est aliquid naturale, ut dictum est.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod objectio illa procedit de passione secundo modo dicta, quæ est per formarum contrarietatem; et hoc ibi esse non potest.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod Augustinus circa hoc, XII Super Genesim ad litteram, cap. xxxii, nihil expresse determinat; sed loquitur inquirendo per modum dubitationis; unde non dicit absolute quod ea quibus animæ separatæ afficiuntur, non sunt corporalia, sed similia corporalibus; sed loquitur sub conditione, scilicet, quod si essent hujusmodi, tamen ex eis possent animæ affici vel a laetitia vel a tristitia. Et similiter quod dicit, quod ad corporalia loca non fertur nisi cum alio corpore; sub disjunctione dicit, adjungens, «vel nonlocaliter» scilicet per commensurationem ad locum.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod in pœna animæ separatæ duo est considerare; scilicet affligens primum et proximum. Affligens primum est ipse ignis corporalis, detinens animam per modum prædictum; sed hoc tristitiam animæ non ingereret, nisi hoc esset ab anima apprehensum. Unde proximum affligens est ignis ipse detinens apprehensus; et iste ignis non est materialis, sed spiritualis: et sic potest verificari dictum Damasceni. Vel potest dici, quod dicit eum non materialem, inquantum non punit animam materialiter agendo, sicut punit corpora.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod ille ignis apprehenditur ut nocivus, inquantum est detinens vel ligans; et sic ejus visio potest esse afflictiva.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod spiritualis ad corporale non est quidem proportio, proportione accepta secundum determinatam habitudinem quantitatis ad quantitatem, vel dimensivæ ad dimensivam, vel virtualis ad virtualem, sicut duo corpora ad invicem sunt proportionata secundum dimensionem et virtutem: virtus enim spiritualis substantiæ non est ejusdem generis cum virtute corporali. Large tamen accepta proportione pro qualibet habitudine, sic est aliqua proportion spiritualis ad corporale, per quam spirituale actualiter agere potest in corporale, quamvis non e converso, nisi divina virtute.\n\nAd octavum dicendum quod instrumentum agit actionem instrumentalem, inquantum est motum ab agente principali, per quem motum participat aliqualiter virtutem agentis principalis, non ita quod virtus illa sit in instrumento secundum esse perfectum, quia motus est actus imperfectus. Objectio autem procedit ac si aliqua virtus perfecta in instrumento acquireretur ad agendum actionem instrumentalem.\n\nAd nonum dicendum quod anima pecatrix simpliciter nobilior est qualibet virtute corporali secundum suam naturam: sed secundum culpam efficitur indignior igne corporali, non simpliciter, sed ut est instrumentum divinæ justitiæ.\n\nAd decimum dicendum quod ignis ille nocet animæ, non ita quod adimat ei aliquam formam absolute inhærentem, sed inquantum ejus substantiae actionem imdit, ut dictum est, in solut. ad v et v1 argum., ipsam detinendo.\n\nAd undecimum dicendum quod in pueris propter defectum gratiae est sola carentia divinæ visionis sine aliquo contrario impediente active; sed damnati in inferno non solum privantur divina visione propter defectum gratiae, sed etiam impediuntur quasi per contrarium, ex hoc quod circa pœnas corporales occupantur.\n\nAd duodecimum dicendum quod anima non patitur ab igne quasi alterata ab eo, sed per modum prædictum, in corp. art.\n\nAd decimumtertium dicendum quod voluntarium est de ratione justitiæ, non autem de ratione pœnæ, sed magis contra pœnæ rationem: et ideo non instrumenta divinæ misericordia, quæ sunt ad justificandum, in animam renitentem agunt; sed instrumenta divinæ justitiæ, quæ sunt ad puniendum, in animam renitentem agunt.\n\nAd decimumquartum dicendum quod objectio illa procedit de passione proprie dicta, quæ in motu consistit, de qua nunc non loquimur.\n\nAd decimumquintum dicendum quod ad hoc quod sit passio, proprie loquendo, oportet quod aliquid habeat naturam contrarietati subjectam, ut dictum est, in corp. art.; et ad hoc quod sit motus passio, oportet quod sit materia communis. Tamen aliquid potest pati ab altero cum quo non communicat in materia, sicut corpora inferiora a sole; et aliquid potest aliquo modo pati quod nullo modo habet materiam, sicut ex prædictis patet. Quia vero objectiones quæ sunt in contrarium, aliqualiter verum conclusunt, tamen non vere, ad eas per ordinem respondendum est.\n\nSecundo quæritur quomodo anima conjuncta corpori patiatur; et videtur quod non patiatur per accidens. Ut enim dicitur in lib. De spiritu et anima, cap. xiv, in princ., « propter amicitiam corporis et animæ, anima corpori conjuncta non potest esse libera, et non potest interire; potest tamen timere interitum. » Timere autem est quoddam pati. Ergo secundum se ipsam anima patitur corpori conjuncta, quia secundum se ei competit ut interire non possit.\n\n2. Præterea, omne quod dat alteri perfectionem est eo præstantius. Sed corpus dat animæ perfectionem, nam anima uni-tur corpori ad hoc quod ibi perficiatur. Ergo corpus est præstantius anima; et ita anima potest per se pati a corpore cui unitur.\n\n3. Præterea, anima movetur secundum locum per accidens; quia per accidens est in loco, in quo est corpus per se. Sed forma vel qualitas quæ inest corpori per se, non videtur inesse animæ per accidens. Cum ergo passio sit secundum formam vel qualitatem, quia est secundum motum alterationis, videtur quod anima in corpore non possit pati per accidens.\n\n4. Præterea, moveri per accidens distinguitur contra moveri secundum partem, ut patet in V Phys., comm. 1. Sed anima est pars compositi, quod per se movetur, ut patet in patet in I De anima, com. Lxiii et Lxiv. Ergo non debet dici moveri per accidens, sed sicut pars ad motum totius.\n\n5. Præterea, illud quod est per se, prius est eo quod est per accidens. Sed in passionibus animæ prius est quod est ex parte animæ quam quod est ex parte corporis; quia ex apprehensione et appetitu animæ transmutatur corpus, ut patet in ira, timore, et aliis hujusmodi. Ergo non est dicendum quod istis passionibus anima patitur per accidens, et corpus per se.\n\n6. Præterea, in unoquoque principalius est id quod est formale in ipso, quam quod est materiale in eo. Sed in passionibus animæ, quod est ex parte, formale est; quod autem est ex parte corporis, materiale: hæc enim est formalis definitio iræ: « Ira est appetitus in vindictam; » hæc vero materialis: « Ira est accensio sanguinis circa cor. » Ergo in hujusmodi passionibus principalius est quod est ex parte animæ quam quod est ex parte corporis; et sic idem quod prius.\n\n7. Præterea, sicut gaudium et tristitia et hujusmodi passiones animæ non insunt animæ sine corpore, ita nec sentire. Sed non dicitur quod anima sentiat per accidens. Ergo nec debet dici quod anima per accidens patiatur.\n\nSed contra: passio motus quidam est secundum alterationem, ut dictum est, proprie accipiendo passionem. Sed anima non alteratur nisi per accidens. Ergo nec patitur nisi per accidens. Præterea, virtutes animæ non sunt perfectiores quam ipsa animæ substantia. Sed secundum Philosophum, I De anima, comm. Lxiii, virtutes non senescunt per se, sed solum propter defectum corporis. Ergo nec anima patitur per se, sed solum per accidens. Præterea, omne quod per se movetur, est divisibile, ut probatur in VII Physic., comm. 11. Sed anima est indivisibilis. Ergo non per se movetur; et ita nec per se patitur.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod, propriæ accipiendo passionem, impossibile est aliquod incorporeum pati, ut supra, art. præc., dictum est. Illud ergo quod per se patitur passione propria, corpus est. Si ergo passio propriæ dicta aliquo modo ad animam pertineat, hoc non est nisi secundum quod unitur corpori, et ita per accidens. Unitur autem dupliciter: uno modo ut forma, inquantum dat esse corpori, vivificans ipsum; alio modo ut motor, inquantum per corpus suas operationes exercet. Et utroque modo anima patitur per accidens, sed diversimode. Nam id quod est compositum ex materia et forma, sicut agit ratione formæ, ita patitur ratione materiæ; et ideo passio incipit a materia, et quodammodo per accidens pertinet ad formam; sed passio patientis derivatur ab agente, eo quod passio est effectus actionis. Dupliciter ergo passio corporis attribuitur animæ per accidens. Uno modo ita quod passio incipiat a corpore et terminetur in anima, secundum quod unitur corpori ut forma; et hæc est quædam passio corporalis: sicut cum laeditur corpus, debilitatur unio corporis cum anima, et sic per accidens ipsa anima patitur, quæ secundum suum esse corpori unitur. Alio modo ita quod incipiat ab anima, inquantum est corporis motor, et terminetur in corpus; et hæc dicitur passio animalis; sicut patet in ira et timore, et aliis hujusmodi; nam hujusmodi per apprehensionem et appetitum animæ peraguntur, ad quæ sequitur corporis transmutatio; sicut transmutatio mobilis sequitur ex operatione motoris, secundum omnem modum quo mobile disponitur ad obediendum motioni motoris. Et sic corpore transmutato per alterationem aliquam, ipsa anima pati dicitur per accidens.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod anima non timet interitum, ut ipsa secundum se intereat; sed timet interitum conjuncti per separationem sui a corpore; et si sui ipsius interitum timeat, hoc non est nisi inquantum dubitatur an ad corruptionem corporis anima per accidens corrumpatur. Unde nec ipse interitus animae potest convenire per se; nec ipsa passio sine conjunctione corporis ei convenit.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod anima quamvis perficiatur in corpore, non tamen perficiatur a corpore, ut Augustinus probat, XII Super Genesim ad litteram, cap. xvi; sed vel a Deo perficiatur, vel ipsa se ipsam perficit cum adminiculo corporis obsequentis; sicut virtute intellectus agentis perficitur intellectus possibilis adminiculo phantasmatum, quæ per ipsum fiunt intelligibilia actu.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod, quamvis qualitas corporis animæ nullo modo conveniat, tamen esse conjuncti est commune animae et corpori, et similiter operatio: unde passio corporis per accidens redundat in animam.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod passio non accidit conjuncto ex corpore et anima nisi ratione corporis; unde animae non accidit nisi per accidens. Ratio autem procedit ac si passio conveniret toti ratione totius, et non ratione alterius partis.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod ira, et similiter quælibet passio animæ, dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo secundum propriam rationem iræ; et sic per prius est in anima quam in corpore: et alio modo inquantum est passio; et sic per prius est in corpore; ibi enim primo accipit rationem passionis. Et ideo non dicimus quod anima irascatur per accidens, sed quod per accidens patiatur. Et per hoc patet solutio ad sextum.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod anima non dicitur sentire per accidens eadem ratione qua nec gaudere, quamvis dicatur per accidens pati.\n\nTertio quæritur utrum passio sit tantum in appetitiva; et videtur quod non. Christus enim secundum totam animam patiebatur, ut patet per illud Ps. Lxxxvii, 4: Repleta est malis anima mea: quod de passionibus exponit Glossa interl. ex August. Totalitas autem animæ ad potentias pertinet. Ergo in qualibet potentia animæ potest esse passio, et ita non tantum in appetitiva sensitiva.\n\n2. Præterea, omnis motus vel operatio quæ convenit animæ præter corpus, secundum se ipsam est partis intellectivæ, non sensitivæ. Sed sicut dicit Augustinus XIII De civ. Dei, cap. v, in fin., « non ex carne tantum afficitur anima, ut cupiat, metuat, lætetur, cognoscat; verum etiam ex se ipsa hic potest motibus agitari. » Ergo hujusmodi passiones non sunt tantum in parte appetitiva sensitiva.\n\n4. Præterea, ejusdem potentiæ non est agere et pati. Sed sensus videtur potentia activa: nam basiliscus videndo dicitur interficere, et mulier menstruata videndo inficit speculum, ut patet in lib. De somno et vig., cap. xII, ante med. Ergo in parte sensitiva non est posita animæ passio.\n\n5. Præterea, potentia activa est nobilior quam passiva. Sed potentiæ vegetativæ sunt activæ, quibus nobiliores sunt potentiæ sensitivæ. Ergo sensitivæ sunt activæ; et sic idem quod prius.\n\n6. Præterea, potentiæ rationales sunt ad opposita, secundum Philosophum, IX Metaph., com. III. Delectationi autem opponitur tristitia. Cum ergo in parte intellectiva sit proprie delectatio, ut patet in VII et X Ethic., (lib. II Ethic., cap. v, paulo a princ.), videtur quod sit ibi tristitia; et sic passiones possunt esse in parte intellectiva. 7. Sed diceretur quod verbum Philosophi intelligitur de oppositis actibus. — Sed contra: scientia et ignorantia, quæ sunt opposita, sunt in parte animæ intellectiva, et tamen non sunt actus. Ergo verbum Philosophi non tantum de actibus est intelligendum.\n\n8. Præterea, secundum Philosophum in II Phys., comm. III, idem per sui absentiam et præsentiam est causa contrariorum, sicut gubernator salutis et submersionis navis. Sed intelligibile præsens facit delectationem in parte intellectiva. Ergo intelligibile absens facit tristitiam in eadem; et sic idem quod prius.\n\n9. Præterea, Damascenus dicit in lib. II De fid. orth., cap. xxII, quod « Dolor non est passio, sed passionis sensus. » Ergo est in sensitiva virtute, et non in appetitiva; et eadem ratione delectatio, et alia quæ dicuntur animæ passiones.\n\n10. Præterea, secundum Damascenum in II lib., ubi supra, et Philosophum in II Ethic., cap. v, passio est ad quam consequitur gaudium et tristitia. Ergo passiones animæ præcedunt gaudium et tristitiam. Sed gaudium et tristitia sunt in appetitiva. Ergo passiones animæ sunt in ea parte quæ præcedit appetitivam; ergo passiones animæ sunt in parte apprehensiva, quæ appetitivam præcedit.\n\n11. Præterea, sicut in operationibus appetitivæ sensitivæ transmutatur corpus, ita in operationibus sensitivæ apprehensiva. Ergo passio non est tantum in appetitiva, sed in apprehensiva.\n\n12. Præterea, passio, proprie loquendo, est per abjectionem alicujus, et receptionem contrarii. Sed hoc accidit in parte intellectiva; nam abjicitur culpa, et recipitur gratia; abjicitur habitus luxuriæ, et inducitur habitus castitatis. Ergo in parte superiori animæ proprie est passio.\n\n13. Præterea, motus appetitivæ sensitivæ sequitur apprehensionem sensus. Sed aliquando hujusmodi passiones animæ excitantur in nobis ex aliquibus objectis quæ a sensu apprehendi non possunt; sicut verecundia de turpi actu, timor de furto. Ergo hujusmodi non possunt esse in parte appetitiva sensitiva; et sic relinquitur quod sint in parte appetitiva rationali, scilicet in voluntate.\n\n14. Præterea, inter alias passiones animæ ponitur spes. Sed spes est in parte animæ intellectiva: quia sancti Patres in limbo existentes spem habebant; motus autem partis sensitivæ non remanet in anima separata. Ergo passiones sunt in parte animæ intellectiva.\n\n15. Præterea, imago est in parte intellectiva. Sed secundum potentias imaginis, anima patitur: quia potentiæ imaginis, quæ nunc perficiuntur gratia, in statu gloriæ perficientur fruitionis gloria. Ergo passio non est tantum in parte animæ appetitiva sensitiva.\n\n16. Præterea, secundum Damascenum passio est motus ex alio in aliud. Sed intellectus movetur de alio in aliud, procedendo de principiis in conclusiones. Ergo in intellectu est passio; et sic idem quod prius.\n\n17. Præterea, Philosophus, in III De anima, com. xii, dicit quod intelligere est pati quoddam. Sed intelligere est in intellectu. Ergo in intellectu est passio.\n\n18. Præterea, Dionysius dicit de Ierotheo, cap. II De divin. nomin., § ix, quod « Patiens divina didicit divina. » Sed pati divina non poterat secundum partem sensitivam, quæ non est divinorum capax. Ergo passio non est tantum in parte sensitiva; et ita non est solum in appetitu sensitivo.\n\nSed contra est quod Damascenus dicit in lib. III, ubi supra: « Passio est motus appetitivæ virtutis in imaginatione boni vel mali; » et iterum: « Passio est motus irrationalis animæ per susceptionem boni vel mali. » Ergo passio est tantum in parte appetitiva irrationali. Præterea, passio, proprie loquendo, est secundum motum alterationis, ut dictum est, art. 1. Sed alteratio non est nisi in parte animæ sensitiva, ut probatur in VII Physic., comm. xix et xx. Ergo passio non est nisi in parte sensitiva.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod anima Christi tota patiebatur passione corporali; et sic ad omnes potentias passio illa pertinebat, ad minus prout in essentia animæ radicantur; non autem ita quod passio animalis in qualibet potentia animæ ejus esset sicut in proprio subjecto.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur contra quosdam Platonicos: qui dicebant omnium istarum passionum principium esse ex carne. Augustinus autem ostendit quod si caro in nullo esset corrupta, posset esse harum passionum principium ex anima. Et ideo non dicit quod sine carne hujusmodi passiones perficiantur, sed quod non ex carne tantum anima his passionibus afficitur.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod Augustinus vel nomen voluntatis large accipit pro quolibet appetitu; vel timorem vel gaudium et alia hujusmodi accipit pro actibus voluntatis, similibus passionibus in appetitu sensitivo existentibus. Est enim, ut in quaestione de sensualitate, quæst. præc., art. Ⅲ, dictum est, et in ipsa voluntate quodammodo gaudium et tristitia, et alia hujusmodi; sed non ita quod sint passiones, proprie loquendo. Vel potest dicii, quod has passiones Augustinus voluntates nominat, inquantum ex actu voluntatis homo in has passiones iuducitur, secundum quod appetitus inferior sequitur inclinationem appetitus superioris, ut in quaestione de sensualitate, ubi sup., dictum est. Unde ipse Augustinus postea subjungit, XIV De civitate Dei, cap. vi, a med.: « Sicut allicitur vel offenditur voluntas hominis; ita in hos vel illos affectus mutatur et vertitur. »\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod sensus non est virtus activa, sed passiva. Non enim dicitur virtus activa quæ habet aliquem habitum qui est operatio; sic enim omnis potentia animæ activa esset; sed dicitur potentia aliqua activa quæ comparatur ad suum objectum sicut agens ad patiens. Sensus autem comparatur ad sensibile sicut patiens ad agens eo quod sensibile transmutat sensum; quod autem sensibile aliquando a sensu transmutetur, hoc est per accidens, inquantum ipsum organum sensus habet aliquam qualitatem per quam natum est immutare aliquod corpus. Unde infectio illa qua mulier menstruata speculum inficit, vel qua basiliscus hominem videndo interficit, nihil confert ad visionem; sed visio perficitur per hoc quod species visibilis recipitur in visu, quod est quoddam pati. Unde sensus potentia passiva est. Dato etiam quod sensus aliquid ageret active, non ex hoc sequeretur quod in sensu nulla passio esse possit; nihil enim prohibet respectu diversorum idem esse activum et passivum. Dato iterum quod sensus, qui nominat vim apprehensivam, nullius passionis esset capax, non propter hoc excluderetur quin in appetitiva sensibilis passio esse possit.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod quamvis activum simpliciter sit passivo nobilius respectu ejusdem; nihil tamen prohibet aliquod passivum activo nobilius esse, inquantum passivum nobiliori passione patitur quam sit actio qua activum agit; sicut passio a qua intellectus possibilis dicitur passiva potentia. Et etiam sensus recipiendo aliquid immaterialiter, est nobilior actione qua potentia vegetativa agit materialiter, idest mediantibus qualitatibus elementaribus.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod illi delectationi quæ est in parte intellectiva per conjunctionem intelligibilis convenientis, non est aliquod contrarium; quia oporteret quod illi intelligibilis convenienti aliquod contrarium foret, quod causa contrarii esset. Hoc autem esse non potest, eo quod intelligibili speciei nihil est contrarium; species enim contrariorum in anima contrariæ non sunt, ut X Metaphysic., dicitur: unde homo delectatur non solum de hoc quod intelligit bona, sed de hoc quod intelligit mala, inquantum intelligit. Ipsum enim intelligere mala bonum est intellectui; et sic delectatio intellectualis contrarium non habet. Dicitur tamen tristitia vel dolor in parte intellectiva animæ esse, communiter loquendo, inquantum intellectus intelligit aliquid homini nocivum cui voluntas repugnat. Quia tamen illud nocivum non est nocivum intellectui, inquantum est intelligens; ideo illa tristitia vel dolor non contrariatur delectationi intellectus, quæ est secundum id quod est conveniens intellectui, inquantum intelligit.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod potentia rationalis se habet ad contraria aliquo modo sibi proprio, et aliquo modo communi sibi et omnibus aliis. Quod enim potentia rationalis sit subjectum contrariorum accidentium, hoc sibi et aliis commune est, quia omnium contrariorum idem est subjectum: sed quod se habeat ad contrarias actiones, istud est sibi proprium; naturales enim potentiæ sunt determinatæ ad unum. Et sic loquitur Philosophus, quod rationales potestates sunt ad opposita.\n\nAd octavum dicendum quod absentia gubernatoris non est causa submersionis navis nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet removet gubernatoris providentiam, per quam navis submersio prohibebatur; et similiter intelligibilis remotio vel absentia non est causa tristitia, sed non delectandi. Effectus enim proportionantur secundum proportionem causarum: unde intelligere et non intelligere, quæ contradictorie opponuntur, sunt causa delectandi et non delectandi, quæ similiter sunt contradictoria: non autem delectandi et tristandi, quæ sunt contraria. Si autem accipiatur id quod est contrarium intelligentiæ veritatis, scilicet error, non potest esse causa tristitiae; quia vel error æstimatur esse veritas, et sic error delectat sicut et veritas; vel cognoscitur esse error, quod non est nisi cognoscendo veritatem; et sic iterum error delectationem in intelligendo facit.\n\nAd nonum dicendum quod tristitia et dolor hoc modo differunt: quod tristitia est quædam passio animalis, incipiens scilicet in apprehensione documenti, et terminatur in operatione appetitus, et ulterius in transmutatione corporis; sed dolor est secundum passionem corporaem; unde Augustinus dicit, XIV De civitate Dei, cap. vii, in fin., quod dolor usitatius in corporibus dicitur; et ideo incipit a laesione corporis, et terminatur in apprehensione sensus tactus, propter quod dolor est in sensu tactus ut in apprehendente, ut dictum est, in corp. art.\n\nAd decimum dicendum quod gaudium et tristitiam sequi passionem, dicitur et a Damasceno et a Philosopho, sed sub alio intellectu. Damascenus enim et Gregorius Nyssenus, loc. cit. in arg., idem verbum proponentes loquuntur de passione corporali, quæ apprehensa causat gaudium vel tristitiam, et semper experta causat dolorem. Philosophus autem in II Ethic. loquitur procul dubio de passionibus animalibus, volens quod ad omnes passiones animæ sequatur gaudium et tristitia. Cujus ratio est quod inter omnes passiones concupiscibilis potentiae, gaudium et tristitia, quæ causantur ex consecutione convenientis vel nocivi, ultimum locum tenent; omnes autem passiones irascibilis ad passiones concupiscibilis terminantur, ut in quæstione de sensualitate, art. iii, corp., dictum est. Unde restat quod omnes passiones animæ ad gaudium et tristitiam terminentur. Secundum autem neutrum intellectum sequitur quod passiones sint in apprehensiva; quia passio corporalis est ipsa natura corporis; passiones autem animales aliæ sunt in eadem parte appetitiva, in qua gaudium et tristitia; sed tamen quantum ad priores ejus actus. Si autem in actibus appetitivæ ordo non esset, sequeretur ex verbis Philosophi quod passiones animales non essent in appetitiva, ubi est gaudium et tristitia, sed in apprehensiva.\n\nAd undecimum dicendum quod nec sensus, nec vis alia apprehensiva movet immediate, sed solum mediante appetitiva; et ideo ad operationem virtutis sensitivæ apprehensivæ non immutatur corpus quantum ad dispositiones materiales, nisi superveniat motus appetitivæ, quem statim sequitur transmutatio corporis disponentis se ad obediendum. Unde, quamvis vis apprehensiva sensitiva immutetur simul cum organo corporali, non tamen est ibi passio, proprie loquendo: quia in operatione sensus non transmutatur organum corporale, per se loquendo, nisi spirituati immutatione, secundum quod species sensibilium recipiuntur in organis sentiendi sine materia, ut dicitur in II De anima, com. xii.\n\nAd duodecimum dicendum quod quamvis in parte intellectiva aliquid abjiciatur et aliquid recipiatur; hoc tamen non contingit per viam transmutationis, ut continue receptio et abjectio fiat; sed est per simplicem influxum quantum ad habitus infusos; in instanti enim infunditur gratia, per quam subito expellitur culpa. Alteratio autem quæ fit de vitio in virtutem, vel de ignorantia ad scientiam, attingit ad partem intellectivam per accidens, per se existente transmutatione in parte sensitiva, ut patet in VII Ethic. Ex hoc enim quod fit aliqua transmutatio circa partem sensitivam, subito resultat aliqua perfectio in parte intellectiva; ut sic id quod fit in parte intellectiva, sit terminus transmutationis in parte sensitiva existentis; sicut illuminatio est terminus motus localis, et generatio simpliciter alterationis; et hoc intelligendum est quantum ad habitus acquisitos.\n\nAd decimumtertium dicendum quod ex aliquo apprehenso per intellectum potest sequi passio in appetitu inferiori dupliciter. Uno modo inquantum id quod intelligitur universaliter per intellectum, formatur in imaginatione particulariter, et sic movetur inferior appetitus; sicut cum intellectus credentis accipit intelligibiliter futuras pœnas, et earum phantasmata format, imaginando iguem urentem et vermem rodentem et alia hujusmodi, ex quo sequitur passio timoris in appetitu sensitivo. Alio modo inquantum ex apprehensione intellectus movetur appetitus superior, ex quo, per quamdam redundantiam vel imperium, appetitus inferior commovetur.\n\nAd decimumquartum dicendum quod spes quæ in anima separata manet, non est passio, sed vel habitus, vel voluntatis actus, ut ex prædictis, art. 1, patet.\n\nAd decimumquintum dicendum quod ex beatificatione vel perfectione imaginis nihil aliud haberi potest quam quod in parte intellectiva sit passio, secundum quod omnis receptio passio dicitur.\n\nAd decimumsextum dicendum quod passio dicitur esse motus ex alio recepto in aliud receptum, non autem ex alio operato in aliud operatum: sic autem in intellectu est motus ex alio in aliud.\n\nAd decimumseptimum dicendum quod intelligere diictur esse pati, communiter loquendo de passione, prout omnis receptio passio est.\n\nAd decimumoctavum dicendum quod passio illa de qua loquitur Dionysius, nihil aliud est quam affectio ad divina, quæ habet magis rationem passionis quam simplex apprehensio, ut ex prædictis, in corp. art., patet. Ex ipsa enim divinorum affectione provenit manifestatio eorumdem, secundum illud Joan. xiv, 24: Si quis diligit me, diligetur a Patre meo, et ego diligam eum, et manifestabo ei me ipsum.\n\nQuarto quæritur secundum quid attenditur contrarietas et diversitas inter animæ passiones; et videtur quod non secundum bonum et malum. Audacia enim timori opponitur. Utraque vero passio est respectu mali: quia hoc quod timor fugit, audacia aggreditur. Ergo contrarietas passionum animæ non est secundum bonum et malum.\n\n2. Præterea, spes desperationi oppositur. Utraque vero est respectu boni, quod spes consequi expectat, desperatio autem de consecutione diffidit. Ergo contrarietas passionum animæ non est secundum bonum et malum.\n\n3. Præterea, Damascenus in lib. II De fid. orth., cap. xii, Pat. græc. lat. t. XCIV. col. 930, et Gregorius Nyssenus, De viribus animæ, cap. ix, distinguunt passiones animæ per præsens et futurum, et per bonum et malum; ut de bono futuro sit spes vel desiderium, de bono præsenti voluptas vel delectatio sive la-titia, de malo futuro timor, de præsenti tristitia. Sed præsens et futurum per accidens se habent ad bonum et malum. Ergo differentia passionum animæ per se non attenditur secundum bonum et malum.\n\n4. Præterea, Augustinus, XIV De civitate Dei, cap. vii, in fin., distinguit inter tristitiam et dolorem, quod tristitia est animæ, dolor vero corporum: quod ad rationem boni et mali non pertinet. Ergo idem quod prius.\n\n5. Præterea, exultatio, gaudium, lætitia et delectatio, jucunditas et hilaritas differentiam quamdam habent; alias inutiliter duo istorum conjungerentur, ut patet Isa. xxxv, 10: Gaudium et lætitiam obtinebunt. Cum ergo omnia ista respectu boni dicantur, videtur quod bonum et malum passiones animæ non diversificent.\n\n6. Præterea, Damascenus in lib. II De fid. orth., cap. xiv, distinguit quatuor species tristitiae, quæ sunt accidia, achos, invidia, misericordia, præter quas est pœnitentia: quæ omnia respectu mali dicuntur. Ergo idem quod prius.\n\n7. Præterea, ipse distinguit sex species timoris, scilicet segnitiem, erubescentiam, verecundiam, admirationem, stuporem, et agoniam, quæ ad prædictam differentiam non pertinent. Ergo idem quod prius.\n\n8. Præterea, Dionysius, cap. iv De div. nomin., § xiii, zelum amori connumerat, quorum utrumque est passio respectu boni; et sic idem quod prius.\n\nSed contra est quod actus distinguuntur per objecta. Passiones autem animæ sunt actus appetitivæ virtutis, cujus objectum est bonum et malum. Ergo per bonum et malum distinguuntur. Præterea, secundum Philosophum in I Ethic., III, cap. v, paulo a princ., passiones animæ sunt ad quas sequitur gaudium et tristitia. Sed gaudium et tristitia distinguuntur secundum bonum et malum. Ergo bonum et malum distinguunt animæ passiones.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod in passionibus animæ triplex distinctio inventur. Prima quidem est qua differunt quasi genere, utpote ad diversas potentias animæ pertinentes; sicut distinguuntur passiones concupiscibilis a passionibus irascibilis. Ratio hujus distinctionis passionum sumitur ex ipsa ratione distinguendi potentias. Cum enim supra dictum sit, in quaestione de sensualitate, art. ii, quod objectum concupiscibilis est delectabile secundum sensum, irascibilis vero aliquod arduum vel altum; illæ passiones ad concupiscibilem pertinent in quibus importatur ordo ad delectabile sensus absolute, vel ad ejus contrarium; illæ vero ad irascibilem, quæ ordinantur ad aliquod arduum circa hujusmodi. Et sic apparet differentia inter desiderium et spem: nam desiderium dicitur, secundum quod appetitus movetur in aliquid delectabile; spes autem dicit quamdam elevationem appetitus in aliquod bonum, quod aestimatur arduum vel difficile; et similiter est de aliis. Secunda vero distinctio passionum animæ est qua distinguuntur quasi species in eadem potentia existentes. Quæ quidem distinctio in passionibus concupiscibilis secundum duo attenditur. Uno modo secundum contra-rietatem objectorum; et sic distinguitur gaudium, quod est respectu boni, a tristitia, quæ est respectu mali. Alio modo secundum quod ad idem objectum vis concupiscibilis ordinatur secundum diversos gradus consideratos in processu appetitivi motus: ipsum enim delectabile primo appetenti conjungitur aliqualiter secundum quod apprehenditur ut simile vel conveniens: et ex hoc sequitur passio amoris, qui nihil est aliud quam formatio quædam appetitus ab ipso appetibili: unde amor dicitur esse quædam unio amantis et amati. Id autem quod sic aliqualiter conjunctum est, quæritur ulterius ut realiter conjungatur; ut amans scilicet perfruatur amato; et sic nascitur passio desiderii: quod quidem cum adeptum fuerit in re, generat gaudium. Sic ergo primum quod est in motu concupiscibilis, est amor secundum desiderium, et ultimum gaudium: et per contrarium istis sunt accipiendæ passiones quæ ordinantur in malum; ut odium contra amorem, fuga contra desiderium, tristitia contra gaudium. Passiones vero irascibilis, ut in alia quæstione, quæst. præced., art. ii, dictum est, oriuntur ex passionibus concupiscibilis, et terminant ad eas: et ideo in eis inventur distinctio aliqua conformis distinctioni concupiscibilis; et ulterius est in eis distinctio propria secundum rationem proprii objecti. Ex parte quidem concupiscibilis est distinctio qua distinguuntur per bonum et malum, vel per delectabile et contrarium; et iterum secundum habitum realiter, et non habitum realiter: sed propria distinctio ipsius irascibilis est ut passiones ejus distinguantur secundum exceedens facultatem appetentis vel non exceedens, et hoc secundum aestimationem:ista enim videntur distinguere arduum sicut differentiæ per se. Potest ergo passio in irascibili vel respectu boni esse, vel respectu mali. Si respectu boni: vel habiti, vel non habiti. Respectu boni habiti nulla passio potest esse in irascibili: quia bonum, ex quo jam possidetur, nullam difficultatem ingerit possidenti; unde non salvatur ibi ratio ardui. Respectu autem boni non-dum habiti, in quo ratio ardui salvari potest propter difficultatem consequendi; si quidem illud bonum aestimetur ut exceedens facultatem, facit desperationem; si vero ut non exceedens, facit spem. Si vero consideretur motus irascibilis in malum; hoc erit dupliciter: scilicet vel in malum nondum habitum, quod quidem aestimetur ut arduum, inquantum difficile est vitari; vel ut jam habitum, sive conjunctum, quod item rationem ardui habet, inquantum aestimetur difficile repelli. Si autem respectu mali nondum præsentis; si quidem illud malum aestimetur ut exceedens facultatem, sic facit passionem timoris; si autem non ut exceedens, sic facit passionem audaciæ. Si autem malum sit præsens; aut aestimetur ut non exceedens facultatem, et sic facit passionem iræ; aut ut exceedens, et sic nullam passionem facit in irascibili, sed in sola concupiscibili manet passio tristitiæ. Distinctio ergo illa quæ accipitur secundum diversos gradus acceptos in motu appetitivo, non est causa alicujus contrarietatis: quia hujusmodi passiones different secundum perfectum et imperfectum, ut patet in desiderio et gaudio. Sed distinctio quæ est secundum contrarietatem objecti, proprie facit in passionibus contrarietatem. Unde in concupiscibili passiones animæ accipiuntur secundum bonum et malum, ut gaudium et tristitia, amor et odium. In irascibili vero potest accipi duplex contrarietas. Una secundum distinctionem proprii objecti; scilicet secundum exceedens facultatem et non exceedens; et sic sunt contraria spes et desperatio, audacia et timor; et hæc contrarietas est magis propria. Alia vero est secundum differentiam objecti concu-piscibilis, idest secundum bonum et malum; per quem modum spes et timor contrarietatem habere videntur. Ira vero neutro modo potest habere passionem contrariam: nec secundum contrarietatem boni et mali, quia respectu boni præsentis non est aliqua passio in irascibili; similiter nec secundum contrarietatem exceedentis facultatem et non exceedentis, quia malum facultatem exceedens nullam passionem in irascibili facit, ut dictum est. Unde inter ceteras passiones ira habet proprium, quia nibil est contrarium ei. Tertia vero differentia passionum animæ est quasi accidentalis: quæ quidem dupliciter accidit. Uno modo secundum intensionem; sicut zelus importat intensionem amoris, et furor intensionem iræ. Alio modo secundum materiales differentias boni vel mali, sicut differunt misericordia et invidia, quæ sunt species tristitiæ: nam invidia est tristitia de prosperitate aliena, inquantum aestimetur malum proprium; misericordia vero est tristitia de adversitate aliena, inquantum aestimetur ut proprium malum. Et sic est in aliis quibusdam considerare.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod irascibilis objectum non est bonum et malum absolute; sed addita circumstantia arduitatis: unde non solum in eorum passionibus est contrarietas per bonum et malum, sed per differentias quæ distinguunt arduum tam in bono quam in malo. Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod præsens et futurum accipiuntur ut differentiæ ad distinguendas animæ potentias, secundum quod futurum nondum est conjunctum realiter, præsens vero jam conjunctum: perfection vero est motus appetitus in id quod est realiter distans. Unde futurum et præsens licet faciant aliquam distinctionem, nullam tamen contrarietatem faciunt, sicut nec perfectum et imperfectum.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod dolor, secundum quod proprie accipitur, non debet computari inter animæ passiones, quia nihil habet ex parte animæ nisi apprehensionem tantum; est enim dolor sensus laesionis: quæ quidem laesio est ex parte corporis. Et ideo Augustinus, ibidem subdit quod tractando de passionibus animæ, maluit uti nomine tristitiæ quam doloris: tristitia enim perficitur in ipsa appetitiva, ut ex dictis, art. 1 hujus quæst., patet.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod delectatio et gaudium eodem modo differunt sicut tristitia et dolor: nam delectatio sensibilis habet ex parte corporis conjunctionem convenientis, ex parte vero animæ sensum illius convenientiæ; et similiter delectatio spiritualis habet quamdam rationalem conjunctionem convenientis cum convenienti, et perceptionem illius conjunctionis; unde Plato definiens delectationem sensibilem, dixit, quod delectatio est sensibilis generatio in natura; Aristoteles vero definiens generaliter delectationem, dixit, quod delectatio est operatio naturalis habitus non impedita. Ipsa enim operatio conveniens est illud conjunctum conveniens, quod delectationem, praecipue spiritualem, facit: et sic delectatio utrobique incipit a conjunctione reali, et perficitur in ejus apprehensione; gaudium vero incipit in apprehensione, et terminatur in affectu; unde delectatio est interdum causa gaudii, sicut dolor tristitiae. Gaudium vero a laetitia et ceteris differt accidentaliter secundum intensionem et remissionem. Nam alia dicunt quamdam gaudii intensionem: quæ qui dem intensio attenditur vel secundum interiorem dispositionem, et sic est laetitia, quæ importat interiorem cordis dilatationem, dicitur enim laetitia quasi latitia: vel secundum quod intensio gaudii interioris prorumpit in quædam exteriora signa, et sic est exultatio; dicitur enim ex hoc quod gaudium interius quodammodo exterius exilit; quæ quidem exilitio attenditur vel secundum immutationem vultus, in quo primo apparent affectus indicia, propter propinquitatem ejus ad vim imaginativam, et sic est hilaritas; vel secundum quod ex intensione interioris gaudii disponuntur et verba et facta, et sic est jucunditas.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod species tristitiae quas Damascenus ponit, sunt qui dam modi tristitiae addentes supra tristitiam quasdam differentias accidentales: vel secundum intensionem motus; et sic secundum quod ista intentio consistit in interiori dispositione, dicitur accidia, quæ est tristitia aggravans, scilicet cor, ne aliquid agere libeat; vel secundum quod progreditur ad exteriorem dispositionem, et sic est achos quæ est tristitia vocem auferens. Ex parte vero objecti, secundum quod id quod in alio est, reputatur ut proprium malum: et si quidem bonum alterius reputetur ut proprium malum, erit invidia; si autem malum alterius ut proprium malum reputatur, erit misericordia. Pœnitentia vero non addit supra tristitiam generalem aliquam specialem rationem, cum sit absolute de malo proprio; et ideo Damascenus ipsam pratermittit. Possunt tamen multi modi tristitiae assignari, si considerentur omnia quæ accidentaliter se habent ad malum, quod tristitiam facit.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod cum timor sit quædam passio ex nocivo apprehenso, ut exceedente facultatem, proveniens; diversificabuntur modi timoris secundum differentiam talium nocivorum: quod quidem tripliciter ad appetentem potest referri. Uno modo respectu propriæ operationis; et sic inquantum propriæ operatio timetur ut laboriosa, est segnities; inquantum vero timetur ut turpis, est verecundia, quæ est timor in turpi actu. Secundo, respectu cognitionis, prout aliquid cognoscibile apprehenditur ut omnino exceedens cognitionem; et sic ejus consideratio apprehenditur ut supervacua, et sicut nociva. Quod autem excedit cognitionem, contingit vel propter ejus magnitudinem; et sic est admiratio, quæ est timor ex magna imaginatione; vel propter ejus inconsuetudinem, et sic est stupor, qui est timor ex inassueta imaginatione, secundum Damascenum, lib. II Orthod. fidei, cap. xv, Tertio, respectu passionis quæ est ab alio: quæ quidem passio potest timeri vel ratione turpitudinis; et sic est erubescentia, quæ est timor in expectatione convicii: vel ratione laesionis, et sic est agonia, per quam homo timet ne in aliqua infortunia incidat.\n\nAd octavum dicendum quod zelus addit super amorem quamdam intensionem; est enim amor vehemens non patiens consortium in amato.\n\nQuinto quæritur utrum spes, timor, gaudium et tristitia sint quatuor principales animæ passiones; et videtur quod non. Quia Augustinus, XIV De civit. Dei, cap. Ⅲ, Ⅶ, et Ⅷ, in fin., enumerans quatuor principales passiones, ponit cupiditatem loco spei: quod ex verbis Virgilii accipi videtur, qui has principales passiones designatas dixit, sicut homines cupiunt, metuunt, gaudentes dolentesque etc.\n\n2. Præterea, quanto aliquid est perfectius, tanto principalius esse videtur. Sed motus audacia est perfectior quam motus spei, utpote cum majori intensione in suum objectum tendens. Ergo audacia magis est principalis passio quam spes.\n\n3. Præterea, unumquodque denominatur a principaliori. Sed vis irascibilis ab ira denominatur. Ergo ira debet computari inter passiones principales.\n\n4. Præterea, sicut in irascibilis est passio respectu futuri, ita in concupiscibili. Sed passio quæ est in concupiscibili, respectu futuri, scilicet desiderium, non ponitur passio principalis. Ergo nec timor et spes, quæ similiter sunt respectu futuri in irascibili.\n\n5. Præterea, principale dicitur illud quod inter reliqua prius existit: « Principari enim, » secundum Gregorium, homil. xxxiv In Evang., parum ante med., « est inter reliquos priorem esse. » Sed inter reliquas passiones amor est prior; ex amore enim omnes aliæ passiones nascuntur. Ergo amor deberet poni passio principalis.\n\n6. Præterea, illæ passiones videntur esse principales a quibus aliæ dependent. Sed a gaudio et tristitia omnes aliæ passiones dependere videntur; nam passio animæ est quam sequitur gaudium et tristitia, secundum Philosophum in II Ethic., cap. v, paulo a princ. Ergo hæ duæ passiones tantum, scilicet gaudium et tristitia, sunt principales passiones. 7. Sed dicendum quod gaudium et tristitia sunt principales in concupiscibili; spes autem et timor sunt principales in irascibili. — Sed contra est quod dicitur in lib. De spiritu et anima, cap. Ⅳ: « De concupiscibilitate gaudium et spes, de irascibilitate dolor et metus oriuntur. »\n\n8. Præterea, secundum proprietatem irascibilis potentiae spes desperationi oponitur, timor audacia. Sed ex parte concupiscibilis ponuntur duæ principales passiones contrariæ secundum proprie-tatem concupiscibilis, scilicet gaudium et tristitia. Ergo ex parte irascibilis deberent poni principales vel spes et desperatio, vel timor et audacia.\n\nSed contra est quod dicitur in lib. De spiritu et anima, cap. Ⅳ: « Affectus quadripartitus esse dignoscitur, dum de eo quod amamus, jam gaudemus, vel gaudere speramus; et de eo quod odimus, jam dolemus, aut dolendum 'metuimus. » Ergo hæ sunt quatuor passiones principales: gaudium, dolor sive tristitia, spes, et timor. Præterea, Boetius principales passiones enumerans, dicit in lib. De consolat. I, metro ult. circa fin. Patrol. lat. tom. LXIII, coll. 657, 658: Gaudia pelle, Pelle timorem, Spemque fugato, Nec dolor adsit. Et sic idem quod prius.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod quatuor sunt principales animæ passiones: scilicet tristitia, gaudium, spes et timor. Cujus ratio est, quia principales passiones dicuntur quæ aliis priores sunt, et earum origo. Cum autem passiones animæ sint in parte appetitiva, illæ passiones priores erunt quæ immediate ex objecto appetitivæ oriuntur: quod quidem objectum est bonum et malum. Hæ autem erunt quasi secundariæ, quæ mediantibus aliis oriuntur. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua passio immediate oriatur ex bono vel malo, duo requiruntur. Quorum primum est, ut per se ex bono et malo oriatur; quia quod est per accidens, non est primum. Secundum vero, ut nullo præsupposito oriatur; ut sic principalis passio propter duo dicatur: quod nec per accidens, neque per posterius provenit ex objecto, quod tenet locum activi. Ex bono autem provenit per se passio quæ procedit ex bono secundum quod est bonum; per accidens vero illa quæ provenit ex bono secundum quod est malum: et e contrario est intelligendum de malo. Bonum autem, secundum quod est bonum, allicit et ad se trahit: unde, si aliqua passio sit appetitus tendentis in bonum, erit passio per se consequens ex bono. Sed repellere appetitum est proprium mali inquantum est malum; unde, si aliqua passio sit respectu boni, per quam bonum refugiatur, passio illa non erit ex bono per se, sed inquantum apprehenditur ut aliqualiter malum. Et e contrario est intelligendum de malo: quod illa passio per se provenit ex malo quæ consistit in fuga mali; illa vero per accidens quæ consistit in accessu ad malum. Patet igitur qualiter aliqua passio per se ex bono vel malo oritur. Quia vero quanto aliquid est ultimum in consecutione finis, tanto est prius in intentione et appetitu; ideo illæ passiones non præsuppositis aliis ex bono vel malo oriuntur, quæ consistunt in executione finis: et eis præsuppositis oriuntur aliæ. Gaudium vero et tristitia ex ipsa consecutione boni vel mali proveniunt, et per se: nam gaudium provenit ex bono inquantum est bonum, et tristitia ex malo inquantum est malum. Et similiter omnes aliæ passiones concupiscibilis per se ex bono vel malo proveniunt: quod contingit ex hoc quod objectum concupiscibilis est bonum vel malum, secundum absolutam rationem. Sed tamen aliæ passiones concupiscibilis præsupponunt gaudium et tristitiam per modum causæ: nam bonum concupiscibile ideo efficitur amatum et desideratum, quia apprehenditur ut delectabile: malum vero odiosum et fugiendum, inquantum apprehenditur ut tristabile. Et sic, secundum ordinem appetendi, gaudium et tristitia sunt priora; quamvis in ordine exequendi sint posteriora. In irascibili vero non omnes passiones per se consequuntur ex bono vel malo; sed quædam per se, et quædam per accidens: quod contingit ex hoc quod bonum vel malum non secundum absolutam rationem sunt objectum irascibilis, sed secundum quod apponitur conditio arduitatis, secundum quam et bonum repudiatur ut exceedens facultatem, et in malum tenditur prout possibile est repellere vel subjici. Non autem potest esse in irascibili aliqua passio quæ ex bono vel malo consequatur, nulla aliæ præsupposita; bonum enim, postquam habitum est, nullam passionem in irascibili facit, ut ex prædictis, art. præced., patet: malum vero præsens facit quidem passionem in irascibili, sed non per se, sed per accidens; inquantum scilicet quis in malum præsens tendit ut repellendum et subjiciendum, sicut patet in ira. Sic ergo patet ex dictis quod quædam passiones sunt quæ primo et per se ex bono et malo oriuntur, ut gaudium et tristitia: quædam vero quæ per se, sed non primo; sicut aliæ passiones concupiscibilis, et hæ duæ irascibilis timor et spes; quarum una dicit fugam mali, alia accessum ad bonum: quædam vero nec per se nec primo, sicut aliæ quæ sunt in irascibili, ut desperatio, audacia et ira, quæ dicunt accessum ad malum, vel recessum a bono. Sic ergo principalissimæ passiones sunt gaudium et tristitia. Timor autem et spes sunt principales in suo genere: quia non præsupponunt aliquas passiones in potentia in qua sunt, scilicet in irascibili. Aliæ vero passiones concupiscibilis, ut amor, desiderium, odium et fuga, etsi sint per se ex bono vel malo, non sunt tamen primæ in suo genere, cum præsupponant alias in eadem potentia existentes; et sic non possunt dici principales neque simpliciter neque in genere. Et sic restat quod solum quatuor sint principales passiones: gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod cupiditatem vel desiderium præcedit alia passio in eadem potentia, scilicet gaudium, quod est ratio desiderandi: unde non potest esse principalis passio. Spes autem, etsi præsupponat aliam passionem, non tamen in eadem potentia existentem, sed in concupiscibilis: omnes namque passiones irascibilis oriuntur ex passionibus concupiscibilis, ut in alia quæstione, quæst. præc. art. 11, dictum est; unde potest esse passio principalis. Augustinus vero ponit desiderium vel cupiditatem loco spei, propter similitudinem quamdam quæ est inter ea: nam utraque passio est respectu boni nondum habiti.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod audacia non potest esse principalis passio: utitur enim ex malo per accidens, cum sit respectu mali per viam aggrediendi; audax enim aggreditur malum, inquantum aestimat victoriam et repulsionem mali esse quoddam bonum, et ex hujusmodi bona spe audacia oritur; et sic, subtiliiter considerando, invenitur spes esse audacia prior; nam spes victoriæ, vel saltem evasionis, audaciam causat.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod ira oritur ex malo per accidens, inquantum scilicet iratus vindictam mali sibi illati bonum aestimat, et in eam tendit: unde spes vindictæ consequendæ est causa iræ: unde cum aliquis laeditur ab eo cui non reputat posse vindictam inferre, non irascitur, sed tristatur solum vel timet, ut Avicenna dicit, lib. III Met., cap. vi, a med., sicut si rusticus laeditur a rege. Et ideo ira non potest esse principalis passio; præsupponit enim non solum tristitiam, quæ est in concupiscibili; sed spem, quæ est in irascibili. Denominatur autem irascibilis ab ira, quia est ultima passionum quæ sunt in irascibili.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod passiones quæ sunt in concupiscibili, respectu futuri, oriuntur quodammodo ex passionibus in eadem vi existentibus respectu præsentis; sed passiones quæ sunt respectu futuri in irascibili, non oriuntur ex aliquibus passionibus respectu præsentis in eadem potentia existentibus, sed existentibus in alia potentia, scilicet ex gaudio et tristitia; unde non est simile.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod in via exequendi vel consequendi, amor est prima passio; sed in via intentionis gaudium est prius amore, et est ratio amandi; præcipue secundum quod amor est passio concupiscibilis.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod gaudium et tristitia sunt inter alias principalissimæ, ut dictum est. Nihilominus tamen spes et amor in suo genere sunt principales, ut ex dictis, in corp. art., patet.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod liber ille, cum non sit Augustini, non imponit nobis necessitatem ut ejus auctoritatem recipiamus; et præcipue hic ubi videtur expressam falsitatem continere. Spes enim non est in concupiscibili, sed in irascibili; tristitia vero non in irascibili, sed in concupiscibili. Si tamen oporteat auctoritatem sustinere, potest dici quod loquitur de potentiis istis secundum rationes nominum: concupiscentia enim est boni; et ex hac ratione omnes passiones ordinatæ in bonum concupiscibili attribuuntur. Ira autem est ex aliquo malo illato; unde omnes passiones quæ respectu mali sunt, irascibili attribui possunt; et secundum hoc attribuitur irascibili tristitia, et concupiscibili spes.\n\nAd octavum dicendum quod contrarietas quæ est propria passionum irascibilis, scilicet facultatem exceedens et non exceedens, facit alteram passionum per accidens oriri ex bono vel malo; exceedens enim facultatem inducit ad recessum, non excedens autem inducit ad accessum. Et ideo, si istæ differentiæ considerentur in bono, illa passio quæ sequitur ex exceedente facultatem, per accidens ex bono proveniet; si autem circa malum, illa erit per accidens quæ sequitur id quod est facultatem non exceedens; unde in irascibili non possunt esse duæ principales passiones, quæ sunt directe contrariæ, ut spes et desperatio, vel audacia et timor, sicut erat in concupiscibili gaudium et tristitia.\n\nSexto quæritur utrum passionibus mereamur; et videtur quod sic. Implendo enim præcepta meremur. Sed divinis præceptis inducimur ad gaudendum, timendum, dolendum, et ad alias hujusmodi passiones, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV De civit. Dei, cap. ix. Ergo passionibus meremur.\n\n2. Præterea, secundum Augustinum in eodem lib. cap. vi, hujusmodi passiones non sunt sine voluntate; immo et nihil aliud sunt quam voluntates. Sed actibus voluntatis mereri possumus non solum materialiter, sed et formaliter. Ergo et hujusmodi passionibus mereamur.\n\n3. Præterea, passiones animales plus accedunt ad rationem voluntarii quam corporales. Sed passiones animales aliquo modo sunt in nobis, inquantum concupiscibilis et irascibilis obediunt rationi; passiones autem corporales non. Sed passiones corporales sunt meritoriæ, ut patet in Martyribus, qui passionibus corporalibus aureolam martyrrii merentur. Ergo multo fortius passiones animales sunt meritoriæ. 4. Sed dicendum quod passiones corporales sunt meritoriæ, inquantum volitæ sunt. — Sed contra: voluntas patiendi pro Christo potest esse etiam in eo qui nunquam patietur, qui tamen non habebit aureolam. Ergo passio corporalis meretur aureolam non solum secundum quod est volita, sed secundum quod est actualiter experta.\n\n5. Præterea, id ad cujus intensionem sequitur intensio præmii, est meritorium. 1: « meremur. » per se, et non solum materialiter. Sed ad intensionem passionis corporalis sequitur intensio præmii; quia quanto quis magis patitur, tanto gloriosius coronabitur, ut dicitur. Ergo passionibus secundum se meremur, et non solum materialiter.\n\n6. Præterea, Hugo de Sancto Victore dicit, lib. II De sacram., part. xiv, cap. vi, quod « Post ' voluntatem sequitur opus, ut voluntas in suo opere augeatur; » et sic facit aliquid ad meritum opus exterius. Sed similiter in passione potest voluntas augeri. Ergo passio facit ad meritum: et sic idem quod prius.\n\n7. Præterea, cum meritum in voluntate consistat; oportet ut id formaliter et completive ad meritum pertineat in quo voluntas formaliter et completive terminatur. Sed passio, inquantum volita, est objectum voluntatis; et sic voluntatem determinat quasi formaliter. Ergo formaliter ad meritum pertinet ipsa passio.\n\n8. Præterea, aliqui Confessores magis gravia sustinent aliquibus Martyribus; unde eis dicitur quod longum traxere martyrium, cum passio quorumdam Martyrum sit brevi spatio finita; et tamen Confessoribus non debetur aureola: et sic videtur quod ipsa passio corporalis martyrii secundum se aureolam mereatur.\n\n9. Præterea, super illud Jac. i: Omne gaudium existimate, fratres mei, dicit Glossa interlin.: « Tribulatio in præsenti, justitia in futuro auget coronam. » Sed non auget nisi merendo. Ergo, cum tribulatio sit passio, meritoria est.\n\n10. Præterea, hoc idem videtur per id quod dicitur in Psalm. cxv, 15: Pretiosa in conspectu Domini mors Sanctorum ejus: dicitur autem pretiosa quasi pretio digna. Pretium autem laboris est præmium, quod laboribus meremur. Ergo passionibus possumus mereri. 11. Sed dicendum quod passionibus meremur, inquantum sunt volitæ. — Sed contra est quod Lucia dixit: « Si invitam me violari feceris, castitas mihi duplicabitur ad coronam. » Ergo ipsa passio corruptionis, quam in vita sustinuisset, fuisset ei meritoria coronæ; et sic passio non meretur solum quia est voluntaria.\n\n12. Præterea, difficultas est de necessitate meriti: quod patet ex hoc quod Magister dicit in II Sentent., dist. xxiv, quod homo in statu innocentiæ non merebatur; quia nihil impellebat ad malum, neque aliquid retrahebat a bono. Cum ergo passiones difficultatem afferant, videtur quod per se ad meritum faciant.\n\n13. Præterea, timor quædam passio est. Eo autem mereri possumus formaliter, cum sit in parte intellectiva: ut patet, cum timemus illa quæ nonnisi per intellectum cognoscimus, sicut pœnas æternas. Ergo passionibus possumus mereri.\n\n14. Præterea, præmium respondet merito. Sed præmium gloriæ non solum erit in anima, sed in corpore. Ergo et meritum consistit non solum in actione animæ, sed in passione corporis.\n\n15. Præterea, ubi est major difficultas, ibi est major ratio meriti. Sed major difficultas est circa passiones quam circa operationes voluntatis. Ergo passiones sunt magis meritoriae quam actus voluntatis, qui tamen sunt formaliter meritorii.\n\n16. Præterea, virtutibus formaliter meremur. Sed quædam passiones a Sanctis ponuntur virtutes, ut misericordia et pœnitentia; quædam a philosophis ponuntur laudabiles medietates inter vitia extrema, ut verecundia et nemesis a Philosopho in II Eth., cap. vii: quod totum ad virtutem pertinet. Ergo passionibus formaliter meremur.\n\n17. Præterea, meritum et de meritum, cum sint contraria, in eodem genere sunt. Sed in eodem genere passionum inventur demeritum; nam primi motus qui sunt peccata, passiones quædam sunt; ira etiam et accidia sunt quædam passiones, quæ tamen vitia capitalia ponuntur ab Apostolo, Rom. i: peccata namque passiones ignominiæ appellat. Ergo passionibus meremur. 1. Sed contra: nihil potest esse meritorium nisi quod est in nobis: quia, secundum Augustinum, lib. I Retract., cap. ix in med., « voluntas est qua pecatur et recte vivitur. » Sed passiones non sunt in nobis: quia, ut dicit Augustinus, XIV De civ. Dei, cap. iv, in med., « passionibus inviti cedimus. » Ergo passionibus non meremur.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod passionibus non meremur per se, sed quasi per accidens, si proprie accipiatur mereri. Cum autem mereri respectu mercedis dicatur, proprie mereri est aliquid sibi magis acquirere pro mercede; quod quidem non fit nisi cum aliquid damus quod est condignum ei quod mereri dicimur; dare autem non possumus nisi id quod nostrum est, cujus domini sumus. Sumus autem domini nostrorum actuum per voluntatem; non solum illorum qui immediate ex voluntate eliciuntur, ut diligere et velle; sed eorum qui a voluntate imperantur per alias potentias eliciti, ut ambulare, loqui, et hujusmodi. Isti autem actus non sunt condigni quasi pretium respectu vitæ aternæ, nisi secun-dum quod sunt gratia et caritate informati. Unde, ad hoc quod aliquis actus sit per se meritorius, oportet quod sit actus voluntatis vel imperantis vel elicientis; et iterum quod sit caritate informatus. Quia vero principium actus est habitus et potentia, et etiam ipsum objectum; ideo quasi secundario dicimur mereri et habitibus et potentiis et objectis. Sed id quod primo et per se est meritorium, est voluntarius actus gratia informatus. Passiones autem non sunt voluntatis nec ut imperantis nec ut elicientis: passionum enim principium, inquantum hujusmodi, non est in nobis; voluntaria autem dicuntur aliqua ex hoc quod in nobis sunt: unde passiones interdum actum voluntatis præveniunt. Et ideo per se passionibus non meremur; secundum tamen quod aliquo modo concomitantur voluntatem, aliquo modo se habent ad meritum, ut sic possint dici esse meritoriae quasi per accidens. Habet autem se passio ad voluntatem tripliciter. Uno modo ut voluntatis objectum: et sic passiones dicuntur esse meritoriae, inquantum sunt volitæ vel amatae: id enim quo per se meremur, secundum hoc non erit ipsa passio, sed passionis voluntas. Secundo prout passio aliqua excitat voluntatem, vel intendit eam: quod dupliciter accidere potest; vel per se, vel per accidens: per se qui dem quando passio excitat voluntatem ad id quod est sibi consimile, sicut cum ex concupiscentia voluntas inclinatur ad consentiendum concupiscibili, ex ira ad volendum vindictam; per accidens vero quando passio per quamdam occasionem excitat voluntatem ad contrarium; sicut in casto homine, quando insurgit passio concupiscentia, voluntas cum majori conatu resistit; circa difficilia enim magis conamur. Et sic passiones dicuntur esse meritoriae, inquantum voluntas excitata a passione meritoria est. Tertio modo e converso, quando ex voluntate passio excitatur, secundum quod motus superioris appetitus redundat in inferiorem; sicut cum quis per voluntatem detestatur pecati turpitudinem, ex hoc ipso inferior appetitus ad verecundiam afficitur; et sic verecundia dicitur esse vel laudabilis vel meritoria, ratione voluntatis causantis. In primo ergo modo passio se habet ad voluntatem ut objectum; in secundo ut principium; in tertio ut effectus. Unde primus modus remotior est a meritorio: pari enim ratione posset dici aurum vel argentum meritorium vel demeritorium, inquantum hujusmodi volendo meremur vel demerémur. Ultimus autem modus est ad meritum propinquior, secundum quod effectus recipit a causa, et non e converso. Et sic, proprie accipiendo meritum, passionibus non meremur nisi per accidens. Potest autem et meritum large accipi, secundum quod quælibet dispositio faciens congruitatem ad aliquid dicitur mereri illud; sicut si dicamus mulierem ratione pulchritudinis mereri conjugium regis. Et sic passionibus corporalibus mereri dicimur, inquantum ipsæ passiones reddunt nos quodammodo aptos ad aliquam gloriam percipiendam.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod præceptis Dei admonemur ad gaudendum et timendum, secundum quod gaudium, timor, et hujusmodi, in actu voluntatis consistunt, et non sunt passiones, ut ex prædictis, in corp. art., patet, vel secundum quod hujusmodi passiones ex voluntate consequuntur.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod Augustinus dicit has passiones esse voluntates, inquantum ex voluntate consequuntur in nobis; unde subjungit: « Omnino secundum varietatem eorum quæ appetuntur vel fugiuntur, sicut allicitur vel offenditur voluntas hominis, ita in hos vel alios affectus mutatur et vertitur. » Vel loquitur de eis secundum quod nominant quosdam actus voluntatis, ut dictum est, in corp. art.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod passio corporalis Martyris ad meritum essentialis premii non facit, nisi inquantum est volita; sed ad præmium accidentale, quod est aureola, martyrizatio ordinatur per modum meriti, secundum quod facit quamdam decentiam respectu aureolæ: decens enim est ut qui Christo conformatur in passione, ei conformetur in gloria; Rom. viii, 17: Si tamen compatimur ut simul 'glorificemur. Sciendum tamen est, quod voluntas non potest eodem modo se habere ad passiones corporales dum homo eas non patitur sicut quando eas patitur, propter earum acerbitatem. Unde, secundum Philosophum in III Ethic., cap. vii, et lib. II, cap. iii, « in talibus sufficit fortem non contristari. » Et ideo ipsa corporalis passio actualiter perpessa et est signum voluntatis firmæ et constantis, et est excitativa, secundum quod homo circa difficilia conatur. Et sic aureola non debetur Confessori, quamvis debeatur Martyri. Unde patet solutio ad quartum.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod ad passionis intensionem sequitur intensio præmiorum, vel ratione cujusdam decentiæ, vel ratione voluntatis intensæ.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod quamvis voluntas augeatur in passione et in actu exteriori, non tamen est simile de utroque: nam actus imperatur a voluntate, non autem passio. Unde non similiter se habent ad meritum.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod objectum determinat voluntatem secundum speciem actus: meritum autem non consistit in actu, proprie loquendo, secundum speciem actus; sed secundum radicem, quæ est caritas. Et ideo non oportet quod formaliter passione mereamur, quamvis habeat se ut objectum.\n\nAd octavum dicendum quod totus labor quem sustinet aliquis Confessor longinquo tempore non potest adæquari morti quam Martyr sustinet in momento, secundum operis genus: nam per mortem privatur id quod est maxime diligibile scilicet vivere et esse: unde est finis terribilium, secundum Philosophum in III Ethic., cap. vii, a med.; et circa eam est maxime virtus fortitudinis. Et hoc patet manifeste ex hoc quod homines diuturnis afflictionibus fatigati horrent mortem, quasi magis eligentes afflictiones alias pati quam mortem. Et ideo Philosophus in IX Ethic., cap. viii, vers. fin., dicit quod virtuosus exponit se morti, magis eligens unam bonam actionem et magnam quam multas parvas; quasi ille actus fortitudinis in sumendo mortem præponderet multis aliis virtuosis operationibus. Et ideo quantum ad genus operis plus meretur minimus Martyr quam quicumque Confessor. Tamen quantum ad radicem operis potest Confessor plus mereri, inquantum ex majori caritate operatur: quia præmium essentiale respondet radici caritatis, accidentale vero generi actus. Inde est quod aliquis Confessor potest aliquo Martyre esse eminentior quantum ad præmium essentiale, Martyr tamen quantum ad præmium accidentale. 1\n\nAd nonum dicendum quod Glossa illa loquitur de tribulatione secundum quod est volita, vel voluntatem excitans. Et similiter dicendum ad decimum.\n\nAd duodecimum dicendum quod duplex est difficultas: una quæ est ex magnitudine facti et ejus bonitate; et hæc difficultas requiritur ad virtutem; alia quæ est ex parte agentis, inquantum est deficiens vel impeditus circa rectas operationes; et hanc difficultatem vel tollit vel minuit virtus: et sic passiones difficultatem faciunt. Prima ergo difficultas, quæ est ex parte facti, per se facit ad meritum, sicut bonitas actus; secunda vero, quæ est ex infirmitate operantis, non facit ad meritum, nisi forte occasionaliter, inquantum est occasio majoris conatus. Non autem verum est hoc quod Adam in primo statu non potuerit mereri, si gratiam habuit, quamvis nihil impelleret ad malum: quia si perstitisset, ad gloriam quando pervenisset; et constat quod non sine merito. Nec Magister dicit quod mereri non potuisset in primo statu; sed dicit quod poterat vitare peccatum sine gratia, ex hoc quod nihil impellebat ad malum. Sine gratia vero nihil potest esse meritorium.\n\nAd decimumtertium dicendum quod timor ille pœnarum æternarum qui est per se meritorius, est in voluntate, et non est passio, proprie loquendo, ut ex prædictis, in corp. art., patet; potest tamen in inferiori appetitu excitari passio timoris ex pœnis æternis vel per redundantiam ex superiori appetitu in inferiorem, vel per hoc quod conceptio intellectus de pœnis æternis formatur in imaginatione, et sic movetur appetitus inferior per passionem timoris; sed hic timor non se habet ad meritum nisi per accidents, ut dictum est ibid. Ad decimumquartum dicitur quod præmium correspondet merito quo ad commensurationem, quia secundum quantitatem meriti est quantitas præmii: non autem ei semper correspondet quo ad suppositum præcise: potest enim quis mereri alteri primam gratiam. Et ita in proposito corpus præmiabitur, non quia ipsum corpus meruerit, sed quia anima per voluntatem meruerit aliquam gloriam corpori.\n\nAd decimumquintum dicendum quod loquendo de difficultate ex parte nostra, sic passiones difficultatem habent magis quam actus voluntatis; sed sic difficultas non facit ad meritum nisi per accidens, ut dictum est; et similiter nec passiones. Sed loquendo de difficultate quæ est ex excellentia vel bonitate rei, quæ per se facit ad meritum, sic est major difficultas ex parte actuum voluntatis.\n\nAd decimumsextum dicendum quod passiones sunt meritoriae inquantum sunt effectus et indicia bonæ voluntatis; sicut patet de verecundia, quæ indicat voluntatem hominis repugnare turpitudini peccati, et misericordia, quæ est dilectionis signum. Et ideo quandoque a Sanctis nomina harum passionum acci-piuntur pro habitibus, quibus voluntas allicitur, quæ est harum passionum principium.\n\nAd decimumseptimum dicendum quod primi motus non habent perfectam rationem peccati vel demeriti; sed sunt quasi quædam dispositiones ad demeritum, sicut veniale est dispositio ad mortale: unde non oportet quod ipsi motus sensualitatis sint secundum se merita, quia meritum non potest esse nisi actus voluntarius, ut dictum est, in corp. art. Passiones autem istæ dicuntur interdum vitia, inquantum nominibus passionum vel actus voluntatis designantur vel habitus. Etiam vitia contra naturam passiones nominantur, quamvis sint voluntarii actus, inquantum per hujusmodi vitia natura a suo ordine perturbatur.\n\nAd illud vero quod primo in contra-rium objicitur, dicendum quod passionibus inviti cedimus, non quantum ad consensum, cum eis non nisi voluntate consentiamus; sed quantum ad aliquam corporalem transmutationem, sicut est risus et fletus, et alia hujusmodi. Et ideo inquantum eis voluntate consentimus vel dissentimus, sunt meritoriae vel demeritoriae.\n\n3. Præterea, ad actum virtutis discretio rationis exigitur: unde Gregorius dicit in Moralibus, lib. II, cap. xLVI, quod « Nisi ceteræ virtutes ea quæ appetunt, prudent agent, virtutes esse nequaquam possunt. » Passiones autem omnes impediunt judicium vel discretionem rationis: unde dicit Salustius in Catilinario, in cap. cujus titulus est: « Cæsaris oratio, » in princ.: « Omnes homines, Non, ut in qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab ira, amore, odio, misericordia vacui esse debent: non enim animus facile verum prævidet, ubi afficiunt ista. » Ergo hujusmodi passiones diminuunt de laude virtutis, et ita de merito.\n\n4. Præterea, concupiscibilis non minus impedit judicium rationis quam irascibilis. Sed passio irascibilis actui virtutis adjuncta turbat judicium rationis; unde dicit Gregorius, lib. V Mor., cap. xLV, quod « Ira per zelum turbat judicium rationis. » Ergo similiter misericordia quæ est passio concupiscibilis turbat judicium rationis.\n\n5. Præterea, virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII Phys., comm. xvII et xvIII. Ergo id magis est virtuosum in nobis per quod magis appropriquamus perfectis. Sed Deo et Angelis magis assimilantur operantes ex judicio rationis sine passione: Deus enim punit sine ira, et relevat passionem misericordiae sine misericordiae passione. Ergo magis est virtuosum facere bonum sine his passionibus.\n\n6. Præterea, virtutes purgati animi sunt ceteris digniores. Sed, sicut dicit Macrobius Super somnium Scipionis, lib. I, paulo ante med., « virtutes purgati animi facient passiones penitus oblivisci. » Ergo actus virtutis, sine passione factus, est laudabilior, et magis meritorius.\n\n7. Præterea, quanto amor caritatis in nobis est magis a carnali amore depuratus, tanto est laudabilior: non enim carnalis, sed spiritualis inter nos debet esse dilectio, ut Augustinus dicit in Regula, in III regula, cap. iv, in fin.. Sed passio amoris cum quadam carnalitate est. Ergo actus caritatis sine passione amoris est laudabilior: et eadem ratio est de aliis passionibus.\n\n8. Præterea, Tullius dicit in lib. De offic.: « Benevolentiam non ardore qui dem amoris, sed stabilitate mentis esse decet. » Ardor autem ad passionem pertinet. Ergo passio diminuit laudem actus virtutis.\n\nSed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV De civit. Dei, cap. iv, a med.: « Dum hujus vitæ infirmitatem gerimus, si pasiones omnino nullas habeamus, tunc non recte vivimus: vituperabat enim et detestabatur Apostolus quosdam, quos etiam esse dixit sine affectione. Culpavit illos satis Psalmista, de quibus ait Psalm. LXVIII: Sustinui qui simul contristaretur, et non fuit. » Et sic videtur quod sine passionibus non possumus recte vivere. Præterea, Augustinus dicit, IX De civit. Dei, cap. v, et lib. XIV, cap. Ⅺ: « Irasci peccanti, ut corrigatur; contristari pro afflicto, ut liberetur; timere periclitanti, ne pereat: nescio, utrum quisquam sana consideratione reprehendat. Nam et misericordiam Stoicorum est solere culpare; et ita longe melius, et humanius, et piorum sensibus accommodatius locutus est Cicero in fine Orationis pro Quinto Ligario, « ubi ait: Nulla de virtutibus tuis nec admirabilior nec gratior misericordia est. » Et sic idem quod prius.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod passiones animæ in duplici ordine se possunt habere ad voluntatem; vel ut pracedentes, vel ut consequentes: ut pracedentes qui dem, inquantum passiones impellunt voluntatem ad aliquid volendum; ut consequentes vero, prout ex ipsa vehementia voluntatis per quamdam redundantiam commovetur inferior appetitus secundum has passiones, vel etiam inquantum ipsa voluntas has passiones procurat sponte et excitat. Secundum igitur quod sunt pracedentes voluntatem, sic diminuunt de ratione laudabilis: quia laudabilis est actus voluntatis, secundum quod est per rationem ordinatus in bonum secundum debitam mensuram et modum. Qui quidem modus et mensura non servatur, nisi cum actio ex discretione fit: quae discretio non servatur cum homo ex impetu passionis ad aliquid volendum, etiamsi sit bonum, provocatur; sed erit circa modum actionis, secundum quod impetus passionis est magnus vel parvus; et sic non nisi a casu continget quod debita mensura servetur. Secundum vero quod consequuntur ad voluntatem, sic non diminuunt laudem actus vel bonitatem: quia erunt moderatæ secundum judicium rationis, ex quo voluntas sequitur. Sed magis addunt ad bonitatem actus, duplici ratione. Primo per modum signi: quia passio « Ira per vitium mentis oculum excæcat, ira uatem per zelum turbat. »: « similiter misericordia quæ est passio concupiscibilis turbat judicium rationis. » ipsa consequens in inferiori appetitu est signum quod sit motus voluntatis intensus: non enim potest esse in natura passibili quod voluntas ad aliquid fortiter movetur, quin sequatur aliqua passio in parte inferiori. Unde dicit Augustinus, XIV De civ. Dei, cap. iv, a med.: « Dum hujus vitæ infirmitatem gerimus, si passiones nullas habeamus, non recte vivimus. » Et post pauca subjungit causam, dicens: « Nam omnino non dolere dum sumus in hoc loco miseriæ, non sine magna mercede contingit unanimitatis in animo, et stuporis in corpore. » Secundo per modum adjutorii: quia quando voluntas judicio rationis aliquid eligit, promptius et facilius id agit, si cum hoc passio in inferiori parte excitetur; eo quod appetitiva inferior est propinqua ad corporis motum. Unde dicit Augustinus, IX De civit. Dei, cap. v, ante med.: « Servit autem motus misericordiæ rationi, quando in ira probatur misericordia, ut justitia conservetur. » Et hoc est quod Philosophus dicit in III Ethic. inducens versum Homeri: « Virtutem et furorem erige; » quia videlicet, cum aliquis est virtuosus virtute fortitudinis, passio iræ electionem virtutis sequens facit ad majorem promptitudinem actus; si autem pracederet, virtutis modum perturbaret.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod perfecta ratio laudabilis et vituperabilis consistit in voluntario; unde id quod minuit de ratione voluntarii, diminuit rationem laudabilis in bono, et vituperabilis in malo. Passio autem pracedens electionem, diminuit rationem voluntarii; et ideo laudem boni actus et vituperium mali diminuit: sed passio sequens est signum magnitudinis voluntatis, ut dictum est, in corp. art.; unde, sicut in bono addit ad laudem, ita in malo ad vituperium. Ille autem ex passione peccare dicitur in quo passio inducit ad electionem peccati. Qui autem ex electione peccati vituperationem peccati incidit, non dicitur ex passione peccare, sed cum passione. Verum est ergo quod ex passione agere diminuit et laudem et vituperium; sed cum passione agere potest utrumque augere.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod motus virtutis, qui consistit in perfecta voluntate, non potest esse sine passione; non quia voluntas ex passione dependeat, sed quia in voluntate perfecta in natura passibili ex necessitate passio sequitur.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod in opere virtutis est necessaria et electio et executio. Ad electionem autem requiritur discretio; ad executionem vero ejus quod jam determinatum est, requiritur promptitudo. Non autem requiritur multum ut homo actualiter in executione operis existens multum circa opus meditetur: hoc enim, ut Avicenna dicit in sua Metaphys., potius officeret quam prodesset; sicut patet in cytharædo qui multum impediretur, si ad tactum singularum chordarum cogitationem apponeret; et similiter scriptor, si in formatione singularum litterarum cogitaret. Et inde est quod passio electionem præveniens impedit actum virtutis, inquantum impedit judicium rationis, quod necessarium est in eligendo; postquam vero puro judicio rationis jam electio est perfecta, passio sequens plus prodest qnam noceat: quia si in aliquo turbet judicium rationis, facit tamen ad promptitudinem executionis. Et per hoc patet solutio ad quartum.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod Deus et Angeli non sunt susceptivi passionis, et ideo ex voluntate perfecta in eis nulla passio sequitur; sequeretur autem, si passionis capaces essent. Et propter hoc ex quadam operum similitudine consuetudines locutionis humanæ in Angelos usurpantur, non propter aliquam affectionum infirmitatem.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod illi qui habent virtutes purgati animi, sunt aliquo modo immunes a passionibus inclinantibus in contrarium ejus quod eligit virtus, et iterum a passionibus inducentibus voluntatem; non autem a passionibus voluntatem consequentibus.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod ad carnalitatem dilectionis pertinet, si passio amoris dilectionem voluntatis præcedat, non autem si sequatur; hoc enim ad fervorem pertinet caritatis, qui in hoc consistit quod dilectio quæ est in superiori parte, sui vehementia usque ad permutationem inferioris partis redundat. At per hoc patet solutio ad octavum.\n\nUtrum passiones in Christo fuerint. — III part., qu. xv, art. vi, vii, etc. Octavo quæritur utrum hujusmodi passiones in Christo fuerint; et videtur quod non. Quia, secundum Augustinum, XII De Trinit., cap. xvi, circa med., omne agens est praestantius patiente; sed nullum creatum est prestantius anima Christi. Ergo in anima Christi non potuit esse aliqua passio.\n\n2. Præterea, secundum Macrobium, lib. I Super sommium Scipionis, paulo ante med., « fortitudinis purgati animi est passiones ignorare, non vincere. » Sed Christus habuit maxime virtutes animi purgati. Ergo in eo hujusmodi passiones non fuerunt.\n\n3. Præterea, secundum Damascenum, lib. II De fide orth., cap. xxii, passio est « motus animæ appetitivæ per suspicionem boni vel mali. » Sed in Christo non fuit suspicio; hæc enim ad ignorantiam pertinet. Ergo in Christo non fuit aliqua passio animæ.\n\n4. Præterea, secundum Augustinum, IX De civit. Dei, cap. iv, et XIV, cap. ix, passio est « motus animi contra rationem. » Sed in Christo nullus motus fuit contra rationem. Ergo in Christo non fuit aliqua passio animæ.\n\n5. Præterea, Christus quantum ad animam non est Angelis minoratus, sed solummodo quantum ad infirmitatem carnis. Sed in Angelis passiones non sunt, ut Augustinus dicit, IX De civit. Dei, cap. v, circa fin. Ergo nec in anima Christi fuerunt.\n\n6. Præterea, Christus fuit perfectior secundum animam quam homo in primo statu. Sed homo in primo statu his passionibus subjectus non erat: quia, ut dicit Augustinus XI De civit. Dei, cap. x et xix: « Ad vitæ præsentis pertinet infirmitatem in quibuscumque bonis officiis, hujusmodi perpeti affectus; » infirmitas autem in primo statu non fuit. Ergo nec in Christo hujusmodi passiones fuerunt.\n\n7. Præterea, secundum Augustinum; lib. De natura boni, cap. xx, dolor est « sensus divisionis vel corruptionis. » Sed in Christo neque fuit sensus corruptio neque divisio: quia, ut dicit Hilarius, lib. X De Trin., § xxiii, « Habuit vim pœnæ sine sensu pœnæ; » neque fuit in eo divisio vel corruptio, quia a summo bono nulla deperditio fieri potuit. Ergo in Christo non fuit dolor.\n\n8. Præterea, ubi est eadem causa, et idem effectus. Sed in corporibus Sanctorum non erit aliqua passio propter hanc causam, quia erunt a fomite depurata, et animabus gloriosis unita. Cum ergo hoc fuerit in corpore Christi, videtur quod non potuerit esse in eo corporalis passionis dolor.\n\n9. Præterea, nullus sapiens dolet vel tristatur nisi de sui boni amissione: propter hoc enim et malum est contristabile, quia adimit bonum. Sed bonum hominis est virtus; hoc enim solo homo efficitur bonus. Ergo, cum in Christo istud bonum ademptum non fuerit, in eo tristitia vel dolor non fuit.\n\n10. Præterea, secundum Augustinum XIV De civit. Dei, cap. vi, « cum dissentimus ab eo quod nolentibus accidit, talis voluntas tristitia est. » Sed in Christo nihil accidit quod ipse noluerit. Ergo in Christo passio tristitiæ vel doloris non fuit.\n\n11. Præterea, nullus rationabiliter tristatur vel dolet nisi propter aliquam la-sionem. Sed, sicut probat Chrysostomus, homil. xxiii Ad populum Antioch., « nullus la-ditur nisi a se ipso; » quod quidem sapientis non est. Cum ergo Christus fuerit sapientissimus, tristitia in eo non fuit.\n\nSed contra est quod dicitur Marci xiv, 33: Cæpit Jesus pavere et tædere et mæstus esse. Præterea, Augustinus dicit, XIV De civit. Dei, cap. viii et ix, quod « recta voluntas non solum inculpables, verum laudabiles habet motus hos. » Sed in Christo fuit recta voluntas. Ergo in eo isti motus fuerunt. Præterea, in Christo fuerunt defectus hujus vitæ qui perfectioni gratiae non repugnant perfectioni gratiae, sed magis a gratia causantur; ut patet per Augustinum, XIV De civit. Dei, cap. ix: « Hi enim affectus de amore bono et de sancta caritate veniunt. » Ergo hujusmodi passiones in Christo fuerunt.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod passiones istæ aliter sunt in peccatoribus, aliter in justis et perfectis et imperfectis, aliter in Christo homine, aliter in primo homine et beatis; in Angelis enim et Deo omnino non sunt quia vis appe- Hic ordo argumentorum intervertitur in B. « Sine sensu pœnæ vim pœnæ in se desæ-vientis excepit. »: « sapiens. » « Nos enim miseros facere poterit nemo, nisi nos ipsos faciamus. » titiva sensibilis in eis non est, cujus sunt motus hujusmodi passiones. Ad dictorum autem evidentiam sciendum est quod hujusmodi passiones animi quatuor differentiis distingui possunt, secundum quam distinctionem magis vel minus proprie passionis rationem habent. Primo ex hoc quod aliquis afficitur passione animi per id quod est contrarium sive nocivum, vel per id quod est conveniens et proficuum; et magis salvatur ratio passionis quando affectio sequitur ex nocivo, quam si sequatur ex proficuo propter hoc quod passio importat quamdam transmutationem patientis a sua naturali dispositione in contrarium dispositionem. Et inde est quod dolor et tristitia et timor, et aliæ hujusmodi passiones, quæ sunt respectu mali, habent rationem passionis magis quam gaudium et amor et alia hujusmodi, quæ sunt respectu boni; quamvis in his ratio passionis salvetur, secundum quod cor per hujusmodi dilatatur vel accenditur, vel qualitercumque disponitur aliter quam sit ejus communis dispositio; unde ex hujusmodi affectionibus aliquem mori contingit. Secundo per hoc quod passio totaliter est ab extrinseco, vel est ab aliquo principio intrinseco; magis tamen salvatur ratio passionis quando est ab extrinseco, quam quando est ab intrinseco. Ab extrinseco quidem est quando passio subito concitatur ex occursu alicujus convenientis vel nocivi; ab intrinseco autem quando ex ipsa voluntate passiones istæ causantur per modum qui est dictus; et tunc non sunt subitæ, cum sequantur judicium rationis. Tertio ex hoc quod aliquid vel totaliter transmutatur, vel non totaliter. Quod enim aliqualiter alteratur, et non totaliter transmutatur, non ita proprie pati dicimus sicut quod totaliter in contrarium transmutatur: magis enim proprie dicimus hominem pati infirmitatem si totum corpus ejus infirmetur, quam si morbus accidat in aliqua ejus parte. Tunc autem totaliter homo per hujusmodi affectus transmutatur quando non sistunt in appetitu inferiori, sed trahunt ad se et superiorem; quando vero in solo appetitu inferiori sunt, tunc homo immutatur eis quasi secundum partem; unde sic dicuntur propassiones, primo autem modo passiones. Quarto per hoc quod transmutatio est remissa vel intensa. Remissa enim transmutationes minus proprie passiones vocantur; unde Damascenus dicit in lib. II De fid. orth., capit. xxii,: « Non omnes motus passivi passio vocantur, sed qui sunt vehementiores, et insensum procedentes: qui enim sunt parvi et insensibles, nondum passiones sunt. » Sciendum est ergo quod in hominibus in statu viæ, si sunt peccatores, sunt passiones respectu boni et respectu mali non solum prævisæ, sed subitæ, et intensæ, et frequenter, et perfectæ; unde dicuntur passionum sectatores in I Ethicor. In justis vero nunquam sunt perfectæ, quia ratio in eis nunquam deducitur a passionibus; sunt tamen vehementes in imperfectis, sed in perfectis sunt debiles, inferioribus viribus per habitum virtutum moralium refrenatis: habent tamen passiones non solum prævisas, sed subitas; et non solum respectu boni, sed respectu mali. In beatis vero, et in homine in primo statu, et in Christo secundum statum infirmitatis, hujusmodi passiones nunquam sunt subitæ: eo quod propter perfectionem boni in eis, inferiorum virium ad superiores, nullus motus exurgit in appetitu inferiori nisi secundum dictamen rationis; unde dicit Damascenus in lib. III De fid. orth., cap. xx, Pat. græc. lat. t. XCIV, col, 1083: « Non præcedebant in Domino voluntatem naturalia; sed volens esurivit, volens timuit. » Et similiter intelligendum est de beatis post resurrectionem, et de hominibus in primo statu. Sed hoc interest; quod in Christo non solum fuerunt passiones respectu boni, sed respectumali: habebat enim corpus passibile, et ideo ex imaginatione nocivi naturaliter passio timoris et tristitiae et hujusmodi in eo poterant esse. Sed in primo statu et in beatis non potest esse apprehensio alicujus ut nocivi; et ideo in eis non est passio nisi respectu boni, sicut amor et gaudium, et hujusmodi; non autem tristitia, vel timor. aut ira, vel aliquid tale Sic ergo concedimus, veras passiones in Christo fuisse: unde dicit Augustinus, XIV De civ. Dei, cap. 1x, circa med.: « Christus hos motus certissime dispensationis gratia ita cum voluit suscepit animo humano, sicut cum voluit factus est homo.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod non oportet agens esse simpliciter præstantius patiente, sed secundum quid, scilicet inquantum est agens: et sic nihil prohibet objectum animæ Christi esse ea præstantius, inquantum est activum, et anima Christi aliquam habet passivam potentiam.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, IX De civit. Dei, cap. iv, circa hoc fuit contentio inter Stoicos et Peripateticos, quæ tamen magis videbatur esse secundum vocem quam secundum rem. Nam Stoici dicebant hujusmodi passiones nullo modo esse in animo sapientis. Sapientem autem eum dicebant qui perfectus est in virtutibus, quasi habens animi purgati virtutem. Peripatetici vero dicunt has passiones animi in sapientem cadere, sed moderatas, rationique subjectas. Probat autem Augustinus, IX De civit. Dei, cap. iv, ex cujusdam Stoici confessione, quod Stoici volebant hujusmodi affectus subitos in animo sapientis esse, sine hoc tamen quod approbentur, vel quod eis consentiatur. Quos quidem passiones non dicebant, sed quasi visa vel phantasias. Unde patet quod secundum rem Stoici nihil aliud quam Peripatetici dicebant, sed erat tantummodo in verbis dissonantia; quia quod Peripatetici passiones nominabant, Stoici appellabant aliter. Sic ergo secundum Stoicorum sententiam, Macrobius, lib. I In somnium Scipionis, paulo ante med., et Plotinus, in libr. De virtutibus, capit. 11 et sequent., dicunt passiones cum virtute purgati animi non esse: non quia non sint aliqui subiti motus passionum in hujusmodi virtuosis; sed quia nec rationem trahunt, nec adeo vehementes sunt, quod pacem multum perturbent: secundum quod Philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., quod concupiscentiæ in temperatis non sunt fortes, sicut sunt in continentibus; quamvis in neutris ratio ad consensum trahatur. Vel potest dici, et melius, quod, cum hujusmodi passiones ex bono et malo oriantur, distinguendæ sunt secundum differentiam bonorum et malorum. Sunt enim quædam bona et mala naturalia, sicut cibus, potus, sanitas vel aegritudo corporis, et alia hujusmodi; quædam vero non naturalia, sicut divitiæ, honores, et alia hujusmodi circa quæ vita civilis versatur. Distinguunt autem Plotinus et Macrobius, locis nunc cit., virtutes purgati animi contra virtutes politicas. Ex quo patet quod virtutes purgati animi ponuntur in illis qui totaliter sunt a civili conversatione remoti, soli contemplationi sapientiae vacantes. Et ideo in eis non sequuntur aliquæ passiones ex bonis vel malis civilibus; non tamen sunt immunes ab illis passionibus quæ sequuntur bona vel mala naturalia.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod quidquid causatur ex debili causa, potest ex fortiori causa causari. Æestimatio autem causata est fortior causa ad excitandas passiones, quam suspicio: unde Damascenus posuit illud minimum ex quo potest causari passio; per hoc dans intelligere, quod ex fortiori causa fortior causatur.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod secundum Augustinum, XIV De civit. Dei, cap. 1x, a med., impassibilitas dupliciter dicitur: uno modo secundum quod privat affectiones quæ accidunt contra rationem, et mentem perturbant; alio modo secundum quod excludit omnem affectum. Accipitur ergo passio in prædicta auctoritate secundum quod primæ impassibilitati opponitur, non autem secundum quod opponitur secundæ; et sic solummodo in Christo fuit.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod Christus secundum animam intellectivam fuit Angelis superior: habuit tamen appetitum sensitivum, secundum quem passiones ei inesse poterant, quem Angeli non habent.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod in primo homine fuerunt aliquæ passiones, ut gaudium et amor, quæ sunt respectu boni, non autem dolor vel timor, quæ sunt respectu mali: et hæc ad præsentem infirmitatem pertinent, quam Adam non habuit, Christus autem voluntarie assumpsit.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod in Christo fuit vera læsio corporis, et verus sensus læsionis: ipse enim secundum Divinitatem est summum bonum, cui nihil subtrahi potest, non autem secundum corpus. Verbum autem Hilarii, ut quidam dicunt, postmodum est ab ipso retractatum. Vel potest dici quod ideo dicit Christum sensum pœnæ non habuisse, non quia pœnam non senserit, sed quia sensus iste non pervenit usque ad rationem immutandam.\n\nAd octavum dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod anima glorificata est, secundum communem cursum, corpus ei uni-tum gloriosum efficitur, et impassibile læsionis; unde dicit Augustinus in epistola ad Dioscorum: « Tam potenti natura Deus fecit animam, ut ex ejus plenissima beatitudine, quæ in fine temporum Sanctis promittitur, redundet in inferiorem naturam, quod est corpus, non beatitudo quæ fruentis et intelligentis est propria, sed plenitudo sanitatis et incorruptionis vigor. » Sed Christus in sua potestate habens animam suam et corpus, propter virtutem Divinitatis ex quadam disposizione et habebat in anima beatitudinem, et in corpore passibilitatem, Verbo permittente corpori id quod est sibi proprium, ut Damascenus dicit, lib. III De fid. orth., cap. xv,; unde singulare fuit in Christo ut ex plenitudine beatitudinis animæ non redundaret gloria in corpus.\n\nAd nonum dicendum quod bonum hominis Stoici non appellabant nisi illud quo homines boni dicuntur, scilicet virtutes animi. Reliqua vero, sicut corporalia, et ea quæ sunt fortunæ exterioris, non appellabant bona, sed commoda; quæ tamen Peripatetici bona appellabant, sed minima, virtutes autem maxima bona: quæ differentia non erat nisi secundum nomina. Sicut enim ex minimis bonis secundum, Peripateticos, ita ex commodis secundum Stoicos aliqui motus in animo sapientis oriuntur, licet non rationem perturbantes. Et sic non est verum quod in animo sapientis ex solo defectu virtutis possit tristitia oriri.\n\nAd decimum dicendum quod quamvis læsio corporis in Christo non fuerit no-lente ratione, fuit tamen contra appetitum sensualitatis; et sic fuit ibi tristitia.\n\nAd undecimum dicendum quod Chrysostomus loquitur de læsione qua aliquis efficitur miser, qua scilicet privatur bono virtutis: non autem ex sola tali læsione passio tristitiæ in sapientem oritur, ut dictum est. Unde ratio non sequitur.\n\nNono quæritur utrum passio doloris fuerit in anima Christi quantum ad superiorem rationem; et videtur quod non. Tunc enim homo conturbari dicitur et a passione deduci, quando commotio passionis usque ad rationem pertingit. Perturbari autem et a passione deduci non est alicujus sapientis. Cum ergo Christus fuerit sapientissimus, videtur quod in ipso dolor usque ad superiorem rationem non pervenerit.\n\n2. Præterea, unaquæque potentia delectari dicitur secundum convenientiam proprii objecti. Ergo et dolor alicui potentiæ attribui non debet nisi propterocumentum quod accidit ex parte objecti. Sed respectu rerum æternarum, quæ sunt superioris rationis objecta, Christus nullum defectum vel impedimentum patiebatur. Ergo in superiori ratione Christi, passio doloris non fuit.\n\n3. Præterea, secundum Augustinum XIV De civitate Dei, cap. vii, in fin., dolor pertinet ad corporales passiones. Ergo dolor non pertinet ad animam, secundum quod est corpori conjuncta. Sed secundum rationem superiorem anima corpori non conjungitur, cum, secuudum Philosophum in III De anima, comm. vii, intellectus nullius corporis actus sit. Ergo in ratione superiori dolor esse non potest. 4. Sed dicendum quod ratio superior non conjungitur corpori per operationem, conjungitur tamen ei ut forma. — Sed contra: secundum Philosophum in lib. De somm. et vig., cap. i, ante med., ejusdem est potentia et actio. Si ergo actus intellectus est animæ absque communicatione corporis; et potentia intellectiva erit animæ non secundum quod conjungitur corpori: et ita ratio superior, non erit corpori conjuncta ut forma.\n\n5. Præterea, secundum Damascenum, lib. II, cap. xxii, passio est motus irrationalis animæ, et appetitivæ. Sed dolor et tristitia et hujusmodi sunt quædam passiones. Ergo in parte superioris rationis non fuerunt in Christo.\n\n6. Præterea, secundum Augustinum xix De civitate Dei, cap. vii, dolor vel tristitia est eorum quæ nobis nolentibus accident. Sed Christus per superiorem rationem volebat suam passionem corporalem, neque aliquid contra ejus voluntatem accidit, quæ perfectissime divinæ voluntati erat conformis. Ergo in superiori ratione in Christo tristitia vel dolor non fuit. 7. Sed dicendum quod ratio superior ut ratio volebat corporis passionem, non autem ut natura. — Sed contra: eadem potentia est ratio ut est considerata, et ut natura: diversa enim consideratio substantiam rei non variat. Si ergo ratio superior ut ratio aliquid volebat, et ut natura nolebat, eadem potentia simul et semel aliquid volebat et nolebat; quod est impossibile. 8 Præterea, secundum Philosophum, I Topic., cap. xiii, «delectationi quæ est in considerando, nulla tristitia est oppo-sita vel contraria. » Delectatio autem superioris rationis est in contemplando ατε-na. Ergo in ea non potest esse aliquis dolor vel tristitia: hæc enim tristitia sive dolor delectationi contemplativæ oppo-neretur; et ita in anima Christi secundum superiorem rationem passio doloris vel tristitiæ non fuit. 1. Sed contra est quod in Psal. LXXV dicitur: Repleta est malis anima mea; Glossa ibi ex August.: «non vitiis, sed doloribus. » Ergo in qualibet parte anima Christi fuit dolor; et ita in superiori ratione.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex prædictis, art. 11 hujus quæst., patet duplex est passio, qua anima per accidens patitur: una corporalis, quæ incipit a corpore, et terminatur ad animam secundum quod est corpori unita; alia vero est passio animalis, quæ causatur ex hoc quod anima aliquid apprehendit ex quo appetitus movetur, cujus motum sequitur quædam transmutatio corporalis. Loquendo ergo de prima passione, ad quam pertinet dolor, secundum Augustinum, XIV De civit. Dei, cap. vii, in fin., sic dicendum est quod dolor passio-nis Christi quodammodo fuit in superiori ratione ipsius, et quodammodo non. Sunt enim duo in dolore: scilicet læsio, et læsionis experimentalis perceptio; læsio quidem principaliter est in corpore, sed consequenter in anima inquantum corpori unitur. Unitur autem anima corpori per suam essentiam: in essentia vero animæ omnes potentiae radicantur: et secundum hoc illa læsio ad animam et ad omnes partes ejus in Christo pertinebat, etiam ad superiorem rationem, secundum quod in essentia animæ fundatur. Experimentalis autem perceptio læsionis ad solum sensum tactus pertinet, ut supra, art. 11 hujus quæst., dictum est. Loquendo vero de passione animali, in illa sola parte animæ potest esse tristitia, quæ est passio animalis proprie, ex cujus objecto tristitia contingit, per cujus apprehensionem et appetitum tristitia contingit. Ex objecto autem superioris rationis in anima Christi nulla ratio tristitiae accidere poterat; scilicet ex parte αternorum, quibus perfectissime fruebatur; et ideo tristitia animalis in superiori ratione anima Christi esse non potuit. Patiebatur ergo superior ratio in Christo dolore corporali, secundum quod in essentia animæ radicatur; non autem patiebatur tristitia animali, secundum quod per actum proprium ad αterna conspicienda respiciebat.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod tunc homo perturbatur et a passione deduci-tur, quando ratio in propria operatione sequitur inclinationes passionis, consentiendo et eligendo; dolor autem corporalis non pervenit ad superiorem rationem animæ Christi, immutando ejus propriam rationem, sed solummodo ut radicatur in essentia, ut dictum est, in corp. art.; et ideo non sequitur.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod quamvis dolor non fuerit in superiori ratione animæ Christi per comparisonem ad proprium objectum, fuit tamen in ea secundum quod comparatur ad proprium radicem, quæ est animæ essentia.\n\nAd tertium dicendum quod potentia potest esse actus corporis dupliciter. Uno modo inquantum est potentia quædam; et sic dicitur esse actus corporis inquantum informat aliquod organum corporale ad actum proprium exequendum; sicut potentia visiva perficit oculum ad exequendum actum visionis: et sic intellectus non est actus corporis. Alio modo ratione essentiæ in qua fundatur; et sic tam intellectus quam aliæ potentiæ corpori conjunguntur ut forma, inquantum sunt in anima, quæ per sui essentiam est corporis forma.\n\nAd quartum dicendum quod illa objectio procedit secundum rationem potentiæ, non autem secundum quod in essentia animæ radicatur.\n\nAd quintum dicendum quod Damascenus loquitur de passione animali: quæ quidem passio sicut in proprio subjecto est in appetitiva sensuali, sed est in apprehensiva quasi causaliter, inquantum ex objecto apprehenso motus passionis in appetitiva consurgit. Sunt autem et in appetitu superiori aliquæ operationes consimiles passionibus inferioris appetitus, ratione cujus similitudinis nomina passionum aliquando Angelis vel Deo attribuntur, ut Augustinus dicit, IX De civ, Dei, cap. 1x, circa fin. Et per hunc modum quando tristitia dicitur esse in superiori ratione quantum ad apprehensivam et appetitivam. Sic tamen non dicimus fuisse dolorem in superiori ratione animæ Christi, sed secundum quod in essentia animæ radicatur, ut dictum est in corp. art.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod objectio illa probat in ratione superiori non fuisse dolorem, secundum quod per propriam operationem ad suum objectum comparatur: sic enim nihil ea nolente accidit.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod distinctio illa qua distinguitur ratio ut ratio, et ratio ut natura, dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo ita quod ratio ut natura dica-tur ratio secundum quod est natura creaturæ rationalis, prout scilicet funda-ta in essentia animæ dat esse naturale corpori; ratio vero ut ratio dicatur secundum id quod est proprium rationis in-quantum est ratio; et hoc est actus ejus, quia potentiæ definiuntur per actus. Quia igitur dolor non est in superiori ratione prout secundum actum proprium comparatur ad objectum, sed secundum quod in essentia animæ radicatur, ideo dicitur quod superior ratio patiebatur dolorem ut natura, non autem ut ratio. Et est simile de visu qui fundatur super tactum, inquantum organum visus est organum tactus. Unde dupliciter visus potest pati læsionem: uno modo per ac-tum proprium, sicut cum ab excellenti luce visio obtunditur; et hæc est passio visus ut visus: alio modo prout fundatur in tactu, ut cum oculus pungitur, vel aliquo calore dissolvitur; et hoc non est passio visus ut est visus, sed ut est qui-dam tactus. Alio modo potest intelligi prædicta distinctio, ut dicamus rationem ut naturam intelligi secundum quod ratio comparatur ad ea quæ naturaliter cognoscit vel appetit; rationem vero ut rationem, secundum quod per quamdam collationem ordinatur ad aliquid cognoscendum vel appetendum, eo quod rationis est proprium conferre. Sunt enim quædam quæ secundum se considerata sunt fugienda, appetuntur vero secundum ordinem ad aliud; sicut fames et sitis secundum se considerata sunt fugienda; prout autem considerantur ut utilia ad salutem animæ vel corporis, sic appetuntur: et sic ratio ut ratio de eis gaudet, ratio vero ut natura de eis tristatur. Ita etiam passio corporalis Christi inse considerata fugienda erat; unde ratio ut natura de ea contristabatur et eam nolebat: prout vero ordinabatur ad salutem humani generis, sic bona erat et appetibilis; et sic ratio ut ratio eam volebat, et inde gaudebat. Sed hoc non potest referri ad rationem superiorem, sed inferiorem tantum, quæ his quæ sunt corporis intendit sicut proprio objecto: unde in passiones corporis potest ferri et absolute et cum collatione. Sed ratio superior non intendit his quæ sunt corporis, sicut objectis; sic enim intendit solis æternis; ad corporalia vero respicit de eis judicando per rationes æternas, quibus non solum conspiendiis, sed consulendis intendit. Et ita ratio superior non respiciebat ad corporis passionem in Christo nisi in ordine ad rationes æternas, secundum quas de ea gaudebat, inquantum erat Deo placita. Unde nullo modo ratione propriæ operationis tristitia vel dolor in superiori ratione cadebat. Non autem est inconveniens ut eadem potentia idem velit in ordine ad alterum, quod non vult secundum se: quia potest esse quod id quod non est in se bonum, ex ordine ad alterum accipiat quamdam bonitatem; quamvis hoc non habeat locum in superiori ratione in Christo, respectu passionis corporis, ad quam non ordinatur nisi ut ad volitam, ut ex dicit patet.\n\nAd octavum dicendum quod consideratio potest causare delectationem dupliciiter. Uno modo ex parte operationis, quæ est consideratio; et sic delectationi quæ est in considerando nulla tristitia opponitur vel contrariatur: quia huic considerationi quæ est causa delectationis non est aliqua consideratio contraria, quæ sit causa tristitiae: omnis enim consideratio delectabilis est. Non sic autem est ex parte sensus: quia secundum operationes sensus contingit et tristitia et dolor; sicut ex tactu convenientis delectamur, ex tactu autem nocivi dolemus. Alio modo facit delectationem ex parte considerati; inquantum scilicet aliquid consideratur ut bonum vel ut malum. Et sic ex consideratione potest accidere delectatio et tristitia; sic enim et ipsum non intelligere tristitiam causat, inquantum consideratur ut quoddam malum; secundum se vero non causat nisi negationem delectationis. Non tamen hoc modo dicimus dolorem esse in superiori ratione animæ Christi, sed prout in essentia animæ radicatur.\n\nAd id vero quod primo in contrarium objicitur, dicendum quod Glossa non dicit quod anima Christi sit repleta tristitia; sed quod est repleta doloribus, secundum quod compatitur corpori; et sic non oportet quod passio doloris pertineat ad rationem superiorem, nisi secundum quod est in essentia animæ; sic enim corpori unitur.\n\nDecimo quæritur utrum per dolorem passionis, qui erat in superiori ratione Christi, impediretur gaudium fruitionis, et e converso; et videtur quod sic. Beatitudo enim magis proprie est in anima quam in corpore. Sed corpus non potest dici beatum vel gloriosum simul dum patitur: quia impassibilitas ad gloriam corporis pertinet. Ergo nec in ratione superiori Christi potuit esse simul passio doloris et gaudium fruitionis.\n\n2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., cap. xiii et xiv, quod « delectatio quælibet expellit tristitiam contrariam; si autem vehemens sit, expellit omnem tristitiam. » Sed delectatio qua superior ratio animæ Christi fruebatur Divinitate, fuit vehementissima. Ergo expulit a Christo omnem tristitiam et dolorem.\n\n3. Præterea, ratio superior limpidius contemplatur quam Paulus in raptu. Sed ex veri contemplatione anima Pauli abstracta fuit a corpore, non solum quantum ad operationem rationis, sed etiam quantum ad operationes sensibles. Ergo et Christus nec secundum rationem nec secundum sensum, aliquem dolorem sustinuit.\n\n4. Præterea, ex forti causa sequitur fortis effectus. Sed operatio animæ est causa corporalis immutationis, sicut patet quod ex imaginatione terribilium vel delectabilium corpus disponitur ad frigus vel ad calorem. Cum ergo in anima quantum ad superiorem rationem fuerit vehementissimum gaudium, videtur quod corpus fuerit ex hoc gaudio immutatum; et ita dolor non potuit esse nec in corpore, nec in superiori ratione, secundum quod est corpori unita.\n\n5. Præterea, visio Dei in sua essentia est efficacior quam visio Dei in subjecta creatura. Sed visio qua Moyses vidit Deum in subjecta creatura, fecit ut non affligeretur fame quadragenario jejunio. Ergo multo fortius visio Dei in sua essentia, quæ Christo conveniebat secundum superiorem rationem, omnem corporalem afflictionem removit; et sic idem quod prius.\n\n6. Præterea, id quod est in summo, a quo tamen potest fieri recessus, non patitur contrarii permixionem; sicut calor ignis, qui est in summo, non patitur permixionem frigoris, quamvis calor ille sit transmutabilis. Sed gaudium fruitionis fuit in superiori ratione in summo, etiam immutabiliter. Ergo non fuit ibi aliqua permixion doloris.\n\n7. Præterea, homo beatificatur et secundum animam et secundum corpus: utramque autem beatitudinem per peccatum amisit. In Christo autem fuit restituta humana natura ad beatitudinem animæ, quæ consistit in hoc quod superior ratio Divinitate fruebatur. Ergo multo magis fuit restituta ad beatitudinem corporis, quæ minus est; et ita etiam nec secundum corpus in eo dolor fuit; et sic nec in ratione superiori, secundum quod corpori unitur.\n\n8. Præterea, sicut anima Christi unitur Verbo, ita et caro ejus. Sed si caro ejus esset glorificata per unionem ad Verbum, non posset in ea esse aliquis dolor. Ergo, cum superior ratio sit beatificata per unionem ad Verbum, non poterat in ea esse aliquis dolor.\n\n9. Præterea, secundum Augustinum, XII Super Genesim ad litteram, cap. xxiv, gaudium et dolor per essentiam sunt in anima. Gaudium autem et dolor sunt contraria. Cum ergo contraria non possint esse in eodem secundum essentiam, videtur quod in superiori parte rationis non simul potuerit esse gaudium fruitionis et dolor passionis.\n\n10. Præterea, dolor sequitur ex apprehensione nocivi, gaudium ex apprehensione convenientis. Sed non est possibile simul apprehendere nocivum et conveniens: quia contingit unum solum intelligere, secundum Philosophum. Ergo in ratione superiori non potuit esse simul dolor et gaudium.\n\n11. Præterea, majus posse habet in natura integra ratio supra sensualitatem quam in natura corrupta sensualitas suprarationem. Ergo multo fortius in Christo, in quo natura humana fuit integra, ratio trahebat post se sensualitatem. Sed tota sensualitas erat particeps gaudii fruitionis, quod erat in ratione: ex quo videtur quod anima Christi totaliter erat expers doloris.\n\n12. Præterea, major est infirmitas contracta quam assumpta; et similiter potior est unio in persona quam unio per gratiam. Sed in tribus pueris, qui habebant infirmitatem contractam, unio Dei per gratiam, eorum corpora a læsione ignis impassibilia servavit. Ergo multo fortius in Christo, qui non habuit nisi infirmitatem assumptam, unio in persona Verbi Dei et fruitio ipsius conservavit rationem immunem a dolore passionis.\n\n13. Præterea, gaudium fruitionis in superiori ratione est per hoc quod ad Deum convertitur: dolor autem passionis per hoc quod convertitur ad corpus: quia simplex, ad quod convertitur, totum convertitur. Ergo in ratione superiori Christi non potuit esse simul gaudium fruitionis et dolor passionis. 14. Sed dicendum quod in Christo fuit duplex status; scilicet viatoris, et comprehensoris; et secundum hos duos status sic potuit inesse ei gaudium fruitionis et dolor passionis. — Sed contra: duplex status Christi nec aufert contrarietatem quae est inter gaudium et dolorem, nec subjectum gaudii et doloris diversificat. Contraria autem non possunt esse in eodem subjecto. Ergo duplex status Christi non facit quod simul possit inesse ei secundum superiorem rationem dolor et gaudium.\n\n15. Præterea, status viatoris et comprehensoris aut sunt contrarii, aut non. Si sunt contrarii, ergo simul inesse Christo non possunt. Si autem non sunt contrarii, cum contrariorum sint contrariæ causæ, videtur quod duplex status non possit esse causa per quam Christo simul insint gaudium et dolor quæ sunt contraria.\n\nRespondeo dicendum quod in Christo duo prædicta, scilicet gaudium fruitionis et dolor corporalis passionis, se nullatenus impedierunt. Ad cujus evidentiam sciendum est quod secundum naturæ ordinem, propter colligantiam virium animæ in una essentia, et animæ et corporis in uno esse compositi, vires superiores et inferiores, et etiam corpus, invicem in se effluunt quod in aliquo eorum superabundat; et inde est quod ex apprehensione animæ transmutatur corpus secundum calorem et frigus, et quandoque usque ad sanitatem et ægritudinem, et usque ad mortem: contingit enim aliquem ex gaudio vel tristitia vel amore mortem incurrere. Et inde est quod ex ipsa gloria animæ fit redundantia in corpus glorificandum; ut patet per auctoritatem Augustini supra inductam, art. vIII, in sol. ad 1x argum.; et similiter est e converso quod transmutatio corporis in animam redundat. Anima enim conjuncta corpori ejus complexiones imitatur secundum amentiam vel docilitatem, et alia hujusmodi, ut dicitur in lib. Sex principiorum, cap. iv et est de « quando » non procul a fin. inter opera Arist. Similiter ex viriibus superioribus fit redundantia in inferiores; cum ad motum voluntatis intensum sequitur passio in sensuali appetitu, et ex intensa contemplatione retrahuntur vel impediuntur vires animales a suis actibus: et e converso ex viribus inferioribus fit redundantia in superiores; ut cum ex vehementia passionum in sensuali appetitu existentium obtenebratur ratio, ut judicet quasi simpliciter bonum id circa quod homo per passionem afficitur. In Christo autem secus est: nam propter divinam virtutem Verbi, ejus voluntati subjectus erat ordo naturæ; unde poterat hoc contingere ut non fieret prædicta redundantia sive ex anima in corpus vel e converso, sive ex superioribus viribus in inferiores vel e converso, virtute Verbi id faciente, ut comprobaretur veritas humanæ naturæ quantum ad singulas partes ejus, ut decenter impleretur quantum ad omnia nostræ reparationis mysterium. Unde dicit Damascenus in lib. III De fid. orth., cap. xv,: « Movebatur secundum consequentiam naturæ, Verbo volente et permittente dispensative pati et operari quæcumque propria, ut per omnia naturæ credatur veritas. » Sic ergo patet quod, cum in ratione superiori esset summum gaudium, in quantum per ejus operationem anima Deo fruebatur, ipsum gaudium in superiori ratione persistebat, et non derivabatur ad inferiores vires animæ, nec ad corpus: alias nullus dolor nec passio in eo esse potuisset. Et sic effectus fruitionis non pervenit ad essentiam animæ inquantum est forma corporis, nec inquantum est radix inferiorum virium: sic enim et ad corpus et ad inferiores vires pervenisset, ut accidit in beatis post resurrectionem. Similiter dolor, qui erat ex laesione corporis in ipso corpore et essentia animæ secundum quod est forma corporis in inferioribus viribus, non poterat pervenire ad superiorem rationem, secundum quod per actum suum in Deum convertitur, ut per hoc ipsa conversio aliqualiter impediretur. Relinquitur igitur quod superiorem rationem attingebat ipse dolor, inquantum in esse animæ radicatur; et erat ibi gaudium summum inquantum per actum suum Deo fruebatur: et sic ipsum gau- — Edit.: « ergo in Christo dium conveniebat rationi superiori per se, quia per actum proprium; dolor autem quasi per accidens, quia ratione essentiæ animæ, in qua fundatur.\n\nAd primum ergo dicendum quod sicut Deus est bonum et vita animæ, ita anima est bonum et vita corporis; non autem e converso, quod corpus sit bonum animæ. Passibilitas autem est quoddam impedimentum vel nocumentum respectu unionis animæ ad corpus. Et ideo corpus non potest esse beatum suo modo, passibile existens, utpote impedimentum habens respectu participationis summi boni: propter quod impassibilitas pertinet ad gloriam corporis. Animæ vero beatitudo tota consistit in fruitione summi boni, quod est Deus: unde anima quæ fruitur Deo, perfecte est beata, etiam si contingat quod sit passibilis ex parte illa qua corpori unitur, sicut accidit in Christo.\n\nAd secundum dicendum quod hoc quod gaudium vehemens expellat omnem tristitiam etiam non contrariam, contingit ex redundantia virium in invicem, quæ in Christo non fuit, ut dictum est, in corp. art.: et hac ratione ex vehementia contemplationis ipsius Pauli inferiores vires a suis actibus sunt abstractæ. Unde patet solutio ad tertium. Et hac etiam ratione ex operatione animæ contingit aliqua immutatio in corpore: ex quo patet solutio ad quartum Inde est quod Moyses siti et fame nullo modo vel minus affligebatur ex contemplatione, quamvis videret Deum in subjecta creatura: et sic patet solutio ad quintum.\n\nAd sextum dicendum quod in Christo nulla permixtio facta est gaudii et doloris. Nam gaudium fuit in superiori ratione ex illa parte qua est principium sui actus; sic enim Deo fruebatur; dolor vero non erat in ipsa nisi secundum quod læsio corporis attingebat eam ut actum corporis, mediante essentia, in qua radicatur; ita tamen quod actus rationis superioris nullatenus impediebatur: et sic erat et purum gaudium et purus dolor; et sic utrumque in summo.\n\nAd septimum dicendum quod ex quadam dispensatione factum est ut Christo a principio suæ conceptionis gloria animæ, non autem corporis conferretur; ut scilicet cum Deo, per passibilitatem corporis similis esset nobis; et sic esset conveniens mediator Dei et hominum, in gloriam nos adducens, et suam passionem ex parte nostra Deo offerens, secundum illud Hebr. xi, 40: Decebat eum qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat, per passionem consummari.\n\nAd octavum dicendum quod anima Christi fuit conjuncta Verbo dupliciter: uno modo per actum fruitionis; et hæc unio fecit eam beatam; alio modo per unionem, et ex hac non habuit rationem beatitudinis, sed ex hac habuit quod esset anima Dei. Si autem ponatur animam fuisse assumptam in unitate personæ sine fruitione, non esset beata, proprie loquendo: quia nec ipse Deus beatus est nisi per hoc quod se ipso fruitur. Corpus igitur Christi non ex hoc ipso gloriosum est quod est a Filio Dei in unitate personæ assumptum; sed solum ex hoc quod ex anima in ipsum gloria descendit, quod quidem ante passionem non erat gloriosum.\n\nAd nonum dicendum quod contraria esse in eodem per se, est impossibile; contingit tamen esse contrarios motus in eodem, ita quod unus motuum conveniat ei per se, et aliud per accidens; sicut cum aliquis in navi deambulans fertur in contrarium ejus ad quod navis movetur. Ita in superiori ratione animæ Christi erat gaudium per se, quia per actum proprium; dolor autem per accidens, quia per corporis passionem. Vel potest dici quod gaudium illud et ille dolor non erant contraria, cum non essent de eodem.\n\nAd decimum dicendum quod intellectus non potest simul multa intelligere per diversas species; potest autem per unam speciem simul multa intelligere vel qualitercumque aliter intelligere multa ut unum; et sic intellectus animæ Christi et cujuslibet beati multa simul intelligit, inquantum videndo essentiam divinam, alia cognoscit. Dato tamen quod anima Christi non possit simul nisi unum intelligere, per hoc tamen non removetur quin possit simul intelligere unum, et sentire aliud sensu corporali: et ex istis duobus apprehensis in anima Christi sequebatur gaudium fruitionis ex visione Dei, et dolor passionis ex sensu nocumenti. Dato iterum quod non possit simul intelligere unum et sentire vel imaginari aliud; ex illo tamen uno intellecto posset diversimode affici appetitus superior et inferior, ut superior gauderet, et inferior timeret vel doleret: sicut accidit in eo qui sperat ex aliqua horribili medicina se assequi sanitatem. Nam ipsa medicina, ut salubris a ratione considerata, generat in voluntate gaudium; ratione vero horribilitatis suæ in inferiori appetitu timo-rem inducit.\n\nAd undecimum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum communem cursum. In Christo autem specialiter fuit ut non fieret redundantia ex una potentia in aliam.\n\nAd duodecimum dicendum quod corpus puerorum non fuit factum impassibile in fornace; sed divina virtute miraculose factum est ut corpora passibilia existentia ab igne non laederentur, sicut fieri potuisset divina virtute ut neque anima Christi nec corpus aliquid pateretur. Sed quare factum non fuerit, dictum est, in corp. art.\n\nAd decimumtertium dicendum quod conversio potentiæ ad aliquid est per actum ipsius: et sic gaudium fuit in superiori ratione per conversionem ad Deum, ad quem totaliter convertebatur; dolor autem fuit in superiori ratione secundum inhæsionem vel adhærentiam qua adhærebat essentiæ animæ sicut suæ radici.\n\nAd decimumquartum dicendum quod status viatoris est status imperfectionis, status autem comprehensoris est status perfectionis. Secundum hoc ergo Christus statum viatoris habuit quod corpus passibile gerebat, et similiter animam; secundum hoc vero statum comprehensoris, quod per actum superioris rationis perfecte Deo fruebatur. Quod quidem esse poterat in Christo, propter hoc quod impediebatur divina virtute redundantia ex uno in alium, ut dictum est, in corp. art.; et hæc est causa quare gaudium et tristitia simul ei inesse poterant. Et ideo dicitur, quod secundum duos status hæc duo sibi inerant: quia habere duos status, et simul pati dolorem et gaudium, ab eadem causa procedebat.\n\nAd decimumquintum dicendum quod quamvis status viatoris et comprehensoris sint quasi contrarii, tamen Christo simul inesse poterant, non secundum idem, sed secundum diversa. Nam status comprehensoris inerat ei secundum quod per fruitionem adhærebat Deo secundum superiorem rationem; status vero viatoris secundum quod naturali conjunctione anima corpori passibili jungebatur, et superior ratio ipsi animæ; ut sic status comprehensoris pertineat ad actum superioris rationis; status vero viatoris ad corpus passibile, et ad ea quæ ad hoc consequuntur.\n\nAd decimumsextum dicendum quod in Christo hoc fuit speciale, ratione jam dicta, quod quantumcumque intenderetur una potentia in suo actu, alia non retrahebatur a suo actu, nec aliquatenus impediebatur; et sic gaudium superioris neque impediebatur per dolorem qui erat in sensu secundum actum sensus, neque a dolore secundum quod erat in superiori ratione: quia iste dolor non erat in ea secundum actum ejus, sed attingebat eam aliqualiter secundum quod in essentia animæ erat fundata.\n\nAd decimumseptimum dicendum quod sicut cognitio beata est principaliter divinæ essentia, et secundario eorum quæ in divina essentia cognoscuntur; ita affectio et gaudium beatorum principaliter est de Deo; secundario autem eorum de quibus gaudendi Deus est ratio. Et sic quodammodo dolor passionis poterat esse materialis respectu gaudii fruitionis: erat enim illud gaudium principaliter de Deo, secundario de his quæ Deo erant placita; et sic erat de dolore, inquantum a Deo acceptabatur, utpote ad salutem humani generis ordinatus."
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