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  "chapter": {
    "num": 3,
    "slug": "03-book-iii",
    "title": "Book III: God the End of Creatures",
    "of": 4,
    "words": 79468,
    "text": "> **Translation:** Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (*Of God and His Creatures*; London: Burns & Oates, 1905). Verbatim public-domain scholarly text — quotable.\n>\n> **Public-domain basis:** Public domain: published 1905, pre-1929, public domain by term worldwide.\n>\n> **Note:** This is Rickaby's *annotated and lightly abridged* 1905 rendering — faithful and quotable as Rickaby's translation, but it condenses or omits some chapters and folds in his own explanatory notes (his footnote apparatus is not reproduced here). For a complete text see the project's numerus-granular translation, or the modern scholarly edition at https://aquinas.cc.\n\n## Book III: God the End of Creatures\n\n### Chapter I. Preface to the Book that Follows\n\nCHAPTER I. — Preface to the Book that Follows The Lord is a great God, and a great king above all gods. For the Lord will not reject his people, because in his hands are all the ends of the earth, and the heights of the mountains he beholdeth. For the sea is his, and he made it, and his hands have formed the dry land. ( Ps. xciv ). IT has been shown above (B. I, Chap. XIII ) that there is one first of beings, possessing the full perfection of all being, whom we call God. Out of the abundance of His perfection He bestows being on all things that exist; and thus He proves to be not only the first of beings, but also the first principle of all. He bestows being on other things, not out of any necessity of his nature, but by the free choice of His will, as has been shown (B. II, Chap. XXIII ). Consequently He is master of the things that He has made: for we have dominion over the things that are subject to our will. This His dominion over the things that He has brought into being is a perfect dominion, since in producing them He needs the aid of no exterior agent, nor any subject matter to work upon, seeing that He is the universal efficient cause of all being. Of the things produced by the will of an agent every one is directed by that agent to some end: for some good and some end is the proper object of the will: hence the things that proceed from will must be directed to some end. Everything attains its last end by its own action, which is directed by Him who has given to things the principles whereby they act. It needs must be then that God, who is by nature perfect in Himself and by His power bestows being on all things that are, should be the ruler of all beings, Himself ruled by none: nor is there anything exempt from His government, as there is nothing that does not derive being from Him. He is then perfect in government, as He is perfect in being and causation. The effect of this government appears variously in various natures according to the difference between them. Some creatures are brought into being by God to possess understanding, to bear his likeness and present His image. They not only are directed, but also direct themselves by proper actions of their own to their due end. If in the direction of themselves they remain subject to the divine guidance, they are admitted in course of that guidance to the attainment of their last end. Other beings, devoid of understanding, do not direct themselves to their own end, but are directed by another. Some of those are imperishable; and as they can suffer no defect in their natural being, so in their proper actions they never deflect one whit from the path that leads to the end prefixed to them, but are indefectibly subject to the rule of the prime ruler. Other creatures are perishable, and liable to the failure of their natural being, which however is compensated by the gain of another: for the perishing of one is the engendering of another. In like manner in their proper actions they swerve from the natural order from which swerving however there accrues some compensatory good. Hence it appears that even apparent irregularities and departures from the order of the first rule escape not the power of the first ruler. These perishable bodies, created as they are by God, are perfectly subject to His power. The Psalmist, filled with God’s spirit, considering this truth , and wishing to point out to us the divine government of things, first describes to us the perfection of the first ruler, — of His nature, when he says God ; of His power, when he says, is a great Lord , needing no co-operation to work the effect of His power; of His authority, when he says a great king above all gods , because, though there be many rulers, all are subject to His rule. Secondly he describes to us the manner of government, — as well in respect of intelligent beings, which follow His rule and gain from Him their last end, which is Himself, and therefore he says, for the Lord will not reject his people , — as also in respect of perishable beings, which, however they sometimes depart from their proper modes of action, still are never let go beyond the control of the prime ruler: hence it is said, in his hands are all the ends of the earth , — likewise in respect of the heavenly bodies, which exceed all the height of the earth and of perishable bodies, and always observe the right order of divine rule: hence he says, and the heights of the mountains he beholdeth . Thirdly he assigns the reason of this universal control, which is, because things created by God needs must be ruled by Him: hence he says, For the sea is his , etc. Since then in the first Book we have treated of the perfection of the divine nature, and in the second of the perfection of God’s power, it remains for us in this third Book to treat of His perfect authority, or dignity, in as much as He is the last end and ruler of all things. This therefore will be our order of procedure, to treat first of God, as the final end of all things; secondly of His universal control, whereby He governs every creature; thirdly of the special control which He exercises in the government of creatures endowed with understanding.\n\n### Chapter II. That every Agent acts to some End\n\nCHAPTER II. — That every Agent acts to some End IN the case of agents that manifestly act to some end, we call that the end to which the effort of the agent tends. Gaining that, he is said to gain his end; and missing that, he is said to miss his intended end. Nor on this point does it make any difference whether the end be tended to with knowledge or not: for as the target is the end of the archer, so is it also the end of the path of the arrow. The effort of every agent tends to some certain end. Not any and every action can proceed from any and every power. Action is sometimes terminated to some product, sometimes not. When action is terminated to some product, the effort of the agent tends to the same. When action is not terminated to any product, the effort of the agent tends to the action itself. Every agent therefore must intend some end in his action, sometimes the action itself, sometimes something produced by the action. 3. It is impossible for the chain of actions to extend to infinity: there must then be something, in the getting of which the effort of the agent comes to rest. Therefore every agent acts to some end. 6. Actions are open to criticism only so far as they are taken to be done as means to some end. It is not imputed as a fault to any one, if he fails in effecting that for which his work is not intended. A physician is found fault with if he fails in healing, but not a builder or a grammarian. We find fault in points of art, as when a grammarian does not speak correctly; and also in points of nature, as in monstrous births. Therefore both the natural agent, and the agent who acts according to art and with a conscious purpose, acts for an end. 7. To an agent that did not tend to any definite effect, all effects would be indifferent. But what is indifferent to many things, does not do one of them rather than another: hence from an agent open to both sides of an alternative ( a contingente ad utrumque ) there does not follow any effect, unless by some means it comes to be determined to one above the rest: otherwise it could not act at all. Every agent therefore tends to some definite effect, and that is called its end. Still there are actions that do not seem to be for any end, as things done for sport, and acts of contemplation, and things done without advertence, as the stroking of the beard and the like: from which instances one may suppose that there is such a thing as an agent acting not for any end. But we must observe that though acts of contempation are not for any other end, they are an end in themselves: as for things done in sport, sometimes they are their own end, as when one plays solely for the amusement that he finds in play; sometimes they are for an end, as when we play that afterwards we may resume work more vigorously: while things done without advertence may proceed not from the understanding, but from some phantasy or physical principle; yet even these acts tend to certain ends, though beyond the scope of the intellect of the agent. Hereby is banished the error of certain ancient natural philosophers (Empedocles and Democritus, mentioned in Aristotle, Physics II, ii, 6) who supposed all things to happen by necessity of matter, and eliminated final causes from the universe.\n\n### Chapter III. That every Agent acts to some Good\n\nCHAPTER III — That every Agent acts to some Good THAT to which an agent definitely tends must be suited to it: for it would not tend to the thing except for some suitability to itself. But what is suitable to a thing is good for it. Therefore every agent acts to some good. 6. An intellectual agent acts for an end by determining its own end. A physical agent, though acting for an end, does not determine its own end, having no idea of an end, but moves in the direction of an end determined for it by another. Now an intellectual agent does not fix for itself an end except under some aspect of good: for a term of intellect is a motive only under an aspect of good, which is the object of will. Therefore a physical agent also does not move or act to any end except inasmuch as it is good. Such an agent has its end determined by some natural appetite or tendency. 7. It is part of the same plan of action to shun evil and to seek good. But all things are found to shun evil. Intellectual agents shun a thing for this reason, that they apprehend its evil: while all physical agents, to the full extent of the power that is in them, resist destruction, because that is the evil of everything. All things therefore act to some good.\n\n### Chapter IV. That Evil in things is beside the Intention of the Agent\n\nCHAPTER IV — That Evil in things is beside the Intention of the Agent WHAT follows from an action different from what was intended by the agent, manifestly happens beside his intention. But evil is different from good, which every agent intends. Therefore evil happens beside the intention. 2. Failure in effect and action follows upon some defect in the principles of action, as a halting gait follows upon crookedness of legs. Now an agent acts by whatever of active power he has, not by what defect of active power he suffers; and according as he acts, so does he intend his end. He intends therefore an end answering to his power. Anything therefore that ensues answering to defect of power will be beside the intention of the agent. But such is evil. 4. In agents that act by intellect, or by any sort of judgement, intention follows apprehension: for intention tends to that which is apprehended as an end. If then experience lights upon something not of the species apprehended, the event will be beside the intention: thus if one intends to eat honey, and eats gall, taking it for honey, that will be beside the intention. But every intellectual agent intends a thing according as he takes it for something good: if then it turns out not to be good but evil, that will be beside the intention.\n\n### Chapters V, VI. Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with Solutions of the Same\n\nCHAPTERS V, VI — Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with Solutions of the Same Chapter VI FOR the clearer solution of the arguments alleged we must observe that evil may be considered either in a substance or in some action of a substance. Evil in a substance consists in its lack of something which it is naturally apt to have and ought to have. It is no evil to a man not to have wings, because he is not by nature apt to have them; nor not to have yellow hair, because, though his nature is apt to have such hair, still that colour of hair is not due to his nature. But it is an evil to him not to have hands, because he is apt by nature to have them, and ought to have them, if he is to be perfect; and yet the same is no evil to a bird. Every privation, properly and strictly speaking, is of something which one is naturally apt to have and ought to have. The essence of evil consists in privation, thus understood. Primordial matter, being in potentiality to all forms, is naturally in actuality without any one particular form that you like to mention. But some particular form is due to each of the things that are constituted out of such matter. The privation therefore of such a form, in regard of primordial matter, is no evil to the nature of primordial matter; but in regard of the compound whereof it is the form, it is an evil to that compound thing: thus it is evil to incandescent gas ( ignis ) to be deprived of the form of incandescent gas. And since privations are not said to ‘be’ except so far as they are in a subject, a privation will be ’simply evil,’ when it is evil in regard of the subject in which it is: otherwise, it will be ‘evil relatively to something’ ( malum alicujus ), but not ’simply evil.’ Arg. 1 (Chap. V). What happens beside the intention of the agent is said to be ‘matter of luck and chance and rare occurrence.’ But evil is not said to be matter of luck and chance, or rare occurrence, but to happen continually, or for the most part: thus in the physical order the unmaking of one thing is always attached to the making of another; and in the moral order sin is of usual occurrence. This does not look like evil arising contrary to intention. Reply (Chap. VI). Not everything that is beside the intention of the doer need be the result of luck or chance. For if what is beside the intention follows upon what is intended either always or frequently, it cannot be said to happen by luck or chance. Thus in him who intends to enjoy the pleasantness of wine, if from his drinking wind drunkenness follows always or frequently, it will be no matter of bad luck or chance: but it would be by chance, if it were quite the exception. Although then the evil of one thing perishing in course of nature follows beside the intention of him who brings the other thing into being, such evil nevertheless follows invariably: for invariably to the positing of one form there is annexed the privation of another: hence this perishing does not happen by chance, nor as the exception, though the privation is sometimes not evil simply, but only a relative evil, as has been said. But if it be such a privation as to deprive the new being produced of what is due to it, it will be matter of chance and simply evil, as is the case of monstrous births: for such a mishap does not follow of necessity upon what is intended, but is contrary to it, since the agent intends the perfection of the being that he engenders. — Evil affecting action happens in physical agents for want of active power: hence, if the agent’s power is defective, this evil happens contrary to intention, yet not by chance, because it necessarily follows upon such an agent, when such agent suffers this failure of power either always or frequently: but it will be by chance, if the failure rarely accompanies such an agent. — Coming to voluntary agents, intention in them must be of some particular good, if action is to follow: for universal considerations of themselves do not move the will, unless there be added the consideration of the particular circumstances under which the action is to take place. If then the good that is intended has conjoined with it the privation of rational good either always or frequently, there follows moral evil, and that not by chance, as is clear in his case who wishes to cohabit with a woman for pleasure, while the inordination of adultery is annexed to that pleasure: in that case the evil of adultery does not ensue by chance: but it would be an evil happening by chance, if upon the thing intended there followed some exceptional misadventure, as when one aiming at a bird kills a man. That goods of this sort, upon which privations of rational good follow, are so generally intended, arises from the practice of most men living according to sense, which they do because sensible things are more manifest to us, and make more effectual motives in the particular circumstances in which our action is cast; and many such goods are attended with privation of rational good. Arg. 2. Aristotle ( Eth. Nic. , III, vii) expressly says that wickedness is voluntary, and proves it from the fact that men do unjust acts voluntarily: but, he adds, it is irrational to pretend that a man voluntarily acting unjustly does not wish to be unjust, or voluntarily committing rape does not wish to be incontinent; and that is why legislators punish wicked men as voluntary evil-doers. It seems then that evil is not irrespective of will or intention. Reply. Though evil be beside the intention, it is still voluntary, not as it is in itself, but incidentally. The object of intention is the final end, willed for its own sake: but the object of volition is also that which is willed for the sake of something else, though absolutely it would not be willed, — as one throws cargo into the sea to save the ship, not intending the casting away of the cargo, but the safety of the vessel; and yet willing the casting away of the cargo, not simply and absolutely, but for the sake of safety. In like manner, for the gaining of some sensible good, one wills to do an inordinate action, not intending the inordinateness, nor willing it simply, but for that purpose. And therefore in this way wickedness and sin are said to be voluntary, like the casting away of cargo at sea. Arg. 3. Every process of nature serves as an end intended by nature. But destruction is as much a natural change as production: therefore its end, which is a privation and counts as evil, is intended by nature as much as form and goodness, which are the end of production. Reply. From what has been said it appears that what is simply evil is altogether contrary to intention in the works of nature, as are monstrous births: but what is not simply evil, but only evil in a particular relation, is not intended by nature in itself, but incidentally.\n\n### Chapter VII. That Evil is not a Nature or Essence\n\nCHAPTER VII — That Evil is not a Nature or Essence EVIL is nothing else than a privation of that which a thing is naturally apt to have and ought to have. But a privation is not an essence, but a negation in a substance. 5. Every essence is natural to some thing. If the essence ranks as a substance, it is the very nature of the thing. If it ranks as an accident, it must be caused by the principles of some substance, and thus will be natural to that substance, though perhaps not natural to some other substance. But what is in itself evil cannot be natural to anything: for the essence of evil is privation of that which is naturally apt to be in a thing and is due to it. Evil then, being a privation of what is natural, cannot be natural to anything. Hence whatever is naturally in a thing is good, and the want of it an evil. No essence then is in itself evil. 6. Whatever has any essence is either itself a form or has a form, for by form everything is assorted in some genus or species. But form, as such, has a character of goodness, being the principle of action and the end which every maker intends, and the actuality whereby every subject of form is perfected. Whatever therefore has any essence, as such, is good. 7. Being is divided into actuality and potentiality. Actuality, as such, is good, because everything is perfected by that whereby it actually is. Potentiality too is something good: for potentiality tends to actuality, and is proportionate to actuality, not contrary to it; and is of the same genus with actuality; and privation does not attach to it except accidentally. Everything therefore that is, in whatsoever way it is, in so far as it is a being, is good. 8. All being, howsoever it be, is from God (B. II, Chap. VI ). But God is perfect goodness (B. I, Chap. XLI ). Since then evil cannot be the effect of goodness, it is impossible for any being, as being, to be evil. Hence it is said: God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good ( Gen. i, 31 ): He made all things good in his own time ( Eccles. iii, 11 ): Every creature of God is good ( 1 Tim. iv, 4 ).\n\n### Chapters VIII, IX. Arguments against the aforsesaid Conclusion, with Answers to the same\n\nCHAPTERS VIII, IX — Arguments against the aforsesaid Conclusion, with Answers to the same ARG. 1. Evil is a specific difference in certain kinds of things, namely, in moral habits and acts: for as every virtue in its species is a good habit, so the contrary vice in its species is an evil habit; and similarly of acts. Evil therefore is something that gives species to certain things: it is therefore an essence, and natural to some things. Reply. The reason why good and evil are reckoned specific differences in moral matters, is because moral matters depend on the will: for a thing enters into the sphere of morality inasmuch as it is voluntary. But the object of the will is the end in view and good: hence moral actions are specified by the end for which they are done, as physical actions are from the form of their active principle. Since then good and evil are designated according to due bearing on the end, or the lack of such due bearing, good and evil must be the first differentias marking species in moral matters. But the measure of morality is reason. Therefore things must be called morally good or evil according as they bear on the end which reason determines. Whatever therefore in moral matters derives its species from an end, which is according to reason, is said to be good in its species: while what derives its species from an end contrary to reason, is said to be evil in its species. But that end, though inconsistent with the end which reason assigns, is nevertheless some sort of good, as being pleasurable according to sense, or the like: hence such ends are good in some animals, and even in man when they are moderated by reason; and what is evil for one may very well be good for another. And therefore evil, inasmuch as it is a specific differentia in the genus of moral matters, does not involve anything that is essentially evil, but something that is in itself good, but evil to man inasmuch as it sets aside the order of reason, which is man’s good. Arg. 4. All that acts is something. But evil acts inasmuch as it is evil: for it understands good and spoils it. Evil therefore, inasmuch as it is evil, is some thing. Reply. A privation, as such, is no principle of action. Hence it is well said that evil does not fight against good except in the power of good: but in itself it is impotent and weak and originative of no action. Evil is said however to spoil good also formally in itself, as blindness is said to spoil sight, or whiteness to colour a wall. Arg. 5. Where there is found more and less , there must be an order of things, for negations and privations are not susceptible of more and less . But we find among evils one worse than another. Therefore evil must be some thing. Reply. Conditions that imply privation are intensified or relaxed as are inequality and unlikeness: for a thing is more unequal according as it is further removed from inequality, and more unlike according as it is more removed from likeness: hence a thing is more evil according as it is a greater privation of good, or at a greater distance from good. Arg. 6. Thing and being are convertible terms. But evil is in the world. Therefore it is some thing and nature. Reply. Evil is said ‘to be’ in the world, not as having any essence, or existing as a thing, but in the way in which a thing ‘is’ evil precisely by evil, as blindness, an in the way in which any privation is said ‘to be,’ inasmuch as an animal ‘is’ blind by blindness. For there are two senses of ‘being’: in one sense it means the essence of a thing, and is divided into the ten predicaments; and in this sense no privation can be called a being: in another sense, it signifies the truth of an affirmative proposition ( veritatem compositionis ); and thus evil and privation is said to be a being, inasmuch as a thing is said to ‘be’ thereby under a privation.\n\n### Chapter X. That the Cause of Evil is good\n\nCHAPTER X — That the Cause of Evil is good WHAT is not, is cause of nothing: every cause must be some being. But evil is not any being (Chapp. VII , IX ): therefore evil cannot be the cause of anything. If then evil is caused by anything, what causes it must be good. 4. Every cause is either material, formal, efficient, or final. But evil can be neither matter nor form: for it has been shown (Chapp. VII , IX ) that both actual being and potential being is good. In like manner evil cannot be an efficient cause, since everything acts according as it is actually and has a form. Nor can it be a final cause, since it is beside the intention (Chap. IV ). Evil therefore cannot be the cause of anything; and therefore, if there be any cause of evil, it must be caused by good. But since good and evil are opposites, and one opposite cannot be cause of another except accidentally, it follows that good cannot be the active cause of evil except accidentally. In physics, this accident may happen either on the part of the agent or on the part of the effect. On the part of the agent, when the agent suffers from a lack of power, whence it follows that the action is defective and the effect deficient. But to an agent, as such, it is quite an accident to suffer from a lack of power: for an agent does not act inasmuch as power is lacking to him, but according as he has anything of power. Thus then evil is caused accidentally on the part of the agent, inasmuch as the agent runs short of power: therefore it is said that evil has not got an efficient cause, but a deficient cause, because evil does not follow from an efficient cause except in so far as it is deficient in power, and in this respect is is not efficient. It comes to the same thing if the defect of the action and effect arises from some defect of the instrument, or of any other thing requisite for the agent’s action, as when motive power produces halting through crookedness of the shin-bone: for the agent acts by both the power and the instrument. On the part of the effect evil is caused accidentally as well in respect of the matter of the effect as also in respect of its form. For if the matter is indisposed to receive the impression of the agent, some defect must follow in the effect. Nor is it imputable to any defect of the agent, that it does not transmute an indisposed matter to a perfect act: for the power of every natural agent is determined according to the limit of its nature; and its failure to transcend that cannot be brought in against it as a defect in power: such defect can then only be argued when it falls short of the measure of power due to it by nature. On the part of the form of the effect evil is accidentally incident, inasmuch as one form necessarily involves the privation of another form, and with the production of one thing there must needs ensue the destruction of another. But this evil does not belong to the effect intended by the agent, but attaches to something else. In the processes of nature therefore evil is caused by good only accidentally. The same is the case also in the processes of art: for art in its operation imitates nature, and is at fault in the same way as nature. But in moral matters the case seems to be different. For a flaw in morals does not follow from any lack of power, seeing that weakness either entirely removes, or at least diminishes, moral reprehensibleness: for weakness does not deserve the punishment which is due to fault, but rather compassion and indulgence: to be blameworthy, a point of conduct must be a voluntary act, not an inevitable necessity. On careful consideration we find that the case of morals is in some respects like, in some respects unlike the case of physics. The unlikeness consists in this, that a moral fault is viewed as consisting in the action alone, not in any effect produced: for moral virtues are not effective, but active, while arts are effective; and therefore it has been said that art is at fault in the same way as nature. Moral evil therefore is not estimated according to the matter and form of the effect, but follows simply from the agent. Now in moral actions there are found in orderly enumeration four active principles. One principle is the executive power, namely, the motor power which moves the limbs to execute the command of the will. This power is moved by the will, and so the will is another principle. The will is moved by the judgement of the apprehensive faculty, which judges the particular thing proposed to be good or bad. — good and bad being the (formal) objects of the will, the one object of seeking, the other of avoidance. Lastly, the apprehensive faculty is moved by the thing apprehended. The first active principle then in moral actions is the thing apprehended; the second is the apprehensive faculty; the third is the will; the fourth is motor power which executes the command of reason. But the act of the executive power already presupposes moral good or evil; for these exterior acts bear a moral character only in so far as they are voluntary. Hence if the act of the will is good, the exterior act will also be called good; and evil, if the volition is evil. It would be no point of moral badness for the exterior act to fail by some defect unconnected with the will: thus lameness is not a moral but a natural blemish. Such a lack of executive power diminishes, if it does not totally excuse from, moral blemish. Again, the act whereby the object moves the apprehensive faculty is exempt from moral blemish: for it is according to the order of nature that what is visible affects the sight, and every object affects the corresponding passive potentiality. Even the act of the apprehensive faculty, considered in itself, is nowise morally blameworthy, as we see that any defect in it excuses from or diminishes moral blame, like the lack of executive power: for infirmity and ignorance alike excuse from sin, or diminish it. It remains then that moral blameworthiness is found first and foremost in the act of the will alone; and reasonably so, since an act is called ‘moral’ from being voluntary. In the act of the will then is to be sought the root and origin of what in the moral order is sin. But this investigation leads us into an apparent difficulty. On the understanding that defect in an act arises from some defect in the principle of action, some defect in the will must be presupposed before there can be any moral fault. If this defect is natural, it is ever inherent in the will; and the consequence is that the will must always do wrong in action, a consequence proved false by the fact of there being such things as acts of virtue. On the other hand, if the defect is voluntary, that is already a moral fault, the cause of which must stand over for further enquiry; and so we shall have a running account to infinity. We must therefore say that the defect pre-existing in the will is no natural necessity, otherwise it would follow that the will sinned in every act: nor again is a thing of chance and ill luck, for at that rate there could be in us no moral fault, since events of chance are unpremeditated and beyond the control of reason. The defect therefore is voluntary, but not a moral fault: so we must suppose to save the account running to infinity. Now we must consider how that can be. In every active principle the perfection of its power depends on some superior active principle: for a secondary agent acts by virtue of the power of the prime agent. So long then as the secondary agent remains under the power of the prime agent, it will act unfailingly: but it will fail in its action whenever it happens to swerve from the order of the prime agent, as appears in an instrument when it ceases to respond to the movement of the agent who uses it. Now it has been said above that in the order of moral actions principles go before volition, the apprehensive faculty and the object apprehended, which is the end in view. But since to everything movable there corresponds a proper motive power, not any and every apprehensive faculty is the due motive power of any and every appetite, but one apprehension is the proper motive of one appetite, another of another. As then the sensible apprehensive faculty is the proper motive power of the sensible appetite, so the proper motive power of the will is reason itself. Further, as reason can apprehend many sorts of good things and many ends of action; as moreover every power has its own proper end; the will also must have some object and end of action and prime motive, and that must be not any and every sort of good, but some definite good. Whenever then the will tends to act under the motive of an apprehension of reason representing to it its own proper good, a due action ensues. But when the will bursts out into action upon the apprehension of the sensible apprehensive faculty, or even upon the apprehension of reason itself, representing some other good than the proper good of the will, there ensues in the action of the will a moral fault. Therefore any faulty action in the will is preceded by a lack of due regard to reason and to the proper end of willing. I say ‘a lack of due regard to reason,’ in such cases as when, upon some sudden aprehension of sense, the will tends to some good that is pleasant according to sense. I say ‘a lack of due regard to the proper end of willing,’ in cases when the reason arrives by reasoning at some good, which is not either now or in this way good, and still the will tends to it as though it were its proper good. Now this lack of due regard is voluntary: for it is in the power of the will to will and not to will: it is likewise in its power to direct reason actually to consider or to cease from considering, or to consider this or that. Still this failure of due consideration is not a moral evil: for, consideration or no consideration, or whatever the consideration be on reason’s part, there is not sin until the will comes to tend to some undue end, which then is an act of will. — Thus it remains true that in moral as well as in physical actions, evil is not caused by good except accidentally.\n\n### Chapter XI. That Evil is founded in some Good\n\nCHAPTER XI — That Evil is founded in some Good EVIL cannot exist by itself, having no essence (Chap. VII ): it must therefore be in some subject: but every subject, being a substance, is some good. 3. A thing is called evil because it does harm: that can only be because it does harm to good: for to do harm to evil is a good thing, since the undoing of evil is good. But it would not do harm to good, formally speaking, unless it were in good: thus blindness does harm to a man inasmuch as it is within him. But since good and evil are opposites, and one opposite cannot be the subject of another, but expels it, it seems at first sight strange if good is said to be the subject of evil. But if the truth is sought out, we shall find nothing strange or awkward in this conclusion. Good is commonly predicated as being is predicated, since every being, as such, is good. It is not strange that not-being should be in being as its subject: for every privation is some not-being, and still its subject is a substance, which is a being. Still not-being has not for its subject the being that is its opposite: thus sight is not the subject in which blindness is, but the animal. So the subject in which evil is, is not the good opposed to it, for that is taken away by the evil, but some other good. Thus the subject of moral evil is natural good: while natural evil, which is a privation of form, is in matter, and matter is good, as also is potential being.\n\n### Chapter XII. That Evil does not entirely swallow up Good\n\nCHAPTER XII — That Evil does not entirely swallow up Good THE subject of evil must always remain, if evil is to remain. But the subject of evil is good: therefore good always remains. But on the contingency of evil being infinitely intensified, and good being continually diminished by that intensification of evil, it appears that good may be diminished by evil even to infinity. And the good so diminished must be finite, for infinite good is not capable of evil. It seems then that in time good may be entirely taken away by evil. This then is the reply. Evil, as we have seen, entirely takes away the good to which it is opposed, as blindness takes away sight: but there must remain that good which is the subject of evil, which subject, as such, bears a character of goodness, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the actuality of good, whereof it is deprived by evil. The less then it is in potentiality to that good, the less good it will be. But a subject comes to be less in potentiality, or openness to a form, not only by the subtraction of some part of its potentiality, which is tantamount to subtraction of part of the subject itself, but also by the said potentiality being impeded by some contrary act from issuing in the actuality of the form. Good therefore is diminished by evil rather by the planting of evil, its contrary, than by the taking off of any portion of good. And this agrees with what has been already said about evil: for we said that evil happens beside the intention of the doer, who always intends some good, and upon the good intended there follows the exclusion of some other good opposite to that good. The greater then the multiplication of that good, upon which, contrary to the intention of the agent, evil follows, the greater the diminution of potentiality in respect of the opposite good; and so all the more may good be said to be diminished by evil. This diminution however of good by evil in the physical world cannot go on indefinitely: for all the physical forms and powers are limited, and come to some term beyond which they cannot go. But in moral matters this diminution of good by evil may proceed to infinity: for the understanding and the will have no limits to their acts: thus he who wills to commit a theft may will it again and commit another, and so to infinity. The further then the will tends towards undue ends, the more difficult it becomes for it to return to its proper and due end, as may be seen in persons in whom the habit of vice has been induced by a custom of sinning. Thus then by moral evil the good of natural aptitude may be diminished without limit: yet it can never be totally taken away, but always waits on nature while that remains.\n\n### Chapter XIV. That Evil is an Accidental Cause\n\nCHAPTER XIV — That Evil is an Accidental Cause RUNNING through all the species of causes, we find that evil is a cause accidentally. In the species of efficient cause, since through the deficiency of power in the active cause there follows defect in the effect and action. In the species of material cause, since through the indisposition of the matter there follows a defect in the product. In the species of formal cause, since to one form there is always annexed the privation of another form. In the species of final cause, since the evil annexed to an undue end means the hindering of the end that is due.\n\n### Chapter XV. That there is not any Sovereign Evil, acting as the Principle of All Evils\n\nCHAPTER XV — That there is not any Sovereign Evil, acting as the Principle of All Evils A SOVEREIGN evil should be without participation in any good, as that is the sovereign good which is wholly removed from evil. But there cannot be any evil wholly removed from good, since evil is founded on good (Chap. XI ). 2. If anything is sovereignly evil, it must be evil by its very essence, as that is sovereignly good which is good by its essence. But evil has no essence (Chap. VII ). 3. That which is a first principle is not caused by anything. But all evil is caused by good (Chap. X ). There is therefore no evil first principle. 5. The incidental must be posterior to the ordinary. But evil happens only incidentally and beside the intention (Chap. IV ). Therefore it is impossible for evil to be a first principle. Hereby is excluded the error of the Manicheans.\n\n### Chapter XVI. That the End in View of everything is some Good\n\nCHAPTER XVI — That the End in View of everything is some Good THAT to which a thing tends when in absence from it, and in which it rests when in possession of it, is the scope and aim and end in view. But everything, so long as it lacks the perfection proper to it, moves towards gaining that perfection, so far as it depends upon itself so to do; and when it has gained that perfection, therein it rests. The end then of everything is its perfection. But the perfection of everything is its own good. Everything therefore is ordained to good as to its end. 4. Things that are aware of an end and things that are unaware of an end are alike ordained to an end, with this difference, that things that are aware of an end tend to an end of themselves, while things that are unaware of an end tend to an end under the direction of another, as appears in the case of archer and arrow. But things that are aware of an end are always ordained to good for their end: for the will, which is the appetite of a fore-known end, never tends to anything except under the aspect of good, which is its object. Therefore things also which are unaware of an end are ordained to good for their end, and so good is the end of all things.\n\n### Chapter XVII. That all Things are ordained to one End, which is God\n\nCHAPTER XVII — That all Things are ordained to one End, which is God THE sovereign good, which is God, is the cause of goodness in all good things. He is therefore also the cause of every end being an end, since whatever is an end is such inasmuch as it is good. But that whereby another thing has an attribute, has more of that attribute itself. Therefore God above all things is the end of all. 4. In every series of ends the last end must be the end of all the ends preceding. But we find all things arranged in various grades of goodness under our sovereign good, which is the cause of all goodness; and thereby, since good bears the character of an end, all things are ordered under God as ends preceding under their last end. 5. Private good is subordinated to the end of the common good: for the being of a part is for the sake of the being of the whole: hence the good of the race is more godlike than the good of the individual man. But the sovereign good, which is God, is the common good, since the good of the whole community depends on Him: while the goodness which marks any given thing is its own private good, and also the good of other things which depend upon it. All things therefore are subordinate to the end of one good, which is God. 7. The last end of every producer, in so far as he is a producer, is himself: for the things produced by us we use for ourselves; and if ever a man makes anything for another man, that is referred to his own good, — his utility, his pleasure, or his honour. But God is the productive cause of all things, either immediately or mediately. And therefore He is the end of all. Hence it is said: God hath wrought all things for himself ( Prov. xvi, 4 ): and, I am alpha and omega, the first and the last ( Apoc. xxii, 13 ).\n\n### Chapter XVIII. How God is the End of all Things\n\nCHAPTER XVIII — How God is the End of all Things GOD is at once the last end of all things, and is nevertheless before all things in being. There is an end which, while holding the first place in causation according as it is in intention, is nevertheless posterior in being; and this is the case with every end that an agent establishes by his action, as the physician establishes health by his action in the sick man, which health nevertheless is his end. There is again an end which is prior in causation, and also is prior in being: such an end one aims at winning by one’s actions or movement, as a king hopes to win a city by fighting. God then is the end of things, as being something which everything has to gain in its own way. 2. God is the last end of things and the prime agent of all (Chap. XVII ). But an end established by the action of an agent cannot be the prime agent: rather it is the effect produced by the agent. God therefore cannot be the end of things as though He were anything established in being thereby, but only as some pre-existent object for them to attain. 4. An effect tends to an end in the same way that the producer of the effect acts for that end. But God, the first producer of all things, does not act in view of acquiring anything by His action, but in view of bestowing something by His action: for He is not in potentiality to acquire anything, but only in perfect actuality, whereby He can give and bestow. Things then are not directed to God as though God were an end unto which any accretion or acquisition were to be made: they are directed to Him so that in their own way they may gain from God God Himself, since He Himself is their end.\n\n### Chapter XIX.\n\nCHAPTER XIX — That all Things aim at Likeness to God ALL things evidently have a natural appetite for being, and resist destructive agencies wherever they are threatened with them. But all things have being inasmuch as they are likened to God, who is the essential subsistent Being, all other things having being only by participation. All things therefore have an appetite for likeness to God, making that their last end. 4. All created things are some sort of image of the prime agent, God: for every agent acts to the production of its own likeness: now the perfection of an image consists in representing its original by likeness thereto: the image in fact is made on purpose. All things then exist for the attainment of the divine likeness; and that is their last end.\n\n### Chapter XX. How Things copy the Divine Goodness\n\nCHAPTER XX — How Things copy the Divine Goodness NOT all creatures are established in one and the same degree of goodness. The substance of some is form and actuality, — that is to say, something which, in point of essence, has the attribute of actual being and goodness. The substance of other beings is composed of matter and form: this substance has the attribute of actual being and goodness, but only in respect of part of itself, namely, the form. While then the divine substance is its own goodness, a simple substance (or pure spirit) partakes of this goodness to the extent of its essence, but a composite substance to the extent of some part of its essence. In this third grade of substance again there is found a difference in being. For, composed as they are of matter and form, the form of some of them fills the whole potentiality of the matter, so that there remains not in the matter any potentiality to any other form, and consequently not in any other matter any potentiality to this form: such are the heavenly bodies, into the essential constitution of which their whole matter enters. In other bodies the form does not fill the whole potentiality of the matter: hence there still remains in the matter a potentiality to another form, and in some portion of matter there remains a potentiality to this form, as appears in the (four) elements and bodies composed thereof. Now because a privation is a negation in a substance of that which may well be in the substance, it is clear that with this form, which does not fill the whole potentiality of the matter, there is compatible the privation of some form due to that substance. No such privation can attach to a substance, the form of which fills the whole potentiality of its matter; nor to a substance which is essentially a form; still less to that Substance, whose very being is His essence. Further it is clear that, since evil is the privation of good, there is in this lowest order of substances changeable good with admixture of evil, a changeableness to which the higher orders are not liable. The substance therefore that ranks lowest in being is lowest also in rank of goodness. We likewise find an order of goodness among the parts of a substance composed of matter and form. For since matter, considered in itself, is potential being, while form is the actualisation of that being, and the substance composed of the two is actually existent through the form, the form will be good in itself; the composed substance will be good as it actually has the form; and the matter will be good inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the form. But though everything is good in so far as it is being, it need not be supposed that matter, as it is only potential being, is only potentially good. For ‘being’ is an absolute term, while there is goodness even in relation: for not only is a thing called ‘good’ because it is an end, or is in possession of an end, but also, though it has not yet arrived at any end, provided only it be ordained to some end, a thing is called ‘good’ even on that account. Though then matter cannot absolutely be called ‘being’ on the title of its potentiality involving some relation to being, yet it may absolutely be called ‘good’ on account of this very relation. Herein it appears that ‘good’ is a term of wider extension than ‘being.’ Yet in another way does the goodness of the creature fall short of the divine goodness. As has been said, God possesses the highest perfection of goodness in his mere being: but a created thing does not possess its perfection in point of one attribute only, but in point of many: for what is united in the highest is multiple and manifold in the lowest. Hence God is said to be fraught with virtue and wisdom and activity in one and the same respect, but a creature in different respects. The greater the distance at which a creature stands removed from the first and highest goodness, the greater the multiplication of points requisite for it to be perfectly good. But if it cannot attain to perfect goodness, it will hold on to an imperfect goodness in a few points. Hence it is that, though the first and highest goodness is absolutely simple, and the substances nearest to it approach it alike in goodness and in simplicity, still the lowest substances are found to be more simple than other substances higher than they are, as the elements are more simple than animals and men, because they cannot attain to the perfection of knowledge and understanding to which animals and men attain. It appears therefore from what has been said that, though God has His goodness perfect and entire in the simplicity of His being, creatures nevertheless do not attain to the perfection of their goodness by their mere being, but only by many details of being. Hence, though every one of these creatures is good in so far as it has being, still it cannot absolutely be called good if it is destitute of other qualities requisite for its goodness; as a man devoid of virtues and subject to vices is good in a certain way, inasmuch as he is a being and inasmuch as he is a man, but on the whole he is not good, but rather evil. For no creature then is it the same thing to be and to be good , absolutely speaking, although every creature is good in so far as it has being: but for God it is quite the same thing to be and to be good , absolutely speaking. Now, as it has been shown, everything tends finally to some likeness of the divine goodness; and a thing is likened to the divine goodness in respect of all the points which appertain to its own proper goodness; and the goodness of a thing consists not only in its being but in all other qualities requisite for its perfection: from which considerations the consequence is clear, that a thing is finally ordained to God, not only in its substantial being, but likewise in those accidental qualities that appertain to its perfection, and also in respect of its proper activity, which likewise belongs to the perfection of a thing.\n\n### Chapter XXI. That Things aim at Likeness to God in being Causes of other Things\n\nCHAPTER XXI — That Things aim at Likeness to God in being Causes of other Things A THING must be first perfect in itself before it can cause another thing. The last perfection to supervene upon a thing is its becoming the cause of other things. While then a creature tends by many ways to the likeness of God, the last way left open to it is to seek the divine likeness by being the cause of other things, according to what the Apostle says, We are God’s coadjutors ( 1 Cor. iii, 9 ).\n\n### Chapter XXIV. That all Things seek good, even Things devoid of Consciousness\n\nCHAPTER XXIV — That all Things seek good, even Things devoid of Consciousness AS the heavenly sphere is moved by a subsistent intelligence (Chap. XXIII), and the movement of the heavenly sphere is directed to generation in sublunary creatures, the generations and and movements of these sublunary creatures must originate in the thought of that subsistent intelligence. Now the intention of the prime agent and of the instrument is bent upon the same end. The heavenly spheres then ( coelum ) are the cause of sublunary motions by virtue of their own motion, which is impressed upon them by a spirit. It follows that the heavenly spheres are the instrument of spirit. Spirit then is the prime agent, causing and intending the forms and motions of sublunary bodies; while the heavenly spheres are the instruments of the same. But the intellectual outlines of all that is caused and intended by an intelligent agent must pre-exist in his mind, as the forms of works of art pre-exist in the mind of the artificer, and from that mind ( et ex eo ) those forms must pass into the things made. All the forms then that are in sublunary creatures, and all their motions, are determined by the forms that are in the mind of some subsistent intelligence, or intelligences. Therefore Boethius says that the forms which are in matter have come from forms apart from matter. In this respect the saying of Plato is verified, that forms existing apart are the originating principles of the forms that are in matter: only, Plato supposed these forms to subsist by themselves, and to be immediate causes of the forms of sensible things; we suppose them to exist in a mind, and to cause sublunary forms through the instrumentality of the motion of the heavenly spheres. Thus it is not difficult to see how natural bodies, devoid of intelligence, move and act for an end. For they tend to their end, being directed thereto by a subsistent intelligence, in the way that an arrow tends to its end, directed by the archer: as the arrow from the impulse of the archer, so do natural bodies receive their inclination to their natural ends from natural moving causes, whence they derive their forms and virtues and motions. Hence it is plain that every work of nature is the work of a subsistent intelligence. The credit of an effect rests by preference with the prime mover, who guides instruments to their purpose, rather than with the instruments which he guides. Thus we find the operations of nature proceeding in due course and order to an end, like the the operations of a wise man. It is evident therefore that even agents devoid of consciousness can work for an end, and strive after good with a natural appetite, and seek the divine likeness and their own perfection. It is further evident that, the more perfect the power and the more eminent the degree of goodness, the more general is the appetite for good, and the more distant from self are the objects for which good is sought and unto which good is done. For imperfect beings tend solely to the good of the individual; perfect beings to the good of the species; more perfect beings to the good of the genus; and God, who is the most perfect in goodness, to the good of all being. Hence some say, not without reason, that goodness as such is diffusive of itself.\n\n### Chapter XXV. That the End of every Subsistent Intelligence is to understand God\n\nCHAPTER XXV — That the End of every Subsistent Intelligence is to understand God THE proper act of everything is its end, as being its second perfection: hence what is well disposed to its own proper act is said to be virtuous and good. But to understand is the proper act of a subsistent intelligence: that then is its end. And the most perfect instance of this act is its final end and perfection: this is particularly true of acts which are not directed to production, acts such as understanding and feeling. But since such acts take their species from their objects, and are known through their objects, any given one of these acts will be the more perfect, the more perfect its object is. Consequently, to understand the most perfect intelligible object, which is God, will be the most perfect instance of the activity of understanding. To know God then by understanding is the final end of every subsistent intelligence. But one may say: ‘It is true that the last end of a subsistent intelligence consists in understanding the best intelligible object, still the best intelligible object, absolutely speaking, is not the best object for this or that subsistent intelligence; but the higher any subsistent intelligence is, the higher is its best intelligible object; and therefore the highest subsistent intelligence created has for its best intelligible object that which is best absolutely; hence its happiness will be in understanding God; but the happiness of a lower subsistent intelligence will be to understand some lower intelligible object, which is at the same time the highest of the objects that can be understood by it. And particularly it seems to be the lot of the human understanding, on account of its weakness, not to understand the absolutely best intelligible object: for in respect of the knowledge of that truth of which there is most to be known the human intellect is as the bat’s eye to the sun. Nevertheless it may be manifestly shown that the end of every subsistent intelligence, even the lowest, is to understand God. For (a) the final end of all beings, to which they tend, is God (Chap. XVIII . But the human understanding, however it be lowest in the order of subsistent intelligences, is nevertheless superior to all beings devoid of understanding. Since then the nobler substance has not the ignobler end, God Himself will be the end also of the human understanding. But every intelligent being gains its last end by understanding it. Therefore it is by understanding that the human intellect attains God as its end. ( c ). Everything most of all desires its own last end. But the human mind is moved to more desire and love and delight over the knowledge of divine things, little as it can discern about them, than over the perfect knowledge that it has of the lowest things. ( e ). All sciences and arts and practical faculties are attractive only for the sake of something else: for in them the end is not knowledge but production of a work. But speculative sciences are attractive for their own sake, for their end is sheer knowledge. Nor is there found any action in human life, with the exception of speculative study, which is not directed to some other and further end. Even actions done in sport, which seem to be done in view of no end, have a due end, which is refreshment of mind, to enable us thereby to return stronger to serious occupations: otherwise we should play always, if play was sought for its own sake, which would be unbefitting. Therefore the practical arts are ordained to the speculative, and all human activity has intellectual speculation for its end. In all due ordination of sciences and arts, the character of final end attaches to that science or art which issues precepts as master-builder to the rest: thus the art of navigation, to which belongs the management of a ship, lays down precepts for ship-building. In this relation Metaphysics ( philosophia prima ) stand to all speculative sciences. On metaphysics they all depend, and from that science they receive their principles and directions how to proceed against deniers of principles. This first philosophy is wholly directed to the final end of the knowledge of God: hence it is called a divine science. The knowledge of God therefore is the final end of all human study and activity. ( f ). In all series of agents and causes of change the end of the prime agent and mover must be the ultimate end of all, as the end of a general is the end of all the soldiers who serve under him. But among all the component parts of man we find the intellect to be the superior moving power: for the intellect moves the appetite, putting its object before it; and the intellectual appetite, or will, moves the sensible appetites, the irascible and concupiscible: hence we do not obey concupiscence except under the command of the will. The sensitive appetite, crowned by the consent of the will, proceeds to move the body. The end therefore of the intellect is the end of all human actions. But the end and good of the intellect is truth; and consequently its last end is the first truth. The last end then of the whole man and of all his activities and desires is to know the first truth, which is God. ( g ). There is a natural desire in all men of knowing the causes of the things that they see. It was through wonder at seeing things, the causes of which were unseen, that men first began to philosophise. Nor does enquiry cease until we arrive at the first cause: then we consider our knowledge perfect, when we know the first cause. Man then naturally desires so to know the first cause as his last end. But the first cause is God; and the last end of man and of every subsistent intelligence, is called blessedness or happiness. To know God then is the blessedness and happiness of every subsistent intelligence. Hence it is said: This is eternal life, that they know thee, the only true God ( John xvii, 3 ).\n\n### Chapter XXVI. That Happiness does not consist in any Act of the Will\n\nCHAPTER XXVI — That Happiness does not consist in any Act of the Will SINCE a subsistent intelligence in its activity arrives at God, not by understanding alone, but also by an act of the will desiring and loving Him and taking delight in Him, some one may think that the last end and final felicity of man is not in knowing God, but rather in loving Him, or exercising some other act of the will upon Him; especially seeing that the object of the will is good, which bears the character of an end, whereas truth, which is the object of the intellect, does not bear the character of an end except in so far as it ( ipsum ) too is good. Hence it seems that man does not attain his last end by an act of intellect, but rather by an act of will. But this position is manifestly proved to be untenable. 1. Happiness, being the peculiar good of an intelligent nature, must attach to the intelligent nature on the side of something that is peculiar to it. But appetite is not peculiar to intelligent nature, but is found in all things, though diversely in diverse beings: which diversity however arises from the different ways in which they stand to consciousness. Things wholly devoid of consciousness have only natural appetite, or physical tendency. Things that have sensitive consciousness have sensible appetite, under which the irascible and concupiscible are included. Things that have intellectual consciousness have an appetite proportionate to that consciousness, namely, the will. The will therefore, as being an appetite, is not a peculiar appurtenance of an intelligent nature, except so far as it is dependent on the intelligence: but intelligence in itself is peculiar to an intelligent nature. Happiness therefore consists in an act of the intellect substantially and principally rather than in an act of the will. 2. In all powers that are moved by their objects the objects are naturally prior to the acts of those powers. But such a power is the will, for the desirable object moves desire. The object therefore of the will is naturally prior to the act. The prime object of will then precedes every act of will. No act of will therefore can be the prime object of volition. But the prime object of will is the last end, which is happiness. Happiness therefore cannot possibly be itself an act of will. 3. In all powers that can reflect on their own acts, the act of that power must first fix on some object, and then fix on its own act. For if the intellect understands that it understands, we must suppose that it first understands some thing, and afterwards understands its own understanding of that thing: for the act of understanding, which the intellect understands, means the understanding of some object. Hence we must either proceed to infinity; or, coming to some first object of understanding, this object, we must say, will not be a sheer act of understanding, but some intelligible thing. Similarly the first object of will cannot be any sheer act of willing, but some other good. But the first object of will to an intelligent nature is happiness: for it is for the sake of happiness that we will whatever we do will. Happiness therefore cannot possibly consist essentially in any act of will. 4. Everything has the truth of its nature by having the constituents of its substance: for a real man differs from a painted one by the constituents of the substance of man. But true happiness does not differ from false happiness in respect of the act of will: for the will is in the same attitude of desire, or love, or delight, whatever the object proposed to it for its sovereign good, true or false: but whether the object so proposed be the true sovereign good or a counterfeit, that difference is decided by intellect. Happiness therefore consists essentially in intellect rather than in any act of will. 5. If any act of will were happiness itself, that act would be either desire or love or delight. Now it is impossible for desire to be the last end: for desire obtains inasmuch as the will tends to something which it has not yet got: but such straining after the absent is inconsistent with the idea of an achieved last end. Love again cannot be the last end: for good is loved not only in its presence but also in its absence: for it is from love that good not possessed is sought for by desire. And though the love of good already attained is more perfect, that access of perfection is to be ascribed to the attainment and established possession of the good loved. The attainment of good then, which is the end, is a different thing from the love of good, which love is imperfect before attainment, and perfect after attainment. In like manner neither is delight the last end: for the very possession of good is the cause of delight, while we either feel the good now possessed, or remember the good possessed before, or hope for the good to be possessed in future: delight therefore is not the last end. No act of will therefore can be the substance of happiness. 6. If delight were the last end, it would be desirable of itself. But that is false: for it makes a difference what delight is desired, considering the object from which delight ensues: for the delight which follows upon good and desirable activities is good and desirable: but that which follows upon evil activities is evil and to be shunned. Delight therefore has its goodness and desirability from something beyond itself. Therefore it is not itself the final end, happiness. 7. The right order of things coincides with the order of nature, for natural things are ordained to their end without mistakes. But in natural things delight is for activity, and not the other way about: for we see that nature has attached delight to those activities of animals which are manifestly ordained to necessary ends, as in the use of food, which is ordained to the preservation of the individual, and in the intercourse of the sexes, which is ordained to the preservation of the species: for if delight were not in attendance, animals would abstain from the aforesaid necessary acts. It is impossible therefore for delight to be the final end. 8. Delight seems to be nothing else than a rest of the will in some befitting good, as desire is an inclination of the will to the gaining of some good. Now it is ridiculous to say that the end of movement is not the coming to be in one’s proper place, but the satisfaction of the inclination whereby one tended to go there. If the principle aim of nature were the satisfaction of the inclination, it would never give the inclination. It gives the inclination, that thereby one may tend to one’s proper place: when that end is gained, there follows the satisfaction of the inclination: thus the satisfaction of the inclination is not the end, but a concomitant of the end. 9. If any exterior thing is to be any one’s end, we must assign the title of last end to that activity whereby the thing is first gained: thus to people who make money their end, the getting of the money is the end, not the love or desire of it. But the last end of a subsistent intelligence is God. That activity then in man makes the substance of his happiness, whereby he first attains to God. But that is the activity of understanding: for we cannot will what we do not understand. The final happiness of man then substantially consists in knowing God by the understanding, and not in any act of the will. From what has been said we may solve the objections to the contrary. The fact of the sovereign good being the object of the will does not necessitate sovereign good being substantially the act of the will itself, as was the tenor of the argument first proposed: nay, from the fact of its being the first object, it follows that it is not the act. Arg . 2. The last perfection of activity is delight, which perfects activity as beauty does youth. If then any perfect activity is the last end, it seems that the last end is rather in the activity of the will than of the intellect. Reply . There are two ways of being a perfection to a thing. In one way there is a perfection to a thing already complete in its species: in another way there is a perfection going to make up the species. Thus the perfection of a house, considered as complete in its species, is that use for which the house is intended, namely, being inhabited: hence this should be put in the definition of a house, if the definition is to be adequate. A perfection going to make up the species of a house may be one of the constituents and substantial principles of the species: or it may be something that goes to the preservation of the species, as the buttresses made to prop the house up: lastly, under this head we must count whatever makes the house more comely for use, as its beauty. That therefore which is the perfection of a thing, considered as already complete in its species, is the end of a thing, as being inhabited is the end of a house. And in like manner the proper activity of each thing, which is a sort of use of it, is the end of the thing. But the perfections which go to make up the species are not the end of the thing: rather the thing is their end. Thus matter and form are for the species. In like manner the perfections that preserve a thing in its species, as health and nutrition, though they perfect the animal, are not the end of its existence, but rather the other way about. Those perfections also whereby a thing is fitted to discharge the proper activities of its species and gain its due end more becomingly, are not the end of the thing, but rather the other way about, e.g., a man’s beauty and bodily strength, and other accomplishments, of which the philosopher says that they minister to happiness instrumentally. Now when we say that delight is the perfection of activity, we do not mean that activity specifically considered is directed to the purpose of delight, — the fact is, it is ordained to other ends, as eating is ordained to the preservation of the individual, — we mean that delight ranks among the perfections which go to make up the species of a thing: for through the delight that we take in any action we apply ourselves to it more attentively and becomingly. Arg . 3. Delight seems to be so desired for its own sake as never to be desired for the sake of anything else: for it is foolish to ask of any one why [he] wishes to be delighted. But this is the condition of the last end, to be desired for its own sake. Therefore the last end is rather in an act of the will than of the understanding, so it seems. Reply . Delight, though it is not the last end, is still a concomitant of the last end, since from the attainment of the last end delight supervenes. Arg . 4. In the desire of the last end there is the greatest agreement amongst all men, because it is natural. But more seek delight than knowledge. Therefore it seems that delight is the end rather than knowledge. Reply . There are not more seekers of the delight that there is in knowing than there are seekers of knowledge: but there are more seekers after sensible delights than there are seekers of intellectual knowledge and the delight thence ensuing; and the reason is because external things are more known to the majority of men, as human knowledge starts from objects of sense. Arg . 5. The will seems to be a higher power than the understanding: for the will moves the understanding to its end: for when there is the will so to do, then it is that the understanding actually considers the knowledge which it habitually possesses. The action therefore of the will seems to be nobler than the action of the understanding; and therefore the final end of happiness seems in the act of will rather than in the act of understanding. Reply . It is manifestly false to say that the will is higher than the understanding as moving it; for primarily and ordinarily the understanding moves the will. The will, as such, is moved by its object, which is the good apprehended: but the will moves the understanding, we may say, incidentally, inasmuch as the act of understanding itself is apprehended as good and so is desired by the will. Hence it follows that the understanding actually understands, and in this has the start of the will; for never would the will desire to understand, unless first the understanding apprehended the act of understanding itself as good. And again the will moves the understanding to actual activity in the way in which an efficient cause is said to move: but the understanding moves the will in the way in which a final cause moves, for good understood is the end of the will. Now the efficient cause is posterior in motion to the final cause, for the efficient cause moves only for the sake of the final cause. Hence it appears that, absolutely speaking, the understanding is higher than the will, but the will is higher than the understanding accidentally and in a qualified sense.\n\n### Chapter XXVII. That the Happiness of Man does not consist in Bodily Pleasures\n\nCHAPTER XXVII — That the Happiness of Man does not consist in Bodily Pleasures ACCORDING to the order of nature, pleasure is for the sake of activity, and not the other way about. If therefore certain activities are not the final end, the pleasures ensuing upon these activities are neither the final end nor accessories of the final end. But certainly the activities on which bodily pleasures follow are not the final end: for they are directed to other obvious ends, the preservation of the body and the begetting of offspring. Therefore the aforesaid pleasures are not the final end, nor accessories of the final end, and happiness is not to be placed in them. 3. Happiness is a good proper to man: dumb animals cannot be called happy except by an abuse of language. But bodily pleasures are common to man and brute: happiness therefore cannot consist in them. 4. The final end of a thing is noblest and best of all that appertains to the thing. But bodily delights do not appertain to a man in respect of what is noblest in him. 5. The highest perfection of man cannot consist in his being conjoined with things lower than himself, but in his conjunction with something above him. 7. In all things that are said to be ‘ordinarily’ (per se), ‘more’ follows upon ‘more,’ if ‘absolutely’ goes with ‘absolutely.’ If then bodily pleasures were good in themselves, to take them to the utmost would be the best way of taking them. But this is manifestly false: for excessive use of such things is accounted a vice, injures the body, and bars further enjoyments of the same sort. 8. If human happiness consisted in bodily pleasures, it would be a more praiseworthy act of virtue to take such pleasures than to abstain from them. But this is manifestly false, for it is the special praise of the act of temperance to abstain from such pleasures. 9. The last end of everything is God (Chap. XVIII ). That then must be laid down to be the last end of man, whereby he most closely approaches to God. But bodily pleasures injure a man from any close approach to God: for God is approached by contemplation, and the aforesaid pleasures are a hindrance to contemplation. Hereby is excluded the error of the Epicureans, who placed the happiness of man in these pleasures: in whose person Solomon says: This seemed to me good, that man should eat and drink and make merry on the fruit of his toil ( Eccles. V, 17 ). Everywhere let us leave behind us signs of mirth, for this is our portion and this our lot ( Wisd. ii, 9 ). Also the error of the followers of Cerinthus is excluded, who spread the fable of a thousand years of the pleasures of the belly as an element in the kingdom of Christ after the resurrection, hence they are called Chiliasts, or Millennarians. Also the fables of the Saracens, who place the rewards of the just in the aforesaid pleasures.\n\n### Chapter XXVIII, XXIX. That Happiness does not consist in Honours nor in Human Glory\n\nCHAPTER XXVIII, XXIX — That Happiness does not consist in Honours nor in Human Glory THE last end and happiness of man is his most perfect activity (Chap. XXVI ). But the honour paid to a man does not consist in any act of his own, but in the act of another towards him. 2. That is not the last end, which is good and desirable on account of something else. But such is honour: for a man is not rightly honoured except for some other good thing existing in him. 4. Even bad men may be honoured. It is better then to become worthy of honour than to be honoured. Therefore honour is not the highest good of man. Hence it appears that neither does man’s chief good consist in glory, or celebrity of fame. For glory, according to Cicero, is “a frequent mention of a man with praise”; or according to St Augustine, “brilliant notoriety with praise” ( clara notitia cum laude ). So then men wish for notoriety, attended with praise and a certain brilliance, that they may be honoured by those to whom they become known. Glory then is sought for the sake of honour. If then honour is not the highest good, much less is glory.\n\n### Chapter XXX. That Man’s Happiness does not consist in Riches\n\nCHAPTER XXX — That Man’s Happiness does not consist in Riches RICHES are not desired except for the sake of something else: for of themselves they do no good, but only as we use them. But the highest good is desired for its own sake, and not for the sake of something else. 2. The possession or preservation of those things cannot be the highest good, which benefit man most in being parted with. But such is the use of riches, to spend. 3. The act of liberality and munificence, the virtues that deal with money, is more praiseworthy, in that money is parted with, than that money is got. Man’s happiness therefore does not consist in the possession of riches. 4. That in the gaining of which man’s chief good lies must be some thing better than man. But man is better than his riches, which are things ordained to his use. 5. The highest good of man is not subject to fortune: for fortuitous events happen without effort of reason, whereas man must gain his proper end by reason. But fortune has great place in the gaining of riches.\n\n### Chapter XXXI. That Happiness does not consist in Worldly Power\n\nCHAPTER XXXI — That Happiness does not consist in Worldly Power A MAN is called good inasmuch as he attains to the sovereign good. But inasmuch as he has power he is not called either good or evil: for he is not good who can do good things, nor is a man evil of being able to do evil things. Therefore the highest good does not consist in being powerful. 3. All power is over another ( ad alterum ). But the highest good is not over another.\n\n### Chapter XXXII. That Happiness does not consist in the Goods of the Body\n\nCHAPTER XXXII — That Happiness does not consist in the Goods of the Body THE soul is better than the body. Therefore the good of the soul, as understanding and the like, is better than the good of the body. The good of the body therefore is not the highest good of man. 3. These goods are common to man and other animals: but happiness is the proper good of man alone. 4. For goods of the body, many animals are better off than man: some are swifter, some are stronger, and so of the rest. If in these things the highest good consisted, man would not be the most excellent of animals.\n\n### Chapter XXXIV. That the Final Happiness Man does not consist in Acts of the Moral Virtues\n\nCHAPTER XXXIV — That the Final Happiness Man does not consist in Acts of the Moral Virtues HUMAN happiness, if it is final, is not referable to any further end. But all moral acts are referable to something further: thus acts of fortitude in war are directed to securing victory and peace: acts of justice to the preservation of peace amongst men by every one remaining in quiet possession of his own. 2. Moral virtues aim at the observance of the golden mean in passions and in the disposal of external things. But the moderation of the passions or of external things cannot possibly be the final end of human life, since these very passions and external things are referable to something else. 3. Man is man by the possession of reason; and therefore happiness, his proper good, must regard what is proper to reason. But that is more proper to reason which reason has in itself than what it does in another. Since then the good of moral virtue is something which reason establishes in things other than itself, moral virtue cannot be the best thing in man, which is happiness.\n\n### Chapter XXXVII. That the Final Happiness of Man consists in the Contemplation of God\n\nCHAPTER XXXVII — That the Final Happiness of Man consists in the Contemplation of God IF then the final happiness of man does not consist in those exterior advantages which are called goods of fortune, nor in goods of the body, nor in goods of the soul in its sentient part, nor in the intellectual part in respect of the moral virtues, nor in the virtues of the practical intellect, called art and prudence, it remains that the final happiness of man consists in the contemplation of truth. This act alone in man is proper to him, and is in no way shared by any other being in this world. This is sought for its own sake, and is directed to no other end beyond itself. By this act man is united in likeness with pure spirits, and even comes to know them in a certain way. For this act also man is more self-sufficient, having less need of external things. Likewise to this act all other human activities seem to be directed as to their end. For to the perfection of contemplation there is requisite health of body; and all artificial necessaries of life are means to health. Another requisite is rest from the disturbing forces of passion: that is attained by means of the moral virtues and prudence. Likewise rest from exterior troubles, which is the whole aim of civil life and government. Thus, if we look at things rightly, we may see that all human occupations seem to be ministerial to the service of the contemplators of truth. Now it is impossible for human happiness to consist in that contemplation which is by intuition of first principles, — a very imperfect study of things, as being the most general, and not amounting to more than a potential knowledge: it is in fact not the end but the beginning of human study: it is supplied to us by nature, and not by any close investigation of truth. Nor can happiness consist in the sciences, the object-matter of which is the meanest things, whereas happiness should be an activity of intellect dealing with the noblest objects of intelligence. Therefore the conclusion remains that the final happiness of man consists in contemplation guided by wisdom to the study of the things of God. Thus we have reached by way of induction the same conclusion that was formerly established by deductive reasoning, that the final happiness of man does not consist in anything short of the contemplation of God.\n\n### Chapter XXXVIII. That Human Happiness does not consist in such Knowledge of God as is common to the majority of Mankind\n\nCHAPTER XXXVIII — That Human Happiness does not consist in such Knowledge of God as is common to the majority of Mankind THERE is a certain general and vague knowledge of God in the minds of practically, all men, whether it be by the fact of God’s existence being a self-evident truth, as some think (B. I, Chap. X ); or, as seems more likely, because natural reasoning leads a man promptly to some sort of knowledge of God: for men seeing that natural things follow a certain course and order, and further considering that order cannot be without an ordainer, they perceive generally that there is some ordainer of the things which we see. But who or what manner of being the ordainer of nature is, and whether He be one or many, cannot be gathered off-hand from this slight study. Thus, seeing a man move and do other acts, we perceive that there is in him a cause of these activities, which is not in other things; and this cause we call the soul; and still we do not yet know what the soul is, whether it is anything corporeal or not, or how it performs the aforesaid acts. Now such knowledge as this cannot possibly suffice for happiness. 1. For happiness must be an activity without defect. But this knowledge is susceptible of admixture of many errors: thus some have believed that the ordainer of mundane events is no other than the heavenly bodies: hence they have affirmed the heavenly bodies to be gods. Others have said the same of the elements, thinking that their natural movements and activities come not from any controlling power outside them, but that they control other things. Others, believing that human acts are not subject to any other than human control, have called those men who control other men gods. Such knowledge of God is not sufficient for happiness. 3. No one is blameworthy for not possessing happiness: nay, men who have it not, and go on tending to it, are praised. But lack of the aforesaid knowledge of God renders a man particularly blameworthy. It is a great indication of dulness of perception in a man, when he perceives not such manifest signs of God; just as any one would be counted lacking in perception, who, seeing a man, did not understand that he had a soul. Hence it is said in the Psalms ( xiii and lii ): The fool said in his heart: There is no God. 4. Knowledge of a thing in general, not descending into any details, is a very imperfect knowledge, as would be the knowledge of man merely as something that moves. By such knowledge a thing is known potentially only, for details are potentially contained in generalities. But happiness, being a perfect activity and the supreme good of man, must turn upon what is actual and not merely potential.\n\n### Chapter XXXIX. That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God which is to be had by Demonstration\n\nCHAPTER XXXIX — That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God which is to be had by Demonstration AGAIN there is another knowledge of God, higher than the last mentioned: this knowledge is acquired by demonstration, by means of which we come nearer to a proper knowledge of Him, since demonstration removes from Him many attributes, by removal of which the mind discerns God standing apart from other beings. Thus demonstration shows God to be unchangeable, eternal, incorporeal, absolutely simple, one. A proper knowledge of an object is arrived at, not only by affirmations, but also by negations. Thus as it is proper to man to be a rational animal, so it is proper to him also not to be inanimate or irrational. But between these two modes of proper knowledge there is this difference, that when a proper knowledge of a thing is got by affirmations, we know both what the thing is and how it is distinct from others: but when a proper knowledge of a thing is got by negations, we know that the thing is distinct from other things, but what it is remains unknown. Such is the proper knowledge of God that we have by demonstrations. But that is not sufficient for the final happiness of man. 1. The individuals of a species arrive at the end and perfection of that species for the most part; and natural developments have place always or for the most part, though they fail in a minority of instances through something coming in to mar them. But happiness is the end and perfection of the human species, since all men naturally desire it. Happiness then is a common good, possible to accrue to all men, except in cases where an obstacle arises to deprive some of it. But few they are who arrive at this knowledge of God by way of demonstration, on account of the difficulties mentioned above (B. I, Chap. IV ). Such scientific knowledge then is not the essence of human happiness. 3. Happiness excludes all misery. But deception and error is a great part of misery. Now in the knowledge of God by demonstration manifold error may be mingled, as is clear in the case of many who have found out some truths about God in that way, and further following their own ideas, in the failure of demonstration, have fallen into many sorts of error. And if any have found truth in the things of God so perfectly by the way of demonstration as that no error has entered their minds, such men certainly have been very few: a rarity of attainment which does not befit happiness, happiness being the common end of all. 4. Happiness consists in perfect activity. Now for the perfection of the activity of knowledge certainty is required: but the aforesaid knowledge has much of uncertainty.\n\n### Chapter XL. That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God by Faith\n\nCHAPTER XL — That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God by Faith HAPPINESS is the perfect activity of the human intellect (Chap. XXVI ). But in the knowledge that is of faith, though there is high perfection on the part of the object so apprehended, there is great imperfection on the side of intellect, for intellect does not understand that to which it assents in believing. 2. Final happiness does not consist principally in any act of will (Chap. XXVI ). But in the knowledge of faith the will has a leading part: for the understanding assents by faith to the things proposed to it, because it wills to do so, without being necessarily drawn by the direct evidence of truth. 3. He who believes, yields assent to things proposed to him by another, which himself he does not see: hence the knowledge of faith is more like hearing than seeing. Since then happiness consists in the highest knowledge of God, it cannot consist in the knowledge of faith. 4. Happiness being the last end, all natural desire is thereby appeased. But the knowledge of faith, far from appeasing desire, rather excites it, since every one desires to see that which he believes.\n\n### Chapter XLVI. That the Soul in this life does not understand itself by itself\n\nCHAPTER XLVI — That the Soul in this life does not understand itself by itself AN apparent difficulty may be alleged against what has been said from some words of Augustine, which require careful treatment. He says ( De Trinitate , IX, iii): “As the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things by the senses of the body, so of incorporeal things by itself: therefore it knows itself by itself, because itself is incorporeal.” By these words it appears that our mind understands itself by itself, and, understanding itself, understands separately subsistent intelligences, or pure spirits, which would militate against what has been shown above. But it is clear that such is not the mind of Augustine. For he says ( De Trinitate , X, ix, 12) of the soul seeking knowledge of itself: “Let it not then seek to find ( cernere ) itself as though it were absent, but let its care be to discern ( discernere ) itself as it is present: let it not observe itself as though it did not know itself but let it distinguish itself from that other thing which it has mistaken for itself.” Whence he gives us to understand that the soul of itself knows itself as present, but not as distinct from other things; and therefore he says ( De Trin. X, x) that some have erred in not distinguishing the soul from things that are different from it. But by the knowledge of a thing in its essence the thing is known as distinct from other things: hence definition, which marks the essence of a thing, distinguishes the thing defined from all other things. Augustine then did not mean that the soul of itself knows its own essence. So then, according to the thought of Augustine, our mind of itself knows itself, inasmuch as it knows concerning itself that it exists: for by the very perceiving of itself to act it perceives itself to be. But it acts of itself. Therefore of itself it knows concerning itself that it exists. 1. But it cannot be said that the soul of itself knows concerning itself what it essentially is. For a cognitive faculty comes to be actually cognisant by there being in it the object which is known. If the object is in it potentially, it knows potentially: if the object is in it actually, it is actually cognisant: if in an intermediate way, it is habitually cognisant. But the soul is always present to itself actually, and never potentially or habitually only. If then the soul of itself knows itself by its essence, it must ever have an intellectual view of itself, what it essentially is, which clearly is not the case. 2 and 3. If the soul of itself knows itself in its essence, every man, having a soul, knows the essence of the soul: which clearly is not the case, for many men have thought the soul to be this or that body, and some have taken it for a number or harmony. So then, by knowing itself, the soul is led to know concerning separately subsistent intelligences the fact of their existence, but not what they are essentially, which would mean understanding their substances. For whereas we know, either by demonstration or by faith, concerning these pure spirits that they are intelligent subsistent beings, in neither way could we gather this knowledge but for the fact that our soul knows from itself the meaning of intelligent being. Hence we must use our knowledge of the intelligence of our own soul as a starting-point for all that we can know of separately subsistent intelligences. But even granting that by speculative sciences we could arrive at a knowledge of the essence of our own soul, it does not follow that we could thereby arrive at a knowledge of all that is knowable about pure spirits; for our intelligence falls far short of the intelligence of a pure spirit. A knowledge of the essence of our own soul might lead to a knowledge of some remote higher genus of pure spirits: but that would not be an understanding of their substances.\n\n### Chapter XLVII. That we cannot in this life see God as He essentially is\n\nCHAPTER XLVII — That we cannot in this life see God as He essentially is If the connatural dependence of our understanding on phantasms prevents us in this life from understanding other pure spirits, much less can we in this life see the divine essence, which transcends all angels. Of this fact the following may also be taken as an indication: the higher our mind is raised to the contemplation of spiritual things, the more it is abstracted from sensible things: but the final terminus to which contemplation can possibly arrive is the divine substance: therefore the mind that sees the divine substance must be totally divorced from bodily senses, either by death or by some rapture. Hence it is said in the person of God: No man shall see me and live (Exod. xxxiii, 20). Whereas in Holy Scripture some are said to have seen God, that must be understood to have been inasmuch as by some vision of the phantasy or corporeal appearance the presence of divine power was shown. Certain words of Augustine raise a difficulty in this matter. Thus he says ( De Trinitate , IX, vii) : “In the eternal truth, whence all corporeal creatures are, we see with our mind’s eye the form according to which we are, and according to which we execute anything truly and rightly either in ourselves or in corporeal things.” Also he says ( Confess. I, xxv): “If both of us see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true, where, I pray, do we see it? Neither I in you, nor you in me, but both of us in that unchangeable truth which is above our minds.” And to the like effect ( De Trin. XII, ii): “It belongs to the higher reason to judge of these bodily things according to aspects ( rationes ) eternal and everlasting, which certainly would not be unchangeable, were they not above the human mind.” But aspects unchangeable and everlasting cannot be elsewhere than in God, since, according to Catholic faith, God alone is eternal. It seems to follow that we can see God in this life, and that by seeing Him, and aspects of things in Him, we judge of the rest of things. On the other hand it is incredible that in the above words Augustine should mean to assert that in this life we can understand God as He essentially is, seeing that in his book De videndo Deum he says the contrary. It remains to enquire how in this life we can see that unchangeable truth or those everlasting aspects. That truth is in the soul, Augustine himself confesses: hence he proves the immortality of the soul from the eternity of truth. But truth is not in the soul alone as God is said to be ‘essentially’ ( per essentiam ) in all things; nor as He is by His likeness in all things, inasmuch as everything is called ‘true’ so far as it approaches to the likeness of God: for from those points of view the soul stands in no better position than other beings: truth then is in the soul in a special manner, inasmuch as the soul knows truth. As then the soul and other beings are called ‘true’ in their natures, as bearing some likeness to the supreme nature of God, — which is truth itself, as being its own fulness of actual understanding ( suum intellectum esse ), — so what is known by the soul is manifestly known, inasmuch as there exists in the soul a likeness of that divine truth which God knows. Hence on the text ( Ps. xi, 2 ) truths are diminished from the sons of men , the Gloss [Augustine, Enarrationes in h.l.] says: “The truth is one, whereby holy souls are illumined: but since there are many souls, there may be said to be in them many truths, as from one face many images appear in as many mirrors.” Though different things are known and believed to be true by different minds, yet there are some truths in which all men agree, for instance, the primary intuitions of intellect as well speculative as practical, because, so far as these go, an image of divine truth comes out universally in the minds of all. As then whatever any mind knows for certain, it knows it by virtue of these intuitions, which are the canons of all judgements, and into which all judgements may be resolved, the mind is said to see all things in the divine truth, or in everlasting aspects, and to judge of all things according to those aspects. This explanation is confirmed by the words of Augustine ( Soliloq. I, viii, 15): “Even the truths taught in the schools, which every one, who understands them, unhesitatingly allows to be true, we must believe, could not possibly be understood, were they not lit up by the light of another, what I may call a sun proper to them ( nisi ab alio quasi sole suo illustrantur ).” He says then that the theories of science are seen in the divine truth as visible objects are seen in the light of the sun: but certainly such objects are not seen in the very body of the sun, but by the light which is a likeness of the solar brightness, remaining in the air and similar bodies. From these words then of Augustine it cannot be gathered that God is seen in His substance in this life, but only as in a mirror, which the Apostle also confesses of the knowledge of this life, saying ( 1 Cor. xiii, 12 ): We see now as in a glass darkly . Though the human mind represents the likeness of God more closely than lower creatures, still such knowledge of God as can be gathered from the human mind does not transcend that kind of knowledge which is borrowed from sensible objects, since the soul knows her own essential nature by understanding the nature of things of sense (Chap. XLVI ). Hence neither by this method can God be known in any higher way than as the cause is known by the effect.\n\n### Chapter XLVIII. That the Final Happiness of Man is not in this Life\n\nCHAPTER XLVIII — That the Final Happiness of Man is not in this Life IF then human happiness does not consist in the knowledge of God whereby He is commonly known by all or most men according to some vague estimate, nor again in the knowledge of God whereby He is known demonstratively in speculative science, nor in the knowledge of God whereby He is known by faith, as has been shown above (Chapp. XXXVIII-XL); if again it is impossible in this life to arrive at a higher knowledge of God so as to know Him in His essence, or to understand other pure spirits, and thereby attain to a nearer knowledge of God (Chapp. XLI-XLVI); and still final happiness must be placed in some knowledge of God (Ch. XXXVII ); it follows that it is impossible for the final happiness of man to be in this life. 2. The last end of man bounds his natural desire, so that, when that is reached, nothing further is sought: for if there is still a tendency to something else, the end of rest is not yet gained. But that cannot be in this life: for the more one understands, the more is the desire of understanding. natural to all men, increased. 3. When one gains happiness, he gains also stability and rest. All have this idea of happiness, that it involves stability as a necessary condition: hence the philosopher says that we do not take man for a chameleon. But in this life there is no stability: for however happy a man be called, sicknesses and misfortunes may always happen to debar him from that activity, whatever it is, wherein happiness consists. 4. It seems unfitting and irrational that the period of development should be great and the period of duration small: for it would follow that nature for the greater part of its time went without its final perfection. Hence we see that animals that live for a short time take a short time in arriving at maturity. But if human happiness consists in perfect activity according to perfect virtue, whether intellectual or moral, such happiness cannot accrue to man till after a long lapse of time; and this is especially apparent in speculative activity, in which the happiness of man is ultimately placed. For scarcely in extreme age can a man arrive [at] a perfect view of scientific truth; and then for the most part there is little of human life left. 5. That is the perfect good of happiness, which is absolutely free from admixture of evil, as that is perfect whiteness, which is absolutely unmingled with black. But it is impossible for man in the state of this life to be altogether free from evils, — not to say bodily evils, as hunger, thirst, cold and heat, but even from evils of the soul. There is no man living who is not at times disturbed by inordinate passions, who does not at times overstep the mean in which virtue consists, or fall short of it, who is not in some things deceived, or ignorant of what he wishes to know, or driven to weak surmises on points where he would like absolute certainty. 6. Man naturally shrinks from death, and is sad at the thought of it. Yet man must die, and therefore cannot be perfectly happy while here he lives. 7. Happiness consists, not in habit, but in activity: for habits are for the sake of acts. But it is impossible in this life to do any act continually. 8. The more a thing is desired and loved, the greater grief and sadness does its loss bring. But if final happiness be in this world, it will certainly be lost, at least by death; and it is uncertain whether it will last till death, since to any man there may possibly happen in this life diseases totally debarring him from any virtuous activity, such as insanity. Such happiness therefore must always have a natural pendent of sadness. But it may be replied that whereas happiness is the good of an intelligent nature, true and perfect happiness belongs to those in whom intelligent nature is found in its perfection, that is, in pure spirits; but in man it is found imperfectly by way of a limited participation. And this seems to have been the mind of Aristotle: hence, enquiring whether misfortunes take away happiness, after showing that happiness lies in virtuous activities, which are the most permanent things in this life, he concludes that they who enjoy such perfection in this life are “happy for men,” meaning that they do not absolutely attain happiness, but only in a human way. Now it is demonstrable that the aforesaid answer is not to the undoing of the arguments above alleged. For (a) though man is inferior in the order of nature to pure spirits, yet he is superior to irrational creatures; and therefore he must gain his final end in a more perfect way than they. But they gain their final end so perfectly as to seek nothing further. Thus the natural desire of dumb animals is at rest in the enjoyment of sensual delights. Much more must the natural desire of man be put to rest by his arrival at his last end. But that is impossible in this life: therefore it must be attained after this life. (b) It is impossible for a natural desire to be empty and vain: for nature does nothing in vain. But the desire of nature (for happiness) would be empty and vain, if it never possibly could be fulfilled. Therefore this natural desire of man is fulfillable. But not in this life. Therefore it must be fulfilled after this life. Alexander and Averroes laid it down that the final happiness of man is not in such knowledge as is possible to man through the speculative sciences, but in a knowledge gained by conjunction with a separately subsistent intelligence, which conjunction they conceived to be possible to man in this life. But because Aristotle saw that there was no other knowledge for man in this life than that which is through the speculative sciences, he supposed man not to gain perfect happiness, but a limited measure of happiness suited to his state. In all which investigation it sufficiently appears how hard pressed on this side and on that these fine geniuses ( praeclara ingenia ) were. From this stress of difficulty we shall find escape in positing, according to the proofs already given, that man can arrive at true happiness after this life, the soul of man being immortal. In this disembodied state the soul will understand in the way in which pure spirits understand (B. II, Chapp. XCVI , sq.) The final happiness of man then will be in the knowledge of God, which the human soul has after this life according to the manner in which pure spirits know Him. Therefore the Lord promises us reward in heaven ( Matt. v, 12 ), and says that the saints shall be as the angels ( Matt. xxii, 30 ), who see the face of God in heaven ( Matt. xviii, 10 ).\n\n### Chapter XLIX. That the Knowledge which Pure Spirits have of God through knowing their own  Essence does not carry with it a Vision of the Essence of God\n\nCHAPTER XLIX — That the Knowledge which Pure Spirits have of God through knowing their own Essence does not carry with it a Vision of the Essence of God WE must further enquire whether this very knowledge, whereby separately subsistent intelligences and souls after death know God through knowing their own essences, suffices for their own happiness. For the investigation of this truth we must first show that the divine essence is not known by any such mode of knowledge. In no way can the essence of a cause be known in its effect, unless the effect be the adequate expression of the whole power of the cause. But pure spirits know God through their own substances, as a cause is known through its effect inasmuch as each sees God as mirrored in another, and each sees God as expressed in himself. But none of these pure spirits is an effect adequate to the power of God (B. II, Chapp. XXVI , XXVII ). It is impossible therefore for them to see the divine essence by this method of knowledge. 2. An intelligible likeness, whereby a thing is understood in its substance must be of the same species as that thing, or rather it must be its species, — thus the form of a house in the architect’s mind is the same species as the form of the house which is in matter, or rather it is its species, — for by the species of man you do not understand the essence of ass or horse . But the nature of an angel is not the same as the divine nature in species, nay not even in genus (B. I, Chap. XXV ). 3. Everything created is bounded within the limits of some genus or species. But the divine essence is infinite, comprising within itself every perfection of entire being (B. I, Chapp. XXVIII , XLIII ). It is impossible therefore for the divine substance to be seen through any created medium. Nevertheless a pure spirit by knowing its own substance knows the existence of God, and that God is the cause of all, and eminent above all, and removed ( remotus ) from all, not only from all things that are, but from all that the created mind can conceive. To this knowledge of God we also may attain in some sort: for from the effects of His creation we know of God that He is, and that He is the cause (sustaining principle) of other beings, super-eminent above other beings, and removed from all. And this is the highest perfection of our knowledge in this life: hence Dionysius says ( De mystica theologia c. 2) that “we are united with God as with the unknown”; which comes about in this way, that we know of God what He is not, but what He is remains absolutely unknown. And to show the ignorance of this most sublime knowledge it is said of Moses that he drew nigh to the darkness in which God was ( Exod. xx, 21 ). But because an inferior nature at its height attains only to the lowest grade of the nature superior to it, this knowledge must be more excellent in pure spirits than in us. For (a) the nearer and more express the effect, the more evidently apparent the existence of the cause. But pure spirits, that know God through themselves, are nearer and more express likenesses of God than the effects through which we know God. (c) High dignity better appears, when we know to what other high dignities it stands preferred. Thus a clown, knowing the king to be the chief man in the kingdom, but for the rest knowing only some of the lowest officials of the kingdom, with whom he has to do, does not know the king’s pre-eminence so well as another, who knows the dignity of all the princes of the realm. But we men know only some of the lowest of things that are. Though then we know that God is high above all beings, still we do not know the height of the Divine Majesty as the angels know it, who know the highest order of beings and God’s elevation above them all.\n\n### Chapter L. That the desire of Pure Intelligences does not rest satisfied in the Natural Knowledge which they have of God\n\nCHAPTER L — That the desire of Pure Intelligences does not rest satisfied in the Natural Knowledge which they have of God EVERYTHING that is imperfect in any species desires to gain the perfection of that species. He who has an opinion about a thing, opinion being an imperfect knowledge of the thing, is thereby egged on to desire a scientific knowledge of the thing. But the aforesaid knowledge, which pure spirits have of God without knowing His substance fully, is an imperfect kind of knowledge. The main point in the knowledge of anything is to know precisely what it essentially is. Therefore this knowledge which pure spirits have of God does not set their natural desire to rest, but rather urges it on to see the divine substance. 2. The knowledge of effects kindles the desire of knowing the cause: this search after causes set men upon philosophising. Therefore the desire of knowing, naturally implanted in all intelligent beings, does not rest unless, after finding out the substances of things made, they come also [ etiam , not etiamsi ] to know the cause on which those substances depend. By the fact then of pure spirits knowing that God is the cause of all the substances which they see, the natural desire in them does not rest unless they come also to see the substance of God Himself. 4. Nothing finite can set to rest the desire of intelligence. Given any finite thing, intelligence always sets to work to apprehend something beyond it. But the height and power of every created substance is finite. Therefore the intelligence of a created spirit rests not in the knowledge of any created substances, however excellent, but tends still further in a natural desire to understand that substance which is of infinite height and excellence, namely, the divine substance (Chap. XLIII ). 6. The nearer a thing is to the goal, the greater is its desire. But the intelligences of pure spirits are nearer to the knowledge of God than is our intelligence: therefore they desire that knowledge more intensely than we do. But even we, however much we know that God exists and has the attributes above mentioned, have not our desire assuaged, but still further desire to know God in His essence: much more then do pure spirits. The conclusion is, that the final happiness of pure spirits is not in that knowledge of God whereby they know Him through knowing their own substances, but their desire leads them further to the substance of God. Hereby it sufficiently appears that final happiness is to be sought in no other source than in activity of intellect, since no desire carries so high as the desire of understanding truth. All our other desires, be they of pleasure or of anything else desirable by man, may rest in other objects; but the aforesaid desire rests not until it arrives at God, on whom all creation hinges and who made it all. Hence Wisdom aptly says: I dwell in the heights of heaven, and my throne is in the pillar of a cloud ( Ecclus xxiv, 7 ); and it is said, Wisdom calls her handmaids to the citadel ( Prov. ix, 3 ). Let them blush therefore who seek in basest things the happiness of man so highly placed.\n\n### Chapter LI. How God is seen as He essentially is\n\nCHAPTER LI — How God is seen as He essentially is AS shown above (Chap. XLIX ), the divine substance cannot be seen by the intellect in any created presentation. Hence, if God’s essence is to be seen, the intelligence must see it in the divine essence itself, so that in such vision the divine essence shall be at once the object which is seen and that whereby it is seen. This is the immediate vision of God that is promised us in Scripture: We see now in a glass darkly, but then face to face (i Cor. xiii, 2): a text absurd to take in a corporeal sense, as though we could imagine a bodily face in Deity itself, whereas it has been shown that God is incorporeal (B. I, Chap. XX ). Nor again is it possible for us with our bodily face to see God, since the bodily sense of sight, implanted in our face, can be only of bodily things. Thus then shalt we see God face to face, in that we shall have an immediate vision of Him, as of a man whom we see face to face. By this vision we are singularly assimilated to God, and are partakers in His happiness: for this is His happiness, that He essentially understands His own substance. Hence it is said: When He shall appear, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is ( 1 John iii, 2 ). And the Lord said: I prepare for you as my Father hath prepared for me a kingdom, that ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom ( Luke xxii, 29 ). This cannot be understood of bodily meat and drink, but of that food which is taken at the table of Wisdom, whereof it is said by Wisdom: Eat ye my bread and drink the wine that I have mingled for you ( Prov. ix, 5 ). They therefore eat and drink at the table of God, who enjoy the same happiness wherewith God is happy, seeing Him in the way which He sees Himself.\n\n### Chapter LII. That no Created Substance can of its natural power arrive to see God as He essentially is\n\nCHAPTER LII — That no Created Substance can of its natural power arrive to see God as He essentially is THE property of a higher nature cannot be attained by a lower nature except by the action of that higher nature to which it properly belongs. But to see God by the divine essence is the property of the divine nature: for it is proper to every agent to act by its own proper form. Therefore no subsistent intelligence can see God by the divine essence except through the action of God bringing it about. 5. To see the substance of God transcends the limits of every created nature: for it is proper to every intelligent created nature to understand according to the mode of its substance: but the divine substance is not intelligible according to the mode of any created substance (Chap. XLIX ). Hence it is said: The grace of God is life everlasting ( Rom. vi, 23 ). For we have shown that the happiness of man consists in the vision of God, which is called life everlasting , whereunto we are led solely by the grace of God, because such vision exceeds the faculty of every creature, and it is impossible to attain it except by an endowment from God. And the Lord says: I will manifest myself to him ( John xiv, 21 ).\n\n### Chapter LIII. That a Created Intelligence needs some influx of Divine Light to see God in His Essence\n\nCHAPTER LIII — That a Created Intelligence needs some influx of Divine Light to see God in His Essence IT is impossible for that which is the proper form of one thing to become the form of another thing, unless that latter thing comes to partake of some likeness to the former. But the divine essence is the proper intelligible form of the divine intelligence, and is proportioned to it: for in God these three are one, that which understands, that whereby it understands, and that which is understood. It is impossible therefore for the very essence of God to become an intelligible form to any created intellect otherwise than by the said intellect coming to be partaker in some likeness to God. 3. If two things, not previously united, come afterwards to be united, this must be either by a change in both or by a change in one of them. If therefore any created intellect begins anew to see the essence of God, the divine essence must be conjoined anew with that intellect by way of intelligible presentation. But it is impossible for the divine essence to change; and therefore such union must begin by some change in the created intellect, that is to say, by its making some new acquisition. But because we arrive at the knowledge of things intelligible through things sensible, we also transfer the names of sensible cognition to intelligible cognition, and particularly the properties of sight, which among senses is the nobler and more spiritual and more akin to intellect: hence intellectual knowledge itself is called sight, or vision. And because bodily vision is not accomplished except through light, the means whereby intellectual vision is fulfilled borrow the name of light. That disposition therefore whereby a created intelligence is raised to the intellectual vision of the divine substance is called the ‘light of glory.’ This is the light of which it is said: In thy light we shall see light ( Ps. xxxv, 10 ), to wit, of the divine substance; and, The city needeth not sun nor moon, for the brightness of God illuminateth it ( Apoc. xxi, 23 ); and, No more shall there be sun to shine on thee by day, nor brightness of moon to enlighten thee, but the Lord shall be to thee an everlasting light, and thy God shall be thy glory Isaias lx, 19 ). And because in God being and understanding are the same and He is to all the cause of understanding, He is on that account called ‘light’: He was the true light, that enlighteneth every man coming into this world John i, 8 ) : God is light ( 1 John i, 5 ): Clad in light as in a garment ( Ps. ciii, 2 ). And therefore also as well God as the angels in Holy Scripture are described in figures of fire, because of the brightness of fire.\n\n### Chapter LIV. Arguments against the aforesaid statements, and their Solutions\n\nCHAPTER LIV — Arguments against the aforesaid statements, and their Solutions ARG. 1. No access of light to the eye can elevate the sight to see things that transcend the natural faculty of bodily vision. But the divine substance transcends the entire capacity of created intelligence, even more than intellect transcends the capacity of sense. Therefore no light can supervene upon any created intelligence, to elevate it to the capacity of seeing the divine substance. Reply . The divine substance is not beyond the capacity of created intelligence as though it were something altogether alien from it, as sound is alien from sight, or an immaterial substance from sense, — for the divine substance is the prime object of intelligence, and the beginning of all intellectual knowledge, — but it is beyond the capacity of created intelligence as exceeding its power, as the more excellent sensible objects are beyond the capacity of sense. Arg . 2. That light which is received in the created intelligence is itself created, and therefore falling infinitely short of God. Therefore no such light can raise the creature to the vision of the divine substance. Reply . This light raises the creature to the vision of God, not that there is no interval between it and the divine substance, but it does so in virtue of the power which it receives from God to such effect, although in its own being it falls infinitely short of God. For this created light does not conjoin the intelligence with God in point of being, but only in point of understanding. Arg . 4. What is created, may very well be connatural with some created thing. If then that light is created, there may be some created intelligence, which by its own connatural light will see the divine substance, contrary to what has been shown (Chap. XLII ). Reply . The vision of the divine substance exceeds all natural faculty: hence the light whereby a created intelligence is perfected to the vision of the divine substance must be supernatural. Arg . 6. There must be proportion between the intelligence and the thing understood. But there is no proportion between a created intelligence, perfected in the aforesaid light, and the divine substance, since the distance between them still remains infinite. Reply . So there is a proportion between a created intelligence and God as an object of understanding, not a proportion implying any commensurateness of being, but a proportion implying a reference of one to the other, as matter is referred to form, or cause to effect. Thus there may well be a proportion between the creature and God, as the understanding is referred to the understood, or the effect to the cause. Some have been moved by these and the like arguments to lay down the statement that God is never to be seen by any created intelligence. But this position, besides taking away the true happiness of the rational creature, which cannot be except in the vision of the divine substance, as has been shown (Chap. LI ), is also in contradiction with the authority of Holy Scripture, and is to be rejected as false and heretical.\n\n### Chapter LV. That the Created Intelligence does not comprehend the Divine Substance\n\nCHAPTER LV — That the Created Intelligence does not comprehend the Divine Substance THE aforesaid light is a principle of divine knowledge, since by it the created intelligence is elevated to see the divine substance. Therefore the mode of divine vision must be commensurate with the intensity of the aforesaid light. But the aforesaid light falls far short in intensity of the brightness of the divine understanding. It is impossible therefore for the divine substance to be seen by such light so perfectly as the divine understanding sees it. The divine understanding sees that substance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible: for the truth of the divine substance and the clearness of the divine understanding are equal, nay are one. It is impossible therefore for created intelligence through the aforesaid light to see the divine substance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible. But everything that is comprehended by any knowing mind is known by it as perfectly as it is knowable. Thus he who knows that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, taking it as a matter of opinion on probable grounds because wise men say so, does not yet comprehend that truth: he alone comprehends it, who knows it as matter of science, through the medium of a demonstration showing cause. It is impossible therefore for any created intelligence to comprehend the divine substance. 2. Finite power cannot compass in its activity an infinite object. But the divine substance is infinite in comparison with every created intellect, since every created intellect is bounded within the limits of a certain species. When it is said that the divine substance is seen but not comprehended by created intelligence, the meaning is not that something of it is seen and something not seen, since the divine substance is absolutely simple: what is meant is that it is not seen perfectly so far as it is visible. In the same way he who holds a demonstrable conclusion as a matter of opinion, is said to know it but not to comprehend it, because he does not know it perfectly, that is, scientifically, though there is no part of it that he does not know.\n\n### Chapter LVI. That no Created Intelligence in seeing God sees all things that can be seen in Him\n\nCHAPTER LVI — That no Created Intelligence in seeing God sees all things that can be seen in Him THEN only does the knowledge of a principle necessitate the knowledge of all its effects, when the principle is thoroughly comprehended by the understanding: for so a principle is known to the whole extent of its power, all its effects being known as caused by it. But through the divine essence other things are known as effects from their cause. Since then created intelligence cannot know the divine substance so as to comprehend it, there is no necessity for it in seeing the divine substance to see all things that can be known thereby. 3. The extent of any power is measured by the objects to which it reaches. To know then all the objects to which any power reaches is to comprehend the power itself. But the divine power, being infinite, can be comprehended by no created intelligence, as neither can the divine essence (Chap. LV ). Neither then can any created intelligence know all the objects to which the divine power extends. 5. No cognitive faculty knows anything except under the aspect of its proper object: thus by sight we know things only as coloured. Now the proper object of intelligence is whatever is in the substance of a thing. Therefore whatever the intelligence knows of a thing, it knows by a knowledge of the substance of the thing. If ever we know the substance of a thing by its accidents, that happens accidentally, inasmuch as our intellectual knowledge arises from sense, and thus we need to arrive at an intellectual view of substance through a knowledge of accidents: wherefore this does not take place in mathematics, but in the natural sciences only. Whatever therefore in a thing cannot be known by a knowledge of its substance, must remain unknown to the knowing mind. But what a voluntary agent wishes cannot be known by a knowledge of his substance: for the will does not tend to its objects altogether by natural necessity: hence ‘will’ and ‘nature’ are counted two distinct active principles. What therefore a voluntary agent wills is not knowable except haply through certain effects, as, when we see one acting voluntarily, we know what he has willed: or it may be known in its cause, as God knows our wills, as He knows other effects of His production, by the fact of His being to us the cause of willing (B. I, Chap. LXVIII ad fin .): or it may be known by one intimating his will to another, as when one expresses his desire by speech. Since then many things depend on the absolute will of God, as has been partly shown already, and will hereafter appear, a created intelligence, even though seeing the substance of God, does not for all that see all that God sees by his substance. It may be objected that God’s substance is something greater than all that He can make, or understand, or will beyond Himself; and that therefore, if a created intelligence can see the substance of God, much more can it know all that God through Himself either understands or wills or can do. But on careful study we see that it is not one and the same thing for an object to be known in itself and known in its cause. There are things easy enough to know in themselves, but not easily known in their causes. Though it is true that it is a grander thing to have understanding of the divine substance than to understand anything else, knowable in itself, away from that substance, still it is more perfect knowledge to know the divine substance, and in it to see its effects, than to know the divine substance without seeing its effects. Now the seeing of the divine substance may be without comprehension of it: but to have all things rendered intelligible through that substance and actually known, that cannot come about without comprehension.\n\n### Chapter LVII. That every Intelligence of every grade can be partaker of the vision of God\n\nCHAPTER LVII — That every Intelligence of every grade can be partaker of the vision of God SINCE it is by supernatural light that a created intelligence is raised to the vision of the divine substance, there is no created intelligence so low in its nature as to be incapable of being raised to this vision. For that light cannot be connatural to any creature (Chap. LIV ), but transcends the faculty of every created nature. But what is done by supernatural power is not hindered by diversity of nature, since divine power is infinite. Hence in the miraculous healing of the sick it makes no difference whether one be very ill or slightly indisposed. Therefore diversity of grade in intelligent nature is no hindrance to the lowest subject of such a nature being raised by that light to that vision. 2. The distance from God of the intelligence highest in order of nature is infinite in respect of perfection and goodness: whereas the distance of that intelligence from the very lowest intelligence is finite, for between finite and finite there cannot be infinite distance. The distance therefore between the lowest created intelligence and the highest is as nothing in comparison with the distance between the highest created intelligence and God. But what is as nothing can make no sensible variation, as the distance between the centre of the earth and our point of vision is as nothing in comparison with the distance between our point of vision and the eighth sphere, compared with which the whole earth counts as a point; and therefore no sensible error follows from our astronomers in their calculations taking their point of observation for the centre of the earth. Whatever intellect then is raised to the vision of God by the above mentioned light, — be it highest, or lowest, or middlemost, — it makes no difference. 3. Every intelligence naturally desires the vision of the divine substance (Chapp. XXV , L ). But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Any and every created intelligence then can arrive at the vision of the divine substance; and inferiority of nature is no impediment. Hence the Lord promises to man the glory of the angels: They shall be as the angels of God in Heaven ( Matt. xxii, 30 ); and in the Apocalypse the same measure is said to be of man and angel: the measure of a man, that is, of an angel ( Apoc. xxi, 17 ). Therefore often in Holy Scripture the angels are described in the form of men, either entirely so, as with the angels who appeared to Abraham (Gen. xviii), or partially, as with the living creatures of whom it is said that the hand of a man was under their wings ( Ezech. i, 8 ).\n\n### Chapter LVIII. That one may see God more perfectly than another\n\nCHAPTER LVIII — That one may see God more perfectly than another THE light of glory raises to the vision of God in this, that it is a certain likeness to the divine understanding (Chap. LIII ). But a thing may be likened to God with more or less of closeness. Therefore one may see the divine substance with more or less of perfection. 4. The end must correspond to the means taken to gain it. But not all subsistent intelligences are equally prepared for their end, which is the vision of the divine substance: for some are of greater virtue, some of less, virtue being the way to happiness. Therefore there must be a diversity in their vision of God. Hence it is said: in my Father’s House there are many mansions ( John xiv, 2 ). In the mode of vision then there appear diverse grades of glory among the Blessed, but in respect of the object of vision their glory is the same. Hence to all the labourers in the vineyard, though they have not laboured equally, the Lord tells us that the same reward, or penny, is to be given, because the same object is given to all to see and enjoy, namely, God.\n\n### Chapter LIX. How they who see the Divine Substance see all things\n\nCHAPTER LIX — How they who see the Divine Substance see all things SINCE the vision of the divine substance is the final end of every subsistent intelligence, and the natural desire of every being is at rest when it has attained to its final end, the natural desire of every intelligence that sees the divine substance must be perfectly set at rest. But it is the mind’s natural desire to know the genera and species and capabilities of all things and the whole order of the universe, as is shown by the zeal of mankind in trying to find out all these things. Every one therefore of those who see the divine substance will know all the above-mentioned objects. 2. In this is the difference between sense and intellect, as shown in De anima , III, iv, that sense is spoilt or impaired by brilliant or intense sensible objects, so that afterwards it is unable to appreciate similar objects of lower degree: but intellect, not being spoilt or checked by its object, but simply perfected, after understanding an object in which there is more to understand, is not less but better able to understand other objects which afford less scope for understanding. But the highest in the category of intelligible beings is the divine substance. When then an understanding is raised by divine light to see the substance of God, much more is it perfected by the same light to understand all other objects in nature. 4. Though of those who see God one sees Him more perfectly than an other, every one nevertheless sees Him with such perfection as to fill all his natural capacity, nay, the vision transcends all natural capacity (Chap. LII ). Every one therefore, seeing the divine substance, must know in that substance all things to which his natural capacity extends. But the natural capacity of every intelligence extends to the knowledge of all genera and species and the order of creation. These things therefore every one of those who see God will know in the divine substance. Hence to Moses asking for a sight of the divine substance the Lord replied: I will show thee all good ( Exod. xxxiii, 19 ); and Gregory says ( Dialogues iv, 33): “What is it that they do not know, who know Him who knows all things?” But on careful reflection upon what has been said it appears that they who see the divine substance in one way know all things, and in one way they do not. If by ‘all things’ is meant whatever belongs to the perfection of the universe, the arguments alleged prove that they do see all things. To the perfection of natural being belong specific natures, with their properties and powers: for the intention of nature fixes on specific natures: as for individuals, they are for the species. It belongs then to the perfection of a subsistent intelligence, that it should know the natures and capabilities and proper accidents of all species. And by the knowledge of natural species individuals also existing under these species are known by the intelligence that sees God. But if by ‘all things’ is meant all things that God knows by seeing His essence, no created intelligence sees all things in the substance of God, as has been shown above (Chap. LVI ). This may be verified in various respects. First, as regards things that God can do, but neither does nor ever means to do. All such things cannot be known without a thorough comprehension of His power, which is not possible to any created intelligence (Chap. LV ). Hence it is said: Perchance thou wilt seize upon the footprints of God and perfectly discover the Almighty. He is higher than heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than hell, and whence shalt thou know? Longer than the earth is his measure, and broader than the sea ( Job xi, 7-9 ). Secondly, as regards the plans of things made, no intelligence can know them all without comprehending the divine goodness. For the plan of every thing made is taken from the end which the maker intends; and the end of all things made by God is the divine goodness: the plan therefore of things made is the diffusion of the divine goodness in creation. To know then all the plans of things made, one would have to know all the good things that can come about in creation according to the order of the divine wisdom: which would mean comprehending the divine goodness and wisdom, a thing that no created intelligence can do. Hence it is said: I understood that of all the works of God man cannot find out the plan ( Eccles. viii, 17 ). Thirdly, as regards things that depend on the mere will of God, as predestination, election, justification, and the like, which belong to the sanctification of the creature, it is said: The things that are in man none knoweth but the spirit of man that is in him: in like manner the things that are of God none knoweth but the Spirit of God ( 1 Cor. ii, 11 ).\n\n### Chapter LX. That they who see God see all things in Him at once\n\nCHAPTER LX — That they who see God see all things in Him at once SINCE it has been shown that a created intelligence in seeing the divine substance understands therein all the species of things; since moreover all things that are seen by one presentation must be seen together by one vision; it necessarily follows that the intelligence which sees the divine substance views all things, not successively, but simultaneously. Hence Augustine says ( De Trinitate XV, xvi): “Our thoughts will not then be unstable, coming and going from one thing to another, but we shall see all our knowledge together at one glance.”\n\n### Chapter LXI. That by the Sight of God one is Partaker of Life Everlasting\n\nCHAPTER LXI — That by the Sight of God one is Partaker of Life Everlasting ETERNITY differs from time in this, that time has being in succession, but the being of eternity is all present together. But in the sight of God there is no succession: all things that are seen in that vision are seen at one glance. That vision therefore is accomplished in a certain participation of eternity. That vision also is a certain life: for activity of intellect is a life. Therefore by that sight the created intelligence is partaker of life everlasting. 4. The intellectual soul is created on the confines of eternity and time: because it is last in order of intelligences, and yet its substance is raised above corporeal matter, being independent of the same. But its action, inasmuch as it touches inferior things that are in time, is temporal. Therefore, inasmuch as it touches superior things that are above time, its action partakes of eternity. Such is especially the vision whereby it sees the divine substance. Therefore by such vision it enters into participation of eternity, and sees God in the same way as any other created intelligence. Hence the Lord says: This is life everlasting, to know thee the only true God ( John xvii, 3 ).\n\n### Chapter LXII. That they who see God will see Him for ever\n\nCHAPTER LXII — That they who see God will see Him for ever WHATEVER now is, and now is not, is measured by time. But the vision that makes the happiness of intellectual creatures is not in time, but in eternity (Chap. LXI ). It is impossible therefore that from the moment one becomes partaker of it he should ever lose it. 2. An intelligent creature does not arrive at its last end except when its natural desire is set at rest. But as it naturally desires happiness, so it naturally desires perpetuity of happiness: for, being perpetual in its substance, whatever thing it desires for the thing’s own sake, and not for the sake of something else, it desires as a thing to be had for ever. Happiness therefore would not be the last end, if it did not endure perpetually. 3. Everything that is loved in the having of it brings sadness, if we know that at some time we must part with it. But the beatific vision, being of all things most delightful and most desired, is of all things most loved by them who have it. They could not therefore be otherwise than saddened, if they knew that at some time they were to lose it. But if it were not meant to last for ever, they would be aware of the fact: for in seeing the divine substance, they also see other things that naturally are (Chap. LIX ). 6. It is impossible for one to wish to resign a good thing that he enjoys, except for some evil that he discerns in the enjoyment of that good, or because he reckons it a hindrance to greater good. But in the enjoyment of the beatific vision there can be no evil, since it is the best thing to which an intelligent creature can attain: nor can he who enjoys that vision possibly think that there is any evil in it, or anything better than it, since the vision of that sovereign truth excludes all false judgement. 5. Nothing that is viewed with wonder can grow tedious: as long as it is an object of wonder, the desire of seeing it remains. But the divine substance is always viewed with wonder by any created intelligence, since no created intelligence can comprehend it. Therefore such intelligence can never find that vision tedious. 9. The nearer a thing comes to God, who is wholly unchangeable, the less changeable it is and the more enduring. But no creature can draw nearer to God than that which beholds His substance. The intelligent creature then gains in the vision of God a certain immutability, and cannot fall from that vision. Hence it is said: Blessed are they who dwell in thy house, O Lord: they shall praise thee for ever and ever ( Ps. lxxxiii, 5 ): He shall never be moved from his place, that dwelleth in Jerusalem ( Ps. cxxiv, 1 ): Whoever shall overcome, I will make him a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall not go out any more ( Apoc. iii, 12 ).\n\n### Chapter LXIII. How in that Final Happiness every Desire of Man is fulfilled\n\nCHAPTER LXIII — How in that Final Happiness every Desire of Man is fulfilled FROM what has been said it evidently appears that in that final happiness which comes of the vision of God every human desire is fulfilled, according to the text: Who filleth thy desire with good things ( Ps. cii, 5 ). And every human endeavour there finds its final good: as may be seen by discussing the several heads. — I. As man is an intelligent being, there is in him a desire of investigating truth, which desire men follow out in the pursuit of a contemplative life. And this will manifestly be fulfilled in that vision, since by the sight of the first and highest truth all things that man naturally desires to know will become known to him (Chap. L ). 2. There is also a desire which a man has in keeping with his rational faculty of managing and disposing of inferior things: which desire men prosecute in the pursuit of an active and civil life. And the chief scope and purpose of this desire is the laying out of man’s whole life according to reason, which means living virtuously. This desire will then be altogether fulfilled when reason shall be in the height of its vigour, being enlightened by divine light that it may not fall away from what is right. 3. Upon civil life there follow certain goods which a man needs for his social and political activities. Thus there is honour and high estate, the inordinate desire of which makes men intriguing and ambitious. But that vision elevates men to the supreme height of honour, uniting them with God; and therefore, as God is the king of ages ( 1 Tim. i, 17 ), so the Blessed united with Him are said to reign: They shall reign with Christ ( Apoc. xx, 6 ). 4. Another object of desire following upon civil life is celebrity of fame, by inordinate desire of which men are said to be covetous of vain glory. By that divine vision the blessed become celebrated, not before men, who may deceive and be deceived, but in the most true knowledge of God and of all their companions in bliss. And therefore that happiness is very frequently termed ‘glory’ in Holy Scripture, as in Ps. cxliv, 5 : The saints shall exult in glory . 5. There is also another thing desirable in civil society, namely, riches, by inordinate craving and love for which men become illiberal and unjust. But in that blissful state there is sufficiency of all good things, inasmuch as the Blessed enjoy Him who comprises the perfection of them: wherefore it is said: All good things came to me with her ( Wisdom vii, 11 ); and, Glory and wealth is in this house ( Ps. cxi, 3 ). 6. There is also a third desire in man, common to him with other animals, the desire of pleasurable enjoyments, which men pursue in the life of pleasure, and thereby become intemperate and incontinent. But in the happiness of the sight of God there is perfect delight, all the more perfect than the pleasure of sense, which brute animals also can enjoy, as intellect is higher than sense; all the more perfect as ( quanto ) the good in which we shall take delight is greater than any sensible good, and comes more home to us, and is more continually delightful; all the more perfect again as the delight is more pure and free from all admixture of sadness or harassing solicitude; and of this it is said: They shall be inebriated by the plenty of thy house, and thou wilt make them drink of the torrent of thy pleasure ( Ps. xxxv, 9 ). 7. There is also a natural desire common to all things, in that they all desire self-preservation, so far as possible; by the immoderation of which desire men are rendered timid and spare themselves too much from labours. This desire also shall be perfectly fulfilled when the Blessed attain to perfect everlasting duration, secure from all hurt, according to the text: They shall not hunger nor thirst any more, neither shall the sun fall upon them, nor any heat ( Isa. xlix, 10 ; Apoc. vii, 16 ). Thus it appears that by the vision of God subsistent intelligences gain true happiness, in which every desire is wholly laid to rest, and in which there is abundant sufficiency of all good things, which Aristotle considers a requisite of happiness. Nothing in this life is so like this final and perfect happiness as the life of them who contemplate truth so far as possible. For the contemplation of truth begins in this life, but will be consummated in the life to come, whereas the life of action and the political life do not transcend the bounds of this present.\n\n### Chapter LXIV. That God governs things by His Providence\n\nCHAPTER LXIV — That God governs things by His Providence THE foregoing conclusions sufficiently show that God is the end of all things. Hence it may be further gathered that by His providence He governs and rules all things. For whatever things are referred to an end, are all subject to His management to whom principally that end belongs, as appears in an army: for all the components of the army and all their works are referred to one last end, the good of the general, which is victory, and therefore it belongs to the general to govern the whole army. In like manner the art which is concerned with the end gives commands and laws to the art which is concerned with the means, as politics to the art of war, the art of war to the management of cavalry, navigation to shipbuilding. Since therefore all things are referred to an end, which is the divine goodness (Chapp. XVII , XVIII ), God, to whom that goodness principally belongs, — as being His own substance, possessed, understood, and loved, — must have the chief control of all things. 5. Things that are distinct in their natures do not combine into one system, unless they be bound up in one by one directing control ( ab uno ordinante ). But in the universe there are things, having distinct and contrary natures, which nevertheless all combine in one system, some things taking up the activities of other things, some things being aided or even wrought by others. There must then be one ordainer and governor of the universe. 8. Every agent that intends an end cares more for that which is nearer to the last end. But the last end of the divine will is the divine goodness, and the nearest thing to that in creation is the goodness of the order of the entire universe, that being the end to which every particular good of this or that thing is referred, as the less perfect is referred to the more perfect, and every part is for its whole. What therefore God most cares for in creation is the order of the universe: He is therefore its controller. Hence Holy Scripture ascribes the course of events to the divine command: Who giveth command to the sun, and it riseth not, and encloseth the stars as under a seal ( Job ix, 7 ): He hath given a command, and it shall not pass away ( Ps. cxlviii, 6 ).\n\n### Chapter LXV. That God preserves things in being\n\nCHAPTER LXV — That God preserves things in being FROM God’s governing all things by His providence it follows that He preserves them in being. For everything whereby things gain their end is part of the governing of them. But to the last end which God intends, namely, the divine goodness, things are directed not only by their activities, but also by the fact of their existence, because by that mere fact they bear some likeness to the divine goodness. Therefore it is proper to divine providence to keep things in being. 5. As a work of art presupposes a work of nature, so a work of nature presupposes a work of God creating: for the material of artificial things is from nature, and the material of natural things is through creation of God. But artificial things are preserved in being by virtue of natural things, as a house by the solidity of its stones. Therefore natural things are not preserved in being otherwise than through the power of God. 6. The impression made by an agent does not remain in the effect when the action of the agent ceases, unless that impression turns into and becomes part of the nature of the effect. Thus the forms and properties of things generated remain in them to the end, after the generation is done, because they are made natural to the things: in like manner habits are difficult to change, because they turn into nature. But dispositions, bodily impressions, and emotions, though they remain for some little while after the action of the agent, do not remain permanently: they find place in the subject as being on the way to become part of its nature. But what belongs to the nature of a superior genus in no way remains after the action of the agent is over, as light does not remain in a transparent medium after the source of light is taken away. But being is not the nature or essence of anything created, but of God alone (B. I, Chapp. XXI , XXII ). Nothing then can remain in being when the divine activity ceases. 7. Concerning the origin of things there are two theories, one of faith, that things had a first commencement, and were then brought into being by God; the other the theory of sundry philosophers, that things have emanated ( fluxerint ) from God from all eternity. On either theory we must say that things are preserved in being by God. For if things are brought into being by God after not being, the being of things must be consequent upon the divine will; and similarly their not being, because He has permitted things not to be when He willed and made things to be when He willed. Things therefore are, so long as He wills them to be. His will then is the upholder of creation. On the other hand, if things have emanated from God from all eternity, it is impossible to assign any time or instant in which first they emanated from God. Either then they were never produced by God at all, or their being is continually coming forth from God so long as they exist. Hence it is said: Bearing up all things by the word of his power ( Heb. i, 3 ). And Augustine says ( De Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): “The power of the Creator, and the might of the Almighty and All-containing, is the cause of the permanence of every creature. If this power ever ceased from governing creation, all the brave show of creatures would at once cease, and all nature would fall to nothing. It is not like the case of one who has built a house, and goes away, and still the structure remains, when his work has ceased and his presence is withdrawn. The world could not endure for the twinkling of an eye, if God retired from the government of it.” Hereby is excluded the theory of some Doctors of the Law of the Moors, who, by way of sustaining the position that the world needs the preserving hand of God, have supposed all forms to be accidents, and that no accident lasts for two successive instants, the consequence being that the formation of things is always in the making, — as though a thing needed no efficient cause except while it is in the making. Some of them are further said to hold that the indivisible atoms, out of which they say that all substances are composed, — which atoms, according to them, alone are indestructible, — could last for some short time, even though God were to withdraw His guidance from the world. Some of them further say that things would not cease to be but for God causing in them an accident of ‘ceasing.’ All which positions are manifestly absurd.\n\n### Chapter LXVI. That nothing gives Being except in as much as it acts in the Power of God\n\nCHAPTER LXVI — That nothing gives Being except in as much as it acts in the Power of God NOTHING gives being except in so much as it is an actual being. But God preserves things in actuality. 5. The order of effects is according to the order of causes. But among all effects the first is being: all other things, as they proceed from their cause, are determinations of being. Therefore being is the proper effect of the prime agent, and all other things act inasmuch as they act in the power of the prime agent. Secondary agents, which are in a manner particular determinants of the action of the prime agent, have for the proper effects of their action other perfections determinant of being. 6. What is essentially of a certain nature, is properly the cause of that which comes to have that nature only by participation. But God alone is being by essence, all others are beings by participation. Therefore the being of everything that exists is an effect properly due to God; so that anything that brings anything else into being does so insomuch as it acts in the power of God. Hence it is said: God created all things to be ( Wisd. i, 14 ).\n\n### Chapter LXVII. That God is the Cause of Activity in all Active Agents\n\nCHAPTER LXVII — That God is the Cause of Activity in all Active Agents AS God not only gave being to things when they first began to be, but also causes being in them so long as they exist (Chap. LXV ); so He did not once for all furnish them with active powers, but continually causes those powers in them, so that, if the divine influx were to cease, all activity would cease. Hence it is said: Thou hast wrought all our works in us, O Lord ( Isa. xxvi, 12 ). And for this reason frequently in the Scriptures the effects of nature are put down to the working of God, because He it is that works in every agent, physical or voluntary: e.g., Hast thou not drawn me out like milk, and curdled me like cheese? with skin and flesh thou hast clothed me, with bones and sinews thou hast put me together ( Job x, 10, 11 ).\n\n### Chapter LVIII. That God is everywhere and in all things\n\nCHAPTER LVIII — That God is everywhere and in all things AN incorporeal thing is said to be in a thing by contact of power. Therefore if there be anything incorporeal fraught with infinite power, that must be everywhere. But it has been shown (B. I Chap. XLIII ) that God has infinite power. He is therefore everywhere. 4. Since God is the universal cause of all being, in whatever region being can be found there must be the divine presence. 6. An efficient cause must be together with its proximate and immediate effect. But in everything there is some effect which must be set down for the proximate and immediate effect of God’s power: for God alone can create (B. II, Chap. XXI ); and in everything there is something caused by creation, — in corporeal things, primordial matter; in incorporeal beings, their simple essences (B. II, Chapp. XV , sq). God then must be in all things, especially since the things which He has once produced from not-being to being He continually and always preserves in being (Chap. LXV ). Hence it is said: I fill heaven and earth ( Jer. xxiii, 24 ): If I ascend into heaven, thou art there: if I descend into hell, thou art there ( Ps. cxxxviii, 8 ). God is indivisible, and wholly out of the category of the continuous: hence He is not determined to one place, great or small, by the necessity of His essence, seeing that He is from eternity before all place: but by the immensity of His power He reaches all things that are in place, since He is the universal cause of being. Thus then He is whole everywhere, reaching all things by His undivided power.\n\n### Chapter LVIX. Of the Opinion of those who withdraw from Natural Things their Proper Actions\n\nCHAPTER LVIX — Of the Opinion of those who withdraw from Natural Things their Proper Actions SOME have taken an occasion of going wrong by thinking that no creature has any action in the production of natural effects, — thus that fire does not warm, but God causes heat where fire is present. So Avicebron in his book, The Fountain of Life , lays it down that no body is active, but the power of a subsistent spirit permeating bodies does the actions which seem to be done by bodies. But on such theories many awkward consequences follow. 1. If no inferior cause, and especially no corporeal cause, does any work, but God works alone in all agencies, and God does not change by working in different agencies; no difference of effect will follow from the difference of agencies in which God works: but that is false by the testimony of sense. 2. It is contrary to the notion of wisdom for anything to be to no purpose in the works of the wise. But if created things in no way work to the production of effects, but God alone works all effects immediately, to no purpose are other things employed by Him. 3. To grant the main thing is to grant the accessories. But actually to do follows upon actually to be: thus God is at once pure actuality and the first cause. If then God has communicated to other beings His likeness in respect of being, it follows that He has communicated to them His likeness in respect of action. 4. To detract from the perfection of creatures is to detract from the perfection of the divine power. But if no creature has any action in the production of any effect, much is detracted from the perfection of the creature: for it marks abundance of perfection to be able to communicate to another the perfection which one has oneself. 5. God is the sovereign good (B. I, Chap. XLI ). Therefore it belongs to Him to do the best. But it is better for good conferred on one to be common to many than for it to be confined to that one: for common good always proves to be more godlike than the good of the individual. But the good of one comes to be common to many when it is derived from one to many, which cannot be except in so far as the agent diffuses it to others by a proper action of its own. God then has communicated His goodness in such a way that one creature can transmit to others the good which it has received. 6. To take away order from creation is to take away the best thing that there is in creation: for while individual things in themselves are good, the conjunction of them all is best by reason of the order in the universe: for the whole is ever better than the parts and is the end of the parts. But if actions are denied to things, the order of things to one another is taken away: for things differing in their natures are not tied up in the unity of one system otherwise than by this, that some act and some are acted upon. 7. If effects are not produced by the action of creatures, but only by the action of God, it is impossible for the power of any creature to be manifested by its effect: for an effect shows the power of the cause only by reason of the action, which proceeds from the power and is terminated to the effect. But the nature of a cause is not known through its effect except in so far as through its effect its power is known which follows upon its nature. If then created things have no actions of their own productive of effects, it follows that the nature of a created thing can never be known by its effect; and thus there is withdrawn from us all investigation of natural science, in which demonstrations are given principally through the effect. Some Doctors of the Moorish Law are said to bring an argument to show that accidents are not traceable to the action of bodies, the ground of the argument being this, that an accident does not pass from subject to subject: hence they count it an impossibility for heat to pass from a hot body to another body heated by it, but they say that all such accidents are created by God. Now this is a ridiculous proof to assign of a body not acting, to point to the fact that no accident passes from subject to subject. When it is said that one hot body heats another, it is not meant that numerically the same heat, which is in the heating body, passes to the body heated; but that by virtue of the heat, which is in the heating body, numerically another heat comes to be in the heated body actually, which was in it before potentially. For a natural agent does not transfer its own form to another subject, but reduces the subject upon which it acts from potentiality to actuality.\n\n### LXX. How the Same Effect is from God and from a Natural Agent\n\nCHAPTER LXX — How the Same Effect is from God and from a Natural Agent SOME find it difficult to understand how natural effects are attributable At once to God and to a natural agent. For ( Arg. 1 ) one action, it seems, cannot proceed from two agents. If then the action, by which a natural effect is produced, proceeds from a natural body, it does not proceed from God. Arg. 2. When an action can be sufficiently done by one, it is superfluous to have it done by more: we see that nature does not do through two instruments what she can do through one. Since then the divine power is sufficient to produce natural effects, it is superfluous to employ also natural powers for the production of those same effects. Or if the natural power sufficiently produces its own effect, it is superfluous for the divine power to act to the same effect. Arg. 3. If God produces the whole natural effect, nothing of the effect is left for the natural agent to produce. Upon consideration, these arguments are not difficult. Reply 1. The power of the inferior agent depends upon the power of the superior agent, inasmuch as the superior agent gives to the inferior the power whereby it acts, or preserves that power, or applies it to action; as a workman applies a tool to its proper effect, frequently however without giving the tool the form whereby it acts, nor preserving it, but merely giving it motion. The action therefore of the inferior agent must proceed from that agent not merely through its own power, but through the power of all superior agents, for it acts in virtue of them all. And as the ultimate and lowest agent acts immediately, so is the power of the prime agent immediate in the production of the effect. For the power of the lowest agent is not competent to produce the effect of itself, but in power of the agent next above it; and the power of that agent is competent in virtue of the agent above it; and thus the power of the highest agent proves to be of itself productive of the effect, as the immediate cause, as we see in the principles of mathematical demonstrations, of which the first principle is inimediate. As then it is not absurd for the same action to be produced by an agent and the power of that agent, so neither is it absurd for the same effect to be produced by an inferior agent and by God, by both immediately, although in different manners. Reply 2. Though a natural thing produces its own effect, it is not superfluous for God to produce it, because the natural thing does not produce it except in the power of God. Nor is it superfluous, while God can of Himself produce all natural effects, for them to be produced by other causes: this is not from the insufficiency of God’s power, but from the immensity of His goodness, whereby He has wished to communicate His likeness to creatures, not only in point of their being, but likewise in point of their being causes of other things (Chap. XXI ). Reply 3. When the same effect is attributed to a natural cause and to the divine power, it is not as though the effect were produced partly by God and partly by the natural agent: but the whole effect is produced by both, though in different ways, as the same effect is attributed wholly to the instrument, and wholly also to the principal agent.\n\n### Chapter LXXI. That the Divine Providence is not wholly inconsistent with the presence of Evil in Creation\n\nCHAPTER LXXI — That the Divine Providence is not wholly inconsistent with the presence of Evil in Creation PERFECT goodness could not be in creation if there were not found an order of goodness among creatures, some being better than others: or else all possible grades of goodness would not be filled up; nor would any creature be like God in having pre-eminence over another. Thus a great beauty would be lost to creation in the removal of the order of distinct and dissimilar beings, one better than the other. A dead level of goodness would be a manifest derogation to the perfection of creation. A higher grade of goodness consists in there being something which cannot fall away from goodness; a lower grade, in there being that which can fall away. The perfection of the universe requires both grades of goodness. But it is the care of a ruler to uphold perfection in the subjects of his government, not to make it less. Therefore it is no part of divine providence wholly to exclude from creation the capability of falling away from good. But upon this capability evil ensues: for what is capable of falling away, sometimes does fall away; and the mere lack of good is evil (Chap. VII ). 3. The best rule in any government is to provide for everything under government according to the mode of its nature: just administration consists in this. As then it would be contrary to any rational plan of human administration for the civil government to debar its subjects from acting according to their offices and conditions of life, except perhaps in an occasional hour of emergency, so it would be contrary to the plan of divine government not to allow creatures to act according to the mode of their several natures. But by the very fact of creatures so acting there follows destruction and evil in the world, since by reason of mutual contrariety and inconsistency one thing is destructive of another. 5. There are many good things in creation which would find no place there, unless evils were there also. Thus there would be no patience of the just, if there were not the malice of persecutors: no room for vindictive justice, if there were no offences: and in the physical order one thing cannot come to be unless something else is destroyed. If then evil were wholly excluded from the universe by divine providence, the number of good things would be proportionally diminished: which ought not to be, because good is more vigorous in goodness than evil in badness ( virtuosius est bonum in bonitate quam in malitia malum ), as above shown (Chap. XII ). 6. The good of the whole takes precedence of the good of the part. It belongs then to a prudent ruler to neglect some defect of goodness in the part for the increase of goodness in the whole, as an architect buries the foundation under the earth for the strengthening of the whole house. But if evil were removed from certain portions of the universe, much perfection would be lost to the universe, the beauty of which consists in the orderly blending of things good and evil ( pulcritudo ex ordinata bonorum et malorum adunatione consurgit ), while evil things have their origin in the breaking down of good things, and still from them good things again take their rise by the providence of the ruler, as an interval of silence makes music sweet. 7. Other things, and particularly inferior things, are ordained to the end of the good of man. But if there were no evils in the world, much good would be lost to man, as well in respect of knowledge, as also in respect of desire and love of good: for good is better known in contrast with evil; and while evil results come about, we more ardently deire good results: as sick men best know what a blessing health is. Therefore it is said: Making peace and creating evil ( Isai. xlv, 7 ): Shall there be evil in the city that the Lord has not done? ( Amos iii, 6 .) Boethius ( De consolatione , Lib. I, prosa 4) introduces a philosopher asking the question: ‘If there is a God, how comes evil?’. The argument should be turned the other way: ‘If there is evil, there is a God.’ For there would be no evil, if the order of goodness were taken away, the privation of which is evil; and this order would not be, if God were not. Hereby is taken away the occasion of the error of the Manicheans, who supposed two primary agents, good and evil, as though evil could not have place under the providence of a good God. We have also the solution of a doubt raised by some, whether evil actions are of God. Since it has been shown (Chap. LXVI ) that every agent produces its action inasmuch as it acts by divine power, and that thereby God is the cause of all effects and of all actions (Chap. LXVII ); and since it has been further shown (Chap. X ) that in things subject to divine providence evil and deficiency happens from some condition of secondary causes, in which there may be defect; it is clear that evil actions, inasmuch as they are defective, are not of God, but of defective proximate causes; but so far as the action and entity contained in them goes, they must be of God, — as lameness is of motive power, so far as it has anything of motion, but so far as it has anything of defect, it comes of curvature of the leg.\n\n### Chapter LXXII. That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with an element of Contingency in Creation\n\nCHAPTER LXXII — That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with an element of Contingency in Creation AS divine providence does not exclude all evil from creation, neither does it exclude contingency, or impose necessity upon all things. The operation of providence does not exclude secondary causes, but is fulfilled by them, inasmuch as they act in the power of God. Now effects are called ‘necessary’ or ‘contingent’ according to their proximate causes, not according to their remote causes. Since then among proximate causes there are many that may fail, not all effects subject to providence will be necessary, but many will be contingent. 6. On the part of divine providence no hindrance will be put to the failure of the power of created things, or to an obstacle arising through the resistance of something coming in the way. But from such failure and such resistance the contingency occurs of a natural cause not always acting in the same way, but sometimes failing to do what it is naturally competent to do; and so natural effects do not come about of necessity.\n\n### Chapter LXXIII. That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Freedom of the Will\n\nCHAPTER LXXIII — That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Freedom of the Will THE government of every prudent governor is ordained to the perfection of the things governed, to the gaining, or increasing, of maintenance of that perfection. An element of perfection then is more worthy of being preserved by providence than an element of imperfection and defect. But in inanimate things the contingency of causes comes of imperfection and defect: for by their nature they are determined to one effect, which they always gain, unless there be some let or hindrance arising either from limitation of power, or the interference of some external agent, or indisposition of subject-matter; and on this account natural causes in their action are not indifferent to either side of an alternative, but for the most part produce their effects uniformly, while they fail in a minority of instances. But that the will is a contingent cause comes of its very perfection, because its power is not tied to one effect, but it rests with it to produce this effect or that, wherefore it is contingent either way. Therefore providence is more concerned to preserve the liberty of the will than to preserve contingency in natural causes. 2. It belongs to divine providence to use things according to their several modes. But a thing’s mode of action depends upon its form, which is the principle of action. But the form whereby a voluntary agent acts is not determinate: for the will acts through a form apprehended by the intellect; and the intellect has not one determined form of effect under its consideration, but essentially embraces a multitude of forms; and therefore the will can produce multiform effects. 3. The last end of every creature is to attain to a likeness to God (Chap. XVII ): therefore it would be contrary to providence to withdraw from a creature that whereby it attains the divine likeness. But a voluntary agent attains the divine likeness by acting freely, as it has been shown that there is free will in God (B. I, Chap. LXXXVIII ). 4. Providence tends to multiply good things in the subjects of its government. But if free will were taken away, many good things would be withdrawn. The praise of human virtue would be taken away, which is nullified where good is not done freely: the justice of rewards and punishments would be taken away, if man did not do good and evil freely: wariness and circumspection in counsel would be taken away, as there would be no need of taking counsel about things done under necessity. It would be therefore contrary to the plan of providence to withdraw the liberty of the will. Hence it is said: God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel: before man is life and death, whatever he shall please shall be given him ( Ecclus xv, 14-17 ). Hereby is excluded the error of the Stoics, who said that all things arose of necessity, according to an indefeasible order, which the Greeks called ymarmene ( εἱμαρμένη ).\n\n### Chapter LXXIV. That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Fortune and Chance\n\nCHAPTER LXXIV — That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Fortune and Chance THE multitude and diversity of causes proceeds from the order of divine providence and arrangement. Supposing an arrangement of many causes, one must sometimes combine with another, so as either to hinder or help it in producing its effect. A chance event arises from a coincidence of two or more causes, in that an end not intended is gained by the coming in of some collateral cause, as the finding of a debtor by him who went to market to make a purchase, when his debtor also came to market. Hence it is said: I saw that the race was not to the swift . . . . but that occasion and chance are in all things ( Eccles ix, 11 ) to wit, in all sublunary things ( in inferioribus ).\n\n### Chapter LXXV. That the Providence of God is exercised over Individual and Contingent Things\n\nCHAPTER LXXV — That the Providence of God is exercised over Individual and Contingent Things IF God has no care of these individual things, that is either because He does not know them, or because He has no power over them, or because He has no will to take care of them. But it has been shown above (B. I, Chap. LXV ) that God has knowledge of individual things. Nor can it be said that He has no power to take care of them, seeing that His power is infinite (B. II, Chap. XXII ). Nor again that God has no wilt to govern them, seeing that the object of His will is universally all good (B. I, Chap. LXXVIII ). 3. This common attribute is found in productive causes, that they have a care of the things that they produce, as animals naturally nourish their young. God thereof has care of the things of which He is the cause. But He is the cause even of these particular things (B. II, Chap. XV ), and therefore He has care of them. 5. It would be a foolish providence not to take care of those things without which the objects of one’s care could not exist. But certainly, if all particulars were to fail, universals could not remain. If then God has care of the universal only, and neglects the individual altogether, His providence must be foolish and imperfect. But if it is said that God has care of individuals so far as to see that they are maintained in being, but no further, that answer cannot stand. For all that befalls individuals has some bearing on their preservation or destruction. If therefore God has care of individuals so far as to see to their preservation, He must have care of all that befalls them. 7. This is the difference between speculative and practical knowledge, that speculative knowledge and all that concerns such knowledge is wrought out in generalities, whereas the sphere of practical knowledge is the particular. For the end of practical knowledge is truth, which consists primarily and ordinarily in the immaterial and universal, while the end of practical knowledge is action, which deals with particular facts. Hence the physician does not attend man in general, but this man; and to the care of the individual man the whole science of medicine is directed. But providence, being directive of things to their end, must be a department of practical knowledge. Thus the providence of God would be very imperfect, if it stopped short at the universal, and did not reach individual cases. 8. The perfection of speculative knowledge lies in the universal rather than in the particular: universals are better known than particulars; and therefore the knowledge of the most general principles is common to all. Still, even in speculative science, he is more perfect who has not a mere general but a concrete ( propriam ) knowledge of things. For he who knows in the general only, knows a thing only potentially. Thus the scholar is reduced from a general knowledge of principles to a concrete knowledge of conclusions by his master, who has both knowledges, — as a being is reduced from potentiality to actuality by another being, already in actuality. Much more in practical science is he more perfect, who disposes things for actuality not merely in the universal but in the particular. God’s most perfect providence therefore extends even to individuals. 9. Since God is the cause of being, as such (B. II, Chap. XV ), He must also be the provider of being, as such. Whatever then in any way is, falls under His providence. But singular things are beings, and indeed more so than universals, because universals do not subsist by themselves, but are only in singulars. Divine providence therefore has care also of singulars. Hence it is said: Two sparrows are sold for a farthing; and not one of them falls to the ground without your Father ( Matt. x, 29 ); and, [ Wisdom ] reaches from end to end strongly ( Wisd. viii, 1 ), that is, from the highest creatures to the lowest. Also their opinion is condemned who said: The Lord hath abandoned the earth, the Lord doth not see ( Ezech. ix, 9 ): He walketh about the poles of heaven, and doth not consider our things ( Job xxii, 14 ).\n\n### Chapter LXXVI. That the Providence of God watches immediately over all Individual Things\n\nCHAPTER LXXVI — That the Providence of God watches immediately over all Individual Things IN matters of human administration, the higher administrator confines his care to the arrangement of general main issues, and leaves details to his subordinates, and that on account of his personal limitations, because, as for the state and condition of lesser things, he is either ignorant of them, or he cannot afford the labour and length of time that would be necessary to arrange for them. But such limitations are far from God: it is no labour for Him to understand, and it takes Him no time, since in understanding Himself He understands all things else (B. I, Chap. XLIX ). 4. In human administrations, the industry and care of the lower officials arranges matters left to their charge by their chief. Their chief does not bestow upon them their faculty of industry and care, but merely allows it free play. If the industry and care came from their superior, the arrangement would be the superior’s arrangement; and they would not be authors of the arrangement, but carriers of it into execution. But we have seen (B. I, Chap. LI : B. III, Chap. LXVII ) that all wisdom and intelligence comes from God above; nor can any intellect understand anything except in the power of God, nor any agent do anything except in the same power. God Himself therefore by His providence immediately disposes all things; and whoever are called providers under Him, are executors of His providence. 7. If God does not by Himself take immediate care of lower individualities, that must be either because He despises them, or because He fears to sully His dignity, as some say. But that is irrational, for there is greater dignity in devising an arrangement than in working one out. If then God works in all things, as has been shown (Chap. LXVII ), and that is not derogatory to His dignity, nay rather befits His universal and sovereign power, an immediate providence over individual things is no contemptible occupation for Him either, and throws no slur upon His dignity. Hence it is said: Thou hast done the things of old and hast devised one thing after another ( Judith ix, 4 ).\n\n### Chapter LXXVII. That the arrangements of Divine Providence are carried into execution by means of Secondary Causes\n\nCHAPTER LXXVII — That the arrangements of Divine Providence are carried into execution by means of Secondary Causes IT belongs to the dignity of a ruler to have many ministers and diversity of servants to carry his command into execution, the height and greatness of his lordship appearing by the multitude of persons of various ranks who are subject to him: but no dignity of any ruler is comparable with the dignity of the divine government: it is suitable therefore that the arrangements of divine providence be carried into execution by divers grades of agents. 6. As the cause is superior to the effect, the order of causes is nobler than that of effects: in that order therefore the perfection of divine providence is better shown. But if there were not intermediate causes carrying divine providence into execution, there would be in creation no order of causes, but only of effects. The perfection therefore of divine providence requires that there should be intermediate causes carrying it into execution. Hence it is said: Bless the Lord, all his powers, ye ministers that do his word ( Ps. cii, 21 ): Fire, hail, snow, stormy winds that do his word ( Ps. cxlviii, 8 ).\n\n### Chapter LXXVIII. That Intelligent Creatures are the Medium through which other Creatures are governed by God\n\nCHAPTER LXXVIII — That Intelligent Creatures are the Medium through which other Creatures are governed by God SINCE the preservation of order in creation is a concern of divine providence, and it is a congruous order to descend by steps of due proportion from highest to lowest, divine providence must reach by a certain rule of proportion to the lowest things. The rule of proportion in this, that as the highest creatures are under God and are governed by Him, so lower creatures should be under the higher and be governed by them. But of all creatures intelligent creatures are the highest (Chap. XLIX ). Therefore the plan of divine providence requires that other creatures should be governed by rational creatures.\n\n### Chapter LXXXI. Of the Subordination of Men one to another\n\nCHAPTER LXXXI — Of the Subordination of Men one to another SINCE man is endowed with understanding and sense and bodily power, these faculties are arranged in order in him by the disposition of divine providence according to the plan of the order that obtains in the universe, bodily power being put under that of sense and intellect as carrying out their command, and the sentient faculty itself under the faculty of intellect. And similar is the order between man and man. Men pre-eminent in understanding naturally take the command; while men poor in understanding, but of great bodily strength, seem by nature designate for servants, as Aristotle says in his Politics , with whom Solomon is of one mind, saying: The fool shall serve the wise ( Prov. xi, 29 ). But as in the works of one man disorder is born of intellect following sense, so in the commonwealth the like disorder ensues where the ruler holds his place, not by pre-eminence of understanding, but by usurpation of bodily strength, or is brought into power by some burst of passion. Nor is Solomon silent upon this disorder: There is an evil that I have seen under the sun, a fool set in high estate ( Eccles x, 5, 6 ). But even such an anomaly does not carry with it the entire perversion of the natural order: for the dominion of fools is weak, unless strengthened by the counsel of the wise. Hence it is said: A wise man is strong, and a knowing man stout and valiant: because war is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels ( Prov. xxiv, 5, 6 ). And because he who gives counsel rules him who takes it, and becomes in a manner his master, it is said: A wise servant shall be master over foolish sons ( Prov. xvii, 2 ).\n\n### Chapter LXXXVIII. That other Subsistent Intelligences cannot be direct Causes of our Elections  and Volitions\n\nCHAPTER LXXXVIII — That other Subsistent Intelligences cannot be direct Causes of our Elections and Volitions NOR is it to be thought that the souls of the heavens, if any such souls there be, or any other separately subsisting created intelligences, can directly thrust a volition in upon us, or be the cause of our choice. For the actions of all creatures are contained in the order of divine providence, and cannot act contrary to the conditions of action which providence has laid down. Now it is a law of providence that everything be immediately induced to action by its own proximate cause. But the proximate cause of volition is good apprehended by the understanding: that is the proper object of the will, and the will is moved by it as sight by colour. No subsistent creature therefore can move the will except through the medium of good grasped by the understanding. That is done by showing it that something is good to do, which is called persuasion. No subsistent creature therefore can act upon our will, or be the cause of our choice, otherwise than by means of persuasion. 4. “The violent is that the origin whereof is from without, without the subject of violence in any way contributing thereto.” Were then the will to be moved by any exterior principle, that motion would be violent. I call that an exterior principle of motion, which moves as an efficient cause, and not as a final cause. But violence is inconsistent with voluntariness. It is impossible therefore for the will to be moved to voluntary action by an exterior principle acting as an efficient cause, but every motion of the will must proceed from within. Now no subsistent creature is in touch with the interior of an intelligent soul: God alone is in such close connexion with the soul, as He alone is cause of its being and maintains it in existence. Therefore by God alone can a motion of the will be efficiently caused. Hence it is said: The king’s heart is in the hand of the Lord: he shall turn it whithersoever he will ( Prov. xxi, 1 ); and, God it is worketh in us both to will and to accomplish according to his good pleasure ( Phil. ii, 13 ).\n\n### Chapter LXXXIX. That the Motion of the Will is caused by God, and not merely by the Power of the Will\n\nCHAPTER LXXXIX — That the Motion of the Will is caused by God, and not merely by the Power of the Will SOME, not understanding how God can cause the movement of the will in us without prejudice to the freedom of the will, have endeavoured to pervert the meaning of these texts, saying that God causes in us to will and to accomplish, inasmuch as He gives us the power of willing, but not as making us will this or that. Hence some have said that providence is not concerned with the subject-matter of free will, that is, with choices, but with extrinsic issues: for he who makes choice of something to gain or something to accomplish, for instance, building or the amassing of wealth, will not always be able to attain his end, and thus the issues of our actions are not subject to free will, but are disposed by providence. 1. But this theory runs manifestly counter to texts of Holy Scripture. For it is said: All our works thou hast wrought in us, O Lord ( Isai. xxvi, 12 ): hence we have of God not merely the power of willing, but also the act. And the above quoted saying of Solomon, he shall turn it whithersoever he will , shows that the divine causality extends at once to will-power and to actual volition. 2. Nothing can act in its own strength unless it act also in the power of God (Chap. LXVI ): therefore man cannot use the will-power given to him except in so far as he acts in the power of God. 4. God is the cause of all action, and works in every agent (Chap. LXX ): therefore He is cause of the motives of the will.\n\n### Chapter XC. That Human Choices and Volitions are subject to Divine Providence\n\nCHAPTER XC — That Human Choices and Volitions are subject to Divine Providence THE government of providence proceeds from the divine love where with God loves His creatures. Love consists chiefly in the lover wishing good to the loved one. The more God loves things, then, the more they fall under His providence. This Holy Writ teaches, saying: God guards all that love him (Ps. cxliv, 20); and the Philosopher also teaches that God has especial care of those who love understanding, and considers them His friends. Hence He loves especially subsistent intelligences, and their volitions and choices fall under His providence. 6. The inward good endowments of man, which depend on his will and choice, are more proper to man than external endowments, as the gaining of riches: hence it is according to the former that man is said to be good, not according to the latter. If then human choices and motions of the will do not fall under divine providence, but only external advantages, it will be more true to say that human affairs are beyond providence than that they are under providence.\n\n### Chapter XCI. How Human Things are reduced to Higher Causes\n\nCHAPTER XCI — How Human Things are reduced to Higher Causes FROM what has been shown above we are able to gather how human things are reducible to higher causes, and do not proceed by chance. For choices and motives of wills are arranged immediately by God: human intellectual knowledge is directed by God through the intermediate agency of angels: corporeal events, whether interior (to the human body) or exterior, that serve the need of man, are adjusted by God through the intermediate agency of angels and of the heavenly bodies. All this arrangement proceeds upon one general axiom, which is this: ‘Everything manifold and mutable and liable to fail may be reduced to some principle uniform and immutable and unfailing.’ But everything about our selves proves to be manifold, variable, and defectible. Our choices are evidently manifold, since different things are chosen by different persons in different circumstances. They are likewise mutable, as well on account of the fickleness of our mind, which is not confirmed in its last end, as also on account of changes of circumstance and environment. That they are defectible, the sins of men clearly witness. On the other hand, the will of God is uniform, because in willing one thing He wills all other things: it is also immutable and indefectible (B. I, Chapp. XXIII , LXXV ). Therefore all motions of volition and choice must be reduced to the divine will, and not to any other cause, because God alone is the cause of our volitions and elections. In like manner our intelligence is liable to multiplicity, inasmuch as we gather intelligible truth from many sensible objects. It is also mutable, inasmuch as it proceeds by reasoning from one point to another, passing from known to unknown. It is also defectible from the admixture of phantasy and sense, as the errors of mankind show. But the cognitions of the angels are uniform, as they receive the knowledge of truth from the one fountain of truth, God (B. II, Chapp. XCVIII , C , with notes). It is also immutable, because not by any argument from effects to causes, nor from causes to effects, but by simple intuition do they gaze upon the pure truth of things. It is also indefectible, since they discern the very natures of things, or their quiddities in themselves, about which quiddities intelligence cannot err, as neither can sense err about the primary objects of the several senses. But we learn the quiddities (essences) of things from their accidents and effects. Our intellectual knowledge then must be regulated by the knowledge of the angels. Again, about human bodies and the exterior things which men use, it is manifest that there is in them the multiplicity of mixture and contrariety; and that they do not always move in the same way, because their motions cannot be continuous; and that they are defectible by alteration and corruption. But the heavenly bodies are uniform, as being simple and made up without any contrariety of elements. Their motions also are uniform, continuous, and always executed in the same way: nor can there be in them corruption or alteration. Hence our bodies, and other things that come under our use, must necessarily be regulated by the motion of the heavenly bodies.\n\n### Chapter XCII. In what sense one is said to be Fortunate, and how Man is aided by Higher Causes\n\nCHAPTER XCII — In what sense one is said to be Fortunate, and how Man is aided by Higher Causes GOOD fortune is said to befall a man, when something good happens to him beyond his intention, as when one digging a field finds a treasure that he was not looking for. Now an agent may do something beyond his own intention, and yet not beyond the intention of some agent whom he is under: as if a master were to bid a servant to go to some place, to which he had sent another servant without the first servant knowing of it, the meeting with his fellow-servant would be beyond the intention of the servant sent, and yet not beyond the intention of the master sending: in reference to the servant it will be luck and chance, but not in reference to the master, — to him it is an arrangement. Since then man is subordinate in body to the forces of physical nature ( corporibus coelestibus ), subordinate in intellect to the angels, and subordinate in will to God, a thing may happen beside the intention of man, which is nevertheless according to the order of physical nature ( corporum coelestium ), or according to the arrangement of angels, or again of God. But though God alone works directly upon man’s choice, yet the action of an angel does something for that choice by way of persuasion, while the action of the heavenly body (of the forces of physical nature) does something by way of predisposition, inasmuch as the bodily impressions of the heavenly bodies (physical forces) upon our bodies predispose us to certain choices. When then under the impression of the physical forces of nature ( coelestium corporum ) one is swayed to certain choices that prove useful to him, though his own reason does not discern their utility; and simultaneously under the light shed on him by separately subsistent intelligences, his understanding is enlightened to do those acts, and his will is swayed by a divine act to choose that useful course, the utility whereof goes unperceived by him, — then he is said to be a ‘fortunate man.’ But here a difference is to be noted. For the action of the angel and of the physical force ( corporis coelestis ) merely predisposes the man to choose, but the action of God accomplishes the choice. And since the predisposition that comes of the bodily affection, or of the persuasion of the understanding, does not induce necessity of choice, man does not always choose that which his guardian angel intends, nor that to which physical nature ( corpus coeleste ) inclines, but man always chooses that which God works in his will. Hence the guardianship of the angels sometimes comes to nought, according to the text: We have tended Babylon, but she is not healed ( Jerem. li, 9 ). And much more may physical inclination ( inclinatio coelestium corporum ) come to nought: but divine providence always holds firm. It is further to be observed that good or ill fortune may befall a man as a matter of luck, so far as his intention goes, and so far as the working of the prime forces of nature ( corpora coelestia ) goes, and so far as the mind of the angels goes, but not in regard of God: for in reference to God nothing is by chance, nothing unforeseen, either in human life or anywhere else in creation.\n\n### Chapter XCIII. Of Fate, whether there be such a thing, and if so, what it is\n\nCHAPTER XCIII — Of Fate, whether there be such a thing, and if so, what it is SOME when they say that all things are done by fate, mean by fate the destiny that is in things by disposition of divine providence. Hence Boethius says: “Fate is a disposition inherent in changeable things, whereby providence assigns them each to their several orders.” In this description of fate ‘disposition’ is put for ‘destiny.’ It is said to be ‘inherent in things,’ to distinguish fate from providence: for destiny as it is in the divine mind, not yet impressed on creation, is providence; but inasmuch as it is already unfolded in creatures, it is called ‘fate.’ He says ‘in changeable things’ to show that the order of providence does not take away from things their contingency and changeableness. In this understanding, to deny fate is to deny divine providence. But because with unbelievers we ought not even to have names in common, lest from agreement in terminology there be taken an occasion of error, the faithful should not use the name of ‘fate,’ not to appear to fall in with those who construe fate wrongly, subjecting all things to the necessity imposed by the stars. Hence Augustine says: “If any man calls by the name of fate the might or power of God, let him keep his opinion, but mend his speech” ( De civit. Dei , V, 1). And Gregory: “Far be it from the minds of the faithful to say that there is such a thing as fate” ( Hom. 10 in Epiphan. )\n\n### Chapter XCIV. Of the Certainty of Divine Providence\n\nCHAPTER XCIV — Of the Certainty of Divine Providence IT will be necessary now to repeat some of the things that have been said before, to make it evident that (a) nothing escapes divine providence, and the order of divine providence can nowise be changed; and yet (b) it does not follow that the events which happen under divine providence all happen of necessity. ( a ) Our first point of study is this, that as God is the cause of all existing things, conferring being on them all, the order of His providence must embrace all things: for He must grant preservation to those to whom He has granted existence, and bestow on them perfection in the attainment of their last end. In the case of every one who has to provide for others there are two things to observe, the pre-arranging of the order intended and the setting of the pre-arranged order on foot. The former is an exercise of intellectual ability, the latter of practical. The difference between the two is this, that in the pre-arrangement of order the providence is more perfect, the further the arrangement can be extended even to the least details: there would be not many parts of prudence in him who was competent only to arrange generalities: but in the carrying of the order out into effect the providence of the ruler is marked by greater dignity and completeness the more general it is, and the more numerous the subordinate functionaries through whom he fulfils his design, for the very marshalling of those functionaries makes a great part of the foreseen arrangement. Divine providence, therefore, being absolutely perfect (B. I, Chap. XXVIII ), arranges all things by the eternal forethought of its wisdom, down to the smallest details, no matter how trifling they appear. And all agents that do any work act as instruments in His hands, and minister in obedience to Him, to the unfolding of that order of providence in creation which He has from eternity devised. But if all things that act must necessarily minister to Him in their action, it is impossible for any agent to hinder the execution of divine providence by acting contrary to it. Nor is it possible for divine providence to be hindered by the defect of any agent or patient, since all active or passive power in creation is caused according to the divine arrangement. Again it is impossible for the execution of divine providence to be hindered by any change of providence, since God is wholly unchangeable (B. I, Chap. XV ). The conclusion remains, that the divine provision cannot be annulled. ( b ) Now to our second point of study. Every agent intends good, and better so far as it can (Chap. III ). But good and better do not have place in the same way in a whole and in its parts. In the whole the good is the entire effect arising out of the order and composition of the parts: hence it is better for the whole that there should be inequality among the parts, without which inequality the order and perfection of the whole cannot be, than that all the parts should be equal, every one of them attaining to the rank of the noblest part. And yet, considered by itself, every part of lower rank would be better if it were in the rank of some superior part. Thus in the human body the foot would be a more dignified part of man if it had the beauty and power of the eye; but the whole body would be worse off for lacking the office of the foot. The scope and aim therefore of the particular agent is not the same as that of the universal agent. The particular agent tends to the good of the part absolutely, and makes the best of it that it can; but the universal agent tends to the good of the whole: hence a defect may be beside the intention of the particular agent, but according to the intention of the universal agent. It is the intention of the particular agent that its effect should be perfect to the utmost possible in its kind: but it is the intention of the universal agent that this effect be carried to a certain degree of perfection and no further. Now between the parts of the universe the first apparent difference is that of contingent and necessary. Beings of a higher order are necessary and indestructible and unchangeable: from which condition beings fall away, the lower the rank in which they are placed; so that the lowest beings suffer destruction in their being and change in their constitution, and produce their effects, not necessarily, but contingently. Every agent therefore that is part of the universe endeavours, so far as it can, to abide in its being and natural constitution, and to establish its effect: but God, the governor of the universe, intends that of the effects which take place in it one be established as of necessity, another as of contingency; and with this view He applies different causes to them, necessary causes to these effects, contingent causes to those. It falls under divine providence therefore, not only that this effect be, but also that this effect be necessarily, that other contingently. Thus, of things subject to divine providence, some are necessary, and others contingent, not all necessary. Hence it is clear that this conditional proposition is true: ‘If God has foreseen this thing in the future, it will be.’ But it will be as God has provided that it shall be; and supposing that He has provided that it shall be contingently, it follows infallibly that it will be contingently, and not necessarily. Cicero ( De divinatione ii, 8) has this argument: ‘If all things are foreseen by God, the order of causes is certain; but if so, all things happen by fate, nothing is left in our power, and there is no such thing as free will.’ A frivolous argument, for since not only effects are subject to divine providence, but also causes, and modes of being, it follows that though all things happen by divine providence, some things are so foreseen by God as that they are done freely by us. Nor can the defectibility of secondary causes, by means of which the effects of providence are produced, take away the certainty of divine providence: for since God works in all things, it belongs to His providence sometimes to allow defectible causes to fail, and sometimes to keep them from failing. The Philosopher shows that if every effect has a proper cause ( causam per se ), every future event may be reduced to some present or past cause. Thus if the question is put concerning any one, whether he is to be slain by robbers, that effect proceeds from a cause, his meeting with robbers; and that effect again is preceded by another cause, his going out of his house; and that again by another, his wanting to find water; the preceding cause to which is thirst, and this is caused by eating salt meat, which he either is doing or has done. If then, positing the cause, the effect must be posited of necessity, he must necessarily be thirsty, if he eats salt meat; and he must necessarily will to seek water, if he is thirsty; and be must necessarily go out of the house, if he wills to seek water; and the robbers must necessarily come across him, if he goes out of the house; and if they come across him, he must be killed. Therefore from first to last it is necessary for this man eating salt meat to be killed by robbers. The philosopher concludes that it is not true that, positing the cause, the effect must be posited, because there are some causes that may fail. Nor again is it true that every effect has a proper cause: for any accidental effect, e.g., of this man wishing to look for water and falling in with robbers, has no cause.\n\n### Chapter XCV, XCVI. That the Immutability of Divine Providence does not bar the Utility of Prayer\n\nCHAPTERS XCV, XCVI — That the Immutability of Divine Providence does not bar the Utility of Prayer AS the immutability of divine providence does not impose necessity on things foreseen, so neither does it bar the utility of prayer. For prayer is not poured out to God that the eternal arrangement of providence may be changed, — that is impossible, — but that man may gain what he desires of God. It is fitting for God to assent to the pious desires of His rational creatures, not that our desires move the immutability of God, but it is an outcome of His goodness suitably to carry out what we desire. 4. It is proper for friends to will the same thing. Now God loves His creature (B. I, Chap. XCI ) and every creature all the more that the said creature has a share in His goodness, which is the prime and principal object of God’s love. But, of all creatures, the rational creature most perfectly partakes in the divine goodness. God therefore wills the fulfilment of the desires of the rational creature. And His will is effective of things. 5. The goodness of the creature is derived in point of likeness from the goodness of God. But it is a point of special commendation in men, not to deny assent to just requests: thereupon they are called ‘liberal,’ ‘clement,’ ‘merciful and kind.’ This therefore is a very great function of divine goodness, to hear pious prayers. Hence it is said: He will do the will of them that fear him, and hear their prayers and save them ( Ps. cxliv, 9 ): Every one that asketh receiveth, and he that seeketh findeth, and the door shall be opened to him that knocketh ( Matt. vii, 8 ). From what has been said it appears that prayers and pious desires are causes of some things that are done by God. It has been shown above (Chap. LXXVII ) that divine providence does not bar the working of other causes, nay, rather it directs them in the work of imposing upon creation the order which providence in its own counsels has determined upon. Thus secondary causes are not inconsistent with providence, but rather carry providence into effect. Thus then prayers are efficacious with God, not however as breaking through the order of divine providence, because this very arrangement, that such a concession be made to such a petitioner, falls under the order of divine providence. Therefore to say that we should not pray to gain any thing of God, because the order of His providence is unchangeable, is like saying that we should not walk to get to a place, nor eat to support life. Thus a twofold error concerning prayer is excluded. Some have said that there is no fruit of prayer. This was said as well on the part of those who denied divine providence, as the Epicureans did; as also on the part of those who withdrew human affairs from divine providence, as some of the Peripatetics did; as also on the part of those who thought that all things happen of necessity, as the Stoics did. From all these tenets it would follow that prayer is fruitless, and consequently all divine worship in vain: which error is referred to in Malachy iii, 14 : Ye have said: he laboureth in vain who serveth God, and what profit is it that we have kept his ordinances, and that we have walked sad before the Lord of Hosts? There were others on the contrary who said that the divine arrangement was reversible by prayer. And the prima facie rendering of certain texts of scripture seems to favour this view. Thus, after Isaias by divine command had said to King Ezechias: Put thine house in order, for thou shalt die and not live ; yet upon Ezechias’s prayer the word of the Lord came to Isaias, saying: Go and tell Ezechias: I have heard thy prayer, lo I will add to thy days fifteen years ( Isa. xxxviii, 1-5 ). Again it is said in the person of the Lord: I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and pull down and destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them ( Jer. xviii, 7, 8 ); Turn to the Lord your God, for he is gracious and merciful: who knoweth but he will turn and forgive? ( Joel ii, 13, 14 .) But against construing these texts to mean that the will of God is changeable, or that anything happens to God in time, or that temporal events in creation are the cause of anything coming to exist in God, there are other authorities of Holy Writ, containing infallible and express truth. Thus it is said: God is not as man, that he should die, nor as the son of man, that he should change. Has he said then and shall not do? Has he spoken and shall not fulfil? ( Num. xxiii, 19 ): The victorious one in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance: for he is not a man that he should repent ( 1 Kings xv, 29 ): I am the Lord and change not ( Malach. iii, 6 ). On careful consideration it will appear that all mistakes in this matter arise from failing to note the difference between the system of the universe and any particular system ( universalem ordinem et particularem ). There is nothing to hinder any particular system being changed, whether by prayer or by any other means; for there is that existing beyond the bounds of the system which is capable of changing it. But beyond the system that embraces all things nothing can be posited whereby such system could possibly be changed, depending as it does on the universal cause. Therefore the Stoics laid it down that the system established by God could nowise be changed. But they failed in a right appreciation of this general system in supposing that prayers were useless, which was taking for granted that the wills of men, and their desires whence their prayers proceed, are not comprehended in that general system. For when they say that the same effect follows whether prayers are put up or not, — follows, that is, as part of the univeral system of things, — they manifestly reserve and except prayers as not entering into that general system. Supposing prayers included in the system, then effects will follow from them by divine appointment as from other causes. One might as well exclude the effects of other every-day causes as exclude the effect of prayer. And if the immutability of the divine plan does not withdraw the effects of other causes, neither does it take away the efficacy of prayer. Prayers then avail, not as changing a system arranged from eternity, but as being themselves part of that system. And there is no difficulty in the efficacy of prayer changing the particular system of some inferior cause, by the doing of God, who overpasses all causes, and who consequently is not bound by the necessity of any system depending on any cause; but on the contrary every necessity of system dependent on any inferior cause is checked by Him, as having been instituted by Him. Inasmuch then as pious prayers avail to alter some points of the system of inferior causes that was established by God, God is said to ‘turn,’ or ‘repent.’ Hence Gregory says that God does not change His counsel, though He sometimes changes His sentence, not the sentence which declares His eternal arrangements, but the sentence which declares the order of inferior causes, according to which Ezechias was to die, or some nation to be punished for its sins. Such change of sentence is called in metaphorical language ‘repentance,’ inasmuch as God behaves like one repentant, to whom it belongs to change what He has done. In the same way God is said metaphorically to be ‘angry,’ inasmuch as by punishing He produces the effect of anger. (B. I, Chap. XCI ad fin .)\n\n### Chapter XCVI. That God does not hear all Prayers\n\nCHAPTER XCVI — That God does not hear all Prayers THERE is no anomaly in the prayers of petitioners being sometimes not granted by God. For God fulfils the desires of His rational creature inasmuch as that creature desires good: but sometimes it happens that what is asked is not true but seeming good, which is simply evil: such a prayer is not within the hearing of God. Hence it is said: Ye ask and receive not, because ye ask amiss ( James iv, 3 ). 2. It is suitable that God should fulfil our desires in so far as He moves us to desire. If therefore the movement of desire on our part is not kept up by earnestness in prayer, there is nothing to be surprised at if the prayer does not gain its due effect. Hence the Lord [St Luke] says: We ought always to pray and not to faint ( Luke xviii, 1 ); and the Apostle, Pray without ceasing ( 1 Thess. v, 17 ). 3. It befits God to hear the prayer of the rational creature inasmuch as that creature draws nigh to Him. But one draws nigh to God by contemplation and devout affection and humble and firm intention. That prayer therefore which does not so draw nigh to God is not within God’s hearing. Hence it is said: He hath regarded the prayer of the humble ( Ps. ci, 18 ); and, Let him ask in faith, debating not within himself ( James i, 6 ). 4. God hears the prayers of the pious on the ground of friendship. He then who turns away from the friendship of God is not worthy to have his prayer heard. Hence it is said: Whosoever turns away his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be abominable ( Prov. xxviii, 9 ): Though ye multiply prayers, I will not hear: for your hands are full of blood ( Isai. i, 15 ). This is why sometimes a friend of God is not heard, when he prays for those who are not God’s friends, as it was said: Do not thou pray for this people, nor take unto thee praise and supplication for them, and do not withstand me: for I will not hear thee ( Jerem. vii, 16 ). It happens sometimes that for very friendship one denies his friend’s petition, knowing it to be hurtful to him, or the contrary to be better for him, as a physician refuses what his patient asks for. No wonder then if God, who fulfils the desires put before Him by His rational creature for the love that He bears to that creature, fails sometimes to fulfil the petition of those whom He singularly loves, that He may fulfil it otherwise with something more helpful to the salvation of the petitioner, as we read in 2 Cor. xii, 7-9 ; and the Lord says to some: Ye know not what ye ask ( Matt. xx, 22 ). Therefore Augustine says ( Ep. ad Paulin. et Theras. ): “The Lord is good in often not giving what we will, to give instead what we should prefer.”\n\n### Chapter XCVII. How the Arrangements of Providence follow a Plan\n\nCHAPTER XCVII — How the Arrangements of Providence follow a Plan GOD by His providence directs all things to the end of the divine goodness, not that anything accrues as an addition to His goodness by the things that He makes, but His aim is the impression of the likeness of His goodness so far as possible on creation. But inasmuch as every created substance must fall short of the perfection of the divine goodness, it was needful to have diversity in things for the more perfect communication of the divine goodness, that what cannot perfectly be represented by one created exemplar, might be represented by divers such exemplars in divers ways in a more perfect manner. Thus man multiplies his words to express by divers expressions the conception of his mind, which cannot all be put in one word. And herein we may consider the excellence of the divine perfection shown in this, that the perfect goodness which is in God united and simple, cannot be in creatures except according to diversity of modes and in many subjects. Things are different by having different forms, whence they take their species. Thus then the end of creation furnishes a reason for the diversity of forms in things. From the diversity of forms follows a difference of activities, and further a diversity of agents and patients, properties and accidents. Evidently then it is not without reason that divine providence distributes to creatures different accidents and actions and impressions and allocations. Hence it is said: The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth, hath established the heavens in prudence. By his wisdom the depths have broken out, and the clouds grow thick with dew ( Prov. iii, 19, 20 ). As it is necessary for one wishing to build a house to look out for timber, but his looking out for pitch-pine ( ligna abietina ) depends on his mere will, not on his plan of building a house; so it is necessary for God to love His own goodness, but it does not thence necessarily follow that He should wish to have that goodness represented by creatures, since the divine goodness is perfect without that. Hence the bringing of creatures into being depends on the mere will of God, although it is done in consideration of the divine goodness. Supposing however that God wishes to communicate His goodness by way of similitude as far as possible, it logically follows thence that there should be creatures of different sorts: but it does not follow of necessity that creatures should be of this or that grade of perfection, or exist in this or that number. But supposing that it is in the divine will to wish this number in creation, and this grade of perfection in each creature, it thence follows logically that creation be in such and such form, and such and such matter; and so of further consequences. Manifestly then providence disposes of things according to a certain plan, and yet this plan presupposes the divine will. What has been said shuts out two errors, the error of those who believe that all things follow mere will without reason, which is the error of sundry Doctors of the Mohammedan law, as Rabbi Moses says; according to whose teaching, the only difference between fire warming and fire freezing is God’s so willing the former alternative; and again the error is shut out of those who say that the order of causes springs from divine providence by way of necessity. There are certain words of Holy Scripture which appear to put down all things to the mere will of God. Their meaning is not to take away all rational character from the dispensations of Providence, but to show that the will of God is the first principle of all things. Such texts are: All things, whatsoever he hath willed, the Lord hath done ( Ps. cxxxiv, 6 :) Who can say to him, Why doth thou so? ( Job ix, 12 :) Who resisteth his will? ( Rom. ix, 19 .) And Augustine ( De Trin. III:) “Nothing but the will of God is the prime cause of health and sickness, of rewards and punishments, of graces and recompenses.” Thus in answer to the question, Why? asked of any natural effect, we can render a reason from some proximate cause, yet so that we reduce all things to the prime cause. Thus if it is asked why wood gets hot in presence of fire, it is answered [etc., etc., in terms of Aristotelian physics], and so on till we come to the will of God [who willed to create matter and energy, such as we know them, from the beginning]. Hence whoever answers the question, why the wood got hot, Because God has willed it so, answers appropriately, if he intends to carry back the question to the prime cause; but inappropriately, if he intends to exclude all other causes.\n\n### Chapter XCIX. God can work beyond the Order laid down for Creatures, and produce Effects without Proximate Causes\n\nCHAPTER XCIX — God can work beyond the Order laid down for Creatures, and produce Effects without Proximate Causes SINCE accidents follow upon the substantial principles of the thing, he who immediately produces the substance of a thing must be able immediately to work in the thing whatever effects follow upon substantial existence. But God by creation has brought all things immediately into being. He can therefore immediately move anything to any effect without intermediate causes. But if any one says that, once God has fixed an orderly course of events, He cannot change it without changing Himself; and that He would change Himself, if ever He worked in the world to the production of effects apart from their own proper causes, such a saying may be refuted by a study of nature. For the orderly course of events fixed by God, if we look at it as it obtains in creation, will be found to hold for the most part, but not everywhere or always: for sometimes, although in a minority of cases, the thing turns out otherwise, either for lack of power in the agent, or for indisposition of the matter, or from some vis major supervening. Yet not on that account does the law of providence fail or suffer change: for it comes under providence that the natural course of things, instituted to hold usually, should sometimes fail. If therefore by the action of some created power the natural course of events may be altered from the usual to the unusual, and that without any alteration of divine providence, much more may the divine power sometimes do a thing, without prejudice to its own providence, beyond the course assigned to natural events by God. This God does at times to manifest His power: for there is no better way of manifesting the subjection of all nature to the divine will than by something being done at times beyond the course of nature: for thereby it appears that the course of events proceeds from Him, and is not of necessity of nature, but through free will. Nor should this be accounted a frivolous reason to allege, that God works some effects in nature to the end of manifesting Himself to human minds, since it has been shown that all the material creation is subordinated to serve the end of intellectual nature, while the end of intellectual nature itself is the knowledge of God. No wonder then if some change is wrought in corporeal substance to afford intelligent nature a knowledge of God.\n\n### Chapter C. That the things which God does beyond the Order of Nature are not contrary to Nature\n\nCHAPTER C — That the things which God does beyond the Order of Nature are not contrary to Nature SINCE God is prime agent, all things inferior to Him are as His instruments. But instruments are made to serve the end of the prime agent, according as they are moved by Him: therefore it is not contrary to, but very much in accordance with, the nature of the instrument, for it to be moved by the prime agent. Neither is it contrary to nature for created things to be moved in any way whatsoever ( qualitercunque ) by God: for they were made to serve Him. 4. The first measure of every being and of every nature is God, seeing that He is the first being and canse of being to all. And since everything must be judged by its measure, that must be called ‘natural’ to a thing whereby it is conformed to its measure, or standard. That then will be natural to a thing, which has been put into it by God. Therefore, though something further be impressed upon a thing, making it otherwise than as it was before, that is not against nature. 5. All creatures stand to God as the products of art to the artist (B. II, Chap. XXIV ). Hence all nature may be called an artistic product of divine workmanship ( artificiatum divinae artis ). But it is not contrary to the notion of workmanship for the artist to work something to a different effect in his work, even after he has given it the first form. Neither then is it contrary to nature if God works something in natural things to a different effect from that which the ordinary course of nature involves. Hence Augustine says: “God, the Creator and Founder of all natures, does nothing contrary to nature, because to every creature that is natural which He makes so, of whom is all measure, number and order of nature.\n\n### Chapter CI. Of Miracles\n\nCHAPTER CI — Of Miracles CHAPTER 101—THINGS that are done occasionally by divine power outside of the usual established order of events are commonly called miracles (wonders). We wonder when we see an effect and do not know the cause. And because one and the same cause is sometimes known to some and unknown to others, it happens that of the witnesses of the effect some wonder and some do not wonder: thus an astronomer does not wonder at seeing an eclipse of the sun, at which a person that is ignorant of astronomy cannot help wondering. An event is wonderful relatively to one man and not to another. The absolutely wonderful is that which has a cause absolutely hidden. This then is the meaning of the word ‘miracle,’ an event of itself full of wonder, not to this man or that man only. Now the cause absolutely hidden to every man is God, inasmuch as no man in this life can mentally grasp the essence of God (Chap. XLVII ). Those events then are properly to be styled miracles, which happen by divine power beyond the order commonly observed in nature. Of these miracles there are several ranks and orders. Miracles of the highest rank are those in which something is done by God that nature can never do. Miracles of the second rank are those in which God does something that nature can do, but not in that sequence and connexion. Thus it is a work of nature that an animal should live, see and walk: but that it should live after death, see after blindness, walk after lameness, these things nature is powerless to effect, but God sometimes brings them about miraculously. A miracle of the third rank is something done by God, which is usually done by the operation of nature, but is done in this case without the working of natural principles, as when one is cured by divine power of a fever, in itself naturally curable, or when it rains without any working of the elements.\n\n### Chapter CII. That God alone works Miracles\n\nCHAPTER CII — That God alone works Miracles WHAT is entirely subject to established order cannot work beyond that order. But every creature is subject to the order which God has established in nature. No creature therefore can work beyond this order, which working beyond the order of nature is the meaning of working miracles. 2. When any finite power works the proper effect to which it is determined, that is no miracle, though it may surprise one who does not understand the operation. But the power of every creature is limited to some definite effect, or effects. Whatever therefore is done by the power of any creature cannot properly be called a miracle. But what is done by the power of God, infinite and incomprehensible, is properly a miracle. 3. Every creature in its action requires some subject to act upon: for it belongs to God alone to make a thing out of nothing (B. II, Chap. XXI ). But nothing that requires a subject for its action can act except to the production of those effects to which that subject is in potentiality: for the work of action upon a subject is to educe that subject from potentiality to actuality. As then a creature can never create, so it can never act upon a thing except to the production of that which is in the potentiality of that thing. But in many miracles done by divine power a thing is done, which is not in the potentiality of that upon which it is done, as in the raising of the dead. Hence it is said of God: Who doth great wonderful works alone ( Ps. cxxxv, 4 ).\n\n### Chapter CIII. How Separately Subsisting Spirits work certain Wonders, which yet are not true Miracles\n\nCHAPTER CIII — How Separately Subsisting Spirits work certain Wonders, which yet are not true Miracles IT was the theory of Avicenna that matter is far more obedient to spiritual agencies than to the action of contraries in nature. Hence he goes on to say that upon the suggestion of these spiritual agents there sometimes follows an effect in the lower world, such as rain, or the cure of some sick person, without the coming in of any intermediate corporeal agency. He instances the change wrought in the body by the mere suggestion of a strong impression of phantasy, as when one walking upon a plank set aloft easily falls, because his fear pictures a fall to him, whereas he would not fall if the same plank were laid on the ground, giving him no occasion to fear. Again it is notorious that upon the mere suggestion of the soul the body grows hot, as in desire or anger, or is chilled, as in fear. Sometimes too a strong suggestion brings on an illness, a fever, or even leprosy. Thereupon Avicenna says that if the soul is pure, not subject to bodily passions, and strong in its suggestive power, not only its own body will obey its suggestion, but even foreign bodies, even to the healing of the sick upon suggestion made by it. And this he thought to be the cause of the evil eye ( fascinationis ), that any soul having a strong affection of malevolence is capable of making a noxious impression on another, particularly on a child, who for the tenderness of his constitution is readily susceptible of such impressions. Hence he concludes that much more does an effect in this lower world follow upon the suggestion of pure spirits, without the action of any bodily agent. And this position tallies well enough with his other theories: for he supposes that all substantial forms in this lower world are effluxes from a pure spirit, and that bodily agents do no more than prepare the matter to receive the impression of the separately subsisting spiritual agent. But this is not true according to the doctrine of Aristotle, who proves that such forms as are in matter arise from other forms which are also in matter, for thus is maintained the likeness between maker and made. The fact is, a created spirit has no power of its own to induce any form upon corporeal matter otherwise than by setting some body into local motion. This much is in the power of a created spirit, to make a body obey it to the extent of moving locally. So by moving a body locally an angel can employ natural agents to the production of certain effects. But such action is not miraculous, properly speaking. Hence it remains true that created spirits do not work miracles of their own power. But there is nothing against their working miracles inasmuch as they work in the power of God, as appears from the fact that one choir of angels is especially told off, as Gregory says, to work miracles. Gregory further says that some saints sometimes work miracles by an act of power, and not merely by intercession.\n\n### Chapter CIV. That the Works of Magicians are not due solely to the Influence of the Heavenly Spheres\n\nCHAPTER CIV — That the Works of Magicians are not due solely to the Influence of the Heavenly Spheres\n\n### Chapter CV. Whence the performances of Magicians derive their Efficacy\n\nCHAPTER CV — Whence the performances of Magicians derive their Efficacy MAGICIANS in their performances use certain words with a meaning to the production of definite effects. Now a word, as meaning something, has no power except from some understanding, the understanding either of him who utters the word or of him to whom it is uttered: from the understanding of the utterer, in the case where a word is of such power that by the idea which it contains it is apt to produce real effects, the idea being applied to the production of those effects by the ministry of the voice: from the understanding of the person addressed, in the case when the hearer is induced to do something by the reception into his understanding of the idea conveyed by the word. Now it cannot be said that those words, uttered by magicians with a meaning, have their efficacy from the understanding of him who utters them. For, since power follows upon essence, difference of power argues a difference of essential principle. But we find the condition of the understanding of men generally to be such that it is more true to say that its cognition is caused by things than that any idea which it conceives can be the cause of things. If then there are any men who by words expressive of the concept of their understanding can change things one into another, and do that by power of their own ( res possint transmutare propria virtute ), they must be beings of another species from ordinary mortals, and cannot be called men in the sense in which others are men ( dicentur aequivoce homines ). The alternative is to suppose that such effects are accomplished by the understanding of some person, to whom the speech of him who utters such words is addressed. This supposition has its confirmation in the fact that the expressions which magicians use consist of invocations, entreaties, adjurations, or even commands, as of one person talking with another. Besides, in the ceremonies of this art they employ certain characters and geometrical figures. But a figure is no principle of action, imparted or received: or else mathematical drawings would be active and passive. Matter therefore cannot be disposed by geometrical figures to the reception of any natural effect. It follows that these figures are not used as disposing causes, but as signs. Now we use signs only to address other intelligent beings. Magical arts therefore owe their efficacy to some intelligence, to whom the speech of the magician is addressed, — as is also shown by the sacrifices, prostrations, and other rites employed, which can be nothing else but signs of reverence paid to some intelligent nature.\n\n### Chapter CVI. That the Subsistent Intelligence, which lends Efficacy to Magical Performances,  is not Good in both Categories of Being\n\nCHAPTER CVI — That the Subsistent Intelligence, which lends Efficacy to Magical Performances, is not Good in both Categories of Being IT remains to be further investigated, what that intelligent nature is, by whose power these operations are carried into effect. To begin with, it is apparent that it is no good and praiseworthy nature. For it is not the behaviour of an intelligence well disposed to lend countenance to acts contrary to virtue. But that is what is done by magical arts: they usually serve to bring about adulteries, thefts, killing, and the like evil practices. Hence they who use such arts are called ‘evil practitioners’ ( malefici ). 3. The working of a benignant intelligence is to bring men to the proper good things of men, which are the good things of reason: but to draw men away from those good things, and allure them to trifles, is the conduct of an intelligence of a perverse bent. Now by these magical arts men make no profit in the good things of reason, which are sciences and virtues, but only in such trifles as the finding of things stolen, the catching of robbers, and the like. 4. There seems to be a certain grimace and character of unreasonableness attaching to the proceedings of the aforesaid arts. Thus they require an agent who abstains from sexual intercourse, and yet they are frequently employed for the procurement of sexual intercourse in its illicit forms. 6. As it belongs to the good to lead on to goodness, one might expect any right-minded intelligence to lead on to truth, truth being the proper good of the understanding. But the proceedings of magicians are generally of a character to mock men and deceive them. 8. It is not the way of a rightly ordered intelligence, supposing it to be a superior being, to take orders from an inferior; or, supposing it to be an inferior, to suffer itself to be entreated as though it were a superior being. But magicians invoke those whose assistance they use, with supplication, as though they were superior beings; and then, when they have come, they command them as though they were inferiors.\n\n### Chapte CVII. That the Subsistent Intelligence, whose aid is employed in Magic, is not Evil by Nature\n\nCHAPTER CVII — That the Subsistent Intelligence, whose aid is employed in Magic, is not Evil by Nature WHATEVER is in things must be either cause or caused: otherwise it would not be in relation with other things. The subsistent beings in question then are either causes only or they are also caused. If they are causes only, evil cannot be cause of anything except incidentally (Chap. XIV ); and everything incidental must be reducible to that which is ordinary: therefore there must be something in them prior to the evil that is there, something whereby they are causes. But that which is prior in everything is its nature and essence. Therefore these subsistent beings are not evil in their nature. The same conclusion follows if they are things caused. For no agent acts except with some intention of good: evil therefore cannot be the effect of any cause except incidentally. But what is caused incidentally only cannot be by nature, since every nature has a regular and definite mode of coming into being. 4. Nothing can exist unless it has existence from the first being, and the first being is the sovereign good (B. II, Chap. XV ). But since every being, as such, acts to the production of its own likeness, all things that come of the first being must be good. 7. Since the will tends to good grasped by the understanding, and finds therein its natural and proper object and end, it is impossible for any subsistent intelligence to have by nature a bad will, unless the understanding in it naturally is mistaken in its judgement of what is good. But no understanding can be so mistaken: for false judgements in acts of the understanding are like monsters in the physical universe, which are not according to nature, but out of the way of nature: for the good of the understanding and its natural end is the knowledge of truth. This is also confirmed by the authority of Holy Scripture: for it is said, Every creature is good ( 1 Tim. iv, 4 ): God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good ( Gen. i, 31 ). Hereby is excluded the error of the Manicheans, who suppose that these subsistent intelligences, commonly called demons or devils, are naturally evil. Porphyry tells in his Letter to Anebo that there is a certain kind of spirits who make it their business to listen to magicians, a kind naturally deceitful, assuming every form, personating gods [angels] and men and souls of the departed; and that this kind of being it is which makes all these appearances for better or for worse: for the rest, that this kind of spirit renders no assistance towards anything that is really good, but on the contrary is the author of evil counsel, and accuses and hampers and envies the earnest votaries of virtue, and is full of hastiness and pride, rejoices in the smell of burnt meats, and is captivated by flatteries. The only thing to quarrel with in this account is his saying that such malice is in these spirits “naturally.”\n\n### Chapter CIX. That in Spirits there may be Sin, and how\n\nCHAPTER CIX — That in Spirits there may be Sin, and how AS there is an order in active causes, so also in final causes, requiring that the secondary end should be subordinate to the primary, as the secondary agent depends on the primary. Now every will naturally wishes that which is the proper good of the person willing, namely, his own perfect well-being; and the will cannot possibly will aught to the contrary of this. If we can find a voluntary agent, whose good is a final end, such as not to be contained under the order leading to any other end, but rather all other ends being contained in the order leading up to it, — in such a voluntary agent there can be no fault of the will. Such a voluntary agent is God, whose being is sovereign goodness, which is the final end. In God then there can be no fault of the will. But in any other voluntary agent, whose proper good must necessarily be contained in the order leading to some other good, a sin of the will may occur, — considering the agent as he is in his own nature. In every voluntary agent there is a natural inclination to will and love his own perfect well-being, and that to such an extent that he cannot will the contrary. But a created agent has no natural endowment of so subordinating his own well-being to another end than himself as to be incapable of swerving from that end: for the higher end does not belong to the creature’s own nature, but to a superior nature. It is left therefore to the decision of his own will to subordinate his proper well-being to a higher end. Sin therefore might have found place in the will of a pure spirit in this way, — that he did not refer his own good and well-being to the final end, but made that good his end and adhered to it accordingly. And because rules of conduct necessarily are taken from the end in view, it followed as a matter of course that the said spirit arranged his other elections according to that same object ( ex re ipsa ) in which he had placed his last end. Hence his will was not regulated by any higher will, a position of independence proper to God alone. In this sense we must understand the saying that he aimed at equality with God [cf. Isai. xiv, 13 ], not that he ever expected his goodness to equal the divine goodness: such a thought could never have occurred to his mind. But to wish to rule others, and not to have one’s own will ruled by any superior, is to wish to be in power and cease to be a subject; and that is the sin of pride. Hence it is aptly said that the first sin that a spirit committed was pride. But because once error has been committed in regard to a first principle, a varied and manifold course of error is bound to ensue, so from the spirit’s first inordination of will there followed manifold other sin in his will, such as hatred of God for withstanding his pride and justly chastising his offence, envy against man, and the like. Further we may note that when any one’s proper good is subordinate to several higher powers, it is open to a voluntary agent to withdraw himself from his subordination to one superior, and not relinquish his subordination to another, be that other the superior or the inferior of the first. Thus a soldier, being subordinate at once to the king and to the general of the army, may direct his will to the good of the general and not to the good of the king, or the other way about. If the general withdraws from his allegiance to the king, the will of the soldier, withdrawing from the will of the general and directing his affection to the king, will be good; and the will of the soldier, following the general’s will against the will of the king, will be evil. Now not only are pure spirits subordinate to God, but also one of them is subordinate to another from first to last (B. II, Chap. XCV ). And because in any voluntary agent, short of God, there may be sin in his will, if we consider him as left to his own nature, possibly one of the higher angels, or even the very highest of all, committed a sin in his will. And this is probable enough, that the sinner was highest of them all: for he would not have made his own good estate the final end of his acquiescence, had not his goodness been very perfect. Some of the lower angels then of their own will may have subordinated their good to [thrown in their lot with] that leader, and so have withdrawn their allegiance from God, and sinned as he did: while others, observing due regard to God in the motion of their will, rightly withdrew from their subordination to the sinner, although he was higher than they in the order of nature. This is the difference between man and a pure spirit, that in the one being of man there are several appetitive faculties, one subordinate to another: this is not the case in pure spirits, although one of them is under another. But in man, however the inferior appetite may swerve from due subordination, any sin that occurs occurs in his will. As then it would be a sin in pure spirits for any inferior amongst them to swerve from due subordination to a superior, while that superior remained in subordination to God; so in the one person of man sin may occur in two ways: in one way by the human will not subordinating its own good to God, and that sin man has in common with the pure spirit; in another way by the good of the lower appetite not being regulated according to the higher, as when the pleasures of the flesh, to which the concupiscible appetite tends, are willed not in accordance with reason; and this sin does not occur in pure spirits.\n\n### Chapters CVIII, CX. Arguments seeming to prove that Sin is impossible to Spirits, with Solutions of the same\n\nCHAPTERS CVIII, CX — Arguments seeming to prove that Sin is impossible to Spirits, with Solutions of the same ARG. 1. Every other cognitive faculty but the understanding makes use of living bodily organs. In pure spirits therefore it is impossible for there to be any cognitive faculty but the understanding; and whatever they take cognisance of, they have understanding of. But in so far as one has understanding, one does not err: for all error springs from lack of understanding. Therefore there can be no error in the apprehension of these spirits. But without such error there can be no sin in the will: because the will always tends to good as apprehended: hence unless there he a mistake in the apprehension of good, there can be no sin in the will. Arg . 2. In us there occurs sin of the will in respect of matters about which we have true knowledge of their general bearings, but on a particular point our judgement is hampered by some passion fettering the reason. But these passions cannot be in spiritual beings, because such passions belong to the sensitive part, and that has no action without a bodily organ. Having therefore a right knowledge in general, the will of a pure spirit cannot tend to evil by any defed of knowledge in particular. Arg . 3. No cognitive faculty is deceived about its own proper object, but only about some object foreign to it: thus sight is not deceived in judging of colours, but when a man undertakes by sight to judge of tastes, then deception occurs. Now the proper object of understanding is the essence of a thing. No deception then is incident to the apprehension of understanding, so long as it fixes upon the pure quiddities of things: but all intellectual deception, we may think, arises from the forms of things apprehended coming to be mixed up with phantasms, as in our experience. But such a mode of cognition does not obtain in pure spirits, since phantasms cannot be without a body. To pure spirits therefore no error in cognition can possibly be incident, and consequently no sin in the will. Reply to Arguments 1, 2, 3. We are not obliged to say that there was any error in the understanding of a pure spirit, in the shape of a false judgement, judging that to be good which is not good: the mistake, such as it was, lay in not attending to the higher good, to which the spirit’s private good ought to have been referred: the reason of which inattention [read inconsiderationis ratio ] may have been the inward turning of the will upon the spirit’s private good: for it is open to the will to turn more or less of its affection upon this object or upon that. Arg . 5. Since appetite or desire tends to nothing but its own proper good, it seems impossible for desire to go astray in the case when the person desiring has one only definite good to desire. The reason why sin is incident to our desire is the composition of our nature, a compound of the spiritual and the corporeal, occasioning a multiplicity of things to be good for us, one thing being good for us in mind and another in body. Of this variety of good things the less important has to be subordinated to the more important. Hence sin of the will arises in us when we neglect that order, and go after what is good for us under a certain qualification, discarding what is good for us absolutely. But in pure spirits there is no such composition, no diversity of things good for them; nay, all their good is intellectual. Hence it seems they are incapable of sin in the will. Reply . The angel who sinned did not go after any other good than the one good that was proper to him: but his sin lay in this, that he dropped the higher good to which he should have subordinated himself As we sin by pursuing the lower goods of the body away from the order of reason, so the devil sinned by not referring his own excellence to the excellence of God. Arg . 6. In us, sin of the will arises out of excess or defect, while virtue lies in the mean between them. But pure spirits can pursue only intellectual good things, in which things no excess is possible, for of themselves they are in the mean between excess and defect, as truth is in the mean between two errors. Reply . The devil passed the mean of virtue inasmuch as he did not submit himself to a superior order; and thus he gave himself more than his due, and to God less than His due.\n\n### Chapter CXII. That Rational Creatures are governed by Providence for their own sakes, and  other Creatures in reference to them\n\nCHAPTER CXII — That Rational Creatures are governed by Providence for their own sakes, and other Creatures in reference to them THE very condition of intellectual nature, whereby it is mistress of its own acts, requires the care of Providence, providing for it for its own sake: while the condition of other creatures, that have no dominion over their own act, indicates that care is taken of them not for themselves, but for their subordination to other beings. For what is worked by another is in the rank of an instrument: while what works by itself is in the rank of a prime agent. Now an instrument is not sought for its own sake, but for the use of the prime agent: hence all diligence of workmanship applied to instruments must have its end and final point of reference in the prime agent. On the other hand all care taken about a prime agent, as such, is for its own sake. 2. What has dominion over its own act, is free in acting. For he is free, who is a cause to himself of what he does: whereas a power driven by another under necessity to work is subject to slavery. Thus the intellectual nature alone is free, while every other creature is naturally subject to slavery. But under every government the freemen are provided for for their own sakes, while of slaves this care is taken that they have being for the use of the free. 3. In a system making for an end, any parts of the system that cannot gain the end of themselves must be subordinate to other parts that do gain the end and stand in immediate relation to it. Thus the end of an army is victory, which the soldiers gain by their proper act of fighting: the soldiers alone are in request in the army for their own sakes; all others in other employments in the army, such as grooms or armourers, are in request for the sake of the soldiers. But the final end of the universe being God, the intellectual nature alone attains Him in Himself by knowing Him and loving Him (Chap. XXV ). Intelligent nature therefore alone in the universe is in request for its own sake, while all other creatures are in request for the sake of it. 6. Everything is naturally made to behave as it actually does behave in the course of nature. Now we find in the actual course of nature that an intelligent subsistent being converts all other things to his own use, either to the perfection of his intellect, by contemplating truth in them, or to the execution of works of his power and development of his science, as an artist develops the conception of his art in bodily material; or again to the sustenance of his body, united as that is to an intellectual soul. Nor is it contrary to the conclusion of the aforesaid reasons, that all the parts of the universe are subordinate to the perfection of the whole. For that subordination means that one serves another: thus there is no inconsistency in saying that unintelligent natures serve the intelligent, and at the same time serve the perfection of the universe: for if those things were wanting which subsistent intelligence requires for its perfection, the universe would not be complete. By saying that subsistent intelligences are guided by divine providence for their own sakes, we do not mean to deny that they are further referable to God and to the perfection of the universe. They are cared for for their own sakes, and other things for their sake, in this sense, that the good things which are given them by divine providence are not given them for the profit of any other creature: while the gifts given to other creatures by divine ordinance make for the use of intellectual creatures. Hence it is said: Look not on sun and moon and stars besides, to be led astray with delusion and to worship what the Lord thy God hath created for the service of all nations under heaven ( Deut. iv, 19 ): Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, sheep and all oxen and the beasts of the field ( Ps. viii, 8 ). Hereby is excluded the error of those who lay it down that it is a sin for man to kill dumb animals: for by the natural order of divine providence they are referred to the use of man: hence without injustice man uses them either by killing them or in any other way: wherefore God said to Noe: As green herbs have I given you all flesh ( Gen. ix, 3 ). Wherever in Holy Scripture there are found prohibitions of cruelty to dumb animals, as in the prohibition of killing the mother-bird with the young ( Deut. xxii, 6, 7 ), the object of such prohibition is either to turn man’s mind away from practising cruelty on his fellow-men, lest from practising cruelties on dumb animals one should go on further to do the like to men, or because harm done to animals turns to the temporal loss of man, either of the author of the harm or of some other; or for some ulterior meaning, as the Apostle ( 1 Cor. ix, 9 ) expounds the precept of not muzzling the treading ox.\n\n### Chapter CXIII. That the acts of the Rational Creature are guided by God, not merely to the  realisation of the Specific Type, but also to the realisation of the Individual\n\nCHAPTER CXIII — That the acts of the Rational Creature are guided by God, not merely to the realisation of the Specific Type, but also to the realisation of the Individual EVERYTHING is reckoned to exist for the sake of its activity, activity being the final perfection of a thing. Thus then everything, so far as it comes under divine providence, is guided by God to its proper act. But a rational creature subject to providence is governed and provided for as an individual for its own sake, not merely for the sake of the species, as is the case with other perishable creatures (Chap. CXII ). Thus then rational creatures alone are guided by God to their acts, not merely specific but individual. 2. Whatever things are guided in their acts only in what appertains to the species, such things have not the choice of doing or not doing: for what is consequent upon the species is common and natural to all individuals contained under the species; and what is natural is not in our power. If then man were guided in his acts only to the extent of fitting him for his species, he would have no choice of doing or not doing, but would have to follow the natural inclination common to the whole species, as happens in all irrational creatures. 3. In whatsoever beings there are found actions over and above such as fall in with the common inclination of the species, such beings must be regulated by divine providence in their actions with some guidance beyond that which is extended to the species. But in the rational creature many actions appear, which the inclination of the species is not sufficient to account for, as is shown by their being not alike in all, but various in various individuals. 4. The rational creature alone is capable of being guided to its acts not merely specifically but individually: for by the gift of understanding and reason it is able to discern the diversity of good and evil according as is befitting to diverse individuals, times and places. 5. The rational creature is not only governed by divine providence, but is also capable to some extent of grasping the notion of providence, whereas other creatures share in providence merely by being subject to providence. Thus the rational creature is partaker in providence, not merely by being governed, but by governing: for it governs itself by its own acts, and also other beings. But every lower providence is subject to the supreme providence of God. Therefore the government of the acts of the rational creature, in so far as they are personal acts, belongs to divine providence. 6. The personal acts of the rational creature are properly the acts that come from a rational soul. Now the rational soul is capable of perpetuity, not only in the species, as other creatures are, but also in the individual. The acts therefore of the rational creature are guided by divine providence, not only as they belong to the species, but also as they are personal acts.\n\n### Chapter CXIV. That it was necessary for a Law to be given to Man by God\n\nCHAPTER CXIV — That it was necessary for a Law to be given to Man by God THE acts of irrational creatures, as they belong to the species, are guided by God according to a natural inclination, consequent upon the nature of the species. Therefore, over and above that, there must be given to men something to guide them in their personal acts, and that we call ‘law.’ 3 and 4. To them is a law fittingly given, who know what they are about, and have the alternative of doing a thing or leaving it undone. But that is proper to the rational creature only. Therefore the rational creature alone is conceptible of law. Hence it is said: I will give my law in their hearts ( Jer. xxx, 33 ): I will write for him my manifold laws ( Osee viii, 12 ).\n\n### Chapter CXV. That the main purpose of the Divine Law is to subordinate Man to God\n\nCHAPTER CXV — That the main purpose of the Divine Law is to subordinate Man to God THE end which God intends is Himself. 2. The end of every human creature is to adhere to God, for in that his happiness consists. 4. That should be the main purpose of a law, from which the law derives its efficacy. But the law given by God has efficacy among men from the fact that man is suited to God. This therefore ought to be the chief precept in the divine law, that the human mind should adhere to God. Hence it is said: And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God ask of thee but that thou fear the Lord thy God and walk in his ways, and love him and serve the Lord thy God with thy whole heart and thy whole soul? ( Deut. x, 12 .)\n\n### Chapter CXVI. That the End of the Divine Law is the Love of God\n\nCHAPTER CXVI — That the End of the Divine Law is the Love of God THE main intention of the divine law is that man should adhere to God; and man adheres to God chiefly by love. There are two powers whereby man may cleave to God, his understanding and his will. By the lower faculties of his soul man cannot cleave to God, but adheres to lower things. Now the adhesion that is of the understanding is completed by that which is of the will: for by the will man comes to rest in what the understanding apprehends. The will cleaves to a thing either through love or through fear, but in different ways. When it adheres to a thing through fear, it adheres for the sake of something else, namely, to avoid an evil threatening it, if it does not adhere: but when it adheres to a thing through love, it adheres for the thing’s own sake. But what is for its own sake carries the day over what is only for the sake of something else. Therefore the adhesion of love to God is the chief way of adhering to Him, and is the point principally intended in the divine law. 2. The end of every law, and particularly of the divine law, is to make men good. Now a man is called good from having a good will: for the will it is which reduces to act whatever good there is in the man: but the will is good by willing good, and particularly the chief good, which is the end: the more then the will wills this good, the better the man is. Therefore the will of the sovereign good, which is God, is what most of all makes men good, and is principally intended in the divine law. 3. The law aims at making men virtuous: but it is a condition of virtue that the virtuous person should act firmly and with pleasure; and love it is that best makes us do a thing firmly and with delight. Therefore it is said: The end of the commandment is charity ( 1 Tim. i, 5 ): The greatest and first commandment is, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God ( Matt. xxii, 37, 38 ). CHAPTER CXVII — That by the Divine Law we are directed to the Love of our Neighbour THERE should be a union of affection among those who have one common end: but men share in the one common last end of happiness, to which they are ordained of God; and therefore they should be united in mutual love. 2. Whoever loves another, must in consequence also love those whom that other loves and who are united with him. But men are loved by God, seeing that for them He has prepared the enjoyment of Himself as their last end. Therefore as one is a lover of God, so must he also be a lover of his neighbour. 3. Since man is naturally a social animal, he needs to be helped by other men to gain his proper end; and this is most aptly done by mutual love prevailing amongst men. 4. To attend to divine things, a man needs tranquillity and peace. Now the things that might trouble peace are most effectually taken away by mutual love. Since then the law of God orders men to attend to divine things, mutual love amongst men must necessarily be a provision of the divine law. 5. The divine law is given to man to bear out the natural law. But it is natural to all men to love one another: a sign of this is the fact that by a sort of natural instinct man helps any man, even a stranger, in necessity, as by calling him back from a wrong turn that he may have taken on his way, lifting him up from a fall, and the like, as though every man were kinsman and friend of every other man. Hence it is said: This is my commandment, that ye love one another ( John xv, 12 ): This commandment we have of God, that he who loveth God do love also his brother ( 1 John iv, 21 ): The second commandment is, thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself ( Matt. xxii, 39 ).\n\n### Chapter CXVIII. That by Divine Law men are obliged to a Right Faith\n\nCHAPTER CXVIII — That by Divine Law men are obliged to a Right Faith AS sight by the bodily eye is the principle of the bodily passion of love, so the beginning of spiritual love must be the intellectual vision of some object of the same. But the vision of that spiritual object of understanding, which is God, cannot be had at present by us except through faith, because God exceeds our natural reason, especially if we consider Him in that regard under which our happiness consists in enjoying Him. 2. The divine law directs man to be entirely subject to God. But as man will is subjected to God by loving Him, so his understanding is subjected to Him by believing Him, — but not by believing anything false, because no falsehood can be proposed to man by God, who is the truth: hence he who believes anything false does not believe God. 3. Whoever holds an erroneous view about a thing, touching the essence of the thing, does not know the thing. Thus if any one were to fix on the notion of irrational animal, and take that to be man, he would not know man. The case would be otherwise, if he was mistaken only about some of the accidents of man. But in the case of compound beings, though he who errs about any of the essentials of a thing does not know the thing, absolutely speaking, still he knows it in a sort of a way: thus he who thinks man to be an irrational animal knows him generically: but in the case of simple beings this cannot be, — any error shuts out entirely all knowledge of the thing. But God is to the utmost degree simple. Therefore whoever errs about God does not know God. Thus he who believes God to be corporeal has no sort of knowledge of God, but apprehends something else instead of God. Now as a thing is known, so is it loved and desired. He then who errs concerning God, can neither love Him nor desire Him as his last end. Since then the divine law aims at bringing men to love and desire God, that same law must bind men to have a right faith concerning God. Hence it is said: Without faith it is impossible to please God ( Heb. xi, 6 ); and at the head of all other precepts of the law there is prescribed a right faith in God: Hear, O Israel: the Lord thy God is one Lord ( Deut. vi, 4 ).\n\n### Chapter CXIX. That by certain Sensible Rites our mind is directed to God\n\nCHAPTER CXIX — That by certain Sensible Rites our mind is directed to God BECAUSE it is connatural to man to gather his knowledge through the senses, and most difficult for him to transcend sensible things God has provided for man that even in sensible things there should be made for him a commemoration of things divine. To this end sensible sacrifices have been instituted, which man offers to God, not as though God needed them, but to bring home to man the lesson that he ought to offer himself and all he has to God, his end, Creator, Ruler, and Lord of all. There are also exercised upon man certain hallowings through certain sensible things, whereby man is washed, or anointed, or given to eat and drink, along with the utterance ( prolatione ) of audible words, to represent to man by these sensible signs the augmentation of spiritual gifts wrought in him from without, namely, by God, whose name is expressed in audible words. Also certain sensible rites are performed by men, not to rouse God to action, but to prompt themselves to divine service. Of this nature are prostrations, genuflections, vocal cries and chants: which things are not done as though God had need of them, who knows all, even the affection of the mind, — whose will is unchangeable (Chap. XCV ), and who moreover does not accept the movement of the body for its own sake: but we do these things on our own behalf, that by these sensible rites our intention may be directed to God and our affection inflamed. At the same time also we hereby make profession of God being author of our soul and body, in that we pay Him acts of homage spiritual and bodily. Hence it is not surprising that the [Manichean] heretics, who say that God is not the author of our body, blame these bodily observances being paid to God. In which censure they evidently fail to remember that they themselves are men, not seeing that sensible representations are necessary to us for inward knowledge and affection. For it is experimentally shown that our soul is excited by bodily acts to think and feel: hence we properly use such acts to raise our mind to God. In the payment of these bodily observances the cult , or worship , of God is said to consist. For we are said to cultivate those objects to which we pay attention by our works. Now we busy ourselves in paying attention to the things of God, not as though we were of service to Him, as is the case when we are said to tend , or cultivate , other things by our attentions, but because such actions are of service to ourselves, enabling us to come nearer to God. And because by inward acts we go straight to God, therefore it is by inward acts properly that we worship God: nevertheless outward acts also belong to the cult, or worship, of God, inasmuch as by such acts our mind is raised to God, as has been said. Hence the worship of God is also called religion , because by such acts a man in some sort binds ( ligat ) himself, that his thought may not wander astray from God; and also because by a sort of natural instinct he feels himself bound ( obligatum ) to God, that in such manner as he can he should pay reverence to Him from whom is the origin of his being and of all his good. Hence also religion has received the name of piety , for piety is that whereby we pay due honour to parents: hence aptly the honour paid to God, parent of all, is taken to be a part of piety, and they who oppose the worship of God are called impious . But because not only is God cause and origin of our being, but our whole being is in His power, and all that is in us is His due, and thereby He is truly our Lord and Master, therefore what we perform in honour of God is called service . Now God is our master not by accident, as one man is another’s master, but by nature; and therefore the service that we owe to God is quite different from that whereby we are accidentally subject to a man, the dominion of man over man being partial, and derivative from God. Hence the service specially due to God is called among the Greeks latria .\n\n### Chapter CXX. That the Worship of Latria is to be paid to God alone\n\nCHAPTER CXX — That the Worship of Latria is to be paid to God alone THERE have been some who have thought that this worship should be paid not only to the first principle of all things, but also to all creatures that are above men. Hence, while considering God to be the one prime and universal principle of all things, they have still thought it right to pay latria , first after God, to the subsistent intelligences in the heavens, which they also called gods, whether they existed entirely apart from bodies or were the souls of spheres or stars. Secondly, also to certain subsistent intelligences which they believed to be united to bodies of air, and called them genii ( daimones ) : because they believed them to be above men, as a body of air is above a body of earth, they insisted that these intelligences also were to be worshipped by men with divine worship, and in comparison with men they said that they were gods, as being intermediate between men and gods. And because they believed that the souls of good men, by the fact of their separation from bodies, passed to a higher state than the state of the present life, they considered that divine worship should be paid also to the souls of the dead, whom they called ἥρωες , or manes . Some again, taking God to be the soul of the universe, have believed that the worship proper to Godhead is to be paid to the whole universe and to all its parts, not however for the sake of the material part, but for the sake of the soul, which they said was God, as honour is paid to a wise man, not for his body but for his mind. Some again used to say that even things naturally below man still should be worshipped by man with divine honours, inasmuch as some portion of the power of a higher nature is communicated to them. Hence, believing that certain images made by man were receptive of supernatural power, either from the influence of the heavenly bodies or from the presence of Spirits within them, they said that such images should receive divine worship, and they called those images gods: on which account themselves were called ‘idolaters,’ because they paid the worship of latria to idols and images. 1. But it is irrational in men who posit one only separate first principle, to pay divine worship to another. For we pay worship to God, not as though He needed it, but to strengthen in ourselves by sensible signs a true opinion about God. Now the opinion that God is one, exalted above all, cannot be strengthened in us by sensible signs except by our paying him some separate and peculiar tribute, which we call divine worship. Evidently then true opinion about the one principle is weakened, if divine worship is paid to several. 2. This exterior worship is necessary for man, to the end that man’s soul may conceive a spiritual reverence for God. But custom goes a long way in moving the mind of man: for we are more easily moved to that to which we are accustomed. Now the custom among men is that the honour that is paid to him who holds the highest place in the commonwealth, as to the king or emperor, is paid to none other. Therefore there should be a worship that is paid to none other than the one principle of the universe; and that we call the worship of latria . 3. If the worship of latria is due to another merely because he is superior, and not because he is supreme, it would follow that one man should pay latria to another man, and one angel to another angel, seeing that among men, and also among angels, one is superior to another. And since among men he who is superior on one point is inferior on another, it would follow that men should interchange latria in their mutual dealings, which is absurd. 4. Man ought to pay God something special in recognition of the special benefit of his creation; and that is the worship of latria . 5. Latria means service, and service is due to the master. Now he is properly and truly called master, who lays down to others precepts of conduct, and himself takes a precept of conduct from none: for he who executes the arrangement of a superior is rather minister than master. But God’s providence disposes all things to their due actions: hence in Holy Writ the angels and the heavenly bodies are said to minister both to God, whose ordinance they execute, and to us, to whose benefit their actions tend. Therefore the worship of latria , due to the sovereign master, is to be paid only to the sovereign principle of the universe. 6. Among all acts of latria , a unique rank belongs to sacrifice: for genuflections, prostrations and other such marks of honour may be paid even to man, although with another intention than they are paid to God: but no one ever thought to offer sacrifice except to him whom he regarded as God, or affected so to regard. The outward rite of sacrifice represents the inward true sacrifice, whereby the human mind offers itself to God, as to the principle of its creation, the author of its activity, the term of its happiness. Therefore to God alone should man offer sacrifice and the worship of latria , and not to any created spirits whatsoever. Hence it is said: He shall be slain who offers sacrifice to any gods but to the Lord alone ( Exod. xxii, 20 ): The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve ( Deut. vi, 13 ). And because it is an undue thing for the worship of latria to be paid to any other than the first principle of all things, and only an evil-minded rational creature will incite others to undue acts; evidently men have been set on to the aforesaid undue worships by the instigation of devils, who have presented themselves to men to be adored in place of God, seeking divine honour. Hence it is said: All the gods of the heathen are devils ( Ps. xcv, 5 ): The things which the heathen sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God ( 1 Cor. x, 20 ).\n\n### Chapter CXXI. That the Divine Law directs man to a Rational Use of Corporeal and Sensible Things\n\nCHAPTER CXXI — That the Divine Law directs man to a Rational Use of Corporeal and Sensible Things AS man’s mind may be raised to God by corporeal and sensible things, provided that they are duly used to show reverence to God, so also the undue use of them either totally withdraws the mind from God, fixing the final intention of the will upon inferior things, or clogs the mind’s aspiration after God, making it take unnecessary interest in such things. Now the divine law is given for this end chiefly, to lead man to cling to God. It is a function therefore of divine law to direct man in his affection for and use of corporeal and sensible things. 2. As man’s mind is subordinate to God, so his body is subordinate to his soul, and his lower powers to his reason. It belongs therefore to divine providence, the plan of which, as proposed by God to man, is the divine law, to see that all things keep their order. Therefore that divine law must so direct man as that his lower powers shall be subject to his reason, and his body to his soul, and exterior things shall serve his necessity. 4. Every lawgiver must comprise in his legislation those enactments without which the law could not be observed. Now law being set over reason, man could not follow the law unless all other things belonging to man were subjected to reason. Hence it is said: Your reasonable service ( Rom. xii, i ); and, This is the will of God, your sanctification ( 1 Thess. iv, 9 ). Hereby is excluded the error of such as say that those acts alone are sinful, whereby our neighbour is either hurt or shocked.\n\n### Chapter CXXII. Of the reason for which Simple Fornication is a Sin by Divine Law, and of the Natural Institution of Marriage\n\nCHAPTER CXXII — Of the reason for which Simple Fornication is a Sin by Divine Law, and of the Natural Institution of Marriage HENCE appears the folly of those who say that simple fornication is not a sin. For they say: Given a woman free from a husband, and under no control of father or any other person, if any one approaches her with her consent, he does her no wrong, because she is pleased so to act, and has the disposal of her own person: nor does he do any wrong to another, for she is under no one’s control: therefore there appears no sin. Nor does it seem to be a sufficient answer to say that she wrongs God, for God is not offended by us except by what we do against our own good (Chap. CXXI ): but it does not appear that this conduct is against man’s good: hence no wrong seems to be done to God thereby. In like manner also it does not appear a sufficient answer, that wrong is thereby done to one’s neighbour, who is scandalised: for sometimes a neighbour is scandalised by what of itself is not a sin, in which case the sin is only incidental: but the question is not whether fornication is a sin incidentally, but whether it is a sin ordinarily and in itself. We must seek a solution from what has been said before: for it has been said (Chapp. XVI , LXIV ) that God has care of everything according to that which is good for it. Now it is good for everything to gain its end, and evil for it to be diverted from its due end. But as in the whole so also in the parts, our study should be that every part of man and every act of his may attain its due end. Now though the semen is superfluous for the preservation of the individual, yet it is necessary to him for the propagation of the species: while other excretions, such as excrement, urine, sweat, and the like, are needful for no further purpose: hence the only good that comes to man of them is by their removal from the body. But that is not the object in the emission of the semen , but rather the profit of generation, to which the union of the sexes is directed. But in vain would be the generation of man unless due nurture followed, without which the offspring generated could not endure. The emission of the semen then ought to be so directed as that both the proper generation may ensue and the education of the offspring be secured. Hence it is clear that every emission of the semen is contrary to the good of man, which takes place in a way whereby generation is impossible; and if this is done on purpose, it must be a sin. I mean a way in which generation is impossible in itself as is the case in every emission of the semen without the natural union of male and female: wherefore such sins are called ’sins against nature.’ But if it is by accident that generation cannot follow from the emission of the semen , the act is not against nature on that account, nor is it sinful; the case of the woman being barren would be a case in point. Likewise it must be against the good of man for the semen to be emitted under conditions which, allowing generation to ensue, nevertheless bar the due education of the offspring. We observe that in those animals, dogs for instance, in which the female by herself suffices for the rearing of the offspring, the male and female stay no time together after the performance of the sexual act. But with all animals in which the female by herself does not suffice for the rearing of the offspring, male and female dwell together after the sexual act so long as is necessary for the rearing and training of the offspring. This appears in birds, whose young are incapable of finding their own food immediately they are hatched: for since the bird does not suckle her young with milk, according to the provision made by nature in quadrupeds, but has to seek food abroad for her young, and therefore keep them warm in the period of feeding, the female could not do this duty all alone by herself: hence divine providence has put in the male a natural instinct or standing by the female for the rearing of the brood. Now in the human species the female is clearly insufficient of herself for the rearing of the offspring, since the need of human life makes many demands, which cannot be met by one parent alone. Hence the fitness of human life requires man to stand by woman after the sexual act is done, and not to go off at once and form connexions with any one he meets, as is the way with fornicators. Nor is this reasoning traversed by the fact of some particular woman having wealth and power enough to nourish her offspring all by herself: for in human acts the line of natural rectitude is not drawn to suit the accidental variety of the individual, but the properties common to the whole species. A further consideration is, that in the human species the young need not only bodily nutrition, as animals do, but also the training of the soul. Other animals have their natural instincts ( suas prudentias ) to provide for themselves: but man lives by reason, which [read quam ] takes the experience of a long time to arrive at discretion. Hence children need instruction by the confirmed experience of their parents: nor are they capable of such instruction as soon as they are born, but after a long time, the time in fact taken to arrive at the years of discretion. For this instruction again a long time is needed; and then moreover, because of the assaults of passion, whereby the judgement of prudence is thwarted, there is need not of instruction only, but also of repression. For this purpose the woman by herself is not competent, but at this point especially there is requisite the concurrence of the man, in whom there is at once reason more perfect to instruct, and force more potent to chastise. Therefore in the human race the advancement of the young in good must last, not for a short time, as in birds, but for a long period of life. Hence, whereas it is necessary in all animals for the male to stand by the female for such time as the father’s concurrence is requisite for bringing up of the progeny, it is natural for man to be tied to the society of one fixed woman for a long period, not a short one. This social tie we call marriage. Marriage then is natural to man, and an irregular connexion outside of marriage is contrary to the good of man; and therefore fornication must be sinful. Nor yet should it be counted a slight sin for one to procure the emission of the semen irrespective of the due purpose of generation and rearing of issue, on the pretence that it is a slight sin, or no sin at all, to apply any part of one’s body to another use than that to which it is naturally ordained, as if, for example, one were to walk on his hands, or do with his feet something that ought to be done with his hands. The answer is that by such inordinate applications as those mentioned the good of man is not greatly injured: but the inordinate emission of the semen is repugnant to the good of nature, which is the conservation of the species. Hence, after the sin of murder, whereby a human nature already in actual existence is destroyed, this sort of sin seem to hold the second place, whereby the generation of human nature is precluded. The above assertions are confirmed by divine authority. The unlawfulness of any emission of semen , upon which offspring cannot be consequent, is evident from such texts as these: Thou shalt not lie with mankind as with womankind: Thou shalt not lie with any beast ( Levit. xviii, 22, 23 ): Nor the effeminate, nor sodomites, shall possess the kingdom of God ( 1 Cor. vi, 10 ). The unlawfulness of fornication and of all connexion with any other woman than one’s own wife is clear from Deut. xxiii, 17 : There shall be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel: Keep thyself from all fornication, and beyond thine own wife suffer not the charge of knowing another ( Job. iv, 13 ): Fly fornication ( 1 Cor. vi, 18 ). Hereby is refuted the error of those who say that there is no more sin in the emission of the semen than in the ejection of other superfluous products from the body.\n\n### Chapter CXXIII. That Marriage ought to be Indissoluble\n\nCHAPTER CXXIII — That Marriage ought to be Indissoluble LOOKING at the matter rightly, one must see that the aforesaid reasons not only argue a long duration for that natural human partnership of male and female, which we call marriage, but further imply that the partnership ought to be lifelong. 1. Property is a means to the preservation of human life. And because natural life cannot be preserved in one and the same person of the father living on for all time, nature arranges for its preservation by the son succeeding his father in likeness of species: wherefore it is appropriate that the son should succeed his father in his property. It is natural therefore that the father’s interest in his son should continue to the end of his life, and that father and mother should dwell together to the end. 2. Woman is taken into partnership with man for the need of childbearing: therefore when the fertility and beauty of woman ceases, there is a bar against her being taken up by another man. If then a man, taking a woman to wife in the time of her youth, when beauty and fertility wait upon her, could send her away when she was advanced in years, he would do the woman harm, contrary to natural equity. 3. It is manifestly absurd for the woman to be able to send away the man, seeing that woman is naturally subject to the rule of man, and it is not in the power of a subject to run away from control. It being then against the order of nature for the woman to be allowed to desert the man, if the man were allowed to desert the woman, the partnership of man and woman would not be on fair terms, but would be a sort of slavery on the woman’s side. 4. Men show a natural anxiety to be sure of their own offspring; and whatever stands in the way of that assurance runs counter to the natural instinct of the race. But if the man could send away the woman, or the woman the man, and form a connexion with another, certainty as to parentage would be difficult, when a woman had intercourse first with one man and then with another. 5. The greater the love, the more need for it to be firm and lasting. But the love of man and woman is counted strongest of all; seeing that they are united, not only in the union of the sexes, which even among beasts makes a sweet partnership, but also for the sharing in common of all domestic life, as a sign whereof a man leaves even father and mother for the sake of his wife ( Gen. ii, 24 ). It is fitting therefore for marriage to be quite indissoluble. 6. Of natural acts, generation alone is directed to the good of (the specific) nature: for eating and the separation from the body of other excretions concern the individual, but generation has to do with the preservation of the species. Hence, as law is instituted for the common good, the function of procreation ought to be regulated by laws divine and human. Now the laws laid down ought to proceed on the basis of the dictate of nature ( ex naturali instinctu ), if they are human laws, as in the exact sciences every human discovery takes its origin from principles naturally known: but if they are divine laws, they not only develop the dictate of nature, but also make up the deficiency of what nature dictates, as dogmas divinely revealed surpass the capacity of natural reason. Since then there is in the human species a natural exigency for the union of male and female to be one and indivisible, such unity and indissolubility must needs be ordained by human law. To that ordinance the divine law adds a supernatural reason, derived from the significancy of marriage as a type of the inseparable union of Christ with His Church, which is one as He is one. Thus then irregularities in the act of generation are not only contrary to the dictate of nature, but are also transgressions of laws divine and human: hence on this account any irregular behaviour in this matter is even a greater sin than in the matter of taking food or the like. But since all other factors in human life should be subordinate to that which is the best thing in man, it follows that the union of male and female must be regulated by law, not from the mere point of view of procreation, as in other animals, but also with an eye to good manners, or manners conformable to right reason, as well for man as an individual, as also for man as a member of a household or family, or again as a member of civil society. Thus understood, good manners involve the indissolubility of the union of male and female: for they will love one another with greater fidelity, when they know that they are indissolubly united: each partner will take greater care of the things of the house, reflecting that they are to remain permanently in possession of the same things: occasions of quarrels are removed, that might otherwise arise between the husband and the wife’s relations, if the husband were to divorce his wife; and thus affinity becomes a firmer bond of amity: also occasions of adultery are cut off, occasions which would readily offer themselves, if husband could divorce his wife, or wife her husband. Hence it is said: But I say to you that whoever putteth away his wife, except for fornication, and marrieth another, committeth adultery; and he that marrieth her that is put away, committeth adultery ( Matt. xix, 9 ): But to them that are united in marriage, it is not I that give commandment, but the Lord, that the wife depart not from her husband ( 1 Cor. vii, 10 ). Divorce was reckoned an impropriety also among the ancient Romans, of whom Valerius Maximus ( De memor. dictis , II, 1) relates that they believed that the marriage tie ought not to be broken off even for barrenness. Hereby the custom is banned of putting away wives, which however in the Old Law was permitted to the Jews for their hardness of heart, because they were prone to the killing of their wives: so the less evil was permitted to keep out the greater.\n\n### Chapter CXXIV. That Marriage ought to be between one Man and one Woman\n\nCHAPTER CXXIV — That Marriage ought to be between one Man and one Woman ONE general reason holds for all animals, which is this, that every animal desires free enjoyment of the pleasure of sexual union as of eating: which freedom is impeded by there being either several males to one female, or the other way about: and therefore animals fight alike for food and for sexual jealousy. But in men there is a special reason, inasmuch as man naturally desires to be sure of his own offspring. But here a difference comes in. Both of the above mentioned reasons hold for the case of the cohabitation of one female with several males: but the second reason does not hold against the cohabitation of one male with several females, — I mean certainty in point of parentage is not in that case prevented. But the first reason makes against it: for as the free enjoyment of the female is taken from the male, if the female has another partner, so the same free enjoyment is taken from the female, if the male has more than one partner. 2. In every species of animal in which the sire takes any interest in the offspring, one male keeps company with one female only, as in all birds that rear their young in common: for one male could not avail for several females as a helper in the rearing of their progeny: whereas in animals in which the males take no interest in the offspring, one male consorts with several females promiscuously, and the female with several males, as appears in dogs, poultry, and the like. But the male’s interest in the offspring is greater in the human species than in any other. 3 and 4. The reason why a wife is not allowed more than one husband at a time is because otherwise paternity would be uncertain. If then while the wife has one husband only, the husband has more than one wife, there will not be a friendship of equality on both sides, friendship consisting in a certain equality. There will not be the friendship of a free man with a free woman, but a sort of friendship of a slave with her master. The husband might well be allowed a plurality of wives, if the understanding were allowable, that the friendship of each with him was not to be that of a free woman with a free man but of a slave with her master. And this is borne out by experience: for among men that keep many wives the wives are counted as menials. 5. From one man having several wives there arises discord at the domestic hearth, as experience shows. Hence it is said: They shall be two in one flesh ( Gen. ii, 24 ).\n\n### Chapter CXXV. That Marriage ought not to take place between Kindred\n\nCHAPTER CXXV — That Marriage ought not to take place between Kindred SINCE in marriage there is a union of different persons, those persons who ought to reckon themselves as one because of their being of one stock, are properly excluded from intermarrying, that they may love one another more ardently on the mere ground of their common origin. 2. Since the intercourse of man and wife carries with it a certain natural shame, those persons should be prevented from such intercourse who owe one another a mutual reverence on account of the tie of blood. And this is the reason touched on in Leviticus xviii. 3. Excessive indulgence in sexual pleasures makes for the corruption of good manners: for such pleasures of all others most absorb the mind and hinder the right exercise of reason. But such excessive indulgence would ensue, if the intercourse of the sexes were allowed among persons who must necessarily dwell under the same roof, where the occasion of such intercourse could not be withdrawn. 5. In human society the widening of friendships is of the first importance. That is done by the marriage tie being formed with strangers. It is to be observed that as that inclination is ‘natural,’ which works upon objects as they usually occur, so law too is framed for what usually happens. Thus it is no derogation from the reasons above alleged, that in some particular case the venture may turn out otherwise: for the good of the individual ought to be overlooked in view of the good of the many, since the good of the multitude is ever more divine than the good of the individual. Lest however any particular complaint might remain wholly without remedy, there rests with legislators and others on like footing authority to dispense in a general enactment so far as is necessary in a particular case. If the law is human, a dispensation may be given by men possessed of power like to that which made the law. If the law is a divine enactment, a dispensation may be given by divine authority, as in the Old Law a dispensatory indulgence seems to have been granted for plurality of wives, and for concubines, and divorce.\n\n### Chapter CXXVI. That not all Sexual Intercourse is Sin\n\nCHAPTER CXXVI— That not all Sexual Intercourse is Sin THE members of the body being the instruments of the soul, the end of every member is the use of it, as in the case of any other instrument. But there are members of the body the use of which is for the intercourse of the sexes: that therefore is their end. But that which is the end of any natural thing cannot be in itself evil, because the things of nature are ordinances of divine providence. Therefore the intercourse of the sexes cannot be in itself evil. 3. Natural inclinations are put into things by God, who is the prime mover of all. Therefore it is impossible for the natural inclination of any species to be directed to an object in itself evil. But in all full-grown animals there is a natural inclination to sexual union, which union therefore cannot be in itself evil. 4. That without which something good and excellent cannot be, is not in itself evil. But the perpetuity of the species in animals is not preserved except through generation, which is of sexual intercourse. Hence it is said: She sinneth not, if she marry ( 1 Cor. vii, 36 ). Hereby is excluded the error of those who totally condemn marriage, which some do because they believe that temporal things proceed not from a good but from an evil principle.\n\n### Chapter CXXVII. That of no Food is the Use Sinful in itself\n\nCHAPTER CXXVII — That of no Food is the Use Sinful in itself EVERYTHING is done rationally, when it is directed according to its due bearing upon a due end. But the due end of the taking of food is the preservation of the health by nourishment. Therefore whatever food can serve that end, may be taken without sin. 2. Of no thing is the use evil in itself unless the thing itself be evil in itself. But no food is in its nature evil; because everything is in its nature good (Chap. VII ); albeit some particular food may be evil to some particular person, inasmuch as it makes against his bodily health. Therefore of no food, considered as such and such a thing, is the partaking a sin in itself: but it may be a sin, if a person uses it irrationally and not to his health. 3. To apply things to the purpose for which they exist is not in itself evil. But plants exist for the sake of animals, some animals for the sake of others, and all for the sake of man (Chap. LXXXI ). Therefore to use either plants, or the flesh of animals, either for eating, or for any other purpose for which they are useful to man ( vel ad quidquid aliud sunt homini utilia ), is not in itself a sin. 4. The defect which makes sin redounds from soul to body, but not backwards from body to soul: for by sin we mean a disorder of the will. But articles of food concern the body immediately, not the soul. Therefore the taking of various foods cannot be in itself a sin, except in so far as it is inconsistent with rectitude of will. And that may come to be in several ways: in one way by some inconsistency with the proper end of food, as when for the pleasure of eating one uses food that disagrees with health either in kind or in quantity. Another way would be when the food becomes not the condition of him who eats it, or of the society in which he lives, as when one is more nice in his food than his means will allow, or violates the social conventions of those with whom he sits at table. A third way would be in the case of certain foods prohibited by some special law: thus in the Old Law sundry meats were forbidden for what they signified; and in Egypt of old the eating of beef was prohibited, lest agriculture should suffer; and again there is the case of rules prohibiting the use of certain foods in order to check the lower appetites. Hence the Lord says: Not what entereth in at the mouth defiles a man ( Matt. xv, 11 ). Since eating and the intercourse of the sexes are not things in themselves unlawful, and exterior possessions are necessary for getting food, for rearing and supporting a family, and other bodily wants, it follows that neither is the possession of wealth in itself unlawful, provided the order of reason be observed, — I mean, provided the man possesses justly the things that he has, and does not fix the final end of his will in them, and uses them duly for his own and others’ profit. Hereby is excluded the error of some, who, as Augustine says, “most arrogantly called themselves Apostolics, because they did not receive into their communion married men and proprietors, such as are many monks and clerks whom the Catholic Church now contains: these people are heretics, because, separating themselves from the Church, they think that there is no hope for other persons who make use of what they do without” ( De haeresibus , c. 40).\n\n### Chapter CXXVIII. How the Law of God relates a man to his Neighbour\n\nCHAPTER CXXVIII — How the Law of God relates a man to his Neighbour OF all things that man makes use of, the chief are other men. Man is naturally a social animal, needing many things that the individual cannot procure by himself. The divine law therefore must needs instruct man to live according to the order of reason in his relations with other men. 2. The end of the divine law is to bring man to cleave to God. Now man is aided thereto by his fellow-man, as well in point of knowledge as in point of affection: for men help one another in the knowledge of the truth, and one incites another to good and restrains him from evil. Hence it is said: Iron is sharpened by iron, and man sharpens the face of his friend ( Prov. xxvii, 17 ): Better two together than one, etc. ( Eccles iv, 9-12 ). There is then orderly concord amongst men, when to each there is rendered his own, which is the act of justice; and therefore it is said: The work of justice is peace ( Isa. xxxii, 17 ). To the observance of this justice man is inclined both by an interior and an exterior principle. By an interior principle, in so far as a man has a will to observe the precepts of the divine law, which is done by his bearing love to God and to his neighbour: for whoever loves another renders him his due spontaneously and with pleasure, and even acts more by liberality: hence the whole fulfilment of the law hinges upon love ( Rom. xiii, 10 : Matt. xxii, 40 ). But because some are not so inwardly disposed as to do of their own accord what the law commands, they have to be dragged by an exterior force to the fulfilment of the justice of the law; and so they fulfil the law under fear of penalties, not as freemen but as slaves. Hence it is said: When thou shalt do thy judgements upon the earth by punishing the wicked, the inhabitants of earth shall learn justice ( Isa. xxvi, 9 ). Others are so disposed as to do of their own accord what the law bids them. They are a law to themselves, having charity, which bends their wills in place of a law to generous conduct. There was no need of an exterior law being enacted for them: hence it is said: The law was not made for the just, but for the unjust : which is not to be taken to mean that the just are not bound to fulfil the law, as some have misunderstood the text, but that the just are inclined of themselves to do justice even without a law.\n\n### Chapter CXXIX. That the things commanded by the Divine Law are Right, not only because the  Law enacts them, but also according to Nature\n\nCHAPTER CXXIX — That the things commanded by the Divine Law are Right, not only because the Law enacts them, but also according to Nature BY the precepts of the divine law the human mind is subordinated to God, and all the rest of man is subordinated to reason. But this is just what natural order requires, that the inferior be subject to the superior. Therefore the things commanded by the divine law are in themselves naturally right. 2. Divine providence has endowed men with a natural tribunal of reason ( naturale judicatorium rationis ), to be the ruling principle of their proper activities. But natural principles are ordained to natural purposes. There are certain activities naturally suited to man, and these activities are in themselves right, and not merely by positive law. 3. Where there is a definite nature, there must be definite activities proper to that nature: for the proper activity of every nature is consequent upon the nature. Now it is certain that men’s nature is definite. There must therefore be certain activities that in themselves befit man. 4. Wherever a thing is natural to any one, any other thing also is natural, without which the first thing cannot be had, for nature fails not in necessities. But it is natural to man to be a social animal. Those things therefore naturally befit man, without which the maintenance of human society would be impossible. Such things are the securing to every man of his own, and abstinence from wrongdoing. Some points therefore of human conduct are naturally right. 5. The use of lower creatures to meet the need of human life is a natural property of man. Now there is a certain measure in which the use of the aforesaid creatures is helpful to human life. If this measure is transgressed, as in the disorderly taking of food, it results in harm to man. There are therefore certain human acts naturally appropriate, and others naturally inappropriate. 6. In the natural order man’s body is for his soul, and the lower powers of the soul for reason. It is therefore naturally right for man so to manage his body and the lower faculties of his soul as that the act and good of reason may least of all be hindered, but rather helped. Mismanagement in this regard must naturally be sinful. We count therefore as things naturally evil carousings and revellings and the disorderly indulgence of the sexual instinct, whereby the act of reason is impeded and subjected to the passions, which do not leave the judgement of the reason free. 7. To every man those things are naturally befitting, whereby he tends to his natural end; and the contraries are naturally unbefitting. But God is the end to which man is ordained by nature (Chap. CXV ). Those things therefore are naturally right, whereby man is led to the knowledge and love of God; and the contraries are naturally evil for man. Hence it is said: The judgements of the Lord are righteous, having their justification in themselves ( Ps. xviii, 10 ). Hereby is excluded the tenet of those who say that things just and right are the creation of positive law.\n\n### Chapter CXXX. That the Divine Government of Men is after the manner of Paternal Government\n\nCHAPTER CXXX — That the Divine Government of Men is after the manner of Paternal Government THE father has care of the child, not only in his relations with other men, as the king has care of him, but also in his individual concerns, as has been shown above of God (Chap. XCIII ). And this with good reason, for a parent is like God in giving natural origin to a human being. Hence divine and paternal government extend to the individual, not merely as a member of society, but as a person subsisting in his own nature by himself. The two governments differ however in this, that paternal government can extend only to the things that appear in man externally, but divine government reaches also to interior acts and dispositions. For no man can take cognisance of things hidden from him: the secrets of hearts are hidden from men, though open to God (B. I, Chap. LIX ). God therefore takes account of man not only as to his exterior behaviour, but also as to his inward affections, what he means to do, and what he intends to gain by doing it. Of such points man takes no cognisance, except so far as by outward acts the inward disposition is shown. Every one has care of things according as they belong to him: for solicitude about things that are no affair of yours is blamed as meddlesomeness. But one man belongs to another’s charge otherwise than as he belongs to God. One man belongs to another either by natural origin and bodily descent, or by some combination in external works. But man belongs to God inasmuch as he has his origin from Him, which origin means a certain likeness to God: for every being acts to the production of its own likeness. Now man has more of the likeness of God in his soul than in his body, and most of all in his mind. Clearly therefore, in the origin of man as coming from God, the main thing intended is the mind, and for the mind’s sake the other (sentient) parts of the soul are produced by God; and for the soul the body is produced: so God’s principal care is for the mind of man, — first, for the mind; then for the other parts of the soul, and after them for the body. Hence it is by the mind that man attains his last end, which is human happiness (Chap. XXXVII ). Other things in man serve as instruments for the securing of happiness. Hence we may observe that human government takes cognisance of interior acts so far as they are directed to external conduct and are thereby unfolded to view: but God contrariwise takes cognisance of external conduct so far as it points to interior dispositions, particularly in regard of the mind, whereby man is capable of happiness, — human happiness consisting, as has been said, in the fruition of God. The whole care therefore that God has of man is in view of preparing his mind for the fruition of God, whereunto the mind is prepared by faith, hope and charity: for by faith man’s mind is disposed to recognise God as a Being above himself: by hope it is strengthened to reach out to Him and see in Him man’s true good: by charity it fixes upon Him so as immovably to adhere to Him. All things that God requires of man in this life are referable to these three virtues. Hence it is said: And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God ask of thee, except that thou fear the Lord thy God and walk in his ways? ( Deut. x, 12 .) Now there remain faith, hope and charity, these three ( 1 Cor. xiii, 13 ). But because the human mind is naturally more imperfect than other intellectual natures; and the more perfect a thing is, the more energy it shows in tending to its end; it appears that the human mind is naturally weaker in tending to God, the end of all, than are the higher minds of the angels. This weakness shows itself on two points. First, in the deficiency of intellectual power in the human soul, as compared with higher intelligences, so that it cannot go straight to intellectual truth as it is in itself (Chapp. XLI , CXIX ). Secondly, in the obstacles that keep it back from throwing itself with all its force upon God; obstacles on the part of the body, which claims care for sustenance and repose; and again obstacles on the part of the lower powers of the soul, inasmuch as the excitements of phantasy and the perturbations of passion trouble that interior peace, which is so necessary for the mind freely to throw itself upon God. These obstacles cannot be wholly removed by man from his path, so long as he lives in this mortal body: for he has to attend to the things necessary for this mortal life, and is thereby hindered from always actually tending to God. But the aforesaid hindrances should be so far got under that there should be in man’s mind an intention at least, directed to God without interruption; and the more the mind can be even actually fixed on God, the more perfect will man’s life be, as keeping nearer to its last end. And this actual fixing of the mind upon God will go to strengthen the intention directed towards Him, which intention must needs come to naught unless at times the mind be fixed upon Him actually. All the precepts and counsels therefore of the divine law go to furnish man with aids for fixing his mind on God and removing obstacles to such attention. For both these purposes man needs to live at peace and concord with his fellow-men. For man needs to be aided by man, as well to the preservation of life and limb, as also to the end that one man may inflame and incite and instruct another to yearn after God. In the absence of peace and concord, man’s mind must be disquieted by contentions and fighting, and hindered from aspiring to God. And therefore the divine law has made provision for the preservation of peace and concord amongst men by the practice of justice. It commands that to every man be rendered his due, as honour to parents: that none be harmed or hindered in the enjoyment of the good that belongs to him, whether by word, — hence the prohibition of false witness, — or by deed touching his own person, — hence the prohibition of murder, — or by deed touching a person allied to him, — hence the prohibition of adultery, or by deed touching his property, — hence the prohibition of theft. And because God takes cognisance not only of the public but also of the domestic behaviour of men, the divine law has forbidden neglect of wife, servants, etc., which is no concern of human law. But it is not enough for peace and concord to be preserved among men by precepts of justice, unless there be a further consolidation of mutual love. Justice provides for men to the extent that one shall not get in the way of another, but not to the extent of one helping another in his need. One may happen to need another’s aid in cases in which none is bound to him by any debt of justice, or where the person so bound does not render any aid. Thus there came to be need of an additional precept of mutual love amongst men, so that one should aid another even beyond his obligations in justice. Hence it is said: His commandment we have received, that whoever loveth God should also love his brother ( 1 John iv, 21 ): This is my commandment, that ye love one another as I have loved you ( John xv, 12 ). It is evident that love suffices for the fulfilment of the works of justice. Hence it is said: Love is the fulfilment of the law ( Rom. xiii, 10 ): to commend which fulfilment there are given us precepts and counsels of God concerning works of mercy, love and succour of enemies, and the like deeds of kindness, which overflow and run over the measures of justice. But because the aforesaid precepts of justice require their completion in the love of one’s neighbour, and that depends on the love of God; and when love is gone, and faith and charity are also gone, the human mind cannot duly tend to God; it follows that the observance of the precepts of the aforesaid virtues is necessarily required of man, and by the neglect of them man is entirely thrown out of his subordination to God. Now human life takes its denomination from the end to which it is directed. They who constitute their last end in pleasures are said to lead a life of pleasure. They who constitute their last end in the contemplation of truth are said to lead a contemplative life: hence whosoever constitute their last end in the enjoyment of God, their life is an adherence to God, which is absolutely the life of man, for to that end man is naturally ordained (Chap. XXXVII ). On other ends man’s life is dependent only in a qualified sense, inasmuch as such ends are not imposed on man by nature, but by his own choice. Death then being the opposite of life, it is a sort of death to a man to drop out of the order which has its last term in God. Hence the sins whereby a man breaks away from such order are called ‘mortal,’ or ‘deadly’ sins; and those instructions of the law whereby men are held to their engagements of justice, charity, hope, and faith, are called ‘commandments,’ or ‘prohibitions,’ because they are to be of necessity observed. As one necessary condition for the flight of the mind to God is peace with neighbours, with whom man has to live in society and be aided by them, so another necessary condition is peace and good order of the elements within man himself. We observe that there are two ways in which the free flight of the mind to God may be hindered. One way is by the intensification of the acts of the lower powers. When one power comes vigorously into action, it draws to itself the interest of man, which cannot be scattered over many objects simultaneously: hence another power must be either stopped from acting or have its activity diminished. By the lower powers I mean the sentient powers, as well apprehensive, namely, the external and internal senses, the phantasy and other attendant powers, as also appetitive, as the irascible and concupiscible faculties. Hence when there is strong delight in sense, or much excitement of phantasy, or an inclination of the concupiscible or of the irascible faculty to their several objects, the mind must necessarily be impeded in its act of ascent to God. In another way the movement of the mind to God may be hindered on the part of the mind itself, by its occupation with other things: for one power cannot be in perfect activity over several objects simultaneously. But since the mind at times uses the inferior powers as obedient instruments, and can occupy itself with several objects, when they all bear upon one and all help to apprehend that one, we must understand that the mind is then only hindered from its flight to God by the lower powers, or by its own occupation with other objects, when those powers or those objects bear not at all on the mind’s movement to God: otherwise, far from being hindrances, they may be positive helps to the free flight of man’s mind to his Creator. Indeed man cannot altogether avoid occupying his mind about other things, by the fact that he must be solicitous about the necessaries of his bodily life. There are however among men various degrees of this solicitude. The first degree of solicitude extends just so far as the common measure of human life requires. It involves the providing of necessaries for self, wife, children, and other persons belonging to oneself according to one’s state. This degree of solicitude is lawful, and may be said to be connatural to man. The second degree is reached when a man is more solicitous about the aforesaid things of the body than the common measure of human life requires according to his state, without however this solicitude going so far as to withdraw him from his subordination to God, or making him transgress the commandments of justice and charity. There is evidently sin in this, since the man exceeds his proper measure; yet not mortal sin, since he undertakes nothing contrary to the precepts of justice and charity. His sin is called ‘venial,’ as being readily ‘pardonable,’ — as well because, for one who keeps his face set towards his last end, any error that he may make is easily put straight, — thus in speculative sciences any one who has a true conception of principles may thereby easily correct such errors as he may fall into in drawing conclusions; and the end in view in the things of action is like the first principle in things of speculation, — as also because to one steady in friendship any delinquency is readily forgiven, — as also because it is no easy matter absolutely to observe due measure and exceed in nothing. Hence whoever does not cast away from his heart the rule of reason, which is laid down by the end in view, even though he does not altogether observe rectitude in the things which have to be regulated by that rule, is not over-much to be blamed, but deserves pardon. The third degree is when the solicitude for temporals grows so great as to withdraw the soul from subordination to God, and bring it to transgress the commandments of justice and charity, faith and hope, without which man’s mind cannot remain in due relation with God; and this is manifest mortal sin. The fourth degree is when contrariwise man’s solicitude for worldly things stops short of the common measure of human life. If this is owing to remissness and flabbiness of mind, or to any undue eagerness, it is to be held for a base proceeding: for the transgression of the golden mean in either direction is blameworthy. But if lower things are neglected that better things may be attended to, to wit, that the mind may take a free flight to the things of God, this is a virtue more perfect than human. To teach man such perfection, there have not been given him commandments, but rather counsels to draw him forth and incite him.\n\n### Chapter CXXXI. Of the Counsels that are given in the Divine Law\n\nCHAPTER CXXXI — Of the Counsels that are given in the Divine Law BECAUSE the best part for man is to fix his mind on God and divine things, and it is impossible for man to busy himself with intense ardour in a number of different directions, there are given in the divine law counsels for enabling the human mind to take a more free flight to God. These counsels withdraw men from the occupations of the present life, so far as is possible for men still living on earth. Such withdrawal is not so necessary to justice as that justice cannot be without it: for virtue and justice is not done away with by man’s making use of corporeal and earthly things according to the order of reason: therefore these admonitions of the divine law are called counsels, and not commandments, inasmuch as they advise a man to drop things less good for things that are better. Human solicitude busies itself about the common measure of human life in three chief particulars. First, about one’s own person, what one is to do or where to live; secondly, about persons related to oneself, especially wife and children; thirdly, about the procurement of exterior things, needful for the support of life. For cutting off solicitude about exterior things there is given in the divine law the counsel of poverty, which prompts to the casting away of the things of this world. Hence the Lord says: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast and give to the poor, and come, follow me ( Matt. xix, 21 ). For cutting off solicitude about wife and children there is given man the counsel of virginity, or continence. Hence it is said: About virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give a counsel ; and, adding the reason of this counsel, he continues: He that is without a wife is solicitous for the things of the Lord, how he may please God; but he that is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife, and is divided ( 1 Cor. vii, 25-33 ). For cutting off man’s solicitude even about himself there is given the counsel of obedience, whereby a man commits the disposal of his acts to his superior. Therefore it is said: Obey your superiors and be subject to them, for they watch as having to render an account of your souls ( Heb. xiii, 17 ). Because the highest perfection of human life consists in the mind of man being detached from other things and fixed on God, and the three counsels aforesaid seem singularly to dispose the mind to this detachment, we may see in them proper adjuncts of a state of perfection, not that they themselves constitute perfection, but inasmuch as they are dispositions to perfection, which consists in the union of the detached soul with God. This is expressly shown in the words of our Lord counselling poverty: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and follow me , — where He places the perfection of life in the following of Him. They may also be called effects and signs of perfection. For when the mind is strongly possessed with love and desire of anything, it thereupon counts other things as quite secondary: so from man’s mind being carried with fervent love and desire to divine things, wherein its perfection consists, the consequence is a casting off of all that might retard its movement to God, — care of property, affection for wife and children, and even love of one’s own self. This is signified by the words of Scripture: If a man shall give the whole substance of his house in exchange for love, he will account it nothing (Cant. viii, 7): Having found one precious pearl, he went and sold all that he had, and acquired it ( Matt. xiii, 46 ): the advantages that I had I considered as dirt, that I might gain Christ ( Philip. iii, 8 ). Since then the three counsels aforesaid are dispositions to perfection, and effects of perfection, and signs of the same, they who make the three corresponding vows to God are properly said to be in a state of perfection. The perfection to which they dispose the mind consists in the free converse of the soul with God. Hence they who make profession of the aforesaid vows are called ‘religious,’ as dedicating themselves and all that is theirs to God by a manner of sacrifice, extending to property by poverty, to the body by continence, and to the will by obedience: for religion consists in the worship of God (Chap. CXIX ).\n\n### Chapters CXXXII, CXXXV. Arguments against Voluntary Poverty, with Replies\n\nCHAPTERS CXXXII, CXXXV — Arguments against Voluntary Poverty, with Replies THERE have been found persons to condemn voluntary poverty, thereby going against the teaching of the gospel, Of these Vigilantius was the first. He has had imitators, men making themselves out to be doctors of the law, not understanding either what they say or about what they affirm ( 1 Tim. i, 7 ). They have been led by these and the like reasons. Arg . 1. Animals that cannot find the necessaries of life at any time of the year, have a natural instinct for gathering such necessaries at a time when they can be found, and laying them up, as we see in bees and ants. But men need many things for the preservation of their life, which cannot be found any time. Therefore man has a natural tendency to gather together and lay up such things, and it is against the law of nature to scatter them again. Reply . Still it is not necessary for every one to be busy with this task of gathering: as even among bees not all have the same duty, some gather honey, others make cells out of wax, — to say nothing of the queen-bees being exempt from all such occupations. And so it must be with men: for many things being necessary to human life, for which one man by himself cannot suffice, different functions have to be undertaken by different men, — some have to labour in the fields, some to tend cattle, and some to build. And because human life needs not only corporal but also spiritual aids, some have to devote themselves to spiritual things for the benefit of the rest; and these persons should be set free from the care of temporals. Arg. 2. As every one is bound by natural law to preserve his life, so also his exterior substance, as being the means whereby life is preserved. Reply . For them who relinquish temporal things there still remains every likelihood and hope of finding the sustenance necessary for life, either through their own labour, or the benefactions of others, whether in the shape of possessions held in common or of food daily given: for what we can do through our friends, in a manner we can do of ourselves, as the Philosopher says ( Eth. Nic. VIII, xi). Arg . 3. Man is by nature a social animal. But society cannot be maintained among men except on a system of mutual aid. To take their part in this system of aid they render themselves incapable, who fling away their exterior substance. Reply . It is a greater thing to aid another in spirituals than in temporals, spiritual things being the more necessary to the end of final happiness. Hence he who by voluntary poverty strips himself of the ability to aid others in temporals, in order to the acquirement of spiritual good, whereby he may aid others to better advantage, does nothing against the good of human society. Arg . 4. If it is an evil thing to have worldly substance, a good thing to rid neighbours of evil, and an evil thing to lead them into evil, it follows that to give any of the substance of this world to a needy person is evil, and to take away such substance from him who has it is good: which is absurd. It is therefore a good thing to have worldly substance, and to fling it entirely away by voluntary poverty is evil. Reply . Wealth is a good thing for man, so far as it is directed to rational good, but not in itself: hence poverty may very well be better than wealth, if by poverty man finds his way to a more perfect good. Arg. 5. Occasions of evil are to be shunned. But poverty is an occasion of evil, leading men on to thefts, flatteries, perjuries, and the like. Reply . Neither riches, nor poverty, nor any other exterior condition is of itself the good of man. Such things are good only as tending to the good of reason. Hence vice may arise out of any of them, when they are not turned to man’s use according to the rule of reason. Still not for that are they to be accounted simply evil, but only the abuse of them is evil. Arg. 6. Virtue, lying in the mean, is spoilt by either extreme. There is a virtue called liberality, which consists in giving where one should give, and holding one’s hand where one should hold it. On the side of defect is the vice of stinginess, which holds its hand in all cases indiscriminately. On the side of excess is the vice of lavish giving away of everything, as is done by those who embrace voluntary poverty, a vice akin to prodigality. Reply . The golden mean is not determined according to quantity of exterior goods, but according to the rule of reason. Hence sometimes it happens that what is extreme in quantity of some exterior commodity is the mean according to the rule of reason. There is none who tends to great things more than the magnanimous man, or who in expenditure surpasses the munificent, or princely man. The rule of reason does not measure the mere quantity of commodity employed, but the condition of the person and his intention, fitness of place, time, and the like, also many conditions of virtue. Therefore one does not run counter to virtue by voluntary poverty, even though one abandon all things. Nor is this an act of prodigality, seeing that it is done with a due end and other due conditions. To expose oneself to death, under due conditions, is an act of fortitude and a virtue: yet that is going far beyond the abandonment of one’s possessions.\n\n### Chapters CXXXIII, CXXXVI. Of various Modes of Living adopted by the Votaries of Voluntary Poverty\n\nCHAPTERS CXXXIII, CXXXVI — Of various Modes of Living adopted by the Votaries of Voluntary Poverty FIRST MODE. The first mode is for the possessions of all to be sold, and all to live in common on [the capital fund accumulated by] the price, as was done under the Apostles at Jerusalem: As many as had possessions in lands or houses sold them, and laid the price at the feet of the Apostles, and division was made to each according to the need of each ( Acts iv, 34, 35 ). Criticism . It is not easy to induce many men with great possessions to take up this mode of life; and if the amount realised out of the possessions of a few rich is divided among many recipients, it will not last long. Reply . This mode will do, but not for a long time. And therefore we do not read of the Apostles instituting this inode of living when they passed to the nations among whom the Church was to take root and endure. Second Mode . To have possessions in common, sufficient to provide for all members of the community out of what the property brings in, as is done in most monasteries. Criticism . Earthly possessions breed solicitude, as well for the gathering in of the returns as also for the defence of them against acts of fraud and violence; and this solicitude is all the greater as greater possessions are required for the support of many. In this way then the end of voluntary poverty is defeated, at least in the case of many, who have the procuratorship of these possessions. Besides, common possession is wont to be a source of discord. Reply . The administration of these common possessions may be left to the care of one or a few persons, and the rest remain without solicitude for temporals, free to attend to spiritual things. Nor do they who undertake this solicitude for others lose any of the perfection of their life: for what they seem to lose by defect of quiet they recover in the service of charity, in which perfection consists. Nor is there any loss of concord by occasion of this mode of common possessions. For they who adopt voluntary poverty ought to be persons who despise temporal things; and such persons are not the men to quarrel over temporals. Third mode . To live by the labour of one’s hands, as St Paul did and advised others to do. We have not eaten bread of any one for nothing, but in labour and fatigue, night and day working, not to be a burden to any of you: not that we had not authority to act otherwise, but to present ourselves to you as a model for you to imitate: for when we were with you, we laid down to you the rule, if any man not work, neither let him eat ( 2 Thess. iii, 8-10 ). Criticism . It seems folly for one to abandon what is necessary, and afterwards try to get it back again by labour. Moreover, whereas the end of the counsel of voluntary poverty is the readier following of Christ in freedom from worldly solicitudes, earning one’s livelihood by one’s own labour is a matter of more anxiety than living on the possessions which one had before, especially if they were a modest competency. And the Lord seems to forbid manual labour to His disciples in the text: Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither do they reap: consider the lilies of the field how they grow, they labour not, neither do they spin ( Matt. vi, 26, 28 ). Moreover this mode of living is inadequate. Many desire a perfect life, who have not the capacity for earning their livelihood by labour, not having been brought up thereto: also there is the possibility of sickness. And no little time must be spent in labour to suffice for earning a livelihood: many spend their whole time in labour, and yet can scarcely live. Thus the votaries of voluntary poverty will be hindered from study and spiritual exercises; and their poverty will be more of a hindrance than a help to the perfection of their life. Reply . In the case of rich men, their possessions involve solicitude in getting them or keeping them; and the heart of the owner is drawn to them; inconveniences which do not happen to one whose sole object is to gain his daily bread by the labour of his hands. Little time is sufficient, and little solicitude is necessary, for gaining by the labour of one’s hands enough to support nature: but for gathering riches and superfluities, as craftsmen in the world propose, much time has to be spent and much solicitude shown. Our Lord in the Gospel has not forbidden labour of the hands, but anxiety of mind about the necessaries of life. He did not say, Do not labour , but, Be not solicitous . And this precept He enforces by an argument from less to greater. For if divine providence sustains birds and lilies, which are of inferior condition, and cannot labour at those works whereby men get their livelihood, much more will it provide for men, who are of worthier condition, and to whom it has given ability to win their livelihood by their own labours. It is the exception for a man not to be able to win enough to live upon by the labour of his hands; and an institution is not to be rejected for exceptional cases. The remedy is, for him whose labour is not enough to keep him, to be helped out either by others of the same society, who can make more by their labour than is necessary for them, or by others who are well off. Nor need those who are content with little spend much time in seeking a livelihood by the labour of their hands: so they are not much hindered from spiritual works, especially as in working with their hands they can think of God and praise Him. Fourth mode . To live on the alms contributed by others, who retain their wealth. This seems to have been the method observed by our Lord: for it is said that sundry women followed Christ, and ministered to him out of their means ( Luke viii, 2, 3 ). Criticism . It seems irrational for one to abandon his own and live on an other’s property, — or for one to receive of another and pay him back nothing in return. There is no impropriety in ministers of the altar and preachers, to whom the people are indebted for doctrine and other divine gifts, receiving support at their hands: for the labourer is worthy of his hire , as the Lord says ( Matt. x, 10 ); and the Apostle, the Lord hath ordained that they who preach the gospel should live by the gospel ( 1 Cor. ix, 14 ). But it is an apparent absurdity for these persons who minister to the people in no office to receive the necessaries of life from the people. Others moreover, who through sickness and poverty cannot help themselves, must lose their alms through these professors of voluntary poverty, since men neither can nor will succour a great multitude of poor. Moreover independence of spirit is particularly requisite for perfect virtue: otherwise men easily become partakers in other people’s sins, either by expressly consenting to them, or by palliating or dissembling them. But this method of life is a great drawback to such independence, for a man cannot but shrink from offending one by whose patronage he lives. Moreover the necessity of exposing one’s necessities to others, and begging relief, renders mendicants objects of contempt and dislike, whereas persons who take up a perfect life ought to be reverenced and loved. But if any one will praise the practice of begging as conducive to humility, he seems to talk altogether unreasonably. For the praise of humility consists in despising earthly exaltation, such as comes of riches, honours, fame, but not in despising loftiness of virtue, for in that respect we ought to be magnanimous. That then would be a blameworthy humility, for the sake of which any one should do anything derogatory to loftiness of virtue. But the practice of begging is so derogatory, as well because it is more virtuous to give than to receive, as also because there is a look of filthy lucre about it. Reply . There is no impropriety in him being supported by the alms of others, who has abandoned his own possessions for the sake of something that turns to the profit of others. Were this not so, human society could not go on. If every one busied himself only about his own affairs, there would be no one to minister to the general advantage. The best thing then for human society ( hominum societati ) is that they who neglect the care of their own interests to serve the general advantage, should be supported by those whose advantage they serve. Therefore do soldiers live on pay provided by others, and civil rulers are provided for out of the common fund. But they who embrace voluntary poverty to follow Christ, certainly abandon what they have to serve the common advantage, enlightening the people by wisdom, learning and example, or sustaining them by their prayer and intercession. Hence there is nothing base in their living on what they get from others, seeing that they make a greater return, receiving temporals and helping others in spirituals. Hence the Apostle says: Let your abundance in temporals supply their want, that their abundance in spirituals also may supply your want ( 2 Cor. viii, 14 : cf. Rom. xv, 27 ). For he who abets another becomes a partner in his work, whether for good or evil. By their example other men become less attached to riches, seeing them abandon riches altogether for the sake of perfection. And the less one loves riches, the more ready will he be to make distribution of his riches in other’s need: hence they who embrace voluntary poverty are useful to other poor people, provoking the rich to works of mercy by word and example. Nor do they lose their liberty of spirit for the little they receive from others for their sustenance. A man does not lose his independence except for things that become predominant in his affections: for things that a man despises, if they are given to him, he does not lose his liberty. Nor is there any unseemliness in their exposing their necessities, and asking what they need either for themselves or others. The Apostles are read to have done so ( 2 Cor. viii , ix ). Such begging does not render men contemptible, if it is done moderately, for necessaries, not for superfluities, without importunity, and with due regard to the conditions of the persons asked, and place and time. There is no shadow of disgrace about such begging, though there would be, if it were done with importunity or without discretion. There is, no doubt, a certain humiliation in begging, as having a thing done to you is less honourable than doing it, and receiving than giving, and obeying royal power than governing and reigning. The spontaneous embracing of humiliations is a practice of humility, not in any and every case, but when it is done for a needful purpose: for humility, being a virtue, does nothing indiscreetly. It is then not humility but folly to embrace any and every humiliation: but where virtue calls for a thing to be done, it belongs to humility not to shrink from doing it for the humiliation that goes with it, for instance, not to refuse some mean service where charity calls upon you so to help your neighbour. Thus then where begging is requisite for the perfection of a life of poverty, it is a point of humility to bear this humiliation. Sometimes too, even where our own duty does not require us to embrace humiliations, it is an act of virtue to take them up in order to encourage others by our example more easily to bear what is incumbent on them: for a general sometimes will do the office of a common soldier to encourage the rest. Sometimes again we may make a virtuous use of humiliations as a medicine. Thus if any one’s mind is prone to undue self-exaltation, he may with advantage make a moderate use of humiliations, either self-imposed or imposed by others, so to check the elation of his spirit by putting himself on a level with the lowest class of the community in the doing of mean offices. Fifth mode. There have also been some who said that the votaries of a perfect life should take no thought either for begging or labouring or laying up anything for themselves, but should exped their sustenance from God alone, according to the texts, Be not solicitous , and, Take no thought for the morrow ( Matt. vi, 25, 34 ). Criticism . This seems quite an irrational proceeding. For it is foolish to wish an end and omit the means ordained to that end. Now to the end of eating there is ordained some human care of providing oneself with food. They then who cannot live without eating ought to have some solicitude about seeking their food. There follows also a strange absurdity: for by parity of reasoning one might say that he will not walk, or open his mouth to eat, or avoid a stone falling, or a sword striking him, but expect God to do all, which is tantamount to tempting God. Reply . It is quite an irrational error to suppose that all solicitude about making a livelihood is forbidden by the Lord. Every action requires care: if then a man ought to have no solicitude about temporal things, it follows that he should do nothing temporal, which is neither a possible nor a reasonable course. For God has prescribed to every being actions according to the peculiarity of its nature. Man, being made up of a nature at once spiritual and corporeal, must by divine ordinance exercise bodily actions; and at the same time have spiritual aims; and he is the more perfect, the more spiritual his aims are. But it is not a mode of perfection proper to man to omit bodily action: bodily actions serve necessary purposes in the preservation of life; and whoever omits them neglects his life, which he is bound to preserve. To look for aid from God in matters in which one can help oneself by one’s own action, and so to leave that action out, is a piece of folly and a tempting of God: for it is proper to the divine goodness to provide for things, not immediately by doing everything itself, but by moving other things to their own proper action (Chap. LXXVII ). We must not then omit the means of helping ourselves, and expect God to help us in defect of all action of our own: that is inconsistent with the divine ordinance and with His goodness. But because, though it rests with us to act, still that our actions shall attain their due end does not rest with us, owing to obstacles that may arise, the success that each one shall have in his action comes under divine arrangement. The Lord then lays it down that we ought not to be solicitous for what does not belong to us, that is, for the success of our actions: but He has not forbidden us to be solicitous about what does belong to us, that is, for the work which we ourselves do. It is not then to act against the precept of the Lord, to feel solicitude for the things which have to be done; but he goes against the precept, who is solicitous for what may turn out even when ( etiam si ) he does all that is in his power to do, and takes due precautions beforehand ( praemittat ) to meet the contingency of such untoward events. When that is done, we ought to hope in God’s providence, by whom even the birds and herbs are sustained. To feel solicitude on such points seems to appertain to the error of the Gentiles who deny divine providence. Therefore the Lord concludes that we should take no thought for the morrow ( Matt. vi, 34 ), by which He has not forbidden us to lay up betimes things needful for the morrow; but He forbids that solicitude about future events which goes with a sort of despair of the divine assistance, as also the allowing of the solicitude that will have to be entertained to-morrow to come in before its time perversely to-day: for every day brings its own solicitude; hence it is added, Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof .\n\n### Chapter CXXXIV. In what the Good of Poverty consists\n\nCHAPTER CXXXIV — In what the Good of Poverty consists LET us observe in riches what is to be thought of poverty. Exterior riches are necessary to the good of virtue inasmuch as by them we support the body and succour other people. Means to an end must derive their goodness from the end. Exterior riches therefore must be some sort of a good to man, still not a principal but a secondary good: for the principal good is the end, — other things are good as subordinate to the end. Therefore it has been held that the virtues are the greatest of good things to man, and exterior riches the least. Now the means to any end must be checked by the requirements of that end. Riches therefore are so far forth good as they make for the exercise of virtue. But if that measure is exceeded, and the exercise of virtue impeded by them, they are no longer to be counted among good but among evil things. Hence it comes about that the possession of riches is a good thing for some men, who turn them to a virtuous use; and an evil thing for other men, who thereby are withdrawn from virtue, either by excessive solicitude or excessive affection for their wealth, or by elation of mind thence arising. But there are virtues of the active life and virtues of the contemplative life; and these two orders of virtues make use of riches in different ways. The contemplative virtues need riches solely for the sustenance of nature: the active virtues as well for this purpose as also for the further purpose of helping a neighbour. Hence the contemplative life is more perfect in this, that it requires fewer earthly aids, its attention being wholly given to divine things. Hence the Apostle says: Having food, and wherewith to be clothed, with these let us be content ( 1 Tim. vi, 8 ). Poverty then is praiseworthy, inasmuch as it delivers a man from the vices in which some men are entangled by riches. Again, inasmuch as it removes the solicitude that goes with wealth, it is useful to some persons, namely, to those who have the gift of occupying themselves with better things; but hurtful to others, who, set free from this solicitude, busy themselves about worse things. But in so far as poverty takes away the good that comes of riches, namely, the helping of other people, and hinders self support, it is simply an evil, except in so far as the loss of the power of helping neighbours in temporals may be compensated by the advantage of a free attention to divine and spiritual things. But the good of one’s own subsistence is so necessary, that the lack of it can be compensated by no other good: for on the offer of no other good should a man deprive himself of the means of supporting his own life. Poverty therefore is praiseworthy, when it delivers a man from earthly cares, and he thereby arrives to give his mind more freely to divine and spiritual things, yet so that he retains the means of lawful self-support, whereunto not much provision is requisite. And the less solicitude any method of poverty involves, the more praiseworthy is that poverty. But poverty is not more praiseworthy, the greater it is: for poverty is not good in itself, but only inasmuch as it removes from a man’s path the obstacles of his freely applying himself to spiritual things: hence the measure of such removal of obstacles is the measure of the goodness of poverty. And this is a general principle with respect to all creatures: they are good only in so far as they lead to virtue, not in themselves.\n\n### Chapter CXXXVII. Arguments against Perpetual Continence, with Replies\n\nCHAPTER CXXXVII — Arguments against Perpetual Continence, with Replies ARG. 1. The good of the species is more godlike than the good of the individual. He then who abstains altogether from the act whereby the species is perpetuated, sins more than he would by abstaining from the act whereby the individual is preserved, namely, eating and drinking. Reply . Things that belong to the necessity of the individual stand on a different footing from things that belong to the necessity of the community. In the necessities of the individual, individual provision must be made: everyone must make use of meat and drink. But in the necessities of the community it is neither needful nor possible for the office of meeting such needs to be assigned to every individual. Many things are necessary to a multitude of men, which no one individual can attend to: therefore there must be different offices for different persons, as in the body the several members have their several functions. Since then procreation is not a necessity of the individual, but a necessity of the species, there is no need for all men to be procreants; but some men may abstain, and devote themselves to other offices, as to the life of a soldier or a contemplative. Arg . 2. By divine ordinance there are given to man members apt for procreation, and a force of appetite inciting him thereto: whoever then altogether abstains from procreation seems to resist the ordinance of God. Reply . Divine providence gives to man endowments necessary for the species as a whole: still there is no call upon every individual man to make use of every one of these endowments. Thus man has a building capacity and a fighting capacity: yet all men need not be builders or soldiers; neither need every one apply himself to procreation. Arg . 3. If it is good for one man to lead a life of continence, it is better for many so to do, and the best thing of all would be for all to do it: so the human race would become extinct. Reply . From things necessary to the community, though it be better for individuals to abstain, when one is given to better things, still it is not good for all to abstain. This is apparent in the order of the universe. Though a pure spirit is better than a bodily substance, still that would not be a better but a more imperfect universe, in which there were pure spirits alone. Though the eye is better than the foot, it would not be a perfect animal that had not both eye and foot. So neither would the state of the commonwealth of man kind be perfect, unless there were some applied to acts of procreation, and others abstaining from such acts and given to contemplation. Arg . 4. Chastity, like other virtues, lies in the mean. Therefore he acts against virtue, who altogether abstains from the gratification of his appetites. Reply . This objection has been already solved in treating of poverty (Chapp. CXXXII, CXXXV , Arg. 6). Irrational abstinence from all [lawful] sexual pleasures is called the vice of insensibility: but a rational abstinence [from all even lawful forms of such gratification] is a virtue exceeding the common measure of man, for it puts man in some sort of participation of the likeness of God. Hence virginity is said to be allied to angels. But though we say in general that it is better for one individual to observe continence than to use marriage, it may very well be that for some other individual the second course is the better. Hence the Lord says: Not all men take this word: whoever can take, let him take ( Matt. xix, 11, 12 ).\n\n### Chapter CXXXIX. Against those who find fault with Vows\n\nCHAPTER CXXXIX — Against those who find fault with Vows SOME have taken it for a folly to bind oneself by vow to obey another, or to observe any practice: for there is more of virtue in a good act as there is more of freedom: hence the praiseworthiness of virtuous acts seems to be diminished by their being done under necessity of obedience or vow. But these cavillers seem to be ignorant of the nature of necessity. For there is a twofold necessity: a necessity of constraint, and this diminishes the praiseworthiness of virtuous acts, as telling against their voluntariness: for that is done under constraint, which is contrary to the will. There is again a necessity springing out of interior inclination; and this, far from diminishing, increases the credit of a virtuous act: for it makes the will tend to the act of virtue all the more earnestly. For evidently, the more perfect the habit of virtue is, with all the more force does it urge the will to the act of virtue and leaves it less chance of swerving. Nay, if it attains to the highest pitch of perfection, it induces a sort of necessity of well-doing, as will appear in the case of the Blessed, who cannot sin (B. IV, Chap. XCII ); nor yet is there anything thereby lost either to the freedom of the wilt or to the goodness of the act. There is another necessity derived from the bearing of the means on the end in view, as when it is said to be necessary for one to find a ship in order to cross the sea. But neither does this necessity diminish the freedom of the will or the goodness of the acts: nay rather, for one to act as doing something necessary to an end is in itself praiseworthy, and all the more praiseworthy the better the end. But it will be seen that the necessity of observing what one has vowed to observe, or obeying the superior under whom one has placed oneself, is not a necessity of constraint: nor again is it a necessity arising out of interior inclination, but out of the bearing of means on the end: for it is necessary for the votary to do this or that, if the vow is to be fulfilled, or the obedience kept. Since then these are praiseworthy ends, inasmuch as they are acts whereby a man submits himself to God, the aforesaid necessity takes off nothing from the praise of virtue. From yet another point of view the fulfilment of a vow, or of a superior’s commands, for God’s sake, is worthy of greater praise or reward. For as one act may be an act of two vices, in that the act of one vice is directed to the end of another vice, e.g., when one steals to commit fornication, in which case the act is specifically one of avarice, but intentionally one of lust, — so in the same way the act of one virtue may be directed to the act of another virtue, as when one gives for charity, in which case the act is specifically one of liberality, but finally one of charity: such an act is more praiseworthy for the greater virtue of charity than for liberality: hence, though the liberality come to fall short, the act will be more praiseworthy, inasmuch as it is referred to charity, and worthy of greater reward, than if it were done with greater liberality, but not in view of charity. Let us suppose then a man doing some act of virtue, say, fasting, or restraining his sexual passion: if he does this without a vow, it will be an act of chastity, or abstinence: but if he does it under a vow, it is further referable to another virtue, that virtue to which it belongs to vow and pay one’s vows to God, which is called the virtue of religion, a higher virtue than chastity, or abstinence, as putting us in a right relation with God. The act of abstinence therefore, or continence, will be more praiseworthy inasmuch as it is done under vow, even though the doer of it does not take so much delight in his abstinence, or continence: that deficiency is made up by his taking delight in a higher virtue, which is religion. If any one does anything for God, he offers the act to God, such as it is: but if he does it under a vow, he offers to God not only the act but also the power: thus he clearly has the intention of rendering to God some greater service. Therefore his act will be the more virtuous by reason of the greater good intended, even though another shows himself more fervent in the execution. Moreover, the will that goes before a deed, virtually endures throughout the whole course of the doing of it; and renders it praiseworthy, even when the agent in the execution of his work is not thinking of the purpose for which he began: for it is not necessary for him who has undertaken a journey for God’s sake, to be actually thinking of God at every step of the journey. But clearly he who has vowed to do a thing has willed it more intensely than another who simply has a purpose of doing it; because he has not only willed to do it, but also has willed to fortify himself against failing to do it. This original earnestness of will renders the fulfilment of the vow, with more or less of earnestness, praiseworthy, even when the will is not actually fixed on the work, or is fixed on it but languidly. Thus what is done under vow is more praiseworthy than what is done without vow, other conditions however being equal.\n\n### Chapter CXL. That neither all Good Works nor all Sins are Equal\n\nCHAPTER CXL — That neither all Good Works nor all Sins are Equal COUNSELS are not given except of the better good. But in the divine law there are given counsels of poverty and continency: these then are better than the use of matrimony and the possession of temporal estate, which things however are quite consistent with virtuous action. 2. Acts are specified by their objects. The better therefore the object, the more virtuous will be the act according to its species. But the end is better than the means thereto; and in the category of means the better is that which comes nearer to the end. Therefore among human acts that is the best, which tends straight to God, the last end; and after that, an act is better in its species according as its object is nearer to God. 3. Good is in human acts according as they are regulated by reason. But some acts come nearer to reason than others: acts which are acts of reason itself have more of the good of reason in them than the acts of the lower powers commanded by reason. 4. The commandments of the law are best fulfilled by love (Chap. CXXVIII ). But one man may do his duty out of greater love than another. 6. The better act is the act of the better virtue. But one virtue is better than another: thus munificence is better than liberality, and high-souled conduct in a high position ( magnanimitas ) than decency in a lowly state ( moderantia , i.e., μετριότης ). Hence it is said: He who joineth his virgin in marriage doth well: but he who joineth her not doth better ( 1 Cor. vii, 38 ). By the same reasons it appears that not all sins are equal: for one sin goes wider of the last end than another sin, is a greater perversion of the order of reason, and does greater harm to one’s neighbour. Hence it is said: Thou hast done more wicked things than they in all thy ways ( Ezech. xvi, 47 ). But there may seem to be some reason in the position that all virtuous acts are equal, if we consider that every virtuous act is directed to a final good: hence, if there is the same final good for all virtuous acts, they must all be equally good. — It is to be replied that, though there is one final end of goodness, nevertheless there is a difference of degree in the good things that are referred to that end, some of them being better than others and nigher to the last end. Hence there will be degrees of goodness in the will and its acts according to the diversity of good objects to which the will and its acts are terminated, though the ultimate end be the same. Or again it may be argued that all sins are equal, because sin in human acts comes solely of overpassing the rule of reason: but he overpasses the rule of reason who swerves from it in a small matter, equally with him who swerves from it in a great one; just as, if a line be drawn, not to be overstepped, it comes to the same thing in court whether the trespasser has overstepped it little or much; or as a boxer is cast, once he has gone outside the limits of the ring, little or much: so then, once a man has overstepped the bounds of reason, the amount of his transgression makes no difference. On careful consideration, however, it appears that in all cases where perfection and goodness consists in a certain conformity to measure, the evil will be the greater, the greater the departure from that due conformity. Thus health consists in a due blending of humours, and beauty in a due proportion of features and limbs, and truth in a conformity of thought or speech to fact. The greater the unevenness of humours, the greater the sickness: the greater the incongruity of features or limbs, the greater the ugliness; and the greater the departure from truth, the greater the falsehood: thus the reckoning is not so false that brings in 5 for 3 as that which brings in 100 for 3. But the good of virtue consists in a certain conformity to measure: for virtue is a mean, according to due limitation under the circumstances, between contrary vices. Wickedness then is greater, the further it is out of this harmony. Nor is transgressing the limits of virtue like transgressing bounds fixed by a court. For virtue being of itself good, the transgression of it is of itself evil; and therefore the greater the departure from virtue, the greater the evil. But the transgression of a limit fixed by a court is not of itself evil, but only accidentally so, inasmuch as it is forbidden. But in these accidental connexions, though the being of one thing at all follows upon another’s being at all, it does not follow that the being of the one thing in a higher degree follows upon the other’s coming to be in a higher degree. Thus if a white body is musical, it does not follow that the whiter the body, the more musical: but it does follow that if whiteness is distinctive of vision, a stronger whiteness wilt be more distinctive. A noteworthy difference between sins is that between mortal and venial sin. A mortal sin is one that deprives the soul of spiritual life. The essence of spiritual life consists in two things, according to the likeness of natural life. Just as the body lives naturally by its union with the soul, which is the principle of life; and again, quickened by the soul, the body moves of itself, while a dead body either remains immovable, or is moved only by an exterior power: so is man’s will alive, when conjoined by a right intention with its last end, which is its object and, as it were, its form; and in thus cleaving by love to God and to its neighbour, it is moved by an interior principle of action. But when a right intention of the last end and love is gone, the soul is, as it were, dead, and no longer moves of itself to do any right actions, but either wholly gives over doing them, or is led to do them only by an exterior principle, to wit, the fear of punishment. Whatever sins therefore stand not with a right intention of the last end and love, are mortal sins: but, so long as these finalities are attended to, any deficiency in point of right order of reason will not be a mortal sin, but venial.\n\n### Chapter CXLI. That a Man’s Acts are punished or rewarded by God\n\nCHAPTER CXLI — That a Man’s Acts are punished or rewarded by God TO him it belongs to punish or reward, to whom it belongs to lay down the law. But it belongs to divine providence to lay down the law for men (Chap. CXIV ): therefore also to punish or reward. 2. Whenever there is due order to an end, that order must lead to the end, and departure from that order must shut out the end: for things that are according to an end derive their necessity from the end, in such way that they must be, if the end is to follow, and while they are without impediment, the end ensues. But God has imposed upon men’s acts an order in respect of their final good. If then that order is duly laid down, it must be that they who walk according to it shall gain their final good, that is, be rewarded, and they who depart from that order by sin shall be shut out from their final good, that is, punished. 3. As physical things are subject to the order of divine providence, so also human acts. In regard to both the one and the other the due order may be observed, or it may be transgressed. But there is this difference, that the observation or transgression of the due order lies in the power of the human will, but not in the power of physical things. As then in physical things, when due order is observed in them, there follows of natural necessity their preservation and good, but their destruction and evil when the due and natural order is departed from; so in human things it needs must be that when a man voluntarily observes the order of law by Heaven imposed upon him, he gains good, not of necessity, but by the dispensation of the ruler, — that is to say, he gains reward; and conversely, when the order of law is neglected, he comes to evil, that is to say, is punished. 4. It is part of the perfection of God’s goodness to have no part of nature in disorder. Hence we see in the physical world that every evil is part of an orderly arrangement to some good, as the killing of the sheep is the feeding of the wolf. Since then human acts are subject to the order of divine providence as well as physical events, the evil that happens in human acts must lead up in an orderly way to good. But this is most aptly brought about by the punishment of sins: for thus excesses beyond the due amount are embraced under the order of justice, which restores equality. Man exceeds the due degree and proper amount by preference of his own will to that of God, satisfying himself against the ordinance of God: this inequality is removed by his being compelled to suffer something against his will according to the same ordinance. 6. Divine providence has arranged things so that one shall profit another. But it is most fitting for man to be advanced to his final good as well by the good as by the evil of his fellow-man, being excited to do well by seeing well-doers rewarded, and withheld from evil-doing by seeing evil-doers punished. Hence it is said: I am the Lord thy God . . . . visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children . . . . and doing mercy a thousandfold upon them that love me and keep my commandments ( Exod. xx, 5, 6 ): Thou wilt render to every one according to his works ( Ps. lxi, 13 ): To them who, according to patience in good work, seek glory and honour and incorruption, life everlasting: but to them who . . . . obey not the truth, but give credit to iniquity, wrath and indignation ( Rom. ii, 7, 8 ).\n\n### Chapter CXLII. Of the Difference and Order of Punishments\n\nCHAPTER CXLII — Of the Difference and Order of Punishments EVIL is the privation of good: hence the order and difference of punishments must be according to the difference and order of good things. The chief good and final end of man is happiness: the higher good for him then is that which comes nearer to this end. Coming nearest to it of all is virtue, and whatever else advances man to good acts leading to happiness: next is a due disposition of reason and of the powers subject to it: after that, soundness of bodily health, which is necessary to unfettered action: lastly, exterior goods, as accessory aids to virtue. The greatest punishment therefore for man will be exclusion from happiness: after that, the privation of virtue, and of any perfection of supernatural ( supernaturalium ) powers in his soul for doing well: then the disorder of the natural powers of his soul: after that, the harm of his body; and finally the taking away of exterior goods. But because it belongs to the idea of pain not only that it should be a privation of good, but also that it should be contrary to the will, and not every man’s will esteems goods as they really are, but sometimes the privation of the greater good is less contrary to the will, and therefore seems less of a punishment, it so comes about that the majority of men, esteeming sensible and corporeal things more and knowing them better than the good things of the intellect and the spirit, dread corporeal penalties more than spiritual ones: thus in their estimation the order of punishments is the very reverse of that aforesaid. With them, injuries to the body and losses of exterior things make the greatest punishment: but as for disorder of the soul and loss of virtue and forfeiture of the enjoyment of God, in which the final happiness of man consists, all this they count little or nothing. Hence it is that they do not consider the sins of men to be punished by God, because they see usually sinners enjoying good health and the blessings of exterior fortune, of which sometimes virtuous men are deprived. This ought not to appear surprising to persons who look straight at the facts. For since all exterior things are referable to things interior, and the body to the soul, exterior and corporeal good things are really good for man in so far as they turn to the good of reason within him; and turn to his evil so far as they hinder that good of reason. Now God, the disposer of all things, knows the measure of human virtue: hence He sometimes supplies a virtuous man with corporeal and exterior good things to aid his virtue, and does him a favour in so doing: sometimes again He withdraws the aforesaid things, considering them to be an obstacle to man’s virtue and enjoyment of God. Where they are such an obstacle, exterior good things turn to a man’s prejudice, and the loss of them to his gain. If then punishment in every case means the infliction of some evil, and it is not an evil for a man to be deprived of exterior and corporeal good things so far as is conducive to his advancement in virtue, such deprivation will not be a punishment to a virtuous man: on the other hand a real punishment to the wicked will be the concession to them of exterior goods, whereby they are incited to evil. Hence it is said: The creatures of God are turned to hate, and to a temptation to the souls of men, and a trap for the feet of the unwise ( Wisd. xiv, 11 ). But because it is of the notion of punishment not only to be an infliction of evil, but further an evil contrary to the will, the loss of corporeal and exterior goods, even when it makes for advancement in virtue and not for evil, is called punishment by a stretch of language, inasmuch as it is contrary to the will.\n\n### Chapter CXLIII. That not all Punishments nor all Rewards are Equal\n\nCHAPTER CXLIII — That not all Punishments nor all Rewards are Equal AS there are degrees in virtuous actions and in sins (Chap. CXL ), so there must be degrees of rewards and punishments: for so the equality of distributive justice requires, that unequal returns be made for unequal services. Hence it is said: According to the measure of the sin shall also be the measure of the stripes ( Deut. xxv, 2 ).\n\n### Chapter CXLIV. Of the Punishment due to Mortal and Venial Sins respectively in regard to the Last End\n\nCHAPTER CXLIV — Of the Punishment due to Mortal and Venial Sins respectively in regard to the Last End MAN may sin in either of two ways, either so that the intention of his mind be quite turned away from subordination to God, the final good, and that is a mortal sin: or otherwise so that, while the mind’s intention remains fixed on the final end, some obstacle is put in the way to retard its free movement to the end, and that is a venial sin. As then the difference of punishments must be according to the difference of sins, it follows that whoever sins mortally must have for his punishment to be cast out from the attainment of his end; but he who sins venially is punished, not by being cast out, but by being retarded or experiencing difficulty in gaining his end; for so the equality of justice is preserved, in that as man, by sinning [venially], voluntarily turns aside from his end, so in suffering punishment, against his will, he should be impeded in the gaining of that end. 3. When any one attains a good thing that he was not intending, that is by luck and chance. If then he whose intention is turned away from the last end were to gain that last end, it would be by luck and chance, — which is an absurd thing to suppose, seeing that the last end is a good of intelligence, and luck and chance are inconsistent with intelligent action, because chance events come about without the direction of intelligence: it is absurd then to suppose intelligence gaining its end by an unintelligent method. He then will not gain his end, who by sinning mortally has his intention turned away from his last end. 5. In an orderly course of means leading up to an end such a relation obtains that, if the end is or is to be, the means thereto must be: if the means to the end are not forthcoming, neither will the end be forthcoming: for if the end could be secured without the means to the end being taken, it would be labour lost to seek the end by the taking of such means. But it is by arts of virtue, the chief element in which is an intention of the due end, that man attains to his last end and happiness (Chap. CXLI ). Whoever then acts against virtue, and turns his back on his last end, it is proper for him to suffer deprivation of that end. Hence it is said: Depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity ( Matt. vii, 23 ).\n\n### Chapter CXLV. That the Punishment whereby one is deprived of his Last End is Interminable\n\nCHAPTER CXLV — That the Punishment whereby one is deprived of his Last End is Interminable THERE is no privation except of that which naturally belongs to the subject: a puppy at birth cannot be said to lie under any privation of sight. But man is not apt to attain his last end in this life (Chap. XLVIII ). Therefore any privation of such end must come as a punishment after this life. But after this life there remains to man no ability of gaining his last end, since it is through the body that he gains perfection alike in knowledge and in virtue. And once the soul is separated from the body, it returns not again to this state of receiving perfection from the body, as we have argued above (B. II, Chap. LXXXIII ) against the advocates of the transmigration of souls ( transcorporationem ponentes ). Whoever then incurs this punishment must be deprived of his last end, and remain eternally deprived of it. 3. Natural equity seems to require every one to be deprived of the good against which he takes action, as thereby he renders himself unworthy of that good. Hence by process of civil justice whoever offends against the commonwealth is deprived of the society of the commonwealth altogether, either by death or by perpetual banishment. Nor is the time taken by his offence considered, but the power against which he has offended. He then who sins against his last end and against charity, which is the foundation of the society of the Blessed and of wayfarers on the road to Blessedness, ought to be punished eternally, though his sin took only a short space of time. 4. In the divine judgement the will is taken for the deed: because as men see what is done outwardly, so does God view the hearts of men. But whoever for the sake of some temporal good has turned himself away from the final end, which is possessed for ever, has preferred the temporal enjoyment of that good to the eternal enjoyment of the last end: much more then, it clearly appears, would he have willed the enjoyment of that temporal good for all eternity. Therefore according to the divine judgement he ought to be punished as though he had gone on sinning for eternity. And beyond question, for eternal sin eternal punishment is due. Hence it is said: These shall go into everlasting punishment, but the just into life everlasting ( Matt. xxv, 46 ). Hereby is excluded the error of them who say that the punishment of the wicked will at some time come to an end. This position seems to have had its foundation in the position of certain philosophers who said that all punishments were purgatorial, and consequently at some time terminable. And this position seems plausible, as well by the custom of mankind, for human laws inflict penalties as means and in a manner medicines for the amendment of vices; as also by reason, for if punishment were inflicted, not for the sake of something else, but for its own sake, it would follow that the authority punishing took delight in punishments for their own sake, which is inconsistent with the goodness of God: it needs must be then that punishment is inflicted for the sake of something else, and no more suitable end appears than the amendment of vices. There seems therefore reason for saying that all punishments are purgatorial, and consequently terminable, since whatever is matter of purgation is accidental in regard of the creature, and can be removed without consumption of its substance. In reply it must be allowed that punishments are inflicted by God, not for their own sake, as though God took delight in them, but for the sake of something else, namely, in view of the order which He wishes to impose on creatures, in which order the good of the universe consists (B. II, Chap. XLV ). The order of the universe requires all things to be dispensed by God in due proportion, in weight, number, and measure ( Wisd. xi, 21 ). But as rewards answer proportionably to virtuous actions, so punishments to sins; and to some sins everlasting punishments are proportionable. God then inflicts eternal punishments on some sins, that the due order may be observed in things, which order proves His wisdom. But even though one were to allow that all punishments are applied to the amendment of vices, and to no other purpose, not on that account are we obliged to suppose that all punishments are purgatorial and terminable. For even by human laws some men are punished by death, not for their amendment, but for the amendment of others: hence it is said: For the scourging of the pestilent man, the fool shall be wiser ( Prov. xix, 25 ). Sometimes also human laws drive men out of the State into perpetual banishment, that the State may be purer by being rid of them: hence it is said: Cast out the scorner, and the quarrel will go out with him, and suits and brow- beatings will cease ( Prov. xxii, 10 ). Even then though punishments be employed only for the reformation of manners, it may very well be that by the judgement of God some men ought to be for ever separated from the society of the good and eternally punished, that by the fear of everlasting punishment men may cease to sin, and the society of the good may be the purer for their separation, as it is said: There shall not enter therein anything unclean, or making abomination or lying ( Apoc. xxi, 27 ).\n\n### Chapter CXLVI. That Sins are punished also by the experience of something Painful\n\nCHAPTER CXLVI — That Sins are punished also by the experience of something Painful PUNISHMENT ought to be proportionate to the fault. But in a fault not only is there an aversion of the mind from the last end, but also an undue conversion of it to other objects as ends. Not only then should the sinner be punished by exclusion from the end, but also by other things turning to his pain. 2. No one is afraid to lose what he does not desire to gain. They then who have their will turned away from their last end, have no fear of being shut out from it. Consequently that mere exclusion would not be enough to call them off from sinning. Some other punishment then must be employed, which sinners may fear. 3. One who puts to undue use the means to a certain end, not only is deprived of the end, but incurs some other hurt besides. Thus inordinate taking of food not only does not bring health, but further induces sickness. But whoever sets up his rest in creatures does not use them as he ought: he does not refer them to their last end. Not only then ought he to be punished by going without happiness, but also by experiencing some pain from creatures. Hence divine Scripture not only threatens sinners with exclusion from glory, but also with affliction in other ways. Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire ( Matt. xxv, 41 ). He shall rain nets on sinners: fire and brimstone and the breath of stormy winds shall be the portion of their cup ( Ps. x, 7 ).\n\n### Chapter CXLVII. That it is Lawful for judges to inflict Punishments\n\nCHAPTER CXLVII — That it is Lawful for judges to inflict Punishments MEN who on earth are set over others are ministers of divine providence. But it is the order of providence that the wicked be punished. 4. Good stands in no need of evil, but the other way about (Chap. XI). Whatever then is of necessity for the preservation of good, cannot be of itself evil. But for the preservation of concord among men it is necessary for penalties to be inflicted on the wicked. 5. The common good is better than the good of the individual. There fore some particular good must be withdrawn for the preservation of the common good. But the life of certain pestilent fellows is a hindrance to the common good, that is, to the concord of human society. Such persons therefore are to be withdrawn by death from the society of men. Hence the Apostle says: He beareth not the sword in vain ( Rom. xiii, 4 : cf. 1 Pet. ii, 14 ). Hereby is excluded the error of those who say that corporal punishments are unlawful, and quote in support of their error such texts as, Thou shalt not kill ( Exod. xx, 13 ): Let both grow until the harvest ( Matt. xiii, 30 ). But these are frivolous allegations. For the same law which says, Thou shalt not kill , adds afterwards: Thou shalt not suffer poisoners ( maleficos , φαρμακούς ) to live ( Exod. xxii, 18 ). And as for both growing until the harvest, how that is to be understood appears from what follows: lest perchance in gathering the tares ye root out along with them the wheat also : in this passage then the killing of the wicked is forbidden where it cannot be done without danger to the good, as happens when the wicked are not yet clearly marked off from the good by manifest sins, or when there is ground for apprehension that the wicked may involve many good men in their ruin. The fate of the wicked being open to conversion so long as they live does not preclude their being open also to the just punishment of death. Indeed the danger threatening the community from their life is greater and more certain than the good expected by their conversion. Besides, in the hour of death, they have every facility for turning to God by repentance. And if they are so obstinate that even in the hour of death their heart will not go back upon its wickedness, a fairly probable reckoning may be made that they never would have returned to a better mind.\n\n### Chapter CXLVIII. That Man stands in need of Divine Grace for the Gaining of Happiness\n\nCHAPTER CXLVIII — That Man stands in need of Divine Grace for the Gaining of Happiness IT has already been shown (Chapp. CXI – CXIII ) that divine providence disposes of rational creatures otherwise than of other things, inasmuch as their nature stands on a different footing from that of others. It remains to be shown that also in view of the dignity of their end divine providence employs a higher method of government in their regard. Their nature clearly fits them for a higher end. As being intelligent, they can attain to intelligible truth, which other creatures cannot. So far as they attain this truth by their own natural activity, God provides for them otherwise than for other creatures, giving them understanding and reason, and further the gift of speech, whereby they can aid one another in the knowledge of truth. But beyond this, the last end of man is fixed in a certain knowledge of truth which exceeds his natural faculties, so that it is given to him to see the First Truth in itself. To creatures lower than man it is not given to arrive at an end exceeding the capacities of their natures. In view of this end, a method of government must be found for man, different from that which suffices for the lower creation. For the means must be proportionate to the end: if then man is ordained to an end transcending his natural capacities, he must be furnished with some supernatural assistance from heaven, enabling him to tend to that end. 2. A thing of inferior nature cannot be brought to that which is proper to a superior nature except by the virtue and action of the said superior nature. Thus the moon, which has no light of its own, is made luminous by the virtue and action of the sun. But to behold the First Truth as it is in itself so transcends the capacity of human nature as to be proper to God alone (Chap. LII ). Therefore man needs help of God to arrive at such an end. 5. There are many impediments in the way of man’s arriving at his end. He is impeded by the weakness of his reason, which is easily dragged into error, and so erring he is thrown off the right way of arriving at his end. He is impeded by the passions of the sensitive portion of his nature, and by the tastes which drag him to sensible and inferior things. The more he clings to such things, the further he is separated from his last end: for these things are below man, whereas his end is high above him. He is impeded also very frequently by infirmity of body from the performance of the acts of virtue which carry him on to his end. Man therefore needs the divine assistance, lest with such impediments in his way, he fail altogether in the gaining of his last end. Hence it is said: No man can come to me, unless the Father, who hath sent me, draw him ( John vi, 44 ): As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself unless it abide in the vine, so neither can ye unless ye abide in me ( John xv, 4 ). Hereby is excluded the error of the Pelagians, who said that man could merit the glory of God by sheer free will of his own.\n\n### Chapter CXLIX. That the Divine Assistance does not compel a Man to Virtue\n\nCHAPTER CXLIV — That the Divine Assistance does not compel a Man to Virtue DIVINE providence provides for all things according to their mode of existence (Chap. LXXIII, n. 2 ). But it is proper to man and to every rational creature to act voluntarily and to be master of his own acts; and compulsion is contrary to voluntariness. 3. It is by will that man is directed to a final end: for the good and the final end is the object of will. And the divine assistance is vouchsafed us for this special purpose, that we may attain to our final end. That aid therefore does not exclude the act of our will: on the contrary, it is precisely the act of our will that the divine assistance produces in us: hence the Apostle says: It is God who worketh in us both to will and to act according to the good will ( Phil. ii, 13 ). But compulsion defeats in us the act of the will: for we do that under compulsion of which we will the contrary. 4. Man arrives at his last end by acts of virtue. But acts done under compulsion are not acts of virtue, for in virtue the chief thing is choice. Hence it is said: Consider that to-day the Lord hath put forth in thy sight life and good, and on the other hand death and evil, that thou mayest love the Lord thy God and walk in his ways. But f thy heart is turned away, and thou wilt not hear, etc. ( Deut. xxx, 15-18 ): Before man is life and death, good and evil: what pleases him shall be given to him ( Ecclus xv, 18 ).\n\n### Chapter CL. That Man cannot Merit beforehand the said Assistance\n\nCHAPTER CL — That Man cannot Merit beforehand the said Assistance EVERYTHING stands as matter to that which is above itself. Now matter does not move itself to its own perfection, but must be moved by another. Man then does not move himself to the gaining of the divine assistance, which is above him, but rather he is moved by God to the gaining of it. But the motion of the mover precedes the motion of the thing moved, alike in the order of thought and in the order of causation. The divine assistance therefore is not given to us because we are advanced to receive it by our good works; but rather we are proficient in good works because we are forestalled by the divine assistance. Hence it is said: Not by the works of justice that we have done, but according to his own mercy he hath saved us ( Tit. iii, 5 ): It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy ( Rom. ix, 16 ): because man needs must be forestalled by the divine assistance for purposes both of willing well and doing well. As the victory is attributed to the general, which is won by the labour of the soldiers, so such expressions as the above are not to be taken as exclusive of the free choice of the will, according to the misconstruction which some have put upon them, as though man were not master of his own acts, interior and exterior, but they show that man is under God. Again it is said: Turn us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be turned ( Lament. v, 21 ): which shows that our turning, or conversion, is anticipated by the aid of God converting us. Still we read, as spoken in the person of God: Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you ( Zach. i, 3 ); not that the work of God in us does not go before our conversion; but the meaning is that the conversion, whereby we turn to God, is aided also by His subsequent aid, strengthening it to arrive to effect, and securing it that it may reach its due term. Hereby is excluded the error of the Pelagians, who said that the divine assistance is given us in consideration of our deservings; and that, while the beginning of our justification is of ourselves, the consummation of it is of God.\n\n### Chapter CLI. That the aforesaid Assistance is called ‘Grace,’ and what is the  meaning of ‘Grace constituting a State of Grace’\n\nCHAPTER CLI — That the aforesaid Assistance is called ‘Grace,’ and what is the meaning of ‘Grace constituting a State of Grace’ BECAUSE what is given to another without any previous deserts of his is said to be given gratis, and because the divine aid given to man anticipates all human deserving, it follows that this aid is given to man gratis, and therefore is aptly called by the name of ‘grace.’ Hence the Apostle says: If by grace, it is not now of works, otherwise grace is no more grace ( Rom. xi, 6 ). There is also another reason why the aforesaid assistance of God has received the name of ‘grace.’ One person is said to be ‘in the good graces’ of another, because he is well loved by him. Now it is of the essence of love that he who loves should wish good and do good to him whom he loves. God indeed wishes and does good to all His creatures, for the very being of the creature and its every perfection is of God willing and working it (B. I, Chapp. XXIX , XXX : B. II, Chap. XV ): hence it is said: Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things that thou hast made ( Wisd. xi, 25 ). But a special tie of divine love is observable in connexion with those to whom He renders assistance, enabling them to attain the good which transcends the order of their nature, namely, the perfect fruition, not of any created good, but of God’s own self. This assistance then is aptly called ‘grace,’ not only because it is given ‘ gratis ,’ but also because by this assistance a man comes to be, by a special prerogative, ‘in the good graces’ of God. This grace, in the man in the state of grace, must be a form and perfection of him who has it. 1. That whereby a man is directed to an end must be in continual relation with him: for the mover works change continually until the body moved attains the term of its motion. Since then man is directed to his last end by the assistance of divine grace, he must continually enjoy this assistance until he arrives at the end. But that would not be if the assistance were afforded him only as a sort of motion or passion, and not as a form abiding and, as it were, resting in him: for the movement and passion would not be in the man, except when his attention was being actually turned to the end, as is not the case continually, which is evident most of all in men asleep. Therefore the grace that puts a man in the state of grace is a form and perfection abiding in man, even when he is not actively engaged. 2. The love of God is causative of the good that is in us, as the love of man is called forth and caused by some good that is in the object of his love. But man is excited to special love by some special good pre-existent in the object. Therefore where there is posited a special love of God for man, there must consequently be posited some special good conferred by God on man. Since then the grace that constitutes the State of grace denotes a special love of God for man, there must be likewise denoted some special goodness and perfection thereby existing in man. 3. Everything is ordained to an end suited to it according to the character of its form: for of different species there are different ends. But the end to which man is directed by the assistance of divine grace is something above human nature. Therefore there must be superadded to man some supernatural form and perfection, whereby he may be aptly ordained to the aforesaid end. 4. Man ought to arrive at his last end by dint of activities of his own. Now everything is active in virtue of some form of its own. In order then that man may be brought to his last end by activities of his own, there must be superadded to him some form, to validate his activities for the gaining of his last end. 5. Divine providence provides for all according to the mode of their nature. But it is a mode proper to man to require for the perfection of his actions, over and above his natural powers, certain perfections in the shape of habits, whereby he may do good, and do it well, connaturally, readily, and pleasantly. Therefore the aid of grace, given man by God for arriving at his last end, implies some form and perfection intrinsic to man. Hence in Scripture the grace of God is spoken of as light: Ye were once darkness, but now light in the Lord ( Eph. v, 8 ). The perfection whereby man is led on to his final end in the vision of God is appropriately termed light, light being the principle of vision. Hereby is set aside the opinion of some who say that the grace of God is no positive quality in man ( nihil in homine ponit ), as no positive quality is ascribed to the courtier who is said to be in the good graces of the King, but rather to the King who has an affection for him. We see how this mistake arose, from failing to observe the difference between divine love and human love: for divine love is causative of the good that it loves in another, but not so human love.\n\n### Chapter CLII. That the Grace which constitutes the State of Grace causes in us the Love of God\n\nCHAPTER CLII — That the Grace which constitutes the State of Grace causes in us the Love of God THE grace which constitutes the state of grace is an effect of God’s love. But the proper effect of God’s love in man is to make man love God: for the chief effort of the lover is laid out in drawing the beloved to the love of him; and unless that succeeds, the love must be broken off. 2. There must be some union between those who have one end in view, as citizens in one State, and soldiers ranked together on the battlefield. But the final end to which man is led by the assistance of divine grace is the vision of God as He essentially is, which is proper to God Himself; and so God shares this final good with man. Man then cannot be led on to this end unless he is united with God by conformity of will, the proper effect of love: for it belongs to friends to like and dislike together, and to rejoice and grieve together. The grace then that constitutes the state of grace renders man a lover of God, as he is thereby guided to an end shared with him by God. 3. The grace that constitutes the state of grace must principally perfect the heart. But the principal perfection of the heart is love. The proof of that is, that every motion of the heart starts from love: for no one desires, or hopes, or rejoices, except for some good that he loves; nor loathes, nor fears, nor is sad, or angry, except about something contrary to the good that he loves. 4. The form whereby a thing is referred to any end assimilates that thing in a manner to the end: thus a body by the form of heaviness acquires a likeness and conformity to the place to which it naturally moves. But the grace that constitutes the state of grace is a form referring man to his last end, God. By grace then man attains to a likeness of God. And likeness is a cause of love. 5. A requisite of perfect work is that the work be done steadily and regularly. That is just the effect of love, which makes even hard and grievous tasks seem light. Since then the grace that constitutes the state of grace goes to perfect our works, the said grace must establish the love of God within us. Hence the Apostle says: The charity of God is spread abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is given to us ( Rom. v, 5 ).\n\n### Chapter CLIII. That Divine Grace causes in us Faith\n\nCHAPTER CLIII — That Divine Grace causes in us Faith THE movement of grace, guiding us to our last end, is voluntary, not violent (Chap. CXLIX ). But there can be no voluntary movement towards an object unless the object be known. Therefore grace must afford us a knowledge of our last end. But such knowledge cannot be by open vision in our present state (Chap. XLVIII ): therefore it must be by faith. 2. In every knowing mind, the mode of knowledge follows the mode of nature: hence an angel, a man, and a dumb animal have different modes of knowledge according to their differences of natures. But, for the gaining of his last end, man has a perfection superadded to him, over and above his nature, namely, grace. Therefore there must also be superadded to him a knowledge, over and above his natural knowledge, and that is the knowledge of faith, which is of things not discerned by natural reason. 3. As when wood is first warmed by fire, the fire does not take kindly to the wood; but finally, when the wood is all ablaze, the fire becomes as it were connatural to the wood and a part of its very being: or as when a pupil is taught by a master, he must, to start with, take in the ideas of the master, not as understanding them of himself, but in the spirit of one ready to accept on another’s word things beyond his capacity; and so in the end, when his education is advanced, he will be able to understand those things: in like manner, before we arrive at our final end, which is the clear vision of the First Truth as it is in itself, the intellect of man must submit to God in readiness to take His word; and that submission and readiness to believe is the work of divine grace. 4. See further, B. I, Chapp. IV , V . Hence the Apostle says: By grace ye are saved through faith; and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God ( Eph. ii, 8 ). Hereby is refuted the error of the Pelagians, who said that the beginning of faith in us was not of God, but of ourselves.\n\n### Chapter CLIV. That Divine Grace causes in us a Hope of future Blessedness\n\nCHAPTER CLIV — That Divine Grace causes in us a Hope of future Blessedness IN every lover there is caused a desire of union with his loved one, so far as may be: hence it is most delightful to live in the society of those whom one loves. As then by grace man is made a lover of God, there must be caused in him a desire of union with God, so far as may be. But faith, which is caused of grace, declares the possibility of a union of man with God in perfect fruition, wherein blessedness consists. Consequently the desire of this fruition follows upon the love of God. But desire is a troublesome thing, without hope of attainment. It was proper therefore that in men, in whom the love of God and faith in Him was caused by grace, there should be caused also the hope of attaining to future blessedness. 3. Virtue, the way to blessedness, is paved with difficulties: hence the need of hope. 4. No one stirs to reach an end, which he reckons it impossible to compass. Hence it is said: He hath regenerated us unto a living hope ( 1 Pet. i, 3 ): In hope we are saved ( Rom. viii, 24 ).\n\n### Chapter CLV. Of Graces given gratuitously\n\nCHAPTER CLV — Of Graces given gratuitously SINCE the things done by God are done in order (Chapp. LXXVII – LXXX ), a certain order had to be followed in the manifestation of the truths of faith, so that some should receive those truths immediately from God, others receive of them, and so in order even to the last. The invisible good things, the vision of which makes the happiness of the blessed, and which are the objects of faith, are first revealed by God to the blessed angels by open vision: then by the ministry of angels they are manifested by God to certain men, not by open vision, but by a certitude arising from divine revelation. This revelation is made by an inner light of the mind, elevating the mind to see such things as the natural light of the understanding cannot attain to. As the natural light of the understanding renders a man certain of what he observes by that light, so does this supernatural light convey certainty of the objects which it reveals: for we cannot securely publish to others what we are not certain of ourselves. This light, which inwardly enlightens the mind, is sometimes borne out by other aids to knowledge, as well exterior as interior. There may be formed by divine power some utterance, or locution, heard by the external senses. Or it may be an inner locution, caused by God, and perceived by phantasy. Or there may be bodily appearances, external and visible, formed by God. Or such corporeal appearance may be inwardly depicted in phantasy. By these means, aided by the light inwardly impressed on his mind, man receives a knowledge of divine things. Hence, without the inner light, these aids are insufficient for the knowledge of divine things; whereas the inner light is sufficient of itself without them. Now because those who receive a revelation from God ought in the order of divine enactment to instruct others, there needed to be further communicated to them the grace of speech. Hence it is said: The Lord hath given me a learned tongue ( Isai. l, 4 ): I will give you speech and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to withstand and gainsay ( Luke xxi, 15 ). Hence also the gift of tongues ( Acts ii, 4 ). But because any announcement put forth requires confirmation before it can be received, — unless indeed it is self-evident, and the truths of faith are not evident to human reason, — there was need of something to confirm the announcements of the preachers of the faith. But, inasmuch as they transcend reason, they could not be confirmed by any demonstrative process of reasoning from first principles. The means therefore to show that the announcements of these preachers came from God was the evidence of works done by them such as none other than God could do, healing the sick, and other miracles. Hence the Lord, sending his disciples to preach, said: Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse lepers, cast out devils ( Matt. x, 8 ); and, They going forth preached everywhere, the Lord working withal, and confirming their words by the signs that followed . In the aforesaid effects of grace we observe a certain difference. Though the name of ‘grace’ applies to them all, inasmuch as they are given ‘gratuitously’ without any preceding merit, nevertheless the working of love alone has a further claim to the name of ‘grace,’ as constituting the subject in ‘the state of grace,’ or in ‘the good graces of God’ ( gratum Deo facit ): for it is said: I love them that love me ( Prov. viii, 17 ). Hence faith and hope and other means to the last end may be in sinners, who are not in the grace of God: love alone is the proper gift of the just, because he who abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him ( 1 John iv, 16 ). There is another difference to be observed in these workings of grace, and it is this, that some of them are necessary for a whole lifetime, as believing, hoping, loving, and obeying the commandments of God, without which things salvation is impossible; and for these effects there must be in man certain habitual perfections, that he may be able to act according to them as occasion requires. Other effects of grace are necessary, not for a whole lifetime, but at certain times and places, as working of miracles, or foretelling of future events. To these effects habitual perfections are not given, but certain impressions are made by God, which cease when the act ceases, and have to be repeated when the act is repeated. Thus prophets in every revelation are illumined with a new light; and in every working of miracles there must be a fresh putting into operation of divine power.\n\n### Chapter CLVI.That Man needs the Assistance of Divine Grace to persevere in Good\n\nCHAPTER CLVI — That Man needs the Assistance of Divine Grace to persevere in Good THE power of free will regards matters of election: but a matter of election is some particular thing to be done; and a particular thing to be done is what is here and now: but perseverance is not a matter of present and immediate conduct, but a continuance of activity for all time: perseverance therefore is an effect above the power of free will, and therefore needing the assistance of divine grace. 3. Though man is master of his act, he is not master of his natural powers; and therefore, though he is free to will or not will a thing, still his willing cannot make his will in the act of willing adhere immovably to the thing willed or chosen. But the immovable adherence of the will to good is requisite for perseverance: perseverance therefore is not in the power of free will. Hence it is said: He who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus ( Philip. i, 6 ): The God of all grace, who hath called us to his eternal glory in Christ Jesus, himself will perfect us through some little suffering, confirm and establish us ( 1 Pet. v, 10 ). There are also found in Holy Scripture many prayers for perseverance: e.g., Perfect my steps in thy ways, that my footsteps may not slip ( Ps. xvi, 5 ); and especially that petition of the Lord’s Prayer, Thy kingdom come : for the kingdom will not come for us unless we persevere in good. Hereby is refuted the error of the Pelagians, who said that free will is sufficient for man for his perseverance in good, and that there is no need of the assistance of grace for the purpose. As free will is not sufficient for perseverance in good without the help of God given from without, so neither is any infused habit. For in the state of our present life the habits infused into us of God do not totally take away from our free will its fickleness and liability to evil, although they do to some extent establish the free will in good. And therefore, when we say that man needs the aid of grace for final perseverance, we do not mean that, over and above the habitual grace first infused into him for the doing of good acts, there is infused into him another habitual grace enabling him to persevere; but we mean that, when he has got all the gratuitous habits that he ever is to have, man still needs some aid of divine providence governing him from without.\n\n### Chapter CLVII. That he who falls from Grace by Sin may be recovered again by Grace\n\nCHAPTER CLVII — That he who falls from Grace by Sin may be recovered again by Grace IT belongs to the same power to continue and to repair after interruption, as is the case with the powers of nature in regard of bodily health. But man perseveres in good by the aid of divine grace: therefore, if he has fallen by sin, he may be recovered by help of the same grace. 2. An agent that requires no predisposition of its subject, can imprint its effect on its subject, howsoever disposed. But God, requiring no predisposition of the subject of His action, when the subject is corporeal, — as when He gives sight to the blind, or raises the dead to life, — does not require any previous merit either in the will for the conferring of His grace, which is given without merits (Chap. CXLIX ). Therefore even after a man has fallen from grace by sin, God can confer on him the grace that puts the recipient in the state of grace, whereby sins are taken away. 5. In the works of God there is nothing in vain, as neither in the works of nature, for nature has this prerogative of God. Now it would be in vain for anything to move with no chance of arriving at its term. Whatever naturally moves to a certain end, must be somehow competent to get there. But after a man has fallen into sin, so long as the state of this life lasts, there remains in him an aptitude of being moved to good, shown by such signs as desire of good and grief at evil. Therefore there is some possibility of his return to good. 6. There exists in nature no potentiality, which cannot be reduced to act by some natural active power. Much less is there in the human soul any potentiality, which is not reducible to act by the active power of God. But even after sin there still remains in the human soul a potentiality of good, because the natural powers, whereby the soul is related to its proper good, are not taken away by sin. Therefore it is said: Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be made white as Snow ( Isai. i, 18 ): Charity covereth all sins ( Prov. x, 12 ). Nor do we ask of the Lord in vain, Forgive us our trespasses . Hereby is refuted the error of the Novatians, who said that man cannot obtain pardon for sins committed after baptism.\n\n### Chapter CLVIII. That Man cannot be delivered from Sin except by Grace\n\nCHAPTER CLVIII — That Man cannot be delivered from Sin except by Grace BY mortal sin man is turned away from his last end. And to that last end he is set on his way only by grace. 2. Offence is removed only by love. But by mortal sin man quarrels with God: for it is said that God ‘hates’ sinners, inasmuch as He is minded to deprive them of the last end, which He has in preparation for them who love Him. Man then cannot rise from sin except by grace, whereby friendship is established between God and man. Hence it is said: It is I who blot out thine iniquities for my own sake ( Isai. xliii, 25 ). Hereby is refuted the error of the Pelagians, who said that man can rise from sin by free will.\n\n### Chapter CLIX. How Man is delivered from Sin\n\nCHAPTER CLIX — How Man is delivered from Sin BECAUSE man cannot return to one opposite without retiring from the other, to return to the state of righteousness he must withdraw from sin, whereby he had declined from righteousness. And because it is chiefly by the will that man is set on the way to his last end, or turned away therefrom, he must not only withdraw from sin in exterior act by ceasing to sin, but he must further withdraw in will, that so he may rise again by grace. Now withdrawal of the will from sin means at once repentance for the past and a resolution to avoid sin in future. For if a man did not purpose to cease from sin, sin as it is in itself (or sin in general) would not be contrary to his will. If he were minded to cease from sin, but had no sorrow for sin past, that same particular sin of which he was guilty would not be against his will. Now the will must withdraw from sin by taking the course contrary to that which led it into sin. But it was led into sin by appetite and delight in inferior things. Therefore it must withdraw from sin by certain penal inflictions. As delight drew it to consent to sin, so these inflictions strengthen it in abomination of sin. When then man by grace has obtained pardon for his sin and has been restored to the state of grace, he still remains bound by God’s justice to some punishment for his sin. If of his own will he exacts this punishment of himself, he is thereby said to ‘make satisfaction’ to God, inasmuch as by punishing himself for his sin he fulfils with labour and pain the order instituted of heaven, which order he had transgressed by sinning and following his own will. But if he does not exact this punishment of himself it will be inflicted by God, since the domain of divine providence cannot be suffered to lie in disorder. The punishment in that case will not be called ’satisfactory,’ since it will not be of the choice of the sufferer, but it will be called ‘purificatory,’ or ‘purgatorial,’ because he will be purified and purged by another punishing him; and so whatever was inordinate in him will be brought back to due order. Hence the Apostle says: If we were to judge ourselves, we should not be judged: but while we are judged, we are chastised by the Lord, that we may not be condemned with this world ( 1 Cor. xi, 31 ). Nevertheless, in the process of conversion, the disgust for sin and the fixing of the affections on God may be so intense as that there shall remain no outstanding liability to punishment. For the punishment which one suffers after the forgiveness of sin is necessary to bring the mind to cleave more firmly to good, — punishments being medicines, — as also for the observance of the order of justice in the punishment of the sinner. But love of God, especially when it is vehement and strong, is sufficient to establish man’s mind in good; and intense disgust for a past fault carries with it great sorrow for the same. Hence by the vehemence of the love of God and hatred for sin there is excluded any further need of satisfactory or purgatorial punishment. And though the vehemence be not so great as totally to bar the punishment, nevertheless, the greater the vehemence, so much less of punishment will suffice. But what we do through our friends we are reckoned to do of ourselves, inasmuch as friendship makes two one in heart, and this is especially true of the love of charity: therefore, as a man may make satisfaction to God of himself, so also may he do it through another, especially in case of necessity: for the punishment which his friend suffers on his account he reckons as his own punishment; and thus punishment is not wanting to him in that he has compassion for the sufferings of his friend, and that all the more for his being the cause of his friend’s suffering. And again the affection of charity in him who suffers for his friend makes his satisfaction more acceptable to God than it would be if he were suffering for his own doings: for the one is an effort of spontaneous charity, the other an acquiescence in necessity. Hence we learn that one man may make satisfaction for another, provided both of them be in charity. Hence the saying of the Apostle: Bear ye one another’s burdens, and so ye shall fulfil the law of Christ ( Gal. vi, 2 ).\n\n### Chapter CLX. That it is reasonably reckoned a Man’s own Fault if he be not converted to God,  although he cannot be converted without Grace\n\nCHAPTER CLX — That it is reasonably reckoned a Man’s own Fault if he be not converted to God, although he cannot be converted without Grace SINCE no one can be set on the way to his last end without the aid of divine grace, or without it have the necessary means of reaching that end, as are faith, hope, love and perseverance, some might think that man is not to blame for being destitute of these gifts, especially seeing that he cannot merit the assistance of divine grace, nor be converted to God unless God convert him: for none is responsible for that which depends on another. But allow this, and many absurdities follow. It follows that the man who has neither faith nor hope nor love of God, nor perseverance in good, still does not deserve punishment: whereas it is expressly said: He that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him (John iii, 36). And since none reaches the end of happiness without the aforesaid endowments, it would follow further that there are some who neither attain to happiness nor yet suffer punishment of God: the contrary whereof is shown from what will be said to all present at the judgement of God: Come . . . . possess ye the kingdom prepared for you , or, Depart . . . . into everlasting fire ( Matt. xxv, 34-41 ). To solve this doubt, we must observe that though one can neither merit divine grace beforehand, nor acquire it by movement of his free will, still he can hinder himself from receiving it: for it is said of some: They have said unto God, ‘Depart from us, we will not have the knowledge of thy ways’ ( Job xxi, 14 ). And since it is in the power of free will to hinder the reception of divine grace or not to hinder it, not undeservedly may it be reckoned a man’s own fault, if he puts an obstacle in the way of the reception of grace. For God on His part is ready to give grace to all men: He wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth ( 1 Tim. ii, 4 ). But they alone are deprived of grace, who in themselves raise an obstacle to grace. So when the sun lights up the world, any evil that comes to a man who shuts his eyes is counted his own fault, although he could not see unless the sunlight first came in upon him.\n\n### Chapter CLXI. That a Man already in Mortal Sin cannot avoid more Mortal Sin without Grace\n\nCHAPTER CLXI — That a Man already in Mortal Sin cannot avoid more Mortal Sin without Grace WHEN it is said that it is in the power of free will to avoid putting obstacles to grace, that saying is to be understood of those in whom the natural faculty is unimpaired by sin. But if the will has fallen into evil courses by some previous inordinate act, it will not be altogether in its power to avoid putting obstacles in the way of grace. For though for some momentary occasion it may abstain from some particular act of sin by its own power, nevertheless, if left long to itself, it will fall into sin; and by sin an obstacle is put to grace. For when the mind of man turns aside from the state of righteousness, it clearly puts itself out of relation with its due end. Thus what ought to be the prime object of its affections, as being its last end, comes to be less loved than that other object to which it has inordinately turned, making of it another last end. Whatever in such a posture of the mind occurs to fit in with the inordinate end, however inconsistent with the due end, will be chosen, unless the will be brought back to due order, so as to prefer the due end to all others, and that is an effect of grace. But the choice of anything inconsistent with the last end puts an obstacle in the way of grace, as grace goes to turn one in the direction of the end. Hence after sin a man cannot abstain from all further sin before by grace he is brought back to due order. Moreover, when the mind is inclined to a thing, it is no longer impartial between two alternatives. And that to which the mind is more inclined it chooses, unless by a rational discussion, not unattended with trouble, it is withdrawn from taking that side: hence sudden emergencies afford the best sign of the inward bent of the mind. But it is impossible for the mind of man to be so continually watchful as rationally to discuss whatever it ought to do or not to do. Consequently the mind will at times choose that to which it is inclined by the present inclination: so, if the inclination be to sin, it will not stand long clear of sin, thereby putting an obstacle in the way of grace, unless it be brought back to the state of righteousness. Further we must consider the assaults of passion, the allurements of sense, the endless occasions of evil-doing, the ready incitements of sin, sure to prevail, unless the will be withheld from them by a firm adherence to the last end, which is the work of grace. Hence appears the folly of the Pelagian view, that a man in sin can go on avoiding further sins without grace. On the contrary the Lord bids us pray: Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil. But though persons in sin cannot of their own power help putting obstacles in the way of grace, unless they be forestalled by some aid of grace, still this lack of power is imputable to them for a fault, because it is left behind in them by a fault going before; as a drunken man is not excused from murder, committed in drunkenness, when he gets drunk by fault of his own. Besides, though this person in sin has it not in his unaided power altogether to avoid sin, still he has power here and now to avoid this or that sin: hence whatever he commits, he voluntarily commits, and the fault is imputed to him not undeservedly.\n\n### Chapter CLXII. That some Men God delivers from Sin, and some He leaves in Sin\n\nCHAPTER CLXII — That some Men God delivers from Sin, and some He leaves in Sin THOUGH the sinner raises an obstacle to grace, and by the exigence of the order of things ought not to receive grace, nevertheless, inasmuch as God can work setting aside the connatural order of things, as when He gives sight to the blind, or raises the dead, He sometimes out of the abundance of His goodness forestalls by the assistance of His grace even those who raise an obstacle to it, turning them away from evil and converting them to good. And as He does not give sight to all the blind, nor heal all the sick, that in those whom He heals the work of His power may appear, and in the others the order of nature may be observed, so He does not forestall by His aid all who hinder grace, to their turning away from evil and conversion to good, but some He so forestalls, wishing in them His mercy to appear, while in others He would have the order of justice made manifest. Hence the Apostle says: God, though willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much longsuffering vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that he might show forth the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he hath prepared unto glory ( Rom. ix, 22, 23 ). But when, of men who are enthralled in the same sins, God forestalls and converts some, and endures, or permits, others to go their way according to the order of things, we should not enquire the reason why He converts these and not those: for that depends on His sheer will, just as from His sheer will it proceeded that, when all things were made out of nothing, some things were made in a position of greater advantage than others ( digniora ). Hence again the apostle says: Hath not the potter power over the clay, to make of the same lump one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour? ( Rom. ix, 21 .) Hereby is refuted the error of Origen, who said that the reason why some were converted to God, and not others, was to be sought in divers works that their souls had done before they were united with their bodies, a theory already set aside (B. II, Chapp. XLIV , LXXXIII ).\n\n### Chapter CLXIII. That God is Cause of Sin to no Man\n\nCHAPTER CLXIII — That God is Cause of Sin to no Man THOUGH there are some sinners whom God does not convert to Himself, but leaves them in their sins according to their deserts, still He does not induce them to sin. 1. Men sin by deviating from God their last end. But as every agent acts to its own proper and befitting end, it is impossible for God’s action to avert any from their ultimate end in God. 2. Good cannot be the cause of evil, nor God the cause of sin. 3. All the wisdom and goodness of man is derived from the wisdom and goodness of God, being a likeness thereof. But it is repugnant to the wisdom and goodness of man to make any one to sin: therefore much more to divine wisdom and goodness. 4. A fault always arises from some defect of the proximate agent, not from any defect of the prime agent. Thus the fault of limping comes from some defect of the shin-bone, not from the locomotor power, from which power however is whatever perfection of movement appears in the limping. But the proximate agent of human sin is the will. The sinful defect then is from the will of man, not from God, who is the prime agent, of whom however is whatever point of perfect action appears in the act of sin. Hence it is said: Say not, He himself hath led me astray: for he hath no use for sinful men: He hath commanded none to do impiously, and he hath not given to any man license to sin ( Ecclus xv, 12, 21 ): Let none, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God: for God tempteth no man to evil ( James i, 13 ). Still there are passages of Scripture, from which it might seem that God is to some men the cause of sin. Thus it is said: I have hardened the heart of Pharaoh and his servants ( Exod. x, 1 ): Blind the heart of this people, and make its ears dull, and close its eyes, lest perchance it see with its eyes, and be converted, and I heal it: Thou hast made us wander from thy ways: Thou hast hardened our heart, that we should not fear thee ( Isai. vi, 10 : lxiii, 17 ): God delivered them over to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not seemly ( Rom. i, 28 ). All these passages are to be understood as meaning that God does not bestow on some the help for avoiding sin which He bestows on others. This help is not merely the infusion of grace, but also an exterior guardianship, whereby the occasions of sin are providentially removed from a man’s path. God also aids man against sin by the natural light of reason, and other natural goods that He bestows on man. When then He withdraws these aids from some, as their conduct deserves that he should, according to the exigency of His justice, He is said to harden them, or to blind them.\n\n### Chapter CLXIV. Of Predestination, Reprobation, and Divine Election\n\nCHAPTER CLXIV — Of Predestination, Reprobation, and Divine Election SINCE it has been shown that by the action of God some are guided to their last end with the aid of grace, while others, bereft of that same aid of grace, fall away from their last end; and at the same time all things that are done by God are from eternity foreseen and ordained by His wisdom, as has also been shown, it needs must be that the aforesaid distinction of men has been from eternity ordained of God. Inasmuch therefore as He has from eternity pre-ordained some to be guided to the last end, He is said to have ‘predestined’ them. Hence the Apostle says: Who hath predestined us to the adoption of sons, according to the purpose of his will ( Eph. i, 5 ). But those to whom from eternity He has arranged not to give grace, He is said to have ‘reprobated,’ or ‘hated,’ according to the text: I have loved Jacob, and hated Esau (Malach. i, 2). In point of this distinction, inasmuch as some He has reprobated and some He has predestined, we speak of the divine ‘election,’ of which it is said: He hath elected us in him before the constitution of the world ( Eph. i, 4 ). Thus it appears that predestination and election and reprobation is a part of divine providence, according as by the said providence men are guided to their last end. And it may be shown that predestination and election do not induce necessity, by the same arguments whereby it was shown that divine providence does not take away contingency from creation (Chap. LXXII ). But that predestination and election have no cause in any human merits may be shown, not only by the fact that the grace of God, an effect of predestination, is not preceded by any merits, but precedes all merit, but also by this further fact, that the divine will and providence is the first cause of all things that are made. Nothing can be cause of the will and providence of God; although of the effects of providence, and of the effects of predestination, one effect may be cause of another. For who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him? For if him and by him and in him are all things: to him be glory forever, Amen ( Rom. xi, 35, 36 ).",
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        "text": "Deus magnus Dominus, et Rex magnus super omnes deos 2. Quoniam non repellet Dominus plebem suam; quia in manu ejus sunt omnes fines terræ, et altitudines montium * ipse conspicit. Quoniam ipsius est mare, et ipse fecit illud; et siccam manus ejus formaverunt,\n\nPsalm. xciv, 3, 4 et 5. Unum esse primum entium, totius esse perfectionem plenam possidens, quod Deum dicimus, ostensum est superius (l. I, c. xiii), quod ex sui perfectionis abundantia omnibus exsistentibus esse largitur; ut non solum primum entium, sed et primum principium omnium esse comprobetur. Esse autem aliis tribuit non necessitate naturæ, sed secundum suæ arbitrium voluntatis, ut ex superiobus est manifestum (l. II, c. xxiii); unde consequens est, ut factorum suorum sit dominus; nam super ea quæ nostræ voluntati subduntur, dominamur. Hoc autem dominium super res a se productas perfectum habet, ut pote quia ad eas producendas non exterioris agentis adminiculo indiget, nec materiæ fundamento (l. II, c. xvi), quum sit totius\n\nesse universalis effector. Eorum autem quæ per voluntatem producuntur agentis, unumquodque ab agente in finem aliquem ordinatur; bonum enim et finis est objectum proprium voluntatis; unde necesse est, ut quæ ex voluntate procedunt, ad finem aliquem ordinentur. Finem autem ultimum unaquæque res per suam consequitur actionem, quam oportet dirigi ab eo qui principia rebus dedit,\n\nper quæ agunt. Necesse est igitur ut Deus, qui est in se naturaliter perfectus, et omnibus entibus ex sua potestate esse largitur, omnium entium rector exsistat, a nullo utique directus; nec est aliquid quod ab ejus regimine excusetur, sicut nec est aliquid quod ab ipso esse non sortiatur. Est igitur sicut perfectus in essendo, et causando, ita etiam et\n\nin regendo perfectus. Hujus vero regiminis effectus in diversis apparet diversimode secundum differentiam naturarum. — Quædam namque sic a Deo producta sunt, ut intellectum habentia, ejus similitudinem gerant, et imaginem repræsentent; unde et ipsa non solum sunt directa, sed et seipsa dirigentia secundum proprias actiones in debitum finem. Quæ si in sua directione regimini divino subdantur, ad ultimum finem consequendum ex divino regimine admittuntur; repelluntur autem si secus in sua directione processerint. — Alia vero intellectu carentia, seipsa in suum finem non dirigunt, sed ab alio diriguntur. Quorum quædam incorruptibilia ex- 1 A: « Prooemium ad sequentia. 2 Vulgata omittit: « Quoniam non repellet Dominus plebem suam. » sistentia, sicut in esse naturali pati non possunt defectum, ita in propriis actionibus ab ordine in finem eis praestitutum nequaquam exorbitant, sed indeficienter regimini primi regentis subduntur; sicut sunt corpora cælestia, quorum motus semper uniformiter procedunt. Alia vero corruptibilia exsistentia naturalis esse pati possunt defectum, qui tamen per alterius profectum $^4$ completur $^2$; nam uno corrupto aliud generatur: et similiter in actionibus propriis a naturali ordine deficiunt, qui tamen defectus per aliquod bonum inde proveniens compensatur. Ex quo apparet, quod nec illa quæ ab ordine primi regiminis exorbitare videntur, potestatem primi regentis evadunt; nam et hæc corruptibilia corpora sicut ab ipso Deo condita sunt, ita potestati\n\nejus perfecte subduntur. Hoc igitur divino repletus Spiritu Psalmista considerans, ut nobis divinum regimen demonstraret, primo describit nobis primi regentis perfectionem: naturæ quidem in hoc quod dicit Deus; potestatis, in hoc quod dicit: magnus Dominus, quasi nullo indigens ad suæ potestatis effectum producendum; auctoritatis, in hoc quod dicit: Rex magnus super omnes deos; quia etsi sint multi regentes, ejus tamen regimini omnes subduntur. — Secundo autem nobis describit regiminis modum. Et quidem quantum ad intellectualia, quæ ejus regimen sequentia, ab ipso consequuntur ultimum finem, qui est ipse; et ideo dicit: quia non repellet Dominus plebem suam. Quantum vero ad corruptibilia, quæ etiam si exorbitent interdum a propriis actionibus, a potestate tamen primi regentis non excluduntur; unde dicit: quia in manu ejus sunt omnes fines terræ. Quantum vero ad cælestia corpora, quæ omnem altitudinem terræ excedunt, id est corruptibilium corporum, et semper rectum ordinem divini regiminis servant: unde dicit: et altitudines montium ipse conspicit. — Tertio vero ipsius universalis regiminis rationem assignat, quia necesse est ut ea quæ a Deo sunt condita, ab ipso etiam regantur; et hoc est quod dicit, quoniam ipsius est mare, et ipse fecit illud; et siccam\n\nmanus ejus formaverunt. Quia ergo in primo libro de perfectione divinæ naturæ prosecuti sumus; in secundo autem de perfectione potestatis ipsius, secundum quod est omnium re-rum productor et dominus, restat igitur in hoc tertio libro prosequi de perfecta auctoritate, sive dignitate ipsius, secundum quod est omnium rerum finis et rector. Erit ergo hoc ordine procedendum: ut primo agatur de ipso, secundum quod est rerum omnium finis (c. II-LxIII); secundo de regimine universali ipsius, secundum quod omnem creaturam gubernat (c. LxIV-cx); tertio de speciali ipsius regimine, prout gubernat creaturas intellectum habentes (c. cxI-clxIII).\n\ni, a. ii.) Ostendendum est igitur primo, quod omnes agens, in agendo\n\nintendit aliquem finem 1. In his enim quæ manifeste propter finem agunt, hoc dicimus esse finem, in quod tendit impetus agentis; hoc enim adipiscens dicitur adipisci finem; deficiens autem dicitur deficere a fine intento; sicut patet in medico agente ad sanitatem, et homine currente ad certum terminum. Nec differt quantum ad hoc, utrum quod tendit in finem, sit cognoscens, vel non; sicut enim signum est finis sagittantis, ita est finis motus sagittæ. Omnis autem agentis impetus ad aliquid certum tendit; non enim ex quacunque virtute quævis actio procedit, sed a calore quidem calefactio, a frigore autem infrigidatio; unde et actiones secundum diversitatem activorum specie differunt. Actio vero quandoque quidem terminatur ad aliquod factum, sicut a-dificatio ad domum, et sanatio ad sanitatem; quandoque autem non, sicut intelligere et sentire. Et si quidem actio terminatur $^3$ ad aliquod factum, impetus agentis per actionem tendit in illud factum; si autem non terminatur ad aliquod factum, impetus agentis tendit in ipsam actionem. Oportet igitur, quod omne agens in agendo intendat finem; quandoque quidem actionem ipsam, quandoque aliquid per actionem factum. $^1$ B: « Perfectum. » $^2$ A, B, C, D, E, F: « Suppletur. » $^3$ A, hic et mox: « Terminetur. »\n\nC, D, omit- 2. Adhuc, In omnibus agentibus propter finem, hoc esse ultimum finem, dicimus ultra quod agens non quærit aliquid : sicut actio medici est usque ad sanitatem, ea vero consecuta, non conatur ad aliquid ulterius. Sed in actione cujuslibet agentis est venire ad aliquid, ultra quod agens non quærit ultra aliquid; alias enim actiones in infinitum tenderent; quod qui dem est impossibile, quia quum infinita non sit pertransire, agens agere non inciperet; nihil enim movetur ad id, ad quod impossibile est pervenire. Omne igitur agens\n\nagit propter finem. 3. Amplius, Si actiones agentis procedant in infinitum, oportet quod vel existis actionibus sequatur aliquod factum, vel non. — Si quidem sequatur aliquod factum, esse illius facti sequetur post infinitas actiones; quod autem præexigit infinita, impossibile est esse, cum non sit infinita pertransire; quod autem impossibile est esse, impossibile est fieri; et quod est impossibile fieri, est impossibile facere. Impossibile est igitur, quod agens incipiat facere aliquod factum, ad quod præexiguntur actiones infinitæ. — Si autem ex illis actionibus non sequitur aliquod factum, oportet ordinem hujusmodi actionum esse, vel secundum ordinem virtutum activarum : sicut si homo sentit ut imaginetur; imaginatur autem ut intelligat; intelligit autem ut velit; vel secundum ordinem objectorum : sicut si considero corpus ut considerem animam; quam considero ut considerem substantiam separatam; quam considero ut considerem Deum. Non autem est possibile procedere in infinitum, neque in virtutibus activis, sicut neque in formis rerum, ut probatur in secundo Metaphysicorum, c. II; forma enim est agendi principium; neque in objectis, sicut neque in entibus, quum sit unum ens primum, ut supra probatum est (l. I c. xiii). Non est igitur possibile quod actiones in infinitum procedant. Oportet igitur esse aliquid, quo habito, conatus agentis quiescat. Omne igitur agens\n\nagit propter finem. 4. Item, In his quæ agunt propter finem, omnia intermedia inter primum agens et ultimum finem, sunt fines respectu priorum et principia activa respectu sequentium. Si igitur conatus agentis non est ad aliquid determinatum, sed actiones, sicut dictum est, procedunt in infinitum, oportet principia activa in infinitum procedere; quod est impossibile, ut supra ostensum est. Necesse est igitur quod conatus agentis sit\n\nad aliquid determinatum. 5. Adhuc, Omne agens vel agit per naturam, vel per intellectum. De agentibus autem per intellectum non est dubium quin agant propter finem; agunt enim præconcipientes in intellectu id quod per actionem consequuntur, et extali præconceptione agunt; hoc enim est agere per intellectum. Sicut autem in intellectu præconcipiente existit tota similitudo effectus, ad quem per actiones intelligentis pervenitur, ita in agente naturali præexistit similitudo naturalis effectus, ex qua actio ad hunc effectum determinatur; nam ignis generat ignem, et oliva olivam. Sicut igitur agens per intellectum tendit in finem determinatum per suam actionem, ita agens per naturam. Omne igitur agens\n\nagit propter finem. 6. Amplius, Peccatum non inventur nisi in his quæ sunt propter finem; nec enim imputatur alicui ad peccatum, si deficiat ab eo ad quod non est; medico enim imputatur ad peccatum si deficiat a sanando naturam, non autem aedificatori aut grammatico. Sed peccatum invenimus in his quæ fiunt secundum artem, sicut quum grammaticus non recte loquitur $^2$, nec solum in his quæ sunt secundum autem, sed etiam et in his quæ sunt secundum naturam, sicut patet in partubus monstruosis. Ergo tam agens secundum naturam, quam agens secundum artem et a proposito,\n\nagit propter finem. 7. Item, Si agens non tenderet ad aliquem effectum determinatum, omnes effectus essent ei indifferentes. Quod autem indifferenter se habet ad multa, non magis unum eorum operatur quam aliud; unde a contingente ad utrumque non sequitur aliquis effectus, nisi per aliquid quod determinetur ad unum. Impossibile igitur esset quod ageret. Omne igitur agens tendit ad aliquem determinatum effectum, quod\n\ndicitur finis ejus. Sunt autem aliquæ actiones quæ non $^1$ A: « Quod non est de intentione sua. » — $^2$ Sic codd. A, C, D, E, F, H, etc. — Edit. videntur esse propter finem, sicut actiones ludicræ et contemplatoriæ , et actiones quæ absque attentione fiunt, sicut confricatio barbæ et hujusmodi; ex quibus aliquis opinari potest quod sit aliquod agens non propter finem. Sed sciendum, quod actiones contemplative non sunt propter alium finem, sed ipsæ sunt finis; actiones autem ludicræ interdum sunt finis, sicut quum quis solum ludit propter delectationem quæ in ludo est; quandoque autem sunt propter finem, sicut quum ludimus ut postmodum fortius secundo agamus; actiones autem quæ fiunt sine attentione, non sunt ab intellectu, sed ab aliqua subita imaginatione, vel naturali principio: sicut inordinatio humoris pruritum excitantis, est causa confricationis barbæ, quæ fit sine attentione intellectus; et hæc ad aliquos fines tendunt, licet\n\npraeter ordinem intellectus. Per hoc autem excluditur antiquorum naturalium error, qui ponebant omnia fieri ex necessitate materiæ, causam finalem a rebus penitus subtrahentes.\n\nxxii, a. i.) Ex hoc autem ulterius ostendendum est quod omne agens\n\nagit propter bonum. 1. Inde enim manifestum est omne agens agere propter finem, quia quodlibet agens tendit ad aliquod determina-tum. Id autem ad quod agens determinate tendit, oportet esse conveniens ei; non enim tenderet in ipsum nisi propter aliquam convenientiam ad ipsum. Quod autem conveniens est alicui, est illi bonum. Ergo omne agens\n\nagit propter bonum . 2. Præterea, Finis est in quo quiescit appetitus agentis vel moventis, et ejus quod movetur. Hoc autem est de ratione boni, ut terminet appetitum; nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Omnis ergo actio et motus\n\nest propter bonum. 3. Adhuc, Omnis actio et motus ad esse aliquo modo ordinari videtur: vel ut conservetur secundum speciem, vel in- dividuum; vel ut de novo acquiratur. Hoc autem ipsum quod est esse, bonum est; et ideo omnia appetunt esse. Omnis igitur actio, et motus\n\nest propter bonum. 4. Amplius, Omnis actio et motus est propter aliquam perfectionem; si enim ipsa actio sit finis, manifestum est quod est perfectio secunda agentis; si autem actio sit transmutatio exterioris materiæ, manifestum est quod movens intendit aliquam perfectionem inducere in re mota, in quam etiam tendit mobile, si sit motus naturalis. Hoc autem dicimus esse bonum, quod est esse perfectum. Omnis igitur actio et motus\n\nest propter bonum. 5. Item. Omne agens agit secundum quod est actu. Agendo autem tendit in sibi simile. Igitur tendit in actum aliquem. Actus autem omnis habet rationem boni; nam malum non invenitur nisi in potentia deficiente ab actu. Omnis igitur actio\n\nest propter bonum. 6. Adhuc, Agens per intellectum agit propter finem, sicut determinans sibi finem; agens autem per naturam, licet agat propter finem, ut probatum est (c. ii), non tamen determinat sibi finem, quum non cognoscat rationem finis, sed move-tur in finem determinatum sibi ab alio. Agens autem per intellectum non determinat sibi finem, nisi sub ratione boni; intelligibile enim non movet nisi sub ratione boni, quod est objectum voluntatis. Ergo et agens per naturam non movetur, neque agit propter aliquem finem, nisi secundum quod est bonum, quum agenti per naturam determinetur finis ab aliquo appetitu. Omne igitur agens,\n\npropter bonum agit. 7. Item, Ejusdem rationis est fugere malum et appetere bonum, sicut ejusdem rationis est moveri a deorsum et moveri sursum. Omnia autem inveniuntur malum fugere; nam agentia per intellectum hac ratione aliquid fugiunt, quia apprehendunt illud ut malum. Omnia autem agentia naturalia, quantum habent de virtute, tantum resistunt corruptioni, quae est malum uniuscujusque. Omnia igitur\n\nagunt propter bonum. 8. Adhuc. Quod provenit ex alicujus agentis actione præter intentionem ipsius, dicitur a casu vel fortuna accidere. A: « Contemplative. » — C omittit: « Sicut actiones ludicræ et contemplatoriæ. » D: « Propter finem. » A: « Aliquid determinatum. » XII. Videmus autem in operibus naturæ, vel semper, vel frequentius, quod melius est: sicut in plantis folia sic esse disposita, ut producant fructus, et partes animalium sic disponi, ut animal salvari possit. Si ergo hæc eveniunt præter intentionem naturalis agentis, hoc erit accidens a casu vel fortuna. Sed hoc est impossibile; nam ea quæ accidunt semper, vel frequenter, non sunt casualia, neque fortuita, sed quæ accidunt in paucioribus. Naturale ergo agens intendit ad id quod melius est, et multo manifestius quod agit per intellectum. Omne igitur agens intendit\n\nbonum in agendo. 9. Item, Omne quod movetur ducitur ad terminum motus a movente et agente, Oportet igitur movens et motum ad idem tendere, in quantum movetur. Quod autem movetur, quum sit in potentia, tendit ad actum, et ita ad perfectum et bonum; per motum enim exit de potentia in actum. Ergo et movens et agens semper in movendo et\n\nagendo intendit bonum. Hinc est quod philosophi diffinientes bonum dixerunt: Bonum est quod omnia appetunt, Arist. Ethic. I, c. 1. Et Dionysius dicit. De divin nomin. c. vi, quod omnia bonum et optimum concupiscunt.\n\nQuod malum est præter intentionem in rebus (I, D. xxxix, q. ii, a ii.) Ex hoc autem apparet quod malum est præter intentionem in rebus, et incidit præter intentionem agentium. 1. Quod enim ex actione consequitur diversum ab eo quod erat in intentione, sive intentum ab agente, manifestum est præter intentionem accidere. Malum autem diversum est a bono, quod intendit omne agens. Est igitur malum præter intentionem eveniens. 2. Item, Defectus in effectu et actione consequitur aliquem defectum in principiis actionis: sicut ex aliqua corruptione seminis sequitur partus monstruosus, Optimum est in quod omnia convertuntur sicut in propriam singula summitatem, et illud concupiscunt omnia. » (Ex translat. Johan. Scoti.) Bonum est quod desiderant omnia. » (Ex translat. Johan. Sarraceni.) ´ Bonum, illud est quod appetunt universa. » (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, op. S. Dionysii Areopag. t. I, col. 699, De divinis nominibus, cap. iv, § iv. A, B, — præter intentionem. Igitur quum omne agens et movens intendat ad bonum, malum provenit præter intentionem agentis. 4. Amplius, In agentibus per intellectum et aestimationem quamcumque, intentio sequitur apprehensionem: in illud enim tendit intentio quod apprehenditur ut finis. Si ergo perveniatur ad aliquod quod non habet speciem apprehensam, erit præter intentionem; sicut si aliquis intendat comedere mel, et comedat fel, credens illud esse mel, hoc erit præter intentionem. Sed omne agens per intellectum intendit aliquid, secundum quod accipit illud sub ratione boni, sicut ex superioribus (c. iii) patet. Si ergo illud non sit bonum, sed malum, hoc erit præter intentionem. Agens igitur per intellectum non operatur malum, nisi præter intentionem. Cum igitur tendere ad bonum sit commune agenti per intellectum et per naturam, malum non consequitur ex intentione alicujus agentis, nisi præter intentionem. Hinc est quod Dionysius dicit, De divin. nomin. c. iv, quod « malum est præter intentionem, et voluntatem. »\n\nxlviii, a. i.) Ex his autem apparet quod nulla essentia est secundum se\n\nmala. 1. Malum enim, ut dictum est (c. vi), nihil est aliud quam privatio ejus quod quis natus est et debet habere; sic enim apud omnes est usus hujus nominis, « malum. » Privatio autem non est aliqua essentia, sed est negatio in substantia. Malum igitur non est aliqua\n\nessentia in rebus. 2. Adhuc, Unumquodque secundum suam essentiam habet esse. In quantum autem habet esse, habet aliquod bonum; nam si bonum est quod omnia appetunt, oportet ipsum esse bonum dicere, quum omnia esse appetant. Secundum hoc igitur unumquodque bonum est, quod essentiam habet. Bonum autem et malum opponuntur. Nihil igitur est malum secundum quod essentiam habet. Nulla igitur\n\nessentia mala est. 3. Amplius, Omnis res vel est agens, vel est facta. Malum autem non potest esse agens, quia quidquid agit, agit in quantum est actu existens et perfectum; et similiter non potest esse factum; nam cujuslibet generationis terminus est forma et bonum. Nulla igitur res secundum suam\n\nessentiam est mala. 4. Item, Nihil tendit ad suum contra- 1 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Quod vero est\n\nnon esse aquam. » 5. Adhuc, Omnis essentia est alicui rei naturalis; si enim est in genere substantiæ, est ipsa natura rei; si vero sit in genere accidentis, oportet quod ex principiis alicujus substantiæ causetur; et sic illi substantiæ erit naturalis, licet forte alteri substantiæ non sit naturalis, sicut caliditas est naturalis igni, licet sit innaturalis aquæ. Quod autem est secundum se malum non potest esse alicui naturale; de ratione enim mali est privatio ejus quod est alicui natum inesse et debitum ei. Malum igitur quum sit ejus quod est naturale privatio, non potest esse alicui naturale; unde quidquid naturaliter inest alicui, est ei bonum, et malum, si ei desit. Nulla igitur essentia est\n\nsecundum se mala. 6. Amplius, Quidquid habet essentiam aliquam, aut ipsamet est forma, aut habet formam aliquam; per formam enim collocatur unumquodque in genere vel specie. Forma autem, in quantum hujusmodi, habet rationem bonitatis, quum sit principium actionis, et finis quem intendit omne faciens, et actus quo unum-quodque habens formam perfectum est. Quidquid igitur habet essentiam aliquam, in quantum hujusmodi, est bonum. Malum igitur non\n\nhabet essentiam aliquam. 7. Item, Ens per actum et potentiam dividitur. Actus autem, in quantum hujusmodi, bonum est, quia secundum quod aliquid est actu, secundum hoc aliquid est perfectum. Potentia etiam bonum aliquid est; tendit enim potentia ad actum, ut in qnolibet motu apparet, et etiam est actui proportionata, non ei contra-aria, et est in eodem genere cum actu, et privatio non competit ei, nisi per accidens. Omne igitur quod est, quocumque modo sit, in quantum est ens, bonum est. Malum igitur non habet\n\naliquam essentiam. 8. Amplius, Probatum est (l. II, c. vi) quod omne esse, quocumque modo sit, est a Deo. Deum autem esse perfectam bonitatem in primo hujus, cap. xl et xli ostendimus. Quum igitur boni effectus malum esse non possit, impossibile est 2 A, B, C, D, F, F: « Essentia. » aliquod ens, in quantum\n\nest ens, esse malum. Hinc est quod dicitur: Vidit Deus cuncta quæ fecerat; et erant valde bona, Gen. 1, 34. Et: Cuncta fecit bona in tempore suo, Eccles. 111, 14. Et: Omnis creatura Dei bona, I Tim. 11, 4. Et Dionysius dicit 1, De divin. nomin. c. 1v, quod malum non est existens (scilicet 2 per se), nec aliquid in existentibus quasi accidens, sicut\n\nalbedo, vel nigredo. Per hoc autem excluditur error Manichæorum ponentium aliquas res, secundum suas naturas, malas esse.\n\nRationes contra præmissam conclusionem. 3 Videtur autem quibusdam rationibus prædictæ sententiæ posse obviari. 1. Ex propria enim differentia specifica unumquodque speciem sortitur. Malum autem est differentia specifica in aliquibus generibus, scilicet in habitibus et actibus moralibus; sicut enim virtus, secundum suam speciem, est bonus habitus, ita contrarium vitium est malus habitus, secundum suam speciem; et similiter de actibus virtutum et vitiorum. Malum igitur est dans speciem aliquibus rebus; et igitur aliqua essentia, est aliquibus rebus naturalis. 2. Præterea, Utrumque contrariorum est natura quædam; si enim nihil poneret alterum contrariorum esset privatio vel negatio pura. Sed bonum et malum dicuntur esse contraria. Malum igitur est natura aliqua. 3. Item Bonum et malum dicuntur esse genera contrariorum ab Aristotele in Consequentiis categoriarum, c. 1. Cujuslibet autem generis est essentia et natura aliqua; nam non entis non sunt species neque differentia; et ita quod non est, non potest esse genus. Malum est igitur aliqua essentia et natura. 4. Adhuc, Omne quod agit est res aliqua. Malum autem agit in quantum malum; repugnat enim bono, et cor-rumpit ipsum. Malum igitur, in quantum malum, est res aliqua. 5. Amplius, In quibuscumque inventur magis et minus, oportet quod sint res aliquæ habentes ordinem; negationes enim et privationes non suscipiunt magis et minus. Invenitur autem inter mala unum altero pejus. Oportet igitur, ut videtur, quod malum sit res aliqua. 6. Præterea, Res et ens convertuntur. Est autem malum in mundo. Ergo est res aliqua et natura.\n\nQuod causa mali est bonum. (I part. q. xlix, a. 1.) Ex præmissis autem concludi potest quod malum non causatur nisi a bono. 1. Si enim alicujus mali est causa malum, malum autem non agit nisi virtute « Cum autem arguitur quod ad perfectionem universi non pertinet nisi quod est ens, et na-boni, ut probatum est (c. ix), oportet ipsum bonum esse causam primariam mali. 2. Adhuc, Quod non est, nullius est causa. Omnem igitur causam oportet esse ens aliquod. Malum autem non est ens aliquod, ut probatum est (c. vii et ix). Malum igitur non potest esse alicujus causa. Oportet igitur si ab aliquo causatur malum, quod illud sit bonum. 3. Item, Quidquid est proprie et per se alicujus causa, tendit in proprium effectum. Si igitur malum esset per se alicujus causa, tenderet in proprium effectum, scilicet malum. Hoc autem est falsum, nam ostensum est (c. iii), quod omne agens intendit bonum. Malum igitur, per se non est causa alicujus, sed solum per accidens. Omnis autem causa per accidens reducitur ad causam per se, solum autem bonum potest esse per se causa. Malum igitur causatum est a bono. 4. Præterea, Omnis causa vel est materia, vel forma, vel agens, vel finis. Malum autem non potest esse neque materia neque forma; ostensum est enim supra (c. vii) quod tam ens actu quam ens in potentia est bonum. Similiter non potest esse agens, quum unumquodque agat secundum quod est actu et formam habet. Neque etiam potest esse finis, quum sit præter intentionem, ut probatum est (c. iv). Malum igitur non potest esse alicujus causa. Si igitur aliquid sit causa mali, oportet quod sit a bono causatum. — Quum autem bonum et malum sint opposita, unum autem oppositorum non potest esse causa alterius, nisi per accidens, sicut frigidum calefacit, ut dicitur in octavo Physicorum, c. viii, sequitur quod bonum non possit esse causa activa mali, nisi per accidens. Hoc autem accidens in naturalibus potest esse et ex parte agentis et ex parte effectus. Ex parte quidem agentis, sicut quum agens patitur defectum virtutis, ex quo sequitur quod actio sit defectiva et effectus deficiens, ut quum virtus membri digerentis est debilis, sequitur imperfecta decoctio et humor indigestus; quæ sunt quædam mala naturæ. Accidit autem tura quædam, sed malum pertinet ad universitatem perfectionis rerum, dicendum: quod malum neque ad perfectionem universi pertinet, neque sub ordine universi concluditur, nisi per accidens, id est ratione boni adjuncti. (Ex coj. G. de F.) agenti, in quantum est agens, quod defectum virtutis patiatur; non enim agit secundum quod deficit ei virtus, sed secundum quod habet aliquid de virtute; si enim penitus virtute careret, omnino non ageret. Sic igitur malum causatur per accidens ex parte agentis, in quantum agens est deficientis virtutis; propter quod dicitur quod malum non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem, quia malum non sequitur ex causa agente, nisi in quantum est deficientis virtutis 1, et secundum hoc non est efficiens. In idem autem redit si defectus actionis et effectus proveniat ex defectu instrumenti, vel cujuscumque alterius quod requiritur ad actionem agentis; sicut cum virtus motiva producit claudicationem propter tibiæ curvitatem; utroque enim agens agit, et virtute et instrumento. Ex parte vero effectus malum ex bono causatur per accidens tum ex parte materiae effectus, tum ex parte ipsius 2 formæ. — Si enim materia sit indisposita ad recipiendam impressionem agentis, necesse est defectum sequi in effectu; sicut quum monstruosi partus sequuntur propter materiae indigestionem. Nec hoc imputatur ad aliquem defectum agentis, si materiam indispositam non transmutat ad actum perfectum, unicuique enim agenti naturali est virtus determinata secundum modum suæ naturæ, quam si non excedat, non propter hoc erit deficiens in virtute, sed tunc solum quando deficit a mensura virtutis sibi debitæ per naturam. — Ex parte autem formæ effectus per accidens malum incidit, in quantum formæ alicui de necessitate adjungitur privatio alterius formæ; unde simul cum generatione unius rei, necesse est alterius rei sequi corruptionem. Sed hoc malum non est malum effectus intenti ab agente, sicut in præcedentibus patet, sed alterius. Sic igitur in naturalibus patet quod malum per accidens tantum causatur a bono. Eodem autem modo et in artificialibus accidit; ars enim in sua operatione imitatur naturam, et similiter peccatum in utraque invenitur. In moralibus autem 3 non ex defectu virtutis sequi videtur morale vitium, quum infirmitas virtutis morale vitium vel totaliter tollat, vel saltem diminuat; infirmitas enim non meretur pœnam quæ culpæ debetur, sed magis misericordiam et ignoscentiam; voluntarium enim oportet esse moris vitium, non necessarium. Si tamen diligenter consideretur, invenitur quantum ad aliquid simile, quantum vero ad aliquid dissimile. Dissimile quidem quantum ad hoc quod vitium morale in sola actione consideretur 4, non autem in aliquo effectu producto; nam virtutes morales non sunt factivæ, sed activæ, artes autem factivæ sunt; et ideo dictum est, quod in eis similiter pecatum accidit sicut in natura. Malum igitur morale non consideratur ex materia vel forma effectus, sed solum consequitur ex agente. In actionibus autem moralibus inventur per ordinem quatuor activa principia. Quorum unum est virtus exsecutiva, scilicet vis motiva, qua moventur membra ad exsequendum imperium 5 voluntatis; unde hæc vis a voluntate movetur, quæ est aliud principium; voluntas vero movetur, a judicio virtutis apprehensivæ, quæ judicat hoc esse bonum vel malum; quæ sunt voluntatis objecta, unam ad prosequendum, aliud ad fugiendum; ipsa autem vis apprehensiva movetur a re apprehensa. — Primum igitur activum principium in actionibus moralibus est res apprehensa; secundum vis apprehensiva; tertium voluntas; quartum vis motiva quæ exsequitur imperium rationis. Actus autem virtutis exsequentis jam præsupponit bonum morale vel malum; non enim ad mores hujusmodi actus exteriores pertinent, nisi secundum quod sunt voluntarii. Unde, si voluntatis sit actus bonus, et actus exterior bonus dicetur, malus autem, sit ille sit malus; nihil enim ad malitiam moralem pertineret, si actus exterior deficiens esset defectu ad voluntatem non pertinente; claudicatio enim non est vitium moris, sed naturæ. Hujusmodi igitur virtutis exsequentis defectus moris vitium vel totaliter excusat, vel minuit. Actus vero quo res movet apprehensivam virtutem immunis est a vitio moris; movet enim secundum ordinem naturalem visibile visum, et quod- 1 2 A omittit: « Ipsius. » 3 — Sic etiam ed. Romana. » 4 5 A, B, C, libet objectum potentiam passivam. Ipse etiam actus apprehensivæ virtutis, in se consideratus, morali vitio caret, quum ejus defectus vitium morale vel excuset, vel minuat, sicut et defectus exsequentis virtutis; pariter enim infirmitas et ignorantia excusant peccatum, vel minuunt. Relinquitur igitur quod morale vitium in solo actu voluntatis primo et principaliter invenitur, et rationabiliter, quum ex hoc actus moralis dicatur, quia voluntarius 4. In actu igitur voluntatis quærenda est radix et origo peccati moralis. Videtur autem hanc inquisitionem consequi difficultas. Quum enim actus deficiens proveniat propter defectum activi principii, oportet præintelligere defectum in voluntate ante peccatum morale; qui quidem defectus, si sit naturalis, semper inhæret voluntati. Semper igitur voluntas in agendo moraliter peccabit; quod actus virtutum falsum esse ostendunt. Si autem defectus sit voluntarius, jam est peccatum morale, cujus causa iterum inquirenda restabit, et sic ratio in infinitum deducet. Oportet ergo dicere quod defectus in voluntate præexsistens non sit naturalis, ne sequatur voluntatem in quolibet actu peccare. Neque etiam casualis et fortuitus; non enim esset in nobis morale peccatum; casualia enim sunt impræmeditata et extra rationem. Est igitur voluntarius, non tamen peccatum morale, ne cogamur in infinitum procedere. Quod quidem qualiter esse possit considerandum est. Cujuslibet siquidem activi principii perfectio virtutis ex superiori activo dependet; agens enim secundum agit per virtutem primi agentis. Quum 2 igitur secundum agens manet sub ordine primi agentis, indeficienter agit; deficit autem in agendo, si contingat ipsum ab ordine primi agentis deflecti; sicut patet in instrumento, quum deficit a motu agentis. Dictum est autem quod in ordine actionum moralium duo principia voluntatem præcedunt, scilicet vis apprehensiva et objectum apprehensum, quod est finis. Quum autem unicuique mobili respondeat proprium motivum, non quælibet vis apprehensiva est debitum motivum cujuslibet appetitus, sed hujus hæc, et illius alia. Sicut igitur appetitus sensitivi proprium motivum est vis apprehensiva sensualis, ita voluntatis proprium motivum est ratio ipsa. Rursus, quum ratio multa bona et multos fines apprehendere possit, cujuslibet autem sit proprius finis, et voluntatis erit objectum et finis et primum motivum non bonum quodlibet, sed bonum quoddam determinatum. Quum igitur voluntas tendit in actum mota ab apprehensione rationis repræsentantis sibi proprium bonum, sequitur debita actio. Quum autem voluntas in actionem prorumpit, ad apprehensionem apprehensivæ sensualis, vel ipsius rationis aliquod aliud bonum repræsentantis a proprio bono diversum, sequitur in actione voluntatis peccatum morale. Præcedit igitur in voluntate peccatum actionis defectus ordinis ad rationem et ad proprium finem: ad rationem quidem, sicut quum ad subitam apprehensionem sensus, voluntas in bonum delectabile secundum sensum tendit; ad finem vero debitum, sicut quum ratio in aliquod bonum ratiocinando devenit quod non est, vel nunc, vel hoc modo bonum; et tamen voluntas in illud tendit, quasi in proprium bonum.\n\nq. xlix, a. 115.) Ex præmissis etiam ostendi potest quod omne malum est in\n\naliquo bono fundatum. 4. Malum enim non potest esse per se 1 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Voluntarius est. » 2 A omittit: « Cum igitur secundum agens manet sub ordine primi agentis. » 3 A: « In debitum finem tendat. » — F: « In finem debitum tendit. » 4 A, B, C, D, F: « Fundatur in bono. » 5 Et etiam De malo, q. 1, a. 2. exsistens, quum non sit essentiam habens, ut supra (c. vii) ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod malum sit in aliquo subjecto. Omne autem subjectum, quum sit substantia quaedam, bonum quoddam est, ut ex praemissis (c. vii) patet. Omne igitur malum in\n\nbono aliquo est. 2. Adhuc, Malum privatio quaedam est, ut ex praemissis (c. vii) patet. Privatio autem et forma privata in eodem subjecto sunt; subjectum autem formæ est ens in potentia ad formam, quod bonum est; nam in eodem genere sunt potentia et actus. Privatio igitur, quod malum est, est in bono aliquo,\n\nsicut in subjecto. 3. Amplius, Ex hoc dicitur aliquid malum quia nocet, non autem nisi quia nocet bono; nocere enim malo bonum est, quum corruptio mali sit bona. Non autem noceret formaliter loquendo bono, nisi esset in bono; sic enim cæcitas hominis nocet, in quantum in ipso est. Oportet igitur quod malum\n\nsit in bono. 4. Item, Malum non causatur nisi a bono et per accidens tantum (c. x). Omne autem quod est per accidens reducitur ad id quod est per se. Oportet igitur semper cum malo causato, quod est effectus boni per accidens, esse bonum aliquod, quod est effectus boni per se, ita quod sit fundamentum, nam quod est per accidens fundatur super id quod\n\nest per se. Sed quum bonum et malum sint opposita, unum autem oppositorum non possit esse alterius subjectum, sed expellat ipsum, videtur alicui primo aspectu esse inconveniens, si bonum subjectum mali esse dicatur. Non est autem inconveniens, si veritas perquiratur. Nam bonum communiter dicitur sicut et ens, quum omne ens, in quantum hujusmodi, sit bonum, ut probatum est (c. vii). Non est autem inconveniens ut non-ens sit in ente, sicut in subjecto; privatio enim quælibet est non-ens et tamen subjectum ejus est substantia, quæ est ens aliquod. Non tamen non-ens, est in ente sibi opposito, sicut in subjecto; cæcitas enim non est non-ens universale, sed non-ens hoc, quo scilicettollitur visus; non est igitur in visu sicut in subjecto, sed in animali. Similiter autem malum non est sicut in subjecto in bono sibi opposito, sed hoc per malum tollitur, sed in aliquo alio bono, sicut malum moris est in bono naturæ; malum autem naturæ, quod est privatio formæ, est in materia quæ est bonum, sicut etiam ens in potentia.\n\nlxxxv, a. ii.) Patet autem ex prædictis quod quantumcumque multiplicetur malum, nunquam potest\n\ntotum bonum consumere. Semper enim oportet quod remaneat mali subjectum, si malum remanet. Subjectum autem mali est bonum. Manet\n\nigitur semper bonum. Sed quum contingat malum in infinitum intendi, semper autem per intensionem mali minuatur bonum, videtur in infinitum per malum diminui bonum. Bonum autem quod per malum diminui potest, oportet esse finitum; nam infinitum bonum non est capax mali, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xxxix). Videtur igitur quod quando totum tollatur bonum per malum; nam si ex finito aliquid infinities tollatur, oportet illud quandoque\n\nper ablationem consumi. Non autem potest dici, ut dicunt quidam, quod sequens ablatio, secundum eamdem proportionem facta qua et prior, in infinitum procedens, bonum non possit consumere, sicut in continui divisione contingit. Nam si ex bicubitali linea dimidium subtraxeris, itemque ex residuo dimidium, et sic in infinitum procedas, semper aliquid adhuc dividendum remanebit. Sed tamen in hoc divisionis processu semper posterius subtractum oportet esse minus secundum quantitatem; dimidium enim totius quod prius subtrahebatur majus est, secundum quantitatem absolutam, quam dimidium dimidii, licet eadem proportio maneat. Hoc autem in diminutione, qua bonum per malum diminuitur, nequaquam potest accidere; nam quanto bonum magis per malum fuerit diminutum, erit infirmius, et sic per secundum malum magis diminui poterit; rursusque malum sequens contingit esse æquale, vel majus priore; unde non semper secundo subtrahetur a bono per malum minor boni quantitas,\n\nproportione servata eadem. Est igitur aliter 1 dicendum: Ex praemissis enim manifestum est quod malum 1 Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J. — Edit. totaliter bonum cui oppositum est tollit, sicut cæcitas visum. Oportet autem quod remaneat bonum, quod est mali subjectum; quod quidem in quantum subjectum est, habet rationem boni, secundum quod est potentia ad actum boni, quod privatur per malum. Quanto igitur minus fuerit in potentia ad illud bonum, tanto minus erit bonum. Subjectum autem fit minus potentia ad formam, non quidem per solam subtractionem alicujus partis subjecti, per hoc quod aliqua pars potentia subtrahatur, sed per hoc quod potentia impeditur per contrarium actum, ne in actum formæ exire possit; sicut subjectum tanto est minus potentia frigidum, quantum in eo magis calor augetur. Diminuitur igitur bonum per malum magis apponendo contrarium quam de bono aliquid subtrahendo. Quod etiam convenit his, quæ dicta sunt de malo; diximus enim quod malum incidit præter intentionem agentis, quod semper intendit aliquod bonum, ad quod sequitur exclusio alterius boni quod est ei oppositum. Quanto igitur illud bonum ad quod præter intentionem agentis sequitur malum magis multiplicatur, tanto potentia ad bonum contrarium diminuitur magis; et sic magis per malum\n\ndicitur diminui bonum. Hæc igitur diminutio boni per malum non potest in naturalibus in infinitum procedere; nam formæ naturales et virtutes omnes terminatæ sunt, et perveniunt aliquem terminum, ul'ra quem porrigi non possunt. Non potest igitur neque forma aliqua contraria, neque virtus contrarii agentis in infinitum augeri, ut ex hoc sequatur in infinitum diminutio\n\nboni per malum. In moralibus autem potest ista diminutio in infinitum procedere; nam intellectus et voluntas in suis actibus terminos non habent; potest enim intellectus intelligendo in infinitum procedere; unde mathematicae numerorum species et figurarum infinitæ dicuntur. Et similiter voluntas in volendo in infinitum procedit; qui enim vult furtum committere 1, potest iterum velle et aliud committere, et sic in infinitum. Quanto autem voluntas magis in fines indebitos tendit, tanto difficilius redit ad proprium et debitum finem; quod patet in his in quibus per peccandi consuetudinem jam est habitus vitiorum inductus. In infinitum igitur per malum moris bonum naturalis aptitudinis diminui potest; nunquam tamen totaliter toletur, sed semper naturam remanentem comitatur.\n\nxlix, a. iv.) Ex prædictis autem ostendi potest quod etsi malum non habeat causam per se, cujuslibet tamen mali oportet esse causam\n\nper accidens. 1. Quidquid enim est in aliquo ut in subjecto, oportet quod habeat aliquam causam; causatur enim vel ex subjecti principiis, vel ex aliqua extrinseca causa. Malum autem est in bono sicut in objecto, ut ostensum est (c. xi). Oportet ergo quod\n\nmalum habeat causam. 2. Item, Quod est in potentia ad utrumque oppositorum non constituitur in actu alicujus eorum, nisi per aliquam causam; nulla enim potentia facit se esse in actu. Malum autem est privatio ejus quod qui natus est et debet habere; ex hoc enim unumquodque dicitur malum esse. Est igitur malum in subjecto, quod est in potentia ad ipsum et ad suum oppositum. Oportet igitur quod malum\n\nhabeat aliquam causam. 3. Adhuc, Quidquid inest alicui præter suam naturam, advenit ei ex aliqua alia causa; omnia enim in his quæ sunt sibi naturalia permanent, nisi aliquid aliud impediat; unde lapis non fertur sursum, nisi ab aliquo projiciente, nec aqua calefit, nisi ab aliquo calefaciente. Malum autem semper inest præter naturam ejus cui inest, quum sit privatio ejus quod natum est aliquid et debet habere 2. Igitur oportet quod malum semper habeat aliquam causam, vel per se,\n\nvel per accidens. 4. Amplius, Omne malum consequitur ad aliquod bonum; sicut corruptio sequitur ad aliquam generationem. Sed omne bonum habet aliquam causam præter primum bonum, in quo non est aliquid malum, ut ostensum est (l. I c. xxxix). Omne igitur malum habet aliquam causam, ad quam sequitur per accidens. 1 A: « Vult hoc in infinitum. » — B: « Potest aternum velle et aliud commitere. » 2 A: « Quod natum est et debet aliquid habere. »\n\ncausa per accidens. Ex eisdem etiam patet quod malum, etsi non sit causa per se, est tamen\n\ncausa per accidens. 1. Si enim aliquid est causa alicujus per se, id quod accidit ei est causa illius per accidens; sicut album quod accidit aedificatori, est causa domus per accidens. Omne autem malum est in aliquo bono (c. xi); bonum autem omne est alicujus aliquo modo causa; materia enim est quodammodo causa formæ, et quodammodo e converso, et similiter est de agente et fine; unde non sequitur processus in infinitum in causis et causatis, si quod libet est alicujus causa, propter circulum inventum in causis et causatis secundum species diversas 2 causarum. Malum igitur est\n\nper accidens causa. 2. Adhuc, Malum est privatio quædam, ut ex prædictis (c. vi) patet. Privatio autem est principium per accidens in rebus mobilibus, sicut materia et forma per se. Malum igitur est alicujus\n\ncausa per accidens. 3. 3 Præterea, Ex defectu causæ sequitur defectus in effectu. Defectus autem in causa est aliquod malum; non tamen potest esse causa per se, quia res non est causa per hoc quod est deficiens, sed per hoc quod est ens; si enim tota deficeret, nullius esset causa. Malum igitur est alicujus\n\ncausa per accidens. 4. Item, Secundum omnes species causarum discurrendo, inventur malum esse per accidens causa. 4. In specie quidem causæ efficientis, quia propter causæ agentis deficientem virtutem sequitur defectus in effectu et actione. 2. In specie vero causæ materialis, quia ex materiae indispositione causatur in effectu defectus. 3. In specie vero causæ formalis, quia uni formæ semper adjungitur alterius formæ privatio. 4. In specie vero causæ finalis, quia indebito fini adjungitur malum, in quantum per ipsum\n\nfinis debitus impeditur. Patet igitur quod malum est causa per accidens et non potest esse causa per se. 1 F: « Apparet. » 2 A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I, J: « Diversas diversarum. » Omisso: « Causarum. » 3 A non habet tertium istud argumentum.\n\nomnium malorum principium. Ex hoc autem patet quod non potest esse aliquod summum malum, quod sit\n\nomnium malorum principium. 1. Summum enim malum oportet esse absque consortio omnis boni, sicut et summum bonum est quod est omnino separatum a malo. Non potest autem esse aliquod malum omnino separatum a bono, quum ostensum sit (c. xi) quod 5 malum fundatur in bono. Ergo nihil\n\nest summe malum. 2. Adhuc, Si aliquid est summe malum, oportet quod per essentiam suam sit malum, sicut et summe bonum est quod per suam essentiam bonum est. Hoc autem est imposibile, quum malum non habeat aliquam essentiam, ut supra (c. vii) probatum est. Impossible est igitur ponere summum malum, quod\n\nsit malorum principium. 3. Item, Illud quod est primum principium non est ab aliquo causatum. Omne autem malum causatur a bono, ut ostensum est (c. x). Non est igitur malum\n\nprimum principium. 4. Amplius, Malum non agit nisi in virtute boni, ut ex præmissis (c. ix et x) patet. Primum autem principium agit virtute propria. Malum igitur non potest\n\nesse primum principium. 5. Præterea, Quum id quod est per accidens sit posterius eo quod est per se, imposibile est quod sit primum id quod est per accidens. Malum autem non evenit nisi per accidens et præter intentionem, ut probatum est (c. iv). Impossible est igitur quod malum\n\nsit primum principium. 6. Adhuc, Omne malum habet causam per accidens, ut probatum est (c. xiii). Primum autem principium non habet causam, neque per se, neque per accidens. Malum igitur non potest esse primum principium\n\nin aliquo genere. 7. Item. Causa per se prior est ea quæ est per accidens. Sed malum non est causa, nisi per accidens, ut ostensum est 4 Addit: « In entibus. » — A, B, C, D, E, F omittunt: « Quod fit omnium malorum principium. » 5 A: « Quod necessario malum. » (c. xiv). Malum igitur non potest esse primum principium\n\nin aliquo genere. Per hoc autem excluditur error Manichæorum ponentium aliquod summum malum, quod est principium primum omnium malorum.\n\nrei est bonum. Si autem omne agens agit propter bonum, ut supra (c. iii) probatum est, sequitur ulterius quod cujuslibet entis bonum sit finis. 1. Omne enim ens ordinatur in finem per suam actionem; oportet enim quod vel ipsa actio sit finis , vel quod finis actionis sit finis agentis; quod\n\nest ejus bonum. 2. Amplius, Finis rei cujuslibet est in quod terminatur appetitus ejus. Appetitus autem cujuslibet rei terminatur ad bonum; sic enim philosophi diffiniunt bonum: quod omnia appetunt. Cujuslibet igitur rei finis\n\nest aliquod bonum. 3. Item. Illud ad quod aliquid tendit, quum extra ipsum fuerit, et in quo quiescit, quum ipsum habuerit, est finis ejus. Unumquodque autem, si perfectione propria careat, in ipsam movetur, quantum in se est; si vero eam habeat, in ipsa quiescit. Finis igitur uniuscujusque rei est ejus perfectio. Perfectio autem cujuslibet est bonum ipsius. Unumquodque igitur ordinatur in bonum\n\nsicut in finem. 4. Præterea, Eodem modo ordinantur in finem ea quæ cognoscunt finem et ea quæ finem non cognoscunt; licet ea quæ cognoscunt finem, per se moveantur in finem; quæ autem non cognoscunt finem, tendunt in finem quasi ab alio directa; sicut patet de sagittante et sagitta. Sed ea quæ cognoscunt finem, semper ordinantur in bonum, sicut in finem; nam voluntas, quæ est appetitus finis præcogniti, non tendit in aliquid, nisi sub ratione boni, quod est ejus objectum. Ergo, et ea quæ finem non cognoscunt, ordinantur in bonum, sicut in finem. Finis igitur omnium est bonum.\n\nxliv, a. iv.) Ex hoc autem apparet quod omnia ordinantur in unum bonum, sicut\n\nin ultimum finem. 1. Si enim nihil tendit in aliquid sicut in finem, nisi in quantum ipsum est bonum, oportet quod bonum, in quantum bonum, sit finis. Quod igitur est summum bonum, est maxime omnium finis. Sed summum bonum, est unum tantum, quod est Deus, ut probatum est (l. I, c. xlietxlii). Omnia igitur ordinantur, sicut in finem, in unum bonum, quod\n\nest Deus. 2. Item, Quod est maximum in uno-quoque genere, causa est omnium illorum quæ sunt illius generis; sicut ignis, qui est calidissimus, est causa caliditatis in aliis corporibus. Summum igitur bonum, quod est Deus, est causa bonitatis in omnibus bonis. Ergo et est causa cujuslibet finis, quod sit finis, quum quidquid est finis sit hujusmodi in quantum est bonum. Propter quod autem est unum-quoque, et illud magis. Deus igitur maxime est\n\nomnium rerum finis. 3. Adhuc, In quolibet genere causarum, causa prima est magis causa quam causa secunda; nam causa secunda non est causa nisi per causam primam. Illud igitur quod est causa prima in ordine causarum finalium, oportet quod sit magis causa finalis cujuslibet quam causa finalis proxima. Sed Deus est prima causa in ordine causarum finalium, quum sit summum in ordine bonorum. Est igitur magis finis uniuscujusque rei,\n\nquam-aliquis finis proximus. 4. Amplius, In omnibus finibus ordinatis oportet quod ultimus finis sit finis omnium praecedentium finium; sicut si potio conficitur ut detur ægroto, datur autem ut purgetur, purgatur autem ut extenuetur, extenuatur autem ut sanetur, oportet quod sanitas sit finis et extenuationis, et purgationis, et aliorum praecedentium. Sed omnia inveniuntur in diversis gradibus bonitatis ordinata sub A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J omittunt: « In aliquo genere. » A: « Finis, vel aliquod consequens actionem, quod est etiam bonum agentis. » — B, C: « Finis, vel quod ipsa actio finis est et finis agentis quod est ejus bonum. » — D, E: « Finis vel ipsa actio finis est, etc. » — F: « Vel ipsa actio etiam finis est finis agentis. » A: « Magis finis. » — B, C, D, E, F: « Magis finalis. » A: « Prima causa, prima scilicet in ordine. » — C, D: « Prima causa, prima in ordine. » A: « Omnia entia. » uno summo bono quod est causa omnis bonitatis; ac per hoc quum bonum habeat rationem finis, omnia ordinantur sub Deo, sicut fines pracedentes sub fine ultimo. Oportet igitur quod omnium\n\nfinis sit Deus. 5. Præterea, Bonum particulare ordinatur in bonum commune, sicut in finem; esse enim partis est propter esse totius; unde et bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis. Bonum autem summum, quod est Deus, est bonum commune, quum ex eo universorum bonum dependeat; bonum autem quo quælibet res bona est, est bonum particulare ipsius et aliorum quæ ab ipsa dependent. Omnes igitur res ordinantur sicut in finem in unum bonum,\n\nquod est Deus. 6. Item, Ad ordinem agentium sequitur ordo in finibus; nam sicut supremum agens movet omnia secunda agentia, ita ad finem supremi agentis oportet quod ordinentur omnes fines secundorum agentium; quicquid enim agit supremum agens, agit propter finem suum. Agit autem supremum agens actiones omnium inferiorum agentium, movendo omnes ad suas actiones, et per consequens, ad suos fines; unde sequitur quod omnes secundorum agentium actiones ordinentur a primo agente in finem suum proprium. Agens autem primum rerum omnium est Deus, ut probatum est (l. II, c. xv); voluntatis autem ipsius nihil aliud finis est quam sua bonitas, quæ est ipsemet, ut probatum est (l. I, c. lxxiv et xxxviii). Omnia igitur quæcumque sunt facta, vel ab ipso immediate, vel mediantibus causis secundis in Deum ordinantur, sicut in finem. Omnia autem entia sunt hujusmodi; nam sicut probatur (l. II, c. vi et xv), nihil esse potest quod ab ipso non habeat esse. Omnia igitur ordinantur in Deum, sicut\n\nin finem. 7. Adhuc, Finis ultimus cujuslibet facientis, in quantum est faciens, est ipsemet; utimur enim factis a nobis propter nos, et si aliquid aliquando propter alium homo faciat, hoc refertur in bonum suum, vel utile, vel delectabile, vel honestum. Deus autem est causa factiva rerum omnium: quarumdam quidem immediate; quarumdam autem mediate, sive mediantibus aliis cau-sis, ut ex praemissis est manifestum. Est igitur ipsemet\n\nfinis rerum omnium. 8. Præterea, Finis inter alias causas primatum obtinet, et ab ipso omnes aliæ causæ habent quod sint causæ in actu; agens enim non agit nisi propter finem, ut ostensum est (c. ii); ex agente autem materia in actum formæ reducitur. Unde materia fit actu hujus rei materia, et similiter forma hujus rei forma per actionem agentis, et per consequens, per finem. Finis etiam posterior est causa quod pracedens finis intendatur ut finis; non enim movetur aliquid in finem proximum, nisi propter finem postremum. Est igitur finis ultimus prima omnium causa. Esse autem primam omnium causam necesse est primo enti convenire, quod Deus est, ut supra ostensum est (l. I, c. xiii, et l. II, c. xv). Deus igitur\n\nest ultimus omnium finis. Hinc est quod dicitur: Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Deus, Prov. xvi, 4. Et: Ego sum Alpha et Omega; primus et novissimus, Apoc. xxii, 13.\n\nsit finis omnium. Restat igitur inquirendum quomodo Deus sit omnium finis; quod quidem ex\n\npraemissis fiet manifestum. 1. Sic enim est ultimus finis omnium rerum, quod tamen est prius omnibus in essendo. Finis autem aliquis inventur qui, etiamsi primatum obtineat in causando secundum quod est in intentione, est tamen in essendo posterius. Quod quidem contingit in quolibet fine quem agens sua actione constituit; sicut medicus constituit sanitatem per suam actionem in infirmo, quæ tamen est finis ejus. Aliquis autem finis inventur qui, sicut est pracedens in causando, ita etiam in essendo pracedit; sicut dicitur finis id quod aliquis sua actione vel motu acquirere intendit, ut locum sursum ignis per suum motum, et civitatem rex per pugnam. Deus igitur sic est finis rerum, sicut aliquid ab unaquaque re\n\nsuo modo obtinendum. 2. Adhuc, Deus est simul ultimus rerum finis et primum agens, ut ostensum est (c. xvii). Finis autem per actionem A, B, C, D, F: « Finis rerum, » omisso « Omnium. » agentis constitutus non potest esse primum agens, sed est magis effectus agentis. Non potest igitur Deus sic esse finis rerum, quasi aliquid constitutum, sed solum quasi\n\naliquid præexsistens obtinen-dum. 3. Amplius, Si aliquid agat propter rem aliquam jam exsistentem et per ejus actionem aliquid constitutur, oportet quod rei propter quam agit aliquid acquiratur ex actione agentis; sicut si milites pugnant propter ducem, cui acquiritur victoria quam milites suis actionibus causant. Deo autem nihil potest acquiri ex actione cujuslibet rei; est enim sua bonitas omnino perfecta, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xxxviii-xli). Relinquitur igitur quod Deus sit finis rerum, non sicut aliquid constitutum aut aliquid effectum a rebus, neque ita quod aliquid ei a rebus acquiratur, sed hoc solo modo quia\n\nipse rebus acquiritur. 4. Item, oportet quod eo modo effectus tendat in finem quo agens propter finem agit. Deus autem, qui est primum agens omnium rerum, non sic agit quasi sua actione aliquid acquirat, sed quasi sua actione aliquid largiatur, quia non est in potentia ut aliquid acquirere possit, sed solum in actu perfecto, ex quo potest aliquid elargiri. Res igitur non ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem cui aliquid acquiratur, sed ut ab ipso ipsummet suo modo consequantur, quum ipse met sit finis.\n\nintendunt assimilari Deo. Ex hoc autem quod acquirunt divinam bonitatem res creatæ, similes Deo constituuntur. 1. Si igitur res omnes in Deum sicut in ultimum finem tendunt, ut ipsius bonitatem consequantur, sequitur quod ultimus rerum finis sit\n\nDeo assimilari. 2. Amplius, Agens dicitur esse finis effectus in quantum effectus tendit in si- $^1$ Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J. — Edit. omittunt: « Quam milites suis actionibus causant. » $^2$ A, B, C, D, G, H, I, J omitt.: « Aliquid. » $^3$ B, C, D, F, H, I: « Affectum a rebus. » $^4$ A: « Deus autem quod est. » $^5$ A: « Non sic autem agit. » $^6$ A: « Omnium finis. » $^7$ A, C, D: « Quod ultimus finis rerum sit Deo militudinem agentis; unde forma generantis est finisgenerationis. Sed Deus ita est finis rerum, quod est etiam primum agens earum. Omnia igitur intendunt, sicut ultimum\n\nfinem, Deo assimilari. 3. Item, In $^{10}$ rebus evidenter apparet quod esse appetunt naturaliter; unde et si quæ corrumpi possunt, naturaliter corrumpentibus resistunt, et tendunt illuc ubi conserventur; sicut ignis sursum, et terra deorsum. Secundum hoc autem esse habent omnia quod Deo assimilantur, qui est ipsum esse subsistens, quum omnia sunt solum quasi esse participantia. Omnia igitur appetunt, quasi ultimum\n\nfinem, Deo assimilari. 4. Præterea, Res omnes creatæ sunt quædam imagines primi agentis, scilicet Dei; agens enim agit sibi simile. Perfectio autem imaginis est ut repræsentet suum exemplar per similitudinem ad ipsum; ad hoc enim imago constituitur. Sunt igitur res omnes propter divinam similitudinem consequendam, sicut\n\npropter ultimum finem. 5. Adhuc, Omnis res per suum motum vel actionem tendit in aliquod bonum, sicut in finem, ut supra (c. iii) ostensum est. In tantum autem aliquid de bono participat, in quantum assimilatur primæ bonitati, quæ Deus est. Omnia igitur per motus suos et actiones tendunt in divinam similitudinem, sicut in finem ultimum.\n\ndivinam bonitatem imitentur. Patet ergo, ex his quæ dicta sunt, quod assimilari ad Deum est ultimus omnium finis. Id autem quod proprie habet rationem finis est bonum. Tendunt igitur res in hoc, quod assimilentur Deo proprie, in\n\nquantum est bonus. Bonitatem autem creaturæ non assequuntur eo modo sicut in Deo est, licet divinam bonitatem unaquæque res imitetur secundum suum modum. assimilari. — Sic etiam B et F; sed in B legitur: « Ultimus finis Dei; et in F: « Sit assimilari, » omisso: « Deo. » $^8$ Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I. — J Et edit.: « Generati. » $^9$ Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I. — Edit.: « Omnia igitur tendunt sicut ad ultimum finem. » $^{10}$ Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J. — Edit.: « In omnibus rebus. » 1. Divina enim bonitas simplex est, quasi tota in uno consistens; ipsum enim divinum esse omnem plenitudinem perfectionis obtinet, ut probatum est (l. I, c. xxviii). Unde quum unumquodque in tantum sit bonum, in quantum est perfectum, ipsum divinum esse est ejus perfecta bonitas; idem enim est Deo esse, vivere, sapientem esse, beatum esse, et quidquid aliud ad perfectionem et bonitatem videtur pertinere, quasi tota divina bonitas sit ipsum divinum esse. 2. Rursum, Quia ipsum divinum esse est ipsius Dei exsistentis substantia, in aliis autem rebus hoc accidere non potest; ostensum est enim (l. II, c. liii), quod nulla substantia creata est ipsum suum esse. Unde si secundum quod res quælibet bona est, non est earum aliqua suum esse, nulla earum est sua bonitas; sed earum quælibet bonitatis participatione bona est, sicut et ipsius esse\n\nparticipatione est ens. 3. Rursus, Non omnes creaturæ in uno gradu bonitatis constituentur. Nam quorumdam substantia forma et actus est; scilicet cui secundum id quod est, competit esse actu et bonum esse. Quorumdam vero substantia ex materia et forma composita est; cui competit actu esse et bonum esse, sed secundum aliquid sui, scilicet secundum formam. Divina igitur substantia sua bonitas est; substantia vero simplex bonitatem participat secundum id quod est; substantia autem composita\n\nsecundum aliquid sui. In hoc autem tertio gradu substantia-rum iterum diversitas inventur quantum ad ipsum esse. Nam quorumdam ex materia et forma compositorum totam materiæ potentiam forma adimplet; ita quod non remanet in materia potentia ad aliam formam, et per consequens, nec in aliqua alia materia potentia ad hanc formam; et hujusmodi sunt corpora cælestia, quæ ex tota materia sua constant. Quorumdam vero forma non replet totam materiæ potentiam; unde adhuc in materia remanet potentia ad aliam formam, et in aliqua materiæ parte remanet potentia ad hanc formam, sicut patet in elementis et elementatis. Quia vero privatio est negatio in substantia ejus quod substantiae potest inesse, manifestum est quod cum haec forma, quæ non implet totam materiæ potentiam, adjungitur privatio formæ; quæ quidem adjungi non potest substantiae cujus forma implet totam materiæ potentiam; neque illi quæ est forma per suam essentiam, et multo minus illi cujus essentia est ipsum suum esse. Quum autem manifestum sit quod motus non potest esse ubi non est potentia ad aliud, quia motus est actus existentis in potentia; itemque manifestum sit quod malum est ipsa privatio boni (c. vii) planum est quod in hoc ultimo substantiarum ordine est bonum mutabile et permixitionem mali oppositi habens, quod in superioribus substantia-rum ordinibus accidere non potest. Possidet igitur hæc substantia ultimo modo dicta, sicut ultimum gradum in esse, ita ultimum\n\ngradum in bonitate. Inter partes etiam hujus substantiae ex materia et forma composita bonitatis ordo inventur. Quum enim materia sit ens in potentia, secundum se considerata; forma vero sit actus ejus; substantia vero composita sit actu existens per formam, forma quidem erit secundum se bona, substantia vero composita prout actu habet formam; materia vero secundum quod est in potentia ad formam. Et licet unumquodque sit bonum, in quantum est ens, non tamen oportet quod materia, quæ est ens solum in potentia, sit bona solum in potentia. Ense enim absolute dicitur, bonum autem et in ordine consistit; non enim solum aliquid bonum dicitur quia est finis, vel quia est obtinens finem; sed etiam si nondum ad finem pervenerit, dummodo sit ordinatum in finem, ex hoc ipso dicitur bonum. Materia ergo non potest simpli-citer dici ens ex hoc qnod est potentia ens, in quo importatur ordo ad esse; potest autem ex hoc simpli-citer dici bona propter ordinem ipsum. In quo apparet quod bonum quodammodo amplioris est ambitus quam ens. Propter quod Dionysius dicit, De divin. 1 A omittit: « Quantum ad ipsum esse. » 2 A: « Potentiam ad hanc et aliam formam, sicut patet. » — B, D, F: « Ad hanc formam, sicut; » sed: « Aliam » additur in D ad marginem. 3 A: « Cum hoc autem manifestum est. » 4 G, H, I, J: « Itemque manifestum est. » XII. 5 G, H, I, J: « Et ideo planum est. » 6 E: « Bonum imitabile. » 7 Sic A, B. C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N. — Edit.: « Cum permixtione mali oppositi se habens. » 8 G, H, I, J: « Accedere vel accidere. » 9 « Optimum informe formificat. Optimum et nom. c. iv, quod bonum se extendit ad exsistentia et non exsistentia, nam et ipsa non exsistentia, scilicet materia, secundum quod intelligitur privationi subjecta, appetit bonum, scilicet esse : ex quo patet, quod etiam sit bona; nihil enim appetit bonum,\n\nnisi bonum. Est autem et alio modo creaturæ bonitas a bonitate divina deficiens. Nam, sicut dictum est supra, Deus in ipso suo esse summam perfectionem obtinet bonitatis; res autem creata suam perfectionem non possidet in uno, sed in multis; quod enim est in supremo unitum, multiplex in infimis invenitur. Unde Deus secundum idem dicitur esse virtuosus, sapiens et operans; creatura vero secundum diversa, tantoque perfecta bonitas alicujus creaturæ majorem multiplicitatem requirit, quanto magis a prima bonitate distans invenitur. Si vero perfectam bonitatem non possit attingere, imperfectam retinebit in paucis. Et inde est quod licet primum et summum bonum sit omnino simplex, substantiaque ei in bonitate propinquæ sint pariter et quantum ad simplicitatem vicinæ, infimæ tamen substantiae inveniuntur simpliores quibusdam superioribus eis; sicut elementa animalibus et hominibus, quia non possunt pertingere ad perfectionem cognitionis et intellectus, quam consequuntur\n\nanimalia et homines. Manifestum est ergo ex dictis, quod licet Deus secundum suum simplex esse perfectam et totam suam bonitatem habet, creaturæ tamen ad perfectionem suæ bonitatis non pertingunt per solum suum esse, sed per plura. Unde licet quælibet earum sit bona in quantum est, non tamen potest simpliciter bona dici, si aliis careat quæ ad ipsius bonitatem requiruntur; sicut homo qui virtute spoliatus, vitiis est subjectus, dicitur quidem bonus secundum quid, scilicet in quantum est ens et in quantum est homo, non tamen bonus simpliciter, sed magis malus. Non igitur cuilibet creaturarum idem est esse, et bonum esse simpliciter, licet quælibet earum bona sit in quantum est; Deo vero simpliciter idem est esse et\n\nesse bonum simpliciter. Si autem res quælibet tendit in divinæ bonitatis similitudinem, sicut in finem; divinæ autem bonitati assimilatur aliquid quantum ad omnia quæ ad propriam pertinent bonitatem; bonitas autem rei non solum in esse suo consistit, sed in omnibus aliis quæ ad suam perfectionem requiruntur, ut ostensum est, manifestum est, quod ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem, non solum secundum esse substantiale, sed etiam secundum ea quæ ei accidunt pertinentia ad perfectionem ipsius, et etiam secundum propriam operationem; quæ etiam pertinent ad perfectionem rei.\n\nquod sunt causa. Ex his autem apparet quod res intendunt divinam similitudinem etiam in hoc quod\n\nsunt causa aliorum. 1. Tendit enim in divinam similitudinem res creata per suam operationem. Per suam autem operationem una res fit causa alterius. Ergo in hoc etiam res intendunt divinam similitudinem ut sint\n\naliis causa. 2. Adhuc, Res intendunt in divinam similitudinem in quantum est bonus, ut supra (c.xx) dictum est. Ex bonitate autem Dei est quod aliis esse largitur; unum-quodque enim agit in quantum est actu perfectum. Desiderant igitur generaliter res in hoc Deo assimilari ut\n\nsint aliorum causa. 3. Amplius, Ordo ad bonum boni rationem habet, ut ex dictis (c.xx) est manifestum. Unumquodque autem per hoc quod est causa alterius ordinatur ad bonum. Bonum autem solum per se cognoscitur et causatur; malum autem per accidens tantum, ut ostensum est (c.xiii). id quod non est appetit, et contendit quo modo in optimo et hoc ente superessentiali juxta omnium ablationem. » (Ex translat. Johan. Scoti.) « Bonum, et carens forma format. Bonum quod est fieri omnia existentia et ipsum non existens desiderat et certat aliquo modo in bono et ipsum esse. » (Ex translat. Johan. Sarraceni.) « Bonum quod informe est format. Et illud ipsumi quod non est illius quod supra res omnes est boni desiderio tenetur. » (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, op. S. Dionysii Areop. t. I, col. 698, De divinis nominibus, cap. iv, § iii.) A, C, L: « Imperfecta remanebit. » — B, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, N: « Imperfecta retinebit. » A: « Idem est esse simpliciter, et bonum esse simpliciter. » A: « Ipsius rei. » A, B, C, D, E, F: « Quod res intendunt naturaliter assimilari Deo in hoc quod est causa. » A: « Causa aliis. » Esse igitur aliorum causa est bonum. Secundum autem quodlibet bonum ad quod tendit aliquid, intendit divinam similitudinem, quum quodlibet bonum creatum sit ex participatione divinæ bonitatis. Intendunt igitur res divinam similitudinem in hoc quod\n\nsint aliorum causa. 4. Item, Ejusdem rationis est quod effectus tendat in similitudinem agentis et quod agens assimilet sibi effectum. Tendit igitur effectus in finem in quem dirigitur ab agente. Agens autem intendit sibi assimilare patiens, non solum quantum ad esse ipsius, sed etiam quantum ad causalitatem; sicut enim ab agente conferuntur effectui naturali principia per quæ subsistat, ita principia per quæ aliorum sit causa; sicut enim animal, dum generatur, accipit a generante virtutem nutritivam, ita etiam virtutem generativam. Effectus igitur tendit in similitudinem agentis, ut ostensum est, non solum quantum ad speciem ipsius, sed etiam quantum ad hoc quod sit aliorum causa. Sic autem tendunt res in similitudinem Dei, sicut effectus in similitudinem agentis. Intendunt igitur res naturaliter assimilari Deo in hoc quod\n\nsunt causæ aliorum. 5. Præterea, Tunc maxime perfectum est unumquodque, quando potest alterum sibi simile facere; illud enim perfecte lucet quod alia illuminare potest. Unumquodque autem tendens in suam perfectionem, tendit in divinam similitudinem. Per hoc igitur unumquodque tendit in divinam similitudinem quod intendit aliorum causa esse. Quia vero causa, in quantum hujusmodi, snuperior est causato, manifestum est quod tendere in divinam similitudinem, per hunc modum ut sit aliorum causa, est superior\n\nperfectio in entibus. 6. Item, Prius est unumquodque in se perfectum quam possit alterum causare, ut dictum est. Hæc igitur perfectio ultimo accidit rei, ut aliorum causa exsistat. Quum igitur per multa tendat res creata in divinam similitudinem, hoc ultimum ei restat, ut divinam similitudi-nem quærat per hoc quod sit aliorum causa. Unde Dionysius dicit, De cæles. hierarc. c. Ⅲ, quod omnium divinius est Dei cooperatorem fieri; secundum quod Apostolus dicit: Dei adjutores sumus, I Cor., Ⅲ, 9 .\n\nsuos fines ordinantur. Ex præmissis autem manifestum esse potest quod ultimum per quod unaquæque res ordinatur ad finem est ejus operatio, diversimode tamen\n\nsecundum diversitatem operationis. Nam quædam operatio est rei ut aliud moventis, sicut calefacere et secare. Quædam vero est operatio rei, ut ab alio motæ, sicut calefieri et secari. Quædam vero operatio est perfectio operantis actu exsistentis in aliud transmutandum non tendens: quorum primo differt a passione et motu; secundo vero ab actione transmutativa exterioris materiæ. Hujusmodi autem operatio est sicut intelligere, sentire et velle. Unde manifestum est quod ea quæ moventur vel operantur tantum, sine hoc quod moveant vel faciant, tendunt in divinam similitudinem, quantum ad hoc quod sint in seipsis perfecta; quæ autem faciunt et movent, in quantum hujusmodi, tendunt in divinam similitudinem, in hoc quod sint aliorum causa; quæ vero per hoc quod moventur movent, tendunt in divinam similitudinem\n\nquantum ad utrum-que. Corpora autem inferiora, secundum quod moventur motibus naturalibus, considerantur ut mota tantum, non autem ut moventia, nisi per accidens; accidit enim lapidi quod descendens aliquod obvians impellat; et similiter est in alteratione et aliis motibus. Unde finis motus eorum est ut consequantur divinam similitudinem, quantum ad hoc sint in seipsis perfecta; utpote habentia propriam et proprium «ubi» A, B, C, D, F: «Enim. » A, B, C, D: «Sint. » A, B, C, D, F omitt.: «Perfectio. » «Omnium divinius, ut eloquia aiunt, Dei cooperatorem fieri.» (Ex translat. Johan. Scoti.) «Cujuslibet eorum qui sacrum ordinem sortiti sunt in hoc sita est perfectio ut ad divinam, pro nem quærat per hoc quod sit aliorum causa. captu quisque suo, promoveatur imitationem, quodque divinius est omnium, ipsius etiam Dei, ut eloquia loquuntur, cooperator exsistat. » (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, Op. S. Dionysii Areop: t. I, col. 466, De\n\ncælest. hierarch., cap. Ⅲ, § Ⅱ.) Corpora vero cælestia movent mota; unde finis motus eorum est consequi divinam similitudinem quantum ad utrumque. Quantum quidem ad propriam perfectionem, in quantum corpus cæleste sit in aliquo « ubi » in actu, in quo prius erat in potentia. Nec propter hoc minus suam perfectionem consequitur, quamvis ad « ubi » in quo prius erat actu, remaneat in potentia; similiter enim et materia prima in suam perfectionem tendit per hoc quod acquirit in actu formam, quam prius habebat in potentia, licet et aliam habere desinat, quam prius actu habebat; sic enim successive materia omnes formas suscipit ad quas est in potentia, ut tota ejus potentia reducatur in actum successive; quod simul fieri non poterat. Unde quum corpus cælestie sit potentia ad « ubi » sicut materia prima ad formam, perfectionem suam consequitur per hoc quod ejus potentia tota ad « ubi » reducitur in actum successive; quod simul non poterat\n\nfieri. In quantum vero movendo movent, est finis motus eorum consequi divinam similitudinem, in hoc quod sint causæ aliorum. Sunt autem aliorum causæ per hoc quod causant generationem et corruptionem et alios motus in istis inferioribus. Motus igitur corporum cælestium, in quantum movent, ordinantur ad generationem et corruptionem, quæ est in istis inferioribus. Non est autem inconveniens quod corpora cælestia moveant ad generationem horum inferiorum, quamvis hæc inferiora corpora sint cælestibus corporibus indigniora; quum tamen finem oporteat esse potiorem eo quod est ad finem; generans enim agit ad formam generati; quum tamen generatum non sit dignius generante, sed in agentibus univocis sit ejusdem speciei cum ipso; intendit enim generans formam generati, quæ est generationis finis, non quasi ultimum finem, sed similitudinem esse divini in perpetuatione speciei et in diffusione bonitatis suæ, per hoc quod aliis formam speciei suæ tradidit et aliorum fit causa. Similiter autem corpora cælestia, licet sint digniora inferioribus corporibus, non tamen intendunt generationem eorum et formas generatorum in actum educere per suos motus, quasi ultimum finem; sed per hoc ad divinam similitudinem tendentes, quasi ad ultimum finem, in hoc quod causæ\n\naliorum exsistant. Considerandum tamen quod unum-quodque, in quantum participat similitudinem divinæ bonitatis, quæ est objectum voluntatis ejus, in tantum participat de similitudine divinæ voluntatis, per quam res producuntur in esse et conservantur. Superiora autem divinæ bonitatis similitudinem participant simplicius et universalius; inferiora vero particularius et magis divisim; unde et inter corpora cælestia et inferiora non attenditur similitudo secundum æquiparantiam, sicut in his quæ sunt unius speciei; sed sicut universalis agentis ad particularem effectum. Sicut igitur particularis agentis, in istis inferioribus, intentio contrahitur ad bonum ejus speciei vel illius, ita intentio corporis cælestis fertur ad bonum commune substantiæ corporalis, quæ per generationem conservatur, et\n\nmultiplicatur, et augetur. Quum vero, ut dictum est, quælibet res mota, in quantum movetur, tendat in divinam similitudinem ut sit in se perfecta, perfectum autem fit unumquodque in quantum fit actu, oportet quod intentio cujuslibet in potentia existentis sit ut per motum tendat in actum. Quanto igitur aliquis actus est posterior et magis perfectus, tanto principalius in idipsum appetitus materiæ fertur; unde oportet quod in ulteriorem et perfectissimum actum, quem materia consequi potest, tendat appetitus materiæ quo appetit formam, sicut in ultimum finem generationis. In actibus autem formarum gradus quidam inveniuntur. Nam materia prima est in potentia primum ad formam elementi; sub forma vero elementi existens, est in potentia ad formam mixti, propter quod elementa sunt materia mixti; sub forma autem mixti considerata, est in potentia ad animam vegetabilem; nam talis corporis anima actus est; itemque anima vegetabilis est in potentia ad sensitivam; sensitiva vero ad intellectivam. Quod processus generationis ostendit: Primo enim in generatione est fectus vivens vita plantæ; postmodum vero vita animalis; demum vero vita hominis. Post hanc autem formam non in- A: « Suum motum, quasi ultimum finem, sed ut esse aliorum existant. » E. F: « Suos motus, non quasi ultimum finem. » A: « Tendit vel fertur. » A: « Formam vegetabilem vel animam. » E: « Item quia. » venitur in generabilibus et corruptibilibus posterior forma et dignior. Ultimus 4 igitur generationis totius 2 gradus est anima humana, et in hanc tendit materia sicut in ultimam formam. Sunt ergo elementa propter corpora mixta; hæc vero propter viventia; in quibus plantæ sunt propter animalia; animalia propter hominem; homo enim est\n\nfinis totius generationis. Quia vero eadem res generatur et conservatur in esse secundum ordinem praemissum in generationibus rerum, est etiam ordo in conservationibus earumdem. Unde videmus 3 quod corpora mixta sustentantur per elementorum congruas qualitates; plantæ vero ex mixtis corporibus nutriuntur; animalia ex plantis nutrimentum habent; et quædam etiam perfectiora et virtuosiora ex quibusdam imperfectioribus et infirmioribus. Homo vero utitur omnium rerum generibus ad sui utilitatem: quibusdam quidem ad esum; quibusdam vero ad vestitum; unde et a natura nudus est institutus, utpote potens ex aliis sibi vestitum praestate, sicut etiam nullum sibi congruum nutrimentum natura praeparavit, nisi lac, ut ex diversis rebus sibi cibum conquireret 4; quibusdam vero ad vehiculum; nam in motus celeritate et in fortitudine ad sustinendos labores multis animalibus infirmior inventur 5, quasi aliis animalibus ad auxilium sibi praeparatis. Et super hoc omnibus sensibilibus utitur intellectualis cognitionis perfectionem; unde et de homine in Psalmis dicitur, ad Deum directo sermone: Omnia subjecisti sub pedibus ejus; Psal. viii, 8. Et Aristoteles dicit, Politic. I, v, quod homo habet naturale dominium\n\nsuper omnia animalia. Si igitur motio ipsius cæli ordinatur ad generationem, generatio autem tota ordinatur ad hominem, sicut in ultimum finem hujus generis, manifestum est quod finis motionis cæli ordinatur ad hominem, sicut in ultimum finem, in genere\n\ngenerabilium et mobilium. Hinc est quod dicitur quod Deus corpora cælestia fecit in ministerium cunctis gentibus, Deut. iv, 19. 1 B: « Autem. » 2 A, B, C, D: « Generationis terminus. » — E, F, G, H, I, J: « Generationis finis; » sed « Finis » additus est in G ad marginem manu recenti. 3 A: « Videmus enim. » 4 A: « Consequeretur. » — B: « Conquere-tur. » — D: « Conquireretur. » — E: « Conqui-retur. » 5 A, D: « Homo. » 6 A, B, C, D: « Quod motus cæli est a principio intellectivo. » 7 A: « Est mota. » 8 A: « Relinquitur. » veri. Quum autem non sit procedere in infinitum in corporibus, oportebit devenire ad primum movens incorporeum. Quod autem est penitus a corpore separatum oportet esse intellectuale, ut ex superioribus (l. I, c. xliv) patet. Motus igitur cæli, quod est primum corporeum, est ab intellectuali substantia. 3. Item, Corpora gravia et levia moventur a generante et removente prohibens, ut probatur in octavo Physicorum, c. 1; non enim potest esse quod forma in eis sit movens, et materia mota; nihil enim movetur, nisi corpus. Sicut autem elementorum corpora sunt simplicia, et non est in eis compositio, nisi materiæ et formæ, ita et corpora cælestia sunt simplicia. Si igitur moventur sicut gravia et levia, oportet quod moveantur a generante per se, et a removente prohibens per accidens. Hoc autem est impossibile; nam illa corpora ingenerabilia sunt, utpote non habentia contrarietatem, et motus eorum impediri non possunt. Oportet igitur quod moveantur illa corpora a moventibus per apprehensionem; non autem sensitivam, ut ostensum est; ergo intellectivam. 4. Amplius, Si principium motus cælestis est sola natura absque apprehensione aliqua, oportet quod principium motus cæli sit forma cælestis corporis, sicut et in elementis. Licet enim formæ simplices non sint moventes, sunt tamen principia motuum; ad eas enim consequuntur motus naturales, sicut omnes aliæ naturales proprietates. Non autem potest esse quod motus cælestis sequatur formam cælestis corporis, sicut principium activum; sic enim forma est principium motus localis, in quantum alicui corpori, secundum suam formam, debetur aliquis locus in quem movetur ex vi suæ formæ tendentis in locum illum, quem quia dat generans, dicitur esse motor: sicut igni secundum suam formam competit esse sursum. Corpori autem cælesti, secundum suam formam, non magis congruit unum « ubi » quam aliud. Non igitur motus cælestis principium est sola natura. Oportet igitur, quod principium motus ejus sit per apprehensionem moventis. 5. Adhuc, Natura semper ad unum tendit; unde quæ sunt a natura semper sunt eodem modo, nisi impediantur; quod est in paucioribus. Quod igitur ex sui ratione habet deformitatem impossi- bile est quod sit finis in quem tendit natura. Motus autem secundum suam rationem est hujusmodi; quod enim movetur, in quantum hujusmodi, dissimiliter se habet et nunc et prius. Impossibile est igitur quod natura intendat motum propter seipsum. Intendit igitur quietem per motum, quæ se habet ad motum sicut unum ad multa; quiescit enim quod similiter se habet nunc et prius; si enim motus cæli sit a natura tantum, esset ordinatus in aliquam quietem; cujus contrarium apparet, quum sit continuus. Non est igitur motus cæli a natura, sicut a principio activo, sed magis a substantia intelligente. 6. Item, Omni motui qui est a natura, sicut a principio activo, oportet quod si accessus ad aliquid est naturalis, quod recessus ab eodem sit innaturalis et contra naturam; sicut grave accedit deorsum naturaliter, recedit autem inde contra naturam. Si igitur motus cæli esset naturalis, quum tendat ad occidentem naturaliter, contra naturam ab occidente recedens in orientem rediret. Hoc autem est impossibile; in motu enim cælesti nihil est violentum et contra naturam. Impossibile est igitur quod principium activum motus cælestis sit natura. Est igitur principium activum ejus aliqua vis apprehensiva et per intellectum movens, ut ex prædictis patet. Movetur igitur corpus cæleste a substantia intellectuali. Non tamen est negandum motum cælestem esse naturalem. Dicitur enim esse aliquis motus naturalis, non solum propter activum principium, sed etiam propter passivum: sicut patet in generatione simplicium corporum, quæ quidem non potest dici naturalis ratione principii activi. Movetur enim id naturaliter a principio activo, cujus principium activum est intra; natura enim est principium motus in eo in quo est. Principium autem activum in generatione simplicius corporis est extra. Non est igitur naturalis ratione principii activi, sed solum ratione principii passivi, quod est materia, cui inest naturalis appetitus ad formam naturalem. Sic ergo motus cælestis corporis, quantum ad activum principium, non est naturalis, sed magis voluntarius et intellectualis; quantum vero ad principium passivum, est naturalis; nam corpus cæleste habet naturalem aptitudinem ad talem motum. Hoc autem manifeste apparet, si habitudo consideretur cælestis corporis ad suum « ubi. » Patitur enim et movetur unumquodque, secundum quod est in potentia; agit vero et movet, secundum quod est actu. Corpus autem cæleste, secundum suam substantiam consideratum, inventur ut in potentia indifferenter se habens ad quodlibet « ubi », sicut materia prima ad quamlibet formam, sicut (c. xxii) prædictum est. Aliter autem est de corpore gravi et levi, quod in sua natura consideratum, non est indifferens ad omnem locum, sed ex ratione suæ formæ determinatur sibi locus. Natura igitur corporis gravis et levis est principium activum motus ejus; natura vero corporis cælestis est motus ipsius passivum principium. Unde non debet alicui videri quod violenter moveatur, sicut corpora gravia et levia, quæ a nobis moventur per intellectum; corporibus enim gravibus et levibus inest naturalis aptitudo ad contrarium motum ei quo moventur a nobis: et ideo a nobis moventur per violentiam, licet motus corporis animalis, quo moveatur ab anima, non sit ei violentus, in quantum est animatum, etsi sit ei violentus, in quantum est grave quoddam. Corpora autem cælestia non habent aptitudinem ad motum contrarium, sed ad illum quo moventur a substantia intelligente; unde simul est voluntarius, quantum ad principium activum, et naturalis, quantum ad principium passivum. Quod autem motus cæli est voluntarius secundum activum principium, non repugnat unitati et conformitati cælestis motus, ex hoc quod voluntas ad multa se habet et non est determinata ad unum, quia sicut natura determinatur ad unum per suam virtutem, ita voluntas determinatur ad unum per suam sapientiam, qua voluntas dirigitur infallibiliter ad unum finem. Patet etiam ex præmissis quod in motu cæli non est contra naturam, neque accessus ad aliquod « ubi, » neque recessus ab eo. Hoc enim accidit in motu gravium et levium propter duo: Primo quidem, quia intentio naturæ est determinata in gravibus et in levibus ad unum locum; unde sicut naturaliter tendit in ipsum, ita contra naturam recedit ab eo. Secundo, quia duo motus, quorum uno accedit ad medium et altero recedit, sunt contrarii. Si autem accipiatur in motu gravium et levium non ultimus locus, sed medius, sicut ad ipsum acceditur naturaliter, ita ab ipso naturaliter receditur, quia totum stat sub una intentione naturæ, et non sunt motus contrarii, sed unus et continuus. — Ita autem est in motu cælestium corporum, quia naturae intentio non est ad aliquod « ubi » determinatum, ut jam dictum est. Motus etiam quo recedit corpus circuraliter motum ab aliquo signo, non est contrarius motui quo illuc accedit, sed est unus motus et continuus; unde quodlibet « ubi » in motu cæli est sicut medium et non sicut extremum in motu recto. Non differt autem, quantum ad præsentem intentionem, utrum corporus cæleste moveatur a substantia intellectuali conjuncta, quæ sit anima ejus, vel a substantia separata; et utrum unum-quoque corporum cælestium moveatur a Deo; vel nullum immediate, sed mediantibus substantiis intellectualibus creatis; aut primum tantum immediate a Deo, alia vero mediantibus substantiis creatis, dummodo habeatur quod motus cælestis est a substantia intellectuali.\n\nquæ cognitione carent. Si autem corpus cæleste a substantia intellectuali moveur, ut ostensum est (c. xxiii), motus autem corporis cælestis ordinatur ad generationem in inferioribus, necesse est quod generationes et motus istorum inferiorum procedant ex intentione substantiae intelligentis; in eumdem enim fertur finem intentio principalis agentis et instrumenti. Cælum autem est causa inferiorum motuum, secundum suum motum, quo movetur a substantia intellectuali. Sequitur ergo quod sit sicut instrumentum intellectualis substantiae. Sunt igitur formæ et motus inferiorum corporum a substantia intel- A: « Etiam. » A omittit: « Aut primum tantum immediate, alia vero mediantibus substantiiis creatis. » A, B, C, E, F: « Quo modo omnia appetunt. » lectuali causatæ, et intentæ, sicut a principali agente, a corpore vero cælesti,\n\nsicut ab instrumento. Oportet autem quod species eorum quæ causantur et intenduntur ab intellectuali agente, præexsistant in intellectu ipsius, sicut formæ artificiatorum præexsistunt in intellectu artificis, et ex eis deriventur in effectus. Omnes igitur formæ, quæ sunt in istis inferioribus, et omnes motus, determinantur a formis intellectualibus, quæ sunt in intellectu alicujus substantiæ, vel aliquarum. Et propter hoc dicit Boetius in libro De Trinitate c. II, quod « formæ quæ sunt in materia vene-runt a formis quæ sunt sine materia. » Et quantum ad hoc verificatur dictum Platonis, quod formæ separatæ sunt principia formarum quæ sunt in materia: licet posuerit eas per se subsistentes et causantes immediate formas sensibilium; nos vero ponimus eas in intellectu existentes et causantes formas inferiores\n\nper motum cæli. Quia vero omne quod movetur ab ali-quo per se, et non secundum accidens, dirigitur ab eo in finem sui motus, corpus autem cæleste movetur a substantia intellectuali et causa per sui motum omnes motus in istis inferioribus, necessarium est quod corpus cæleste dirigatur in finem sui motus per substantiam intellectualem, et per consequens, inferiora corpora\n\nin proprios fines. Sic igitur non est difficile videre qualiter naturalia corpora cognitione carentia moveantur et agant propter finem. Tendunt enim in finem sicut directa in finem a substantia intelligente, per modum quo sagitta tendit ad signum directa a sagittante; sicut enim sagitta consequitur inclinationem ad signum sive ad finem determinatum, ex impulsione sagittantis, ita corpora naturalia consequuntur inclinationem in fines naturales ex moventibus naturalibus, ex quibus sortiuntur suas formas et\n\nvirtutes et motus. Unde etiam patet quod quodlibet opus naturæ est opus substantia intelligentis; nam effectus principalius attri-buitur primo moventi dirigenti in finem quam instrumentis ab eo directis; et propter hoc operationes naturæ inveniuntur ordinate procedere ad finem,\n\nsicut operationes sapientis. Planum igitur fit quod ea etiam quæ cognitione carent possunt operari propter finem, et appetere bonum naturali appetitu, et appetere divinam similitudinem et propriam perfectionem. Non est autem differentia sive hoc sive illud dicatur; nam per hoc tendunt in suam perfectionem quod tendunt ad bonum, quum unumquodque in tantum bonum sit in quantum est perfectum. Secundum vero quod tendit ad hoc quod sit bonum, tendit in divinam similitudinem; Deo enim assimilatur aliquid in quantum bonum est; bonum autem hoc vel illud particulare habet quod sit appetibile, in quantum est similitudo primæ bonitatis. Propter hoc igitur tendit in proprium bonum, quia tendit in divinam similitudinem, et non e converso. Unde patet quod omnia appetunt divinam similitudinem,\n\nquasi ultimum finem. Bonum autem suum cujuslibet rei po-test accipi multipliciter. — Uno quidem modo, secundum quod est ejus proprium ratione individui; et sic appetit animal suum bonum, quum appetit cibum quo in esse conservatur. — Alio modo, secundum quod est ejus ratione speciei; et sic appetit proprium bonum animal, in quantum appetit generationem prolis et ejus nutritionem, vel si aliquid operetur ad conservationem vel defensionem individuorum suæ speciei. — Tertio vero modo, ratione generis; et sic appetit proprium bonum in causanda agens αquivocum, sicut cælum. — Quarto autem modo, ratione similitudinis analogia principiatorum ad suum principium; et sic Deus, qui est extra genus (l. I, c. xxv), propter suum bonum omnibus\n\nrebus dat esse. Ex quo patet quod quando aliquid est perfectioris virtutis et eminentius in grau bonitatis, tanto appetitum boni communiorem habet, et magis in distantibus 1 A: « Derivantur. » 2 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Derivantur. » 3 « Ex his enim formis quæ præter materiam sunt, istæ formæ venerunt quæ sunt in materia et corpus efficiunt; nam cæteras quæ in corporibus sunt abutimur formas vocantes, dum sunt imagines. (De Trinitate, cap. II, tom. II, col. 1250, circ. fin.) » 4 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Omnia inferiora. » 5 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Sic non est » omisso: « Igitur. » 6 A: « Directionem ad finem. » B, C, D, E, F: « Inclinationem ad finem. » omisso: « Ad signum sive. » 7 A: « Sive illud dicatur sive istud. » a se bonum quærit et operatur; nam imperfecta ad solum bonum proprii individui tendunt; perfecta vero ad bonum speciei; perfectiora vero ad bonum generis; Deus autem, qui est perfectissimus in bonitate, ad bonum totius entis. Unde non immerito dicitur a quibusdam quod bonum, in quantum hujusmodi, est diffusivum, quia quanto aliquid invenitur melius, tanto ad remotiora bonitatem suam diffundit. Et quia in quolibet genere quod est perfectissimum est exemplar et mensura omnium quæ sunt illius generis, oportet quod Deus, qui est in bonitate perfectissimus et suam bonitatem communissime diffundens, in sua diffusione sit exemplar omnium bonitatem diffundentium; in quantum enim unumquodque communius bonitatem diffundit in alia, fit altior causa. Hinc etiam patet quod unumquodque tendens ad hoc quod sit aliorum causa, tendit in divinam similitudinem, et nihilominus tendit\n\nin suum bonum. Non est ergo inconveniens si motus corporum cælestium et actiones motorum eorum dicantur esse aliqualiter propter hæc corpora quæ generantur et corrumpuntur, quæ sunt eis indigniora; non enim sunt propter hæc sicut propter ultimum finem, sed intendentes horum generationem tendunt suum bonum et divinam similitudinem, tanquam ultimum finem.\n\nI, a. VII.) Quum autem omnes creaturæ, etiam intellectu carentes, ordinentur in Deum, sicut in finem ultimum, ad hunc autem finem pertingant omnia in quantum de similitudine ejus aliquid participant, intellectuales creaturæ aliquo specialiori modo ad ipsum pertingunt, scilicet per suam propriam operationem, intelligendo ipsum; unde oportet quod hoc sit finis intellectualis creaturæ,\n\nscilicet intelligere Deum. 1. Ultimus enim finis cujuslibet rei est Deus, ut osṭensum est (c. xviii). Intendit igitur unumquodque sicut ultimo fini Deo conjungi, quanto magis sibi possibile est. Vicinius autem conjungitur aliquid Deo per hoc quod ad ipsam substantiam ejus aliquo modo pertingit, quod fit dum aliquid quis cognoscit de divina substantia, quam dum consequitur ejus aliquam similitudinem. Substantia igitur intellectualis tendit in divinam cognitionem, sicut\n\nin ultimum finem. 2. Item, Propria operatio cujuslibet rei est finis ejus; est enim secunda perfectio ipsius; unde quod ad propriam operationem bene se habet dicitur virtuosum et bonum. Intelligere autem est propria operatio substantiae intellectualis. Ipsa igitur est finis ejus. Quod igitur est perfectissimum in hac operatione, hoc est ultimus finis, et praecipue in operationibus quæ non ordinantur ad aliqua operata, sicut est intelligere et sentire. Quum autem hujusmodi operationes ex objectis speciem recipiant per quæ etiam cognoscuntur, oportet quod tanto sit perfectior aliqua istarum operationum quanto ejus objectum est perfectius; et sic intelligere perfectissimum intelligibile, quod Deus est, est perfectissimum in genere hujus operationis quæ est intelligere. Cognoscere igitur Deum intelligendo est ultimus finis\n\ncujuslibet intellectualis substantiae. Potest autem aliquis dicere, intellectualis quidem substantiae ultimum finem consistere in intelligendo optimum intelligibile. Non tamen illud quod est optimum intelligibile hujus vel illius intellectualis substantiae est optimum intelligibile simpliciter, sed quanto aliqua intellectualis substantia est altior, tanto suum intelligibile optimum est altius. Et ideo suprema intellectualis substantia creata habet pro intelligibili optimo in quod est optimum simpliciter; unde ejus felicitas erit in intelligendo Deum. Cujuslibet vero inferioris substantiae intellectualis felicitas erit intelligere aliquod inferius intelligibile, quod est tamen altissimum eorum quæ ab ipsa intelliguntur. Et praecipue intellectus humani videtur quod non sit intelligere optimum intelligibile simpliciter, propter ejus debilitatem: habet enim se ad cognoscendum illud quod est maxime cognoscibile, sicut oculus\n\nnoctuæ ad solemm. Sed manifeste apparet quod finis cujuslibet substantiae intellectualis, etiam infimæ, est intelligere Deum; ostensum est enim supra (c. xvii) quod omnium ultimus finis in quem tendunt, est Deus. Intellectus autem humanus, etsi sit infimus in ordine intellectualium substantiarum, est tamen superior omnibus intellectu carentibus. Quum ergo nobi- lioris substantiæ non sit ignobiliar finis, erit etiam intellectus humani finis ipse Deus. Unumquodque autem intelligens consequitur suum finem ultimum per hoc quod ipsum intelligit, ut ostensum est (c. xxii). Intelligendo igitur pertingit intellectus humanus ad Deum,\n\nsicut ad finem. 3. Adhuc, Sicut res intellectu carentes tendunt in Deum, sicut in finem, per viam assimilationis, ita substantiæ intellectuales per viam cognitionis, ut ex pradictis patet. Res autem intellectu carentes, etsi tendant in similitudinem proximorum agentium, non tamen ibi quiescit naturæ intentio, sed habet pro fine assimilationem ad summum bonum, ut ex dictis (c. xxi) patet, etsi imperfectissime ad hanc similitudinem possint pertingere. Intellectus igitur, quantumcumque modicum possit de divina cognitione percipere, illud erit pro sibi ultimo fine magis quam perfecta\n\ncognitio inferiorum intelligibilium. 4. Amplius, Unumquodque maxime desiderat suum ultimum finem. Intellectus autem humanus magis desiderat et amat et delectatur in cognitione divinorum, quamvis modicum quidem de illis percipere possit, quam in perfecta cognitione quam habet de rebus infimis. Est igitur ultimus finis hominis intelligere\n\nquoquo modo Deum. 5. Adhuc, Unumquodque tendit in divinam similitudinem, sicut in proprium finem. Illud igitur per quod unumquodque maxime Deo assimilatur, est ultimus finis ejus. Deo autem assimilatur maxime creatura intellectualis per hoc quod intellectualis est; hanc enim similitudinem habet præ cæteris creaturis, et hoc includit omnes alias. In genere autem hujus similitudinis magis assimilatur Deo secundum quod intelligit actu, quam secundum quod intelligit in habitu vel potentia, quia Deus semper actu intelligens est, ut probatum est (l. I, c. lvi); et in hoc quod intelligit actu, maxime assimilatur Deo, secundum quod intelligit ipsum Deum; nam ipse Deus intelligendo se, intelligit omnia alia, ut probatum est (l. I, c. xlvi). Intelligere igitur Deum est ultimus finis\n\nomnis intellectualis substantiæ. 6. Item, Quod est tantum propter aliud diligibile, est propter illud quod est tantum propter se diligibile; non enim est abire in infinitum in appetitu naturæ, quia desiderium naturæ frustraretur, quum non sit possibile pertransire infinita. Omnes autem scientiae et artes et potentiæ practicæ sunt tantum propter aliud diligibles; nam in eis finis non est scire, sed operari. Scientiae autem speculativa sunt propter seipsas diligibles; nam finis earum est ipsum scire. Nec inventur aliqua actio, in rebus humanis, quæ non ordinetur ad alium finem, nisi consideratio speculativa; nam etiam ipsae actiones ludicræ, quæ videntur absque fine fieri, habent aliquem finem debitum, scilicet ut per eas quodammodo mente relevati, magis simus postmodum potentes ad studiosas operationes; alias esset semper ludendum, si ludus propter se quæreretur; quod est inconveniens. Ordinantur igitur artes practicæ ad speculativas, et similiter omnis humana operatio ad speculationem intellectus, sicut ad finem. In omnibus autem scientiis et artibus ordinatis, ad illam videtur pertinere ultimus finis quæ est præceptiva et architectonica aliarum; sicut ars gubernatoria, ad quam pertinet finis navis, qui est usus ipsius, est architectonica et præceptiva respectu navis factivæ. Hoc autem modo se habet philosophia prima ad alias scientias speculativas; nam ab ipsa omnes aliæ dependent, utpote ab ipsa accipientes sua principia et directionem contra negantes principia ipsaque prima philosophia tota ordinatur ad Dei cognitionem, sicut ad ultimum finem; unde et scientia divina nominatur. Est ergo cognitio divina finis ultimus omnis humanæ\n\ncognitionis et operationis. 7. Adhuc, In omnibus agentibus et moventibus ordinatis, oportet quod finis primi agentis et motoris sit ultimus finis omnium; sicut finis ducis exercitus est finis omnium sub eo militantium. Inter omnes autem hominis partes intellectus inventur superior motor; nam intellectus movet appetitum, proponendo ei suum objectum. Appetitus autem intellectus, qui est voluntas, movet appetitus sensitivos, qui sunt irascibilis et concupiscibilis; unde et concupiscentiae non obedimus', nisi voluntatis imperium ad sit. 4 A: « Concupiscentiae non obedimus, nisi adveniente consensu voluntatis moventis jam corpus. » In G « nisi » additur. Appetitus autem sensitivus, adveniente consensu voluntatis, movet jam corpus. Finis igitur intellectus est finis omnium actionum humanarum. Finis autem et bonum intellectus est verum; et per consequens, ultimus finis, primum verum. Est igitur ultimus finis totius hominis et omnium operationum et desideriorum ejus, cognoscere primum verum,\n\nquod est Deus. 8. Amplius, Naturaliter inest omnibus hominibus desiderium cognoscendi causas eorum quæ videntur; unde propter admirationem eorum quæ videbantur, quorum causæ latebant, homines primo philosophari cæperunt; invenientes autem causam quiescebant. Nec sistit inquisitio quousque perveniatur ad primam causam; et tunc perfecte nos scire arbitramur quando primam causam cognoscimus. Desiderat igitur homo naturaliter cognoscere primam causam quasi ultimum finem. Prima autem omnium causa Deus est. Est igitur ultimus finis\n\nhominis cognoscere Deum. 9. Præterea, Cujuslibet effectus cogniti naturaliter homo causam scire desiderat. Intellectus autem humanus cognoscit ens universale. Desiderat igitur naturaliter cognoscere causam ejus, quæ solum Deus est, ut probatum est (l. II, c. xv). Non est autem aliquis assecutus finem ultimum quousque naturale desiderium quiescat. Non sufficit igitur, ad felicitatem humanam, quæ est ultimus finis, qualiscumque intelligibilis cognitio, nisi divina cognitio adsit, quæ naturale desiderium quietet sicut ultimus finis. Est igitur ultimus finis hominis\n\nipsa Dei cognitio. 10. Amplius, Corpus quod naturali appetitu tendit in suum « ubi » tanto vehementius et velocius movetur, quanto magis appropinquat fini; unde probat Aristoteles, De cælo, I, c. iv et v, quod motus naturalis rectus non potest esse ad infinitum, quia non magis moveretur postea quam prius. Quod igitur vehementius in aliquid tendit postea quam prius, non movetur ad infinitum, sed ad aliquid determinatum tendit. Hoc autem invenimus in desiderio sciendi; quanto enim aliquis plura scit, tanto majori desiderio affectat scire. Tendit igitur desiderium naturale hominis in sciendo ad aliquem determinatum finem. Hoc autem non potest esse aliud quam nobilissimum scibile, quod Deus est. Est igitur cognitio divina\n\nfinis ultimus hominis. Ultimus autem finis hominis et cujuslibet intellectualis substantiae felicitas sive beatitudo nominatur; hoc enim est quod omnis substantia intellectualis desiderat tanquam ultimum finem et propter se tantum. Est igitur beatitudo et felicitas ultima cujuslibet substantiae\n\nintellectualis cognoscere Deum. Hinc est quod dicitur: Beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt, Matth. v, 8; et: Hæc est vita æterna ut cognoscant te solum Deum verum,\n\nJoan. xvii, 3. Huic etiam sententiæ Aristoteles, Ethic. X, c. vii, concordat ubi ultimam hominis felicitatem dicit esse speculativam quantum ad speculationem optimi speculabilis.\n\nQuod felicitas in actu voluntatis non consistit. (I-II, q. iii, a. iv.) 1. Quia vero intellectualis substantia sua operatione pertingit ad Deum, non solum intelligendo, sed per actum etiam voluntatis desiderando, et amando ipsum, et in ipso delectationem habendo, potest alicui videri quod ultimus finis et ultima hominis felicitas non sit in cognoscendo Deum, sed magis in amando vel aliquo alio actu voluntatis se habendo ad ipsum: praecipue quum objectum voluntatis sit bonum, quod habet rationem finis; verum autem, quod est objectum intellectus, non habeat rationem finis, nisi in quantum et ipse est bonum. Unde non videtur homo consequi ultimum finem per actum intellectus, sed magis per actum voluntatis. 1 2 3 « Ubi jacitur fundamentum, ibi debet erigiædificium completum. Fundamentum spiritualisædificii est meritum, quod consistit principaliter in voluntate. Complementum autem hujusædificii est beatitudo. Ergo etiam debet beatitudo in actu voluntatis consistere. Sed dicendum quod meritum est causa quodammodo beatitudinis non habens omnimodam similitudinem cum fundamento materiali. Non oportet autem ibi esse effectum ubi est sua causa. Item finis cujus adeptione omnes primarii motores quietantur, est 2. Præterea, Ultima perfectio operationis est delectatio, quæ perficit operationem, sicut pulchritudo juventutem, ut Philosophus dicit, Ethic. X, c. iv. Si igitur perfecta operatio est ultimus finis, videtur quod ultimus finis magis sit secundum operationem voluntatis quam intellectus. 3. Adhuc, Delectatio videtur ita propter se desiderari quod nunquam propter aliud; stultum enim est quærere ab aliquo quare velit delectari. Hæc autem est conditio ultimi finis, ut scilicet propter se quæratur. Est igitur ultimus finis magis in operatione voluntatis quam intellectus, ut videtur. 4. Item, In appetitu ultimi finis maxime omnes concordant, quum sit naturalis. Plures autem quærunt delectationem quam cognitionem. Magis igitur videtur esse finis delectatio quam cognitio. 5. Amplius, Voluntas videtur esse altior potentia quam intellectus; nam voluntas movet intellectum ad finem; intellectus enim actu considerat quæ habitu tenet, quum aliquis voluerit. Actio igitur voluntatis videtur nobilior quam actio intellectus. Magis igitur videtur ultimus finis, quæ est beatitudo, consistere in finis principalis motoris. Beatitudo est hujus principalis, motor est voluntas. Ergo ad eum pertinet principaliter beatitudo. Et dicendum quod sit sicut finis; ex quo non sequitur quod sit actus ejus, quinimo actus alterius potentiæ bene est finis ejus. Item cum impossibile sit esse beatum qui non amat actus, affectus necessario concurrit ad beatitudinem non accidentaliter, quia tunc sine amore posset esse beatitudo, ergo essentialiter. Sed in habentibus ordinem essentialem posterius est nobilius et principalius. Sed hoc posset negari, quia ad factionem freni concurrit militaris tamquam prior, et ars frenefactoria posterior, quæ tamen non est nobiliar. Item eo quo anima fertur in Deum, eo etiam quietatur in illo. Sed dicit Augustinus xiii Confess.: amor meus pondus meum, eo feror quocumque feror. Sed illud quo quis quietatur in Deo est beatitudo. Sed dicendum quod Augustinus attribuens amori inclinationem spiritualem, non excludit objectum amoris, cum amor non moveat nisi ratione objecti, quod est visio Dei. Verius enim dicitur quod appetimus videre Deum quam amare ipsum. » (Ex cod. G. de F.) 1 — A, B, C, D, E, F omittunt: « Ab aliquo. » 2 (Ex cod. G. de F.) « Quia beatitudo, cum sit res altissima, debet actu voluntatis quam in actu intellectus. Hoc autem esse impossibile manifeste ostenditur. 1. Quum enim beatitudo sit proprium bonum intellectualis naturæ, oportet quod secundum id intellectuali naturæ conveniat quod est sibi proprium. Appetitus autem non est proprium intellectualis naturæ, sed omnibus rebus inest, licet diversimode in diversis; quæ tamen diversitas procedit ex hoc quod res diversimode se habent ad cognitionem: quæ enim omnino cognitione carent habent appetitum naturalem tantum; quæ vero habent cognitionem sensitivam, et appetitum sensibilem habent, sub quo irascibilis et concupiscibilis continentur; quæ vero habent cognitionem intellectivam, et appetitum cognitioni proportionatum habent, scilicet voluntatem. Voluntas igitur, secundum quod est appetitus, non est proprium intellectualis naturæ, sed solum secundum quod ab intellectu dependet. Intellectus autem secundum se proprius est intellectuali naturæ. Beatitudo igitur vel felicitas in actu intellectus consistit substantialiter et principaliter magis quam in actu voluntatis. Operationes enim conservantes proprium subjectum nobiliores videntur quam illæ per quas simile in specie producitur. Item objectum beatificans est summum bonum secundum quod bonum, quia bonum est conditione finis. Ergo beatitudo magis spectat ad actum illius potentiæ cujus objectum est bonum secundum quod bonum. Dicendum quod intellectus natus est cognoscere omne ens et rationem omnium entium, unde natus est intelligere id quod est summum bonum, et etiam sub ratione boni, id est cum ratione qua bonum est, sed tamen per rationem veri. Si ergo dicatur quod summum bonum per rationem boni, secundum quam est objectum, affectus est objectum beatificans, hoc est falsum, sed summum bonum per rationem veri. Item altioris potentiæ est imperare. Ergo voluntas est altior. Imperare alteri ad bonum imperantis nobilioris est non imperare ad bonum imperati. » (Ex cod. G. de F.) 2. Adhuc, In omnibus potentiis quæ moventur a suis objectis, objecta sunt naturaliter priora actibus illarum potentiarum, sicut motor naturaliter prior est quam moveri ipsius mobilis. Talis autem potentia est voluntas; appetibile enim movet appetitum. Objectum igitur voluntatis est prius naturaliter quam actus ejus. Primum igitur ejus objectum praecedit omnem actum ipsius. Non potest ergo actus voluntatis primum volitum esse. Hoc autem est ultimus finis, quæ est beatitudo. Impossibile est igitur quod beatitudo sive felicitas sit ipse actus voluntatis. 3. Præterea, In omnibus potentiis quæ possunt converti in suos actus, prius oportet quod actus illius potentiæ feratur in objectum aliquod, et postmodum feratur in suum actum. Si enim intellectus intelligit se intelligere, prius oportet ponere quod intelligat rem aliquam, et consequenter quod intelligat se intelligere; nam ipsum intelligere quod intellectus intelligit alicujus objecti est; unde oportet quod vel procedatur in infinitum, vel, si est devenire ad primum intellectum, hoc non erit ipsum intelligere, sed aliqua res intelligibilis. Similiter oportet quod primum volitum non sit ipsum velle, sed aliquod aliud bonum. Primum autem volitum intellectualis naturæ est ipsa beatitudo sive felicitas; nam propter hoc volumus quæcumque volumus. Impossibile est igitur felicitatem essentialiter in actu voluntatis consistere. 4. Amplius Unumquodque, secundum ea quæ constituunt substantiam ejus, habet naturæ suæ veritatem; differt enim verus homo a picto per ea quæ substantiam hominis constituunt. Vera autem beatitudo non differt a falsa secundum actum voluntatis; nam eodem modo se habet voluntas in desiderando vel amando vel delectando, quidquid sit illud quod sibi proponitur ut summum bonum, sive vere sive false. Utrum autem vere sit summum bonum quod ut tale proponitur vel false, hoc differt ex parte intellectus. Beatitudo igitur sive felicitas in intellectu essentialiter magis quam in actu voluntatis consistit. 5. Item, Si aliquis actus voluntatis esset ipsa felicitas, hic actus esset aut desiderare aut amare aut delectari. Impossibile est autem quod desiderare sit ultimus finis; est enim desiderium secundum quod voluntas tendit in id quod nondum habet; hoc autem contrariatur rationi ultimi finis. Amare etiam non potest esse ultimus finis; amatur enim bonum, non solum quando habetur, sed etiam quando non habetur; ex amore enim est quod non habitum desiderio quæratur; et si amor jam habiti perfectior sit, hoc causatur ex hoc quod bonum amatum habetur; aliud est igitur habere bonum, quod est finis, quam amare, quod ante habere est imperfectum, post habere perfectum. Similiter autem nec delectatio est ultimus finis; ipsum enim habere bonum causa est delectationis, vel dum bonum nunc habitum sentimus, vel dum prius habitum memoramur, vel dum in futuro habendum speramus; non est igitur delectatio ultimus finis. Nullus ergo actus voluntatis potest esse substantialiter ipsa felicitas. 6. Adhuc, Si delectatio esset ultimus finis, ipsa secundum seipsam esset appetenda. Hoc autem est falsum; refert enim discernere quæ delectatio appetatur ex eo ad quod consequitur delectatio; nam delectatio quæ consequitur bonas et appetendas operationes bona est et appetenda; quæ autem malas, mala est et fugienda. Habet igitur quod sit bona et appetenda ex alio. Non est igitur ipsa ultimus finis, quod est felicitas. 7. Adhuc, Rectus ordo rerum convenit cum ordine naturæ; nam res naturales ordinantur in suum finem absque errore. In naturalibus autem est delectatio propter operationem, et non e converso; videmus enim quod natura illis operationibus animalium delectationem apposuit quæ sunt manifeste ad fines necessarios ordinatæ, sicut in usu ciborum, qui ordinatur ad conservationem individui, et in usu vene-reorum, qui ordinatur ad conservationem speciei; nisi enim adesset delectatio, animalia a prædictis usibus necessariis abstinerent. Impossibile ergo est quod delectatio sit ultimus finis. 8. Item, Delectatio nihil aliud esse videur quam quietatio voluntatis in aliquo bono convenienti, sicut desiderium est inclinatio voluntatis in aliquod bonum consequendum. Sicut autem homo per voluntatem inclinatur in finem et quietatur in et in fine E, F habent nihilominus: « Consistere. » A omittit: « Voluntatis. » illo, ita corpora naturalia habent inclinationes naturales in fines proprios, quæ quidem quietantur, fine jam adepto. Ridiculum autem est dicere quod finis motus corporis gravis non sit esse in loco proprio, sed quietatio inclinationis qua in hoc tendebat; si enim hoc principaliter natura intenderet ut inclinationo quietaretur, non daret eam; dat autem eam ut per hoc in locum proprium tendat; quo consecuto quasi fine, sequitru inclinationis quietatio; et sic quietatio talis non est finis, sed concomitans finem. Nec igitur delectatio est finis ultimus, sed concomitans ipsum. Multo igitur magis nec aliquis voluntatis actus est felicitas. 9. Adhuc, si alicujus rei sit aliqua res exterior finis, illa operatio dicetur esse finis ultimus, per quam primo consequitur rem illam; sicut his quibus pecunia est finis dicitur etiam possidere pecuniam finis, non autem amare neque concupiscere. Finis autem ultimus substantiae intellectualis est Deus. Illa igitur operatio hominis est substantialiter ejus beatitudo vel felicitas, per quam primo attingit ad Deum. Hoc autem est intelligere; nam velle non possumus quod non intelligimus. Est igitur ultima felicitas hominis in cognoscendo Deum per intellectum substantialiter, et non in actu voluntatis. Jam igitur, per ea quæ dicta sunt, patet solutio in contrarium objectorum. 1. Non enim, si felicitas, per hoc quod habet rationem summi boni, est objectum voluntatis, propter hoc necesse est quod sit substantialiter ipse actus voluntatis, ut prima ratio procedebat; imo, ex hoc ipso quod est primum objectum, sequitur quod non sit actus ejus, ut ex dictis apparet. 2. Nec etiam oportet quod omne id quo res quocumque modo perficitur sit finis illius rei, sicut secunda ratio procedebat. Est enim aliquid perfectio alicujus dupliiter: uno modo, ut habentis jam speciem; alio modo, ut ad speciem habendam; sicut perfectio domus, secundum quod jam habet speciem, est id ad quod species domus ordinatur, scilicet habitatio; non enim domus fieret, nisi propter hoc; unde et in diffinitione domus oportet hoc poni, si debeat diffinitio esse perfecta. Perfectio vero ad speciem domus est tam id quod ordinatur ad speciem constituentam, sicut principia substantialia ipsius, quam id quod ordinatur ad speciei conservationem; sicut appodiacula quæ fiunt ad sustentationem domus, quam etiam illa quæ faciunt ad hoc quod domus usus sit convenientior, sicut pulchritudo domus. Illud igitur quod est perfectio rei secundum quod jam habet speciem, est finis ipsius, ut habitatio est finis domus. Et similiter propria operatio cujuslibet rei, quæ est quasi usus ejus, est finis ipsius. Quæ autem sunt perfectiones rei ad speciem, non sunt finis rei; imo res est finis ipsarium. Materia enim et forma sunt propter speciem; licet enim forma sit finis generationis, non tamen est finis jam generati et speciem habentis; imo ad hoc quæritur forma ut species sit completa. Similiter conservantia rem in sua specie, ut sanitas et vis nutritiva, licet perficiant animal, non tamen sunt finis animalis, sed magis e converso. Ea etiam quibus aptatur res ad proprias operationes speciei perficiendas et ad debitum finem congruentius consequendum, non sunt finis rei, sed magis e converso; sicut pulchritudo hominis et robur corporis et alia hujusmodi, de quibus dicit Philosophus, Ethic. I, c. xii, quod organice deservient felicitati. Delectatio autem est perfectio operationis, non ita quod ad ipsam ordinatur operatio secundum suam speciem, sed ordinatur ad alios fines, sicut comestio ordinatur ad conservationem individui; sed est similis perfectioni quæ ordinatur ad speciem rei; nam propter delectationem attentius et decentius operationi insistimus in qua delectamur. Unde Philosophus dicit, Ethic. X, c. ix, quod delectation perficit operationem, sicut decor juventutem; qui quidem est propter eum cui inest juventus, et non e converso. 3. Neque autem quod delectationem 1 2 3 « Tenentes hanc opinionem videntur dicere quod licet beatitudo consistat principaliter in actu intellectus, scilicet in cognitione Dei, tamen delectatio, quæ est quasi formaliter complens rationem beatitudinis, est ex parte voluntatis, et in voluntate. Sed cum videre Deum habeat delecta-tionem inseparabiliter annexam, quæ est in cadem potentia cujus actus est videre, sicut et diligere Deum habet delectationem annexam, quæ est in ea potentia cujus est diligere. Dicit enim Avicenna quod delectatio cujuscumque virtutis plena est acquisitio suæ perfectionis. Non vide-tur bene dictum quod delectatio formaliter complens beatitudinem sit in voluntate, immo in illa potentia cujus est actus principalis, scilicet conon propter aliud volunt homines, sed propter seipsam, est sufficiens signum quod delectatio sit ultimus finis, sicut tertia ratio concludebat. Nam delectatio, etsi non sit ultimus finis est tamen ultimum finem concomitans, quum ex adeptione fines delectatio consurgat. 4. Non autem plures quærunt delectationem quæ est in cognoscendo quam cognitionem; sed plures sunt ui quærunt delectationes sensibiles quam cognitionem intellectus et delectationem ipsam consequentem; quia ea quæ exterius sunt magis nota pluribus existunt, eo quod a sensibilibus incipit humana cognitio. 5. Quod autem quinta ratio proponit, voluntatem esse altiorem intellectu quasi ejus motivam, falsum esse manifestum est. Nam primo et per se intellectus movet voluntatem; voluntas enim, in quantum hujusmodi, movetur a suo objecto, quod est bonum apprehensum. Voluntas autem movet intellectum quasi per accidens, in quantum scilicet intelligere ipsum apprehenditur ut bonum et sic desideratur a voluntate; ex quo sequitur quod intellectus actu intelligit, et in hoc ipso voluntatem præcedit; nunquam enim voluntas desideraret intelligere, nisi prius intellectus ipsum intelligere apprehenderet ut bonum. Et iterum voluntas movet intellectum ad operandum in actu per gnoscere et videre Deum. Ita tamen quod delectatio de veritate est in potentia apprehensiva veritatis. In eadem enim potentia sunt operatio et delectatio continens illam operationem. Unde rationes et auctoritates ostendentes beatitudinem consistere in delectatione, non conclusunt quod principaliter pertineat ad voluntatem, cum etiam ipse intellectus in sua operatione delectetur. Cum ergo in habere summum bonum et summum verum consistat beatitudo, in summo bono et vero idem est perfecte noscere quod habere. Secundum Augustinum beatitudo consistit principaliter in notitia quam consequitur delectatio. Minus autem sequitur majus, non e converso. Unde etiam principalius consistit beatitudo in cognitione quam in delectatione, non solum quæ est voluntatis, sed etiam quæ est ipsius intellectus. Sed ad hoc posset dici quod beatitudo consistit in habere summum bonum, quod quidem habere idem est ac noscere, verum est præsuposita delectatione. Noscere enim summum bonum notitia simplici, non est notitia quæ faciat perfecte beatum, sed noscere notitia perfecte amante. Unde habere quod facit beatum utrumque implicat et noscere et amare. Item beatitudo est bonum sufficientissimum; sed actus intellectus est sufficientor quam affectus, quia affectus est minus indigens actu affectus quam e converso. Qui enim diligit aliquem desiderat videre eum; et quanto magis diligit, tanto magis desiderat modum quo agens movere dicitur; intellectus autem voluntatem, per modum quo finis movet, nam bonum intellectum est finis voluntatis. Agens autem est posterior in movendo quam finis, nam agens non movet nisi propter finem. Unde apparet intellectum simpliciter esse altiorem voluntate, voluntatem vero intellectu, per accidens et secundum quid.\n\nxi, a. vi.) Ex praemissis autem apparet quod imposibile est felicitatem humanam consistere in delectationibus corporalibus, quarum praecipuæ sunt in cibis et\n\nvenereis. 1. Ostensum est enim (c. xxvi) quod, secundum naturæ ordinem, delectatio est propter operationem, et non e converso. Si igitur operationes non fuerint ultimus finis, delectationes consequentes eas neque sunt ultimus finis neque concomitantes ultimum finem. Constat autem quod operationes quas consequuntur pradictæ delectationes non sunt ultimus finis; ordinantur autem ad aliquos fines manifestos, sicut comestio ad conserva- Qui autem perfecte videt amicum, non dicit quod desideret amare amicum. Ergo videns non ita indiget amare sicut amans visione. Posset dici quod visio, ad hoc quod sit beatifica, indiget dilectione. Videre enim sine dilectione non faceret animam beatam. Qui ergo videns amat non desiderat amare, hoc est quia jam præsupponitur esse amicus. Sicut etiam amatum perfecte visum non desiderat videre, ut hic cum amore præsupponatur visio. Sicut ibi cum visione præsupponitur delectatio. Cum enim secundum Augustinum XIII De civitate Dei, c. I et IV, causa beatitudinis animorum sit adhærere Deo; adhæsio autem et unio ad Deum maxime est per amorem: amor enim est vita quædam duo copulans aut copulare appetens; videtur quod beatitudo consistat in actu voluntatis. Item rationalis creatura maxime debet appetere quod Deus summe exigit ab ea, et approbat in ea. Magis autem exigit Deus a nobis amari quam videri. Ergo et hoc videtur esse potissimum in quo maxime consistere debet beatitudo. Item si aliquis habens perfectam Dei visionem et delectationem deberet αternaliter cadere ab uno istorum, mallet αternaliter esse perfectus et gratuitus Dei amator et non Dei comprehensor per manifestam visionem quam e converso. Ergo et hoc videtur esse magis essentiale beatitudinis. (Ex cod. G. de F.) A, B, C, D, E, F: « Carnalibus. » A: « Carnalibus. » tionem corporis, coitus autem ad generationem prolis. Delectationes igitur præmissæ non sunt ultimus finis neque ultimum finem concomitantes. Non est igitur in\n\nhis ponenda felicitas. 2. Adhuc, Voluntas est superior quam appetitus sensitivus; movet enim ipsum, sicut superius (c. xxv) dictum est. In actu autem voluntatis non consistit felicitas, sicut jam supra (c. xxvi) ostensum est. Multo igitur minus in delectationibus prædictis, quæ sunt\n\nin appetitu sensitivo. 3. Amplius, Felicitas est quoddam homum hominis proprium; non enim bruta possunt dici felicia nisi abusive. Delectationes autem præmissæ sunt communes hominibus et brutis. Non est igitur in\n\neis pronenda felicitas. 4. Item, Ultimus finis est nobilissimum eorum quæ ad rem pertinent; habet enim rationem optimi. Hæ autem delectationes non conveniunt homini secundum id quod est nobilissimum in ipso, quod est intellectus, sed secundum sensum. Non est igitur in talibus delectationibus\n\nponenda felicitas. 5. Amplius, Summa perfectio hominis esse non potest in hoc quod conjungitur rebus se inferioribus, sed per hoc quod conjungitur alicui rei altiori; finis enim est melior eo quod est ad finem. Delectationes autem præmissæ consistunt in hoc quod homo secundum sensum conjungitur aliquibus se inferioribus, scilicet sensibilibus quibusdam. Non est igitur in talibus\n\ndelectationibus felicitas ponenda. 6. Amplius, Quod non est bonum nisi secundum quod est moderatum non est secundum se bonum, sed accipit bonitatem a moderante. Usus autem prædictum delectationum non est bonus homini, nisi sit moderatus; aliter enim delectationes se invicem impedirent. Non sunt igitur hæ delectationes secundum se bonum hominis. Quod autem est summum bonum est per se bonum, quia quod per se bonum est melius est eo quod est per aliud. Non sunt igitur tales delectationes summum hominis bonum,\n\nquod est felicitas. 7. Item, In omnibus quæ per se dicuntur, sequitur magis ad magis, si simpliciter sequatur ad simpliciter; sicut calidum calefacit, magis calidum magis calefacit, et maxime calidum maxime ca- lefaciet. Si igitur delectationes præmissæ essent secundum se bonæ, oporteret quod maxime uti eis esset optimum. Hoc autem patet esse falsum; nam nimius usus eorum reputatur in vitium et est etiam corpori noxius et similium delectationum impeditivus. Non sunt igitur per se bonum hominis. In eis igitur non\n\nconsistit humana felicitas. 8. Præterea, Actus virtutum sunt laudabiles ex hoc quod ad felicitatem ordinantur. Si igitur in delectationibus præmissis consisteret humana felicitas, actus virtutis magis esset laudabilis in accedendo ad has delectationes quam in abstinendo ab eis. Hoc autem patet esse falsum; nam actus temperantiæ maxime laudatur in abstinendo a delectationibus, unde ab hoc denominatur. Non est igitur in delectationibus\n\npræmissis hominis felicitas. 9. Amplius, Finis ultimus cujuslibet rei Deus est, ut ex præmissis (c. xvii et xviii) patet. Illud igitur oportet ultimum finem hominis poni per quod maxime appropinquat ad Deum. Per prædictas autem delectationes homo impeditur a maxima appropinquatione ad Deum, quæ fit per contemplationem, quam maxime prædictæ delectationes impediunt, utpote ad sensibilia maxime hominem immergentes et per consequens ab intelligibilibus retrahentes. Non est igitur in delectationbus corporalibus\n\nfelicitas humana ponenda. Per hoc autem excluditur error Epicureorum in his voluptatibus felicitatem hominis potentium; ex quorum persona dicit Salomon: Hoc itaque visum est mihi bonum, ut comedat quis, et bibat, et fruatur lætitia ex labore suo...; et hæc pars illius, Eccles. v, 17; et Ubique relinquamus signa lætitia, quoniam hæc est pars nostra, et hæc est sors, Sap. 11, 9. Excluditur etiam error Cerinthianorum, qui in ultima felicitate post resurrectionem mille annos in regno Christi secundum carnales ventris voluptates fabulantur futuros; unde et « Chiliastæ », quasi « Millenarii », sunt appellati; in græco enim « chilia » idem est quod « mille ». Excluduntur etiam Judæorum et Sarracenorum fabulæ, qui retributiones justorum in prædictis voluptatibus ponunt; felicitas enim virtu-tis est præmium. 1 A omittit: « Sequatur. » 2 A: « Apparet.»\n\nxi, a. ii.) Ex praedictis patet quod etiam nec in honoribus est summum hominis bonum,\n\nquod est felicitas. 1. Finis enim ultimus hominis et sua felicitas est ejus perfectissima operatio, ut ex superioribus (c. xxvi et xxvii) patet. Honor autem hominis non consistit in sua operatione, sed alterius ad ipsum, qui ei reverentiam exhibet. Non est igitur felicitas hominis\n\nin honoribus ponenda. 2. Adhuc, Quod est propter alterum bonum et desiderabile non est ultimus finis. Tale autem est honor; non enim aliquis recte honoratur, nisi propter aliquod aliud bonum in eo exsistens; et propter hoc homines honorari quærunt, quasi boni alicujus quod in eis est testimonium habere volentes; unde et magis gaudent homines a magnis et sapientibus honorari. Non est igitur in honoribus\n\nfelicitas hominis ponenda. 3. Amplius, Ad felicitatem per virtutem pervenitur. Operationes autem virtutum sunt voluntariæ; aliter enim non essent laudabiles. Oportet igitur felicitatem esse aliquod bonum ad quod homo sua voluntate perveniat. Hoc autem quod honorem assequatur non est in potestate hominis, sed magis in potestate honorantis. Non est igitur in honoribus\n\nfelicitas humana ponenda. 4. Item, Omne dignum honore non potest nisi bonis inesse. Honorari autem possunt etiam mali. Melius est igitur fieri honore dignum quam honorari. Non est igitur honor\n\nsummum hominis bonum. 5. Præterea, Summum bonum est perfectum bonum. Perfectum autem bonum non compatitur aliquod malum; cui autem inest aliquod malum impossibile est esse beatum. Impossibile est igitur esse malum cui adest summum bonum. Potest autem aliquis malus honorem consequi. Non est igitur honor summum hominis bonum.\n\nin gloria humana. Ex quo etiam apparet quod nec in gloria quæ est in celebritate famæ consistit\n\nsummum hominis bonum. 1. Est enim gloria, secundum Tullium, « frequens de aliquo fama cum laude, » et, secundum Ambrosium, « clara cum laude notitia . » Ad hoc autem volunt homines innotescere cum laude et claritate quadam, ut ab eis quibus innotescunt honorentur. Est igitur gloria propter honorem quæsita. Si igitur honor non est summum bonum,\n\nmulto minus gloria. 2. Adhuc, Laudabilia bona sunt secundum quæ aliquis ostenditur ordinatus ad finem. Qui autem ordinatur ad finem non dum est ultimum finem assecutus. Laus igitur non attribuitur ei qui jam est ultimum finem assecutus, sed magis honor, ut Philosophus dicit, Ethic. I, c. xii. Non potest igitur gloria esse summum bonum, quum principaliter\n\nin laude consistat. 3. Amplius, Cognoscere nobilius est quam cognosci; non enim cognoscunt nisi quæ sunt nobiliora in rebus; cognoscuntur autem etiam infima. Non potest igitur summum hominis honum esse gloria, quæ consistit in hoc\n\nquod aliquis cognoscatur. 4. Item, Cognosci aliquis non desiderat nisi in bonis; in malis autem quærit latere. Cognosci igitur bonum est et desiderabile propter bona quæ in aliquo cognoscuntur. Illa igitur sunt meliora. Non est igitur gloria, quæ in hoc consistit quod aliquis cognoscatur,\n\nsummum hominis bonum. 5. Præterea, Summum bonum oportet esse perfectum, quum quietet appetitum. Cognitio autem famæ, in qua gloria humana consistit, est imperfecta; est enim plurimum incertitudinis et erroris habens. Non potest igitur talis gloria\n\nesse summum bonum. 5. Item, Id quod est summum hominis bonum oportet esse stabilissimum in rebus humanis; naturaliter enim deside- A, E, F, G, H, I: « Cum autem. » A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I: « Non inest aliquod malum, impossibile est esse malum. » J omittit: « Cui autem inest aliquod malum, impossibile est esse beatum. » « Gloria... hoc est clara cum laude notitia » XII. ratur diuturna boni constantia. Gloria autem quæ in fama consistit est instabilissima; nihil enim est mutabilius opinione et laude humana. Non est igitur talis gloria summum hominis bonum.\n\nxi, a. i.) Ex hoc autem apparet quod nec divitiæ sunt\n\nsummum hominis bonum. 1. Non enim appetuntur divitiæ nisi propter aliud; per se enim nihil boni inferunt, sed solum utimur eis vel ad corporis sustentationem vel ad aliquid hujusmodi. Quod autem est summum est propter se desideratum, et non propter aliud. Non sunt igitur divitiæ\n\nsummum hominis bonum. 2. Adhuc, Eorum possessio vel conservatio non potest esse summum hominis bonum quæ maxime conferunt homini in hoc quod emittuntur. Divitiæ autem in hoc maxime conferunt quod expenduntur; hoc enim earum usus est. Non potest igitur divitiarum possessio esse\n\nsummum hominis bonum. 3. Amplius, Actus virtutis laudabilis est secundum quod ad felicitatem accedit. Magis autem est laudabilis actus liberalitatis et munificentiae, quæ sunt circa pecunias ex hoc quod pecuniæ emittuntur, quam ex hoc quod conservantur; unde et ab hoc nomina harum virtutum sumuntur. Non consistit igitur hominis felicitas\n\nin possessione divitiarum. 4. Item, Illud in cujus consecutione summum hominis bonum est oportet esse homine melius. Divitiis autem homo est melior, quum sint res quædam ad usum hominis ordinatæ. Non est igitur in divitiis\n\nsummum hominis bonum. 5. Præterea, Summum hominis bonum fortunæ non subjacet; nam fortuita absque studio rationis eveniunt; oportet autem quod per rationem homo proprium finem consequatur. In consecuzione autem divitiarum maximum locum habet fortuna. Non est igitur in divitiis\n\nhumana felicitas constituta. 6. Amplius, Hoc evidens fit per hoc quod divitiæ involuntarie amittuntur; et quod malis evenire possunt, quos necesse est summo bono carere; et quod instabiles sunt; et alia hujusmodi, quæ ex superioribus rationibus colligi possunt.\n\na. iv.) Similiter autem nec in mundana potentia summum hominis bonum esse potest: 1. Quum in ea obtinenda plurimum fortuna possit, et instabilis sit, et non subjaceat hominis voluntati, et plerumque malis adveniat; quæ summo bono repugnant, ut ex præmissis (c. xxix\n\net xxx) patet. 2. Item, Homo maxime dicitur bonus secundum quod ad summum bonum attingit. Secundum autem quod habet potentiam, non dicitur bonus neque malus; non enim est bonus omnis qui potest bona facere, neque malus est aliquis ex hoc quod potest mala facere. Summum igitur bonum non consistit in hoc quod\n\nest esse potentem. 3. Adhuc, Omnis potentia ad alterum est. Summum autem bonum non est ad alterum. Non est igitur potentia\n\nsummum hominis bonum. 4. Amplius, Illud quo quis potest et bene et male uti non potest esse summum hominis bonum; melius enim est quo nullus male uti potest. Potentia autem aliquis bene et male uti potest; nam potestates rationales ad opposita sunt. Non est igitur potestas humana\n\nsummum hominis bonum. 5. Præterea, Si aliqua potestas est summum bonum, oportet illam esse perfectissimam. Potestas autem humana est imperfectissima; radicatur enim in hominum voluntatibus et opinionibus, in quibus est maxima inconstantia; et quanto magis reputatur potestas, tanto a pluribus dependet; quod etiam ad ejus debilitatem pertinet, quum quod a multis dependet destrui multipliciter possit. Non est igitur in potestate humana\n\nsummum hominis bonum. Felicitas igitur homini in nullo bono exteriori consistit, quum omnia exteriora bona, quæ dicuntur bona fortunæ, sub prædictis contineantur. 1 A: « Emittuntur, augmentur. »\n\nxi, a. v.) Quod autem nec in corporis bonis, cujusmodi sunt sanitas, pulchritudo et robur, sit hominis summum bonum, per similia manifeste apparet. 1. Hæc enim etiam bonis et malis communia sunt, et instabilia sunt, et\n\nvoluntati non subjacent. 2. Præterea, Anima est melior corpore, quod non vivit nec prædicta bona habet nisi per animam. Bonum igitur animæ, sicut intelligere et alia hujusmodi, est melius quam bonum corporis. Non est igitur corporis bonum\n\nsummum hominis bonum. 3. Adhuc, Hæc bona sunt homini et aliis animalibus communia. Felicitas autem est proprium hominis bonum. Non est igitur in præmissis\n\nbonis hominis felicitas. 4. Amplius, Multa animalia, quantum ad bona corporis, sunt homine potiora; quædam enim sunt velociora homine, quædam robustiora, et sic de aliis. Si igitur in his esset summum hominis bonum, non esset homo optimum animalium; quod patet esse falsum. Non est igitur felicitas humana in bonis corporis consistens.\n\n(I-II, q. Ⅲ, a. Ⅲ). Per eadem etiam apparet quod neque summum hominis bonum est in bonis sensitivæ partis. 1. Nam hæc etiam bona sunt homini et\n\naliis animalibus communia. 2. Item, Intellectus est melior sensu. Bonum igitur intellectus est melius quam bonum sensus. Non igitur summum hominis bonum\n\nin sensu consistit. 3. Adhuc, Maximæ delectationes secundum sensum sunt in cibis et venereis, in quibus oporteret esse summum bonum, si in sensu esset. Non est autem in his. Non est igitur in sensu\n\nsummum hominis bonum. 4. Amplius, Sensus diliguntur propter utilitatem et propter cognitionem. Tota autem utilitas sensuum ad corporis bona refertur, cognitio autem sensus ad intellectivam ordinatur; unde animalia intellectu carentia non delectantur in sentiendo nisi per comparisonem ad utilitatem ad corpus pertinentem, secundum quod per sensus cognitionem consequuntur cibos vel venerea. Non est igitur in parte sensitiva summum hominis bonum, quod est felicitas.\n\nactibus virtutum moralium. Apparet autem quod nec in operationibus moralibus consistit\n\nultima felicitas hominis. 1. Felicitas enim humana non est ad ulteriorem finem ordinabilis, si sit ultima. Omnes autem operationes morales sunt ordinabiles ad aliquid aliud; quod patet ex his quæ inter eas sunt præcipuæ; operationes enim fortitudinis, quæ sunt in rebus bellicis, ordinantur ad victoriam et ad pacem; stultum enim esset propter se tantum bellare; similiter operationes justitiæ ad servandam pacem inter homines ordinantur, per hoc quod unusquisque quiete quod suum est possidet; et similiter patet in omnibus aliis. Non est igitur in operationibus moralibus\n\nultima hominis felicitas. 2. Adhuc, Virtutes morales ad hoc sunt ut per eas conservetur medium in passionibus intrinsecis et exterioribus rebus. Non est autem possibile quod modificatio passionum vel rerum exteriorum sit ultimus finis humanæ vitæ, quum ipsæ passiones et exteriores res sint ad aliud ordinabiles. Non est igitur possibile quod in actibus virtutum moralium sit\n\nultima hominis felicitas. 3. Amplius, Quum homo sit homo ex eo quod est rationem habens, oportet quod proprium ejus bonum; quod est felicitas, sit secundum id quod est proprium rationis. Magis autem est proprium rationis quod ipsa in se habet quam quod in alio facit. Quum igitur homum moralis virtutis sit quoddam a ratione in rebus aliis a se institutum, non poterit esse optimum hominis, quod est felicitas; sed magis bonum quod est in ipsa ratione\n\nsitum. 4. Item, Ostensum est supra (c. xix) quod finis omnium rerum ultimus est assimilari ad Deum. Illud igitur secundum quod homo maxime assimilatur Deo erit ejus felicitas. Hoc autem non est secundum actus morales, quum tales actus Deo attribui non possint nisi metaphorice; non enim Deo convenit habere passiones vel aliqua hujusmodi quæ sunt circa actus morales. Non est igitur ultima felicitas hominis, quæ est ultimus ejus finis, consistens\n\nin actibus moralibus. 5. Præterea, Felicitas est proprium hominis bonum. Illud igitur quod est maxime proprium hominis inter omnia bona humana, respectu aliorum animalium, est in quo quærenda est ejus ultima felicitas. Hujusmodi autem non est virtutum moralium actus; nam alia animalia aliquid participant vel liberalitatis vel fortitudinis; intellectualis autem actionis nullum animal aliquid participat. Non est igitur ultima hominis felicitas in actibus moralibus.\n\nin actu prudentiae. Ex hoc etiam apparet quod neque in actu prudentiae est ultima\n\nhominis felicitas. 1. Actu enim prudentiae est solum circa ea quæ sunt moralium virtutum. Non est autem in actibus moralium virtutum ultima hominis felicitas. Neque igitur\n\nin actu prudentiae. 2. Adhuc, Ultima felicitas hominis est in optima hominis operatione . Optima autem hominis operatio, secundum id qud est proprium hominis, est in comparatione ad perfectissima objecta. Operatio autem prudentiae non est erga objecta perfectissima intellectus vel rationis; non enim est erga necessaria, sed erga contingentia operabilia. Non est igitur in ejus operatione\n\nultima hominis felicitas. 3. Amplius, Quod ordinatur ad alterum sicut ad finem non est ultima hominis felicitas. Operatio autem prudentiae ordinatur ad alterum sicut ad finem: tum quia omnis practica cognitio, sub qua continetur prudentia, ordinatur ad operationem; tum etiam quia prudentia facit hominem bene se habere in his quæ sunt ad finem eligenda, sicut patet per Aris-totelem, Eth. VI, c. xi. Non est igitur in operatione prudentiae\n\nultima hominis felicitas. 4. Item, Animalia irrationabilia non participant aliquid felicitatis, sicut probat Aristoteles, Ethic. I, c. x. Participant autem quædam eorum aliquid prudentiae, ut patet per eumdem, Metaphys. I, c. 1. Igitur felicitas non consistit in operatione prudentiae.\n\nin operatione artis. Patet etiam quod neque\n\nin operatione artis. 1. Quia etiam artis cognitio practica est, et ita ad finem ordinatur; et ideo ipsa non\n\nest ultimus finis. 2. Præterea, Operationum artis fines sunt artificiata, quæ non possunt esse ultimus finis humanæ vitæ, quum magis nos simus fines omnium artificialium; omnia enim propter hominis usum fiunt. Non potest igitur in operatione artis esse ultima felicitas.\n\nIII, cap. cvii.) Si igitur ultima felicitas hominis non consistit in exterioribus quæ dicuntur bona fortunæ, neque in bonis corporis, neque in bonis animæ quantum ad sensitivam partem, neque quantum ad intellectivam secundum actus moralium virtutum, neque secundum intellectuales quæ ad actionem pertinent, scilicet artem et prudentiam, relinquitur quod ultima hominis felicitas sit\n\nin contemplatione veritatis. 1. Hæc enim sola operatio hominis est sibi propria et in qua nullo modo aliquod\n\naliud communicat. 2. Hoc etiam ad nihil aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, quum contemplatio veritatis\n\npropter seipsam quæratur. 3. Per hanc etiam operationem homo substantiis superioribus conjungitur per similitudinem, quia hoc tantum de ope- A: « Hominis operatione, et optima. Optima autem. » A: « Circa. » rationibus humanis in Deo et in\n\nsubstantiis separatis est. 4. Hac etiam operatione ad illa superiora conjungitur, cognoscendo\n\nipsa quocumque modo. 5. Ad hanc etiam operationem homo sibi magis est sufficiens, utpote ad eam parum auxilio\n\nexteriorum rerum egens. 6. Ad hanc etiam omnes aliæ operationes humanæ ordinari videntur, sicut ad finem. Ad perfectionem enim contemplationis requiritur incolumitas corporis, ad quam ordinantur artificialia omnia quæ sunt necessaria ad vitam. Requiritur etiam quies a perturbationibus passionum, ad quam pervenitur per virtutes morales et per prudentiam, et quies ab exterioribus passionibus, ad quam ordinatur totum regimen vitæ civilis, ut sic, si recte considerentur, omnia humana officia servire\n\nvideantur contemplantibus veritatem. Non est autem possibile quod ultima hominis felicitas consistat in contemplatione quæ est secundum iutellectum principiorum, quæ est imperfectissima, sicut maxime universalis, rerum cognitionem in potentia continens, et est principium, non finis humani studii, a natura nobis proveniens, non secundum studium veritatis; — neque etiam secundum scientias quæ sunt de rebus infimis, quum oporteat felicitatem esse in operatione intellectus per comparisonem ad nobilissima intelligibilia. Relinquitur igitur quod in contemplatione sapientia ultima hominis felicitas consistat,\n\nsecundum divinorum considerationem. Ex quo etiam patet, inductionis via, quod supra rationibus est probatum : quod ultima felicitas hominis non consistit nisi in contemplatione Dei.\n\nIII. cap. iv.) Inquirendum autem relinquitur in quali Dei cognitione ultima felicitas substantiae intellectualis consistit. Est enim quædam communis et confusa Dei cognition, quæ quasi omnibus hominibus adest; sive hoc sit per hoc quod Deum esse sit per se notum, sicut alia demonstrationis principia, sicut quisbusdam videtur, ut est dictum (l. I, c. x); sive (quod magis verum videtur), quia naturali ratione statim homo in aliqualem Dei cognitionem pervenire potest; videntes enim homines res naturales secundum ordinem certum currere, quum ordinatio absque ordinatore non sit, percipiunt ut in pluribus aliquem esse ordinatorem rerum quas videmus. Quis autem vel qualis vel si unus tantum est ordinator naturæ, non-dum statim ex hac communi consideratione habetur; sicut, quum videmus hominem moveri et alia opera agere, percipimus in eo quamdam causam harum operationum quæ aliis rebus non inest, et hanc causam animam nominamus, nondum tamen scientes quid sit anima, si est corpus, vel qualiter\n\noperationes prædictas efficiat. Non est autem possiibile hanc cognitionem ad\n\nfelicitatem sufficere. 1. Felicitatem enim operationem esse oportet absque defectu. Hæc autem cognitio est multorum errorum admixtionem suscipiens; quidam enim rerum mundanarum non alium ordinatore esse crediderunt quam corpora cælestia; unde corpora cælestia deos esse dixerunt; quidam vero ulterius ipsa elementa quæ ex eis generantur, quasi aestimantes motus et operationes naturales quas habent non ab alio ordinatore eis inesse, sed ab eis alia ordinari; quidam vero, humanos actus non alicujus ordinationi subesse credentes nisi humanæ, homines qui alios ordinant deos esse, dixerunt. Ista igitur Dei cognitio non\n\nsufficit ad felicitatem. 2. Amplius, Felicitas est finis humanorum actuum. Ad prædictam autem cognitionem non ordinantur humani actus sicut ad finem; imo quasi statim a principio omnibus adest. Non igitur in hac Dei\n\ncognitione felicitas consistit. 3. Item, Nullus per hoc vituperabilis apparet quia felicitate careat; quinimo carentes ea et in ipsam tendentes laudantur. Ex hoc autem quod prædicta Dei cognitione aliquis caret, maxime vituperabilis apparet; designatur enim per hoc maxime hominis stoliditas, quod tam manifesta Dei signa non percipit, sicut stolidus reputaretur qui, hominem videns, A: « Autem. » habere animam eum non comprehenderet, unde dicitur: Dixit insipiens in corde suo: Non est Deus, Psalm. xiii, 1, et lii. Non est igitur hæc Dei cognitio quæ\n\nad felicitatem sufficiat. 4. Amplius, Cognitio quæ habetur de re tantum in communi, non secundum aliqid sibi proprium, est imperfectissima, sicut cognitio quæ habetur de homine ex hoc quod movetur; est enim hujusmodi cognitio per quam res cognoscitur in potentia tantum; propria enim in communibus potentia continentur. Felicitas autem est operatio perfecta, et summum hominis bonum oportet esse secundum id quod est actu, et non secundum quod est potentia tantum; nam potentia per actum perfecta habet boni rationem. Non est igitur præmissa Dei cognitio ad felicitatem nostram sufficiens.\n\nv, ad 2um.) Rursus est quædam alia Dei cognitio, altior quam præmissa, quæ de Deo per demonstrationem habetur, per quam magis ad propriam ipsius cognitionem acceditur, quum per demonstrationem removeantur ab eo multa per quorum remotionem ab aliis discretus intelligitur; ostendit enim demonstratio Deum esse immobilem, æternum, incorporeum, omnino simplicem, unum, et alia hujusmodi quæ de Deo ostendimus (l. I, c. xiii et seqq.). Ad propriam autem alicujus rei cognitionem pervenitur, non solum per affirmationes, sed etiam per negationes; sicut enim proprium hominis est esse animal rationale, ita proprium ejus est non esse inanimatum neque irrationale; sed hoc interest inter utrumque cognitionis propriæ modum, quod, per affirmationes propriia cognitione de re habita, scitur quid est res et quomodo ab aliis separatur; per negationes autem habita propriia cognitione de re, scitur quod est ab aliis discreta, tamen quid sit remanet ignotum. Talis autem est propria cognitio quæ de Deo habetur per demonstrationes (l. I, c. xiv). Non est autem necista ad ultimam\n\nhominis felicitatem sufficiens. 1. Ea enim quæ sunt alicujus speciei perveniunt ad finem illius speciei ut in pluribus: ea vero quæ sunt natura sunt semper vel in pluribus, deficiunt autem in paucioribus propter aliquam corruptionem. Felicitas autem est finis humanæ speciei, quum omnes homines ipsam naturaliter desiderent. Felicitas igitur est quoddam commune bonum possibile provenire omnibus hominibus, nisi accidat aliquibus impedimentum quo sint orbati. Ad prædictam autem cognitionem de Deo habendam per viam demonstrationis pauci perveniunt, propter impedimenta hujus cognitionis, quæ tetigimus (l. I, c. iv). Non est igitur talis cognition essentialiter\n\nipsa humana felicitas. Adhuc, Esse in actu est finis exsistentis in potentia, ut ex præmissis (c. xx) patet. Felicitas igitur, quæ est ultimus finis, est actus cui non adjungitur potentia ad ulteriorem actum. Talis autem cognitio, per viam demonstrationis de Deo habita, remanet adhuc in potentia ad aliquid ulterius de Deo cognoscendum, vel eadem nobiliori modo; posteriores enim conati sunt aliquid ad divinam cognitionem pertinens adjungere his quæ a prioribus invenerunt tradita. Non est igitur talis cognition\n\nultima hominis felicitas. 3. Amplius, Felicitas omnem miseriam excludit; nemo enim simul miser et felix esse potest. Deceptio autem et error magna pars miseriæ est; hoc est enim quod omnes naturaliter fugiunt. Prædictæ autem cognitioni quæ de Deo habetur multiplex error adjungi potest; quod patet in multis qui aliqua vera de Deo per viam demonstrationis cognoverunt, qui, suas æstimationes sequentes, dum demonstratio eis deesset, in errores multiplices inciderunt. Si autem aliqui fuerunt qui sie de divinis veritatem invenerunt, demonstrationis via, quod eorum æstimationi nulla falsitas adjungeretur, patet eos fuisse paucissi- A, B, C, D, E, F: « Sunt a natura. » A: « Sunt ut semper vel ut. » A, B, C, D: « In principio libri. » A: « Quæ est ultimus actus cui non adjun- gitur potentia ad alteriorem actum, debet esse simpliciter et pure in actu. » A, B, C, D: « Humana. » A, E: « Humanam. » mos: quod non congruit felicitati, quæ est communis finis. Non igitur est in hac cognitione de Deo\n\nultima hominis felicitas. 4. Præterea, Felicitas in operatione perfecta consistit. Ad perfectionem autem cognitionis requiritur certitudo; unde scire aliquid non dicimur nisi cognoscamus quod impossibile est aliter se habere, ut patet in primo Posteriorum Analyticorum, c. 11. Cognitio autem prædicta multum incertitudinis habet; quod demonstrat diversitas scientiarum de divinis eorum qui hæc per viam demonstrationis invenire conati sunt. Non est igitur in tali\n\ncognitione ultima felicitas. 5. Item, Voluntas quum consecuta fuerit ultimum finem, quietatur ejus desiderium. Ultimus autem finis omnis cognitionis humanæ est felicitas. Illa igitur cognitio Dei essentialiter est ipsa felicitas, qua habita, non restabit alicujus scibilis desideranda cognitio. Talis autem non est cognitio quam philosophi per demonstrationes de Deo habere potuerunt, quia adhuc, illa cognitione habita, alia desideramus scire quæ per hanc cognitionem nondum sciuntur. Non est igitur in tali\n\ncognitione Dei felicitas. 6. Adhuc, Finis cujuslibet in potentia exsistentis est ut ducatur in actum; ad hoc enim tendit per motum quo movetur in finem. Tendit autem unumquodque ens in potentia ad hoc quod sit actu secundum quod est possibile. Aliquid enim est exsistens in potentia cujus tota potentia potest reduci in actum; unde hujs finis est ut totaliter in actum reducatur; sicut grave extramedium exsistens est in potentia ad proprium «ubi;» — aliquid vero cujus potentia tota non potest simul in actum reduci, sicut patet de materia prima; unde per suum motum appetit successive in actum diversarum formarum exire, quæ sibi propter earum diversitatem simul inesse non possunt. Intellectus autem videtur esse in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, ut dictum est (l. II, c. Lxxiii et seqq.); duo autem intelligibilia possunt simul in intellectu possibili exsistere secundum actum primum, qui est scientia, licet forte non secundum actum secundum, qui est consideratio; ex quo patet quod tota po-tentia intellectus possibilis potest reduci simul in actum. Hoc igitur requiritur ad ejus ultimum finem, qui est felicitas. Hoc autem non facit prædicta cognitio quæ de Deo per demonstrationem haberi potest, quia, ea habita, adhuc multa ignoramus. Non est igitur talis cognitio Dei sufficiens ad ultimam felicitatem.\n\nest per fidem. Est autem et alia Dei cognitio quantum ad aliquid superior cognitione prædicta, qua scilicet Deus ab omnibus per fidem cognoscitur; quæ quidem quantum ad hoc cognitionem quæ de Deo per demonstrationem habetur excedit, quia quædam de Deo per fidem cognoscimus, ad quæ, propter sui eminentiam, ratio demonstrans pervenire non potest, sicut in principio hujus operis dictum est (l. I, c. v). Non est autem possibile neque in hac Dei cognitione ultimam\n\nhominis felicitatem consistere. 1. Felicitas enim est perfecta humani intellectus operatio, sicut exdictis (c. xxxviii et xxxix) patet. In cognitione autem fidei inventur operatio intellectus imperfectissima quantum ad id quod est ex parte intellectus, quamvis maxima perfectio inventatur ex parte objecti; non enim intellectus capit illud cui assentit credendo. Non est igitur neque in hac Dei cognitione ultima hominis\n\nfelicitas. 2. Item, Ostensum est supra (c. xxvi) quod ultima felicitas non consistit principaliter in actu voluntatis. In cognitione autem fidei principalitatem habet voluntas; intellectus enim assentit per fidem his quæ sibi proponuntur, quia vult, non autem ex ipsa veritatis evidentia necessario tractus. Non est igitur in hac cognitione\n\nultima hominis felicitas. 3. Adhuc, Qui credit assensum præbet his quæ sibi ab alio proponuntur, quæ ipse non videt; unde fides magis habet cognitionem auditui similem quam visioni. Non autem crederet aliquis non visis, ab aliquo propositis, nisi æstimaret eum perfectiorem cognitionem habere de propositis quam ipse habeat qui non videt. Aut igitur æstimatio credentis est falsa, 1 A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J: «Aliter.» 2 A: «Christianis.» aut oportet quod proponens habeat perfectiorem cognitionem propositorum; quod et si ipse non (per se) solum cognoscit ea, sed quasi ab aliquo alio audiens, non potest hoc in infinitum procede re; esset enim vanus et absque certitudine fidei assensus; non enim inveniretur aliquod primum ex se certum, quod certitudinem fideicredentium afferret; non est enim possibile fidei cognitionem esse falsam neque vanam, ut ex dictis patet (l. I, c. vi); et tamen, si esset falsa et vana, in tali cognitione felicitas non posset consistere. Est igitur aliqua hominis cognitio de Deo altior cognitione fidei, sive ipse homo proponens fidem immediate videat veritatem, sicut Christo credimus; sive a vidente immediate accipiat, sicut credimus Apostolis et Prophetis. Quum igitur in summa Dei cognitione felicitas hominis consistat, impossibile est quod consistat\n\nin fidei cognitione. 4. Amplius, Per felicitatem, quum sit ultimus finis, naturale desiderium quietatur. Cognitio autem fidei non quietat desiderium, sed magis ipsum accendit, quia unusquisque desiderat videre quod credit. Non est igitur in cognitione fidei\n\nultima hominis felicitas. 5. Præterea, Cognitio de Deo dicta est finis, in quantum ultimo fini rerum, scilicet Deo, conjungit. Per cognitionem autem fidei non fit res credita intellectui præsens perfecte, quia fides de absentibus est, non de præsentibus; unde et Apostolus dicit quod, quandiu per fidem ambulamus, peregrinamur a Domino, II Cor. v, 6; fit tamen per fidem Deus præsens affectui, quum voluntarie credens Deo assentiat, secundum quod dicitur: Habitare Christum per fidem in cordibus nostris, Ephes. 111, 47. Non est igitur possibile quod in cognitione fidei ultima felicitas humana consistat.\n\nut voluit Avempeche. Habet autem et adhuc aliam cognitionem de Deo intellectualis substantia. Dic- 1 A, B, C, D: « Quia et si ipse non solum cognoscit ea, quasi ab alio audiens. » 2 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Utrum in hac vita, homo possit intelligere » omisso: « Ut voluit avem-tum est enim (l. II, c. xcvi-c) quod intellectualis substantia separata, cognoscendo essentiam suam, cognoscit et quod est supra se et quod est sub se, et secundum modum suæ substantiae; quod præcipue necesse est si illud quod est supra ipsam sit causa ejus, quum oporteat in effectibus similitudinem inveniri causæ. Unde, quum Deus sit causa omnium substantiarum intellectualium creaturarum, ut ex superioribus (l. II, c. xv) patet, necesse est quod intellectuales substantiae separatæ, cognoscendo suam essentiam, cognoscant per modum visionis cujusdam ipsum Deum. Res enim illa per intellectum, visionis modo, cognoscitur cujus similitudo in intellectu exsistit, sicut et similitudo rei corporaliter visæ est in sensu videntis. Quicumque ergo intellectus apprehendit substantiam separatam, cognoscendo de ea quid est, videt Deum altiori modo quam\n\naliqua prædictarum 3 cognoscatur. Quia ergo quidam posuerunt ultimam felicitatem hominis esse in hac vita, per hoc quod cognoscit substantias separatas, considerandum est utrum homo in hac vita possit substantias separatas cognoscere. Hoc autem quæstionem habet. Intellectus enim noster, secundum statum præsentem, nihil intelligit sine phantasmate, quod ita se habet ad intellectum possibile, quo intelligimus, sicut se habent colores ad visum, ut patet ex his quæ in secundo libro (c. lviii-lv) tractata sunt: Si igitur, per cognitionem intellectivam quæ est ex phantasmatibus, possit pervenire aliquis nostrum ad intelligendas substantias separatas, possibile erit quod aliquis in hac vita intelligat ipsas substantias separatas, participabit modum illius cognitionis quo substantia separata, intelligens se, intelligit Deum. Si autem, per cognitionem quæ est ex phantasmatibus, nullo modo possit pervenire ad intelligendas substantias separatas, non erit possibile quod homo, in statu hujus vitæ, prædictum modum\n\ndivinæ cognitionis assequatur. Quod autem, ex cognitione quæ est per phantasmata, ad intelligendum sub- pace. » 3 A ex alia manu alioque atramento: « Viarum. » 4 A omittit: « Et per consequens videndo ipsas substantias separatas. » stantias separatas pervenire possimus aliqui diversimode posuerunt. Avempeche namque posuit quod, per studium speculativarum scientiarum, possumus ex his intellectis quæ per phantasmata cognoscimus pervenire ad intelligendas substantias separatas. Possumus enim actione intellectus extrahere quidditatem rei cujuslibet habentis quidditatem quæ non est sua quidditas; est enim intellectus natus cognoscere quamlibet quidditatem, in quantum est quidditas, quum intellectus proprium objectum sit « quod quid est. » Si autem illud quod primo per intellectum possibile intelligitur est aliquid habens quidditatem, possumus per intellectum possibile abstrahere quidditatem illius primo intellecti; et si illa quidditas habeat quidditatem, possibile erit iterum abstrahere quidditatem illius quidditatis; et, quum non sit procedere in infinitum, oportet quod stetur alicubi. Potest igitur intellectus noster pervenire, via resolutionis, ad cognoscendam quidditatem substantiae separatæ non habentem aliam quidditatem. Talis autem est quidditas substantiae separatæ. Potest igitur intellectus noster, per cognitionem quæ ex phantasmatibus accipitur, pervenire ad\n\nintelligendas substantias separatas. Procedit autem ad ostendendum idem per aliam similem viam. Ponit enim quod intellectum unius rei, utputa equi, apud me et apud te multiplicatur solum per multiplicationem specierum spiritualium, quæ sunt diversæ in me et in te. Oportet igitur quod intellectum quod non sustentatur in aliqua hujusmodi specie sit idem apud te et apud me. Sed quidditas intellecti, quam intellectus noster natus est abstrahere, ut probatum est, non habet aliquam speciem spiritualem et individualem, quum quidditas intellecti non sit quidditas individui neque spiritualis neque corporalis, quum intellectum, in quantum est hujusmodi, sit universale. Intellectus igitur noster natus est intelligere quidditatem cujus intellectus est unus apud omnes. Talis autem est quidditas substantiae separatæ. Est igitur intellectus noster natus\n\ncognoscere substantiam separatam. Si autem diligenter consideretur, viæ istæ frivolæ invenientur. 4. Quum enim intellectum, in quantum hujusmodi, sit universale, oportet quod quidditas intellecti sit quidditas alicujus universalis, scilicet generis vel speciei. Quidditas autem generis vel speciei horum sensibilium, cujus cognitionem intellectivam per phantasmata accipimus, comprehendit in se materiam et formam. Est igitur omnino dissimilis quidditati substantiae separatæ, quæ est simplex et immaterialis. Non est igitur possibile quod, per hoc quod intelligitur quidditas rei sensibilis per phantasmata, intelligatur\n\nquidditas substantiae separatæ. 2. Præterea, Non est ejusdem rationis forma quæ secundum se non potest separari ab aliquo subjecto cum illa quæ separatur secundum esse a tali subjecto, licet utraque secundum considerationem accipiatur absque tali subjecto; non enim est eadem ratio magnitudinis et substantiae separatæ, nisi ponamus magnitudines separatas medias inter species et sensibilia, sicut aliqui Platonici posuerunt. Quidditas autem generis vel speciei reum sensibilium non potest separari secundum esse ab hac individuali materia, nisi forte, secundum Platonicos, ponamus rerum species separatas; quod est ab Aristotele, Metaphys. I, c. vi, improbatum. Est igitur omnino dissimilis quidditas prædicta a substantiis separatis, quæ nullo modo sunt in materia. Non igitur, per hoc quod hæ quidditates intelliguntur, substantiae\n\nseparatæ intelligi possunt. 3. Adhuc, Si quidditas substantiae separatæ detur esse ejusdem rationis cum quidditate generis vel speciei istorum sensibilium, non poterit dici quod sit ejusdem rationis secundum speciem; nisi dicamus quod species horum sensibilium sint ipsæ substantiae separatæ, sicut Platonici posuerunt. Remanet igitur quod non erunt ejusdem rationis, nisi quantum ad rationem quidditatis, in quantum est quidditas. Hæc est ratio communis generis scilicet et speciei et substantiae. Non igitur per has quidditates de substantiis separatis aliquid intelligi poterit, nisi remotum genus ipsarum. Co- A: « Communis generis et speciei. Non igitur. » — B: « Communis generis, scilicet substantiae. Non. » — C, D, E, F: « Generis scilicet et substantiae. » gnito autem genere, non propter hoc cognoscitur species, nisi in potentia. Non poterit igitur intelligi substantia separata per\n\nintellectum harum quidditatum. 4. Amplius, Major est distantia substantiæ separatæ sensibilibus quam unius sensibilis ab alio. Sed intelligere quidditatem unius sensibilis non sufficit ad intelligendam quidditatem alterius sensibilis; cæcus enim natus, per hoc quod intelligit quidditatem soni, nullo modo potest pervenire ad intelligendam quidditatem coloris. Multo igitur minus, per hoc quod intelligat quis quidditatem sensibilis substantiæ, poterit intelligere\n\nquidditatem substantiæ separatæ. 5. Item, Si etiam ponamus quod substantiæ separatæ orbes moveant ex quorum motibus causantur formæ sensibilium, hic modus cognitionis substantiæ separatæ ex sensibilibus non sufficit ad sciendam quidditatem ipsarum. Nam per effectum scitur causa, vel ratione similitudinis quæ est inter effectum et causam, vel in quantum effectus demonstrat virtutem causa. Ratione autem similitudinis ex effectu non poterit sciri de causa quid est, nisi sit agens unius speciei; sic autem non se habent substantiæ separatæ ad sensibilia. Ratione autem virtutis hoc etiam non potest esse, nisi quando effectus adæquat virtutem causa (tunc enim per effectum tota virtus causæ cognoscitur, virtus autem rei demonstrat substantiam ipsius); hoc autem in proposito dici non potest; nam virtutes substantiarum separatarum excedunt effectus sensibiles omnes quos intellectu comprehendimus, sicut virtus universalis effectum particularem. Non est igitur possibile quod, per sensibilium intellectum, devenire possimus ad\n\nintelligendum substantias separatas. 6. Adhuc, Omnia intelligibilia in quorum cognitionem devenimus per inquisitionem et studium ad aliquam scientiarum speculativarum pertinent. Si igitur, per hoc quod intelligimus naturas et quidditates istorum sensibilium, pervenimus ad intelligendas substantias separatas, oportet quod intelligere substantias separatas contingat per aliquam scientiarum speculativarum. Hoc autem non videmus; non est enim aliqua speculativa scientia quæ doceat de aliqua substantia-rum separatarum quid est, sed solum quia est. Non est igitur possibile quod, per hoc quod intelligimus naturas sensibilium, perveniamus ad\n\nintelligendas substantias separatas. Si autem dicatur quod est possibile esse aliquam talem scientiam speculativam, quamvis adhuc non sit inventa, hoc nihil est; quia non est possibile, per aliqua principia nobis nota, ad intelligendas substantias prædictas devenire. Omnia enim propria principia cujuscumque scientiæ dependent ex principiis primis indemonstrabilibus per se notis, quorum cognitionem a sensibilibus accipimus, ut patet in fine Posteriorum analyticorum, II, c. xviii. Sensibilia autem non sufficienter ducunt in cognitionem rerum immaterialium, ut per superiores rationes est probatum. Non est ergo possibile aliquam scientiam esse per quam ad intelligendas substantias separatas perveniri possit.\n\nQuod non possumus in hac vita cognoscere substantias separatas, ut posuit Alexander. Quia vero Alexander posuit, Paraphr., De anima,l. I, cap. De intellectu agente: quod intellectus possibilis est generabilis et corruptibilis, utpote quædam præparatio humanæ naturæ, consequens commixtionem elementorum, ut habitum est (l. II, c. lxii) (non est autem possibile ut talis virtus supra materialia elevetur), posuit quod intellectus possibilis noster nunquam possit pervenire ad intelligendas substantias separatas. Posuit tamen quod nos, secundum statum præsentis vitæ, possumus substantias separatas intelligere; quod quidem ostendere nitebatur hoc modo: Unumquodque quando pervenerit ad complementum in sua generatione et ad ultimam perfectionem suæ substantiae, complebitur operatio propria sua, sive actio sive passio; sicut enim operatio substantiam sequitur, ita operationis perfectio perfectionem substantiae; unde animal, quum fuerit ex toto perfectum, poterit per se ambulare. Intellectus autem habitualis, qui nihil est aliud quam species intelligibiles factæ per intellectum agentem existentes in intellectu possibili, operatio est duplex: Una ut faciat intellecta in potentia esse intellecta actu, quam habet ex parte intellectus agentis; secunda est intelligere intellecta in actu; hæc enim duo homo potest facere per habitum intellectualem. Quando igitur complebitur generatio intellectus in habitu, complebitur in ipso utraque præmissarum operationum. Semper autem accedit ad complementum suæ generationis, dum novas species intellectas acquirit; et sic necesse est quod quandoque generatio compleatur, nisi sit impedimentum, quia nulla generatio est ad infinitum tendens. Complebitur igitur quandoque utraque operationum intellectus in habitu, per hoc quod omnia intellecta in potentia faciet in actu (quod est complementum primæ operationis), et per hoc quod intelliget omnia intelligibilia separata et non separata. Quum autem intellectus possibilis non possit intelligere substantias separatas jam, secundum ejus opinionem, ut dictum est, intendit quod intelligemus per intellectum in habitu substantias separatas, in quantum intellectus agens, qui ab ipso ponitur substantia separata, fiet forma intellectus in habitu et in nobis ipsis; ita quod per eum intelligemus, sicut nunc intelligimus per intellectum possibilem. Et quum de virtute intellectus agentis sit facere omnia intellecta in actu quæ sunt intelligibilia in potentia et etiam intelligere substantias separatas, in statu illo intelligemus omnes substantias separatas et omnia intelligibilia non separata. Et, secundum hoc, per hanc cognitionem quæ est ex phantasmatibus, pervenimus in cognitionem substantia separata; non quod ipsa phantasmata intellecta, per ea, sint medium aliquod ad cognoscendas substantias separatas, prout accidit in scientiis speculativis, sicut posuit opinio superior (c. xLI), sed in quantum species intelligibles sunt quædam dispositiones in nobis ad talem formam quæ est intellectus agens. Et hoc est primum in quo differunt hæ duæ opiniones. Unde, quando intellectus in habitu fuerit perfectus per hujusmodi species intelligibles in nobis factas ab intellectu agente, fiet ipse intellectus agens nobis forma, ut dictum est; et nominat ipsum intellectum adeptum, de quo dicunt Aristotelem dicere, De generat. animal. II, c. III, quod sit ab extrinseco. Et sic, licet in scientiis speculativis non sit perfectio ultima humana, sicut superior ponebat opinio, per eas tamen homo disponitur ad ultimam perfectionem consequendam. Et hoc est secundum in quo differt secunda opinio a prima. Tertio autem differt per hoc quod, secundum primam opinionem, intelligere intellectum agentem est causa quod continuetur nobiscum; secundum vero hanc secundam opinionem, est e converso; nam, propter hoc quod nobiscum continuatur ut forma, intelligimus ipsum et alias substantias separatas. Hæc autem irrationabiliter dicuntur. 1. Intellectus enim in habitu, sicut intellectus possibilis, ponitur ab Alexandro esse generabilis et corruptibilis. Æternum autem non potest fieri forma generabilis et corruptibilis, secundum eum; propter hoc enim ponit intellectum possibilem, qui unitur nobis ut forma, esse generabilem et corruptibilem; intellectum vero agentem, qui est incorruptibilis, esse substantiam separatam. Quum igitur intellectus agens, secundum Alexandrum, ponatur esse quædam substantia separata æterna, impossibile erit quod intellectus agens fiat forma intellectus in habitu. 2. Præterea, Forma intellectus, in quantum est intellectus, est intelligibile, sicut forma sensus est sensibile; non enim recipit intellectus aliquid, per se loquendo, nisi intelligibiliter, sicut nec sensus nisi sensibiliter. Si igitur non potest intellectus agens esse intelligibile per intellectum in habitu, impossibile erit quod sit forma ejus. 3. Item, Intelligere aliquo tripliciter dicimur: — Uno modo, sicut intelligimus intellectu, qui est virtus a qua egreditur talis operatio; unde et ipse intellectus intelligere dicitur, et ipsum intelligere intellectus fit intelligere nostrum; — alio modo, sicut specie intelligibili, qua quidem dicimur intelligere, non quasi ipsa intelligat, sed quia vis intellectiva perficitur per eam in actu, sicut vis visiva per speciem coloris; — tertio modo, sicut medio, per cujus cognitionem deveni- Omissis mus in cognitionem alterius. Si igitur homo quando per intellectum agentem intelligat substantias separatas, oportet aliquo modorum dictorum hoc dici. Non autem dicitur hoc modo tertio, quia non concedit Alexander quod intelligat intellectum agentem vel intellectus possibilis, vel intellectus in habitu. Nec etiam secundo modo, quia intelligere per speciem intelligibilem attribuitur virtuti intellectivæ, cujus illa species intelligibilis est forma; nec autem concedit Alexander quod intellectus possibilis vel intellectus in habitu intelligat substantias separatas; unde non potest esse quod sic intelligamus substantias separatas per intellectum agentem sicut intelligimus aliqua per speciem intelligibilem. Si autem sicut per virtutem intellectivam, oportet quod ipsum intelligere intellectus agentis sit intelligere hominis. Hoc autem esse non potest, nisi ex substantia intellectus agentis et substantia hominis fiat unum secundum esse; impossibile est enim, si sint duæ substantia secundum esse diversæ, quod operatio unius sit operatio alterius. Eritigitur intellectus agens unum secundum esse cum homine; non autem secundum esse accidentale, quia jam non esset intellectus agens substantia, sed accidens; sic enim ex colore et corpore fit unum secundum esse accidentale. Relinquitur igitur quod intellectus agens sit cum homine unum secundum esse substantiale. Eritigitur vel anima humana vel pars ejus, et non aliqua substantia separata, sicut Alexander ponit. Non igitur, secundum opinionem Alexandri, potest poni quod homo intelligat substantias separatas. 4. Amplius, Si intellectus agens quandoque fiet forma istius hominis, ita quod per ipsum intelligere possit, eadem ratione poterit fieri forma alterius hominis per ipsum similiter intelligentis. Sequitur ergo quod duo homines simul per intellectum agentem intelligent sicut per formam suam. Hoc autem est ita quod ipsum intelligere intellectus agentis sit intelligere intelligentis per ipsum, ut jam dictum est. Erit ergo idem intelligere duorum intelligentium; quod est impossibile. Ratio etiam ejus frivola est omnino. Primo quidem, quia, quando perficitur 1 2 intellectum possibilem in habitu totaliter corruptibilem, Averrhoes, De anima, l. III, faciliorem viam se existimavit adinvenisse ad ostendendum quod quando intelligamus substantias separatas, ex hoc quod ponit intellectum possibilem incorruptibilem et a nobis secundum esse separatum, sicut et intellectum agentem. Ostendit enim primo quod necesse est ponere quod intellectus agens se habeat ad principia naturaliter cognita a nobis, vel sicut agens ad instrumentum vel sicut forma ad materiam. Intellectus enim in habitu, quo intelligimus, non solum habet hanc actionem quæ est intelligere, sed etiam hanc quæ est facere intellecta in actu; utrumque enim experimur in nostra potestate exsistere. Hoc autem quod est facere intellecta in actu magis proprie notificat intellectum in habitu quam intelligere, quia prius est facere intellecta in actu quam intelligere; sunt enim quædam in nobis facta intellecta in actu naturaliter, non ex studio aut ex nostra voluntate, sicut prima intelligibilia. Hæc autem facere intellecta actu non contingit per intellectum in habitu, per quem fiunt intellecta in actu ea quæ scimus ex studio, sed magis sunt initium intellectus in habitu; unde et habitus horum intelligibilium ab Aristotele, Ethic. VI, c. vii, intellectus dicitur; fiunt autem intellecta in actu per solum intellectum agentem, per hoc autem fiunt intellecta in actu alia quæ ex studio scimus. Facere igitur hæc consequentia intellecta in actu est actio et intellectus in habitu, quantum ad prima principia, et ipsius intellectus agentis. Una autem actio non est duorum, nisi unum eorum comparetur ad alterum sicut agens ad instrumentum, vel sicut forma ad materiam. Oportet igitur quod intellectus agens comparetur ad prima principia intellectus in habitu, vel sicut agens ad instrumentum, vel sicut forma ad materiam. Quod quidem qualiter possit esse sic ostendit. Intellectus possibilis, quum sit, secundum ejus positionem, quædam substantia separata, intelligit intellectum agentem et alias substantias separatas et etiam primo intellecta speculativa; est igitur subjectum utrorumque. Quæcumque autem conveniunt in uno subjecto, alterum eorum est sicut forma alterius; sicut, quum color et lux sint in diaphano sicut in subjecto, oportet quod alterum, scilicet lux, sit quasi forma alterius, scilicet coloris. Hoc autem necesse est quando habent ordinem ad invicem, non in his quæ per accidens conjunguntur in eodem subjecto, sicut albedo et musica. Sunt autem intellecta speculativa et intellectus agens ordinem ad invicem habentia, quum intellecta speculativa sint facta intellecta in actu per intellectum agentem. Habet se igitur intellectus agens ad intellecta speculativa quasi forma ad materiam. Oportet igitur quod, quum intellecta speculativa sint nobis copulata per phantasmata, quæ sunt quasi quoddam subjectum ipsorum, etiam intellectus agens continuetur nobiscum, in quantum est forma intellectorum speculativorum. Quando igitur intellecta speculativa sunt in nobis solum in potentia, intellectus agens continuatur nobiscum solum in potentia; quando autem aliqua intellecta speculativa insunt nobis in actu et aliqua in potentia, continuatur nobis partim in actu et partim in potentia; et tunc dicimur moveri ad continuationem prædictam, quia, quanto plura intellecta in actu fuerint in nobis facta, perfectius intellectus agens continuatur in nobis.\n\nprædictæ opiniones finunt. Non est autem possibile felicitatem humanam in tali cognitione substantiarum separatarum ponere, sicut\n\nprædicti philosophi posuerunt. 1. Vanum enim est quod est ad finem quem non potest consequi. Quum igitur finis hominis sit felicitas, in quam tendit naturale ipsius desiderium, non potest poni felicitas hominis in eo ad quod homo pervenire non potest; alioquin, sequeretur quod homo esset in vanum, et naturale ejus desiderium esset inane; quod est impossibile. Quod autem intelligere substantias separatas homini sit impossibile secundum prædictas positiones, ex dictis est manifestum. Non est igitur in tali cognitione substantiarum separatarum\n\nfelicitas hominis constituta. 2. Præterea, Ad hoc quod intellectus agens uniatur nobis ut forma, ita quod per ipsum intelligamus substantias separatas, requiritur quod generatio intellectus in habitu sit completa, secundum Alexandrum, De anima paraphr. l. III, vel quod omnia intellecta speculativa sint facta in nobis in actu, secundum Averhoem; quæ duo in idem redeunt; nam secundum hoc intellectus in habitu generatur in nobis secundum quod intellecta speculativa fiunt in nobis in actu. Omnes autem species rerum sensibilium sunt intellectæ in potentia. Ad hoc igitur quod intellectus agens copuletur alicui, oportet quod intelligat in actu per intellectum speculativum omnes naturas rerum sensibilium et omnes virtutes et operationes et motus earum. Quod non est possibile aliquem hominem scire per principia scientiarum speculativarum, per quas movemur ad continuationem intellectus agentis, ut ipsi dicunt; quum ex his quæ nostris sensibus subsunt, ex quibus sumuntur principia scientiarum speculativarum, non possit perveniri ad omnia prædicta cognoscenda. Est igitur impossibile quod ' aliquis homo ad illam continuationem perveniat per modum ab eis assignatum. Non est igitur possibile quod in tali continuatione\n\nsit hominis felicitas. 3. Adhuc, Dato quod talis continuatio hominis ad intellectum agentem sit possibilis qualem ipsi describunt, planum est quod talis perfectio paucissimis hominum advenit, in tantum quod nec ipsi nec aliqui, quantumcumque in scientis speculativis studiosi et periti, ausi sunt talem perfectionem de se profiteri; quinimo omnes plurima a se asserunt ignorata, sicut Aristoteles quadraturam circuli et rationes ordinis corporum cælestium, in quibus, ut ipsemet dicit, De cælo, II, nonnisi topicas rationes reddere potest; et quid sit in eis necessarium et eorum motoribus, aliis reservat, Metaphys. XII, c. viii. Felicitas autem est quoddam commune bonum, ad quod plures pervenire possunt, nisi sint orbati, ut Aristoteles dicit, Ethic. I, c. x; et hoc etiam verum est de omni fine naturali alicujus speciei, quia ipsum consequentur ea quæ sunt illius speciei ut in pluribus. Non est ergo possibile quod ultima hominis felicitasin\n\ncontinuatione prædicta consistat. Patet autem quod nec Aristoteles, cujus sententiam sequi conantur prædicti philosophi, in tali continuatione hominis ultimam felicitatem opinatus est esse. Probat enim, Ethic. I, c. viii, quod felicitas hominis est operatio ipsius secundum virtutem perfectam; unde necesse fuit quod de virtutibus determinaret, quas divisit in virtutes morales et intellectuales. Ostendit autem, Ethic. X, c. viii, quod ultima felicitas hominis est in speculatione; unde patet quod non est in actu alicujus virtutis moralis, nec prudentiae nec artis, quae tamen sunt intellectuales. Relinquitur igitur quod sit operatio secundum sapientiam, quae est præcipua inter tres residuas intellectuales, quae sunt sapientia, scientia, et intellectus, ut ostendit, Ethic. VI, c. vi; unde 1 A: « Impossibile quod in tali continuatione perveniat. » et sapientem judicat esse felicem, Ethic. X, c. viii. Sapientia autem, secundum ipsum, est una de scientiis speculativis, caput aliarum, ut dicitur in sexto Ethicorum, c. viii, et in principio Metaphysicæ, scientiam, quam in illo libro tradere intendit, sapientiam nominat. Patet ergo quod opinio Aristotelis fuit quod ultima felicitas quam homo in hac vita acquirere potest sit cognitio de rebus divinis, qualis per scientias speculativas haberi potest. Ille autem posterior modus cognoscendi res divinas, non per viam scientiarum speculativarum, sed quodam generationis ordine naturali, est confictus ab expositoribus quisbusdam.\n\nQuod non possumus in hac vita intelligere substantias separatas. (I, q. lxxxviii, a. i.) Quiaigitur, secundum modos prædictos, substantiae separatæ non possunt cognosci a nobis in vita ista, inquirendum restat utrum aliquo modo in vita ista substantias ipsas separatas intelligere possimus. Quod autem hoc sit possibile, nititur ostendere Themistius (l. III. c. L) per locum a minori. Substantiæ enim separatæ sunt magis intelligibiles quam materialia; hæc enim sunt intelligibilia in quantum sunt facta intellecta in actu per intellectum agentem; illa vero sunt secundum seipsa intelligibilia. Si ergo intellectus noter comprehendit hæc materialia, multo magis natus est intelligere illas substantias separatas. Hæc autem ratio, secundum diversas opiniones de intellectu possibili, diversimode judicanda est. Si enim intellectus possibilis non sit virtus a materia dependens et sit iterum secundum esse a corpore separatus, ut Averrhoes ponit, sequetur quod nullum necessarium ordinem ad res materiales habeat; unde quæ sunt magis intelligibilia in seipsis erunt ei magis intelligibilia. Sed tunc sequi videtur quod, quum nos a principio per intellectum possibilem intelligamus, a principio intelligamus subs-tantias separatas; quod patet esse falsum. Sed hoc inconveniens evitare Averrhoes nititur secundum ea quæ de ejus opinione dicta sunt (c. xliii), quæ patet esse falsa ex præmissis. Si autem intellectus possibilis non est a corpore separatus secundum esse, ex hoc ipso quod est tali corpori unitus secundum esse, habet quemdam necessarium ordinem ad materialia, ut nonnisi per ista ad aliorum cognitionem pervenire possit; unde non sequitur, si substantiæ separatæ in seipsis sint magis intelligibiles quod propter hoc sint magis intelligibiles intellectui nostro 4. Et hoc demonstrant verba Aristotelis; dicit enim Metaphys. II, c. i, quod « difficultas intelli-gere substantias separatas. (I, q. lxxxviii, a. i.) Quiaigitur, secundum modos prædictos, substantiae separatæ non possunt cognosci a nobis in vita ista, inquirendum restat utrum aliquo modo in vita ista substantias ipsas separatas intelligere possimus. Quod autem hoc sit possibile, nititur ostendere Themistius (l. III. c. L) per locum a minori. Substantiæ enim separatæ sunt magis intelligibiles quam materialia; hæc enim sunt intelligibilia in quantum sunt facta intellecta in actu per intellectum agentem; illa vero sunt secundum seipsa intelligibilia. Si ergo intellectus noter comprehendit hæc materialia, multo magis natus est intelligere illas substantias separatas. Hæc autem ratio, secundum diversas opiniones de intellectu possibili, diversimode judicanda est. Si enim intellectus possibilis non sit virtus a materia dependens et sit iterum secundum esse a corpore separatus, ut Averrhoes ponit, sequetur quod nullum necessarium ordinem ad res materiales habeat; unde quæ sunt magis intelligibilia in seipsis erunt ei magis intelligibilia. Sed tunc sequi videtur quod, quum nos a principio per intellectum possibilem intelligamus, a principio intelligamus subs-tantias separatas; quod patet esse falsum. Sed hoc inconveniens evitare Averrhoes nititur secundum ea quæ de ejus opinione dicta sunt (c. xliii), quæ patet esse falsa ex præmissis. Si autem intellectus possibilis non est a corpore separatus secundum esse, ex hoc ipso quod est tali corpori unitus secundum esse, habet quemdam necessarium ordinem ad materialia, ut nonnisi per ista ad aliorum cognitionem pervenire possit; unde non sequitur, si substantiæ separatæ in seipsis sint magis intelligibiles quod propter hoc sint magis intelligibiles intellectui nostro 4. Et hoc demonstrant verba Aristotelis; dicit enim Metaphys. II, c. i, quod « difficultas intelli-gere substantias separatas. (I, q. lxxxviii, a. i.) Quiaigitur, secundum modos prædictos, substantiae separatæ non possunt intelligi substantiæ separatæ, ur supra (c. xliv) ostensum est, sequitur quod intellectus possibilis noter nullo modo possit intelligere substantias separatas. Hoc etiam apparet ex ordine intellectus possibilis ad agentem. Potentia enim passiva ad illa solum est in potentia in quæ potest proprium ejus activum; omni enim potentiæ passivæ respondet potentia activa in natura; alias, potentia passiva esset frustra, quum non possit reduci in actum nisi per activam; unde videmus quod visus non est susceptivus nisi colorum qui illuminantur per lucem. Intellectus autem possibilis, quum sit virtus quodammodo passiva, habet proprium agens sibi respondens, scilicet intellectum agentem, qui ita se habet ad intellectum possiblem sicut se habet lux ad visum. Non est igitur intellectus possibilis in potentia nisi ad illa intelligibilia quæ sunt facta per intellectum agentem. Unde et Aristoteles, describens utrumque intellectum, dicit quod « intellectus possi-bilis est quo est omnia fieri, agens vero « quo est omnia facere de Anima, III, « c. v, » ut ad eadem utriusque potentia referri intelligatur, hujus activa, illius passiva. Quum ergo substantiae separatæ non sint factæ intellectæ in actu per in- 1, et cod. Berg.: Edit. addunt: « Aliquo modo. » 3 4, et cod. Berg. — tellectum agentem, sed solum materialia, ad hæc sola se extendit possibilis intellectus. Non igitur per ipsum possumus intelligere substantias separatas. Propter quod Aristoteles congruo exemplo usus est, Metaphys. II, c. 1; nam oculus vespertilionis nunquam potest videre lucem solis; quamvis Averrhoes hoc exemplum depravare nitatur, dicens quod simile non est de intellectu nostro ad substantias separatas et oculo vespertilionis ad lucem solis quantum ad impossibilitatem, sed solum quantum ad difficultatem; quod tali ratione probat ibidem: Quia, si illa quæ sunt intellecta secundum se, scilicet substantiae separatae essent nobis impossibles ad intelligendum, frustra essent; sicut si esset aliquod visibile quod a nullo visu videri possit. -- Quæ quidem ratio quam frivola sit apparet. Etsi enim a nobis nunquam illæ substantiae intelligentur, tamen intelligentur a seipsis; unde nec frustra intelligibiles essent, sicut nec sol frustra visibilis est, ut Aristotelis exemplum prosequamur, quia non potest ipsum videre vespertilio, quum possit ipsum videre homo et alia animalia. Sic ergo intellectus possibilis, si ponitur corpori unitus secundum esse, non potest intelligere substantias separatas. Interest tamen qualiter de substantia ipsius sentiatur. Si enim ponatur esse quædam virtus materialis generabilis et corruptibilis, ut quidam posuerunt, sequitur quod ex sua substantia determina-tur ad intelligendum materialia: unde necesse est quod nullo modo possit intelligere substantias separatas, quia impossibile erit ipsum esse separatum. Si autem intellectus possibilis, quamvis sit corpori unitus, est tamen incorruptibilis et a materia non dependens secundum suum esse, sicut supra (l. II, c. LIX et LX) ostendimus, sequitur quod obligatio ad intelligendas res materiales accidat ei ex unione ad corpus; unde, quum anima a corpore tali fuerit separata, intellectus possibilis intelligere poterit ea quæ secundum se sunt intelligibilia, scilicet substantias separatas, per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est similitudo in anima intellectualis luminis quod est in substantiis separatis. Et hæc est sententia nostræ fidei de intelligendo substantias separatas a nobia post mortem, et non in hac vita.\n\nseipsam per seipsam. Videtur autem difficultas quædam contra prædicta afferri ex quibusdam Augustini verbis, quæ diligenter pertractanda sunt. Dicit enim quod « mens, sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum rerum per semetipsam. Ergo et seipsam per seipsam novit, quoniam ipsa est incorporea, De Trinit. l. IX, c. III . » Ex his enim verbis videtur quod mens nostra se per seipsam intelligat, et, intelligendo se, intelligat substantias separatas; quod est contra prædicta. Inquirere ergo oportet quomodo anima nostra per\n\nseipsam intelligat se. Impossibile est autem dici quod per seipsam intelligat de se quid est. 1. Per hoc enim fit potentia cognoscitiva actu cognoscens, quod est in ea id quo cognoscitur. Et, si quidem sit in ea in potentia, cognoscit in potentia; si autem in actu, cognoscit in actu; si autem medio modo, cognoscit in habitu. Ipsa autem anima semper adest sibi actu et nunquam in potentia vel in habitu tantum . Si igitur per seipsam anima seipsam cognoscit quid est, semper actu intelliget de se quid est; quod\n\npatet esse falsum. 2. Adhuc, Si anima per seipsam cognoscit de se quid est, omnis autem homo animam habet, omnis igitur homo cognoscit de anima quid est; quod patet\n\nesse falsum. 3. Amplius, Cognitio quæ fit per ali- quid naturaliter nobis inditum, est naturalis, sicut principia indemonstrabia, quæ cognoscuntur per lumen intellectus agentis. Si igitur nos de anima scimus A: « Ejus. » A: « Et non in nostra vita. » — B, sed ex alia manu: « Et non in hac vita. » A: « Quomodo anima humana seipsam intelligit. » B, ex alia manu: « Non est hic aliquod capitulum. » Cod. Bergom. omittit: « Per seipsam. » « Sic incorporearum per semetipsam. Ergo et semetipsam per seipsam novit, quoniam ipsa est incorporea. » — (Ed. L. Vivès, tom. XXVII, p. 365.) A, B, C, D, E, F: « In eo. » A, B, E, F: « Illud quod cognoscitur. » A omiitit: « Tantum. » quid est per ipsam animam, hoc erit naturaliter notum. In his autem quæ naturaliter nota sunt, nullus potest errare; in cognitione enim principiorum indemonstrabilium nullus errat. Nullus igitur erraret circa animam quid est, si hoc anima per seipsam cognosceret; quod patet esse falsum, quum multi opinati sint animam esse hoc vel illud corpus, et aliqui numerum vel harmoniam. Non igitur anima per seipsam cognoscit de\n\nse quid est. 4. Amplius, In quolibet ordine, quod est per se est prius eo quod est per aliud et principium ejus. Quod ergo est per se notum est prius notum omnibus quæ per aliud cognoscuntur, et principium cognoscendi ea, sicut primæ proposiones conclusionibus. Si igitur anima per seipsam de se cognoscit quid est, hoc erit per se notum, et per consequens primo notum et principium cognoscendi alia. Hoc autem patet esse falsum; nam quid est anima non supponitur in scientia quasi notum, sed proponitur ex aliis inquirendum. Non igitur anima de seipsa cognoscit quid\n\nest, per seipsam. Patet autem quod nec ipse Augustinus hoc voluit; dicit enim quod anima, quum sui notitiam quærit, « non velut absentem se quærit cernere, sed præsentem » se curat discernere; non ut cognoscat » se quasi non norit, sed ut dignoscat » ab eo quod alterum novit 1, DeTrinitate, » X, c. ix. » Ex quo dat intelligere quod anima per se cognoscit seipsam quasi præsentem, non 2 quasi ab aliis distinctam; unde et in hoc dicit alios errare quod animam non distinxerunt ab illis quæ sunt ab ipsa diversa. Per hoc autem quod scitur de re quid est, scitur res prout est ab aliis distincta; unde et diffinitio, quæ signat quid est res, distinguit diffinitum ab omnibus aliis. Non igitur voluit Augustinus quod anima de se cognoscat quid\n\nest per seipsam. Nec Aristoteles hoc voluit; dicit enim, De anima, III, c. iv, quod intellectus possibilis intelligit se sicut alia; intelligit enim se per speciem intelligibilem, qua fit actu in genere intelligibilium; in se enim consideratus, est solum in potentia ad esse intelligibile. Nihil autem cognoscitur secundum quod est in potentia, sed secundum quod est in actu; unde 1 « Non itaque velut absentem se quærat cernere, sed præsentem se curet discernere. Nec se quasi non novit cognoscat, sed ab eo quod alte-substantiæ separatæ, quarum substantiæ sunt ut aliquid actu ens in genere intelligibilium, de se intelligunt quid sunt persuas substantias; intellectus vero possibilis noter per speciem intelligibilem, per quam fit actu intelligens. Unde et Aristoteles, De anima, III, c. iv, ex ipso intelligere demonstrat naturam intellectus possibilis, scilicet quod sit immixtus et incorruptibilis, ut ex præmissis (l. II,\n\nc. lxii) patet. Sic igitur, secundum intentionem Augustini, mens nostra per seipsam novit seipsam, in quantum de se cognoscit quod est; ex hoc enim ipso quod percipit se agere, percipit se esse; agit autem per seipsam; unde per seipsam de se\n\ncognoscit quod est. Sic ergo et de substantiis separatis anima, cognoscendo seipsam, cognoscit quia sunt, non autem quid sunt, quod est earum substantias intelligere. Quum enim de substantiis separatis hoc quod sint intellectuales quædam substantiæ cognoscamus, vel per demonstrationem vel per fidem, neutro modo hanc cognitionem accipere possemus, nisi hoc ipsum quod est intellectuale anima nostra ex seipsa cognoscet; unde et scientia de intellectu animæ oportet uti ut principio ad omnia quæ de\n\nsubstantiis separatis cognoscimus. Non autem oportet quod, si per scientias speculativas possumus pervenire ad sciendum de anima quid est, possimus ad sciendum quid est de substantiis separatis per hujusmodi scientias devenire; nam intelligere nostrum, per quod pervenimus ad sciendum de anima nostra quid est, multum est remotum ab intelligentia substantiæ separatæ. Potest tamen, per hoc quod scitur de anima nostra quid est, perveniri ad sciendum aliquod genus remotum substantiarum separatarum; quod non est\n\nearum substantias intelligere. Sicut autem de anima scimus quia est per seipsam, in quantum ejus actus percipimus, quid autem sit inquirimus ex actibus et objectis per principia scientiarum speculativarum, ita etiam de his quæ sunt in anima nostra, scilicet potentiis et habitibus, scimus quidem quia sunt, in quantum actus percipimus; quid vero sint, ex ipsorum actuum qualitate invenimus. rum novit dignoscat. » (Ed. L. Vivès, tom. XXVII, p. 390.) 2 A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I omittunt: « Non. »\n\nQuod non possumus in hac vita videre Deum per essentiam. (I, q. xii, a. i.) Si autem alias substantias separatas in hac vita intelligere non possumus propter connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad phantasmata, multo minus in hac vita divinam essentiam videre possumus, quæ transcendit omnes substantias separatas. Hujus autem signum hinc etiam accipi potest quia, quanto magis mens nostra ad contemplanda spiritualia elevatur, tanto magis abstrahitur a sensibilibus. Ultimus autem terminus quo contemplatio pertingere potest est divina substantia. Unde oportet mentem quæ divinam substantiam videt totaliter a corporeis sensibus esse absolutam, vel per mortem vel per aliquem raptum. Hinc est quod dicitur ex persona Dei: Non videbit me homo, et vivet, Exod., xxxiii, 20. Quod autem in sacra Scriptura aliqui Deum vidisse dicuntur, oportet intelligi hoc fuisse per aliquam imaginariam visionem seu etiam corporalem, prout scilicet per aliquas corporeas species, vel exterius apparentes vel interius formatas in imaginatione, divinæ virtutis præsentia demonstrabatur, vel etiam secundum quod aliquæ spirituales substantiæ aliquam cognitionem de Deo intelligibilem perceperunt. Difficultatem autem afferunt quædam verba Augustini, ex quibus videtur quod in hac vita possimus intelligere ipsum Deum. Dicit enim quod « in illa æterna veritate, ex qua temporalia » facta sunt omnia, formam secundum quam sumus et secundum quam vel in nobis vel in corporibus vera et recta ratione aliquid operamur, visu mentis aspicimus 3, atque inde conceptam rerum veracem notitiam tanquam verbum apud nos habemus 4, De Trinitate, IX, c. vii. Ed. L. Vivès, tom. XXIII, p. 374. — XII etiam Confessionum c. xxv. — Ed. L. Vivès, tom. II, p. 360. dicit: « Si ambo videmus verum esse quod dicis, et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico; ubi, quæso, id videmus? Nec ego utique in te, nec tu in me; sed ambo in ipsa, quæ supramentes nostras est, incommutabili. — Veritate In libro autem De vera religione 5 dicit quod secundum veritatem divinam de omnibus judicamus. — In libro autem Soliloquiorum l. I, c. xv dicit quod prius ipsa veritas cognoscenda est per quam possunt illa cognosci: quod 6 de veritate divina intelligere videtur. Videtur ergo, ex verbis ejus, quod ipsum Deum, qui sua veritas est, videamus, et per ipsum alia cognoscamus. Ad idem etiam pertinere videntur verba ejusdem, quæ ponit, sic dicens 7 in XII, 8 De Trin. c. ii, Ed. L. Vivès, tom. XXVII, page 448: « Rationis est judicare « de istis corporalibus secundum ratio « nes incorporales et sempiternas; quæ, « nisi supra mentem humanam essent, « incommutabiles profecto non essent. Rationes autem incommutabiles et sempiternæ alibi quam in Deo esse non possunt, quum solus Deus, secundum fidei doctrinam, sit sempiternus. Videtur igitur sequi quod Deum in ista vita videre possimus; et, per hoc quod eum et in eo rerum rationes videmus, de aliis judicamus. Non est autem credendum quod Augustinus, in verbis præmissis, senserit quod in hac vita Deum per suam essentiam intelligere possimus, quum contra-rium dicat in libro De videndo Deum ad Paulinam 9., et cod. Berg.: « Alias. » 2 A, B, C, D, D, F, omittunt: « Temporalia. » — Cod. Berg.: « Corporalia. » 3 A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg.: « Conspicimus. », et cod. Berg. et omittunt: « XII etiam Confessionum., et cod. Berg.: « In libro etiam de Vera Religione. », et cod. Berg: « In libro autem Soliloquiorum. » 5 Ut enim nos et omnes animæ rationales, secundum veritatem de inferioribus recte judicamus, sic de nobis, quando eidem cohæremus, sola ipsa veritas judicat. » (Ed. L. Vivès, tom. III, p. 633.) (Ed. L. Vivès, tom. II, p. 587.), et cod. Bergom.: « In xii De Trinitate. », et cod. Bergom. (Lib. De videndo Deum, seu Littera cxLVII, cap. viii, n. 20. — Ed. L. Vivès, tom. V, p. 286.) Qualiter igitur illam incommutabilem veritatem vel istas rationes aternas in hac vita videamus, et secundum eam de aliis judicemus, inquirendum est. Veritatem quidem in anima esse ipse Augustinus confitetur; unde ab aternitate veritatis immortalitatem animæ probat 1, Soliloq. II, c. xix. Non solum autem sic veritas est in anima sicut Deus per essentiam in rebus omnibus dicitur, neque sicut in rebus omnibus est per suam similitudinem, prout unaquæque res in tantum dicitur vera in quantum ad Dei similitudinem accedit; non enim in hoc anima rebus aliis præfertur. Est ergo speciali modo in anima, in quantum veritatem cognoscit. Sicut igitur animæ et res aliæ veræ quidem dicuntur in suis naturis, secundum quod similitudinem illius summæ naturæ habent quæ est ipsa veritas, quum sit suum intellectum esse, ita id quod per animam cognitum est verum est, in quantum illius divinæ veritatis, quam Deus cognoscit, similitudo quædam exsistit in ipsa. Unde et Glossa super illud Psalmistæ: Diminutæ sunt veritates a filiis hominum, Psalm. xi, 2, dicit quod, sicut ab una facie resultant multæ facies in speculo, ita ab una prima veritate resultant multæ veritates in mentibus hominum. 2 Quamvis autem 3 diversa a diversis cognoscantur et credantur vera, tamen quædam sunt vera in quibus omnes homines concordant, sicut sunt prima principia intellectus tam speculativi quam practici, secundum quod universaliter in mentibus hominum divinæ veritatis quasi quædam imago resultat. In quantum ergo quælibet mens quidquid per certitudinem cognoscit in his principiis intuetur, secundum quæ de omnibus judicatur, facta resolutione in ipsa, dicitur omnia in divina veritate vel in rationibus aternis videre et secundum eas de omnibus judicare. Et hunc sensum confirmant verba Augustini qui dicit, Soliloq. I, c. viii, quod scientiarum spectamina videntur in divina veritate, sicut visibilia in lumine solis; quæ constat non videri in ipso corpore solis, sed per lumen, quod est similitudo solaris claritatis, in aere et similibus corporibus relicta 4. Ex his ergo verbis Augustini non habetur quod Deus videatur secundum suam substantiam in hac vita, sed solum sicut in speculo; quod et Apostolus de cognitione hujus vitæ confitetur, dicens: Videmus nunc per speculum, I Cor. xiii, 12. Quamvis autem mens humana de propinquiori Dei similitudinem repræsentet quam inferiores creaturæ, tamen cognitio Dei quæ ex mente humana accipi potest non excedit illud genus cognitionis quod ex sensibilibus sumitur, quum et ipsa de seipsa cognoscat quid est per hoc quod naturas sensibilium intelligit, ut dictum est (c. xlvi); unde nec per hanc viam cognosci Deus altiori modo potest quam sicut 5 cognoscatur causa per effectum.\n\nv, a. v.) 1. Si ergo humana felicitas ultima non consistat in cognitione Dei qua communiter ab omnibus vel pluribus cognoscitur secundum quamdam aestimationem confusam; neque iterum in cognitione Dei qua cognoscitur per viam demonstrationis in scientiis speculativis; neque in cognitione Dei qua cognoscitur per fidem, ut in superioribus (c. xxxviii- 4 « R. Nemo ambiget veritatem anima nostra contineri. Quod si quælibet disciplina ita est in animo ut in subjecto inseparabiliter, nec interire potest veritas, quid quæso de animi perpetua vita, nescio qua mortis familiaritate, dubitamus?.. An disciplina non est in animo? — A. Quis hoc dixerit? — R. Sed forte potest intereunte subjecto id quod in subjecto est permanere? — A. Quando hoc mihi persuadetur. — R. Restat ut occidat veritas. — A. Unde fieri potest? — R. Immortalis estigitur anima. Jamjam crede rationibustuis, crede veritati: clamat et in te sese habitare et immortalem esse. » (Soliloq., II, c. xix). Ed. L. Vivès, tom. II, p. 613.) 2 « Veritas una est, qua illustrantur animæ sanctae; sed quoniam multæ sunt animæ, in ipsis multæ veritates dici possunt, sicut ab una facie multæ in speculis imagines apparent. » (S. Aug., Enarrat. in Psalm. xi. Edit. L. Vivès, tom. XI, p. 707.) 5 A, B omitt. : « Autem. » — A: « Quamvis a diversis credantur diversa esse. » 4 « Intelligibilis Deus est; intelligibilia sunt illa disciplinarum spectamina; tamen plurimum differunt. Nam et terra visibilis et lux; sed terra nisi luce collustrata videri non potest. Ergo et illa quæ in disciplinis traduntur, quæ quisquis verissima esse concedit, credendum est non posse intelligi nisi ab alio, quasi sole suo, illustrentur, scilicet Deo, qui, ut sol est, intelligitur et cætera facit intelligi. » (Soliloq. I, c. viii. — Ed. L. Vivès, tom. II, p. 577.) 5 A, B, C, E, F: « Quam sic. » xl) est ostensum: — non autem est possibile in hac vita ad altiorem Dei cognitionem pervenire ut per essentiam cognoscatur, vel saltem ita quod aliæ substantiae separatæ intelligantur ut ex his possit Deus quasi de propinquiori cognosci, ut ostensum est (c. xli-xlvi); — oportet autem in aliqua Dei cognitione felicitatem ultimam poni, ut supra (c. xxxvii) ostensum est, impossibile est quod in hac vita sit\n\nultima hominis felicitas. 2. Item, Ultimus finis hominis terminat ejus naturalem appetitum ita quod, eo habito, nihil aliud quæritur; si enim adhuc movetur ad aliud, nondum habet finem in quo quiescat. Hoc autem in hac vita accidere non potest; quanto enim plus aliquis intelligit, tanto magis in eo desiderium intelligendi augetur; quod est omnibus naturale, nisi forte aliquis sit qui omnia intelligat, quod in hac vita nulli unquam accidit qui esset solum homo, nec est possibile accidere, quum in hac vita substantias separatas, quæ sunt maxime intelligibilia, cognoscere non possimus, ut ostensum est (c. xli-xlvi). Non est igitur possibile ultimam hominis felicitatem in\n\nhac vita esse. 3. Adhuc, Omne quod movetur in finem desiderat naturaliter stabiliri et quiescere in illo; unde a loco quo corpus naturaliter movetur non recedit nisi per motum violentum, qui contrariatur appetitui Felicitas autem est ultimus finis quem homo naturaliter desiderat. Est igitur hominis desiderium naturale ad hoc quod in felicitate stabiliatur. Nisi igitur cum felicitate pariter immobiliterque stabilitatem consequatur, nondum est felix, ejus desiderio naturali nondum quiescente. Quum igitur aliquis felicitatem consequitur, pariter stabilitatem et quietem consequitur ; unde et omnium hæc est de felicitate conceptio quod de sui ratione stabilitatem requirat; propter quod Philosophus dicit, Ethic. I, c. xi, quod non aestimamus felicem chamæleonta quemdam. In vita autem ista non est aliqua certa stabilitas; cuilibet enim, quantumcumque felix dicatur, possibile est infirmitates et infortunia accidere, quibus impeditur ab operatione, quæcumque sit illa, in qua ponitur felicitas. Non igitur est possibile in hac vita esse\n\nultimam hominis felicitatem. 4. Amplius, Inconveniens videtur et irrationabile quod tempus generationis alicujus rei sit magnum, tempus autem durationis ipsius sit parvum; sequetur enim quod natura, in majori tempore, suo fine privaretur; unde videmus quod animalia quæ parvo tempore vivunt parvum etiam tempus ad hoc quod perficiantur habent. Si autem felicitas consistat in perfecta operatione secundum virtutem perfectam, vel intellectualem vel moralem, impossibile est eam advenire homini nisi post tempus diuturnum; et hoc maxime in speculativis apparet, in quibus ultima felicitas hominis ponitur, ut ex prædictis (c. xxxvii) patet; nam vix in ultima aetate homo ad perfectam speculationem scientiarum pervenire potest; tunc autem, ut plurimum, modicum restat humanæ vitæ. Non est igitur possibile in hac vita ultimam hominis\n\nfelicitatem esse perfectam. 5. Præterea, Felicitatem perfectum quoddam bonum omnes confitentur; alias appetitum non quietaret. Perfectum autem bonum est quod omnino caret admixtione mali, sicut perfectum album est quod est omnino impermixtum nigro. Non est autem possibile quod homo, in statu istius vitæ, omnino sit immunis a malis, non solum corporalibus sive carnalibus, quæ sunt fames, sitis, frigus et alia hujsmodi, sed etiam a malis animæ; nullus enim inventur qui non aliquando inordinatis passionibus inquietetur; qui non aliquando prætereat medium, in quo virtus consistit, vel in plus vel in minus; qui non etiam in aliquibus decipiatur, vel saltem ignoret quæ scire desiderat, aut etiam debili opinione concipiat ea de quibus certitudinem habere vellet. Non est igitur aliquis in\n\nhac vita felix. 6. Adhuc, Homo naturaliter refugit mortem et tristatur de ipsa, non solum ut nunc, quum eam sentit et eam refugit, sed etiam quum eam recogitat. Hoc autem quod non moriatur homo non potest assequi in hac vita. Non est igitur possibile quod homo in hac\n\nvita sit felix. 7. Amplius, Felicitas ultima non consistit in habitu, sed in operatione; habitus enim propter actus sunt. Sed impos- A: « Naturali. » A, B, C, D, E, F: « Consequetur. » sibile est in hac vita continue agere quamcumque actionem. Impossibile est igitur in hac vita hominem\n\ntotaliter esse felicem. 8. Item, Quanto aliquid est magis desideratum et dilectum, tanto ejus amissio majorem dolorem et tristitiam affert. Felicitas autem maxime desideratur et amatur. Maxime igitur ejus amissio tristitiam habet. Sed, si sit in hac vita ultima felicitas, certum est quod amittetur saltem per mortem; et non est certum utrum duratura sit usque ad mortem, quum cuilibet homini possibile sit in hac vita accidere morbos, quibus totaliter ab operatione virtutis impeditur, sicut phrenesim et alia hujusmodi, in quibus impeditur rationis usus. Semper igitur talis felicitas habebit tristitiam naturaliter annexam. Non erit\n\nigitur perfecta felicitas. Potest autem aliquis dicere quod, quum felicitas sit bonum intellectualis naturæ, perfecta et vera felicitas est illorum in quibus natura intellectualis perfecta inventur, id est in substantiis separatis. In hominibus autem inventur imperfecta per modum participationis cujusdam; ad veritatem enim intelligendam plene, nonnisi per quemdam inquisitionis motum pertingere possunt; et ad ea quæ sunt secundum naturam maxime intelligibilia, omnino deficiunt, sicut ex dictis (c. xlv) patet. Unde nec felicitas, secundun suam perfectam rationem, potest omnibus hominibus adesse; sed aliquid ipsius participant etiam in hac vita. Et hæc videtur fuisse sententia Aristotelis de felicitate; unde, in primo Ethicorum, c. xi, ubi inquirit utrum infortunia tollant felicitatem, ostenso quod felicitas sit in operationibus virtutis quæ maxime permanentes in hac vita esse videntur, concludit illos quibus talis perfectio in hac vita quidem adest esse beatos ut homines, quasi non simpliciter ad felicitatem pertingentes,\n\nsed modo humano. Quod autem prædicta responsio rationes præmissas non\n\nevacuet, ostendendum est. 1. Homo enim, etsi naturæ ordine substantiis separatis sit inferior, creaturis tamen irrationalibus superior est. Perfectiori igitur modo suum finem ultimum consequitur quam illa. Illa vero sic perfecte suum finem ultimum consequuntur quod nihil aliud quærunt; grave enim, quum fuerit in suo «ubi», quiescit; animalia etiam quum fruuntur delectationibus secundum sensum, eorum naturale desiderium quietatur. Oportet igitur multo fortius quod, quum homo pervenerit ad suum finem ultimum, naturale ejus desiderium quietetur. Sed hoc non potest fieri in vita ista. Ergo homo non consequitur felicitatem, prout est finis proprius ejus, in hac vita, ut ostensum est. Oportet ergo quod consequatur\n\npost hanc vitam. 2. Adhuc, Impossibile est naturale desiderium esse inane; natura enim nihil facit frustra. Esset autem inane naturæ desiderium, si nunquam posset impleri. Est igitur implebile desiderium naturale hominis. Non autem in hac vita, ut ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod impleratur post hanc vitam. Est igitur felicitas ultima hominis\n\npost hanc vitam. 3. Amplius, Quamdiu aliquid movetur ad perfectionem, nondum est in ultimo fine. Sed omnes homines cognoscendo veritatem semper se habent ut moti et tendentes ad perfectionem, quia illi qui sequuntur semper inveniunt alia ab illis quæ a prioribus inventa sunt, sicut dicitur in secundo Metaphysicorum, c. 1. Non igitur homines in cognitione veritatis sic se habent quasi in ultimo fine exsistentes. Quum igitur in speculatione, per quam quæritur cognitio veritatis, maxime videatur ultima hominis felicitas in hac vita consistere, sicut etiam ipse Aristoteles probat, Ethic. X, c. vii, impossibile est dicere quod homo in hac vita ultimum\n\nfinem suum consequatur. 4. Præterea, Omne quod est in potentia intendit exire in actum. Quamdiu igitur non est ex toto factum in actu, non est in suo fine ultimo. Intellectus autem noster est in potentia ad omnes formas rerum cognoscendas; reducitur autem in actum quum aliquam earum cognoscit. Ergo non erit ex toto in actu nec in ultimo suo fine, nisi quando omnia saltem ista materialia cognoverit. Sed hoc non potest homo assequi per scientias speculativas, quibus in hac vita veritatem cognoscimus. Non est igitur possibile quod ultima felicitas hominis sit\n\nin hac vita. Propter has autem et hujusmodi rationes, Alexander et Averrhoes posuerunt ultimam felicitatem hominis non esse in cognitione humana quæ est per scientias speculativas, sed per continuationem cum substantia separata, quam esse credebant possibile homini in hac vita. Quia vero Aristoteles vidit, Ethic. X, c. viii, quod non est alia cognitio hominis in hac vita quam per scientias speculativas, posuit hominem non consequi felicitatem perfectam,\n\nsed suo modo. In quo satis apparet quantam angustiam patiebantur hinc inde eorum praeclara ingenia; a quibus angustiis liberabimur, si ponamus, secundum probationes præmissas, homines ad veram felicitatem post hanc vitam pervenire posse, anima hominis immortali existente; in quo statu anima intelliget per modum quo intelligunt substantiae separatæ, sicut in secundo hujus operis ostensum est (l. II, c.\n\nxcvi et seqq.). Erit igitur ultima felicitas hominis in cognitione Dei quam habet humanamens post hanc vitam per modum quo ipsum cognoscunt substantiae separatæ. — Propter quod Dominus mercedem in cælis nobis promittit, Matth., v, 12, et Matthæus dicit quod sancti erunt sicut Angeli, xxii, 30, qui vident Deum semper in cælis, ut dicitur, Matth, xvii, 10.\n\nQuod substantiae separatæ non vident Deum per essentiam, ex hoc quod cognoscunt eum per suas essentias. (I, q. xii, a. iv, q. lxiv, a. i, ad 2ᵐᵗ.) Oportet autem inquirere utrum hæc ipsa cognitio, qua substantiae separatæ et animæ post mortem cognoscunt Deum per suas essentias, sufficiat ad ipsarum ultimam felicitatem. Ad cujus veritatis indagationem primo ostensum est, quod per talem modum cognitionis non cognoscitur divina essentia. 1. Contingit enim ex effectu causam cognoscere multipliciter: — Uno modo, secundum quod effectus sumitur ut medium ad cognoscendum de causa quod sit et quod talis sit, sicut accidit in scientiis, quæ causam demonstrant per effectum. — Alio modo, ita quod in ipso effectu videatur causa, in quantum similudo causæ resultat in effectu, sicut homo videtur in speculo propter suam similitudinem. Et differt hic modus a primo; nam in primo sunt duæ cogni-tiones, effectus et causæ, quarum una est alterius causa; nam cognitio effectus est causa quod cognoscatur causa ejus; in modo autem secundo una est visio utriusque; simul enim dum videtur effectus, videtur et causa in ipso. — Tertio modo, ita quod similitudo causæ in effectu sit forma qua cognoscit causam suus effectus; sicut si arca haberet intellectum, et per formam suam cognoscert artem a qua talis forma ejus similudo processit. — Nullo autem istorum modorum per effectum potest cognosci causa quid est, nisi sit effectus causæ adæquatus, in quo tota virtus causæ exprimatur. Substantiæ autem separatæ cognoscunt Deum per suas substantias, sicut causa cognoscitur per effectum; non autem primo modo, quia sic eorum cognitio esset discursiva, sed secundo modo, in quantum una videt Deum in alia, et tertio modo, in quantum quælibet earum videt Deum in seipsa. Nulla autem earum est effectus adæquans virtu-tem Dei, ut in secundo libro ostensum est (l. II, c. xxvi et xxvii). Non est igitur possibile quod, per hunc modum cognitionis, ipsam divinam essentiam videant. 2. Amplius, Similitudo intelligibilis per quam intelligitur aliquid secundum suam substantiam oportet quod sit ejus-dem speciei, vel magis species ejus, sicut forma domus quæ est in mente artificis est ejus-dem speciei cum forma domus quæ est in materia, vel potius species ejus; non enim per speciem hominis intelligitur de asino vel equo quid est. Sed ipsa natura substantiae separatæ non est idem specie cum natura divina; quinimo nec genere, ut in primo libro ostensum est (l. I, xxv). Non est igitur possibile quod substantia separata intelligat divinam substantiam per propriam naturam. 3. Item, Omne creatum ad aliquod genus vel speciem terminatur. Divina autem essentia est infinita, comprehendens in se omnem perfectionem totius esse, ut in primo libro ostensum est (l. I, c. xliii et xx). Impossibile est igitur quod per aliquod creatum divina substantia videatur. 4. Præterea, Omnis intelligibilis species per quam intelligitur quidditas vel essen- 1 Cod. Berg.: « Hominem. » 2 A, B, C, D, E, F omittunt: « Hominis. » 3 4 A, B, C, D, E, F omittunt: « Quod. » 5 tia alicujus rei comprehendit in repræsentando rem illam; unde et orationes signantes quod quid est «terminos » et «rationes » et «diffinitiones » vocamus. Impossibile est autem quod aliqua similitudo creata totaliter Deum repræsentet, quum quælibet similitudo creata sit alicujus generis determinati, non autem Deus, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xxv). Non igitur est possibile quod per aliquam similitudinem creatam divina substantia intelligatur. 5. Amplius, Divina substantia est suum esse, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xxii). Ipsum autem esse substantiæ separatæ est aliud quam sua substantia, ut probatum est (l. II, c. lii). Essentia igitur substantiæ separatæ non est sufficiens medium quo Deus per essentiam suam videri possit. Cognoscit tamen substantia separata per suam substantiam de Deo quia est, et quod est omnium causa et eminens omnibus et remotus ab omnibus, non solum quæ sunt, sed etiam quæ mente creata concipi possunt. Ad quam etiam cognitionem de Deo nos utcumque pertingere possumus; per effectus enim de Deo cognoscimus quia est, et quod causa aliorum est et aliis supereminens et ab omnibus remotus; et hoc est ultimum et perfectissimum nostræ cognitionis in hac vita. Unde Dionysius dicit, De myst. theol. c. 11, quod Deo quasi ignoto conjungimur; quod quidem contingit dum de Deo quid non sit cognoscimus, quid vero sit penitus manet ignotum. Unde et, ad hujus sublimissimæ cognitionis ignorantiam demonstrandam, de Moyse dicitur quod accessit ad caliginem in qua erat Deus, Exod. xx, 24. Quia vero natura inferior in sui summo nonnisi ad infimum supe- 1 -- etc, ut in A. — ut in A, B, C, D. — Cod. Berg: « Terminos scepæ et diffinitiones vocamus. » 2 (Ex translat. Johan. Scoti.) 4 Omnino autem ignoto vacatione omnis cognitionis secundum melius unitus, et eo quod nihil cognoscit super mentem cognoscens. — Precamur per non videre et ignorare videre et cognoscere eum qui est super visionem, et cognoscere cognitionem. (Ex translat. Johan. Sarraceni.) « In omnimode intactile et invisibili hæret... cum eo qui est penitus icognoscibilis copulatus, et eo ipso quod nihil cognoscit supra mentem cognoscens. — Exoptamus per visionis cognitionis que negationem videre et cognoscere id quod supra visionem cognitionem que existit. » (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, Op. S. Dionysii Aréop. t. 1., De mystica theologia, cap. 1, § 111, col. 1002, et cap. 11, § unic. col. 1026.) 4, et cod. Berg. 6 — Cod. Berg.: « sicut et si. », et cod. Berg. principium regni dignitatem novit, qui bus scit regem esse prælatum, quam vis neuter altitudinem regiæ dignitatis comprehendat. Nos autem non scimus nisi quædam infima entium. Licet ergo sciamus Deum omnibus entibus eminere, non tamen ita cognoscimus eminentiam divinam sicut substantiae separatæ, qui bus altissimi rerum ordines noti sunt, et eis omnibus superiorem Deum esse cognoscunt. 4. Ulterius, Manifestum est quod causalitas alicujus causæ et virtus ejus tanto magis cognoscitur quanto plures et majores ejus effectus innotescunt. Ex quo manifestum fit quod substantiae separatæ causalitatem Dei et ejus virtutem magis cognoscunt quam nos, licet nos omnium entium eum esse causam sciamus.\n\nearum naturale desiderium. Non potest autem esse quod in tali Dei cognitione quiescat naturale\n\ndesiderium substantiae separatæ. 1. Omne enim quod est imperfectum in aliqua specie desiderat consequi perfectionem illius speciei; qui enim habet opinionem de re aliqua, quæ imperfecta illius rei est notitia, ex hoc ipso incitatur ad desiderandum illius rei scientiam. Prædicta autem cognitio quam substantiae separatæ habent de Deo, non cognoscentes ipsius substantiam plene, est imperfecta cognitionis species; non enim arbitramur nos aliquid cognoscere, si substantiam ejus non cognoscamus; unde et præcipuum in cognitione alicujus rei est scire de ea quid est. Ex hac igitur cognitione quam habent substantiae separatæ de Deo non quiescit naturale desiderium, sed incitatur magis ad\n\ndivinam substantiam videndam. 2. Item, Ex cognitione effectuum incitatur desiderium ad cognoscendum causam; unde et homines philosophari inceperunt, causas rerum inquirentes. Non quiescit igitur sciendi desiderium, naturaliter omnibus substantiiis intellectualibus inditum, nisi, cognitis substantiis effectuum, etiam substantiam causæ cognoscant. Per hoc igitur quod substantiae separatæ cognoscunt omnium rerum quarum substantias vident esse Deum causam, non quiescit naturale desiderium in ipsis, nisi etiam ipsius\n\nDei substantiam videant. 3. Adhuc, Sicut se habet quæstio « propter quid » ad quæstionem « quia, » ita se habet quæstio « quid est » ad quæstionem « an est; » nam quæstio « propter quid » quærit medium ad demonstrandum « quia » est aliquid, puta quia luna eclipsatur; et similiter quæstio « quid est » quærit medium ad demonstrandum « an est, » secundum doctrinam traditam in secundo Posteriorum Analyticorum, c. 1. Videmus autem quod videntes naturaliter quia est aliquid scire desiderant quid est ipsum, quod est intelligere ejus substantiam. Non igitur quietatur naturale sciendi desiderium in cognitione Dei, qua scitur de ipso\n\nsolum quia est. 4. Amplius, Nihil finitum desiderium intellectus quietare potest; quod exinde ostenditur quod intellectus, quolibet finito dato, aliquid ultra molitur ; unde, qualibet linea finita data, aliquam majorem molitur apprehendere, et similiter in numeris; et hæc est ratio infinitæ additionis in numeris et lineis mathematicis. Altitudo autem et virtus est finita cujuslibet substantiae creatæ. Non igitur intellectus substantiae separatæ quiescit per hoc quod cognoscit substantias creatas quantumcumque eminentes, sed adhuc naturali desiderio tendit ad intelligendum substantiam quæ est altitudinis infinitæ, ut ostensum est de substantia divina (l.\n\nI, c. xliii). 5. Præterea, Sicut naturale desiderium inest omnibus intellectualibus naturis ad sciendum, ita inest eis naturale desiderium ignorantiam seu nescientiam pellendi. Substantiæ autem separatæ, sicut jam dictum est (c. xlix), cognoscunt, prædicto cognitionis modo, substantiam Dei esse supra se et supra omne id quod ab eis intelligitur; et per consequens, sciunt divinam substantiam sibi esse ignotam. Tendit igitur naturale ipsorum desiderium ad intelligendam divinam substantiam. A: « Cognoscamus vel. » Sic A, B, D et Cod. Berg. — Edit.: « Molitur apprehendere. » A: «\n\nEst in numeris. » 6. Item, Quanto aliquid est fini propinquius, ex majori desiderio tendit ad finem; unde videmus quod motus naturalis corporum in fine intenditur. Intellectus autem substantiarum separatarum propinquiores sunt divinæ cognitioni quam noster intellectus. Intensius igitur desiderant Dei cognitionem quam nos. Nos autem, quantumcumque sciamus Deum esse et alia quæ supra dicta sunt, non quiescimus desiderio, sed adhuc desideramus Deum per essentiam suam cognoscere. Multo igitur magis substantiæ separatæ hoc naturaliter desiderant. Non igitur in cognitione Dei prædicta\n\neorum desiderium quietatur. Ex quibus concluditur quod ultima felicitas substantiæ separatæ non est in illa cognitione Dei qua Deum cognoscunt per suas substantias, quum adhuc earum desiderium ducat 1 eas usque\n\nad Dei substantiam. In quo etiam satis apparet quod in nullo alio quærenda est ultima felicitas quam in operatione intellectus, quum nullum desiderium tam in sublime ferat 2 sicut desiderium intelligendæ veritatis; omnia namque desideria nostra, vel delectationis vel cujuscumque alterius quod ab homine desideratur, in aliis rebus quiescere possunt; desiderium autem prædictum non quiescit, nisi ad summum rerum cardinem et factorem pervenerit. Propter quod convenienter Sapientia dicit: Ego in altissimis habitavi, et thronus meus in columna nubis, Eccli. xxiv, 7, et dicitur quod Sapientia ancillas suas vocat ad arcem, Proverb. ix, 3. Erubescant igitur qui felicitatem hominis, tam altissime sitam, in infimis rebus quærunt.\n\nQuomodo Deus per essentiam videatur 3. (I, q. xii, a. iv.) Quum autem impossibile sit naturale desiderium esse inane (quod quidem esset, si non esset possibile pervenire ad divinam substantiam iutelligendam, quod naturaliter omnes mentes desiderant), necesse est dicere quod possibile est substantiam Dei videri per intellectum, et a substantiis intellectualibus separatis, et animabus nostris. Modus autem hujus visionis satis jam ex dictis qualis esse debeat apparet. Ostensum enim est supra (c. xlix) quod divina substantia non potest videri per intellectum in aliqua specie creata; unde oportet, si Dei essentia videatur, quod per ipsammet essentiam divinam intellectus ipsam videat, ut sic 4, in tali visione, divina essentia sit et quod videtur et quo videtur. Quum autem intellectus substantiam ali- 1, et cod. Berg. 3 4 A omittit: « Sic. » « Dicitur enim quod ad intellectualem cognitionem sufficiat quod intellectus habeat lumen spirituale vel intellectuale, mediante quo est principium intelligendi, sive actionem intelligendi, eliciendi, si adsit objectum perfectius, vel species, quæ est ratio cognoscendi et assimilandi objectum ipsi intellectui cui essentialiter non est praesens, non principium effective actionem intelligendi eliciendi. Unde non refertur ad hoc quod talis species, quæ est ratio cognoscendi, sit quasi in se subsistens potentia, cum cognitione praesens, sive sit quasi potentiam per inhærentiam perficiens. Non sic de lumine elevante, quod est etiam principium operandi. Oportet enim quod ex virtute cognoscitiva, quæ habet potentiam remotam et imperfectam eliciendi aliquam operationem, et eo quod debet ipsam perficere ad talem operationem perficiendam efficiatur unum quoddam compositum ex aliquo ente in potentia, et aliquo ente in actu. Unde si species lapidis, quæ est ratio cognoscendi lapidem, extra esset quasi subsistens oculo, tamen vel intellectui praesens nobilius per illam subs-tantiam lapidis cognosceretur; quinimo si ipsa substantia lapidis etiam in se subsistens posset illabi intellectui et sic praesens esse, per ipsam suam essentiam absque alia similitudine cognosceretur. Non sic, si lumen intellectuale esset quasi subsistens, ipsam potentiam intellectivam non informans, posset intellectus aliud intelligere. Cum ergo essentia divina, quæ est prima veritas, imo ipsa veritas, per essentiam sit intime per illapsum in intellectu alicujus absque aliqua similitudine intellectum per inhærentiam informante, poterit ab hujusmodi intellectu apprehendi si adsit in intellectu lumen supernaturale ad hoc ipsum intellectum potens elevare. Sed tunc argumentatur in oppositum. Solum id quod est principium essendi, est principium agendi. Unumquodque enim agit secundum quod est in actu. Sed nihil est principium actuale essendi alicujus, sive essentialiter sive accidentaliiter, nisi formaliter inhæreat et inhærendo perficiat. Ergo cum oporteat intellectum agere sive esse in actu secundum aliquam formam, quæ non videtur esse nisi aliqua species vel similitudo quæ sit principium elicendi talem actum, videtur quod oporteat talem speciem informare intellectum et eidem inhærere. Sicut enim id quod est principium actionis primæ, quod est esse vel vivere, est principium essendi quantum ad tale quam intelligere non possit, nisi fiat actu secundum aliquam speciem uniformantem ipsum, quae sit similitudo rei intellectae, impossibile potest alicui videri esse essentiale vel substantiale, et hoc intranee perficiendo et inhærendo; ita videtur quod id quod est principium actionis secundae, quod est sentire vel intelligere, sit principium essendi quantum ad esse secundum, scilicet quantum ad esse accidentale, et hoc etiam per inhærentiam perficiendo: et sic pertractando redit idem quod prius. Videmus autem quod divina essentia, quae est forma et actus purus, intime illabitur essentiæ uniuscujusque rei et materiae et totius compositi. Quia tamen non sic animæ vel illabitur quod inhæreat, ideo per talem præsentiam non potest dare esse primum sive substantiale rebus, nisi formam aliquam essentialiter perficiat efficiendo. Non enim lapis potest dici esse propter internitatem primi et purissimi esse in ipsum. Nec asinus potest dici vivere vel aliud hujusmodi propter talem internitatem et præsentiam. Ergo similiter videtur quod quantumcumque præsens sit et illabitur essentia divina potentiæ intellective, non potest illi dare esse secundum, quia non potest illam perficere inhærendo, et ex consequenti per talem præsentiam essentia divina non poterit intellectus creatus disponi ad hoc quod actum cognitionis vel visionem hujusmodi essentia eliciat, nisi cum tali præsentia ipsius essentia divina imprimatur in intellectum aliqua species vel similitudo, quae sit formale principium talis operationis determinata. Nec videtur sufficere ad lumen, quod ponitur per modum formæ et habitus inhærere, licet tamen ad hoc lumen hujusmodi requiratur, sicut patet de hiis qui lumine intellectus naturalis intelliguntur, ubi etiam cum illo lumine species inhærens informans requiratur. Adhuc forte posset dici quod si in cognitione nudæ essentia divina esset actio, sive operatio activa, intellectus haberet efficaciam supradictam. Cum enim in nostro intelligere sit quædam passio in receptione speciei intelligibilis, et ulterius quædam actio in formatione verbi, quae ex illa specie objecta in actione intelligente concipitur; talis actio non potest esse ab intellectu non informato specie inhærente, propter quod forte verum est quod quæcumque in verbo a mente nostra de rebus saltem aliis a se concepto vel formato cognoscuntur, per aliquam speciem vel similitudinem inhærentem et informantem apprehenduntur. Sed nuda divina essentia non sic in verbo vel per talem operationem activam intellectus creati cognoscitur, sed simplici contuitu, ita quod in hujus cognitione non est nisi quoddam recipere et pati ipsius intellectus ex præsentia objecti se ipsi intellectui intime unientis, et ex hoc quoddam intelligere, quod est quoddam pati, non per abjectionem, sed secundum perfectionem quamdam efficientis. Sicut enim videmus quod alio modo cognoscit intellectus noter quidditatem lapidis, scilicet de illa verbum per speciem lapidis concipiendo, et sic quodammodo agendo illud in quo cognoscit hujusmodi quidditatem, quia tale verbum non est nisi ipsa quidditas rei ut concepta, et sic non cognoscit ipsam quidditatem quasi intuitive, et in se, sed in verbo de illa concepto; et alio modo apprehendit visus visibile sive totum illud intuitive, et in se ipso nude inspiciens illud absque quod per essentiam divinam intellectus creatus possit videre ipsam divinam substantiam, quasi per quamdam speciem intelligibilem, quum divina essentia sit formatione actus conceptionis in quo illud videatur: ita alio modo cognoscuntur creaturæ ab intellectu creato per earum similitudines, et in verbo de illis per hujusmodi similitudines concepto, et ipsa essentia divina et ea etiam quae in illa relucent immediate sine specie vel similitudine et non in verbo aliquo. Sed ex hoc videtur quod angelus, si cognoscat se ipsum per suam essentiam sibi præsentem, non cognoscat se in verbo accidentali et inhærente sibi, quia videtur quod tale verbum non concipiatur nisi per aliquam similitudinem etiam inhærentem. Et forte non est inconveniens dicere quod non in verbo, sed intuitive se per se ipsum præsentialiter cognoscat. Vel forte dicendum quod immo cognoscit se per essentiam suam, et tamen concipiendo quoddam verbum accidentale et inhærens de se ipso, in quo se ipsum cognoscit. Cum enim ponamus quod Deus ipse Pater cognoscendo se ipsum per essentiam suam concepit quamdam notitiam quae dicitur Verbum, in quo ipse se cognoscit perfecte et distincte; similiter oportet dicere in cognitione angeli, scilicet quod intuendo essentiam suam, quae est sibi loco speciei in memoria, concipit quamdam notitiam quae etiam est verbum quoddam, in quo seipsum cognoscit, sed quia in Deo, actio qua concipitur hujusmodi verbum, est ipsa essentia divina plenitudine et idemptitate, quia in Deo nihil est accidens, sed ipsa essentia est ipsa actio ejus, quae etiam est quasi subsistens; ideo etiam Verbum divinum est quasi subsistens in natura divina. Sed quia in creaturis nihil est sua actio, sed omnis actio creaturæ est quoddam accidens ejus et ex consequenti constitutum per illam est accidens: et sic quia intelligere angeli est quoddam accidens ejus, licet non intelligat per se similitudinem inhærentem, sed per essentiam suam sibi præsentem, quae est perfectius principium agendi, sive actu intelligendi eliciendi, et sic etiam verbum concipiendo quam species quæcumque ei inhærens. Oportet enim quod illud quod agit sit in actu, aut de se sicut hoc, aut per aliud additum, sicut in cognitione qua cognoscit alia a se per similitudines eorum, etc., cum verbum in quo se intelligit, est quasi accidentale et inhærens. Ad præmissorum declarationem posset induci quod aliqui, licet forte non bene, dixerunt, quod id quod de re intelligibili est in intellectu, quod dicitur species intelligibilis, et illud quod de sensibilis est in sensu, quod dicitur species sensibilis, nihil aliud est quam ipsa intellectio vel sensatio, ut sic liceat loqui, quia non est aliud quam id quod intellectus vel sensus erat in potentia ante intelligere vel sentire. Sed constat quod ipsa intellectio est perfectio intellectus ad quam est in potentia cum non intelligit; et secundum hoc intelligere nostrum non esset nisi quoddam pati et perfici in recipiendo præsente activo, ut sicut color est magis visus, et præsens oculo ipsum immutat mediante lumine sensibilii immutatione quidem qua efficit de non sentiente vel vidente sentientem et videntem: ita phantasm, ain virtute luminis intellectus agentis existens principium activum in intellectum et ejus immutativum, facit ipsum de non intelliquoddam per seipsum subsistens et ostensum sit (l. I, c, xxvii) quod Deus nullius potest esse forma. Ad hujusmodi 1 igitur intelligentiam veritatis, considerandum est quod substantia quæ est per seipsam subsistens, est vel forma tantum vel compositum ex materia et forma. Illud igitur quod est ex materia et forma compositum non potest alteri esse forma, quia forma in eo jam est contracta ad illam materiam ut alterius rei forma esse non possit. Illud autem quod sic est subsistens ut solum 2 tamen sit forma potest alteri esse forma, dummodo esse suum sit tale quod ab aliquo alio participari possit, sicut ostendimus (l. II, c. lxviii) de anima humana. Si vero esse suum ab altero participari non possit, nullius rei forma esse potest; sic enim per suum esse determinatur in seipso, sicut quæ sunt materialia per materiam. Hoc autem, sicut in esse substantiali vel naturali invenitur, sic et in esse intelligibili considerandum est; quum enim intellectus perfectio sit verum, illud intelligibile erit ut forma tantum in genere intelligibilium quod est veritas ipsa, quod convenit soli Deo; nam, quum verum sequatur ad esse, illud tantum sua veritas est quod est suum esse; quod est proprium soli Deo, ut ostensum est (l. II, c. xv). Alia igitur intelligibilia subsistentia non sunt ut pura forma in genere intelligibilium, sed ut formam in subjecto aliquo habentes; est enim unumquodque eorum verum, non vegente intelligentem absque alia impressione similitudinis cujuscumque. Imo illud intelligere, quo sic intellectus est in actu, est illud quod similitudo vel species rei dicitur, quantum per hoc dicitur intellectus assimilari rei, et effici quodammodo unaquæque res: ita in proposito; cum Deus se ipso præsens sit intellectui, si adsit lumen gloriæ elevans intellectum, efficit sui cognitionem immediatam in illo absque alia similitudine, nisi quod talis intellectio sic creata in intellectu ex præsentia essentia divinæ quæ habet rationem agentis objective, cum lumine gloriæ disponente intellectum, formaliter similitudo quædam Dei dicatur, quia ex hoc intellectus qui ad hoc erat in potentia quodammodo ei assimilatur et identificatur, sicut dictum est prius quod intellectus quodammodo fit unaquæque res ex hoc quod specie rerum dicitur informari, quæ species in intellectu existens non dicitur nisi hujusmodi intellectio, quia sic in actu efficitur intellectus. Quia tamen res ipsæ subsistentes extra non habent rationem acti, ut immediate possint agere in intellectum nostrum, et illum immutare nisi mediante phantasmate; ideo etiam ritas, sicut et est ens, non autem ipsum esse. Manifestum est igitur quod essentia divina potest comparari ad intellectum creatum ut species intelligibilis qua intelligit; quod non contingit de essentia alicujus alterius substantiae separatæ. Nec tamen potest esse forma alterius rei secundum esse naturale; sequeretur enim quod simul cum aliquo unita 3 constitueret unam naturam; quod esse non potest, quum essentia divina in se perfecta sit in sui natura; species autem intelligibilis unita intellectui non constituit aliquam naturam, sed perficit ipsum ad intelligendum; quod perfectioni divinæ essentiae non repugnat. Hæc igitur visio immediata Dei repromittitur nobis in Scriptura: Videmus nunc per speculum in exnigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem, I Cor., xiii, 12, quod corporali modo nefas est intelligere, ut in ipsa Divinitate corporalem faciem imaginemur, quum ostensum sit (l. I, c. xx). Deum incorporeum esse, neque etiam sit possibile ut nostra corporali facie Deum videamus, quum visus corporalis, qui in facie nostra residet, nonnisi rerum corporalium esse possit. Sic igitur facie Deum videbimus quia immediate eum videbimus, sicut hominem quem facie ad faciem videmus. Secundum autem hanc visionem maxime Deo assimilamur et ejus beatitudinis participes sumus; nam ipse Deus per suam essentiam suam substantiam intelligit, et hæc est felicitas; unde dicitur: Quum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est, 1 Cod. Berg.: « Hujus. » 2 3 I Joan. III. 2; et Dominus dicit: Ego dispono vobis sicut disposuit mihi Pater meus regnum, ut edatis et bibatis super mensam meam in regno meo, Luc. xxii, 29 et 30. Quod quidem de corporali cibo vel potu non potest intelligi, sed de eo qui in mensa sapientiae sumitur, de quo a Sapientia dicitur: Comedite panes meos 4, et bibite vinum quod miscui vobis, Prov. ix, 5. Super mensam ergo Dei manducant et bibunt, quia eadem felicitate fruuntur qua Deus felix est, videntes eum illo modo quo ipse 2 videt seipsum.\n\nxii, a. iv.) Non est autem possibile quod ad istum visionis divinæ modum aliqua creata substantia ex virtute\n\npropria possit attingere. 1. Quod enim est superioris naturæ proprium non potest consequi natura inferior, nisi per actionem superioris naturæ cujus est proprium, sicut aqua non potest esse calida nisi per actionem ignis. Videre autem Deum per ipsam divinam essentiam est proprium naturæ divinæ; operari autem secundum propriam formam est proprium cujuslibet operantis. Nulla igitur intellectualis substantia potest videre Deum per ipsam divinam essentiam, nisi\n\nDeo hoc faciente. 2. Amplius, Forma alicujus propria non fit alterius, nisi eo agente; agens enim facit sibi simile, in quantum formam suam alteri communicat. Videre autem substantiam Dei impossibile est nisi ipsa divina essentia sit forma intellectus quo intelligit 4, ut probatum est (c. li). Impossibile est igitur quod aliqua substantia creata ad illam visionem perveniat nisi\n\nper actionem divinam. 3. Adhuc, Si aliqua duo debeant ad invicem copulari, quorum unum sit formale et aliud materiale, oportet quod copulatio eorum copuletur per actionem quæ est ex parte ejus quod est formale, non autem per actionem ejus quod est materiale; forma enim est principium agendi, materia vero principium patien- di. Ad hoc autem quod intellectus creatus videat Dei substantiam, oportet quod ipsa divina essentia copuletur intellectui ut forma intelligibilis, sicut probatum est (c. li). Non est igitur possibile ad hanc visionem perveniri ab aliquo intellectu creato, nisi\n\nper actionem divinam. 4. Item, Quod est per se est causa ejus quod est per aliud. Intellectus autem divinus per seipsum divinam essentiam videt; nam intellectus divinus est ipsa essentia divina, qua Dei substantia videatur, ut probatum est (l. l, c. xlv). Intellectus autem creatus videt divinam substantiam per essentiam Dei quasi per aliud a se. Hæc igitur visio non potest advenire intellectui creato, nisi\n\nper actionem Dei. 5. Præterea, Quidquid excedit limites alicujus naturæ non potest sibi advenire nisi per actionem alterius, sicut aqua non tendit sursum nisi ab aliquo alio mota. Videre autem Dei substantiam transcendit limites omnis naturæ creatæ; nam cuilibet naturæ intellectuali creatæ proprium est ut intelligat secundum modum suæ substantia; substantia autem divina non potest sic intelligi, ut supra ostensum est (c. xlx). Impossibile est igitur perveniri ab aliquo intellectu creato ad visionem divinæ substantia, nisi per actionem Dei, qui\n\nomnem creaturam transcendit. Hinc est quod dicitur: Gratia Dei vita æterna, Rom. vi, 23. In ipsa enim divina visione ostendimus esse hominis beati-tudinem (c. xxxvii), quæ vita æterna dicitur; ad quam sola Dei gratia ducimur et dicimur pervenire, quia talis visio omnem creaturæ facultatem excedit, nec est possibile ad eam pervenire nisi divino munere; quæ autem sic adveniunt creaturæ Dei gratiae deputantur. Et dicitur: Ego manifestabo ei meipsum, Joan. xiv, 21.\n\nxii, a. v.) Oportet autem quod ad tam nobilem visionem intellectus creatus per aliquam divinæ bonitatis influentiam elevetur. 1 Sic A, B, C, D, E, et cod. Berg. — Edit.: « Panem meum. » 2 A omittit: « Ipse. » 3\n\nA omittit: « Videndum. » 1. Impossibile enim est quod id quod est forma alicujus rei propria, fiat alterius rei forma, nisi res illa participet aliquam similitudinem illius cujus est forma propria, sicut lux non fit actus alicujus corporis nisi aliquid participet de diapha-no. Essentia autem divina est propria forma intelligibilis intellectus divini et ei proportionata; nam hæc tria in Deo sunt unum, intellectus, quo intelligitur, et quod intelligitur (liv. I, c. xliv-xlviii). Impossibile est igitur quod ipsa essentia Dei fiat intelligibilis forma alicujus intellectus creati, nisi per hoc quod aliquam divinam similitudinem intellectus creatus participet. Hæc igitur divinæ similitudinis participatio necessaria est ad hoc quod\n\nDei substantia videatur. 2. Adhuc, Nihil est susceptivum formæ sublimioris nisi per aliquam dispositionem ad illius capacitatem elevetur; proprius enim actus in propria potentia fit. Essentia autem divina est forma altior omni intellectu creato. Ad hoc igitur quod essentia divina fiat intelligibilis species alicujus intellectus creati (quod requiritur ad hoc quod divina substantia videatur), necesse est quod intellectus creatus aliqua dispositione sublimiori\n\nad hoc elevetur. 3. Amplius, Si aliqua duo prius fuerint non unita et postmodum uniantur, oportet quod hoc fiat per mutationem utriusque vel alterius tantum. — Si autem ponatur quod intellectus aliquis creatus de novo incipiat Dei subtantiam videre, oportet, secundum præmissa, quod divina essentia copuletur ei de novo ut intelligibilis species. Impossibile est autem quod divina essentia moveatur, sicut supra ostensum est (l. I, c. xiii). Oportet igitur quod talis unio incipiat esse per mutationem intellectus creati; quæ qui dem mutatio aliter esse non potest, nisi per hoc quod intellectus creatus aliquam dispositionem de novo acquirat. — Idem autem sequitur, si detur quod, a principio suæ creationis, tali visione aliquis intellectus creatus potiatur. Nam si talis visio facultatem naturæ creatæ excedit, ut probatum est (c. lii), potest intelligi aliquis intellectus creatus in specie suæ naturæ consistere absque hoc quod Dei substantiam videat; unde, sive a princi-pio sive postmodum Deum videre incipiat, oportet ejus\n\nnaturæ aliquid superaddi. 4. Item, Nihil potest ad altiorem operationem elevari, nisi per hoc quod ejus virtus fortificatur. Contingit autem dupliciter alicujus virtutem fortificari: Uno modo, per simplicem ipsius virtutis intensionem, sicut virtus activa calidi augetur per intensionem caloris, ut possit efficere vehementiorem actionem in eadem specie; alio modo, per novæ formæ appositionem, sicut diaphani virtus augetur ad hoc ut possit illuminare, per hoc quod fit lucidum actu per formam lucis receptam in ipso de novo; et hoc quidem virtutis augmentum requiritur ad alterius speciei operationem consequendam. Virtus autem intellectus creati naturalis non sufficit ad divinam substantiam videndam, ut ex prædictis (c. lii) patet. Ergo oportet quod augeatur ei virtus ad hoc quod ad talem visionem perveniat. Non sufficit autem augmentum per intensionem naturalem virtutis, quia talis visio non est ejusdem rationis cum visione naturali intellectus creati; quod ex distantia visorum patet. Oportet igitur quod fiat augmentum virtutis intellectivæ per alicujus\n\nnovæ dispositionis adeptionem. Quia vero in cognitionem intelligibilium ex sensibilibus pervenimus, etiam sensibilis cognitionis nomina ad intelligibilem cognitionem transsumimus, et præcipue quæ pertinent ad visum, qui inter cæteros sensus nobilior est et spiritualior ac per hoc intellectui affinior, et inde est quod ipsa intellectualis cognitio nominatur visio; et, quia corporalis visio non completur nisi per lucem, ea a quibus intellectualis visio perficitur lucis nomen assumunt; unde et Aristoteles, De anima, III, c. v, intellectum agentem luci assimilat, ex eo quod intellectus agens facit intelligibilia in actu, sicut lux quodammodo facit visibilia in actu. Illa igitur dispositio qua intellectus creatus ad intellectualem divinæ substantia visionem extollitur congrue lux gloriæ dicitur, non propter hoc quod faciat intelligibile in actu, sicut lux intellectus agentis, sed per hoc quod facit intellectum\n\npatientem actu intelligere. Hoc autem est lumen de quo dicitur: 1 B: « Cui est. » 2 A omittit: « Forma. » 3 A: « Acquirit. » In lumine tuo videbimus lumen, Psal. xxxv, 10, scilicet divinæ substantiae; et dicitur: Civitas, scilicet beatorum, non eget sole neque luna; nam claritas Dei illuminavit illam, Apoc. xxi, 23; et dicitur: Non erit tibi amplius sol ad lucendum per diem, neque splendor lunæ illuminavit te; sed erit tibi Dominus in lucem sempiternam, et Deus tuus in gloriam tuam, Isai. lx, 19. Inde est etiam, quia Deo est idem esse ferentes secundum imperfectum et perfectum vel consummatum; ut sic gloria sumpta pro hujusmodi habitu luminis gloriæ, non sit nisi gratia consummata. Sicut enim anima in statu viæ sufficienter disponitur et elevatur ut Deo tanquam suo fini assimiletur, et ei perfecte uniatur, perfectione, inquam, quam exigit talis status, qui non est perfectus simpliciter, sed via deveniendi ad perfectum, per quemdam habitum supernaturalem, quem gratiam dicimus, imperfectum tamen, quia et pro statu imperfecto etiam imperfecte elevat et assimilatur; ita videtur quod ipsa eadem secundum ejus esse perfectum vel consummatum perfecte disponat et elevat animam pro suo statu perfecto, qui est status proprie, nec requiritur alius habitus elevans ipsam animam, sed tantummodo perfectio et consummatio istius habitus. Si enim ipsa gratia secundum ejus esse imperfectum potest imperfecte elevare animam ut ipsa quodammodo deiformis sit et opera meritoria agere possit, ita secundum ejus esse perfectum, perfecte ipsam animam poterit elevare et deiformem facere, et ad opera perfecta et gloriosa disponere, supposito tamen quod etiam potentiae suis habitibus disponantur. Certum est enim quod gratia non destruetur sed perficietur et consummabitur; sed propter hoc videtur dici perfectum vel consummatum, quia perfecte et consummate perficit et elevat. Ad quid ergo ponetur alius habitus ad elevandum? E contra videtur aliis quod necesse sit hos habitus differre per essentiam. Si enim essent idem per essentiam, differentes secundum perfectum et imperfectum, tunc ad eosdem actus disponerent, licet differentes secundum perfectum et imperfectum. Sicut ergo habitus luminis gloriæ disponit et elevat animam ad hoc ut divinam essentiam aperte et immediate contempletur; ita habitus gratia ad hoc animam elevaret et disponeret ut Deum immediate videret in via, sed imperfecte respectu perfectæ visionis patriae. Sicut dicitur quod quia caritas viæ et patriae sunt idem habitus per essentiam, differentes solum secundum esse perfectum et imperfectum, ideo ad eumdem actum disponunt, scilicet ad diligendum Deum immediate, sed imperfecte pro statu viæ, perfecte autem pro statu patriae. Sed gratia non disponit ad hoc quod Deus aliquo modo immediate videatur, ergo non potest esse idem per essentiam cum habitu luminis gloriæ qui ad hoc disponit. Sicut enim habitus scientiae per diversa media eamdem cognitionem inferentes differunt per essentiam, sicut patet de scientia naturali et geographia, quæ probant rotunditatem terræ, sed per diversa media; ita habitus gratia, qui disponit et elevat animam ad videndum Deum in aenigmate et speculo creaturarum, et sic per medium quodammodo extraneum, differt per essentiam ab illo habitu qui elevat et disponit ad videndum Deum absque omni medio, etc. Si ergo quæratur ulterius utrum hujusmodi habitus luminis gloriæ inest potentiis animæ per essentiam, vel e converso, secundum illos qui ponunt quod non differt per essentiam a gratia, dicendum esset de isto sicut de habitu gratia, scilicet quod sicut habitus gratiae disponit per essentiam, eo quod gratia dat esse supernaturale sive spirituale, esse autem est ipsius animæ sive essentiae. Sed quia potentiæ naturales naturaliter oriuntur ab ipsa animæ essentia, et in illa radicantur, non potest ipsa essentia animæ perfici vel elevari quin hujusmodi dispositio in omnes ejus potentias naturales redundet. Ideo gratia, etsi prius insit essentiae animæ, tamen ex hoc etiam quoddam in potentias dicitur redundare. Ita dicendo de gloriæ habitu. Sicut enim perfectio essentiae animæ, scilicet gratia, pro statu viæ imperfecto redundat in omnes potentias animæ, ut operationes earum sint meritoriae et Deo acceptæ, sive gratæ, suppositis habitibus qui ad eliciendas hujusmodi operationes requiruntur, et ab ipsa gratia in essentia animæ existente in ipsis potentiis oriuntur, sicut etiam potentiæ animæ ab essentia oriri dicuntur, eo quod id quod est sufficiens principium alicujus esse primi, debet etiam esse principium originale, vel causa horum principiorum esse secundi sive operationis illius cujus est illud esse conveniens; entis autem spiritualis etiam in esse gratuito constituti debent esse operationes spirituales et Deo acceptæ, quod non potest esse nisi potentiæ naturales, quæ sunt primariæ operationes, etiam habitibus supernaturalibus sint perfectæ; et sic videtur quod talium habituum debeat gratia esse principium originale: et ita perfectio essentiae animæ pro statu patriae perfecto, scilicet habitus luminis gloriæ redundare debet in totum hominem, sive in omnes potentias animæ, ita ut ex hoc etiam omnes operationes quarumlibet potentiarum sint perfectæ et gloriosæ, supposito etiam quod ipsa potentiæ habitibus debitis sint perfectæ, qui etiam habitus potentiarum sub suo esse perfecto, quo competunt illi statui, oriuntur ab habitu luminis gloriæ perfecto, sicut imperfecti habitus potentiarum ab ipsa gratia imperfecta oriuntur, ut dictum est, secundum quorum opinionem. Si etiam ponatur quod hujusmodi habitus luminis gloriæ differat per essentiam ab habitu gratia, tamen dicendum est sicut prius quod non inest essentiae per potentias, sed e converso. Per habitum enim luminis gloriæ intelligimus quoddam habitum communem et generalem quo disponitur anima ad statum omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectum. Unde debet esse per se et immediate in illo, in quo omnia quae sunt hominis quodammodo ra-\n\net earum solutiones 4. Objiciet autem\n\naliquis contra prædicta. 1. Nullum enim lumen adveniens visui potest visum elevare ad videndum ea quæ naturalem facultatem visus corporalis excedunt; non enim potest visus videre nisi colorata. Divina autem substantia excedit omnem intellectus creati capacitatem magis quam intellectus excedat capacitatem sensus. Nullo igitur lumine superveniente, intellectus creatus elevari poterit ad\n\ndivinam substantiam videndam. 2. Præterea, Lumen illud quod in intellectu creato recipitur creatum aliquid est. Ipsum ergo in infinitum a Deo distat. Non sic igitur per hujusmodi lumen intellectus creatus ad divinæ essentiae\n\nvisionem elevari potest. 3. Item, Si hoc quidem 2 potest facere lumen prædictum, propter hoc quod est divinæ substantiae similitudo, quum omnis intellectualis substantia, ex hoc ipso quod intellectualis est, divinam similitudinem gerat, ipsa natura cujuslibet intellectualis substantiae ad\n\nvisionem divinam sufficiet 3. 4. Adhuc, Si lumen illud creatum est, nihil autem prohibet quod est creatum alicui rei creatæ connaturale esse, poterit aliquis intellectus creatus esse qui suo connaturali lumine divinam substantiam videbit; cujus contrarium ostensum est (c.\n\nlii). 5. Amplius, Infinitum, in quantum hujusmodi, incognitum est. Ostensum autem est (l. I, c. xliii) Deum esse infinitum. Non igitur potest divina substantia per\n\nlumen prædictum videri. 6. Adhuc, Oportet esse proportionem intelligentis ad rem intellectam. Non est autem aliqua proportio intellectus creati, lumine prædicto perfecti, ad substantiam divinam, quum adhuc remaneat distantia infinita. Non potest igitur intellectus creatus ad divinam substantiam videndam per\n\nlumen aliquod elevari. Ex hujusmodi 4 autem rationibus aliqui moti sunt ad ponendum quod divina substantia nunquam ab aliquo intellectu creato videtur. Quæ quidem positio et veram creaturæ rationalis beatitudinem tollit, quæ non potest esse nisi in visione divinæ substantiae, ut ostensum est (c. xxxvii), et auctoritati sacræ Scripturæ contradicit, ut ex superioribus (c. li) patet; unde tamquam falsa et hæretica abjicienda est. dicantur. Hoc autem est ipsa essentia animæ a qua fluunt suæ potentiæ, non e converso. Et ideo si esset per se et immediate in aliqua potentiarum determinatarum, cum potentiæ animæ sint diversæ et ad diversos actus ordinatæ, jam non esset habitus nisi ad determinatos actus disponens, quod est contra rationem talis habitus, ut dictum est. Cum etiam talis habitus sit unus simpliciter, virtute quodammodo multiplicatur in quantum ex illo quodammodo omnes potentiæ perficiuntur, debet esse per se perfectio illius quod est unum simpliciter in anima. Hoc autem est essentia animæ in qua omnes potentiæ universaliter continentur et a qua originantur. Si enim esset in pluribus potentiis, non esset unus et simplex. Si autem esset in una tantum per illum vel ab illo habitu non fieret directe redundantia in totum hominem, sive in omnes ejus potentias. Sicut etiam dicitur de gratia quod oporteat ipsam esse per se immediate in essentia animæ, quia per illam intelligimus habitum tribuentem animæ esse primum supernaturale, quod est Deo conformare et gratificare; ita cum pro statu gloriæ oporteat animam sortiri esse spirituale, oportet quod hoc sit etiam per aliud, quod primo insit ei cujus est esse. Hoc autem est essentia, non potentiæ; et ideo ille habitus luminis gloriæ qui hoc facit, scilicet qui glorificat animam, inerit per prius essentia. Si autem dicatur quod per habitum luminis gloriæ intelligimus dispositionem qua anima sufficienter disponitur ad visionem Dei immediatam absque aliquo habitu spirituali; visio autem hæc est actus ipsius potentiæ intellectivæ: propter quod videtur quod et hujus habitus sit etiam immediata dispositio ejusdem potentiæ; posset dici quod verum est, quod hujusmodi habitus primo et per se perficiens ipsam essentiam animæ, et in hoc quodammodo omnes potentias in illa radica-tas, sufficienter disponat potentiam intellectivam ad visionem Dei, sive ad suum actum, ipsam sando et elevando ut Deum sibi immediate præsentem tanquam formam summe intelligibilem apprehendat; propter quod etiam hujusmodi habitus forte lumen dicitur, quia perficiendo essentiam sufficienter perficit ipsum oculum spiritualem, et secundum hoc in intellectu, loco habitus fidei, hujusmodi habitus sucedere diceretur. Vel forte una cum ipso habitu generali requiritur aliquis habitus spiritualis in intellectu ad Deum videndum sicut in affectu ad Deum intelligendum. 4 Cod. Berg. : « Et earum solutio. » A : « Rationes probare volentium quod absque Dei influentia videri potest ab intellectu creato divina essentia. » — B, C, D : « Quibus videtur probari quod Deus non possit videri per suam essentiam et earum solutio. » 2 A omittit : « Quidem. » — B, C, E : « Si hoc quod potest. » 3 A : « Sufficit. » 4 Cod. Berg. : « Ex his\n\nautem et similibus. » Rationes autem prædictas non difficile est solvere. 1. Divina enim substantia non sic est extra facultatem intellectus creati quasi aliquid omnino extraneum ab ipso, sicut est sonus a visu vel substantia immaterialis a sensu; nam 1 divina substantia est primum intelligibile et totius intellectualis cognitionis principium; sed est extra facultatem intellectus creati sicut excedens virtutem ejus, sicut excelentia sensibilium sunt extra facultatem sensuum; unde et Philosophus, Metaphys. II, c. 1, dicit quod intellectus noster se habet ad rerum manifestissima sicut oculus noctuæ ad lucem solis. Indiget igitur comfortari intellectus creatus aliquo divino lumine ad hoc quod divinam essentiam videre possit; per quod\n\nprima ratio solvitur. 2. Hujusmodi autem lumen intellectum creatum ad Dei visionem exaltat, non propter ejus indistantiam a divina substantia, sed propter virtutem quam a Deo sortitur ad talem effectum, licet secundum suum esse a Deo in infinitum distet, ut secunda ratio proponebat; non enim hoc lumen creatum intellectum Deo conjungit secundum esse, sed\n\nsecundum intelligere solum. 3. Quia vero ipsius Dei proprium est ut suam substantiam perfecte cognoscat, lumen prædictum Dei similitudo est quantum ad hoc quod ad Dei substantiam videndam perducit. Hoc autem modo nulla intellectualis substantia similitudo Dei esse potest; quum enim nullius substantia creatæ simplicitas sit aqualis divinæ, impossibile est quod totam suam perfectionem creata substantia habeat in eodem; hoc enim est proprium Dei, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xxviii), qui secundum idem est ens intelligens et beatus. Igitur oportet aliud esse, in substantia intellectuali creata, lumen quo divina visione beatificatur, et aliud quodcumque lumen quo in specie suæ naturæ completur et proportionaliter suam substantiam intelligit; ex quo patet\n\nsolutio tertia rationis. 4. Quarta vero solvitur per hoc quod visio divinæ substantia omnem naturalem virtutem excedit, ut ostensum est (c. lii); unde et lumen quo intellectus creatus perficitur ad divinæ substantia visionem\n\noportet esse supernaturale. 5. Neque autem divinæ substantia visionem impedire potest quod Deus dicitur esse infinitus, ut quinta ratio proponebat. Non enim dicitur infinitus privative, sicut quantitas; hujusmodi enim infinitum rationabiliter est ignotum, quia est quasi materia carens forma, quae est principium cognitionis; sed dicitur infinitus negative, quasi forma per se subsistens, non limitata per materiam recipientem; unde quod sic est infinitum maxime cognoscibile\n\nest secundum se. 6. Proportio autem intellectus creati est quidem ad Deum intelligendum, non secundum commensurationem aliquam proportione existente, sed secundum quod proportio significat quamcumque habitudinem unius ad alterum, vel 2 materiae ad formam vel causæ ad effectum; sic enim nihil prohibet esse proportionem creaturæ ad Deum secundum habitudinem intelligentis ad intellectum, sicut et secundum habitudinem effectus ad causam. Unde patet solutio sextæ objectionis.\n\niv, a. ii.) 1. Quia vero cujuslibet actionis modus sequitur efficaciam activi principii, magis enim calefacit cujus calor virtuosior est, oportet quod etiam modus cognitionis sequitur\n\nefficaciam principii cognoscendi. Lumen autem prædictum est quoddam divinæ cognitionis principium, quum per ipsum elevetur intellectus creatus ad divinam substantiam videndam. Oportet igitur quod modus divinæ visionis commensuretur virtuti prædicti luminis. Lumen autem prædictum multum deficit in virtute a claritate divini intellectus, quum claritas divini intellectus sit infinita, lumen autem istud finitum, quia recipitur in substantia finita. Impossibile est igitur quod, per hujusmodi lumen, ita perfecte divina substantia videatur sicut eam videt intellectus divinus. Intellectus autem divinus 1 Sic A, B, C, D, E, et cod. Berg. — Edit.: « Ipsa divina. » — C: « Divina enim. » 2 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Ut. » 3 Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit.: « Essentiam. » substantiam illam videt ita perfecte sicut perfecte visibilis est; veritas enim divinæ substantiae et claritas intellectus divini sunt aqualia; imo magis sunt unum. Impossibile est igitur quod intellectus creatus per lumen prædictum videat divinam substantiam ita perfecte sicut perfecte est visibilis. Omne autem quod comprehenditur ab aliquo cognoscente cognoscitur ab eo ita perfecte sicut cognoscibile est; qui enim novit quod triangulus habet tres angulos aquales duobus rectis, quasi opinabile quoddam probabili ratione, quia sic a sapientibus dicitur, nondum hoc comprehendit, sed solum ille qui novit hoc quasi quoddam scibile per medium quod est causa. Impossibile est igitur quod intellectus creatus\n\ndivinam substantiam comprehendat. 2. Adhuc, Virtus finita non potest adæquare in sua operatione objectum infinitum. Substantia autem divina quoddam infinitum est, per comparisonem ad omnem intellectum creatum, quum omnis intellectus creatus sub certa specie terminetur. Impossibile est igitur quod visio alicujus intellectus creati adæquet in videndo divinam substantiam, scilicet ita perfecte ipsam videndo sicut visibilis est. Nullus igitur intellectus\n\ncreatus ipsam comprehendit. 3. Amplius, Omne agens in tantum perfecte agit in quantum perfecte participat formam, quæ est operationis principium. Forma autem intelligibilis qua divina substantia videtur est ipsa divina essentia; quæ etsi fiat forma intellectus creati, non tamen intellectus creatus capit ipsam secundum totum posse. Non igitur ita perfecte ipsam videt sicut ipsa visibilis est; non ergo comprehenditur\n\nab intellectu creato. 4. Item, Nullum comprehensum excedit terminos comprehendentis. Si igitur intellectus creatus divinam substantiam comprehenderet, divina substantia non exceederet limites intellectus creati; quod est impossibile. Impossibile est igitur quod intellectus creatus\n\ndivinam substantiam comprehendat. Non autem sic dicitur quod divina substantia ab intellectu creato videtur, non tamen comprehenditur, quasi aliquid ejus videatur et aliquid non videatur, quum divina substantia sit simplex omnino, sed quia non ita perfecte ab intellectu creato videtur sicut visibilis est; per quem modum dicitur opinans conclusionem demonstrativam cognoscere, sed non comprehendere, quia non perfecte ipsam cognoscit, scilicet per modum scientiæ, licet nulla pars ejus sit quam non cognoscat.\n\nQuod nullus intellectus creatus, videndo Deum, videt omnia quæ per divinam essentiam videri possunt. Ex hoc autem apparet quod intellectus creatus, etsi divinam substantiam videat, non tamen omnia cognoscit quæ per divinam substantiam cognosci possunt. 1. Tunc enim solum necesse est quod, cognito aliquo principio, omnes ejus effectus cognoscantur per ipsum, quando principium comprehenditur intellectu; sic enim principium aliquod secundum suam totam virtutem cognoscitur, quoniam omnes ejus effectus cognoscuntur qui causantur ex ipso. Per divinam autem essentiam alia cognoscuntur sicut cognoscitur effectus ex causa. Quum igitur intellectus creatus non possit divinam substantiam cognoscere sic quod ipsam comprehendat, non est necessarium quod, videndo ipsam, omnia videat quæ per ipsam cognosci possunt. 2. Item, Quanto aliquis intellectus est altior, tanto plura cognoscit, vel secundum rerum multitudinem, vel secundum earumdem plures rationes. Intellectus autem divinus excedit omnem intellectum creatum. Plura igitur cognoscit quam intellectus aliquis creatus. Non autem cognoscit aliquid, nisi per hoc quod suam essentiam videt, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xlvi). Plura igitur sunt cognoscibilia per essentiam divinam quam aliquis intellectus creatus per ipsam videre possit. 3. Adhuc, Quantitas virtutis attenditur secundum ea in quæ potest. Idem igitur est cognoscere omnia in quæ potest aliqua virtus et ipsam virtutem comprehendere. Divinam autem virtutem, quum sit 1 A: « Impossibile est igitur quod visio alicujus intellectus creati adæquet in videndo divinam substantiam, scilicet, ita perfecte videndo ipsam, sicut visibilis est. Nullus igitur intellectus creatus ipsam comprehendit. », et cod. Bergom. infinita, non potest aliquis creatus intellectus comprehendere, sicut nec essentiam ejus, ut probatum est (c. lv). Neque igitur intellectus creatus potest cognoscere omnia in quæ divina virtus potest. Omnia autem in quæ divina virtus potest sunt per essentiam divinam cognoscibilia; omnia enim cognoscit Deus, et nonnisi per essentiam suam (l. I, c. xlvi). Non igitur intellectus creatus, videns divinam substantiam, videt omnia quæ in Dei substantia videri possunt. 4. Amplius, Nulla virtus cognoscitiva cognoscit rem aliquam, nisi secundum rationem proprii objecti; non enim visu cognoscimus aliquid, nisi in quantum est coloratum. Proprium autem objectum intellectus est quod quid est, id est substantia rei, ut dicitur in tertio De anima, (c. iv). Igitur quidquid intellectus de aliqua re cognoscit, cognoscet per cognitionem substantia illius rei; unde, in qualibet demonstratione per quam innotescunt nobis propria accidentia, principium accipimus quod quid est, ut dicitur in secundo libro Posteriorum analyticorum, c. iii. Si autem substantiam alicujus rei intellectus cognoscat per accidentia, sicut dicitur in primo De anima, c. i, quod accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est, hoc est per accidens, in quantum cognitio intellectus oritur a sensu; et sic per sensibilium accidentium cognitionem oportet ad substantia intellectum pervenire; propter quod hoc non habet locum in mathematicis, sed in naturalibus tantum. Quidquid igitur est in re quod non potest cognosci per cognitionem substantia ejus, oportet esse intellecte 1 2 « Nulla creatura videt Deum sicut vel quantum ex parte sua visibilis est; quia quantum Deus in patria videtur, tantum diligitur. Si ergo intellectus creatus videret Deum quantum ex parte sua visibilis est, diligeretur etiam ab affectu creato quantum diligibilis est. Sed beatitudo consistit in coujunctione cum Deo quæ est per claram visionem et consummatam directionem: ergo creatura beatificaretur in Deo quantum ipse Deus. Item quilibet angelus beatus esset quantum possibile est quamcumque creaturam esse beatam, cum tamen dicamus beatam Virginem super choros angelorum exaltatam et beatificatam. Item quantum habet res de entitate, tantum habet de intelligibilitate. Deus autem est infinitæ entitatis, et sic etiam intelligibilitis; et sic intelligibilis actu infinito intensive et vigore. Nullus autem intellectus creatus hoc potest, etc. Sed si beati videent in Deo omnia quæ videt Deus, viderent Deum quantum ex parte sua visibilis est. Cognitio enim duarum conclusionum in aliquo principio, ceteris paribus, requirit perfectiorem cognitionem illius principii quam cognitio unius conclusionis tantum. Ita autem est de affectibus per comparison ad causam. Creaturæ vero videntur in Deo sicut effectus in causa, ergo ceteris paribus, perfection requiritur Dei cognitio ad cognoscendum duas creaturas in ipso quam ad videndum unam tantum. Et sic secundum multitudinem cognitionum in Deo oportet esse gradus in cognitione Dei. Ergo cognoscere in Deo creaturas infinitas includit Deum cognosci cognitione habente perfectionem infinitam intensione. Sed sic cognoscere Deum est ipsum cognoscere quantum cognoscibilis est, etc. Sed videns in Deo infinita, videt Deum quantum ex parte sua visibilis est. Videns autem in Deo omnia quæ videt Deus, videt in Deo infinita, quia Deus videt infinita, cum sua essentia sit infinitis modis imitabilis, etc. » (Ex cod. G. de F.) cognosci potest. Perfectionis autem cognitionis est cognoscere divinam substantiam, et in ea ejus effectus videre, quam cognoscere divinam substantiam sine hoc quod videantur effectus in ipsa. Et hoc quidem quod divina substantia videatur, absque comprehensione ipsius fieri potest; quod autem omnia per ipsam intelligi possint et cognoscantur, hoc absque comprehensione non potest accidere, ut ex prædictis apparet.\n\npotest divinæ visionis. Quum autem ad visionem divinæ substantia intellectus creatus quodam supernaturali lumine sublimetur, ut patet ex dictis (c. LIII), non est aliquis intellectus creatus ita secundum naturam infimus qui non ad hanc visionem possit\n\nelevari. 1. Ostensum est enim (c. LIV) quod lumen illud non potest esse alicui creaturæ connaturale, sed omnem creatam 4 naturam excedit secundum virtutem. Quod autem fit virtute supernaturali non impeditur propter naturæ diversitatem 2, quum divina virtus sit infinita; unde, in sanatione infirmi quæ fit miraculose, non differt utrum aliquis parum vel multum infirmetur. Diversus igitur gradus naturæ intellectualis non impedit quin infimum in tali natura ad illam visionem perduci\n\npossit prædicto lumine. 2. Adhuc, Distantia intellectus secundum ordinem naturæ supremæ ad Deum est infinita in perfectione et bonitate; ejus autem distantia ad intellectum infimum est finita. Finiti autem ad finitum non potest esse infinita distantia. Igitur distantia quæ est inter infimum intellectum creatum et supremum est quasi nihil in comparatione ad illam distantiam quæ est inter supremum intellectum creatum et Deum. Quod autem est quasi nihil non potest variationem sensibilem facere; sicut distantia quæ est inter centrum terræ et visum est quasi nihil in comparatione ad distantiam quæ est inter visum nostrum et sphæram oc-tavam, ad quam tota terra comparata obtinet locum puncti; et propter hoc nulla sensibilis variatio fit per hoc quod astrologi, in suis demonstrationibus, utuntur visu nostro quasi centro terræ. Nihil ergo differt, quicumque intellectus sit qui ad Dei visionem per lumen prædictum elevetur, utrum summus vel infimus vel medius. 3.\n\nItem, Supra probatum est (c. XXV et L) quod omnis intellectus naturaliter desiderat divinæ substantia visionem. Naturale autem desiderium non potest esse inane. Quilibet igitur intellectus creatus potest pervenire ad divinæ substantia visionem, non impediente\n\ninferioritate naturæ. Hinc 3 est quod 4 Matth. XXII, 30, Dominus hominibus repromittit gloriam Angelorum: Erunt, inquit, de hominibus loquens, sicut Angeli Dei incælo, et eadem mensura hominis et Angeli esse perhibetur, Apoc. XXI, 15 et 17; propter quod saepe in Scriptura sacra Angeli in forma hominum describuntur, vel in toto, sicut patet de Angelis qui apparuerunt Abrahæ in similitudine virorum, Gen. XVIII, 2; vel in parte, sicut patet de animalibus de quibus dicitur quod manus hominis erant sub pennis\n\neorum, Ezech. I, 8. Per hoc autem excluditur error quorumdam qui dicebant quod anima humana, quantumcumque elevetur, non potest ad æqualitatem superiorum intellectuum pervenire.\n\nXII, a. VI.) 1. Quia vero modus operationis consequitur formam, quae est operationis principium, visionis autem qua intellectus creatus substantiam divinam videt principium quoddam est lumen prædictum, ut ex dictis (c. LV) patet, necesse est quod secundum modum hujus luminis sit modus divinæ visionis. Possibile est autem hujus luminis diversos esse participationis gradus, ita quod unus eo perfectius illustretur quam alius. Possi- 1 Sic A, B, C, D, F, G, H, I, J. — E: « Creaturam naturæ. » — Edit.: « Creaturam. » 2 A: « Naturæ diversitate. » 3 F: « Hoc » 4 Sic A, B, C, D, E, F et cod. Berg. — Edit. omittunt: « Quod Matth. XXII. » 5 A: « Quod videntes Deum omnia vident in ipsa. » bile est igitur quod unus Deum videntium perfectius alio videat, quamvis uterque\n\nvideat ejus substantiam. 2. Adhuc, In quocumque genere est aliquod summum quod excedit alia, est etiam invenire magis et minus secundum majorem propinquitatem vel distantiam ab ipso; sicut aliqua sunt magis et minus calida secundum quod magis et minus appropinquant ad ignem, qui est summe calidus. Deus autem suam substantiam perfectissime videt, utpote qui solus eam comprehendit, ut supra (c. LV) ostensum est. Igitur et eum videntium unus alio magis vel minus ejus substantiam videt, secundum quod magis vel\n\nminus ei appropinquat. 3. Amplius, Lumen gloriæ ex hoc ad divinam visionem elevat quod est similitudo quædam intellectus divini, sicut jam (c. LIII) dictum est. Contingit autem aliquid magis vel minus assimilari Deo. Possibile est igitur aliquid perfectius vel minus perfecte\n\ndivinam substantiam videere. 4. Item, Quum finis proportionaliter respondeat his quæ sunt ad finem, oportet quod, sicut aliqua diversimode præparantur ad finem, ita diversimode participent finem. Visio autem divinæ substantiae est ultimus finis cujuslibet intellectualis substantiae, ut ex dictis est (c. xxv et L) patet. Intellectuales autem substantiae non omnes æqualiter præparantur ad finem; quædam enim sunt majoris virtutis et quædam minoris; virtus autem est via ad felicitatem. Oportet igitur quod in visione divina sit diversitas, qua quidam perfectius et quidam minus perfecte\n\ndivinam substantiam videant. Hinc est quod, ad hanc felicitatis differentiam designandam, Dominus dicit: In domo Patris mei mansiones multæ\n\nsunt, Joan. xiv, 2. Per hoc autem excluditur error quorumdam dicentium omnia\n\npræmia esse æqualia. Sicut autem, ex modo visionis, apparet diversus gradus gloriæ in beatis; ita, ex eo quod videtur, apparet gloria eadem; nam cujuslibet felicitas ex hoc est quod Dei substantiam videt, ut probatum est (c. xxv). Idem ergo est quod omnes beatos facit, non tamen ab eo omnes\n\næqualiter beatitudinem capiunt. Unde prædictis non obviat quod Dominus omnibus laborantibus in vinea, licet non æqualiter laboraverint, idem tamen præmium reddendum docet, scilicet denarium, Matth. xx; quia idem est quod omnibus datur in præmium ad videndum et ad\n\nfruendum, scilicet Deus. In hoc etiam considerandum est quod quodammodo contrarius est ordo corporalium et spiritualium motuum. Omnium enim corporalium motuum est idem numero primum subjectum, fines vero diversi; spiritualium vero motuum, scilicet intellectualium apprehensionum et voluntatum, sunt quidem diversa subjecta prima, finis vero numero idem.\n\nQuomodo videntes divinam substantiam omnia videant. (I, q. xII, a. vIII.) 4. Quia vero visio divinæ substantiae est ultimus finis cujuslibet intellectualis substantiae, ut patet ex dictis (c. xxv et L), omnis autem res quum pervenerit ad ultimum finem, quiescit appetitus ejus naturalis, oportet quod naturalis appetitus substantiae intellectualis, divinam substantiam videntis omnino quiescat. Est autem appetitus naturalis intellectus ut cognoscat omnium rerum genera et species et virtutes et totum ordinem universi; quod demonstrat humanum studium erga singula prædictorum. Quilibet igitur divinam substantiam videntium cognoscit omnia supradicta. 2. Amplius, Si in hoc sensus et intellectus differunt, ut patet in tertio De anima, c. iv, quod sensus a sensibilibus excellentibus corrumpitur vel debilitatur, ut postmodum minora sensibilia percipere non possit, — intellectus autem, quia non corrumpitur nec impeditur a suo objecto, sed solum perficitur, postquam intellexit majus intelligibile, non minus poterit alia intelligibilia intelligere, sed magis; summum autem in genere intelligibilium est divina substantia, — intellectus, et cod. Berg., et cod. Berg. In A cap. LIX transcriptum est ante cap. LVIII. igitur, qui per lumen divinum elevatur ad videndum Dei substantiam, multo magis eodem lumine perficitur ad omnia alia intelligenda quae sunt in rerum natura. 3. Adhuc, Esse intelligibile non minoris ambitus est quam esse naturale, sed forte majoris; intellectus enim natus est omnia quae sunt in rerum natura intelligere, et quædam intelligit quae non habent esse naturale, sicut negationes et privationes. Quæcumque igitur requiruntur ad perfectionem esse naturalis requiruntur etiam ad perfectionem esse intelligibilis, vel etiam plura. Perfectio autem esse intelligibilis est quum intellectus ad suum finem ultimum pervene rit, sicut perfectio esse naturalis in ipsa rerum constitutione consistit. Omnia igitur quae Deus ad perfectionem universi produxit intellectui se videnti manifestat. 4. Item, Quamvis videntium Deum unus alio perfectius eum videat, ut os-tensum est (c. lviii), quilibet tamen ita perfecte eum videt quod impletur tota capacitas naturalis; quinimo ipsa visio omnem capacitatem naturalem excedit, ut ostensum est (c. lii). Oportet igitur quod quilibet videns divinam substantiam in ipsa divina substantia cognoscat omnia ad quae se extendit sua capacitas naturalis. Capacitas autem naturalis cujuslibet intellectus se extendit ad cognoscenda omnia genera et species et ordinem rerum. Hæc igitur quilibet Deum videntium in divina substantia cognoscat. Hinc est quod Dominus Moysi petenti divinæ substantia visionem respondit: Ego ostendam omne bonum tibi, Exod. xxxiii, 19; et Gregorius: « Quid est quod ibi nesciant, ubi scientem omnia sciunt? Dialogorum lib. IV, cap. xxxiii, circ. fin. tom. III, col. 376. Dialog. l. IV, c. xxxviii? » Si autem præmissa diligenter conside- « Utrum beati cognoscant res in verbo per aliquas similitudines in ipsis existentes? Videtur quod sic. Constat quod plura potest aliquis beatus cognoscere in verbo quam cognoscit. Ergo Deus potest illi aliqua ex illis japerire et revelare, ita quod simul cum illis quae prius in verbo videbat, videat nunc aliqua in eodem verbo. Hoc autem non potest fieri sine aliqua mutatione, non ipsius verbi, quia omnino est immutabile, ergo mutatione intellectus creati. Non mutaretur autem nisi aliquid creatum esset in ipso quod non prius. Ergo illud quod sic de novo cognosceret in verbo, per aliud creatum cognosceret, non ergo sine similitudine creata in ipso existente. Posset dici quod sicut a principio beatitudinis, cum intellectus creatus fuit informatus et perfectus lumine gloriæ ex unione essentia divinæ ad ipsum intellectum, efficiebatur cognitio beata et immediata ipsius essentia divinæ, et eorum quae in ipsa relucent, et ipsi intellectui manifestabantur absque aliqua alia similitudine influxa et sine mutatione divinæ essentia, non tamen sine mutatione ipsius creaturæ, in qua talis notitia efficiatur. Et ita cum alia vult manifestare, absque mutatione sui id efficit, non tamen sine mutatione intellectus creati, nec in hoc sic mutatur quod novam speciem suscipiat, sed novam cognitionem vel novæ cognitionis impressionem. Videtur tamen quod Deus non possit aliquid de novo manifestare in verbo, quia cum ea quae videntur in verbo per visionem ipsius verbi videantur, non posset aliquid amplius videri in verbo nisi et ipsum verbum perfectius videretur. Sed cum in visione verbi consistat beatitudo essentialis, de cujus ratione est immutabilitas, videtur quod ipsum non possit perfectius videri a beato, quam a principio beatitudinis, et per consequens videtur quod nihil de novo possit in verbo manifestari. Nec videtur quod per aliam revelationem hoc possit fieri, quia nihil cognoscitur nisi per suam similitudinem. Ergo talia non possent cognosci nisi per impressionem novæ speciei vel similitudinis novæ, non per ipsum verbum, quod tamen est sufficiens omnium similudo. Sed si per impressionem novæ similitudinis aliquid de novo cognoscat, cum etiam ipse Deus, ut dictum est, sit illius perfectior similitudo, videtur quod etiam illud quod sic de novo cognoscet per ejus propriam similitudinem, cognoscet etiam in verbo, et sic perfectius cognoscet verbum quam prius. Nihil enim videtur posse cognosci in propria natura in beatis, quin etiam in verbo perfectius cognoscatur, alioquin non essent in beatis simul cognitio matutina, sive diurna, et vespertina, etc. Contra si videns divinam essentiam aliqua cognoscat, et aliqua non, quia etiam Deus aliqua in verbo reluctentia potest manifestare, et aliqua potest non manifestare, qua ratione potest unum manifestare, et aliud non, et sic posset nudam essentiam suam manifestare, et tamen in illa nulla alia res ab ipsa cognosceterut, quod videtur inconveniens et imposibile, ergo e contra videtur quod omnia quae relucent in essentia divina a quolibet vidente illam cognoscantur. Potest dici quod sicut Deus non potest se cognoscere comprehendendo seipsum nisi simul in hoc cognoscat omnia, quorum ipse est similitudo perfecta; ita intellectus creatus non potest videre essentiam divinam nisi in illa videat omnia quae relucent in illa, secundum quod est objectum beatificans et terminans ipsius beati appetitum. Nunc autem, cum non comprehendatur a creatura, finite videtur, ita tamen quod ea ad quorum cognitionem naturaliter intellectus creatus ordinatur in ipsa reluceant simul cum multis aliis possibilibus fieri quae numquam fient nec ad quietationem appetitus intellectus creati directe ordinantur. Non autem comprehendit intellectus creatus in illa. Quantum ad alia vero potest Deus revelare prout vult, et abscondere etiam in toto, etc. » (Ex cod. G. de F.) rentur, patet quod, quodam modo, videntes divinam substantiam omnia vident; quodam vero modo, non. Si enim per « omnia » illa intelligentur quæ ad universi perfectionem pertinent, manifestum est ex dictis quod videntes divinam substantiam omnia vident, ut rationes modo inductæ ostendunt. Quum enim intellectus sit quodammodo omnia, quæcumque ad perfectionem naturæ pertinent, omnia etiam pertinent ad perfectionem esse intelligibilis; propter quod, secundum Augustinum, Super Genesim ad litteram, l. II, c. viii, quæcumque facta sunt per Dei Verbum ut in prima natura subsisterent fiebant etiam in intelligentia angelica ut ab Angelis intelligentur. De perfectione autem naturalis esse sunt naturæ specierum et earum proprietates et virtutes; ad naturas enim specierum intentio naturæ fertur, individua enim sunt propter speciem. Pertinet igitur ad perfectionem intellectualis substantiae ut omnium specierum naturas et virtutes et propria accidentia cognoscat. Hoc igitur in finali beatitudine consequitur per divinæ essentiae visionem. Per cognitionem autem naturalium specierum, et individua sub speciebus hujusmodi existentia cognoscuntur ab intellectu Deum vidente, ut ex his quæ dicta sunt supra de cognitione Dei et Angelorum potest esse manifestum. Sivero per « omnia » intelligentur omnia quæ Deus, suam essentiam videndo, cognoscit, nullus intellectus creatus omnia in Dei substantia videt, ut superius (c. lvi) ostensum est. Hoc autem considerari potest quantum ad plura: — Primo quidem, quantum ad ea quæ Deus facere potest, sed nec facit nec facturus est unquam; omnia enim hujusmodi cognosci non possunt nisi ejus virtus comprehenderetur; quod non est possibile alicui intellectui creato, ut supra (c. lv ostensum est. Hinc est quod dicitur: Forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes, et usque ad perfectum Omnipotentem reperies? Excelsior cælo est, et quid facies? Profundior inferno, et unde cognosces? Longior terra mensura ejus et latior mari, Job, xi, 7, 8 et 9. Non enim hæc dicuntur quasi dimensionibus quantitatis Deus sit magnus, sed quia ejus virtus non limitatur ad omnia quæ magna esse videntur quin possit etiam majora facere. — Secundo, quantum ad rationem rerum factarum, quas omnes cognoscere non potest intellectus nisi divinam bonitatem comprehendat. Ratio enim cujuslibet rei factæ sumitur ex fine quem faciens intendit. Finis autem omnium a Deo factorum divina bonitas est. Ratio igitur rerum factarum est ut divina bonitas diffundatur in rebus. Sic igitur aliquis omnes rationes rerum creatarum cognosceret, si cognosceret omnia bona quæ in rebus creatis secundum ordinem divinæ sapientiae provenire possunt; quod esset divinam bonitatem et etiam sapientiam comprehendere; quod nullus intellectus creatus potest. Hinc est quod dicitur: Intellexi quod omnium Dei operum nullam possit homo invenire rationem, Eccles. viii, 17. — Tertio, quantum ad ea quæ ex sola Dei voluntate dependent, sicut prædestinatio, electio et justificatio et hujusmodi quæ ad sanctificationem pertinent creaturæ. Hinc est quod dicitur: Quis enim hominum scit quæ hominis sunt, nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est? Ita et quæ sunt Dei nemo cognovit, nisi Spiritus Dei, I Cor. ii, 14.\n\nQuod videntes Deum omnia simul vident in ipso. (I, q. xii, a. xi). 1. Quum autem ostensum sit (c. lix) quod intellectus creatus, divinam substantiam videns, in ipsa Dei substantia omnes species rerum intelligat, quæcumque autem una specie videntur oportet simul et una visione videri, quum visio principio visionis respondeat, necesse est quod intellectus qui divinam substantiam videt non successive, sed simul, omnia contempletur. 2. Item, Summa et perfecta felicitas intellectualis naturæ in Dei visione consistit, ut supra (c. xxv) ostensum est. Felicitas autem non est secundum habitum, sed secundum actum, quum sit ultima perfectio et ultimus finis. Ea igitur quæ videntur per visionem divinæ substantiae, qua beati sumus, omnia secundum actum videntur; non ergo unum prius et aliud posterius. 3. Adhuc, Unaquæque res, quum veomisso: « Ratio igitur rerum factarum nerit ad suum ultimum finem, quiescit, quum omnis motus sit ad acquirendum finem. Ultimus autem finis intellectus est visio divinæ substantiae, ut supra (c. xxv) ostensum est. Intellectus igitur divinam substantiam videns non movetur de uno intelligibili in aliud. Omnia igitur quæ per hanc visionem cognoscit simul actu considerat. 4. Amplius, In divina substantia intellectus omnes rerum species cognoscit, ut ex prædictis (c. lix) patet. Quorumdam autem generum sunt species infinitæ, sicut numerorum et figurarum et proportionum. Intellectus igitur in divina substantia videt infinita. Non autem omnia ea videre posset nisi simul videret, quia infinita non est transire. Oportet igitur quod omnia quæ intellectus in divina substantia videt simul videat. Hinc est quod Augustinus in libro decimo quinto De Trinitate, c. xvi. — Ed. L. Vivès, t. XXVII, p. 534, dicit: «Non erunt tunc volubiles nostræ cogitationes, ab aliis in alia euntes et redeuntes; sed omnem scientiam nostram uno simul conspectu videbimus. »\n\nparticeps vitæ æternæ. Ex hoc autem apparet quod, per visionem prædictam, intellectus creatus vitæ\n\næternæ sit particeps. 1. In hoc enim æternitas a tempore differt quod tempus in quadam successione habet esse, æternitatis vero esse est totum simul. Jam autem ostensum est (c. lx) quod in prædicta visione non est aliqua successio, sed omnia quæ per illam videntur simul et uno intuitu videntur. Illa ergo visio in quadam æternitatis participatione perficitur. Est autem illa visio quædam vita; actio enim intellectus est vita quædam. Fit ergo, per illam visionem, intellectus creatus vitæ\n\næternæ particeps. 2. Item, Per objecta actus specificantur. Objectum autem prædictæ visionis est divina substantia secundum seipsam, non secundum aliquam ejus similitudinem creatam, ut supra (c. lix) ostensum est. Esse autem divinæ substantiae in æternitate est, vel magis est ipsa æternitas. Ergo visio prædicta in\n\nparticipatione æternitatis est. 3. Adhuc, Si aliqua actio sit in tempore, hoc erit vel propter principium actionis, quod est in tempore, sicut actiones rerum naturalium sunt temporales, vel propter operationis terminum, sicut substantia-rum spiritualium, quæ sunt supra tempus, quas exercent in res tempori subditas. Visio autem prædicta non est in tempore, ex parte ejus quod videtur, quum hoc sit substantia æterna; neque etiam ex parte ejus quo videtur, quod etiam est substantia æterna; neque etiam ex parte videntis, quod est intellectus, cujus esse non subjacet tempori, quum sit incorruptibilis, ut supra (l. II, c. lxxix) probatum est. Est igitur visio illa secundum æternitatis participationem, utpote\n\nomnino transcendens tempus. 4. Amplius, Anima intellectiva est creata in confinio æternitatis et temporis, ut in libro De causis, propos. 2, dicitur; et ex præmissis potest esse manifestum, quia est ultima in ordine intellectuum, et tamen ejus substantia est elevata supra materiam corporalem, non dependens ab ipsa. Sed actio ejus, secundum quam conjungitur inferioribus quæ sunt in tempore, est temporalis. Ergo actio ejus, secundum quam conjungitur superioribus quæ sunt supra tempus, æternitatem participat. Talis autem est maxime visio qua substantiam divinam videt. Ergo per hujsmodi visionem in participatione æternitatis fit, et eadam ratione quicumque alius intellectus\n\ncreatus Deum videt . Hinc est quod Dominus dicit: Hæc est vita æterna, ut cognoscant te solum Deum verum, Joan. xvii, 3.\n\nperpetuum eum videbunt. Ex hoc autem apparet quod illi qui ultimam felicitatem consequuntur ex visione divina nunquam\n\nab illa decident . 1. Omne enim quod quando est et Sic A, B, C. D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. : « Fortassis etiam volubiles…… atque redeuntes. » A: « Operationes. » A: « Videns. » Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. : « Decidunt. » quandoque non est tempore mensuratur, ut patet in quarto Physicorum, c. xi. Visio autem prædicta, quæ intellectuales creaturas facit beatas, non est in tempore, sed in aternitate. Impossibile est ergo quod, ex quo illius particeps aliquis\n\nfit, ipsam amittat. 2. Adhuc, Creatura intellectualis non pervenit ad ultimum finem, nisi quando ejus desiderium naturale quietatur. Sicut autem naturaliter desiderat felicitatem, ita naturaliter desiderat felicitatis perpetuitatem; quum enim in sua substantia sit perpetua, illud quod propter se desiderat, et non propter aliud, desiderat ut semper habendum. Non igitur esset felicitas ultimus finis,\n\nnisi perpetuo permaneret. 3. Amplius, Omne illud quod cum amore possidetur, si sciatur quod quando amittatur, tristitiam infert. Visio autem prædicta, quæ beatos facit, quum sit maxime delectabilis et maxime desiderata, a possidentibus eam maxime amatur. Ergo impossibile esset eos non tristari, si scirent se quando eam amissuros. Si autem non esset perpetua, hoc scirent; jam enim ostensum est (c. lix) quod, videndo divinam substantiam, etiam alia cognoscunt quæ naturaliter sunt; unde multo magis cognoscunt qualis illa visio sit, utrum perpetua vel quandoque desitura. Non ergo talis visio adesset sine tristitia; et ita non esset vera felicitas, quæ ab omni malo immunem reddere debet, ut supra (c.\n\nxlviii) ostensum est. 4. Item, Quod movetur naturaliter ad aliquid, sicut ad finem sui motus, non removetur ab eo, nisi per violentiam, sicut grave, quum projicitur sursum. Constat autem ex prædictis (c. l) quod omnis substantia intellectualis naturali desiderio tendit ad illam visionem. Non igitur ab illa deficiet, nisi per violentiam. Nihil autem tollitur per violentiam alicujus, nisi virtus auferentis sit major virtute causantis. Visionis autem divinæ causa est Deus, ut supra (c. lii) probatum est. Ergo, quum nulla virtus divinam virtutem excedat, impossibile est quod illa visio per violentiam tollatur. In\n\nperpetuum ergo durabit. 5. Adhuc, Si aliquis videre desinat quod primo videbat, aut hoc erit quia deficiet ei facultas videndi, sicut quum aliquis moritur vel cæcatur vel aliqualiter aliter impeditur; aut erit quia non vult amplius videre, sicut quum aliquis avertit visum a re quam prius videbat; aut quia objectum subtrahitur; et hoc est communiter verum, sive de visione sensus sive de intellectuali visione lo-quamur. Substantiæ autem intellectuali videnti Deum, non potest deesse facultas videndi Deum neque per hoc quod esse desinat, quum sit perpetua, ut supra (l. II, c. lv) ostensum est; neque per defectum luminis quo Deum videt, quum lumen illud incorruptibiliter recipiatur secundum conditionem et recipientis et dantis; neque potest ei deesse voluntas tali visione fruendi, ex quo percipit in illa visione esse suam ultimam felicitatem, sicut non potest velle non esse felix; neque etiam videre desinet per subtractionem objecti, quia objectum illud, quod est Deus, semper eodem modo se habet nec elongatur a nobis, nisi in quantum nos elongamur ab ipso. Impossibile est igitur quod visio illa Dei quæ beatos\n\nfacit unquam deficiet. 6. Præterea, Impossibile est quod aliquis a bono quo fruitur velit discedere, nisi propter aliquod malum quod in fruitione illius boni æstimatur, saltem propter hoc quod æstimatur impedimentum majoris boni; sicut enim nihil desiderat appetitus nisi sub ratione boni, ita nihil fugit nisi sub ratione mali. Sed in fruitione illius visionis non potest esse aliquod malum, quum sit optimum ad quod creatura intellectualis pervenire potest; neque etiam potest esse quod ab eo qui illa fruitur visione æstimetur in ea esse aliquod malum vel aliquid eo melius, quum visio illius summæ veritatis omnem falsam æstimationem excludat. Impossibile est igitur quod substantia intellectualis quæ Deum videt unquam illa\n\nvisione carere velit. 7. Item, Fastidium alicujus quo prius aliquis delectabiliter fruebatur accidit propter hoc quod res illa aliquam immutationem facit in re, corrumpendo vel debilitando virtutem ipsius; et propter A omittit: « Sursum. » A, B, C, D, E, F: « Quam visus videbat. » A: « Voluntas a tali visione, cum sciat in tali visione esse suam ultimam felicitatem, si- cut. » A: « Vel saltem. » A: « Possit aut velit. » hoc vires sensibiles, quibus accidit fatigatio in suis actionibus propter immutationem corporalium organorum a sensibilibus, a quibus, etiamsi fuerint excellentia, corrumpuntur, fastidiunt post aliquod tempus frui eo quod prius delectabiliter sentiebant; et propter hoc etiam intelligendo fastidium patimur, post longam vel vehementem meditationem, quia fatigantur potentiæ utentes corporalibus organis, sine quibus consideratio intellectus nostri compleri non potest. Divina autem substantia non corrumpit, sed maxime perficit intellectum; neque ad ejus visionem concurrit aliquis actus qui per organa corporalia exerceatur. Impossibile est igitur quod illa visio aliquem fastidiat qui prius\n\nea delectabiliter fruebatur. 8. Amplius, Nihil quod cum admiratione consideratur potest esse fastidiosum, quia, quamdiu sub admiratione est, adhuc desiderium manet. Divina autem substantia a quolibet intellectu creato semper cum admiratione videtur, quum nullus intellectus creatus eam comprehendat. Impossibile est igitur quod substantia intellectualis illam visionem fastidiat, et ita non potest esse quod per propriam voluntatem ab\n\nilla visione desistat. 9. Adhuc, Si aliqua duo fuerunt prius unita et postmodum separentur, oportet quod hoc accidat per mutationem alicujus eorum; relatio enim, sicut non incipit esse de novo absque mutatione alterius relatorum, ita nec absque mutatione alterius de novo esse desinit. Intellectus autem creatus videt Deum per hoc quod ei quodammodo unitur, ut ex dictis (c. li) patet. Si ergo visio illa desinat, unione hujsmodi desinente, oportet quod hoc fiat per mutationem divinæ substantia vel intellectus ipsam videntis; quorum utrumque est impossibile; nam divina substantia est immutabilis, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xiii); substantia etiam intellectualis elevatur supra omnem mutationem, quum Dei substantiam videt. Impossibile est igitur quod aliquis decidat ab illa felicitate qua\n\nDei substantiam videt. 10. Item. Quanto aliquid est Deo propinquius, qui est omnino immobilis, tanto est minus mutabile et magis perseverans; unde quædam corpora, propter hoc quod longe distant a Deo, non possunt in perpetuum durare, sicut dicitur in secundo De generatione. Sed nulla creatura potest Deo vicinius appropinquare quam quæ ejus substantiam videt. Creatura igitur intellectualis quæ Dei substantiam videt summam immobilitatem consequitur; non igitur possibile est quod unquam ab\n\nilla visione deficiat. Hinc est quod in Psalmis dicitur: Beati qui habitant in domo tua, Domine; in sæcula sæculorum laudabunt te, Psalm. lxxxiii, 5; et alibi: Non commovebitur in æternum qui habitat in Jerusalem, Psalm. cxxiv, 4; et: Oculi tui videbunt Jerusalem, habitationem opulentam, tabernaculum quod nequaquam transferri poterit; nec auferentur clavi ejus in sempiternum, et omnes funiculi ejus non rumpentur; quia solummodo ibi magnificus est Dominus noter, Isai. xxxiii. 20-24; et: Qui vicerit, faciam illum columnam in templo Dei mei, et foras non egredietur\n\namplius, Apoc. iii, 12. Per hoc autem excluditur error Plato-nicorum, qui dicebant animas separatas, postquam felicitatem ultimam adeptæ fuissent, iterum ad corpora incipere velle redire, et, finita felicitate illius vitæ, iterum miseriis vitæ hujus involvi; et etiam error Origenis, qui dixit animas et Angelos post beatitudinem iterum posse ad miseriam devenire.\n\ndesiderium hominis completur. Ex præmissis autem apparet quod, in illa felicitate quæ provenit ex visione divina, omne desiderium humanum impletur, secundum illud: Qui replet in bonis desiderium tuum, Psalm. cii, 5; et omne humanum studium ibi suam consumptionem´ accipit. Quod quidem patet discurrenti per singula. A omittit: « Impossibile est igitur quod aliquis decidat ab illa felicitate qua Dei substantiam videt. » A: « Qualiter in illa felicitate omne desiderium intellectuale et hominis completur. » B: « Qualiter in illa optima…… desiderium hominis, » omisso: « Omne. » Idem habet D, sed loco « Optima » habet: « Ultima. » A: « Etiam suam. » Sic A, C, D, et cod. Berg. — B, E, F: « Conservationem. » —\n\nEdit.: « Consuetudinem. » 4. Est enim quoddam desiderium hominis, in quantum intellectualis est, de cognitione veritatis; quod quidem homines consequuntur per studium contemplative vita. Et hoc quidem manifeste in illa visione consummabitur, quando per visionem primæ veritatis omnia quæ intellectus naturaliter scire desiderat ei innotescent, ut ex supra dictis\n\n(c. lix) apparet. 2. Est etiam quoddam hominis desiderium, secundum quod habet rationem qua inferiora disponere potest; quod quidem consequuntur homines per studium activæ et civilis vita; quod desiderium principaliter ad hoc est ut tota hominis vita secundum rationem disponatur, quod est vivere secundum virtutem; cujuslibet enim virtuosi finis in operando est propriæ virtutis bonum, sicut fortis ut fortiter agat. Hoc autem desiderium tunc omnino complebitur quando ratio in summo vigore erit, divino lumine illustrata, ne a recto deficere possit. — Consequuntur etiam civilem vitam quædam bona quibus homo indiget ad civiles operationes; sicut honoris sublimitas, quam homines inordinate appetentes superbi et ambitiosi fiunt. Ad summam autem honoris altitudinem per illam visionem Dei homines sublimantur, in quantum Deo quodammodo uniuntur, ut supra (c. li) ostensum est; et propter hoc, sicut ipse Deus Rex seculorum est, I Tim. 1, 47, ita et beati ei conjuncti « reges » dicuntur : Regnabunt cum Christo, Apoc. xx, 6. — Consequitur etiam civilem vitam aliud appetibile, quod est famæ celebritas, per cujus inordinatum appetitum homines inanis gloriæ cupidi dicuntur. Beati autem per illam visionem redduntur celebres, non secundum hominum, qui decipere possunt, opinionem, sed secundum verissimam cognitionem, et Dei et omnium beatorum; et ideo illa beatitudo in Scriptura sacra frequentissime « gloria » nominatur, sicut dicitur : Exsultabunt Sancti in gloria, Psalm. cxlix, 5. — Est etiam et aliud in civili vita appetibile, scilicet divitiæ, per cujus inordinatum appetitum et amorem homines illiberales et injusti fiunt. In illa autem beatitudine est bonorum omnium sufficientia, in quantum beati perfruuntur illo quod comprehendit bonorum omnium perfectionem; propter quod dicitur : Venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa, Sap. vii, 14; et dicitur : Gloria et divitiæ in domo\n\nejus, Psalm. cxix, 3. 3. Est etiam tertium hominis desiderium, quod est sibi et aliis animalibus commune, ut delectationibus perfruatur; quod homines maxime prosequuntur secundum vitam voluptuosam; et per ejus immoderantiam intemperati et incontinentes fiunt. In illa vero felicitate est delectatio perfectissima, tanto quidem perfection ea quæ secundum sensus est, qua et bruta animalia perfruuntur, quanto intellectus est altior sensu. Tanto etiam illud bonum in quo delectabimur majus est omni sensibili bono et magis intimum et magis continue delectans, quanto etiam illa delectatio est magis pura ab omni permixtione contristantis aut sollicitudinis alicujus molestantis, de qua dicitur : Inebriabuntur ab ubertate domus tuæ, et torrente voluptatis tuæ potabis\n\neos, Psalm. xxxv, 9. 4. Est etiam naturale desiderium omnibus rebus commune, per quod conservationem sui desiderant, secundum quod possibile est; per cujus immoderantiam homines timidi redduntur et nimis a laboribus sibi parentes; quod quidem desiderium tunc omnino complebitur quando beati perfectam sempiternitatem consequentur, ab omni nocumento securi, secundum illud : Non esurient neque sientent, et non percutiet eos æstus et sol, Isa.\n\nxlix, 40; Apoc. vii, 16. Sic igitur patet quod per divinam visionem consequuntur substantiæ intellectuales veram felicitatem, in quo omnino desiderium quietatur; in quo est plena sufficientia omnium bonorum, quæ, secundum Aristotelem Ethic., X, c. vii, ad felicitatem requiritur; unde et Boetius 1 Sic A, B, C, D, et cod. Berg. — Edit. : « Maxime. » 2 Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. : « Consequuntur. » 3 A: « Sensum. » 4 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Quanto etiam illud bonum. » 5 « Ea quæ appellatur vita bonis omnibus per se cumulata, nihilque externum desiderans, in ea beatitudine maxime quæ in rerum contemplatione versatur reperitur…… Si mentis functio gravitate et studio rerum seriarum videtur præstare cæteris, quum in rerum contemplatione versetur, et praeter eam nullum alium finem expetere, propriamque voluptatem habere (hæc autem muneris functionem amplificat), copiam autem bonis omnibus cumulatam, nihilque præterea desiderantem, et liberam cessandi otiandique fa- dicit $^4$, Consol. philos. l. III, pros. II, tom. I, col. 724, quod beatitudo est « status omnium\n\nbonorum congregatione perfectus. » Hujus autem perfectæ et ultima felicitatis in hac vita nihil est adeo simile sicut vita contemplantium veritatem, secundum quod est possibile in hac vita. Et ideo philosophi, qui de illa felicitate ultima plenam notitiam habere non potuerunt, in contemplatione quæ est possibilis in hac vita ultimam felicitatem hominis posuerunt, Ethic. X, c. viii. Propter hoc etiam inter alias vitas in Scriptura divina magis contemplativa commendatur, dicente Domino: Maria optimam partem elegit, scilicet contemplationem veritatis, quæ non auferetur ab ea, Luc. x, 42; incipit enim contemplatio veritatis in hac vita, sed in futura consummatur; activa vero et civilis vita hujus vitæ terminos non transcendunt.\n\nxxii, a. ii.) Ex his autem quæ præmissa sunt sufficienter habetur quod Deus rerum omnium est finis; ex quo haberi potest ulterius quod ipse sua Providentia gubernat\n\nvel regit $^3$ universa $^4$. $^1$ Quandocumque enim aliqua ordinantur ad aliquem finem, omnia dispositioni illius subjacent ad quem principaliter pertinet ille finis, sicut in exercitu apparet; omnes enim partes exercitus et earum opera ordinantur ad bonum ducis, quod est victoria, sicut in ultimum finem, et propter hoc ad ducem pertinet totum exercitum gubernare; similiter ars quæ est de fine imperat et dat leges arti quæ est de his quæ sunt ad finem, ut civilis militari, militaris equestri, et ars gubernatoria navifactivæ. Quum igitur omnia ordinentur ad bonitatem divinam sicut in finem, ut ostensum est (c. xvii et xviii), oportet quod Deus, ad quem principaliter cultatem, et occupationem defatigationis expertem, quantum res humanæ ferunt, et quæcumque alia beato tribuuntur in hac functione muneris inesse constat. Si igitur ita est, perfecta sane fuerit hæc hominis beatitudo, si perfectam vitæ longitudinem adepta sit. » Arist. Ethic. X, c. viii. $^4$ « Liquet igitur esse beatitudinem statum bonorum omnium congregatione perfectum…… Non est aliud quod æque perficere beatitudinem possit, quam copiosus bonorum omnium status. » illa bonitas pertinet sicut substantialiter habita et intellecta et amata, sit\n\ngubernator omnium rerum. 2. Adhuc, Quicumque facit aliquid propter finem utitur illo ad finem. Ostensum est autem supra (l. II, c. xv) quod omnia quæ habent esse quocumque modo sunt effectus Dei, et (l. III, c. xvii) quod Deus omnia facit propter finem, qui est ipse. Ipse igitur utitur omnibus, dirigendo ea in finem. Hoc autem est gubernare. Est igitur Deus per suam Providentiam omnium gubernator. 3.\n\nAmplius, Ostensum est (l. I, c. xiii) quod Deus est primum movens non motum. Primum autem movens non minus movet quam secunda moventia, sed magis, quia sine eo non movent alia; omnia autem quæ moventur, moventur propter finem, ut supra (c. ii) ostensum est. Movet igitur Deus omnia ad fines suos, et per intellectum; ostensum est enim supra (l. II, c. xxiii et xxiv) quod non agit per necessitatem naturæ, sed per intellectum et voluntatem $^5$. Nihil autem aliud est regere et gubernare per Providentiam quam movere per intellectum aliqua ad finem. Deus igitur per suam Providentiam gubernat et regit omnia quæ moventur in finem, sive moveantur corporaliter, sive spiritualiter, sicut desiderans dicitur moveri a desiderato. 4.\n\nItem, Probatum est (c. ii et iii) quod corpora naturalia moventur et operantur propter finem, licet finem non cognoscant, ex hoc quod semper vel frequentius accidit in eis quod melius est et non aliter fierent per artem. Impossible est autem quod aliqua non cognoscentia finem operentur propter finem et ordinate perveniant in ipsum, nisi sint mota ab aliquo habente cognitionem finis, sicut sagitta dirigitur ad signum a sagittante. Oportet ergo quod tota operatio naturæ ab aliqua cognitione ordinetur; et hoc quidem mediate vel immediate oportet reducere in Deum; oportet enim quod Consolat. philos., l. III, prosa 1. $^2$ Sic B, C, D, E, F et cod. Berg. — Edit. : « Gubernat universa » — A : « Quod Deus sua prudentia seu providentia res gubernat et ordinat. » $^3$ Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. : « Et regit. » $^4$ A, D : « Omnia. » $^5$ A : « Cum ipse sit suus intellectus et sua voluntas, ut ostensum est. » omnis inferior ars et cognitio a superiori principia accipiat, sicut in scientiis speculativis et operativis apparet. Deus igitur sua\n\nProvidentiam undum gubernat. 5. Adhuc, Ea quæ sunt secundum suam naturam distincta in unum ordinem non conveniunt nisi ab uno ordinante colligantur in unum. In universitate autem rerum sunt res distinctæ et contrarias naturas habentes, quæ tamen omnes in unum ordinem conveniunt, quum quædam operationes quorumdam excipiunt, quædam autem a quibusdam juvantur vel etiam operantur. Øportet igitur quod sit universorum unus\n\nordinator et gubernator. 6. Amplius, Eorum quæ circa cælestium corporum motus apparent ratio assignari non potest ex necessitate naturæ, quum quædam eorum habeant plures motus quibusdam et omnino difformes. Oportet igitur quod illorum motuum ordinatio sit ab aliqua providentia, et per consequens omnium inferiorum motuum et operationum quæ per\n\nillos motus disponuntur. 7. Item, Quanto aliquid propinquius est causæ, tanto plus participat de effectu ipsius; unde, si aliquid tanto participatur perfectius ab aliquibus quanto alicui rei magis appropriquat signum est quod illa res sit causa illius quod diversimode participatur; sicut, si aliqua sint magis calida secundum quod magis appropriquant igni, signum est quod ignis sit causa caloris. Inveniuntur autem aliqua tanto perfectius ordinata esse quanto sunt Deo magis propinqua; nam, in corporibus inferioribus, quæ sunt maxime a Deo distantia, naturæ similitudine, inventur esse defectus aliquando ab eo quod est secundum cursum naturæ, sicut patet in monstruosis et aliis casualibus; quod nunquam accidit in corporibus cælestibus, quæ tamen sunt aliquo modo mutabilia; quod non accidit in substantiis intellectualibus separatis. Manifestum est autem quod Deus est causa totius ordinis rerum. Est igitur Ipse per suam Providentiam gubernator totius univer sitatis rerum. 8.\n\nAdhuc, Sicut supra (l. II, c. xxiii et xxiv) probatum est, Deus res omnes in esse produxit, non ex necessitate naturæ, sed per intellectum et voluntatem. Intellectus autem et voluntatis Ipsius non potest esse alius finis ultimus nisi bonitas ejus, ut scilicet eam rebus communicet, sicut ex praemissis (c. xvi-xix) apparet. Res autem participant divinam bonitatem per modum similitudinis, in quantum ipsæ sunt bonæ. Id autem quod est maxime bonum in rebus creatis est bonum ordinis universi, quod est maxime perfectum, ut Philosophus dicit, Metaphys. XII, c. x, cui etiam consonat divina Scriptura, quum dicitur: Vidit Deus cuncta quæ fecerat, et erant valde bona, Gen. 1, 34, quum de singulis operibus dixisset simpliciter quod « erant bona. » Bonum igitur ordinis rerum creatarum a Deo est id quod est praecipue volitum et intentum a Deo. Nihil autem aliud est gubernare aliquam rem quam ei ordinem imponere. Ipse igitur Deus omnia suo intellectu\n\net voluntate gubernat. 9. Amplius, Unumquodque intendens aliquem finem magis curat de eo quod est propinquius fini ultimo, quia hoc est etiam finis aliorum. Ultimus autem finis divinæ voluntatis est bonitas Ipsius, cui propinquissimum in rebus creatis est bonum ordinis totius universi, quum ordinetur ad ipsum, sicut ad finem, omne particulare bonum hujus vel illius rei, sicut minus perfectum ordinatur ad id quod est perfectius; unde et quælibet pars inventur esse propter suum totum. Id igitur quod maxime curat Deus in rebus creatis est ordo universi. Est\n\nigitur gubernator ipsius. 10. Item, Quælibet res creata consequitur suam ultimam perfectionem per operationem propriam; nam oportet quod ultimus finis et perfectio rei sit vel ipsa operatio vel operationis terminus aut effectus. Forma vero, secundum quam res est, est perfectio prima, ut patet in secundo De anima, c. 1. Ordo autem rerum creatarum, secundum distinctionem naturarum et graduum ipsarum, procedit ex divina sapientia, sicut ostensum est (l. II, c. xxiv). Ergo et ordo operationis, per quam res creatæ magis appropriquant ad ultimum finem. Ordinare autem actiones aliquarum rerum ad finem est gubernare ipsas. Deus igitur per suæ sapientiae Providentiam rebus gubernationem\n\net regimen praestat. Hinc est quod Scriptura Deum Dominum et Regem profitetur, secundum illud: 1 A: « Videmus eas in unum ordinem convenire, quum quædam earum quarumdam. » 2 A: « Illius quæ diversimode participat. » Dominus ipse est Deus, Psalm. xcix, 3; et item: Rex omnis terræ Deus, Psalm. xlvi, 8. Regis enim est et Domini suo imperio regere et gubernare subjectos; unde et rerum cursum sacra Scriptura divino praecepto adscript: Qui præcipit soli et non oritur; et stellas claudit quasi sub signaculo, Job, ix, 7; et: Præceptum posuit, et non\n\npræteribit, Psalm. cxlviii, 6. Per hoc autem excluditur error antiquorum naturalium, qui dicebant omnia ex necessitate materiæ provenire; ex quo sequebatur omnia a casu accidere, et non ex aliquo Providentia ordine.\n\nciv, a. i.) Ex hoc autem quod Deus res sua Providentia regit, sequitur quod\n\nin esse conservet. 1. Ad gubernationem enim aliquorum pertinet omne illud per quod suum finem consequuntur; secundum hoc etiam aliqua regi vel gubernari dicuntur quod ordinantur in finem. In finem autem ultimum quem Deus intendit, scilicet bonitatem divinam, ordinantur res, non solum per hoc quod operantur, sed per hoc quod sunt; quia, in quantum sunt, divinæ bonitatis similitudinem gerunt quod est finis rerum, ut supra ostensum est (c. xix et xx). Ad divinam igitur Providentiam pertinet quod res\n\nconserventur 2 in esse. 2. Item, Oportet quod idem sit causa rei et conservationis ipsius; nam conservatio rei non est nisi continuatio esse ipsius. Ostensum est autem supra (l, II, c. xxiii et xxiv) quod Deus, per suum intellectum et voluntatem, est causa essendi omnibus rebus. Igitur, per suum intellectum et voluntatem, conservat res\n\nomnes in esse. 3. Item, Nullum particulare agens univocum potest simpliciter esse causa speciei, sicut hic homo non potest esse causa speciei humanæ; esset enim causa ho-minis, et per consequens suiipsius, quod est impossibile; est autem causa hic homo hujus hominis per se loquendo. Hic autem homo est per hoc quod natura humana est in hac materia, quæ est individuationis principium. Hic igitur homo non est causa hominis, nisi in quantum est causa quod forma humana fiat in hac materia. Hoc autem est esse principium generationis hujus hominis. Patet ergo quod nec hic homo nec aliquod aliud agens univocum in natura est causa nisi generationis, vel hujus vel illius rei. Oportet autem ipsius speciei humanæ esse aliquam per se causam agentem; quod ipsius compositio ostendit et ordinatio partium, quæ eodem modo se habet in omnibus, nisi per accidens impediatur; et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis speciebus rerum naturalium. Hæc autem causa est Deus, vel mediate vel immediate; ostensum est enim (l. II, c. vi) quod ipse est omnium rerum causa prima. Oportet ergo quod Ipse se hoc modo habeat ad conservationem specie-rum sicut se habet hoc generans in natura ad generationem cujus et per se causa. Generatio autem cessat, cessante operatione generantis. Ergo et omnes rerum species cessarent, cessante operatione divina. Igitur Ipse per suam operationem conservat\n\nres in esse. 4. Adhuc, Licet alicui exsistenti accidat motus, tamen motus est præter esse rei. Nullum autem corporeum est causa alicujus rei, nisi in quantum movetur, quia nullum corpus agit nisi per motum, ut Aristoteles 3 probat, Physic. I. Nullum igitur corpus est causa esse alicujus rei in quantum est esse, sed est causa ejus quod est moveri ad esse, quod est fieri rei. Esse autem cujuslibet rei est esse participatum, quum non sit res aliqua, præter Deum, suum esse, ut supra (l. I, c. xxii) probatum est; et sic oportet quod ipse Deus, qui est suum esse, sit primo et per se causa omnis esse. Sic igitur se habet ad esse rerum operatio divina sicut motio corporis moventis ad fieri et moveri rerum 4 factarum vel mo- 1 A: « Deus sua providentia. » 2 B, C, D, E, F: « Gubernatur in esse. » — A: « Gubernatur in esse conservando. » 3 A: « Dicit. » 4 A: « Quæ fiunt vel moveatur. » « Ad omnipotentiam Dei non pertinet quod possit facere duo contradictoria esse simul. In hoc autem quod dicitur quod Deus faciat aliquid quod sua conservatione non indigeat, contradictio implicatur. Omnis enim effectus a sua causa dependet secundum quod est ejus causa. In hoc ergo quod ponitur Dei conservatione non indigere, ponitur non esse creatum a Deo. In hoc autem quod dicitur quod Deus faciat ipsum, ponitur esse creatum. » (Ex cod. G. de F.) tarum. Impossibile autem est quod fieri vel moveri alicujus rei maneat, cessante motione moventis. Impossibile est igitur quod esse alicujus rei maneat, nisi\n\nper operationem divinam. 5. Amplius, Sicut opus artis præsuponit opus naturæ, ita opus naturæ præsuponit opus Dei creantis; nam materia artificialium est a natura, naturalium vero per creationem a Deo. Artificialia autem conservantur in esse virtute naturalium, sicut domus per soliditatem lapidum. Omnia igitur naturalia non conservantur in esse\n\nnisi virtute Dei. 6. Item, Impressio agentis non remanet in effectu, cessante actione agentis, nisi vertatur in naturam effectus; formæ enim generatorum et proprietates ipsorum remanent in eis post generationem, quia efficiuntur eis naturales; et similiter habitus sunt difficile mobiles, quia vertuntur in naturam; dispositiones autem et passiones, sive corporales sive animales, manent aliquantulum post actionem agentis, sed non semper, quia insunt ut in via ad naturam. Quod autem pertinet ad naturam superioris generis nullo modo post actionem agentis manet, sicut lumen non manet in diaphano recedente illuminante. Esse autem non est natura vel essentia alicujus rei creatæ, sed solius Dei, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xxI et xxII). Nulla igitur res remanere potest in esse,\n\ncessante operatione divina. 7° Adhuc, Circa rerum originem duplex est positio: una fidei, quod res de novo fuerunt a Deo productæ in esse; et positio quorumdam philosophorum, quod res ab æterno a Deo fluxerunt. Secundum autem utramque positionem, oportet dicere quod res conserventur a Deo in esse. Nam, si res a Deo productæ sunt in esse postquam non fuerunt, oportet quod esse rerum divinam voluntatem consequatur, et similiter non esse; quia permisit res non esse quando voluit, et fecit res esse quam voluit; tamdiu igitur sunt quamdiu Deus eas esse vult; sua igitur voluntas conservatrix est rerum. Si autem res ab æterno a Deo fluxerunt, non est dare tempus aut instans in quo primo a Deo effluxerunt; aut igitur nunquam a Deo productæ sunt, aut semper a Deo earum esse procedit quamdiu sunt; sua igitur operatione res\n\nin esse conservat. Hinc est quod dicitur: Portans omnia Verbo virtutis suæ, Hebr. 1, 3. Et Augustinus dicit: « Creatoris namque potentia et omnipotentis atque omnitenentis virtus causa est subsistendi omni creaturæ; quæ virtus ab eis quæ creata sunt regendis si aliquando cessaret, et similiter cessaret illorum species, omnisque natura concideret. Neque enim, sicut structor ædium, quum fabricaverit, abscedit, atque, illo cessante atque abscedente, stat opus ejus, ita mundus vel ictu oculi stare poterit, si ei Deus regimen sui subtraxerit, Super Genesim ad litteram, l.\n\nIV, c. xxI. » Per hoc autem excluditur quorumdam loquentium in lege Maurorum positio, qui, ad hoc quod sustinere possunt mundum Dei conservatione indigere, posuerunt omnes formas esse accidentia, et quod nullum accidens durat per duo instantia, ut sic semper rerum formatio esset in fieri, quasi res non indigeret causa agente, nisi dum est in fieri. Unde et ali qui eorum dicuntur ponere quod corpora indivisibilia, ex quibus omnes substantias dicunt esse compositas, quæ sola secundum eos firmitatem habent, possunt, ad horam aliquam remanere, si Deus suam gubernationem rebus subtraxerit. Quorum etiam quidam dicunt quod res esse non desineret, nisi Deus in ipsa accidens decisionis causaret. Quæ omnia patet esse absurda.\n\nin virtute divina. Ex hoc autem manifestum est quod omnia inferiora agentia non dant esse, nisi in quantum agunt in\n\nvirtute divina. 1. Nihil enim dat esse, nisi in quantum est ens actu. Deus autem conservat res in esse per suam Providentiam, ut ostensum est (c. Lxv). Ex virtute igitur divina est quod\n\naliquid det esse. 2. Amplius, Quando aliqua agentia diversa sub uno agente ordinantur, necesse est quod effectus qui ab eis communiter fit sit eorum secundum quod uniuntur in participando motum et virtutem illius agentis; non enim plura faciunt unum, nisi in quantum unum sunt; sicut patet A: « A Deo productæ sunt. Igitur semper, etc. » Sic A, C, D, E (sed ex alia manu ad oram codicis), et cod. Berg. — Edit.: « Simul et. » quod omnes qui in exercitu sunt operantur ad victoriam causandam, quam causant secundum quod sunt sub ordinatione ducis, cujus proprius effectus victoria est. Ostensum est autem (l. I, c. xiii) quod primum agens est Deus. Quum igitur esse sit communis effectus omnium agentium, nam omne agens facit esse actu, oportet quod hunc effectum producant, in quantum ordinantur sub primo agente et\n\nagunt in virtute ipsius. 3. Item, In omnibus causis agentibus ordinatis, quod est ultimum in generatione et primum in intentione est proprius effectus primi agentis, sicut forma domus, quæ est proprius effectus aedificatoris, posterius provenit quam praeparatio cæmenti et lapidum et lignorum, quæ fiunt per artifices inferiores qui subsunt aedificatori. In omni autem actione, esse in actu est principaliter intentum, et ultimum in generatione; nam, eo habito, quiescit agentis actio et motus patientis. Est igitur esse proprius effectus primi agentis, scilicet Dei; et omnia quæ dant esse hoc habent, in quantum agunt\n\nin virtute Dei. 4. Amplius, Ultimum in bonitate et perfectione, inter ea in quæ potest agens secundum, est illud in quod potest ex virtute agentis primi; nam complementum virtutis agentis secundi est ex virtute agentis primi. Quod autem est in omnibus agentibus perfectissimum, est esse; quælibet enim natura vel forma perficitur per hoc quod est actu, et comparatur ad esse in actu sicut potentia ad actum. Ipsum 2 igitur esse est quod agentia secunda agunt in\n\nvirtute primi agentis. 5. Item, Secundum ordinem causarum est ordo effectuum. Primum autem in omnibus effectibus est esse; nam omnia alia sunt determinationes ipsius. Igitur esse est proprius effectus primi agentis, et omnia alia agunt ipsum, in quantum agunt in virtute primi agentis; secunda autem agentia, quæ sunt quasi particularia et determinantia actionem primi agentis, agunt, sicut proprios effectus, alias perfectiones\n\nquæ determinant esse. 6. Praeterea, Quod est per essentiam tale est propria causa ejus quod est per participationem tale, sicut ignis est causa omnium ignitorum. Deus autem solus est ens per essentiam suam, omnia autem alia sunt entia per participationem; nam in solo Deo esse est sua essentia. Esse igitur cujuslibet exsistentis est proprius effectus ejus, ita quod omne quod producit aliquid in esse hoc facit in quantum agit\n\nin virtute Dei. Hinc est quod dicitur: Creavit Deus, ut essent omnia, Sap. 1, 44; et in pluribus Scripturæ locis dicitur quod nec intelligentia dat esse, nisi in quantum est divina et in quantum agit in 3 virtute divina.\n\noperandi omnibus operantibus. Ex hoc autem apparet quod Deus est causa omnibus operantibus ut operentur. 1. Omne enim operans est aliquo modo causa essendi, vel secundum esse substantiale vel accidentale. Nihil autem est causa essendi, nisi in quantum agit in virtute divina, ut ostensum est (c. LXVI). Omne igitur operans operatur\n\nper virtutem Dei. 2. Adhuc, Omnis operatio quæ consequitur aliquam virtutem attribuitur, sicut causæ, 4 illi rei quæ dedit illam virtutem; sicut motus gravium et levium naturalis consequitur formam ipsorum secundum quod sunt gravia et levia, et ideo causa ipsorum motus dicitur esse generans qui dedit formam. Omnis autem virtus uniuscujusque agentis est a Deo sicut a principio omnis perfectionis. Ergo, quum omnis operatio consequatur aliquam virtutem, oportet quod cujuslibet operationis\n\ncausa sit Deus. 3. Amplius, Manifestum est quod omnis actio quæ non potest permanere, cessante impressione alicujus agentis, est ab illo agente; sicut manifestatio colorum non posset esse, cessante actione solis quæ aerem illustrat 5; unde non est dubium quin sol sit causa manifestationis colorum; et similiter patet de motu violento, qui cessat, cessante violentia impellentis. Sicut autem Deus non solum dedit esse rebus quum primo esse inceperunt, sed 1 A: « Formam vel actum. » 2 Sic A, B, C, D, E, F. — Edit.: « Actum ipsum. Igitur esse. » 3 A omittit: « In. » 4 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Causæ illius rei. » 5 A, B, F: « Illuminat. » quamdiu sunt esse in eis causat, res in esse conservans, ut ostensnm est (c. Lxv) ; ita, non solum quum res primo conditæ sunt, eis virtutes operativas indidit, sed semper eas in rebus causat ; unde, cessante influentia divina, omnis operatio cessaret. Omnis igitur rei operatio in Ipsum reducitur,\n\nsicut in causam. 4. Item, Quidquid applicat virtutem activam ad agendum dicitur esse causa illius actionis ; artifex enim applicans virtutem rei naturalis ad aliquam actionem dicitur esse causa illius actionis, sicut coquus decoctionis, quæ est per ignem. Sed omnis applicatio virtutis ad operationem est principaliter et primo a Deo ; applicantur enim virtutes operativæ ad proprias operationes per aliquem motum vel corporis vel animæ ; primum autem principium utriusque motus est Deus ; est enim primum movens omnino immobile, ut supra (l. I, c. xiii) ostensum est ; et similiter omnis motus voluntatis, quo applicantur aliquæ virtutes ad operandum, reducitur in Deum sicut in primum appetibile et in primum volentem. Omnis igitur operatio debet attribui Deo sicut primo\n\net principali agenti. 5. Adhuc, In omnibus causis agentibus ordinatis, semper oportet quod causæ sequentes agant in virtute causæ primæ; sicut, in rebus naturalibus, corpora inferiora agunt in virtute corporum cælestium, et, in rebus voluntariis, omnes artifices inferiores operantur secundum imperium supremi architectoris. In ordine autem causarum agentium, Deus est prima causa, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xiii). Ergo omnes causæ inferiores agentes agunt in virtute Ipsius. Causa autem actionis magis est id cujus virtute agitur quam etiam illud quod agit, sicut principale agens magis agit quam instrumentum. Deus igitur principalius est causa cujuslibet actionis quam etiam\n\nsecundæ causæ agentes. 6. Item, Omne, operans, per suam operationem, ordinatur ad finem ultimum. Oportet autem quod vel operatio ipsa sit finis, vel operatum quod est operationis effectus. Ordinare autem res in finem est ipsius Dei, ut supra (c. Lxiv) ostensum est. Oportet igitur dicere quod omne agens in virtute divina agat. Ipse igitur est qui est causa\n\nactionis omnium rerum. Hinc est quod dicitur : Omnia opera nostra operatus es nobis, Domine, Isai. xxvi, 12 ; et : Sine me nihil potestis facere, Joan. xv, 5 ; et : Deus est qui operatur in nobis et velle et perficere, pro bona voluntate, Philipp. ii, 13. Et hac ratione frequenter in Scriptura naturæ effectus operationi divinæ attribuuntur, quia Ipse est qui operatur in omni operante per naturam vel per voluntatem, sicut illud : Nonne sicut lac mulsisti me, et sicut caseum me coagulasti? Pelle et carnibus vestisti me, ossibus et nervis compegisti me, Job, x, 10 et 11 ; et : Intonuit de cœlo Dominus, et Altissimus dedit vocem suam : grando et carbones ignis, Psalm, xvii, 14.\n\nxvii, q. 1. a. 1.) Ex hoc autem apparet quod Deum necesse est esse ubique et\n\nin omnibus rebus. 1. Movens enim et motum oportet simul esse, ut probat Philosophus, Physic. VII, c. ii. Deus autem omnia movet ad suas operationes, ut ostensum est (c. Lxvii). Est igitur\n\nin omnibus rebus. 2. Item, Omne quod est in loco vel in re quacumque, aliquo modo contingit ipsam. Res enim corporea est in aliquo sicut in loco secundum contactum quantitatis dimensivæ; res autem incorporea in aliquo esse dicitur secundum contactum virtutis, quum careat dimensiva quantitate. Sic igitur se habet res incorporea ad hoc quod sit in aliquo per virtutem suam, sicut se habet res corporea ad hoc quod sit in aliquo per quantitatem dimensivam. Si autem esset aliquod corpus habens quantitatem dimensivam infinitam, oporteret illud esse ubique. Ergo, si sit aliqua res incorporea habens virtutem infinitam, oporteret quod sit ubique. Ostensum est autem, (l. I, c. xliii,) Deum esse infinitæ virtutis. Est igitur ubique. 1 Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. : « Architectonis. » 2 A : « Attribuitur. » 3 A, B, C, D, E, F omittunt : « Et in\n\nomnibus rebus. » XII. 3. Adhuc, Sicut se habet causa particularis ad particularem effectum, ita se habet causa universalis ad universalem effectum. Oportet autem causam particularem proprio effectui particulari adesse simul; sicut ignis per suam essentiam calefacit, et anima per suam essentiam vitam corpori confert. Quum igitur Deus sit causa universalis totius esse, ut ostensum est (l. II, c. vi), oportet quod, in quocumque est invenire esse, ei ad\n\nsit divina præsentia. 4. Amplius, Quodcumque agens est præsens tantum uni suorum effectuum, ejus actio non potest derivari ad alia nisi illo mediante, eo quod agens et patiens oportet esse simul; sicut vis motiva non movet alia membra nisi mediante corde. Si igitur Deus esset præsens uni tantum suorum effectuum, utpote primo mobili, quod ab eo immediate movetur, sequeretur quod ejus actio non posset ad alia derivari nisi illo mediante. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Si enim alicujus agentis actio non potest derivari ad alia nisi mediante aliquo primo, oportet quod illud proportionaliter respondeat agenti secundum totam ejus virtutem; aliter enim non posset agens tota sua virtute uti, sicut videmus quod omnes motus quos potest causare virtus motiva expleri possunt per cor. Non est autem aliqua creatura per quam posset expleri quidquid divina virtus facere potest, quum divina virtus exceedat in infinitum quamlibet rem creatam, ut apparet ex his quæ ostensa sunt (l. I, c. xliii). Inconveniens est igitur dicere quod divina actio non se extendat ad alia, nisi mediante uno primo. Non est igitur præsens in uno tantum suorum effectuum, sed in omnibus; eadem enim ratione opinabitur, si quis dicat eum esse in aliquibus et non in omnibus, quia, quocumque modo effectus divini acci-piantur, non sufficienter explere poterunt\n\ndivinæ virtutis exsecutionem. 5. Præterea, Necesse est ut causa agens sit simul cum suo effectu proximo et immediato. In qualibet autem re est aliquis effectus proximus et immediatus ipsius Dei; ostensum est enim (l. II, c. xxi) quod solus Deus creare potest; in qualibet autem re est aliquid quod per creationem causatur: in rebus quidem corporalibus, prima materia; in rebus autem incorporeis, simplices earum essentiæ, ut ex his apparet quæ sunt determinata (l. II, c. xlix-lv). Oportet igitur simul Deum adesse in omnibus rebus, præsertim quum ea quæ de non esse ad esse produxit continuo et semper in esse conservet, ut\n\nostensum est, (c. lxv.) Hinc est quod dicitur: Cælum et terram ego impleo, Jerem. xxiii, 24; et: Si ascendero in cælum, tu illic es; si descendero ad* infernum,\n\nades, Psalm. cxxxviii, 8. Per hoc autem excluditur error quorumdam dicentium Deum in aliqua parte mundi determinata esse, puta in primo cælo est in parte orientis, unde est principium motus cæli. Quorum tamen dictum sustineri posset, si sane accipiatur, ut scilicet non intelligamus Deum aliqua determinata mundi parte esse conclusum, sed quia omnium corporearum motionum principium, secundum naturæ ordinem, ab aliqua determinata incipit parte, Deo movente; propter quod et in sacra Scriptura Deus dicitur specialiter esse in cælo, secundum illud: Cælum mea sedes, Isai. lxvi, 1; et: Cælum cæli Domino, Psalm. cxiii, 16. Sed ex hoc quod, præter naturæ ordinem etiam in infimis corporibus Deus aliquid operatur quod virtute cælestis corporis causari non potest, manifeste ostenditur Deum, non solum cælesti corpori, sed etiam infimis\n\nrebus immediate adesse. Non est autem æstimandum Deum sic esse ubique quod per locorum spatia dividatur, quasi una pars ejus sit hic et alia alibi; sed totus ubique est; Deus enim, quum sit omnino simplex, partibus caret. Neque sic simplex est sicut punctus qui est terminus continui, et, propter hoc, determinatum situm in continuo habet; unde non potest unus punctus nisi in uno loco indivisibili esse. Deus autem indivisibilis est, quasi omnino extra genus continui existens; unde non determinatur ad locum, vel magnum vel parvum, ex necessitate suæ essentiæ, quasi oporteat eum esse in aliquo loco, quum ipse fuerit ab æterno ante omnem locum; sed immensitate suæ virtutis attingit omnia quæ sunt in loco, quum sit universalis causa essendi ut dictum est (l. II, c. vi). A: « Autem ratio operabitur. » — B: « Opinatur. » A: « In omnibus opinetur. » A: « Corporum motionis. » — B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J: « Corporearum motionis. » — E: « Motionis principiis. » Sic igitur Ipse totus est ubicumque est, quia per simplicem suam virtutem universa attingit. Non est tamen aestimandum quod sic sit in rebus quasi in rebus mixtus; ostensum est enim) l. I, xxvi et xxvii) quod neque materia neque forma est alicujus; sed est in operibus per modum causae agentis.\n\nDe opinione eorum qui a rebus naturalibus proprias subtrahunt actiones. (II D. xi, q. i, a. iii; I, q. liii, a. i.) Ex 1 praemissis autem quidam occasionem errandi sumpserunt, putantes quod nulla creatura habet aliquam actionem in productione effectuum naturalium, ita scilicet quod ignis non calefacit, sed Deus causat calorem, praesente igne; et similiter dicunt in aliis omnibus effectibus naturalibus. Hunc autem errorem rationibus confirmare conati sunt, ostendentes nullam formam, neque substantialem neque accidentalem, nisi per viam creationis produci in esse; non enim possunt formae et accidentia fieri ex materia, quum non habeant materiam partem sui; unde, si fiant, oportet quod fiant ex nihilo, quod est creari; et, quia creatio solius Dei actio est, ut ostensum est (l. II, c. xxi), sequi videtur quod solus Deus tam formas substantiales quam accidentales in natura producat. Huic autem positioni partim etiam quorumdam philosophorum opinio concordavit. Quia enim omne quod per se non est ab eo quod est per se derivatum inventur, videtur quod formæ rerum quæ non sunt per se existentes, sed in materia, proveniant ex formis quæ per se sine materia sunt; quasi formæ in materia existentes sint quædam participationes illarum formarum quæ sine materia sunt. Et propter hoc Plato posuit species rerum sensibilium esse quasdam formas separatas, quæ sunt causæ essendi his sensibilibus secundum quod eas participant. Avicenna vero, Metaphys. tract. ix, c. iv et v, posuit omnes formas substantiales ab intelligentia agente effluere; accidentales autem formas esse ponebat materiæ dispositiones, quæ ex actione inferiorum agentium materiam disponentium proveniebant; in quo a priore stultitia declinabat. Hujus autem signum esse videbatur quod nulla virtus activa inventur esse in istis corporibus, nisi accidentalis forma, sicut qualitates activæ et passivæ, quæ non videntur esse ad hoc sufficientes quod substantiales formas causare possint. Inveniuntur etiam quædam in istis inferioribus quæ non generantur ex similibus, sicut animalia ex putrefactione generata: unde videtur quod horum formæ ex altioribus proveniant principiis, et pari ratione aliæ formæ quarum quædam sunt multo nobiliores. Quidam vero, ad hoc, argumentum assumunt ex naturalium corporum imbecillitate ad agendum; nam omnis corporis forma est adjuncta quantitati; quantitas autem impedit et actionem et motum; cujus signum ponunt quia, quantum additur in quantitate alicui corpori, tanto fit ponderosius et tardatur motus ejus; unde ex hoc concludunt quod nullum corpus sit activum, sed passivum tantum. Hoc etiam nituntur ostendere per hoc quod omne patiens est subjectum agenti et omne agens, praeter primum, quod causat, requirit subjectum inferius se; nulla autem substantia est inferior corporali; unde videtur quod nullum corpus sit activum. Addunt etiam, ad hoc, quod corporalis substantia est in ultima distantia a primo agente; unde non videtur eis quod virtus activa perveniat usque ad substantiam corporalem, sed, sicut Deus est agens tantum, ita substantia corporalis, quum sit infima in genere rerum, sit passiva tantum. Propter has igitur rationes ponit Avicebron in libro Fontis vitæ quod nullum corpus est activum, sed virtus substantia spiritualis, pertransiens per corpora, agit actiones quæ per corpora fieri videntur. Quidam etiam loquentes in lege Maurorum dicuntur ad hoc rationem inducere quod etiam accidentia non sint ex actione corporum, quia accidents non transit a subjecto in subjectum; unde reputant impossibile quod calor transeat a corpore calido in aliud corpus ab ipso calefactum; 1 Cod. Berg: « Ex hoc autem. » sed dicunt omnia hujusmodi accidentia creari a Deo. Ad praemissas autem positiones multa inconvenientia sequuntur. 1. Si enim nulla inferior causa, et maxime corporalis, aliquid operatur, sed Deus operatur in omnibus solus, Deus autem non variatur per hoc quod operatur in rebus diversis, non sequetur diversus effectus ex diversitate rerum in quibus operatur. Hoc autem ad sensum apparet falsum; non enim ex appositione calidi sequitur infrigidatio, sed calefactio tantum, neque ex semine hominis sequitur generatio nisi hominis. Non ergo causalitas effectuum inferiorum est ita attribuenda divinæ virtuti quod subtrahatur causalitas inferiorum agentium. 2. Item, Contra rationem sapientiae est ut sit aliquid frustra in operibus sapientis. Si autem res creatæ nullo modo operentur ad effectus producendos, sed solus Deus operetur omnia immediate, frustra essent adhibitæ ab ipso aliæ res ad producendos effectus. Repugnat igitur prædicta positio divinæ sapientiae. 3. Adhuc, Quod dat alicui aliquod principale dat eidem omnia quæ consequuntur ad illud; sicut causa quæ dat corpori elementari gravitatem dat ei motum deorsum. Facere autem aliquid actu consequitur ad hoc quod est esse actu, ut patet in Deo; ipse enim est actus purus et est prima causa essendi omnibus, ut supra (l. I, c. xiii; l. II c. xv) dictum est. Si igitur communicavit aliis similitudinem suam quantum ad esse, in quantum res in esse produxit, consequens est quod communicavit eis similitudinem suam quantum ad agere, ut etiam res creatæ habeant proprias actiones. 4. Amplius, Perfectio effectus determinat perfectionem causæ; major enim virtus perfectiorem effectum inducit. Deus autem est perfectissimum agens. Oportet igitur quod res ab Ipso creatæ perfectionem ab eo consequantur. Detrahere ergo perfectioni creaturarum est detrahere perfectioni divinæ virtutis. Sed, si nulla creatura habet aliquam actionem ad aliquem effectum producendum, multum petrahitur perfectioni creaturæ; ex abundantia enim perfectionis est quod perfectionem quam habet possit alteri com-municare. Detrahit igitur hæc positio divinæ virtuti. 5. Item, Sicut est boni bonum facere, ita summi boni est aliquid optime facere. Deus autem est summum bonum, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xli). Igitur ejus est facere optime omnia. Melius autem est bonum quod, alicui collatum, sit multorum commune quam quod sit proprium, quia bonum commune semper inventur esse divinius quam bonum unius tantum. Sed bonum unius fit multis commune, si ab uno in alia derivatur; quod non potest esse, nisi in quantum diffundit ipsum in alia per propriam actionem; si vero potestatem non habet illud in alia transfundendi, manet sibiipsi proprium. Sic igitur Deus rebus creatis suam bonitatem communicavit ut una res quod accepit possit in aliam rem transfundere. Detrahere ergo actiones proprias a rebus creatis est divinæ bonitati derogare. 6. Adhuc, Subtrahere ordinem rebus creatis est eis subtrahere id quod optimum habent; nam singula in seipsis sunt bona, simul autem omnia sunt optima propter ordinem universi; semper enim totum melius est partibus et finis ipsarum. Si autem rebus subtrahantur actiones, subtrahitur ordo rerum ad invicem; rerum enim quæ sunt diversæ secundum suas naturas non est colligatio in ordinis unitatem, nisi per hoc quod quædam agunt et quædam patiuntur. Inconveniens igitur est dicere quod res non habent proprias actiones. 7. Amplius, Si effectus non producuntur ex actione rerum creatarum, sed solum ex actione Dei, imposibile est quod per effectus manifestetur virtus alicujus causæ creatæ; non enim effectus ostendit virtutem causæ, nisi ratione actionis, quæ, a virtute procedens, ad effectum terminatur. Natura autem causæ non cognoscitur per effectum, nisi in quantum per ipsum cognoscitur ejus virtus, quæ naturam consequitur. Si igitur res creatæ non habeant actiones ad producendum effectus, sequitur quod nunquam natura alicujus rei creatæ poterit cognosci per effectum; et sic subtrahitur nobis omnis cognitio scientiæ naturalis, in qua præcipue demonstrationes per effectum sequuntur. — et cod. Berg. rebus. » 8. Item, Apparet per inductionem in omnibus quod simile agat suum simile. Id autem quod generatur in rebus inferioribus non est forma tantum, sed compositum ex materia et forma; nam omnis generatio ex aliquo est, scilicet ex materia, et ad aliquid, scilicet ad formam. Oportet igitur quod generans non sit forma tantum, sed compositum ex materia et forma. Non igitur species rerum separatarum, ut Platonici posuerunt, neque intelligentia agens, ut posuit Avicenna, est causa formarum quae sunt in materiis, sed magis hoc compositum ex materia et forma. 9. Item, Si agere sequitur ad esse in actu, inconveniens est quod actus perfectior actione destituatur. Perfection autem actus est forma substantialis quam forma accidentalis. Si igitur formæ accidentales quæ sunt in rebus corporalibus habent proprias actiones, multo magis forma substantialis habet aliquam propriam actionem. Non est autem ejusmodi actio disponere materiam, quia hoc fit per alterationem, ad quam sufficiunt formæ accidentales. Igitur forma generantis est principium actionis ut forma substantialis introducatur in generatum. Rationes autem quas inducunt facile est solvere. 1. Quum enim ad hoc aliquid fiat ut sit, sicut forma non dicitur ens quasi ipsa habeat esse, sed quia per eam compositum est, ita nec forma proprie fit, sed incipit esse per hoc quod compositum sit reductum de potentia in actum, qui est forma. 2. Nec etiam oportet ut omne quod habet aliquam formam quasi participatam recipiat eam immediate ab eo quod est essentialiter forma, sed immediate quidem ab alio quod habet similem formam simili modo, scilicet participatam, quod tamen agat in virtute illius formæ separatæ, si qua sit talis; sic enim agens similem effectum sibi producit. 3. Similiter etiam nec oportet quod, quia omnis actio inferiorum corporum fit per qualitates activas et passivas, quæ sunt accidentia, non producatur ex actione earum nisi accidens; quia illæ formæ accidentales, sicut causantur a forma substantiali, quæ simul cum materia est causa propriorum accidentium, ita agunt virtute formæ substantialis; quod autem agit in virtute alterius producit effectum similem, non sibi tantum, sed magis ei in cujus virtute agit, sicut ex actione instrumenti fit in artificiato similitudo artis; ex quo sequitur quod ex actione formarum accidentalium producuntur formæ substantiales, in quantum agunt instrumentaliter in virtute substantialium formarum. 4. In animalibus vero quæ ex putrefactione generantur, causatur forma substantialis ex agente corporali, scilicet corpore cœlesti, quod est primum alterans; unde oportet quod omnia moventia ad formam, in istis inferioribus, agant in virtute illius; et propter hoc ad producendas aliquas formas imperfectas sufficit virtus cœlestis absque agente univoco; ad producendas autem formas perfectiores, sicut sunt animæ animalium perfectorum, requiritur cum agente cœlesti agens univocum; talia enim animalia non generantur nisi ex semine; et propter hoc dicit Aristoteles, Physic. II, c. III, in fine, quod « homo generat ho « minem et sol. » 5. Non est autem verum quod quantitas impediat actionem formæ, nisi per accidens, in quantum scilicet omnis quantitas continua est in materia; forma autem in materia existens, quum sit minoris actualitatis, est, per consequens, minoris virtutis in agendo; unde corpus quod habet minus de materia et plus de forma, sicut ignis, est magis activum. 6. Supposito autem modo actionis quam forma in materia existens habere potest, quantitas coauget magis quam minuat actionem; nam, quanto corpus ignis fuerit majus, supposita æque intensa caliditate, tanto magis calefacit; et, supposita gravitate æque intensa, quanto majus fuerit corpus grave, tanto velocius movebitur motu naturali, et inde est quod tardius movetur motu innaturali; quia igitur corpora gravia sunt tardioris motus innaturalis, quum fuerint majoris quantitatis, non ostenditur quod quantitas impediat actionem, sed magis quod coaugeat ipsam. 7. Non oportet etiam quod corpus omne careat actione propter hoc quod, in ordine rerum, substantia corporalis est infima secundum suum genus; quia A addit: « Cum minus perfecto actui actio conceditur. » etiam inter corpora unum est superius altero et formalius et magis activum, sicut ignis est respectu inferiorum corporum, nec tamen etiam infimum corpus excluditur ab agendo. Manifestum est enim quod corpus non potest agere se toto, quum sit compositum ex materia, quæ est ens in potentia, et forma, quæ est actus; agit enim unumquodque secundum quod est actu; et propter hoc, omne corpus agit secundum suam formam, ad quam comparatur aliud corpus, scilicet patiens, secundum suam materiam, ut subjectum, in quantum materia ejus est in potentia ad formam agentis. Si autem e converso ad formam corporis patientis sit in potentia materia corporis agentis, erunt agentia et patientia ad invicem, sicut accidit in duobus corporibus elementaribus; sin autem, erit unum tantum agens et alterum tantum patiens respectu illius, sicut est comparatio corporis cælestis ad corpus elementare. Sic igitur corpus agit in subjectum, non ratione totius corporis, sed formæ per quam agit. 8. Non est etiam verum quod corpora sint in ultima remotione a Deo. Quum enim Deus sit actus purus, secundum hoc aliqua magis vel minus ab eo distant secundum quod sunt plus vel minus in actu vel in potentia. Illud etiam in entibus est extreme distans a Deo quod est potentia tantum, scilicet materia prima; unde ejus tantum est pati et non agere. Corpora vero, quum sint composita ex materia et forma, accedunt ad divinam similitudinem in quantum habent formam, quam Aristoteles, Physic. I, c. 1x, nominat « divinum quoddam », et propter hoc, secundum quod habent formam, agunt; secundum vero quod habent materiam, patiuntur. 9. Ridiculum autem est dicere quod ideo corpus non agat quia accidens non transit de subjecto in subjectum. Non enim hoc modo dicitur corpus calidum calefacere quod idem numero calor qui est in calefaciente corpore transeat ad corpus calefactum, sed quia, virtute caloris qui est in calefaciente corpore, alius calor numero fit actu in corpore calefacto, qui prius erat in eo in potentia; agens enim naturale non est traducens propriam formam in alterum subjectum, sed reducens subjectum quod patitur de potentia in actum. Non igitur auferimus proprias actiones rebus creatis, quamvis omnes effectus rerum creatarum Deo attribua-mus, quasi in omnibus operanti.\n\na naturali agente. Quibusdam autem difficile videtur ad intelligendum quod effectus naturales attribuantur Deo\n\net naturali agenti. 1. Nam una actio a duobus agentibus non videtur progredi posse. Si igitur actio per quam naturalis effectus produci-tur procedit a corpore naturali, non\n\nprocedit 2 a Deo. 2. Item, Quod potest fieri sufficienter per unum superfluum est quod fiat per multa; videmus enim quod natura non facit per duo instrumenta quod potest facere per unum. Quum igitur virtus divina sufficiens sit ad producendos effectus naturales, superfluum est adhibere, ad eosdem effectus producendos, etiam naturales virtutes; vel, si virtus naturalis sufficienter proprium effectum producit, superfluum est quod divina virtus ad\n\neum-dem effectum agat. 3. Præterea, si Deus totum effectum naturalem producit, nihil de effectu relinquitur naturali agenti ad producendum. Non videtur igitur esse possibile quod eosdem effectus Deus producere dicatur quos\n\nres naturales producunt. Hæc autem difficultatem non afferunt, si præmissa considerentur. 1. In quolibet enim agente est duo considerare, scilicet rem ipsam quæ agit et virtutem qua agit, sicut ignis calefacit per calorem. Virtus autem inferioris agentis dependet a virtute superioris agentis, in quantum superius agens dat virtutem ipsam inferiori agenti per quam agit, vel conservat eam, aut etiam applicat eam ad agendum; sicut artifex applicat instrumentum ad proprium effectum, cui tamen interdum formam non dat per quam agit instrumentum, nec conservat, sed dat ei solum motum. Oportet igitur quod actio inferioris agentis non solum sit ab eo per virtutem propriam, sed per virtutem omnium superiorum agentium; 1 H: « Quod idem effectus. » 2 A: « Ut videtur. » agit enim in virtute omnium; et, sicut agens infimum invenitur immediatum activum, ita virtus primi agentis invenitur immediata ad producendum effectum; nam virtus infimi agentis non habet quod producat hunc effectum ex se, sed ex virtute superioris proximi, et virtus illius ex virtute superioris, et sic virtus supremi agentis invenitur ex se productiva effectus, quasi causa immediata; sicut patet in principiis demonstrationum, quorum primum est immediatum. Sicut igitur non est inconveniens quod una actio producatur ex aliquo agente et ejus virtute, ita non est inconveniens quod producatur idem effectus ab inferiori agente et a Deo, ab utroque immediate, licet alio\n\net alio modo. 2. Patet etiam quod, si res naturalis producat proprium effectum, non est superfluum quod Deus illam producat, quia res naturalis non producit ipsum nisi virtute divina. Neque est superfluum, si Deus per se ipsum potest omnes effectus producere, quod per quasdam alias causas producantur; non enim hoc est ex insufficientia divinæ virtutis, sed ex immensitate bonitatis ipsius, per quam suam similitudinem rebus communicare voluit, non solum quantum ad hoc quod essent, sed etiam quantum ad hoc quod aliorum causæ essent; his enim duobus modis creaturæ communiter omnes divinam similitudinem consequuntur, ut supra (c. xx et xxi) ostensum est. Per hoc etiam decor ordinis in\n\nrebus creatis apparet. 3. Patet autem quod non sic idem effectus causæ naturali et divinæ virtuti attribuitur quasi partim a Deo et partim a naturali agente fiat, sed totus ab utroque secundum alium modum; sicut idem effectus totus attribuitur instrumento, et principali agenti etiam totus.\n\nii, ad 111nm.) Ex his etiam apparet quod divina Providentia, quæ res gubernat, non impedit quin corruptio et defectus et malum in rebus inveniatur. 1 A: « Non corruptionem,\n\ndefectum et malum. » 4. Divina enim gubernatio, qua Deus in rebus operatur, non excludit operationem cansarum secundarum, sicut jam ostensum est (c. lxx). Contingit autem provenire defectum in effectu propter defectum causæ secundæ agentis, absque eo quod sit defectus in primo agente; sicut quum, in effectu artificis habentis perfecte artem, contingit aliquis defectus propter instrumenti defectum; et sicut hominem cujus vis motiva est fortis contingit claudicare 2, non propter defectum virtutis motivæ, sed propter tibiæ curvitatem. Contingit igitur, in his quæ aguntur et gubernantur a Deo, aliquem defectum et aliquod malum inveniri propter defectum secundorum agentium, licet in ipso Deo\n\nnullus sit defectus. 2. Amplius, Perfecta bonitas in rebus creatis non inveniretur, nisi esset ordo bonitatis in eis, ut scilicet quædam sint aliis meliora; non enim implerentur omnes gradus possibiles bonitatis, neque etiam aliqua creatura Deo assimilaretur quantum ad hoc quod alteri emineret; tolleretur etiam summus decor a rebus, si ab eis ordo distinctorum et disparium tolleretur, et, quod est amplius, tolleretur multitudo a rebus, inæqualitate bonitatis sublata, quum, per differentias quibus res ab invicem differunt, unum altero melius exsistat, sicut animatum inanimato et rationale irrationali; et sic, si æqualitas omnimoda esset in rebus, non esset nisi unum bonum creatum; quod manifeste perfectioni derogat creaturæ. Gradus autem bonitatis superior est ut aliquid sit bonum quod non possit deficere a bonitate; inferior autem eo est quod potest a bonitate deficere. Utrumque igitur gradum bonitatis perfectio universi requirit. Ad Providentiam autem gubernantis pertinet perfectionem in rebus gubernatis conservare, non autem eam minuere. Igitur non pertinet ad divinam Providentiam ut omnino excludat a rebus potentiam deficiendi a bono. Hanc autem potentiam sequitur malum; quia quod potest deficere, quando deficit; et ipse defectus boni malum est ut supra ostensum est (c. vii). Non est igitur ad divinam Providentiam pertinens ut omnino malum a\n\nrebus gubernatis prohibat. 3. Adhuc, Optimum in gubernatione qualibet est ut rebus gubernatis secun- 2 A: « Claudicare propter defectum virtutis motivæ instrumenti, vel. » dum modum suum provideatur; in hoc enim regiminis justitia consistit. Sicutigitur esset contra rationem humani regiminis si impedirentur a gubernatore civitatis hominesagere secundum sua officia, nisi forte quando ad horam propter aliquam necessitatem, ita esset contra rationem divini regiminis si non sineret res creatas agere secundum modum propria naturæ. Ex hoc autem quod creaturæ sic agunt, sequitur corruptio et malum in rebus; quum, propter contrarietatem et repugnantiam quæ est in rebus, una res sit alterius corruptiva. Non est igitur ad divinam Providentiam pertinens malum omnino a\n\nrebus gubernatis excludere. 4. Item, Impossibile est quod agens operetur aliquod malum, nisi propter hoc quod intendit aliquod bonum, sicut ex superioribus (c. 111 et 114) apparet. Prohibere autem cujuscumque boni intentionem universaliter a rebus creatis non pertinet ad Providentiam ejus qui est omnis boni causa; sic enim multa bona subtraherentur ab universitate rerum; sicut, si subtraheretur igni intentio generandi sibi simile, ad quam sequitur hoc malum quod est corruptio rerum combustibilium, tolleretur hoc bonum quod est generatio ignis et conservatio ipsius secundum suam speciem. Non est igitur Providentia malum totaliter\n\na rebus excludere. 5. Adhuc, Multa bona sunt in rebus, quæ, nisi mala essent, locum non haberent; sicut non esset patientia justorum, si non esset malignitas persequentium; nec esset locus justitia vindicativæ 1, si delicta non essent; in rebus etiam naturalibus, non esset unius generatio nisi esset alterius corruptio. Si ergo malum totaliter ab universitate rerum per divinam Providentiam excluderetur, oporteret etiam bonorum multitudinem diminui; quod esse non debet, quia virtuosius est bonum in bonitate quam in malitia malum, sicut ex superioribus (c. xii) patet. Igitur non debet per divinam Providentiam totaliter malum\n\nexcludi a rebus. 6. Amplius, Bonum totius præeminet bono partis. Ad prudentem igitur guber-natorem pertinet negligere aliquem defectum bonitatis in parte, ut fiat augmentum bonitatis in toto; sicut artifex abscondit fundamentum sub terra, ut tota domus habeat firmitatem. Sed, si malum a quibusdam partibus universi subtraheretur, multum deperiret perfectionis universi, cujus pulchritudo ex ordinata bonorum et malorum adunatione consurgit, dum mala ex bonis deficientibus proveniunt, et tamen ex eis quædam bona consequuntur ex Providentia gubernantis, sicut et silentii interpositio facit cantile-nam esse suavem. Non igitur per divinam Providentiam debuit malum\n\na rebus excludi. 7. Adhuc, Res aliæ, et præcipue inferiores, ad bonum hominis ordinantur sicut ad finem. Si autem nulla mala essent in rebus, multum de bono hominis diminueretur, et quantum ad cognitionem, et quantum ad boni desiderium vel amorem; nam bonum ex comparatione mali magis cognoscitur, et dum aliqua mala perpetrantur, ardentius bona optamus; sicut quantum bonum sit sanitas infirmi maxime cognoscunt, qui etiam ad eam magis exardent quam sani. Non igitur pertinet ad divinam Providentiam mala a\n\nrebus totaliter excludere. Propter quod dicitur : Faciens pacem, et creans malum, Isai. xlv, 7; et : Si erit malum in civitate quod Dominus\n\nnon fecerit? Amos, 111, 7. Per hoc autem excluditur quorumdam error, qui, propter hoc quod mala in mundo evenire videbant, dicebant Deum non esse; sicut Boetius introducit quem-dam philosophorum quærentem : « Si Deus est, unde mala? » De consol. philos. l. I, pros. 11. Esset autem e contrario arguendum. Si malum est, Deus est. Non enim esset malum, sublato ordine boni, cujus privatio est malum; hic autem ordo non esset, si\n\nDeus non esset. Tollitur etiam et erroris occasio, per præmissa, illis qui divinam Providentiam ad hæc corruptibilia extendi negabant, propter hoc quod in eis multa mala advenire conspiciebant; sola autem incor- 1 A, B, C, D, E, F, H, I, J : « Vindicanti. » — G : « Vindicantis. » Non quemdam Philosophum introducit Boetius, sed seipsum Philosophiæ dicentem : « Ea est maxima nostri causa mœroris quod cum reum bonus rector existat, vel esse omnino mala possint, vel impunita prætereant. » — De conso-latione Philosophiæ, lib. IV, Prosa 1, tom. I, col. 786. Recte tamen S. Thomas scripsit : « Boetius introducit quem-dam Philosophum; » nam Boetius non suas, sed variorum Philosophorum varias objectiones in libro illo pulcherrimo tradit. ruptibilia divinæ Providentia subdi dicebant, in quibus nullus defectus nec malum aliquod inveniuntur. Per hoc etiam tollitur errandi occasio Manichæis, qui duo prima principia agentia posuerunt, bonum et malum, quasi malum sub Providentia boni Dei locum\n\nhabere non posset. Solvitur etiam quorumdam dubitatio, utrum scilicet actiones malæ sint a Deo. Nam, quum ostensum sit omne agens actionem suam producere, in quantum agit virtute divina, et ex hoc Deum esse omnium et effectuum et etiam actionum causam; itemque ostensum sit (c. LXX) quod malum et defectus in his quæ Providentia divina reguntur accidat ex conditione secundarum causarum, in quibus potest esse defectus, manifestum est quod actiones malæ, secundum quod deficientes sunt, non sunt a Deo, sed a causis proximis deficientibus; quantum autem ad id quod de actione et de entitate habent, oportet quod sint a Deo; sicut claudicatio est a virtute motiva quantum ad id quod habet de motu, quantum vero ad id quod habet de defectu est ex curvitate cruris.\n\ncontingentiam a rebus. Sicut autem divina Providentia non excludit universaliter malum a rebus, ita etiam non excludit contingentiam, nec necessitatem rebus\n\nimponit. 1. Jam enim ostensum est (c. LXX) quod operatio Providentia, qua Deus operatur in rebus, non excludit causas secundas, sed per eas impletur, in quantum agunt virtute Dei. Ex causis autem proximis aliqui effectus dicuntur necessarii vel contingentes, non autem ex remotis causis; nam fructificatio plantæ est effectus contingens propter causam proximam, quæ est vis germinativa, quæ potest impediri et deficere, quamvis causa remota, scilicet sol, sit causa ex necessitate agens. Quum igitur inter causas proximas multa sint quæ deficere possunt, non omnes effectus qui Providentia subduntur erunt necessarii, sed\n\nplurimi sunt contingentes. 2. Adhuc, Ad divinam Providentiam pertinet ut gradus entium qui possibiles sunt adimpleantur, ut ex supradictis (c. LXXI) patet. Ens autem dividitur per contingens et necessarium; et est per se divisio entis. Si igitur divina Providentia excluderet omnem contingentiam, non omnes\n\ngradus entium conservarentur. 3. Amplius, Quanto aliqua sunt propinquiora Deo, tanto magis de ejus similitudine participant; et quanto magis distant, tanto magis a similitudine ipsius deficiunt. Illa autem quæ sunt Deo propinquissima sunt omnino immobilia, scilicet substantiæ separatæ, quæ maxime ad Dei similitudinem accedunt, qui est omnino immobilis; ea autem quæ sunt his proxima et moventur immediate ab his, quæ semper eodem modo habent, quamdam immobilitatis speciem retinent in hoc quod semper eodem modo moventur, sicut corpora cælestia. Sequitur ergo quod ea quæ consequuntur ad ista, et ab eis sunt mota, longius ab immobilitate Dei distant, ut scilicet non semper eodem modo moveantur; et in hoc ordinis pulchritudo apparet. Omne autem necessarium, in quantum hujusmodi, semper eodem modo se habet. Repugnaret igitur divina Providentia, ad quam pertinet ordinem in rebus statuere etconservare, si omnia\n\nex necessitate evenirent. 4. Præterea, Quod necessarium est esse semper est. Nullum autem corruptibile semper est. Si igitur divina Providentia hoc requirit quod omnia sint necessaria, sequitur quod nihil sit in rebus corruptibile, et, per consequens, nec generabile. Subtrahetur ergo a rebus tota pars generabilium et corruptibilium; quod perfectioni\n\nderogat universi. 5. Aduc, In omni motu est quædam generatio et corruptio; nam in eo quod movetur, aliquid incipit et aliquid desinit esse. Si ergo omnis generatio et corruptio subtraheretur, subtracta contingentia rerum omnium, ut ostensum est, consequens est quod et motus subtraheretur a rebus,\n\net omnia mobilia. 6. Item, Debilitatio virtutis alicujus substantiæ, et ejus impedimentum ex aliquo contrario agente, est ex aliqua ejus immutatione. Si ergo divina Providentia non impedit motum a rebus, neque etiam impedietur debilitatio virtutis ipsarum aut A: « Removet. » A: « Nec imponit necessitatem. » impedimentum ex resistentia alterius. Ex virtutis autem debilitate et ejus impedimento contingit quod res naturalis non semper eodem modo operatur, sed quandoque deficit ab eo quod competit sibi secundum suam naturam, ut sic naturales effectus non ex necessitate proveniant. Non igitur pertinet ad Providentiam divinam quod rebus\n\nprovisis necessitatem imponat. 7. Amplius, In his quae Providentia debite reguntur, non debet esse aliquid frustra. Quumigitur manifestum sit causas aliquas esse contingentes ex eo quod impediri possunt ut non producant suos effectus, patet quod contra rationem Providentia esset quod omnia ex necessitate contingentent. Non igitur divina Providentia necessitatem rebus imponit, contingentiam a rebus universaliter excludens.\n\nad 4um.) Ex quo etiam patet quod Providentia divina voluntatis libertati\n\nnon repugnat. 1. Cujuslibet enim gubernantis prudentis gubernatio ad perfectionem rerum gubernatarum ordinatur vel adipiscendam vel augendam vel conservandam. Quod igitur perfectionis est magis conservandum est per Providentiam quam quod est imperfectionis et defectus. In rebus autem inanimatis, causarum contingentia ex imperfectione et defectu est; secundum enim suam naturam, sunt determitatæ ad unum effectum, quem semper consequuntur, nisi sit impedimentum, vel ex debilitate virtutis, vel ex aliquo exteriori agente, vel ex materiae indispositione; et propter hoc causæ naturales agentes non sunt ad utrumque, sed ut frequentius eodem modo suum effectum producunt, deficiunt autem raro. Quod autem voluntas sit causa contingens, ex ipsius perfectione provenit, quia non habet virtutem limitatam ad unum, sed habet in potestate producere hunc effectum vel illum; propter quod est contingens ad utrumlibet. Magis igitur pertinet ad Providentiam divinam conservare libertatem voluntatis quam contingentiam\n\nin naturalibus causis. 2. Amplius, Ad Providentiam divinam pertinet ut rebus utatur secundum modum earum. Modus autem agendi cujuslibet rei consequitur formam ejus, quæ est principium actionis. Forma autem per quam agit voluntarie agens non est determinata; agit enim voluntas per formam apprehensam ab intellectu; nam bonum apprehensum movet voluntatem ut ejus objectum; intellectus autem non habet unam formam effectus determinatam, sed de ratione sua est ut multitudinem formarum comprehendat; et propter hoc voluntas multiformes effectus producere potest. Non igitur ad rationem Providentiae pertinet quod\n\nexcludat libertatis voluntatem. 3. Item, Per gubernationem cujus-cumque providentis res gubernatæ deducuntur ad finem convenientem; unde et de Providentia divina Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, De philos. l. VIII, c. ii, quod est « voluntas Dei per quam omnia quæ sunt convenientem deductionem acci-piunt. » Finis autem ultimus cujuslibet creaturæ est ut consequatur divinam similitudinem, sicut supra (c. xvii) ostensum est. Esset igitur divina Providentiae repugnans si alicui rei subtraheretur illud per quod assequitur divinam similitudinem. Agens autem voluntarium assequitur divinam similitudinem in hoc quod libere agit; ostensum est enim, l. I, c. lxxxviii, liberum arbitrium in Deo esse. Non igitur per Providentiam\n\nsubtrahitur voluntatis libertas. 4. Adhuc, Providentia est multiplicativa bonorum in rebus gubernatis. Illud ergo per quod multa bona subtraherentur a rebus non pertinet ad Providentiam. Si autem libertas voluntatis tolleretur, multa bona suhtraherentur; tolleretur enim laus virtutis humanæ, quæ nulla est si homo libere non agat; tolleretur etiam justitia præmiantis et punientis, si non libere homo ageret bonum vel malum; cessaret etiam circumspectio in consilis, quæ de his quæ ex necessitate aguntur frustra tractarentur. Esset igitur contra Providentiae rationem si\n\nsubtraheretur voluntatis libertas. Hinc est quod dicitur: Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit illum in manu consili sui, Eccli. xv, 14; et iterum: Ante hominem vita et mors, bonum et malum quod placuerit ei, dabitur illi, Ibid. xv, 18. 1 A omittit: «\n\nCausis. » Per hoc autem excluditur error et opinio Stoicorum, qui secundum ordinem quemdam causarum intransgressibilem, quem Græci ymarmenem vocabant, omnia ex necessitate dicebant provenire.\n\ncasum et fortunam. Ex præmissis etiam apparet quod divina Providentia non subtrahit a rebus\n\ncasum et fortunam. 1. In his enim quæ in minori parte accident dicuntur esse fortuna et casus. Si autem non provenirent aliqua ut in minori parte, omnia ex necessitate accident; nam ea quæ sunt contingentia ut in pluribus in hoc solo a necessariis differunt, quod possunt in minori parte deficere. Esset autem contra rationem divinæ Providentiae si omnia ex necessitate contingentent, ut (c. LXXII) ostensum est. Igitur et contra rationem Providentiae divinæ esset si nihil fieret fortuitum et\n\ncasuale in rebus. 2. Amplius, Contra rationem Providentiae esset si res Providentiae subjecte non agerent propter finem, quum Providentiae sit omnia ordinare in finem; esset etiam contra perfectionem universi. si nulla res corruptibilis esset, nec aliqua virtus deficere potens, ut ex supradictis (c. LXXI et LXXII) patet. Ex hoc autem quod aliquod agens propter finem deficit ab eo quod intendit, sequitur aliqua casu contingere. Esset igitur contra rationem Providentiae et perfectionis rerum, si non essent\n\naliqua casualia. 3. Adhuc, Multitudo et diversitas causarum ex ordine Providentiae divinæ et dispositionis procedit. Supposita autem causarum dispositione, oportet unam alteri quando concurrere, per quam impediatur vel juvetur ad suum effectum producendum. Ex concursu autem duarum causarum vel plurium contingit aliquid casualiter evenire, dum finis non intentus ex concursu alicujus causæ provenit; sicut inventio debitoris ab eo qui ibat ad forum, causa emendi aliquid, provenit ex hoc quod debitor etiam ad forum venit. Non est igitur divinæ Providentiae contrarium quod sint aliqua fortuita et\n\ncausalia in rebus. 4. Item, Quod non est non potest esse alicujus causa; unde oportet quod unum-quodque, sicut se habet ad esse, ita se habeat ad hoc quod sit causa. Oportet igitur quod, secundum diversitatem ordinis in entibus, sit diversitas etiam ordinis in causis. Ad perfectionem autem rerum requiritur quod non solum sint in rebus entia per se, sed etiam entia per accidens; res enim quæ non habent in sua substantia ultimam perfectionem oportet quod perfectionem aliquam consequantur per accidentia, et tanto per plura quanto magis a Dei simplicitate distant. Ex hoc autem quod aliquod subjectum habet multa accidentia, sequitur quod sit aliquod ens per accidens; nam subjectum et accidens, et etiam duo accidentia unius subjecti, sunt unum per accidens; sicut homo albus, et musicum album. Oportet igitur ad perfectionem rerum quod sint etiam quædam causæ per accidens. Ea autem quæ ex causis aliquibus procedunt per accidens dicuntur accidere a casu vel a fortuna. Non est igitur contra rationem Providentiae, quæ perfectionem rerum conservat, ut aliqua fiant vel\n\ncasu vel fortuna. 5. Præterea, Ad ordinem divinæ Providentiae pertinet ut sit ordo et gradus in causis. Quanto autem est aliqua superior causa, tanto est majoris virtutis; unde ejus causalitas ad plura se extendit. Nullius autem causæ naturalis intentio se extendit ultra virtutem ejus; esset enim frustra. Oportet ergo quod intentio causæ particularis non se extendat ad omnia quæ contingere possunt. Ex hoc autem contingit aliquid casualiter vel fortuito quod eveniunt aliqua præter intentionem agentium. Ordo igitur divinæ Providentiae exigit quod sit casus et\n\nfortuna in rebus. Hinc est quod dicitur: Vidi nec velocium esse cursum, nec fortium bellum, nec sapientium panem, nec doctorum divitias, nec artificum gratiam; sed tempus casumque in omnibus, Eccle. ix, 11, scilicet inferioribus.\n\nXXII, a. I.) Ex his autem quæ ostensa sunt manifestum fit quod divina Providentia prove- 1 A: « Substrahit. » 2 A: « Dispositione. » nit usque ad singularia\n\ngenerabilium et corruptibilium. 1. Non enim videtur horum non esse Providentiam, nisi propter eorum contingentiam, et quia in eis multa casualiter et fortuito eveniunt; in hoc enim solum differunt ab incorruptibilibus et universalibus corruptibilium, quorum dicunt Providentiam esse. Providentiae autem non repugnat contingentia et causus et fortuna, et neque $^4$ voluntarium, ut ostensum est (c. LxxII, LxxIII et LxxIV). Nihiligitur prohibet horum Providentiam esse, sicut\n\nincorruptibilium et universalium. 2. Adhuc, Si Deus horum singularium providentiam non habet, aut hoc est quia non cognoscit ea, aut quia non potest, aut quia non vult horum curam habere. — Non autem potest dici quod Deus singularia non cognoscat; ostensum enim est supra (l. I, c. Lxv) quod Deus eorum notitiam habet. — Nec etiam potest dici quod Deus eorum curam habere non possit, quum ejus potentia sit infinita, ut supra probatum est (l. I, c. xxvIII), neque etiam hæc singularia gubernationis non capacia sunt, quum videamus ea gubernari rationis industria, sicut patet in hominibus, et per naturalem instinctum, sicut patet in apibus et multis animalibus brutis, quæ quodam naturali instinctu gubernantur. — Neque etiam potest dici quod Deus non velit ea gubernare, quum voluntas ipsius sit universaliter omnis boni; bonum autem eorum quæ gubernantur in ordine gubernationis maxime consistit. Non igitur potest dici quod Deus horum singularium\n\ncuram non habet. 3. Amplius, Omnes causæ secundæ, in hoc quod causæ exsistunt, divinam similitudinem consequuntur, ut ex supradicis (c. xxI) patet. Invenitur autem hoc communiter, in causis producentibus aliquid, quod curam habent eorum quæ producunt; sicut animalia naturaliter nutriunt fetus suos. Deus igitur curam habet eorum quorum causa exsistit. Est autem causa etiam istorum particnlarium, ut ex supradicis (l. II, c. xv) patet. Habet igitur eorum curam. 4. Item, Ostensum est supra (l. II, c. xxIII et xxIV) quod Deus in rebus creatis non ex necessitate naturæ agit, sed per voluntatem et intellectum. Ea autem quæ aguntur per voluntatem et intellectum curæ providentis subduntur, quæ in hoc consistere videtur quod per intellectum aliqua dispensentur. Divinæ ergo Providentiae subduntur ea quæ ab Ipso\n\naguntur. Ostensum est autem supra (c. Lxx) quod Deus operatur in omnibus causis secundis, et omnes rerum effectus reducuntur in Deum sicut in causam; et sic oportet quod ea quæ in istis singularibus aguntur sint sicut ipsius opera. Igitur hæc singularia, et motus et operationes ipsorum,\n\ndivinæ Providentiae subjacent. 5. Præterea, Stulta est Providentia alicujus qui non curat ea sine quibus ea quæ curat non possunt esse. Constat autem quod, si omnia deficerent particularia, universalia eorum remanere non possent. Si igitur Deus universalia tantum curat, singularia $^2$ vero ista omnino derelinquit, stulta et imperfecta\n\nerit ejus Providentia. — Si autem dicat aliquis quod horum singularium Deus curam habet usque ad hoc quod conserventur in esse, non autem quantum ad alia, hoc omnino esse non potest. Nam omnia alia quæ circa singularia accidunt ad eorum conservationem vel corruptionem ordidantur. Si ergo Deus habet curam singularium quantum ad eorum conservationem, habet etiam curam omnium\n\ncirca ea contigentium. — Potest autem aliquis dicere quod sola cura universalium sufficit ad particularium conservationem in esse; provisa sunt enim cuilibet speciei ea per quæ quodlibet individuum illius speciei potest conservari in esse; sicut data sunt animalibus organa ad cibum sumendum et digerendum, et cornua ad protegendum se; utilitates autem horum non deficiunt nisi in minori parte, quum ea quæ sunt a natura producant effectus suos vel semper vel frequenter; et sic non possunt omnia individua deficere,\n\netsi aliquod deficiat. — Sed, secundum hanc rationem, omnia quæ circa individua contingunt Providentiae subjacebunt, sicut et conservatio eorum in esse; quia singulari alicujus speciei nihil potest accidere quod non reducatur aliquo modo ad principia illius speciei. Sic igitur singularia non magis subjacent divinæ Providentiae, quantum ad conservationem in esse, quam quantum ad alia. $^1$ A: « Neque etiam. » $^2$ A: « Singularia non, sed ea omnia,\n\nomnino derelinquit, stulta. » 6. Præterea, In comparatione rerum ad finem, talis ordo apparet quod accidentia sunt propter substantias, ut per ea perficientur. In substantiis autem, materia est propter formam; per hanc enim participat divinam bonitatem, propter quam omnia facta sunt, ut supra (c. xviii) ostensum est. Ex quo patet quod particularia sunt propter naturam universalem; cujus signum est quod, in his in quibus potest natura universalis conservari per unum individuum, non sunt multa individua unius speciei, sicut patet in luna et sole. Quum autem Providentia sit ordinativa aliquorum in finem, ideo oportet quod ad Providentiam pertineant et fines et ea quæ sunt ad finem. Subjacent ergo Providentia non solum universalia,\n\nsed etiam singularia. 7. Adhuc, Hæc est differentia inter speculativam cognitionem et practicam quod cognitio speculativa et ea quæ ad ipsam pertinent perficiuntur in universali; ea vero quæ pertinent ad cognitionem practicam perficiuntur in particulari; nam finis speculativæ est veritas, quæ primo et per se et in immaterialibus consistit et in universalibus; finis vero practicæ est operatio, quæ est circa singularia; unde medicus non curat hominem in universali, sed hunc hominem, et ad hoc est tota scientia medicinae ordinata. Constat autem quod Providentia ad practiam cognitionem pertinet, quum sit ordinativa rerum in finem. Esset igitur imperfecta Dei Providentia, si in universalibus consisteret et usque ad\n\nsingularia non perveniret. 8. Item, Cognitio speculativa magis perficitur in universali quam in particulari, quia magis sciuntur universalia quam particularia; et propter hoc universalissimorum principiorum cognitio est communis. Ille vero est perfectior in scientia speculativa qui, non solum universale, sed propriam cognitionem de rebus habet; nam qui cognoscit in universali tantum, cognoscit rem solum in potentia; propter quod discipulus de universali cognitione principiorum reducitur in propriam cognitionum conclusionem per magistrum, qui utramque cognitionem habet, sicut aliquid reducitur de potentia in actum per ens actu. Multo igitur magis in scientia practica perfectior est qui, non solum in universali, sed etiam in particulari, res disponit ad actum. Divina igitur Providentia, quæ est perfectissima, usque ad singularia\n\nse extendit. 9. Amplius, Quum Deus sit causa entis, in quantum est ens, ut supra (l. II, c. xv) ostensum est, oportet quod ipse sit provisor entis, in quantum est ens; providet enim rebus, in quantum est causa earum. Quidquid ergo quocumque modo est sub ejus Providentia cadit. Singularia autem sunt entia, et magis quam universalia non subsistunt per se, sed sunt solum in singularibus. Est igitur divina\n\nProvidentia etiam singularium. 10. Item, Creaturæ divinæ Providentia subduntur prout ab Ipso in finem ultimum ordinantur, qui est bonitas sua. Participatio igitur divinæ bonitatis a rebus creatis est per divinam Providentiam. Bonitatem autem divinam participant etiam singularia contingentia. Oportet ergo quod etiam ad ea divina\n\nProvidentia se extendat. Hinc est quod dicitur: Nonne duo passeres asse veneunt? et unus ex illis non cadet super terram sine Patre vestro, Matth. x, 27, et: Attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, Sap. vii, 4, id est a primis creatis usque ad infima eorum. — Arguitur etiam opinio quorumdam qui dicebant: Dereliquit Dominus terram, et Dominus non videt, Ezech. ix, 9; et: Nec nostra considerat, et circa cardines cœli\n\nperambulat, Job, xxii, 14. Per hoc autem excluditur opinio quorumdam qui dixerunt quod divina Providentia non se extendit usque ad hæc singularia; quam quidem opinionem qui dam Aristoteli imponunt, licet ex verbis ejus haberi non possit.\n\nxxii, a. iii.) Quidam autem concesserunt Providentiam divinam usque ad hæc singularia procedere, sed quibusdam mediantibus causis. Posuit enim Plato, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, De philos. l. VIII, c. iii, triplicem Providentiam. Quarum prima est summi Dei, quæ primo et principaliter providet propriis, id est omnibus A: « Creaturis. » spiritualibus et intellectualibus, consequent vero toti mundo quantum ad genera et species et universales causas, quæ sunt corpora cælestia. Secunda vero est, qua providetur singularibus animalium et plantarum et eorum generabilium et corruptibilium, quantum ad eorum generationem et corruptionem et mutationes alias; quam quidem providentiam Plato attribuit diis qui cælum circumeunt; Aristoteles vero, De gener. et corrupt. II, c. xi, horum qualitatem attribuit obliquo circulo. Tertiam vero providentiam ponit rerum quæ ad humanam vitam pertinent; quam quidem attribuit quibusdam dæmonibus circa terram existentibus, qui, secundum ipsum, humanarum actionum sunt custodes. — Sed tamen, secundum Platonem, secunda et tertia providentia a prima dependent; nam Deus summus secundos et\n\ntertios statuit provisores. Hæc autem positio catholicæ fidei consonat, quantum ad hoc quod omnium providentiam reducit in Deum sicut in primum auctorem. Videtur autem sententiæ fidei repugnare, quantum ad hoc quod non omnia particularia divinæ Providentiae dicit esse subjecta. Quod ex\n\nprædictis ostendi potest. 1. Habet enim Deus immediatam singularium cognitionem, non quasi ea in suis causis cognoscens tantum, sed etiam in seipsis, sicut in primo hujus operis libro (c. lxv) est ostensum. Inconveniens autem videtur quod, singularia cognoscens, eorum ordinem non velit, in quo bonum præcipuum rerum constat, quum voluntas sua sit totius bonitatis principium. Oportet igitur quod, sicut immediate singularia cognoscit, ita immediate\n\neorum ordinem statuat. 2. Amplius, Ordo qui per Providentiam in rebus gubernatis statuitur ex ordine illo provenit quem provisor in sua mente disposuit, sicut et forma artis quæ fit in materia ab ea procedit quæ est in mente artificis. Oportet autem, ubi sunt multi provisores, unus sub alio, quod ordinem contentum superior inferiori tradat, sicut ars inferior accipit principia a superiori. Si igitur secundi et tertii provisores ponuntur esse sub primo provisore, qui est Deus summus, oportet quod or-dinem statuendum in rebus a summo Deo accipiant. Non est autem possibile quod iste ordo sit in eis perfectior quam in summo Deo: quinimo omnes perfectiones per modum descensus ab eo in alia proveniunt, ut ex superioribus (lxix) patet. Oportet autem quod ordo rerum sit in secundis provisoribus, non solum in universali, sed etiam quantum ad singularia: alias, non possent sua providentia in singularibus ordinem statuere. Multo igitur magis ordo singularium est\n\nin divinæ Providentiae dispositione. 3. Adhuc, In his quæ humana providentia reguntur, inventur quod aliquis superior provisor circa quædam magna universalia per seipsum excogitat qualiter sint ordinanda, minorum vero ordinem ipse non excogitat, sed aliis inferioribus excogitatum relinquit; et hoc quidem contingit propter ejus defectum in quantum vel singularium minorum conditiones ignorat vel non sufficit ad omnium ordinem excogitatum, propter laborem et temporis prolixitatem quæ requireretur. Hujusmodi autem defectus longe sunt a Deo; nam ipse omnia singularia cognoscit, nec intelligendo laborat aut tempus requirit, quum intelligendo seipsum omnia alia cognoscat, sicut supra (l. I, c. l et xlvi) ostensum est. Ipse igitur omnium singularium ordinem excogitat; ejus igitur Providentia est\n\nomnium singularium immediate. 4. Item, In rebus humanis, inferiores provisores per suam industriam ordinem excogitat in his quorum gubernatio eis a præsidente committitur, quam quidem industriam a præsidente homine non habent, sed usum ipsius; si vero a superiore eam haberent, jam ordinatio per superiorem fieret, ipsi autem essent illius ordinationis non provisores, sed exsecutores. Constat autem per supradicta (l. I, c. l1; l. III, c. lxvii) quod omnis sapientia et intellectus a summo Deo in omnibus intellectibus causatur; nec intellectus aliquis potest aliquid intelligere nisi virtute divina, sicut nec aliquod agens operatur nisi in quantum agit virtute Ipsius. Est igitur ipse Deus immediate sua Providentia omnia dispensans; quicumque vero sub ipso provisores dicuntur sunt Providentiae ipsius exsecutores. 1 Sic cod. Berg. — Edit. : « Per. » 2 Sic A, et cod. Berg. — Edit. : « Habere non possunt. » — B, C, D, E, F : « Habere non ha-bent. » sed in D : « Habere » expurgandum notatur. 3 A, B, C, D, E,\n\nF : « Nec usum. » 5. Præterea, Superior providentia dat regulas providentiæ inferiori, sicut politicus dat regulas et leges duci exercitus, qui dat regulas et leges centurionibus et tribunis. Si igitur sub prima Providentia Dei summi sunt aliæ providentiæ, oportet quod Deus illis secundis vel tertiis provisoribus det regulas sui regiminis. — Aut ergo dat regulas et leges universales, vel particulares. — Si autem dat eis universales regulas regiminis, quum universales regulæ non possint semper ad particularia applicari, et maxime in rebus mobilibus, quæ non semper eodem modo se habent, oporteret quod illi provisores secundi vel tertii quandoque præter regulas sibi datas ordinarent de rebus suæ provisioni subjectis. Haberent ergo judicium super regulas acceptas, quando secundum eas oporteret agere et quando eas præterittere oporteret; quod esse non potest, quia hoc judicium ad superiorem pertinet; nam ejus est interpretari leges et dispensare in eis cujus est eas condere. Hoc igitur judicium de regulis universalisibus datis oportet quod fiat per supremum provisorem; quod quidem esse non posset, si se ordinationi singularium immediate non immisceret. Oportet igitur, secundum hoc, quod sit horum immediatus provisor. — Si vero secundi vel tertii provisores a summo provisore particulares regulas et leges accipiunt, manifeste apparet quod horum singularium ordinatio sit immediate\n\nper Providentiam divinam. 6. Amplius, Semper provisor habet judicium de his quæ ab inferioribus provisoribus ordinantur, utrum sint bene ordinata necne. Si igitur secundi provisores vel tertii sint sub Deo primo provisore, oportet quod Deus judicium haeat de his quæ ab eis ordinantur; quod quidem esse non potest, si horum singularium ordinem non considerat. Habet igitur Ipse per seipsum\n\ncuram de singularibus. 7. Adhuc, Si Deus per seipsum immediate inferiora singularia non curat, ideo est vel quia ea despicit vel ne ejus dignitas inquinetur, utquidam dicunt, Averrh., Metaphys. Hoc autem irrationabile est; nam dignius est provide aliquorum ordinationem excogitare quam in eis operari. Si igitur Deus in omnibus operatur, sicut supra (c. LXXVII) ostensum est, nec in hoc aliquid ejus dignitati derogatur, quin imo pertinet ad ejus universalem et summam virtutem, nullo modo despiciendum est ei, vel ejus dignitatem commaculat, si circa hæc singularia\n\nimmediate providentiam habeat. 8. Item, Omnis sapiens qui provide sua virtute utitur, in agendo moderatur suæ virtutis usum, ordinans ad quid et quantum proveniat; alias, virtus in agendo sapientiam non sequeretur. Constat autem ex præmissis (c. LXXV et LXXVI) quod divina virtus, in operando, usque ad infima rerum pervenit. Igitur divina sapientia est ordinativa qui et quot et qualiter ex ejus virtute progrediantur effectus, etiam in infimis rebus. Est igitur Ipse immediate sua Providentia omnium rerum\n\nordinem excogitans. Hinc est quod dicitur: Quæ autem sunt, a Deo ordinata sunt, Rom. xiii, 1; et: Tu fecisti priora, et illa post illa cogitasti; et hoc factum est quod ipse voluisti, Judith. ix, 4.\n\nmediantibus causis secundis. 4. Attendendum est autem quod ad Providentiam duo requiruntur, ordinatio scilicet et ordinis exsecutio. Quorum primum fit per virtutem cognoscitivam; unde qui perfectioris cognitionis sive cognitationis sunt, ordinatores aliorum dicuntur; sapientis enim est ordinare. Secundum vero fit per virtutem operativam. Et contrario autem se habet in his duobus; nam tanto perfectior est ordinatio quanto magis descendit ad minima; minimorum autem exsecutio condecet inferiorem virtutem effectui proportionatam. In Deo autem, quantum ad utrumque, summa perfectio inventur; est enim in eo perfectissima sapientia ad ordinandum et virtus perfectissima ad operandum. Oportet ergo quod Ipse per sapientiam suam omnium ordines disponat, etiam minimorum; exsequatur vero minima sive infima per alias inferiores virtutes, per quas Ipse operatur, sicut virtus universalis et altior per inferiorem et particularem virtutem. Conveniens est 1 A, C, F: « Minorum. » igitur quod sint inferiores virtutes agentes, divinæ Providentiae\n\nexsecutrices. 2. Item, Ostensum est supra (c. Lxix) quod divina operatio non excludit operationes causarum secundarum. Ea vero quæ ex operationibus secundarum causarum provenient divinæ Providentiae subjacent, quum Deus omnia singularia ordinet per seipsum, ut supra (c. Lxxvi) ostensum est. Sunt igitur secundæ causæ\n\ndivinæ Providentiae exsecutrices. 3. Adhuc, Quanto virtus alicujus agentis est fortior, tanto in magis remota suam operationem extendit; sicut ignis, quanto est major, tanto magis calefacit. Hoc autem non contingit in agente quod non agit per medium, quia quodlibet in quod agit est sibi proximum. Quum igitur virtus divinæ Providentiae sit maxima, per aliqua media ad ultimum suam\n\noperationem producere debet. 4. Amplius, Ad dignitatem regentis pertinet ut habeat multos ministros et diversos sui regiminis exsecutores; quia tanto altius et magis suum dominium ostendetur quanto plures in diversis gradibus ei subduntur. Nulla autem dignitas alicujus regentis est comparabilis dignitati divini regiminis. Conveniens igitur est quod per diversos gradus agentium fiat\n\ndivinæ Providentiae exsecutio. 5. Praeterea, Convenientia ordinis perfectionem Providentiae demonstrat, quum ordo sit proprius effectus Providentiae. Ad convenientiam autem ordinis pertinet ut nihil inordinatum relinquatur. Perfectio igitur divinæ Providentiae requirit ut excessum aliquarum rerum supra alias ad ordinem convenientem reducat. Hoc autem fit quum ex superabundantia aliquorum magis habentium provenit aliquod bonum minus habentibus. Quum igitur perfectio universi requirat quod quædam aliis abundantius divinam bonitatem participent, ut supra (l. II, c. Lxv) ostensum est, exigit divinæ Providentiae perfectio ut, per ea quæ plenius divinam bonitatem participant, exsecutio\n\ndivini regiminis compleatur. 6. Adhuc, Nobiliar est ordo causarum quam effectuum, sicut causa potior est effectu. Magis igitur in eo perfectio Providentiae demonstratur. Si autem non essent aliquæ causæ media exsequentes divinam Providentiam, non esset in rebus ordo causarum, sed effectuum tantum. Exigit igitur divinæ Providentiae perfectio quod sint causæ\n\nmedia exsequentes ipsum. Hinc est quod dicitur: Benedicite Domino, omnes virtutes ejus, ministri ejus, Psalm. cii, 21; et alibi: Ignis, grando, nix, glacies, spiritus procellarum, quæ faciunt verbum ejus, Psalm. cxLVIII, 8.\n\nreguntur a Deo. 1. Quia vero ad Providentiam divinam pertinet ut ordo servetur in rebus, congruus autem ordo est ut a supremis ad infima descendatur proportionaliter, oportet quod divina Providentia secundum quamdam proportionem usque ad res ultimas perveniat. Hæc autem proportio est ut, sicut supremæ creaturæ sunt sub Deo et gubernantur ab ipso, ita inferiores creaturæ sint sub superioribus et regantur ab ipsis. Inter omnes autem creaturas sunt supremæ intellectuales, ut ex superioribus (l. II, c. xlix) patet. Exigit igitur providentiae ratio ut cæteræ creaturæ per\n\ncreaturas rationales regantur. 2. Amplius, Quæcumque creatura exsequitur divinæ Providentiae ordinem hoc habet in quantum participat aliquid de virtute sibi providentis; sicut instrumentum non movet, nisi in quantum per motum participat aliquid de virtute principalis agentis. Quæ igitur amplius de virtute divinæ Providentiae participant sunt exsecutivæ divinæ Providentiae in illa quæ minus participant. Creaturæ autem intellectuales plus aliis de ipsa participant; nam, quum ad Providentiam requiratur dispositio ordinis, quæ fit per cognoscitivam virtutem, et exsecutio, quæ fit per operativam (c. Lxxvii); creaturæ rationales utramque virtutem participant; reliquæ vero creaturæ, virtutem operativam tantum. Per creaturas igitur rationales omnes aliæ creaturæ sub\n\ndivina Providentia reguntur. 3. Adhuc, Cuicumque a Deo datur aliqua virtus, datur ei in ordine ad effectum ipsius virtutis; sic enim optime omnia disponuntur, dum unumquodque ordinatur ad omnia bona quæ ex ipso nata sunt provenire. Virtus autem intellectiva de se est ordinativa et regitiva, unde videmus quod, quando conjunguntur in eo- dem, virtus operativa sequitur regimen virtutis intellectivæ; sicut in homine videmus quod ad imperium voluntatis movetur membrum. Item etiam apparet, si in diversis exsistant; nam illi homines qui excedunt in virtute operativa oportet quod dirigantur ab illis qui in virtute intellectiva excedunt. Exigit igitur divinæ Providentia ratio quod creaturæ aliæ per\n\ncreaturas intellectuales regantur. 4. Item, Virtutes particulares natæ sunt moveri a virtutibus universalibus, ut patet tam in arte quam in natura. Constat autem quod virtus intellectiva est universalior omni alia virtute operativa; nam virtus intellectiva continet formas universales, omnis autem virtus operativa tantum est ex aliqua propria forma operantis. Oportet igitur quod per virtutes intellectuales moveantur et regantur\n\nomnes aliæ creaturæ. 5. Præterea, In omnibus potentiis ordinatis, una est directiva alterius, quæ magis rationem cognoscit; unde videmus, in artibus, quod ars illa ad quam pertinet finis, ex quo sumitur ratio totius artificii, dirigit illam et imperat ei quæ artificium operatur, sicut ars gubernatoria navifactivæ, et illa quæ formam inducit imperat ei quæ materiam disponit; instrumenta autem quæ non cognoscunt aliquam rationem reguntur tantum. Quum ergo solæ intellectuales creaturæ rationes ordinis rerum creatarum cognoscere possint, earum erit regere et gubernare\n\nomnes alias creaturas. 6. Adhuc, Quod est per se est causa ejus quod est per aliud. Solæ autem creaturæ intellectuales operantur per seipsas, utpote suarum operationum per liberum voluntatis arbitrium dominæ existentes; aliæ vero creaturæ ex necessitate naturæ operantur, tanquam ab alio motæ. Creaturæ igitur intellectuales per suam operationem sunt motivæ et regitivæ aliarum creaturarum.\n\nreguntur per superiores. 1. Quum autem inter creaturas intellectuales quædam sint aliis altiores, ut ex superioribus patet (l. II, c. xcII-xcv), oportet quod inferiores intellectualium naturarum per\n\nsuperiores gubernentur. 2. Adhuc, Virtutes magis universales XII. sunt motivæ virtutum particularium, ut dictum est (c. lxxvIII). Superiores autem inter intellectuales naturas habent formas magis universales, ut supra (l. II, c. xcVIII) ostensum est. Sunt igitur regitivæ\n\ninferiorum intellectualium naturarum. 3. Item, Potentia intellectiva quæ est propinquior principio semper inventur regitiva intellectualis virtutis quæ magis a principio distat; quod quidem apparet tam in scientiis speculativis quam in activis; nam scientia speculativa, quæ accipit ab alia principia ex quibus demonstrat, dicitur esse illi subalternata, et scientia activa, quæ est propinquior fini, qui est principium in operativis, est architectonica respectu magis distantis. Quum ergo inter intellectuales substantias quædam sint primo principio, scilicet Deo, propinquiores, ut supra (l. II, c. xcII-xcv) ostensum est, ipsæ\n\nerunt aliarum regitivæ. 4. Adhuc, Superiores intellectuales substantia perfectius divinæ sapientiae influentiam in seipsis recipiunt, quum unum-quodque recipiat aliquid secundum modum suum. Per sapientiam autem divinam omnia gubernantur; et sic oportet quod ea quæ magis participant divinam sapientiam sint gubernativa corum quæ minus participant. Substantiæ igitur intellectuales inferiores gubernantur\n\nper superiores. Dicuntur igitur superiores spiritus et Angeli, in quantum inferiores spiritus dirigunt, quasi eis annuntiando; nam Angeli quasi nuntii dicuntur et ministri, in quantum per suam operationem exsequuntur, etiam in rebus corporalibus, divinæ Providentiae ordinem; nam minister est quasi instrumentum animatum, secundum Philosophum, Ethic. VIII, c. vi, et Polit. I, c. iv. Et hoc est quod dicitur: Qui facis Angelos tuos spiritus, et ministros tuos ignem urentem, Psalm. ciii, 5.\n\nDe ordinatione Angelorum ad invicem. Quum autem corporalia per spiritualia regantur, ut ostensum est (c. lxxvIII), corporalium autem sit quidam ordo, oportet quod superiora per superiores intellectuales substantias regantur, inferiora vero per inferiores. Quia vero, quanto aliqua substantia est superior, tanto virtus ejus est universalior, virtus vero intellectualis substantia est universalior virtute corporis, superiores quidem inter intellectuales substantias habent virtutes non explicabiles per aliquam virtutem corpoream, et ideo non sunt corporibus unitæ; inferiores vero habent virtutes particulatas explicabiles per aliqua corporea instrumenta, et ideo oportet quod corporibus uniantur. Sicut autem superiores inter substantias intellectuales sunt universalioris virtutis, ita etiam et perfectius divinam dispositionem ab Ipso recipiunt in hoc quod, usque ad singularia, ordinis rationem cognoscunt per hoc quod a Deo accipiunt. Hæc autem divinæ ordinationis manifestatio, divinitus facta, usque ad ultimas intellectualium substantiarum pertingit; sicut dicitur: Numquid est numerus militum ejus? Et super quem non surget lumen illius? Job, xxv, 3. Sed inferiores intellectus non in ea perfectione ipsam recipiunt quod per eam singula quæ ad ordinem divinæ Providentiae spectant, ab ipsis exsequenda, cognoscere possint, sed solum in quadam communitate; quantoque sunt inferiores, tanto per primam illuminationem divinitus acceptam minus in speciali divini ordinis cognitionem accipiunt, in tantum quod intellectus humanus, qui est infimus secundum naturalem cognitionem, solum quorumdam universalissimorum notitiam habet. Sic igitur substantiae intellectuales superiores perfectiorem cognitionem prædicti ordinis immediate consequuntur a Deo; quam quidem perfectionem oportet quod aliæ inferiores per eas consequantur, sicut supra diximus quod universalis discipuli cognitio per cognitionem magistri, qui in speciali cognoscit, perducitur ad perfectum. — Hinc est quod Dionysius de supremis intellectualibus substantiis, quas primæ hierarchiae, id est sacri principatus, nominat, dicit quod, non per alias substantias sanctificatæ, sed ab ipsa Divinitate in ipsam 1 immediate extenduntur, etiam ad 2 immaterialem et invisibilem pulchritudinem, quantum fas est, in contemplationem adducuntur et ad divinorum operum scibiles rationes; et per has dicit suppositas cælestium essentiarum dispositiones erudiri, Cælest. hier. c. VII 3. Sic ergo altiores intellectus in altiori principio cognitionis perfectionem suscipiunt. In qualibet autem dispositione Providentiae, ipsa ordinatio effectuum ex forma agentium derivatur; oportet enim effectus a causa secundum aliquam similitudinem procedere. Quod autem agens suæ formæ similitudinem effectibus communicet, est propter aliquem finem. Primum ergo principium in dispositione Providentiae est finis; secundum, forma agentis; tertium, ipsa dispositio ordinis effectuum. Supremum igitur in ordine intellectus est quod in fine ordinis ratio attendatur; secundum autem, quod in forma; tertium vero, quod ipsa ordinis dispositio in seipsa, non in aliquo altiori principio, cognoscatur. Unde et ars quæ considerat finem est « architectonica » respectu ejus quæ considerat formam, sicut gubernatoria respectu navifactivæ; ea vero quæ considerat formam; respectu ejus quæ considerat solum ordinem motuum qui ordinantur ad formam, sicut navifactiva respectu naviartificum 4. Sic ergo inter illos intellectus qui immediate in ipso Deo perfectam cognitionem ordinis Providentiae divinæ percipiunt est quidam ordo: Quia supremi et primi rationem ordinis Providentiae accipiunt in ipso ultimo fine, 2 — 3 « Non autem per alias sanctas essentias, sed ab ipsa divinitate sanctificatæ in ipsam immediate extenduntur omnibus supereminenti ordine et virtute, et ad castissimam omnino fortitudinem collocantur, et ad immaterialem et invisibilem pulchritudinem, quantum fas, in contemplationem adducuntur, et ad divinorum operum scibiles rationes, ut primæ et circa Deum essentiae flectuntur, et ab ipso perfectionis principe excellentissime sanctificatæ sunt. Hoc ergo theologi aperte declarant suppositas quidem cælestium essentiarum dispositiones superfirmatis ornate erudiri. » (Ex translat. Joh. Scoti.) sed ex alia manu et alio atramento ad oram codicis: « Manuum. » sed ex correctione, ut videtur. G, K ex correctione: « Manuum. » qui est divina bonitas (quidam tamen eorum aliis clarius); et isti dicuntur Seraphim, » quasi ardentes vel incendentes, quia per incendium solet designari intensio amoris vel desiderii, qui sunt de fine. — Unde Dionysius dicit quod ex hoc eorum nomine designantur et immobilitas eorum erga divina fervens et conflexibilis reductio inferiorum in Deum, sicut in finem Cælest. hier. c. VII 2. Secundi autem rationem ordinis 3 Providentiae in ipsa forma divina perfecte cognoscunt: et hi dicuntur «Cherubim 4», quod interpretatur scientiae plenitudo; scientia enim per formam scibilis perficitur. — Unde dicit Dionysius quod talis nominatio signat quod sunt contemplativi in prima operatrice virtute divina pulchritudinis, c. ibid. VII 4. Tertii vero ipsam dispositionem divinorum judiciorum in seipsa considerant; et hi dicuntur « Throni; » nam per thronum potestas judiciaria designatur, secundum illud: Sedisti super thronum, qui judicas justitiam, Psalm. IX, 5. — Unde dicit Dionysius quod, per hanc denominationem, designatur quod sunt deiferi et ad omnes divinas susceptiones familiariter apti, ibid. c. VII 5. Non autem sic præmissa intelligenda sunt quasi aliud sit divina bonitas et aliud divina essentia et aliud scientia rerum dispositionem continens, sed quia secundum hoc alia et alia est ejus consideratio. Item, Inter ipsos etiam inferiores spiritus, qui divini ordinis per eos exsequendi perfectam cognitionem per supe- 4 — — (Ex translat. Joh. Scoti.) « Perennem eorum circa res divinas motionem, fervoremque, subditosque ad superna subrigendi facultatem, et abscondi nesciam inextinc tamque illuminandi proprietatem, nomen Seraphim luculenter declarat. » (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, op. S. Dionysii Areop. t. I, col. 266, De cælest. hierarch. cap. VII, § I.), et cod. Berg.: « Ordinis. » (Ex translat. Joh. Scoti.) « Cherubim vero (nomen declarat) vim contemplandi in ipsamet primæva virtute divinam venustatem. » (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, op. S. Dionysii Areop. t. I, col. 266, De cælest. hierarch. cap. VII, § I.) De cælest. hierarch. cap. VII, § I.) (Ex translat. Johan. Scoti.) « Thronorum porro nomen denotat id quod Deum portat, officioseque ad ea quæ divina sunt capienda propensum est. » (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, op. S. Dionysii Areop. t. I, col. 266, De cælest. hierarch. cap. VII, § I.) 6 A, 7 (Vid. Notam... et cap. VII, Cælest. hierarch. « Sanctarum dominationum nominationem aestimo declarare quamdam anagogem omni servituti superpositam, superiorem subjectione omni. » (Ex translat. Johan. Scoti.) « Nomen quod designat dominationes existimo declarare aliquem ad superna transitum, dominationem quæ omni servitute celsior, omni dejectione superior. » (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, op. S. Dionysii Areop. t. I, col. 238, De cælest. hierarch. cap. VII, § I.) quente distribuitur et multiplicatur ad varios effectus; quod quidem fit per ordinem « Virtutum, » quarum ordo, ut dicit Dionysius, ibidem, significat quamdam fortem virilitatem in omnes deiformes operationes, non relinquentem sui imbecillitate aliquem defiormem motum. Et sic patet quod principium universalis operationis ad hunc ordinem pertinet; unde videtur quod ad hunc ordinem pertineat motus cælestium corporum, ex quibus sicut a quibusdam causis universalibus consequuntur particulares effectus in natura; et ideo, « Virtutes cælorum » nominantur, ubi dicitur quod Virtutes cælorum movebuntur, Luc. xxI, 26. Et ad eos etiam spiritus pertinere videtur exsecutio divinorum operum quæ praeter naturæ ordinem fiunt, et ideo ista sunt sublimissima in divinis ministeriis; propter quod dicit Gregorius quod « Virtutes » dicuntur illi spiritus per quos signa frequentius fiunt; » et si quid aliud universale et primum est in ministeriis divinis exsequendis, conveniens ad est hunc ordinem pertinere. Tertio vero universalis Providentiae ordo, jam in effectibus institutus, inconfusus custoditur, dum cohibentur ea quæ possent hunc ordinem perturbare; « quod quidem pertinet ad ordinem « Potestatum. » — Unde Dionysius dicit, ibidem, quod nomen « Potestatum » importat quamdam bene ordinatam et inconfusam circa divinas susceptiones ordinationem;» (Ex translat. Johan. Scoti.) « Appellatio virtutum fortem quamdam denotat virilitatem in omnes deiformes earum actiones, quæ neque motui divino ignavia sua deest. » (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, op. S. Dionysii Areop. t. I, col. 288, 289, De cælest. hierarch. cap. vIII, § 1.) 2 Homilar. in Evang. lib. II, Homil. xxxiv, n. 10, tom. II, col. 4251.) 4 (Ex translat. Johan. Scoti.) « Nomen potestatum coæqualem signat, et inconfusum divinis rebus suscipiendis ordinem. » (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, op. S. Dionysii Areop. t. I, col. 239, De cælest. hierarch. cap. vIII, § 1.) 6 « Perceperunt ut eorum ditioni virtutes adet ideo Gregorius dicit quod ad hunc ordinem pertinet contrarias potestates arcere. 6 Infimi autem inter superiores intellectuales substantias sunt qui ordinem divinæ Providentiae in particularibus causis cognoscibilem divinitus accipiunt; et hi immediate rebus humanis præponuntur. — Unde Dionysius de eis dicit, ibid., quod « ista tertia dispositio Spirituum humanis hierarchiis per consequentiam præcipit. » — Per res autem humanas intelligendæ sunt omnes inferiores naturæ et causæ particulares quæ ad hominem ordinantur et in usum hominis cedunt, sicut patet ex præmissis. Inter has etiam quidam ordo existit. Nam in rebus humanis est aliquod bonum commune, quod quidem est bonum civitatis vel gentis, quod videtur ad « Principatuum » ordinem pertinere. » Unde Dionysius dicit, in eodem capitulo, quod nomen « Principatus » designat quoddam dominium cum ordine sacro; propter quod fit mentio, Dan. x, 13, 20, 24, de Michaele Principe Judæorum, et Principe Persarum, et Græcorum. Et sic dispositio regnorum et mutatio dominationis de gente in gentem ad ministerium hujus ordinis pertinere oportet. Instructio etiam eorum qui inter homines existunt principes, de his quæ ad administra-tionem sui regiminis pertinent, ad hunc ordinem spectare videtur. Est etiam aliquod humanum bonum versæ subjectæ sint, quorum potestate refrenantur, ne corda hominum tantum tentare prævaileant quantum volunt. » (Homiliar. in Evang. lib. II, Homil. xxxiv, n. 10, tom. II, col. 4251.) (Ex translat. Johan. Scoti.) « Porro principatuum, archangelorum atque angelorum ordinem explanatorium humanis per vices præesse hierarchiis. » (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, op. S. Dionysii Areop. t. I, col. 259, De cælest. hierarch. cap. 1x, § 1.) (Ex translat. Johan. Scoti.) « Nomen principatuum significat cum sacro quodam ordine principandi atque gubernandi potestatem. — Hinc theologia nostram hierarchiam angelis attribuit, cum populi Judæorum principem appellet Michaelem, aliasque gentium aliarum. » (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, op. S. Dionysii Areop. t. I, col. 258, 259, De cælest. hierarch. cap. 1x, § 1 et 11.) quod non in communitate consistit, sed ad unumquemque pertinet secundum seipsum; non tamen uni soli est utile, sed multis; sicut quæ sunt ab omnibus et singulis credenda et servanda, sicut ea quæ sunt fidei, et cultus divinus, et alia hujusmodi. — Et hoc ad « Archangelos » pertinet, de quibus Gregorius dicit 4, Homil. xxxiv, sup. Evang. quod summa nuntiant; sicut Gabrielem Archangelum nominamus, qui 2 Virgini 3 Verbi incarnationem nuntiavit, ab omnibus credendam 4. Quoddam vero humanum bonum est ad unumquodque 5 singulariter pertinens, et hoc 6 ad ordinem pertinet Angelorum, de quibus Gregorius dicit, ibid., quod infima nuntiant 7; unde et hominum custodes esse dicuntur, secundum illud: Angelis suis mandavit de te, ut custodiant te in omnibus viis tuis, etc. Psalm. xc, 14. Unde et Dionysius dicit 8 quod Archangeli medii sunt inter Principatus et Angelos, habentes aliquid commune cum utrisque: cum Principatibus quidem, in quantum inferioribus Angelis ducatum præstant, nec immerito, quia quæ sunt propria in humanis secundum ea quæ sunt communia dispensari oportet; cum Angelis vero, quia annuntiant Angelis et per Angelos nobis, quorum est manifestare hominibus quæ ad eos pertinent secundum uniuscujusque analogiam; propter quod et commune nomen ultimus ordo quasi speciale sibi assumit, quia scilicet officium habet nobis immediate nuntiandi; et propter hoc Archangeli nomen compositum habent ex utroque; dicuntur enim Archangeli, quasi « Principes-Angeli. » (Homiliarum in Evang. lib. II, Homil. xxxiv, n. 8, tom. II, col. 1250.), L, M, N, et cod. Berg. omisso: « Virgini. » 4 Sic J, et cod. Berg. — 5 6 (Homiliarum in Evang. lib. II, Homil. xxxiv, n. 8, t. II, col. 1250.) (Ex translat. Johan. Scoti.) « Archangelorum ordo sanctissimis principatibus communicat et sanctis angelis, illis quidem quia angelis ducatu unionis auctor existit; his autem quia divinas illustrationes angelis annuntiat, nobis que per angelos, pro cujusque ad res sacras capacitate. » (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, Op. S. Dionysii Areop. t. I, col. 258, De cælest. hierarch. cap. ix, § ii.) 9 (Homiliarum in Evang. lib. II, Homil. xxxiv, n. 10, tom. II, col. 1251.) et cod. Berg. omittunt: « a. » eis Dominationes, sub quibus Principatus, et sub his Potestates posuit; quem ordinem Gregorius observavit. — De Seraphim autem fit mentio Isaiæ sexto; de Cherubim autem, Ezechielis primo; de Archangelis, in Catholica Judæ: Quum Michael Archangelus cum diabolo disputans altercaretur de Moysi corpore, etc. Jud. v, 9; de Angelis autem, in Psalmis, ut dictum est 4. Est autem in omnibus ordinatis virtutibus hoc commune, quia in vi superioris virtutis omnes inferiores agunt; unde id quod diximus ad Seraphim ordinem pertinere omnes inferiores ex virtute ipsius exsequuntur; et similiter etiam in aliis ordinibus est considerandum.\n\net ad alia. Inter alias vero intellectuales substantias, humanæ animæ infimum gradum habent; quia sicut supra (c. Lxxx) dictum est, in sui institutione, cognitionem ordinis Providentiae divinæ in sola quadam universali cognitione suscipiunt; ad perfectam vero ordinis singularium cognitionem oportet quod ex ipsis rebus, in quibus ordo divinæ Providentiae jam particulariter institutus est, perducantur; unde oportuit quod haberent organa corporea, per quæ a rebus corporalibus cognitionem haurirent, ex quibus tamen, propter debilitatem intellectualis luminis, perfectam notitiam eorum quæ ad hominem spectant adipisci non valent, nisi per lumen superioris spiritus adjuventur, hoc exigente divina dispositione, ut inferiores per superiores spiritus perfectionem acquirant, ut supra (c. Lxxix) ostensum est. Quia tamen aliquid homo de lumine intellectuali participat, ei secundum Providentiae divinæ ordinem, subduntur animalia bruta, quæ de intellectu nullo modo participant; unde dicitur: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, scilicet secundum quod intellectum habet, et præsit piscibus maris, et volatilibus cæli, et bestiis,\n\nuniversæque terræ, Gen. 1, 26. Animalia vero bruta, etsi intellectu ca-reant, quia tamen cognitionem aliquam habent, plantis et aliis quæ cognitione carent, secundum divinæ Providentiae ordinem, præferuntur; unde dicitur: Ecce dedi vobis omnem herbam afferentem semen super terram, et universa ligna quæ habent in semetipsis sementem generis sui, ut sint vobis in escam et cunctis\n\nanimantibus terræ, Gen. 1, 29-30. Inter ea vero quæ penitus cognitione carent, unum subjacet alteri, secundum quod unum est altero potentius 3 in agendo; non enim participant aliquid de dispositione Providentiae, sed\n\nsolum de exsecutione. Quia vero homo habet intellectum et sensum et corporalem virtutem, hæc in ipso ad invicem ordinantur, secundum divinæ Providentiae dispositionem, ad similitudinem ordinis qui in universo invenitur; nam virtus corporea subditur sensitivæ et intellectivæ virtuti, velut exsequens earum imperium; ipsa vero sensitiva potentia intellectivæ subditur, et sub 4\n\nejus imperio continetur 5. Ex eadem ratione, et inter ipsos homines ordo invenitur; nam illi qui intellectu præeminent naturaliter dominantur; illi vero qui sunt intellectu deficientes, corpore vero robusti, a natura videntur instituti ad serviendum, sicut Aristoteles dicit in sua Politica, I, c. v; cui etiam concordat sententia Salomonis, qui dicit: Qui stultus est serviet sapienti, Proverb. x1, 29; et dicitur: Provide de omni plebe viros sapientes * et timentes Deum..., qui judicent populum omni tempore,\n\ntes. Exod. xviii, 21-22. Sicut autem, in operibus unius hominis, ex hoc inordinatio provenit quod intellectus sensualem virtutem sequitur, sensualis vero virtus, propter corporis indispositionem, trahitur ad corporis motum, ut in claudicantibus apparet; ita, et in regimine humano, inordinatio provenit ex eo quod non propter intellectus præeminentiam aliquis præest, sed vel robore corporali dominium sibi usurpat, vel propter sensualem affectionem aliquis ad regendum præficitur; quam quidem inordinationem nec Salomon tacet, qui dicit: Est malum quod vidi sub sole quasi per errorem egrediens a facie principis, positum stultum in dignitate sublimi, Eccl. x, 5-6. Hujusmodi autem inordinatio divinam Providentiam non 1 A: « Ubi dictum. » 2 A: « Quæ est in hominibus. » 3 A, C: « Magis potens. » — B, D, E, F: « Ma- gis potentius. » 4 A, B, C, D, E, F omittunt: « Sub. » 5 E: « Continuetur, » mendose, ut patet. excludit; provenit enim ex permissione divina, propter defectum inferiorum agentium, sicut et de aliis malis superius dictum est. Sed 1 neque per hujusmodi inordinationem totaliter naturalis ordo pervertitur; nam stultorum dominium infirmum est, nisi sapientum consilio roboretur. Unde dicitur: Cogitationes consiliis roborantur, et gubernaculis tractanda sunt bella, Prov. xx, 18; et: Vir sapiens fortis est, et vir doctus robustus et validus, quia cum dispositione initur bellum, et erit salus ubi multa consilia sunt, ibid., xxiv, 5-6. Et, quia consilians regit eum qui consilium accipit et quodammodo ei dominatur, dicitur quod servus sapiens dominabitur filiis\n\nstultis, ibid., xvii, 2. Patet ergo quod divina Providentia omnibus rebus ordinem imponit, ut sic verum sit quod dicit Apostolus: Quæ autem sunt, a Deo ordinata* sunt, Rom. xiii. * Ordinatum natæ.\n\ncorpora cælestia superiora 2. 1. Sicut autem in substantiis intellectualibus est superius et inferius, ita etiam in substantiis corporalibus. Substantiæ autem intellectuales reguntur a superioribus, ut dispositio divinæ Providentiae proportionaliter descendat usque ad infima, sicut jam dictum est (c. lxxvii et seq.). Ergo, pari ratione, inferiora corpora\n\nper superiora disponuntur. 2. Amplius, Quanto aliquod corpus est superius loco, tanto inventur esse formalius; et propter hoc rationabiliter locus superior est locus inferioris; nam formæ est continere, sicut loci; aqua enim est formalior terra, aer aqua, et ignis aere. Sed corpora cælestia sunt omnibus loco superiora. Ipsa igitur sunt magis formalia omnibus aliis; ergo magis activa. Agunt ergo in inferiora corpora, et sic per\n\nea inferiora disponuntur. 3. Item, Quod est in sua natura perfectum, absque contrarietate, est universalis virtutis quam illud quod in sua natura non perficitur nisi in contrarietate; contrarietas enim est ex differentiis determinantibus et contrahentibus genus; unde, in acceptance intellectus, quia est universalis, species contrario- rum non sunt contrariæ, quum sint simul. Corpora autem cælestia sunt in suis naturis absque omni contrarietate perfecta; non sunt enim levia, neque sunt gravia, neque calida, neque frigida; corpora vero inferiora non perficiuntur in suis naturis, nisi cum aliqua contrarietate; et hoc etiam motus eorum demonstrat; nam motui circulari corporum cælestium non est aliquid contrarium, unde nec in eis violentia esse potest; motus autem inferiorum, corporum contrarii sunt, scilicet motus deorsum motui sursum. Corpora ergo cælestia sunt universalis virtutis quam corpora inferiora. Universales autem virtutes sunt motivæ particularium, sicut ex dictis (c. lvii) patet. Corpora ergo cælestia movent et disponunt corpora\n\ninferiora. 4. Adhuc, Ostensum est supra (c. lxxviii) quod per substantias intellectuales omnia alia reguntur. Corpora autem cælestia sunt similiora substantiis intellectualibus quam alia corpora, in quantum sunt incorruptibilia; sunt etiam eis propinquiora, in quantum ab eis immediate moventur, ut supra ostensum est (l. II, c. lxx; l. III, c. lxxx). Per ipsa igitur\n\nreguntur inferiora corpora. 5. Præterea, Oportet primum principium motus esse aliquid immobile. Quæ ergo magis accedunt ad immobilitatem debent esse aliorum motiva. Corpora autem cælestia magis accedunt ad immobilitatem primi principii quam inferiora, quia non moventur nisi una specie motus, scilicet motu locali; alia vero corpora moventur omnibus speciebus motus. Corpora igitur cælestia sunt motiva et regitiva\n\nomnium inferiorum corporum. 6. Amplius, Primum in quolibet genere est causa eorum quae sunt post. Inter omnes autem alios motus, primus est motus cæeli: Primo quidem, quia motus localis est primus inter omnes motus; — et tempore. quia solus potest esse perpetuus, ut probatur in octavo Physicorum, c. viii et ix; et naturaliter, quia sine ipso non potest esse aliquis aliorum motuum; non enim augmentatur aliquid nisi præexsistente alteratione, per quam quod prius erat dissimile convertatur et fiat simile; neque alteratio potest esse nisi præexistente loci mutatione, quia ad hoc quod fiat altera- 1 Sic A, B, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. omitunt: « Sed. » 2 Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit.: « Per superiora. » tio oportet quod alterans sit magis propinquum alterato nunc quam prius; — est etiam perfectione prior, quia motus localis non variat rem secundum aliquid ei inhærens, sed solum secundum aliquid extrinsecum, et propter hoc est rei jam perfectæ. Secundo, quia etiam inter motus locales est motus circularis prior; — et tempore, quia solus ipse potest esse perpetuus, ut probatur in octavo Physicorum, c. ix; — et naturaliter, quia est magis simplex et unus, quum non distinguatur in principium, medium et finem, sed totus sit quasi medium; — et etiam perfectione, quia reflectitur ad principium. Tertio, quia solus motus cæli inventur semper regularis et uniformis; in motibus enim naturalibus gravium et levium fit additio velocitatis in fine, in violentis autem additio tarditatis. Oportet ergo quod motus cæli causa sit\n\nomnium aliorum motuum. 7. Adhuc, Sicut se habet immobile simpliciter ad motum simpliciter, ita se habet immobile secundum hunc motum ad motum talem. Id autem quod est immobile simpliciter est principium omnis motus, ut supra (l. I, c. xiii) probatum est. Quod ergo est immobile secundum alterationem est principium omnis alterationis. Corpora autem cælestia sola inter corporalia sunt inalterabilia; quod demonstrat dispositio eorum, quæ semper eadem invenitur. Est ergo corpus cæleste causa omnis alterationis in his quæ alterantur. Alteratio autem in his inferioribus est principium omnis motus; nam per alterationem pervenitur ad augmentum et generationem; generans autem est motor per se in motu locali gravium et levium. Oportet ergo quod cælum sit causa omnis motus in\n\nistis inferioribus corporibus. Sic ergo patet quod corpora inferiora a Deo per corpora superiora reguntur.\n\nEpilogus prædictorum. Ex omnibus autem his quæ ostensa sunt colligere possumus quod, quantum ad ordinis excogitationem rebus imponendi, Deus omnia per seipsum disponit; unde super illud: Quem posuit alium super orbem, quem fabricatus est, Job, xxxiv, 43, dicit Gregorius: « Mundum quipe per seipsum regit qui per seipsum conidit », Moral. in Job, et Boetius: « Deus per se\n\nsolum cuncta disponit . » Sed, quantum ad exsecutionem, inferiora per superiora dispensat: corporalia quidem, per spiritualia; unde Gregorius dicit: « In hoc mundo visibili nihil nisi per invisibilem creaturam disponi potest ; » inferiores vero spiritus, per superiores; unde dicit Dionysius quod « cælestes essentiae « intellectuales primo in seipsas divinam « edunt illuminationem, et in nos defeer « runt quæ supra nos sunt manifestationes » Cælest. hier., c. iv ; inferiora etiam corpora, per superiora; unde Dionysius dicit quod « sol ad generationem « visibilium corporum confert, et ad viam ipsa movet, et nutrit, et auget, et perficit, et mundat, et renovat » De divin.\n\nnomin., c. iv . De his autem omnibus simul dicit Augustinus ; « Quemad- modum corpora grossiora et inferiora « per subtiliora et potentiora quodam « ordine reguntur, ita omnia corpora per « spiritum vitæ rationalem, et spiritus Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, et cod. Berg. — Edit. omittunt: « In fine, in violentis autem additio tarditatis. » « Per se igitur solum cuncta disponit. » De consolatione philosophiæ, l. III, prosa xii, tom. I, col. 779. (Dialog. lib. IV. cap. vi, tom. III, col. 329, circ. med.) « Primo ad ipsos ingignitur thearchica illuminatio, et per ipsos ad nos deferuntur illæ quæ super nos sunt manifestationes. » (Ex translat. Johan. Scoti.) « Ipsæ primum a Deo illuminantur, et per ipsos nobis nostræ revelationes transmittuntur. » (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, op. S. Dionysii Areop. t. I, col. 669, De divinis nominibus, cap. iv, § iv.) « Corpora crassiora... et spiritus rationalis desertor atque peccator per spiritum rationalem pium et justum. » (Ed. L. Vivès, tom. XXVII, p. 234.) « rationalis peccator per spiritum rationale « lem justum » De Trinitate, l. III, c. vi.\n\nc. xv, a. 4.) Ex his autem quæ præmissa sunt in promptu apparet quod eorum quæ sunt circa intellectum corpora cælestia causæ esse non possunt. 1. Jam enim ostensum est (c. LXXXI et LXXXII) quod divinæ Providentia ordo est ut per superiora regantur inferiora et moveantur. Intellectus autem ordine naturæ omnia corpora excedit, ut ex prædictis (c. xlix et LXXVIII) patet. Impossibile est igitur quod corpora cælestia agant in intellectum directe. Non igitur possunt esse causa per se eorum quæ\n\nsunt circa intellectum. 2. Adhuc, nullum corpus agit nisi per motum, ut probatur in octavo Physicorum, passim. Quæ autem sunt immobilia non causantur ex motu; nihil enim causatur ex motu alicujus agentis, nisi in quantum movet; passum autem movetur. Quæ igitur sunt omnino extra motum non possunt esse causata a corporibus cælestibus. Sed ea quæ sunt circa intellectum sunt omnino extra motum per se loquendo, sicut patet per Philosophum in septimo Physicorum, c. III; quinimo per quietem a motibus fit anima prudens et sciens, ut ibidem dicitur. Impossibile est ergo quod corpora cælestia sint per se causa eorum quæ\n\nsunt circa intellectum. 3. Amplius, Si nihil causatur ab aliquo corpore, nisi in quantum movet dum movetur, oportet omne illud quod recipit impressionem alicujus corporis moveri. Nihil autem movetur nisi corpus, ut probatur in sexto Physicorum, c. VIII et x. Oportet ergo omne id quod recipit impressionem alicujus corporis esse corpus vel aliquam virtutem corpoream. Ostensum est autem (l. II, c. xlix) quod intellectus neque est corpus neque virtus corporea. Impossibile est igitur quod corpora cælestia directe\n\nimprimant in intellectum. 4. Item, Omne quod movetur ab aliquo reducitur ab eo de potentia in actum. Nihil autem reducitur ab aliquo de potentia in actum nisi per id quod est actu. Oportet ergo omne agens et movens esse aliquo modo actu, respectu eorum ad quæ passum et motum est in potentia. Corpora autem cælestia non sunt actu intelligibilia, quum sint quædam singularia sensibilia. Quum igitur intellectus noster non sit in potentia nisi ad intelligibilia in actu, impossibile est quod corpora cælestia directe\n\nagant in intellectum. 5. Adhuc, Propria operatio rei consequitur naturam ipsius, quæ rebus generatis per generationem acquiritur simul cum propria operatione; sicut patet de gravi et levi, quæ habent statim proprium motum in termino suæ generationis, nisi sit aliquid impediens; ratione cujus generans dicitur movens. Illud ergo quod secundum principium suæ naturæ non est subjectum actionibus corporum cælestium, neque secundum operationem suam potest ei esse subjectum. Pars autem intellectiva non causatur ab aliquibus principiis corporis, sed est omnino ab extrinseco, ut supra (l. II, c. LXXXVII-LXXXIX) probatum est. Operatio igitur intellectus non directe\n\nsubjacet corporibus cælestibus. 6. Amplius, Ea quæ causantur ex motibus cælestibus tempori subduntur, quod est numerus primi motus cælestis. Quæ igitur omnino abstrahunt a tempore non sunt cælestibus motibus subjecta. Intellectus autem in sua operatione abstrahit a tempore, sicut et a loco; considerat enim universale, quod est abstractum ab hic et nunc. Non igitur operatio intellectualis\n\nsubditur cælestibus motibus. 7. Adhuc, nihil agit ultra suam speciem. Ipsum autem intelligere transcendit speciem et formam cujuslibet corporis agentis, quia omnis forma corporea est materialis et individuata, ipsum autem intelligere habet speciem a suo objecto, quod est universale et immateriale; unde nullum corpus per formam suam corpoream intelligere potest. Multo igitur minus potest quodcumque corpus causare ipsum\n\nintelligere in alio. 8. Item, Secundum illud quo aliquid unitur superioribus, non est inferioribus subjectum. Anima autem nostra, secun- A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, omittunt: « Ratione cujus generans dicitur movens. » A omittit: « Ipsum. » dum quod intelligit, unitur substantiis intellectualibus, quæ sunt superiores ordine naturæ corporibus cælestibus; non enim potest anima nostra intelligere nisi secundum quod lumen intellectuale inde sortitur. Impossibile est igitur quod intellectualis operatio directe\n\nmotibus cælestibus subdatur. 9. Præterea, Huic rei fidem faciet si consideremus ea quæ a philosophis circa hoc dicta sunt. Antiqui enim philosophi naturales, ut Democritus, Empedocles et hujusmodi, posuerunt quod intellectus non differt a sensu, ut patet in quarto Metaphys. c. v, et in tertio De anima, c. 111; et ideo sequebatur quod intellectus sit quædam virtus corporea sequens corporum transmutationem; et ideo dixerunt quod, quum transmutatio inferiorum corporum sequatur transmutationem superiorum corporum, intellectualis etiam operatio sequetur corporum cælestium motus, secundum illud Homeri: Talis est intellectus in diis hominibus et terrenis, qualem in dies 1 inducit Pater virorum deorumque, id est sol, vel magis Jupiter, quem dicebant summum Deum, intelligentes per ipsum totum cælum, ut patet per Augustinum 2, De civit. Dei,\n\nIV, c. xi. Hinc etiam processit Stoicorum opinio, qui dicebant cognitionem intellectus cau-sari ex hoc quod imagines corporum nostris mentibus imprimuntur, sicut speculum imagines et pagina recipit litteras impressas absque hoc quod aliquid agat, ut Boetius narrat, Consol. philos. l. V, metr. iv 3; secundum quorum sententiam sequebatur quod maxime ex impressione corporum cælestium intellectuales notiones nobis imprimerentur; unde et Stoici fuerunt qui præcipue necessitate quadam fatali hominum vitam duci posuerunt. Sed hæc positio inde falsa apparet, ut Boetius ibidem dicit, quod intellectus componit et dividit, et comparat suprema ad infima, et cognoscit universalia et simplices formas, quæ in corporibus non inveniuntur; et sic manifestum est quod intellectus non est sicut recipiens tantum imagines corporum, sed habet aliquam virtutem corporibus altiorem; nam sensus exterior, qui solum imagines corporum recipit, ad prædicta\n\nse non extendit. Omnes autem sequentes philosophi, intellectum a sensu discernentes, causam nostræ scientiæ, non aliquibus corporibus, sed rebus immaterialibus attribuerunt; sicut Plato posuit causam nostræ scientiæ esse ideas, Aristoteles autem, De anima, III, c.\n\nv, intellectum agentem. Ex his omnibus est accipere quod po- 1 A, B, F: « In die ducit. » — C, D, E: « In die inducit. » — Cod. Berg: « In diem. » 2 Nam, ut alia omittam, quæ sunt innumerabilia, quum dicunt omnia sidera partes Jovis esse, et omnia vivere atque rationales animas habere, et ideo sine controversia deos esse, non vident quam multos non colant, quam multis ædes non construant, aras non statuant, quas tamen paucissimis siderum statuendas esse putaverunt, et singillatim sacrificandum. Si igitur irascuntur qui singillatim non coluntur, non metuunt, paucis placatis, toto cælo irato vivere? Si autem stellas omnes ideo colunt, quia in Jove sunt quem colunt, isto compendio possent in illo uno omnibus supplicare. Sic enim nemo irascetur, quum in illo uno nemo contemneretur, potius quam, cultis quibusdam, justa irascendi causa illis qui prætermissi essent, multo numerosioribus, præcretur; præsertim quum eis de superna sede fulgentibus, turpi nuditate distentus præponeretur Priapus (De civit. Dei, l. IV, c. xi. Ed. L. Vivès tom. XXIII, p. 573.) 3 Quondam Porticus attulit Obscuros nimium senes, Qui sensus et imagines E corporibus extimis Credant mentibus imprimi, Ut quondam celeri stylo Mos est aquore paginæ, Quæ nullas habeat notas, Pressas figere litteras. Sed mens, si propriis vigens Nihil motibus explicat, Sed tantum patiens jacet Notis subdita corporum, Cassasque in speculi vicem Rerum reddit imagines; Unde hæc sic animis viget Cernens omnia notio? Quæ vis singula prospicit. Aut quæ cognita dividit? Quæ divisa recolligit, Alternumque legens iter Nunc summis caput inserit, Nunc desidit in infima, Tum sese referens sibi Veris falsa redarguit? Hæc est efficiens magis Longe causa potentior, Quam quæ materiae modo Impressas patitur notas. Præcedit tamen excitans, Ac vires animi movens, Vivo in corpore passio. Cum vel lux oculos ferit, Vel vox auribus instrepit: Tum mentis vigor excitus, Quas intus species tenet, Ad motus similes vocans, Notis applicat exteris, Introrsumque reconditis Formis miscet imagines. (Boetius, Consol. philos., l. V, metr. iv, t. I, coll. 850-53.) nere corpora cælestia esse causam nobis intelligendi est consequens opinionem eorum qui ponebant intellectum a sensu non differre, ut patet etiam per Aristotelem, De anima, III, c. 111. Hanc 4 opinionem manifestum est esse falsam. Igitur manifestum est eam esse falsam quae ponit corpora cælestia esse nobis\n\ncausam intelligendi directe. Hinc 2 est quod sacra Scriptura causam nostræ intelligentiæ attribuit, non alicui corpori, sed Deo: Ubi est Deus, qui fecit me; qui dedit carmina in nocte; qui docet nos super jumenta terræ, et super volucres cæli erudit nos, Job, xxxv, 10 et 11, et: Qui docet hominem\n\nscientiam, Psalm. xcIII, 10. Sciendum est tamen quod, licet corpora cælestia directe intelligentiæ nostræ causae esse non possint, aliquid tamen ad hoc operantur indirecte. Licet enim intellectus non sit virtus corporea, tamen in nobis intellectus operatio compleri non potest sine operatione virtutum corporearum, quæ sunt imaginatio, et vis memorativa, et cogitativa, ut ex superioribus (l. II, c. lxxiii) patet; et inde est quod, impeditis harum virtutum operationibus propter aliquam indispositionem corporis, impeditur operatio intellectus, sicut patet in phreneticis et lethargicis et aliis hujusmodi; et propter hoc etiam bonitas dispositionis corporis humani facit aptum ad bene intelligendum, in quantum ex hoc prædictæ vires fortiores existunt; unde dicitur in secundo De anima, c. 1x, quod « molles carne aptos mente videmus. » Dispositio autem corporis humani subjacet cælestibus motibus; dicit enim Augustinus quod « non usquequaque absurde dici potest ad solas corporum differentias afflatus quosdam valere sidereos 3, » De civit. Dei, l. V, c. vi et vii; et Damascenus dicit quod « aliii et alii planetæ diversas complexiones et habitus et dispositiones in nobis constituunt, De orthod. fid. l. II, c. vii. Ideo 4 indirecte corpora cælestia ad bonitatem intelligentiæ operantur; et sic, sicut medici possunt judicare de bonitate intellectus ex corporis complexione, sicut ex dispositione proxima, ita astrologus ex motibus cælestibus sicut ex causa remota talis dispositionis. Et per hunc modum potest verificari quod Pto-lomæus in Centiloquio dicit: « Quum fuerit Mercurius, in nativitate alicujus, in aliqua domorum Saturni, et ipse fortis in esse suo, dat bonitatem intelligentiæ medullitus in rebus. »\n\nq. cxv. a. 4.) Ex hoc autem ulterius apparet quod corpora cælestia non sunt voluntatum nostrarum\n\nneque electionum causa. 1. Voluntas enim in parte intellectiva animæ est, ut patet per Philosophum, De anima, III, c. 1x. Si igitur corpora cælestia non possunt imprimere directe in intellectum nostrum, ut ostensum est (c. lxxiv), neque etiam in voluntatem nostram\n\ndirecte imprimere poterunt. 2. Amplius, Omnis electio et actualis voluntas in nobis immediate ex apprehensione intellectuali 5 causatur; bonum enim intellectum est objectum voluntatis, ut patet in tertio De anima, c. x, et propter hoc non potest sequi perversitas in eligendo, nisi intellectus judicium deficiat in particulari eligibili, ut patet per Philosophum, Ethic. VII, c. iv. Corpora autem cælestia non sunt causæ intelligentiæ nostræ. Ergo non electionis nostræ\n\npossunt esse causæ. 3. Item, Quæcumque ex impressione corporum cælestium in istis inferioribus eveniunt naturaliter contingunt, quum hæc inferiora sint naturaliter sub illis ordinata. Si ergo electiones nostræ eveniunt, ex impressione corporum cælestium, oportet quod naturaliter eveniant, ut scilicet sic homo naturaliter eligat operari suas operationes sicut naturali instinctu bruta operantur et naturaliter corpora inanimata moventur. Non ergo erunt propositum et natura duo principia agentia, sed unum tantum, quod est natura; cujus contrarium patet per Aristotelem, Physic. II, c. viii. Non est ergo verum quod ex impressione corporum cælestium nostræ electiones provenient. 1 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Autem. » 2 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Etiam. » 3 « Dici posset. » — Ed. L. Vivès, tom. XXIII, p. 603. 4 Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. omittunt: « Et. » 5 A, B, C, D, E, F, G,\n\nH, I: « Intelligibili. » 4. Præterea, Ea quæ naturaliter fiunt, determinatis mediis perducuntur ad finem; unde semper et eodem modo contingunt; natura enim determinata est ad unum. Electiones autem humanæ diversis mediis tendunt ad finem, tam in moralibus quam in artificialibus. Non igitur electiones\n\nhumanæ fiunt naturaliter. 5. Amplius, Ea quæ naturaliter fiunt, ut plurimum recte fiunt; natura enim non deficit nisi in paucioribus. Si igitur homo naturaliter eligeret, ut in pluribus electiones ejus essent rectæ; quod patet esse falsum. Non igitur homo naturaliter eligit; quod oporteret, si ex impulsu\n\ncorporum cælestium eligeret. 6. Item, Ea quæ sunt ejusdem speciei non diversificantur in operationibus naturalibus, quæ naturam speciei consequuntur; unde omnis hirundo similiter facit nidum, et omnis homo similiter in lelligit prima principia, quæ sunt naturaliter nota. Electio autem est operatio consequens speciem humanam. Si igitur homo naturaliter eligeret, oporteret quod omnes homines eodem modo eligerent; quod patet esse falsum, tam in moralibus\n\nquam in artificialibus. 7. Adhuc, Virtutes et vitia sunt electionum principia propria; nam virtuosus et vitiosus differunt ex hoc quod contra-ria eligunt. Virtutes autem politicæ et vitia non sunt nobis a natura, sed ex assuetudine, ut probat Philosophus, Ethic. II, c. 1, ex hoc quod, quales operationes assuescimus, et maxime a puero, ad tales habitum habemus. Ergo electiones nostræ non sunt nobis a natura. Non ergo causantur ex impressione corporum cælestium, secundum quam\n\nres naturaliter procedunt. 8. Adhuc, Corpora cælestia non imprimunt directe nisi in corpora, ut ostensum est (c. Lxxxii). Si igitur sint causa electionum nostrarum, aut hoc erit in quantum imprimunt in corpora nostra, aut in quantum imprimunt in exteriora. Neutro autem modo sufficienter possunt esse causa electionis nostræ. Non enim est sufficiens causa nostræ electionis quod aliqua corporalia nobis exterius præsententur; patet enim quod ad occursum alicujus delectabilis, puta cibi vel mulieris, temperatus non movetur ad eligendum ipsum, intemperatus autem move-tur. Similiter etiam non sufficit ad nostram electionem quæcumque immutatio possit esse in nostro corpore ab impressione corporis cælestis, quum per hoc non sequantur in nobis nisi quædam passiones, vel magis vel minus vehementes; passiones autem, quantumcumque vehementes, non sunt causa sufficiens electionis, quia, per easdem passiones incontinens inducitur ad eas sequendum per electionem, continens autem non inducitur. Non potest igitur dici quod corpora cælestia sint\n\ncausae nostrarum electionum. 9. Amplius, Nulla virtus datur alicui rei frustra. Homo autem habet virtutem judicandi et consiliandi de omnibus quæ per ipsum operabilia sunt, sive in usu exteriorum rerum, sive in admittendo et repellendo intrinsecas passiones; quod quidem frustra esset, si electio nostra causaretur a corporibus cælestibus, non exsistens in nostra potestate. Non est igitur possibile quod corpora cælestia sint\n\ncausae nostræ electionis, 10. Præterea, Homo naturaliter est animal politicum vel sociale; quod quidem ex hoc apparet quod unus homo non sufficit sibi, si solus vivat, propterea quod natura in paucis homini providit sufficienter, dans ei rationem per quam possit sibi necessaria ad vitam præparare, sicut cibum, indumenta et alia hujusmodi, ad quæ omnia operanda non sufficit unus homo; unde naturaliter inditum est homini ut in societate vivat. Sed ordo Providentiae non aufert alicui rei quod est sibi naturale, sed magis unicuique providetur secundum suam naturam, ut ex dictis (c. Lxxiii) patet. Non igitur per ordinem Providentiae sic est homo ordinatus ut vita socialis tollatur. Tolleretur autem, si electiones nostræ ex impressionibus corporum cælestium provenirent sicut naturalis instinctus aliorum animalium; frustra etiam darentur leges et præcepta vivendi, si homo electionum suarum dominus non esset; frustra etiam adhiberentur præmia et pœnæ bonis et malis, ex quo non esset in nobis hæc vel illa eligere; his autem desinentibus, statim socialis vita corrumpitur. Non ergo homo est sic, secundum ordinem divinæ Providentiae, institutus ut electiones ejus ex motibus cælestium corporum provenient. A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J: « Sunt. » A: «\n\nNaturaliter instinctus... provenient. » 44. Adhuc, Electiones hominum ad bona et mala se habent. Si igitur electiones nostræ ex motibus stellarum provenirent, sequeretur quod stellæ per se essent causa malarum electionum. Quod autem est malum non habet causam in natura; nam malum incidit ex defectu alicujus causæ et non habet causam per se, ut supra (c. xiii) ostensum est. Non est igitur possibile quod electiones nostræ directe et per se a corporibus cælestibus provenient\n\nsicut ex causis. — Potest autem aliquis huic rationi obviare, dicendo quod omnis mala electio ex alicujus boni appetitu provenit, ut supra (c. iii et iv) ostensum est; sicut electio adulterii provenit, ex appetitu boni delectabilis quod est in venereis; ad quod quidem bonum universale aliqua stella movet, et hoc necessarium est ad generationem animalium perficiendam; nec debuit hoc commune bonum prætermitti propter malum particulare hujusmodi qui ex hoc instinctu\n\nelegit malum. — IIæc autem responsio sufficiens non est, si ponantur corpora cælestia per se causa electionum nostrarum, utpote per se imprimentia in intellectum et voluntatem. Nam impressio universalis causæ recipitur in unoquoque secundum modum suum. Effectus ergo stellæ moventis ad delectationem, quæ est in conjunctione ordinata ad generationem, recipietur in quolibet secundum modum sibi proprium; sicut videmus quod diversa animalia habent diversa tempora et diversos modos commixtionis, secundum congruentiam suæ naturæ, ut Aristoteles dicit, De hist. animal. V, c. ii-viii. Recipiunt ergo intellectus et voluntas impressionem illius stellæ secundum modum suum. Quum autem aliquid appetitur secundum modum intellectus et rationis, non accidit peccatum in electione, quæ quidem semper ex hoc mala est quod non est secundum rationem rectam. Non igitur, si corpora cælestia essent causa electionum nostrarum, esset unquam in\n\nnobis electio mala. 42. Amplius, Nulla virtus activa se extendit ad ea quæ sunt supra speciem et naturam agentis, quia omne agens agit per suam formam. Sed ipsum velle transcendit omnem speciem corporalem, sicut et ipsum intelligere; sicut enim intelligimus universalia, ita et voluntas nostra in aliquod universale fertur, puta quododimus omne latronum genus, ut Philosophus dicit, Rhet. l. II, c. iv. Nostrum igitur velle non causatur\n\na corpore cælesti. 43. Præterea, Quæ sunt ad finem proportionantur fini. Electiones autem humanæ ordinantur ad felicitatem sicut ad ultimum finem; quæ quidem non consistit in aliquibus corporalibus bonis, sed in hoc quod anima conjungatur per intellectum rebus divinis, ut supra (c. xxv, xxxvii et seq.) ostensum est, tam secundum sententiam fidei quam secundum philosophorum opiniones. Corpora igitur cælestia non possunt esse\n\ncausa electionum nostrarum. Hinc est quod dicitur: A signis cæeli nolite metuere, quæ timent gentes, quia leges populorum vanæ sunt,\n\nJerem. x, 2 et 3. Per hoc autem excluditur positio Stoicorum, qui ponebant omnes actus nostros, et etiam electiones nostras, secundum corpora cælestia disponi. Quæ etiam dicitur fuisse positio antiqua Phariseorum apud Judæos. Priscillianistæ hujusmodi erroris etiam rei fuerunt, ut dicitur in libro De hæresibus, c. lxx. Hæc etiam fuit opinio antiquorum naturalium, qui ponebant sensum et intellectum non differre; unde Empedocles dixit quod voluntas augetur in hominibus sicut in aliis animalibus, ad præsens, id est secundum præsens momentum, ex motu cæeli causante tempus, ut Aristoteles introducit, De anima,\n\nIII, c. iii. Sciendum tamen est quod, licet corpora cælestia non sint directe causa electionum nostrarum, quasi directe in voluntates nostras imprimentia, indirecte tamen ex his aliqua occasio nostris electionibus præstatur, secundum quod habent impressionem super corpora. Et hoc dupliiter: uno quidem modo, secundum quod impressiones corporum cælestium in exteriora corpora sunt nobis causa alicujus electionis, sicut, quum per corpora cælestia disponitur aer ad frigus intensum, eligimus calefieri ad ignem vel ali- Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. omittunt: « Ex. » Cod. Berg. ; « Poterit. » Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. omittunt: « Quod. » A: « Odimus omnem latronem, vel omne latronum genus. » A: « Physicorum. » A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J: « Qui apud. » qua hujusmodi facere quæ congruunt tempori: alio modo, secundum quod imprimunt in corpora nostra, ad quorum immutationem insurgunt nobis aliqui motus passionum, vel per eorum impressionem efficimur habiles ad aliquas passiones, sicut cholerici sunt proni ad iram; vel secundum quod ex eorum impressione causatur in nobis aliquo dispositio corporalis quæ est occasio alicujus electionis, sicut quum, nobis infirmantibus,\n\neligimus accipere medicinam; interdum etiam ex corporibus cælestibus actus humani causantur, in quantum ex indispositione corporis aliqui amentes efficiuntur, usu rationis privati, in quibus proprie electio non est, sed moventur aliquo naturali instinctu, sicut et bruta. Manifestum est autem et experimento cognitum quod tales occasiones, sive sint exteriores sive interiores, non sunt causa necessaria electionis, quum homo per rationem possit eis resistere vel obedire; sed plures sunt qui impetus tales naturales sequuntur, pauciores autem, idest soli sapientes, qui occasiones male agendi et naturales impetus non sequuntur. Et propter hoc dicit Ptolomæus in Centiloquio quod « anima sapiens adjuvat opus stellarum: et quod non poterit astrologus dare judicia secundum stellas, nisi vim animæ et complexionem bene cognoverit; et quod astrologus non debet dicere rem specialiter, sed universaliter, » quia scilicet impressio stellarum in pluribus sortitur effectum, qui non resistunt inclinationi quæ est ex corpore, non autem semper in hoc vel illo qui forte per rationem naturali inclinationi resistit.\n\nQuod corporales effectus, in istis inferioribus, non sequuntur ex necessitate a corporibus cælestibus. Non solum autem corpora cælestia humanæ electioni necessitatem inferre non possunt, sed nec etiam corporales effectus, in istis inferioribus, ex necessitate ab eis procedunt. 1. Impressiones enim causarum naturalium recipiuntur in effectibus secunbum recipientium modum. Hæc autem inferioria sunt fluxibilia et non semper eodem modo se habentia, propter materiam, quæ est in potentia ad plures formas, et propter contrarietatem formarum et virtutum. Non igitur impressiones corporum cælestium recipiuntur in istis inferioribus per modum necessitatis. 2. Item, A causa remota non sequitur effectus de necessitate, nisi etiam sit causa media necessaria, sicut et in syllogismis ex majori de necessitate et minori de contingenti non sequitur conclusio de necessitate. Corpora autem cælestia sunt causæ remotæ; proximæ autem causæ inferiorum effectuum sunt virtutes activæ et passivæ in istis inferioribus, quæ non sunt necessariæ, sed contingentes; possunt enim deficere ut in paucioribus. Non ergo ex corporibus cælestibus sequuntur in istis inferioribus corporibus effectus de necessitate. 3. Præterea, Motus cælestium corporum semper est eodem modo. Si igitur effectus cælestium corporum in istis inferioribus corporibus ex necessitate provenirent, semper eodem modo se habent quæ in inferioribus sunt. Non autem semper eodem modo se habent, sed ut in pluribus. Non igitur ex necessitate proveniunt. 4. Adduc, Ex multis contigentibus non potest fieri unum necessarium, quia, sicut quodlibet contingentium per se deficere potest ab effectu, ita et omnia simul. Constat autem quod singula quæ in istis inferioribus fiunt ex impressione cælestium corporum sunt contingentia. Non igitur connexio eorum quæ in istis inferioribus contingunt ex impressione cælestium corporum est necessaria; manifestum est enim quod quodlibet eorum impediri potest. 5. Amplius, Corpora cælestia sunt agentia naturaliter, quæ requirunt materiam in quam agant. Non igitur ex actione corporum cælestium tollitur id quod materia requirit. Materia autem in quam agunt corpora inferiora, quæ, quum sint corruptibilia secundum suam naturam, sicut deficere possunt ab esse, ita ab operari; et sic eorum natura hoc habet ut non ex necessitate producant effectus. Non igitur ex neccesitate proveniunt effectus cælestium corporum in corporibus inferioribus. A, B, C, D, E, F omittunt: « Quia. » Si autem aliquis forte dicat quod necessarium est quod effectus corporum cælestium compleantur nec tamen per hoc tollitur possibilitas a rebus inferioribus, — eo quod quilibet effectus est in potentia antequam fiat, et tunc dicitur possibilis; quando autem jam est in actu transit a possibilitate in necessitatem; et totum hoc subjacet cælestibus motibus, et sic non tollitur quin aliquando effectus sit possibilis, licet necessarium sit effectum illum quandoque produci (sic enim Albumazar, in primo libro sui Introductorii, defendere nititur possibile),—non autem est possibile quod secundum hunc modum possibile defendatur. Possibile enim quoddam est quod ad necessarium sequitur; nam quod necesse est esse possibile est esse; quod enim non possibile est esse impossibile est esse, et quod impossibile est esse necesse est non esse. Igitur quod necesse est esse necesse est non esse. Hoc autem est impossibile. Ergo impossibile est quod aliquid necesse sit esse et tamen non sit possibile illud esse. Ergo possibile esse sequitur ad necesse esse. — Hoc autem possibile non est necessarium defendere contra hoc quod effectus ex necessitate causari dicuntur, sed possible quod opponitur necessario, prout dicitur possibile quod potest esse et non esse. Non autem dicitur aliquid per hunc modum possibile et contingens ex hoc solum quod quandoque sit in potentia et quandoque in actu, ut prædicta responsio præsupponit; nam sic etiam in motibus cælestibus est possibile et contingens; non enim semper est conjunctio vel oppositio solis aut lunæ in actu, sed quandoque quidem in actu, quandoque autem in potentia; quæ tamen necessaria sunt, quum de his dentur demonstrationes. Sed possibile vel contingens quod opponitur necessario hoc in sua ratione habet quod non sit necesse illud fieri quando non est; quod quidem est quia non de necessitate sequitur ex causa sua; sicut quum dicimus «Socratem esse sessurum» esse contingens, «ipsum» autem «esse mo-riturum» esse necessarium, quia secundum horum ex causa sua de necessitate sequitur, non autem primum. Si ergo ex motibus cælestibus de necessitate sequitur quod eorum effectus sint quandoque futuri, tollitur possibile et contingens quod necessario opponitur. Sciendum est autem quod, ad probandum effectus cælestium corporum ex necessitate provenire, Avicenna, Metaphys. X, c. 1, utitur tali ratione: Si enim effectus aliquis cælestium corporum impeditur, oportet quod hoc sit per aliquam causam voluntarium vel naturalem. Omnis autem causa voluntaria vel naturalis reducitur ad aliquod cæleste principium. Ergo impedimentum effectuum cælestium corporum procedit ex aliquibus cælestibus principiis. Impossibile est ergo, si totus ordo cælestium corporum simul accipiatur, quod effectus ejus unquam cassetur; unde concludit quod corpora cælestia faciunt necessario esse debere effectus, in istis inferioribus, tam voluntarios quam naturales. Hæc autem ratio, ut Aristoteles dicit, Physic. II, c. iv, v et vi, fuit quorumdam antiquorum, qui negabant casum et fortunam per hoc quod cujuslibet effectus est aliqua causa determinata; posita autem causa, ponitur effectus de necessitate; et sic, quum omnia de necessitate proveniant, non est aliquid fortuitum neque causale. Hanc autem rationem ipse Aristoteles solvit, Metaphys. VI, negando duas propositiones quibus hæc ratio utitur. — Quarum una est quod, posita causa qua-cumque, necesse sit ejus effectum poni; hoc enim non oportet in omnibus causis, quia, aliqua causa licet sit per se et proprie causa sufficiens alicujus effectus, potest tamen impediri, ex concursu alterius causæ, ut non sequatur effectus. — Alia propositio est quam negat, (dicens) quod non omne quod est quocumque modo habet causam per se, sed solum ea quæ sunt per se; quae autem sunt per accidens non habent aliquam causam; sicut quod sit musicum habet aliquam, et cod. Berg.: «Autem.», et cod. Berg. — sed in D primum quod expungendum notatur., et cod. Berg., et cod. Berg. 7 8 A, B, C, D: Quilibet effectus est ab.» 9 F omittit: «Effectus.» 10 causam in homine, quod autem homo sit simul albus et musicus non habet aliquam causam; quæcumque enim sunt simul propter aliquam causam ordinem habent ad invicem ex illa causa; quæ autem sunt per accidens non habent ordinem ad invicem, non igitur sunt ex aliqua causa per se agente, sed solum per accidens hoc evenit; accidit enim docenti musicam quod doceat hominem album; est enim praeter ejus intentionem; sed intendit docere disciplinæ susceptibilem. Sic ergo, proposito aliquo effectu, dicemus quod habuit aliquam causam ex qua non de necessitate sequebatur, quia poterat impediri ex alia causa concurrente per accidens; et, licet illam causam concurrentem habeat reducere in aliquam causam altiorem, tamen ipsum concursum qui impedit non est reducere in aliquam causam; et sic non potest dici quod impedimentum hujus effectus vel illius procedit ex aliquo cælesti principio. Unde non oportet dicere quod effectus corporum cælestium ex necessitate provenient in istis inferioribus. Hinc est quod Damascenus dicit quod corpora cælestia non sunt causa generationis alicujus eorum quæ fiunt neque corruptionis eorum quæ corrumpuntur, De orthod. fide, II, c. vii, quia scilicet non ex necessitate ex eis effectus provenient. Aristoteles etiam dicit, De divinatione per somnum, c. ii, quod « eorum quæ in corporibus sunt signorum, etiam cælestium, velut aquarum et ventorum, multa non eveniunt; si enim aliquis alius vehementior isto accidit motus a quo futuro signum factum est, non fit, sicut et multa consulta bene, quæ fieri expediebat dissoluta sunt propter alias digniores inchoationes. » Ptolomæus etiam in Quadripartito dicit: « Rursus nec aestimare debemus quod superiora procedunt inevitabiliter, ut ea quæ divina dispositione contingunt et quæ nullatenus sunt vitanda, nec non quæ veraciter et ex necessitate provenient. » In Centiloquio etiam dicit: Hæc indicia quæ tibi trado sunt media inter necessarium et possibile. » 1 (Ex translatione Burgundioni). « Quamobrem hoc dicimus sidera nec eorum quæ contingunt, nec ortus eorum quæ nascuntur, nec eorum quæ pereunt interitus causas esse. » (De fide orthodoxa, lib. II, cap. vii, tom. I, col. 894.) 3 et cod. Berg., et cod. Berg.: « Ut quidam dicunt. » anima, non pervenit ad aliam nisi mediante corpore ; vox enim prolata immutat organum auditus, et, sic a sensu percepta, pervenit ejus signatum usque ad intellectum. Si igitur anima cœlestis aliquid imprimat in animas nostras per motum corporeum, actio illa non pervenit usque ad animam nostram nisi per mutationem corporis nostri; quæ quidem non est causa nostrarum actionum, sed occasio tantum, sicut ex præmissis (c. Lxxxv) patet. Non igitur erit motus cœlestis causa nostræ electionis nisi per occasionem tantum. 3. Item, Quum movens et motum oportet simul esse, ut probatur in septimo Physicorum, c. 11, oportet quod a primo movente proveniat motus usque ad ultimum quod movetur, quodam ordine, ut scilicet movens per id quod est sibi proximum moveat id quod est ab eo distans. Corpori autem cœlesti, quod moveri ponitur ab anima sibi conjuncta, propinquius est corpus nostrum quam anima, quæ non habet ordinem ad corpus cœleste nisi mediante corpore; quod ex hoc patet quia intellectus separatus nullum habet ordinem ad corpus cœleste, nisi forte moventis ad motum. Immutatio igitur corporis cœlestis ab anima ejus procedens non pertingit ad animam nostram nisi mediante corpore. Ad motum autem corporis non movetur anima nisi per accidens, nec immutationem corporis sequitur electio nisi per occasionem, ut dictum est (c. Lxxxv). Motus igitur cœlestis non potest esse causa electionis nostræ per hoc quod est ab anima. 4. Praeterea, Secundum positionem Avicennæ, Compend. de anima, c. x, et quorumdam philosophorum aliorum, Averrh., De anima, l. III, intellectus agens est quædam substantia separata, quæ quidem agit in animas nostras in quantum facit intellecta in potentia esse intellecta in actu. Hoc autem fit per abstractionem ab omnibus materialibus dispositionibus, ut patet ex his quæ dicta sunt (l. II, c. Lxxvi et Lxxix). Quod igitur agit directe in animam non agit in eam per motum corporeum, sed magis per abstractionem ab omni corporeo. Anima igitur cœeli, si sit animatum, non potest esse causa electionum nostrarum vel intelligentiarum per motum cœeli. Per easdem etiam rationes potest probari quod motus cœli non sit causa electionum nostrarum per virtutem substantiæ separatæ, si quis ponat cœlum non esse animatum, sed a substantia separata moveri.\n\n1x, a. 1x.) Non est autem aestimandum quod animæ cœlorum, si quæ sint, vel quæ-cumque aliæ substantiæ intellectuales separatæ creatæ possint directe voluntatem nobis immitterere aut electionis\n\nnostræ causa esse. 1. Omnium enim creatorum actiones sub ordine divinæ Providentiae continentur; unde praeter leges ipsius agere non possunt. Est autem Providentiae lex ut unumquodque immediate a proxima sibi causa moveatur. Causa igitur superior creata, tali ordine praetermisso, nec movere nec agere potest. Proximum autem motivum voluntatis est bonum intellectum, quod est suum objectum, et movetur ab ipso sicut visus a colore. Nulla igitur substantia creata potest movere voluntatem nisi mediante bono intellecto. Hoc autem est in quantum manifestat ei aliquid esse bonum ad agendum; quod est persuadere. Nulla igitur substantia creata potest agere in voluntatem et esse causa electionis nostræ nisi\n\nper modum suadentis. 2. Item, Ab illo agente aliquid natum est moveri et pati per cujus formam reduci potest in actum; nam omne agens agit per formam suam. Voluntas autem reducitur in actum per appetibile, quod motum desiderii ejus quietat. In solo autem bono divino quietatur desiderium voluntatis sicut in ultimo fine, ut ex supradictis (c. xxxvii, l et Lxiii) patet. Solus igitur Deus potest movere voluntatem\n\nper modum agentis. 3. Adhuc, Sicut in re inanimata se habet inclinatio naturalis ad proprium finem, quæ appetitus dicitur naturalis, ita se habet in substantia intellectuali voluntas, quæ dicitur appetitus intellec- $^1$ Quidam Edit.: « Mediante corporis. » $^2$ A, B, C, D, E, F: « Immutationem. » XII. $^3$ A: « Non potest esse. » $^4$ B, C, D, E, F: « Sed solus Deus. » tualis. Inclinationes autem naturales dare non est nisi illius qui naturam instituit. Ergo et voluntatem inclinare in aliquid non est nisi ejus qui est naturæ intellectualis causa. Hoc autem solius Dei est, sicut ex superioribus (l. II, c. xxI) patet. Ipse igitur solus voluntatem nostram in aliquid inclinare\n\npotest. 4. Amplius, « Violentum, ut dicitur in tertio Ethicorum, c. I, est cujus principium est extra 1, nil conferente vim passo. » Si igitur voluntas moveatur ab aliquo exteriori principio, erit violentus motus; dico autem moveri ab extrinseco principio quod moveat per modum agentis et non per modum finis. Violentum autem voluntario repugnat. Impossibile est igitur 2 quod voluntas 3 moveatur a principio extrinseco quasi ab agente, sed oportet quod omnis motus voluntatis ab interiori procedat. Nulla autem substantia creata conjungitur animæ intellectuali quantum ad sua interiora, nisi 4 solus Deus, qui solus est causa ipsius et sustinens eam in esse. A solo igitur Deo potest\n\nmotus voluntarius causari. 5. Adhuc, Violentum opponitur naturali et voluntario motui, quia utrumque oportet quod sit a principio intrinseco. Agens autem exterius sic solum naturaliter movet in quantum causat in mobili intrinsecum principium motus: sicut generans quod dat formam gravitatis corpori gravi generato, movet ipsum naturaliter deorsum. Nihil autem aliud extrinsecum movere potest absque violentia corpus naturale, nisi forte per accidens, sicut removens prohibens, quod magis utitur motu naturali vel actione quam causet ipsum. Illud igitur solum agens potest causare motum voluntatis absque violentia quod causat principium intrinsecum hujus motus, quod est potentia ipsa voluntatis. Hoc autem est Deus, qui animam solus creat, ut ostensum est (l. II, c. xxI et lxxxvii). Solus igitur Deus potest movere voluntatem, per modum\n\nagentis, absque violentia. Hinc est quod dicitur: Cor regis in manu Domini; quocumque voluerit inclinabit illud, Proverb. xxI, I; et: Deus est qui operatur in vobis et velle et perficere, pro bona voluntate, Philipp. II, 13. 1 Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit.: « Extrinsecum. » 2 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Ergo. » 3 E omittit: « Voluntas. »\n\nQuod motus voluntatis causatur a Deo, et non solum a potentia voluntatis 5. Quidam vero, non intelligentes qualiter motum voluntatis Deus in nobis causare possit absque præjudicio libertatis voluntatis, conati sunt has auctoritates male exponere, ut scilicet dicerent quod Deus causat in nobis velle et perficere in quantum dat nobis virtutem volendi, non autem sic quod faciat nos velle hoc vel illud, sicut Origines exponit (Περι Αρχων, liv. III, c. I,) liberum arbitrium defendens contra auctoritates prædictas. Et ex hoc processisse videtur opinio quorumdam, qui dicebant quod Providentia non est de his quæ subsunt libero arbitrio, scilicet de electionibus, sed Providentia refertur ad exteriores eventus; non enim qui elegit aliquod consequi vel perficere, puta ædificare vel ditari, semper poterit ad hoc pervenire; et sic eventus actionum nostrarum non subjacent libero arbitrio, sed Providentia disponuntur. Quibus quidem auctoritatibus sacræ Scripturæ resistitur evidenter. 1. Dicitur enim: Omnia opera nostra operatus es nobis, Domine, Isa., xxvi, 12; unde non solum virtutem volendi a Deo habemus, sed etiam operationem. 2. Præterea, Hoc ipsum quod Salomon dicit: Quocumque voluerit, inclinabit illud, Proverb. xxI, I, ostendit non solum divinam causalitatem ad potentiam voluntatis extendi, sed etiam ad actum ipsius. 3. Item, Deus non solum dat rebus virtutem, sed etiam nulla res potest propria virtute agere, nisi agat in virtute ipsius, ut supra (c. lxvii et lxx) ostensum est. Ergo homo non potest virtute voluntatis sibi data uti, nisi in quantum agit in virtute Dei. Illud autem in cujus virtute agens agit est causa, non solum virtutis, sed etiam actus: quod in artifice apparet, in cujus virtute agit instrumentum, etiam quod ab hoc artifice propria formam non accipit, sed solum ab ipso applicatur ad actum. Deus igitur est causa nobis, non solum voluntatis, sed etiam volendi. 4, et cod. Berg. 4. Amplius, Perfectius inventur ordo in spiritualibus quam in corporalibus. In corporalibus autem omnis motus causatur a primo motu. Oportet igitur quod in spiritualibus omnis motus voluntatis a prima voluntate causetur, quæ est voluntas Dei. 5. Adhuc, Superius (c. LXXII et LXX) ostensum est quod Deus est causa omnis actionis et operatur in omni agente. Est igitur causa motuum voluntatis. 6. Item, Arguit Aristoteles in septimo Ethicorum Eudemiorum, c. XIV, per hunc modum: Hujus quod aliquis intelligat, consilietur, et eligat, et velit, oportet aliquid esse causam, quia omne novum oportet quod habeat aliquam causam; si autem est causa ejus aliud consilium et alia voluntas pracedens, quum non sit procedere in his in infinitum, oportet devenire ad aliquod primum; hujusmodi autem primum oportet esse aliquid quod est melius ratione; nihil autem est melius intellectu et ratione nisi Deus; est igitur Deus primum principium nostrorum consiliorum et voluntatum.\n\nII ad. 4um.) Ex quo patet quod oportet etiam voluntates humanas et electiones divinæ\n\nProvidentiæ subditas esse. 1. Omnia enim quæ Deus agit, ex ordine Providentiæ suæ agit. Quum igitur Ipse sit causa electionis et voluntatis nostræ, et electiones et voluntates nostræ\n\ndivinæ Providentiæ subduntur. 2. Amplius, Omnia corporalia per spiritualia administrantur, sicut superius (c. LXXVII) est ostensum. Spiritualia autem agunt in corporalia per voluntatem. Si igitur electiones et motus voluntatum intellectualium substantiarum ad Dei Providentiam non pertinent, sequitur quod etiam corporalia ipsius Providentiæ subtrahantur; et sic totaliter\n\nnulla erit Providentia. 3. Item, Quanto aliquo sunt nobiliora in universo, tanto oportet quod magis participent ordinem, in qua bonum universi consistit;unde Aristoteles, Phys. II, c. IV, arguit antiquos philosophos, qui ponebant casum et fortunam in constitutione cœlestium corporum, non autem in inferioribus rebus. Substantiae autem intellectuales sunt nobiliores substantiis corporalibus. Si igitur substantiae corporales, quantum ad suas substantias et actiones, cadunt sub ordine Providentiæ, multo\n\nmagis substantiae intellectuales. 4. Præterea, Ea quæ sunt propinquiora fini magis cadunt sub ordine qui est ad finem, nam, eis mediantibus, etiam alia ordinantur in finem. Actiones autem substantiarum intellectualium propinquius ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem quam actiones aliarum rerum, sicut supra (c. L) ostensum est. Magis igitur cadunt actiones intellectualium substantiarum sub ordine Providentiæ, qua Deus omnia in se ipsum ordinat, quam\n\nactiones aliarum rerum. 5. Adhuc, Gubernatio Providentiæ ex amore divino procedit, quo Deus res a se creatas amat; in hoc enim præcipue consistit amor quod amans amato bonum velit. Quanto ergo Deus aliqua magis amat, tanto magis sub ejus Providentia cadunt. — Hoc autem et sacra Scriptura docet, dicens: Custodit Dominus omnes diligentes se, Psalm. cxliv, 20, — et etiam Philosophus in decimo Ethicorum, c. IX, tradit, dicens quod Deus maxime curat de his qui diligunt intellectum, tanquam de suis amicis; ex quo etiam habetur quod maxime substantias intellectuales amat; sub ejus igitur Providentia cadunt earum\n\nvoluntates et electiones. 6. Amplius, Bona interiora hominis quæ ex voluntate et electione dependent sunt magis propria hominis quam illa quæ extra ipsum sunt, ut adeptio divi-tiarum vel si quid aliud est hujusmodi; unde per illa homo dicitur esse bonus, non autem per ista. Si igitur electiones humanæ et voluntatis motus non cadunt sub divina Providentia, sed solum exteriores proventus, verius erit quod res humanæ sunt extra Providentiam quam quod Providentia subsint; quod quidem ex persona blasphemantium inducitur: Nec nostra considerat, et circa cardines cœli per-ambulat, Job, XXII, 14, et: Dereliquit Dominus terram, et Dominus non videt, Ezech, IX, 9, et: Quis est iste qui dixit ut fieret, Domino non jubente? Thren. III, 37. 1 Cod. Berg: « Hæc. » — A, B,\n\nC, D: « Ista. » Videntur autem quædam in doctrina sacra secundum prædictam sententiam sonare. Dicitur enim: Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit illum in manu consilii sui, Eccli. xv, 14; et infra: Apposuit tibi aquam et ignem; ad quod volueris, porrige manum tuam. Ante hominem vita et mors, bonum et malum; quod placuerit ei dabitur illi, Ibid. xv, 17 et 18; et: Considera quod hodie proposuerim in conspectu tuo vitam et bonum, et, e converso, mortem et malum, Deuter. xxx, 15. Hæc autem verba ad hoc inducuntur ut homines esse liberi arbitrii ostendantur, non ut eorum electiones a\n\ndivina Providentia subtrahantur. Et similiter 4, quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit in libro quem de homine fecit: « Providentia est eorum quæ non sunt in nobis; non autem eorum quæ sunt in nobis, » et Damascenus, eum sequens, dicit, De orthod. fide, l. II, c. xxx, quod « ea quæ sunt in nobis Deus prænoscit 2, sed non prædeterminat, » exponenda sunt ut intelligatur ea quæ sunt in nobis divinæ determinai non esse subjecta quasi ab 3 ea necessitatem accipientia.\n\nsuperiores causas reducantur. Ex his ergo quæ supra ostensa sunt colligere possumus quomodo humana ad superiores reducuntur causas et\n\nnon aguntur fortuito. Nam electiones et voluntates immediate a Deo disponuntur; cognitio vero humana, ad intellectum pertinens, a Deo, mediantibus Angelis, ordinatur; ea vero quæ ad corporalia pertinent, sive sint interiora, sive exteriora in usum hominis venientia, a Deo, mediantibus Angelis et\n\ncælestibus corporibus, dispensantur. Hujus autem ratio generaliter una est. Nam oportet omne multiforme et mutabile et deficere potens reduci, sicut in principium, in aliquod uniforme et immutabile et deficere non valens. Omnia autem quæ in nobis sunt inveniuntur esse multiplicia 4,\n\nvariabilia et defectibilia: 1. Patet enim quod electiones nostræ multiplicitatem habent, quum in diversis et a diversis diversa eligantur; mutabiles etiam sunt, tum propter animi levitatem qui non est firmatus in fine ultimo, tum etiam propter mutationem rerum quæ nos extra circumstant; quod autem defectibilies sint, hominum peccata testantur. Divina autem voluntas uniformis est, quia unum volendo omnia alia vult; et immutabilis et indeficiens est, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xxiii, lxxv et lxxvi). Oportet ergo omnium voluntatum et electionum motus in divinam voluntatem reduci, non autem in aliquam aliam causam, quia solus Deus nostrarum voluntatum et\n\nelectionum causa est. 2. Similiter autem intelligentia nostra multiplicationem habet, quia ex multis sensibilibus veritatem intelligibilem quasi congregamus; est etiam mutabilis, quia ex uno in aliud discurrendo procedit, ex notis ad ignota proveniens; est etiam defectibilis, propter permixionem phanta-sia et sensus, ut errores hominum ostendunt. Angelorum autem cognitio est uniformis quia ab ipso uno veritatis fonte, scilicet Deo, accipiunt veritatis cognitionem; est etiam immobilis, quia non discurrendo ab effectibus in causas, aut e converso, sed simplici intuitu, puram veritatem de rebus intuentur; est etiam indefectibilis, quum ipsas rerum naturas seu quidditates intueantur per seipsas, circa quas non potest intellectus errare, sicut nec sensus circa propria sensibilia; nos autem quidditates rerum ex accidentibus et effectibus cognoscimus. Oportet ergo quod nostra intellectualis cognitio reguletur\n\nper Angelorum cognitionem. 3. Rursus de corporibus humanis et exterioribus quibus homines utuntur, manifestum est quod est in eis multiplicitas commixtionis et contrarietatis 6; et quod non semper eodem modo moventur, quia motus eorum non possunt esse continui; et quod defectibilia sunt per alterationem 1 A: « Similiter etiam. » 2 « Oportet noscere quod omnia quidem prænoscit Deus, non omnia autem determinat. Prænoscit enim quæ in nobis, non autem determinat ea. » (Ex translat. Burgundionis.) 3 Illud scire interest, Deum omnia quidem præscire, sed non omnia præfinire; præscit enim ea quæ in nostra potestate sunt: at non item ea præfinit. (προμρίξει.) (De fide orthodoxa, lib. II, cap. xxx, tom. I, col. 971.) 4 A: « Sub ea. » 5 A: « Multiformia. » 6 A: « Contrarietas in esse. » — B, C, D, E, F: « Contrarietatis esse. » et corruptionem. Corpora autem cælestia sunt uniformia, utpote simplicia, absque omni contrarietate existentia; motus etiam eorum sunt uniformes, continui et semper eodem modo se habentes; necineis potest esse corruptio vel alteratio. Unde necessarium est quod corpora nostra et alia quæ in usum nostrum veniunt, per motum cælestium corporum regulentur.\n\nQuomodo dicitur aliquis bene fortunatus, et quomodo adjuvatur homo ex superioribus causis. Ex his autem apparere potest quomodo aliquis possit dici bene fortunatus. Dicitur enim alicui homini bene secundum fortunam contingere quando aliquod bonum accidit sibi præter intentionem; sicut quum aliquis fodiens in agro invenit thesaurum quem non quærebat. Contingit autem aliquem operantem præter intentionem operari propriam, non tamen præter intentionem alicujus superioris cui ipse subest; sicut, si dominus aliquis præcipiat alicui servo quod vadat ad aliquem locum quo ipse alium servum jam miserat, illo ignorante, inventio conservi est præter intentionem servi missi, non autem præter intentionem domini mittentis; et ideo, licet per comparationem ad hunc servum sit fortuitum et casuale, non tamen per comparationem ad dominum, sed est aliquid ordinatum. Quum igitur homo sit ordinatus secundum corpus sub corporibus cælestibus, secundum intellectum vero sub Angelis, secundum voluntatem autem sub Deo, potest contingere aliquid præter intentionem hominis quod tamen est secundum ordinem cælestium corporum vel dispositionem Angelorum vel etiam Dei. Quamvis autem Deus solus directe ad electionem hominis operetur, tamen actio Angeli operatur aliquid ad electionem hominis per modum persuasionis, actio vero corporis cælestis per modum disponentis, in quantum corporales cælestium impressiones in corpora nostra disponunt ad aliquas electiones. Quando igitur ali- A, et cod. Berg. omittunt: « Jam. », et cod. Berg., et cod. Berg. B, C, D, E, F omittunt: « Non solum. » — E omittit: « Sed etiam bene natus aut male. » F: « Vel male. clinat; semper tamen hoc homo eligit quod Deus operatur in ejus voluntate. Unde custodia Angelorum interdum cas-satur, secundum illud: Curavimus Babylonem, et non est sanata, Jerem. 11, 9; et multo magis inclinatio cælestium corporum; divina vero Providentia semper est firma. Est etiam et alia differentia consideranda. Nam, quum corpus cæleste non disponat ad electionem nisi in quantum imprimit in corpora nostra dispositiones ex quibus homo incitatur ad eligendum per modum quo passiones inducunt ad electionem, omnis dispositio ad electionem quæ est ex corporibus cælestibus est per modum alicujus passionis, sicut quum quis inducitur ad aliquid eligendum per odium vel amorem, vel iram, vel aliquid hujusmodi. Ab Angelo vero disponitur aliquis ad eligendum per modum intelligibilis considerationis, absque passione; quod quidem contingit dupliciter: — Quandoque enim illuminatur intellectus hominis ab Angelo ad cognoscendum solum quod aliquid est bonum fieri, non autem instruitur de ratione propter quam est bonum, quæ sumitur ex fine; et ideo homo quandoque aestimat quod aliquid sit bonum fieri; si tamen quæeretur quare, responderet se nescire; unde, quando perveniet in finem utilem, quem non præconsideravit, erit sibi fortuitum. — Quandoque vero per illuminationem Angeli instruitur etiam quod hoc sit bonum et de ratione quare est bonum, quæ dependet ex fine: et sic, quando pervenerit ad finem quem præconsideravit, non erit fortuitum. Sciendum est etiam quod vis activa spiritualis naturæ, sicut est altior quam corporalis, ita est universalior; unde non ad omnia ad quæ se extendit humana electio se extendit dispositio cælestis corporis. Rursus, virtus humanæ animæ vel etiam Angeli est particularis in comparatione ad virtutem divinam, quæ est universalis respectu omnium entium. Sic ergo aliquod bonum accidere potest homini, et præter propriam intentionem, et præter inclinationem cælestium corporum, et præter Angelorum illuminationem, non autem præter divinam Providentiam, quæ est gubernativa sicut et factiva entis in quantum est ens; unde oportet quod omnia sub se contineat. Sic ergo aliquid fortuitum bonum vel malum potest contingere homini, et per comparisonem ad cælestia corpora, et per comparisonem ad Angelos, non autem per comparisonem ad Deum; nam, per comparisonem ad Ipsum, non solum in rebus humanis, sed nec in qualibet alia re, potest esse aliquid casuale et improvisum. Quia vero fortuita sunt quæ sunt præter intentionem (bona autem moralia præter intentionem esse non possunt, quum in electione consistant), respectu eorum non potest dici aliquis bene vel male fortunatus, licet respectu eorum possit aliquis dici bene vel male natus, quando ex naturali dispositione corporis est aptus ad electiones virtutum vel vitiorum. Respectu autem exteriorum bonorum, quæ præter intentionem homini evenire possunt, potest dici homo, et bene natus, et bene fortunatus, et a Deo gubernatus, et ab Angelis custoditus. Consequitur autem ex superioribus causis et aliud auxilium quantum ad exitus suarum actionum. Quum enim homo et eligere habeat et prosequi quod eligit, in utroque a causis superioribus adjuvatur interdum et impeditur: secundum electionem quidem, ut dictum est, in quantum homo vel disponitur ad aliquid eligendum per cælestia corpora, vel quasi illustratur per Angelorum custodiam, vel etiam inclinatur per operationem divinam; secundum exsecutionem vero, in quantum homo consequitur ex aliqua superiori causa robur et efficaciam ad implendum quod eligit; quae quidem non solum a Deo et ab Angelis esse potest, sed etiam a corporibus cælestibus, in quantum talis efficacia in corpore sita est. Manifestum est enim quod etiam inanimata corpora quasdam vires et efficacias a cælestibus corporibus consequuntur, et etiam præter eas quae ad qualitates activas et passivas ele- 1 B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg.: « Imprimit ex quibus. » 2 3 4, et cod. Berg.: « Quasi. » 6 7 8 A omittit: « Et. » mentorum consequuntur, quas etiam non est dubium cœlestibus corporibus esse subjectas; sicut quod magnes attrahit ferrum habet ex virtute cœlestis corporis, et lapides quidam et herbæ alias occultas virtutes. Unde nihil prohibet quod etiam aliquis homo habeat, ex impressione corporis cœlestis, aliquam efficaciam in aliquibus operibus faciendis, quam alius non habet; puta medicus in sanando, et agricola in plantando, et miles in expugnando. Hanc autem efficaciam multo perfectius Deus hominibus largitur ad sua opera efficaciter exsequenda. Quantum ergo ad primum auxilium, quod est in eligendo, dicitur Deus hominem dirigere; quantum vero ad secundum auxilium, dicitur hominem confortare; et hæc auxilia tanguntur simul ubii dicitur: Dominus illuminatio mea et salus mea; quem timebo? quantum ad primum; et: Dominus protector vitæ meæ; a quo trepidabo? Psalm. xxvi, 1 et 2, quantum ad secundum. Sed inter hæc duo auxilia est differentia duplex: Prima quidem, quia ex auxilio primo adjuvatur homo, tam in his quæ virtuti hominis subduntur quam etiam in aliis; sed secundum auxilium ad illa tantum se extendit ad quæ virtus hominis valet. Quod enim homo fodiens sepulcrum inveniat thesaurum, ex nulla hominis virtute procedit; unde, respectu talis proventus, adjuvari potest homo in hoc quod instigetur ad quærendum ubi est thesaurus, non autem in hoc quod ei aliqua virtus detur ad thesaurum inveniendum. In hoc autem quod medicus sanet vel miles in pugna vincat, potest adjuvari in hoc quod eligat convenientia ad finem; et in hoc quod efficaciter exsequatur per virtutem a superiori causa adeptam. Unde primum auxilium est universalius. Secunda differentia est quia secundum auxilium datur ad prosequendum efficaciter ea quæ intendit; unde, quum fortuita sint præter intentionem, ex tali auxilio non potest dici homo, proprieloquendo, bene fortunatus, sicut potest dici ex primo, ut supra ostensum est. Contingit autem homini bene vel male secundum fortunam, quando ipso solo agente, sicut quum fodiens terram invenit thesaurum quiescentem; quandoque autem actione alterius causæ concurrente, sicut quum aliquis vadens ad forum, causa emendi aliquid, invenit debitorem quem non credebat invenire. In primo autem eventu, homo adjuvatur, ad hoc quod aliquid sibi bene contingat, secundum hoc solum quod dirigitur in eligendo illud cui conjunctum est per accidens aliquod commodum, quod provenit præter intentionem. In secundo autem eventu, oportet quod uterque agens dirigatur ad eligendum actionem vel motum unde sibi occurrant. Oportet autem et aliud considerare circa ea quæ dicta sunt. Dictum est enim quod hoc quod homini aliquando bene contingat vel male secundum fortunam, et ex Deo est, et a corpore cœlesti esse potest, in quantum homo a Deo inclinatur ad eligendum aliquid cui conjunctum est aliquod commodum vel incommodum, quod eligens non præconsiderat, et in quantum a corpore cœlesti ad tale aliquid eligendum disponitur. Hoc autem commodum vel incommodum relatum quidem ad electionem hominis est fortuitum, relatum vero ad Deum rationem amittit fortuiti, non relatum ad corpus cœleste. — Quod sic patet: Non enim aliquis eventus amittit rationem fortuiti, nisi reducatur in causam per se. Virtus autem cœlestis corporis est causa agens, non per modum intellectus et electionis, sed per modum naturæ. Naturæ autem est proprium tendere ad unum. Si ergo aliquis effectus non est unus, non potest per se causa ejus esse aliqua virtus naturalis. Quum autem aliqua duo sibi per accidens conjunguntur, non sunt vere unum, sed solum per accidens; unde hujus conjunctionis nulla causa naturalis per se causa esse potest. Si ergo iste homo ex impresione cœlestis corporis instigetur per modum passionis, ut dictum est, ad fodien-dum sepulcrum (sepulcrum autem et locus thesauri non sunt unum nisi per accidens, quia non habent aliquem ordinem ad invicem), virtus cœlestis corporis non potest per se inclinare ad hoc totum quod iste fodiat sepulcrum et locum ubi est thesaurus; sed aliquis per intellectum, et cod. Berg., et cod. Berg. agens potest esse causa inclinationis in hoc totum, quia intelligentis est multa ordinare in unum. Patet etiam quod homo qui sciret thesaurum ibi esse posset alium ignorantem mittere ad fodiendum sepulcrum in loco eodem, ut praeter intentionem suam inveniret thesaurum. Sic igitur hujusmodi fortuiti eventus, reducti in causam divinam, amittunt rationem fortuiti, reducti vero in causam cælestem, nequaquam. Per eamdem etiam rationem apparet quod homo non potest esse bene fortunatus universaliter ex virtute corporis cælestis, sed solum quantum ad hoc vel illud. Dico autem universaliter, ut aliquis homo habeat in natura sua impressionem cælestis corporis ut eligat semper et in pluribus aliqua quibus sint conjuncta per accidens aliqua commoda vel incommoda. Natura enim non ordinatur nisi ad unum; ea autem secundum quæ homini accidit bene vel male secundum fortunam non sunt reducibilia in aliquod unum, sed sunt indeterminata et infinita, ut Philosophus, Physic. II, c. v, dicit et ad sensum patet. Non est ergo possibile quod aliquis habeat in natura sua eligere semper ea ad quæ etiam per accidens sequuntur aliqua commoda, sed potest esse quod ex inclinatione cælesti inclinetur ad eligendum aliquid cui conjungatur per accidens aliquod commodum, et ex alia inclinatione aliud, et ex tertia tertium; non autem ita quod ex una inclinatione inclinetur ad omnia. Ex una autem divina dispositione potest homo ad omnia dirigi.\n\nq. cxvi, d. 1.) Ex his autem quæ præmissa sunt apparet quid sit\n\nde fato sentiendum. Videntes enim homines multa in hoc mundo per accidens contingere, si causæ particulares considerentur, posuerunt: Quidam quod nec etiam ab aliquibus superioribus causis ordinentur; et his videbatur fatum esse\n\nnihil omnino. Quidam vero in aliquas ea altiores cau- sas reducere sunt conati, ex quibus tamen cum quadam dispositione ordinate procedant; et hi fatum posuerunt quasi ea quæ videntur a casu contingere sint ab aliqua causa effata sive prælocuta et\n\npræordinata ut essent. Horum autem quidam omnia quæ hic accident a casu contingere reducere sunt conati, sicut in causas, in cælestia corpora, etiam electiones humanas; vim positionis siderum, cui omnia cum quadam necessitate subdi ponebant, fatum appellantes; quæ quidem positio impossibilis est et a fide aliena, ut ex superioribus (c. lxxi\n\net seq.) patet. Quidam vero in dispositionem divinæ Providentiae omnia reducere voluerunt quæcumque in his inferioribus casu contingere videntur; unde omnia fato agi dixerunt, ordinationem quæ est in rebus ex divina Providentia fatum nominantes. Unde Boetius dicit , De consol. philos. l. IV, pros. vi, tom. I, col. 815, quod « fatum est inhærens rebus mobilibus dispositio, per quam Providentia suis quæque nectit ordinibus. » In qua fati descriptione, « dispositio » pro « ordinatione » ponitur. « Rebus » autem « inhærens », ponitur, ut distingantur fatum a Providentia; nam ipsa ordinatio, secundum quod in mente divina est, non-dum rebus impressa, Providentia est; secundum vero quod jam est explicata in rebus, fatum nominatur. « Mobilibus » autem dicit, ut ostendat quod ordo Providentiae a rebus contingentiam et mobilitatem non aufert,\n\nut quidam posuerunt. Secundum hanc ergo acceptionem, negare factum est Providentiam divinam negare. Sed, quia cum infidelibus nec nomina debemus habere communia, ne ex consortio nominum possit sumi erroris occasio, nomine fati non est a fidelibus libere utendum, ne videamur illis assentire qui male de fato senserunt, omnia necessitati siderum subjicientes. Unde Augustinus dicit: « Quæ si quisquam fato tribuit, quia ipsam Dei voluntatem vel potestatem fati nomine appellat, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat, De civit. Dei, l. v, c. I. Ed. Vives, tom. XXIII, p. 596. Gregorius dicit, secundum eumdem Sic B, C, D, — A: « Per vim positionis. » — Cod. Berg: « Vi positionis. » — Edit.: « Dispositionem. » Providentia est illa ipsa divina ratio in summo intellectum: « Absit a fidelium mentibus ut fatum aliquid esse dicant » Hom. x in Evang. Epiph.). Quod rationalis creatura dirigitur a Deo ad suos actus, non solum secundum ordinem ad speciem, sed secundum quod congruit individuo. Ex hoc autem apparet quod sola rationalis creatura dirigitur a Deo ad suos actus, non solum secundum congruentiam speciem, sed etiam secundum congruentiam individui. 1. Omnis enim res propter suam operationem esse videtur; operatio enim est ultima perfectio rei. Sic igitur unum-quoque a Deo ad suum actum ordinatur secundum quod divinæ Providentia substat. Creatura autem rationalis divinæ Providentia substat sicut secundum se gubernata et provisa, non solum propter speciem, ut aliæ corruptibiles creaturæ; quia individuum quod gubernatur solum propter speciem non gubernatur propter seipsum, creatura autem rationalis propter seipsam gubernatur, ut ex dictis (c. cxii) manifestum est. Sic igitur solæ rationales creaturæ directionem a Deo ad suos actus accipiunt, non solum propter speciem, sed etiam secundum individuum. 2. Adhuc, Quæcumque directionem habent in suis actibus solum secundum Hic cod. Berg. et omnes codd. quos vidimus habent: « Occidendo. » A: « Scilicet, si quis. » quod pertinet ad speciem, non est in istis agere vel non agere; quæ enim consequuntur speciem sunt communia et naturalia omnibus individuis sub specie contentis; naturalia autem non sunt in nobis. Si igitur homo haberet directionem in suis actibus solum secundum congruentiam speciei, non esset in ipso agere vel non agere, sed oporteret quod sequeretur inclinationem naturalem toti speciei communem, ut contingit in omnibus irrationalibus creaturis. Manifestum est igitur quod rationales creaturæ actus directionem habent, non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam secundum individuum. 3. Amplius, Sicut supra (c. LXXV et LXXVI) ostensum est, divina Providentia ad omnia singularia se extendit, etiam minima. Quibuscumque igitur sunt aliquæ actiones præter inclinationem speciei, oportet quod per divinam Providentiam regulentur in suis actibus præter directionem quæ pertinet ad speciem. Sed in rationali creatura apparent multæ actiones ad quas non sufficit inclinatio speciei; cujus signum est quod non similes sunt in omnibus, sed variæ in diversis. Oportet igitur quod rationalis creatura dirigatur a Deo ad suos actus, non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam secundum individuum. 4. Item, Deus unicuique naturæ providet secundum ipsius capacitatem; tales enim singulas creaturas conditit quales aptas esse cognovit ut per suam gubernationem pervenirent ad finem. Sola autem creatura rationalis est capax directionis qua dirigitur ad suos actus, non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam secundum individuum; habet enim intellectum et rationem, unde percipere possit quomodo diversimode sit aliquid bonum vel malum, secundum quod congruit diversis individuis, temporibus et locis. Sola igitur creatura rationalis dirigitur a Deo ad suos actus, non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam secundum individuum. 5. Præterea, Creatura rationalis sic divinæ Providentia subjacet quod non solum ab ea gubernatur, sed etiam rationem Providentia utcumque cognoscere potest; unde sibi competit etiam aliis providentiam et gubernationem exhibere; quod non contingit in cæteris creaturis, quæ solum Providentiam participant in quantum Providentia subduntur. Per hoc autem quod aliquis facultatem providendi habet, potest etiam suos actus dirigere et gubernare. Participat igitur rationalis creatura divinam Providentiam, non solum secundum gubernari, sed etiam secundum gubernare; gubernat enim se suis actibus propriis, et etiam alia. Omnis autem inferior providentia divinæ Providentia subditur, quasi supremæ. Gubernatio igitur actuum rationalis creaturæ, in quantum sunt actus personales, ad divinam Providentiam pertinet. 6. Item, Actus personales rationalis creaturæ sunt proprie actus qui sunt ab anima rationali. Anima autem rationalis non solum secundum speciem est perpetuitatis capax, sicut aliæ creaturæ, sed etiam secundum individuum. Actus ergo rationalis creaturæ a divina Providentia diriguntur, non solum ea ratione qua ad speciem pertinent, sed etiam in quantum sunt personales Hinc est quod, licet divinæ Providentia omnia subdantur, tamen in Scripturis sacris specialiter ei hominum cura attribuitur, secundum illud: Quid est homo, quod memor es ejus, aut filius hominis quoniam visitas eum? Psalm. vIII, 5; et: Numquid de bobus cura est Deo? I Cor. 1x, 9. Quæ quidem ideo dicuntur quia de humanis actibus Deus curam habet, non solum prout ad speciem pertinent, sed etiam secundum quod sunt actus personales.\n\ncertitudine divinæ Providentia. Difficultas autem quædam ex praemissis suboritur. Si enim omnia quæ hic inferius aguntur, etiam contingentia, Providentiae divinæ subduntur, oportet, ut videtur, vel Providentiam non esse certam, vel omnia\n\nex necessitate contingere. 1. Ostendit enim Philosophus, Metaphys. VI, c. 111, quod si omnem effectum ponimus habere aliquam causam per se, et iterum quod, qualibet causa per se posita, necessarium sit effectum poni, sequeretur quod omnia futura ex necessitate eveniant. Si enim quilibet effectus habeat causam per se, quodlibet futurum erit reducere in aliquam causam praesentem vel praeteritam; ut, si quæratur de aliquo utrum sit occidendus a latronibus, hujusmodi effectus praecedit causa, occursus latronum; hunc autem effectum praecedit alia causa, scilicet quod ipse exivit domum; hunc autem adhuc alia, quod vult quærere aquam; quam quidem praecedit causa, scilicet sitis; et hæc causatur ex comestione salsorum, quæ jam est vel fuit. Si ergo, causa posita, necesse est effectum poni, necesse est quod, si comedat salsa, sitiat; et si sitit, quod velit quærere aquam, et si vult quærere aquam, quod exeat domum; et si exeat domum, quod occurrant ei latrones; et si occurrant, quod occidatur. Ergo de primo ad ultimum necesse est hunc comedentem salsa a latronibus occidi. Concludit ergo Philosophus non esse verum quod, posita causa, necesse est effectum poni, quia aliqua causa est quæ potest deficere; neque iterum verum est quod omnis effectus habeat per se causam, quia quod est per accidens, scilicet istum volentem aquam quærere occurrere latronibus, non habet aliquam causam. Ex hac ratione apparet quod omnes effectus qui reducuntur in aliquam causam per se, praeteritam vel præsentem, qua posita necesse sit poni effectum, ex necessitate contingunt. Vel ergo oportet dicere quod non omnes effectus divinæ Providentiae subdantur, et sic divina Providentia non est de omnibus, quod prius (c. lxxv et lxvvi) fuit ostensum; vel quod non est necessarium quod, Providentia posita, effectus ejus ponatur, et sic Providentia non est certa; aut est necessarium quod omnia ex necessitate contingant; Providentia enim non solum est in præsenti tempore vel praeterito, sed aterno, quia nihil potest esse in\n\nDeo non aternum. 2. Adhuc, Si divina Providentia est certa, oportet hanc conditionalem esse veram: Si Deus providit hoc, hoc erit. Hujus autem conditionalis antecedens est necessarium, quia est aternum. Ergo consequens est necessarium; oportet enim omnis conditionalis consequens esse necessarium; cujus antecedens est necessarium, et hoc ideo quia consequens est sicut conclusio antecedentis. Quidquid autem ex necessario sequitur oportet esse necessarium. Sequitur igitur, si divina Providentia est certa, quod omnia\n\nex necessitate provenient. 3. Amplius, Si aliquid est provisum a Deo, puta quod talis sit regnaturus, aut ergo possibile est accidere quod non regnet, aut non. Si quidem non esset possile ipsum non regnare, ergo impossibile est ipsum non regnare; ergo necessarium est eum regnare. Si autem possibile est eum non regnare (possibili autem posito non sequitur aliud impossibile), sequitur divinam Providentiam deficere; non est igitur impossibile divinam Providentiam deficere. Igitur oportet, si omnia sint provisa a Deo, aut quod divina Providentia non sit certa, aut quod omnia\n\nex necessitate eveniant. 4. Item, Argumentatur sic Tullius, De divinat. l. II, c. viii: Si omnia a Deo provisa sunt, certus est ordo causarum; si autem hoc verum est, omnia fato aguntur; quod si omnia fato aguntur, nihil est in nostra potestate; nullum est ergo « A fidelium cordibus absit ut aliquid fatum esse dicant. » (Homiliarum in Evang. lib. I, Homil. x, n. 3, tom. II, col. 1112.) Sic A, B, C. D, E, F, G, H, I, J. — Cod. Berg.: » Procedit a causa, occursu latronum. » — Edit.: « Effectum praecedit causa, scilicet. » Sic A, B, C, D, G, H, I, J, et cod. Berg. hic et infra — Edit.: « Domo. » Sic, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — A: « Causam per se praeteritam, nisi ex necessitate contingant. — Edit. — « Non omnes effectus reducantur... uua posita necesse sit poni effectum ex necessitate contingere. » A omittit: « Est. » voluntatis arbitrium. Sequitur ergo quod tollatur liberium arbitrium, si divina Providentia sit certa, et eodem modo sequitur quod omnes\n\ncausæ contingentes tollantur. 5. Præterea, Divina Providentia causas medias non excludit, ut supra (c. LXXVII) ostensum est. Inter causas autem sunt aliquæ contingentes et deficere potentes. Deficere igitur potest Providentiae effectus. Non est igitur\n\nDei Providentia certa. Oportet autem, ad horum solutionem, aliqua repetere ex his quæ supra posita sunt, ut manifestum fiat quod nihil divinam Providentiam effugit et quod ordo divinæ Providentiae omnino immutari non potest, nec tamen oportet quod ea quæ ex Providentia divina proveniunt ex\n\nnecessitate cuncta provenient. Primo namque considerandum est quod, quum Deus sit omnium exsistentium causa, rebus omnibus conferens esse, oportet quod suæ Providentiae ordo omnes res complectatur; quibus enim esse largitus est oportet quod conservationem largiatur et perfectionem in\n\nultimo fine conferat. Quum autem, in quolibet providente, duo considerari oporteat, scilicet ordinis præmeditationem et præmeditati ordinis institutionem in rebus quæ Providentiae subduntur — quorum primum ad cognoscitivam virtutem pertinet, aliud vero ad operativam, — hoc inter utramque differt quod, in præmeditando ordinem, tanto est Providentia perfection quanto magis usque ad minima ordo Providentiae potest produci; quod enim nos omnium particularium ordinem præmeditari non possumus circa ea quæ sunt disponenda a nobis, ex defectu nostræ cognitionis provenit, quæ cuncta singularia complecti non potest; tanto autem unusquisque in providendo solertior habetur quanto plura singularia præmeditari potest; cujus autem provisio in solis universalibus consisteret parum de prudentia participaret; simile autem in omnibus operativis artibus considerari potest. — Sed in hoc quod ordo præmeditatus rebus imponitur, tanto est dignior et perfectior providentia gubernantis quanto universalior est et per plura ministeria suam explicat præmeditationem; quia et ipsa ministeriorum dispositio magnam partem provisi ordinis habet. — Oportet autem quod divina Pro- videntia in summo perfectionis consistat, quia Ipse est simpliciter et universaliter perfectus, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xxvIII). In providendo igitur, suæ sapientiae præmeditatione sempiterna omnia ordinat, quantumcumque minima videantur; quæcumque vero rerum aliquid operantur, instrumentaliter agunt ab eo mota, et ei obtemperando ministrant ad ordinem Providentiae ab aeterno, ut ita dicam, excogitatum explicandum in rebus. Si autem omnia quæ agere possunt necesse est ut in agendo ei ministrent, impossibile est quod aliquod agens divinæ Providentiae exsecutionem impediat, sibi contrarium agendo. Neque etiam possible est divinam Providentiam impediri per defectum alicujus agentis vel patientis, quum omnis virtus activa et passiva sit in rebus secundum divinam dispositionem causata. Impossibile est etiam quod impediatur divinæ Providentiae exsecutio per providentis immutationem , quum Deus sit omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum est (l. I, c. xv). Relinquitur ergo quod divina provisio omnino\n\ncassari non potest. Deinceps autem considerandum est quod omne agens intendit ad bonum et melius quod potest, ut supra (c. Ⅲ) ostensum est. Bonum autem et melius non eodem modo considerantur in toto et in partibus. In toto enim bonum est integritas, quæ ex partium ordine et compositione relinquitur; unde melius est toti quod sit inter partes ejus disparitas, sine qua ordo et perfectio totius esse non potest, quam quod omnes partes essent αἱquales, unaquaque earum perveniente ad gradum nobilissimæ partis. Quælibet autem pars inferioris gradus, in se considerata, melior esset si esset in gradu superioris partis, sicut patet in corpore humano; dignior enim pars eset pes hominis, si oculi pulchritudinem et virtutem haberet; corpus autem totum esset imperfectius, si ei pedis officium deesset. Ad aliud igitur tendit intentio particularis agentis et universalis. Nam particulare agens tendit ad bonum partis absolute et facit eam quanto meliorem potest; universale autem agens tendit ad bonum totius; unde aliquis effectus est præter intentionem particularis agentis, qui est secundum intentionem agentis universalis; sicut patet quod generatio A omittit: « Omnis. » A: « Intentionem. » feminæ est præter intentionem naturæ particularis, id est hujus virtutis quæ est in hoc semine, quæ ad hoc tendit quod persiciat conceptum quanto magis potest; est autem de intentione naturæ universalis, id est virtutis universalis agentis, ad generationem inferiorum, quod femina generetur, sine qua generatio multorum animalium compleri non posset; et eodem modo corruptio et diminutio et omnis defectus est de intentione naturæ universalis, non autem naturæ particularis; nam quælibet res fugit defectum, tendit vero ad perfectionem quantum in se est. Patet ergo quod de intentione particularis agentis est quod effectus suus fiat perfectus quantumcumque potest in genere suo; de intentione autem naturæ universalis est quod hic effectus fiat perfectus tali perfectione, puta perfectione masculi, ille autem perfectione feminæ. Inter partes autem totius universi, prima distinctio apparet secundum contingens et necessarium; superiora enim in entibus sunt necessaria et incorruptibilia et immobilia; a qua quidem conditione tanto magis deficiunt quanto in inferiori gradu constituuntur, ita quod infima corrumpuntur quidem quantum ad esse suum, moventur vero quantum ad suas dispositiones, suos etiam effectus non de necessitate, sed contingenter producunt. Quodlibet igitur agens quod est pars universi intendit, in quantum potest, in suo esse et naturali dispositione persistere et suum stabilire effectum. Deus autem, qui est universi gubernator, intendit quod effectum ejus hic quidem stabiliatur per modum necessitatis, hic autem contingenter et secundum hoc diversas causas eis adaptat, his quidem necessarias, his autem contingentes. Cadit igitur sub ordine divinæ Providentiae, non solum hunc effectum esse, sed hunc effectum esse contingenter, alium autem necessario; et secundum hoc quædam eorum quæ divinæ Providentiae subduntur sunt necessaria, quædam vero contingentia; non\n\nautem omnia necessaria. 1. Patet ergo quod, etsi divina Providentia sit per se causa hujus effectus futuri, est etiam præsentis et præteriti, magis autem ab æterno. Non tamen sequitur, ut prima ratio procedebat, quod effectus sit de necessitate futurus; est enim divina Providentia per se causa quod hic effectus contingenter proveniat, et hoc\n\ncassari non potest. 2. Ex quo etiam patet quod hæc conditionalis est vera: Si Deus providit hoc futurum, hoc erit, sicut secunda ratio procedebat. Sed sic erit sicut Deus providit illud esse futurum; providit autem illud esse futurum contingenter; sequitur ergo infaillibiliter quod erit\n\ncontingenter, non necessario. 3. Patet etiam quod hoc quod ponitur provisum esse a Deo ut sit futurum, si sit de genere contingentium, poterit non esse, secundum se consideratum; sic enim provisum est ut sit contingens, potens non esse; non tamen est possibile quod ordo Providentiae deficiat quin contingenter eveniat. Et sic tertia ratio solvitur. Unde potest poni quod iste non sit regnaturus, si secundum se consideretur; non autem, si\n\nconsideretur ut provisum. 4. Illud autem quod Tullius objicit, secundum præmissa frivolum apparet. Quum enim divinæ Providentiae non solum subdantur effectus, sed etiam causæ et modi essendi, utex præmissis (c. Lxxvii et seq.) patet, non sequitur quod, si omnia Dei Providentia aguntur, nihil sit in nobis; sic enim sunt a Deo provisa ut per\n\nnos libere fiant. 5. Neque etiam defectibilitas causarum secundarum, quibus mediantibus effectus divinæ Providentiae producuntur, certitudinem Providentiae potest auferre, ut quinta ratio procedebat, quum ipse Deus in omnibus operetur et pro suo arbitrio voluntatis, ut supra (c. Lxvi et seq.) ostensum est; unde ad ejus Providentiam pertinet ut causas defectibles quando sinat deficere, quando eas\n\nabsque defectu conservet. Ea vero quæ ad necessitatem provisorum a Deo possent assumi ex certitudine scientiae supra (l. I, c. Lxvii) soluta sunt, quum de Dei scientia ageretur.\n\nQuod immobilitas divinæ Providentiae utilitatem orationis non excludit. Considerare etiam oportet quod, sicut divinæ Providentiae immobilitas necessitatem rebus provisis non imponit, ita etiam nec orationis utilitatem excludit. Non enim ad hoc oratio ad Deum funditur ut aeterna Providentia dispositio immutetur; hoc enim impossibile est —, sed ut aliquis illud quod desiderat assequatur a Deo. 1. Piis enim desideriis rationalis creaturæ conveniens est quod Deus assentiat, non tanquam desideria nostra moveant immobilem Deum, sed ex sua bonitate procedit ut convenienter desiderata perficiat. Quum enim omnia naturaliter bonum desiderent, ut supra (c. xxiv) probatum est, ad supereminentiam autem divinæ bonitatis pertineat quod esse et bene esse omnibus ordine quodam distribuat, consequens est ut, secundum suam bonitatem, desideria pia, quæ per orationem explicantur, adimpleat. 2. Adhuc, Ad moventem pertinet ut illud quod movetur perducat ad finem; unde et per eamdem naturam aliquid movetur ad finem; et consequitur finem, et in eodem quiescit. Omne autem desiderium est quidam motus ad bonum, qui quidem non potest rebus inesse nisi a Deo, qui est per essentiam suam bonus et fons bonitatis; movens enim omne movet ad aliquid simile sibi. Ad Deum igitur pertinet, secundum suam bonitatem, quod desideria nostra convenientia, quæ per orationem explicantur, ad effectum convenientem perducat. 3. Item, Quanto aliqua sunt propinquiora moventi, tanto efficacius impressionem moventis assequuntur; nam et quæ propinquiora sunt igni magis ab ipso calefiunt. Substantiæ autem intellectuales propinquiores sunt Deo quam substantiae naturales inanimatæ. Efficacior est igitur impressio divinæ motionis in substantiis intellectualibus quam in substantiis aliis naturalibus. Corpora autem naturalia in tantum participant de motione divina quod naturalem appetitum boni consequuntur ex ea et etiam appetitus completionem; quod quidem fit, dum proprios fines consequuntur. Multo igitur magis intellectuales substantiae desideriorum suorum, quæ per orationem suam Deo offerunt, impletionem consequuntur. 4. Amplius, De ratione amicitiae est quod amans velit impleri desiderium amati, in quantum vult ejus bonum et perfectionem; propter quod dicitur quod amicorum est idem velle. Ostensum est autem supra (l. I, c. lxxiv et lxxv) quod Deus suam creaturam amet, et tanto magis unamquamque quanto plus de bonitate participat, quæ est primum et principale amatum ab ipso. Vult igitur impleri desideria rationalis creaturæ, quæ perfectissime divinam bonitatem participat inter cæteras creaturas. Sua autem voluntas est perfectissima causa rerum; est enim causa rerum per suam voluntatem, ut supra (l. II, c. xxiii) ostensum est. Ad bonitatem igitur divinam pertinet ut impleat desideria rationalis creaturæ sibi per orationem proposita. 5. Præterea, Bonum creaturæ derivatum est secundum quamdam similitudinem a bonitate divina. Hoc autem maxime commendabile in hominibus apparet ut juste petentibus assensum non denegent; ex hoc enim vocantur liberales, clementes, misericordes et pii. Maxime igitur hoc ad divinam bonitatem pertinet ut pias orationes exaudiat. Hinc est quod dicitur: Voluntatem timentium se faciet, et deprecationem eorum exaudiet, et salvos faciet eos, Psalm. cxliv, 19; et Dominus dicit: Omnis qui petit accipit, et qui quærit invent, et pulsanti aperietur, Matth. vii, 8. CAPUT XCVI (a.) Quod petitiones orantium non semper admittuntur a Deo. Non est autem inconveniens si quando petitiones orantium non admittuntur a Deo. 1. Ea enim ratione ostensum est (c. xcv) quod Deus desideria rationalis creaturæ adimplet in quantum desiderat bonum. Quandoque autem contingit quod id quod petitur non est verum bonum, sed apparens, simpliciter autem malum. Non est igitur talis oratio a Deo exaudibilis. Hinc est quod dicitur: Petitis et non accipitis eo quod male petatis, Jac. iv, 3. 2. Similiter autem, ex hoc quod Deus, et cod. Berg. — Quædam edit.: Consequentur. » A, et cod. Berg.: « Amat. » Ex omittit: « Semper. » B omittit: « A Deo. » Hoc capitulum in A, C, D, finis est capituli precedentis. ad desiderandum movet, ostensum est (c. xcv) conveniens esse quod desideria impleat. Mobile autem ad finem motus non perducitur a movente, nisi motus continuetur. Si igitur motus desiderii per orationis instantiam non continuetur, non est inconveniens si oratio effectum debitum non sortiatur. Hinc est quod Dominus dicit: Quoniam oportat semper orare, et non deficere, Luc. xviii, 1; et dicit Apostolus; Sine intermissione orate, I Thessal. v, 17. 3. Rursus, Ostensum est (c. xcv) quod Deus rationalis creaturæ decenter desiderium implet, in quantum ei appropinquat. Appropinquat autem quis ei per contemplationem, et devotam affectionem, et humilem et firmam intentionem. Illa igitur oratio quæ sic Deo non appropinquat non est a Deo exaudibilis. Unde dicitur: Respexit in orationem humilium, Psalm. c1, 18; et: Postulet autem in fide nihil hæsitans, Jac. 1, 6. 4. Item, Ostensum est (c. xcv) quod, ratione amicitiæ, Deus vota piorum exaudit. Qui igitur a Dei amicitia declinat non est dignus ut ejus oratio exaudiatur. Hinc est quod dicitur: Qui declinat aurem suam ne audiat legem, oratio ejus erit exsecrabilis, Proverb, xxviii, 9; et: Quum multiplicaveritis orationem, non exaudiam; manus enim vestræ sanguine plenæ sunt, Isai. 1, 15. Ex hac autem radice procedit quod quandoque aliquis Dei amicus non exauditur, quando pro his rogat qui non sunt Dei amici, secundum illud: Tu ergo noli orare pro populo hoc, nec assumas pro eis laudem et orationem, et non obsistas mihi; quia non exaudiam te, Jerem. vii, 16. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquis ex amicitia denegat quod petitur ab amico, quia cognoscit hoc ei esse nocivum, vel contrarium ei magis expedire, ut medicus infirmanti quandoque denegat quod petit, considerans quod non expedit ei ad salutem corporis consequendam. Unde, quum ostensum sit (c. xcv) quod Deus, ex amore quem ad creaturam rationalem habet, ejus desideria impleat per orationem sibi proposita, non est mirandum si quandoque eorum etiam quos praecipue diligit petitionem non implet, ut impleat quod petenti magis expedit ad salutem; propter quod a Paulo stimulum carnis non amovit, quamvis hoc ter peteret, providens hoc ei esse utile ad humilitatis conservationem, ut habetur in secunda ad Corinthios, xii, 7-9. Unde et quibusdam dicitur: Nescitis quid petatis, Matth. xx, 22; et dicitur: Nam quid oremus sicut oportet, nescimus, Rom. viii, 26. Et propter hoc Augustinus, dicit in Epistola xxxi ad Paulinum et Therasiam: Ed. L. Vivès, tom IV, p. 335. « Bonus Dominus, qui non tribuit sæpe quod volumus, ut quod mallemus attribuat. » Patet igitur ex præmissis quod corum quae fiunt a Deo causa sunt orationes et pia desideria. Ostensum est autem supra (c. lxxvii) quod divina Providentia causas alias non excludit, quin potius ordinat eas ad hoc quod ordo quem apud se statuit rebus imponatur; et sic causæ secundæ Providentia non repugnant, sed magis Providentia exsequunture effectum. Sic ergo orationes apud Deum efficaces sunt, non tamen ordinem immutabilem divinæ Providentia solvunt, quia et hoc ipsum, quod tali petenti hoc concedatur, sub ordine divinæ Providentia cadit. Simile est ergo dicere non esse orandum ut aliquid consequamur a Deo, quia ordo suæ Providentia est immutabilis, ac si diceretur quod non esset ambulandum ut perveniamus ad locum, nec comedendum ut nutriamur; quae omnia patet esse absurda. Excluditur ergo ex præmissis duplex error circa orationem: Quidam enim dixerunt nullum esse orationis fructum; quod quidem dicebant tam illi qui negabant divinam Providentiam omnino, sicut Epicurei, quam illi qui res humanas divinæ Providentia subtrahebant, sicut aliqui Peripateticorum, necnon et illi qui omnia quae Providentia subsunt ex necessitate contingere arbitrabantur, sicut Stoici; ex his enim omnibus sequitur quod nullus sit orationis fructus, et per consequens quod omnis Deitatis cultus fiat in vanum; qui quidem error tangitur: Dixistis: Vanus est qui servit Deo; et quod emolumentum, quia custodivimus præcepta ejus et quia ambulavimus tristes coram Domino exercituum? Malach. iii, 14. Quidam vero e contrario divinam dispositionem vertibilem orationibus esse — dicebant, sicut Ægyptii dicebant quod fatum orationibus quibusdam et imaginibus, et subfumigationibus, et incantationibus vertebatur; et ad hunc sensum pertinere videntur quædam quæ in Scripturis divinis dicuntur, secundum id quod prima facie apparet ex eis; dicitur enim quod Isaias ex mandato Domini dixit Ezechiæ regi: Hæc dicit Dominus: Dispone domui tuæ, quia morieris tu, et non vives; et post orationem Ezechiæ, factum est verbum Domini ad Isaiam, dicens: Vade, et dic Ezechiæ... Audivi orationem tuam... ecce adjiciam super dies tuos quindecim annos, Isai. xxxviii, 1, 4 et 5; et dicitur ex persona Domini: Repente loquar adversus gentem et adversus regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud. Si pœnitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, quod locutus sum adversus eam agam et ego pœnitentiam super malo quod cogitavi ut facerem ei, Jerem. xviii, 7 et 8; et: Convertimini ad Dominum Deum vestrum, quia benignus et misericors est... et præstabilis super malitiam*. Quis scit si convertatur et ignoscat Deus? Joel. 11, 13 et 14. Hæc autem, si secundum superficiem intelligantur, ad inconveniens ducunt. Sequitur enim primo quod voluntas Dei sit mutabilis; item, quod aliquid ex tempore Deo adveniat; et ulterius, quod aliqua quæ temporaliter in creaturis sunt sint causa alicujus exsistentis in Deo; quæ sunt manifeste impossibilia, sicut ex superioribus patet. Adversantur autem auctoritatibus sacræ Scripturæ, quæ infallibilem continet veritatem et expressam; dicitur enim: Non est Deus quasi homo, ut mentiatur, nec ut filius hominis, ut mutetur. Dixit ergo et non faciet? Locutus est non implebit? Num. xxxiii, 19, et: Triumphator in Israel non parcet, et pœnitudine non flectetur; neque enim homo est ut agat pœnitentiam, I. Reg: xv, 29 et. Ego Dominus, et non mutor, Malach. 11, 6. Si quis autem diligenter consideret circa prædicta, inventet quod omnis error qui in his accidit ex hoc provenit quod non consideratur differentia inter universalem ordinem et particularem. Quum enim omnes effectus ordinem ad invicem habeant, secundum quod in una causa conveniunt, oportet tanto commu-, et cod. Berg.: « Quibusdam » et loco: « Et » habent: « Sive. » 2 3 4 ris causæ continetur sub ipso quasi ab eo institutus. In quantum ergo per orationem immutatur aliquid de ordine inferiorum causarum instituto a Deo propter orationes piorum, dicitur Deus «converti» vel pœnitere, non quod æterna ejus dispositio mutetur, sed quia mutatur aliquis effectus. Unde et Gregorius dicit quod » non mutat Deus consilium, quamvis quandoque mutet sententiam; » non tamen illam quæ exprimit dispositionem æternam, sed illam sententiam quæ exprimit ordinem inferiorum causarum, secundum quem Ezechias erat moriturus vel gens aliqua pro peccatis suis punienda. Talis autem immutatio sententiæ Dei, transsumpta locutione, dicitur pœnitentia, in quantum Deus ad pœnitentis similitudinem se habet, cujus est mutare quod fecerat; per quem modum dicitur et metaphorice irasci, in quantum puNiendo facit irascentis effectum.\n\ndispositio habeat rationem. Ex his autem quæ præmissa sunt manifeste videri potest quod ea quæ sunt per divinam Providentiam dispensata sequuntur aliquam\n\nrationem. Ostensum est enim (c. xci) quod Deus per suam Providentiam omnia ordinat in divinam bonitatem, sicut in finem; non autem hoc modo quod aliquid divinæ bonitati per ea quæ fiunt accrescat, sed ut similitudo suæ bonitatis, in quantum possibile est, imprimatur in rebus. Quia vero omnem creatam substantiam a perfectione divinæ bonitatis deficere necesse est, ad hoc ut perfectius divinæ bonitatis similitudo rebus communicaretur oportuit esse diversitatem in rebus, ut quod perfecte ab uno aliquo representari non potest, per diversa diversimode perfectiori modo repræsentaretur; nam et homo quum mentis conceptum uno vocali verbo videt sufficienter exprimi non posse, verba diversimode multiplicat ad exprimendam per diversa suæ mentis conceptionem. Et in hoc etiam divinæ perfectionis eminentia considerari potest quod perfecta bonitas, quæ in Deo est unite et simpliciter, in creaturis esse non potest nisi secundum modum diversum et per plura. Res autem per hoc diversæ sunt quod formas habent diversas, a quibus speciem sortiuntur. Sic igitur ex fine sumitur ratio diversitatis\n\nformarum in rebus. Ex diversitate autem formarum sumitur ratio ordinis in rebus. Quum enim forma sit secundum quam res habet esse, res autem quælibet, secundum quod habet esse, accedat ad similitudinem Dei, qui est ipsum suum esse simplex (l. I, c. xxii), necesse est quod forma nihil sit aliud quam divina similitudo participata in rebus; unde convenienter Aristoteles, Physic. I, c. ix, de forma loquens, dicit quod « est divinum quoddam et appetibile. » Similitudo autem, ad unum simplex considerata, diversificari non potest, nisi secundum quod magis et minus similitudo est propinqua vel remota. Quanto autem aliquid propinquius ad divinam similitudinem accedit, perfectius est; unde in formis differentia esse non potest nisi per hoc quod una perfectior existit quam alia: propter quod Aristoteles, Metaphys. VIII, c. iii, diffinitiones, per quas naturæ rerum et formæ signantur, assimilat numeris, in quibus species variantur per additionem vel subtractionem unitatis; ut ex hoc detur intelligi quod formarum diversitas diversum gradum perfectionis requirit. — Et hoc evidenter apparet naturas rerum speculanti. Inveniet enim, si quis diligenter consideret, gradatim rerum diversitatem compleri; nam supra inanimata corpora inveniet plantas, et super has irrationabilia animalia, et super hæc intellectuales substantias; et in singulis horum inveniet diversitatem, secundum quod quædam sunt aliis perfectiora, in tantum quod ea quæ sunt suprema inferioris generis videntur propinqua superiori generi, et e converso, sicut animalia 1 A, C, D, E, F: « Ejus. » 2 « Cum ergo exterius mutari videtur sententia, interius consilium non mutatur, quia de unaquaque re immutabiliter intus constituitur, quidquid foris mutabiliter agitur. » (Moralium lib. XVI, in capit. xxiii B. Job. n. 46, tom. I. col. 1144.) 3 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Sententiae transmutatio dicitur transsumptive Dei pœnitentia. » 4 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Omnem creato. » 5 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Nam cum mentis, » omisso: « Et homo. » 6 A: « Irrationalia. » immobilia sunt similia plantis; unde et Dionysius, De divin. nomin. c. vii, ait quod « divina Sapientia conjungit fines primorum principiis secundorum. » Unde patet quod rerum diversitas exigit quod non sint omnia aequalia, sed sit ordo in\n\nrebus et gradus. Ex diversitate autem formarum, secundum quas rerum species diversificantur, sequitur et operationum differentia; quum enim unumquodque agat secundum quod est actu; quae enim sunt in potentia, secundum quod hujusmodi, inveniuntur actionis expertia, — est autem unumquodque ens actu per formam, oportet quod operatio rei sequatur formam ipsius. Oportet ergo quod, si sint diversæ formæ,\n\nhabeant diversas operationes. Quia vero per propriam actionem res quælibet ad proprium finem pertingit, necesse est et proprios fines diversificari in rebus, quamvis sit finis\n\nultimus omnibus communis. Sequitur etiam ex diversitate formarum diversa habitudo materiæ ad res. Quum enim formæ diversæ sint secundum quod quædam sunt aliis perfectiores, sunt inter eas aliquæ in tantum perfectæ quod sunt per se subsistentes et perfectæ, ad nihil indigentes materiæ fulcimento; quædam vero per se perfecte subsistere non possunt, sed materiam pro fundamento requirunt, ut sic illud quod subsistit non sit forma tantum nec materia tantum, quæ per se non est ens actu, sed\n\ncompositum ex utroque. Non autem possent materia et forma ad aliquid unum constituendum convenire, nisi esset aliqua proportio inter ea. Si autem proportionata oportet ea esse, necesse est quod diversis formis diversæ materiæ respondeant. Unde fit ut quædam formæ requirant materiam simplicem, quædam vero materiam compositam; et, secundum diversas formas, diversam partium compositionem oportet esse congruentem ad speciem formæ\n\net operationem ipsius. Ex diversa autem habitudine ad materiam sequitur diversitas agentium et patientium. Quum enim agat unumquodque ratione formæ, patiatur vero et moveatur ratione materiæ, oportet quod illa quorum formæ sunt perfectiores et minus materiales agant in illa quæ sunt magis materialia et quorum\n\nformæ sunt imperfectiores. Ex diversitate autem formarum et materiarum et agentium sequitur diversitas proprietatum et accidentium. Quum enim substantia sit causa accidentis, sicut perfectum imperfecti, oportet quod ex diversis principiis substantialibus diversa accidentia propria consequantur. Rursus, quum ex diversis agentibus sint diversæ impressiones in patientibus, oportet quod, secundum diversa agentia, diversa sint accidentia quæ\n\nab agentibus imprimuntur. Patet ergo ex dictis quod, quum per divinam essentiam rebus creatis diversa accidentia et passiones et collocationes distribuantur, non hoc absque ratione accidit. Hinc est quod sacra Scriptura rerum productionem et gubernationem sapientia et prudentiae divinæ attribuit; dicitur enim: Dominus sapientia fundavit terram; stabilivit cælos prudentia. Sapientia illius eruperunt abyssi, et nubes rore concrescunt, Proverb. iii, 19 et 29; et dicitur de Dei sapientia quod attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter, Sap. viii, 4; et dicitur: Omnia in mensura, et numero, et pondere disposuisti, Domine, Ibid., xi, 24; ut, per mensuram, quantitatem sive modum aut gradum perfectionis uniuscujusque rei intelligamus; per numerum vero, diversitatem et pulchritudinem specierum consequentem ex diversis perfectionis gradibus; per pondus vero, inclinationes diversas ad proprios fines et operationes, et ad propria agentia et patientia et accidentia, quæ\n\nsequuntur distinctionem specierum. In prædicto autem ordine, secundum quem ratio divinæ Providentiae attenditur, primum esse diximus divinam bonitatem, quasi ultimum finem, qui est primum principium in agendis; dehinc vero, rerum numerositatem, ad quam constituendam necesse est gradus diversos in formis et materiis et agentibus et patientibus et actionibus et accidentibus esse. Sicut ergo prima ratio divinæ Providentiae simpliciter est divina bonitas, 1 « Est agnoscenda (divina Sapientia) quoniam ipsa, secundum Scripturam, est omnium effectrix, quæque semper erat cuncta componens (Prov., viii, 30), et indissolubilis rerum omnium connexionis ordinisque causa, semperque fines pracedentium cum principiis sequentium connectit, unicamque totius universi concordiam et consonantiam concinnat. » (S. Dionys. De div. nom. c. 7). ita prima ratio in creaturis est earum numerositas, ad cujus conservationem et constitutionem omnia alia ordinari videntur. Et secundum hoc videtur esse rationabiliter a Boetio dictum, in principio suæ Arithmetica, c. 11, quod « omnia quæcumque a primæva rerum natura constructa sunt, numerorum videntur\n\nratione esse formata 4. » Est autem considerandum quod operativa ratio et speculativa partim quidem conveniunt et partim differunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc quod, sicut ratio speculativa incipit ab aliquo principio et per media devenit ad conclusionem intentam, ita ratio operativa incipit ab aliquo principio et per aliqua media devenit ad operationem vel operatum quod intenditur 2. Principium autem in speculativis est forma et « quod quid est; » in operativis vero, finis, quod quando est forma, quando aliquid aliud. Principium etiam in speculativis semper oportet esse necessarium; in operativis autem, quando quidem est necessarium, quando autem non; necessarium enim est hominem velle felicitatem ut finem, non necessarium autem velle domus aedificationem. Similiter, in demonstrativis, semper posteriora ad priora de necessitate sequuntur; non autem in operativis semper, sed tunc solum quando ad finem nonnisi per hanc viam perveniri potest; sicut necessarium est volenti aedificare domum quod quærat ligna; sed quod quærat abietina ligna, hoc ex simplici voluntate ipsius dependet, non autem ex\n\nratione domus aedificandæ. — Sic igitur quod Deus suam bonitatem amet, hoc necessarium est; sed ex hoc non necessario sequitur quod per creaturas repræsentetur, quum sine hoc divina bonitas sit perfecta. Unde quod creaturæ in esse producantur, etsi ex ratione divinæ bonitatis originem habeant, tamen ex simplici Dei voluntate dependet. Supposito autem quod Deus creaturis suam bonitatem communicare, secundum quod est possibile, velit per similitudinis modum, ex hoc rationem accipit quod sint creaturæ diversæ; non autem ex necessitate sequitur quod secundum hanc vel illam perfectionis mensuram aut secundum hunc vel illum numerum rerum. Supposito autem ex divina voluntate quod hunc numerum in rebus statuere velit et hanc unicuique rei perfectionis mensuram, ex hoc rationem accipit quod habeat formam talem et materiam talem. Et similiter\n\nin omnibus patet. Manifestum igitur fit quod divina Providentia secundum rationem quamdam res dispensat; et tamen hæc ratio sumitur ex\n\nsuppositione voluntatis divinæ. Sic igitur per præmissa duplex error excluditur: eorum scilicet qui credunt quod omnia simplicem voluntatem sequantur absque ratione, qui est error loquentium in lege Saracenorum, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit, secundum quos nulla differentia est quod ignis calefaciat et infrigidet, nisi quia Deus ita vult; excluditur etiam error eorum qui dicunt causarum ordinem ex divina Providentia secundum modum necessitatis provenire. Quorum utrumque patet esse falsum ex\n\ndictis. Sunt autem quædam verba sacrae Scripturæ quæ videntur omnia simplici voluntati Dei 3 attribuere; quæ non dicuntur ad hoc ut ratio tollatur a Providentiae dispensatione, sed ut omnium primum principium Dei voluntas ostendatur, sicut jam dictum est; sicut illud: Omnia quæcumque voluit, Dominus fecit, Psalm. cxxxiv, 6; et: Quis dicere ei potest: Cur ita facis? Job, ix, 12, et: Voluntati enim ejus quis resistit? Rom. ix, 19. Et Augustinus dicit: « Nonnisi Dei voluntas causa prima sanitatis et aegritudinis, præmiorum atque pœnarum, gratiarum atque retributionum, 4 » De Trinit.,\n\nl. III, c. 4. Sic ergo, quum quæritur « propter quid » de aliquo effectu naturali, possumus reddere rationem ex aliqua proxima causa, dum tamen sicut in primam causam reducam omnia in voluntatem divinam; sicut si quæratur quare lignum est calefactum ad 1 « Ratione formata » omisso « Esse. » (De arithmetica, lib. I, cap. II, t. I, col. 1083.) 2 A: « Intendit. » 3 A, B, C, D, E, F omittunt: « Dei. » — Cod. Berg.: « Voluntati divinæ. » 4 « Voluntas Dei est prima et summa causa omnium corporalium specierum atque motio- XII. præsentiam ignis, dicitur quod calefactio est naturalis actio ignis; hoc autem, quia calor est proprium accidens ejus; hoc autem consequitur propriam formam ejus; et sic inde quousque perveniatur ad divinam voluntatem. Unde, si quis respondet quærenti quare lignum calefactum est: quia Deus voluit, convenienter quidem respondet, si intendit reducere quæstionem in primam causam; inconvenienter vero, si intendit omnes alias excludere causas.\n\nordinem suæ Providentiæ. Ex præmissis autem accipi potest duplicis ordinis consideratio: quorum unus quidem dependet ex prima omnium causa, unde et omnia complectitur; alius particularis, qui ex aliqua causa creata dependet et continet illa quæ causæ illi subduntur; et hic quidem multiplex est, secundum diversitatem causarum quæ inter creaturas inveniuntur, unus tamen eorum sub altero continetur, sicut et causarum una sub altera exsistit. Unde oportet quod omnes particulares ordines sub illo universali ordine contineantur et ab illo descendant, quæ inveniuntur in rebus, secundum quod a prima causa dependent. Hujusmodi exemplum in politicis considerari potest; nam omnes domestici unius patrisfamilias ordinem quemdam ad invicem habent, secundum quod ei subduntur; rursus autem, tam ipse paterfamilias, quam omnes alii qui sunt suæ civitatis, ordinem quemdam ad invicem habent et ad principem civitatis, qui iterum cum omnibus qui sunt in regno aliquem ordinem\n\nhabent ad regem. Ordinem autem universalem, secundum quem omnia ex divina Providentia ordinantur, possumus considerare dupliciter, scilicet quantum ad res quæ subduntur ordini et quantum ad ordinis rationem quæ ex principio ordinis\n\ndependet. Ostensum est autem (l. II, c. xxiii) quod res ipsæ quæ a Deo sub ordine ponuntur proveniunt ab ipso, non sicut ab agente per necessitatem naturæ vel cujuscumque alterius, sed ex simplici voluntate, maxime quantum ad primam rerum institutionem. Relinquitur ergo quod, præter ea quæ sub ordine divinæ Providentiæ cadunt, Deus aliqua facere potest; non autem est ejus virtus ad has vel\n\nillas res obligata. — Si autem consideremus prædictum ordinem quantum ad rationem a principio dependentem, sic præter ordinem illum Deus facere non potest. Ordo enim ille procedit, ut dictum est (c. xcvii), ex scientia et voluntate Dei omnia ordinante in suam bonitatem, sicut in finem. Non est autem possibile quod Deus aliquid faciat quod non sit ab eo volitum, quum creaturæ ab ipso non procedant naturaliter, sed per voluntatem, ut ostensum est (l. II, c. xxiii). Neque etiam est possibile ab eo aliquid fieri quod ejus scientia non comprehendatur, quum voluntas esse non possit nisi de aliquo noto. Neque iterum est possibile quod in creaturis aliquid faciat quod in suam bonitatem non sit ordinatum, sicut in finem, quum sua bonitas sit proprium objectum voluntatis Ipsius. Similiter autem, quum Deus sit omnino immutabilis, impossibile est quod aliquid velit quod prius noluerit, aut aliquid de novo incipiat scire vel in\n\nsuam ordinet bonitatem. Nihil igitur Deus facere potest quin sub ordine suæ Providentiæ cadat, sicut non potest aliquid facere quod ejus operationi non subdatur; potest tamen alia facere quam ea quæ subduntur ejus Providentiæ vel operationi, si absolute consideretur ejus potestas; sed nec potest facere aliqua quæ sub ordine Providentiæ ipsius ab æterno non fuerunt, eo quod mutabilis\n\nesse non potest. Hanc autem distinctionem quidam non considerantes in diversos errores inciderunt. Quidam enim immobilitatem divini ordinis ad res ipsas quæ ordini subduntur extendere conati sunt, dicentes quod omnia necesse est esse sicut sunt, in tantum quod quidam dixerunt quod Deus non potest alia facere quam quæ facit; contra quod est quod habetur: An putas quia non possum rogare Patrem meum, et exhibebit mihi modo plus quam duodecim legiones Angelorum? Math. xxvi, 52. Quidam autem, e converso, mutabilitatem rerum quæ divinæ Providentiæ subjiciuntur in mutabilitatem divinæ Providentiæ transtulerunt, de eo carnaliter sentientes quod Deus ad modum carnalis hominis sit in sua voluntate mutabilis; contra A, B, C, D, E, F: « Autem. » A: « Et hujusmodi. » quod dicitur : Non est Deus quasi homo, ut mentiatur; nec ut filius hominis, ut mutetur, Num. xxiii, 19. — Alii vero contingentiam divinæ Providentiæ substraxerunt, contra quos dicitur : Quis est iste qui dixit ut fieret aliquid, Domino non jubente? Jerem., Thren., iii, 37.\n\nabsque causis proximis. Restat autem ostendere quod præter ordinem ab ipso rebus inditum\n\nDeus agere possit. 1. Est enim ordo divinitus institutus ut inferiora per superiora moveantur a Deo ut supra (c. lxxvii-lxxxii) dictum est. Potest autem Deus præter hunc ordinem facere ut scilicet ipse effectum aliquem in inferioribus operetur, nihil ad hoc agente superiori agente. In hoc enim differt agens secundum necessitatem naturæ ab agente secundum voluntatem, quia ab agente secundum necessitatem naturæ effectus non potest sequi nisi secundum modum virtutis activæ; unde agens quod est maximæ virtutis non potest immediate producere effectum aliquem parvum, sed producit effectum suæ virtuti proportionatum; in quo tamen inventur quandoque minor virtus quam in causa; et sic per multa media tendens a causa suprema provenit aliquis parvus effectus. In agente autem per voluntatem non est sic; nam agens per voluntatem statim sine medio potest producere quemcumque effectum qui suam non excedat virtutem; artifex enim perfectissimus potest facere opus quale faciat artifex imperfectus. Deus autem operatur per voluntatem, et non per necessitatem naturæ, ut supra(l. II. c. xxiii) ostensum est. Igitur minores effectus, qui fiunt per causas inferiores potest facere immediate\n\nabsque secundis causis. 2. Adhuc, Virtus divina comparatur ad omnes virtutes activas sicut virtus universalis ad virtutes particulares, sicut per supradicta (c. lxvii et seq.) patet. Virtus autem activa universalis ad particularem effectum producendum determinari potest dupliciter: uno modo, per causam mediam particularem, sicut virtus activa cælestis corporis determinatur ad effectum generationis humanæ per virtutem particularem quæ est in semine, sicut et in syllogismis virtus propositionis universalis determinatur ad particularem conclusionem per assumptionem particularem; alio modo, per intellectum, qui determinatam formam apprehendit et eam in effectum producit. Divinus autem intellectus non solum est cognoscitivus suæ essentiæ, quæ est quasi universalis virtus activa, neque etiam tantum universalisium et primarum causarum, sed omnium particularium, sicut per supradicta (c. lxxvi) patet. Potest igitur producere immediate omnem effectum quem producit\n\nquodcumque particulare agens. 3. Amplius, Quum accidentia consequuntur principia substantialia rei, oportet quod ille qui immediate substantiam rei producit possit immediate circa ipsam rem operari quæcumque ad substantiam ejus consequuntur; generans enim quod dat formam dat omnes proprietates et motus consequentes. Ostensum est autem supra (l. II, c. xxi) quod Deus, in prima rerum institutione, omnes res per creationem immediate produxit in esse. Potest igitur immediate unamquamque rem producere sive movere ad aliquem effectum\n\nabsque mediis causis. 4. Item, Ordo rerum profluit à Deo in res secundum quod est præcogitatus in intellectu Ipsius; sicut videmus, in rebus humanis, quod princeps civitatis ordinem apud se præmeditatum cuilibet imponit. Intellectus autem divinus non est determinatus ad hunc ordinem de necessitate, ut nullum alium ordinem intelligere possit, quum et nos alium ordinem per intellectum apprehendere possimus; potest enim intelligi a nobis quod Deus hominem ex terra absque semine formet. Potest igitur Deus præter inferiores causas effectum illis\n\ncausis proprium operari. 5. Præterea, Licet ordo rebus inditus a Providentia divinam bonitatem suo modo repræsentet, non tamen ipsam repræsen- Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. : « Propriis. » B : « Post autem ostenditur quod. » A : « Vel inferiori. » A, B, E : « Excedit. » A, B, C, D, E, F : « Facit. » A omittit : « Causis. » — B : « Secundis substantiis. » A, B : « Operatur. » tat perfecte, quum non pertingat bonitas creaturæ ad aequalitatem bonitatis divinæ. Quod autem non repræsentatur perfecte per aliquod exemplatum potest iterum, praeter hoc, alio modo repræsentari. Repræsentatio autem divinæ bonitatis in rebus est finis productionis rerum a Deo, ut supra (c. xx) ostensum est. Non est igitur voluntas divina determinata ad hunc ordinem causarum et effectuum, ut non possit velle effectum aliquem in inferioribus producere immediate\n\nabsque aliis causis. 6. Adhuc, Universa creatura magis est Deo subdita quam corpus humanum sit subditum animæ ejus; nam anima est corpori proportionata ut forma ipsius, Deus autem omnem proportionem creaturæ excedit. Ex hoc autem quod anima imaginatur aliquid et vehementer afficiatur ad illud, sequitur aliquando immutatio in corpore ad sanitatem vel aegritudinem, absque actione principiorum corporalium quæ sunt nata in corpore aegritudinem vel sanitatem causare. Multo igitur magis ex voluntate divina potest effectus aliquis sequi in creaturis absque causis quæ natæ sunt, secundum naturam,\n\nillum effectum producere. 7. Præterea, Secundum naturæ ordinem, virtutes activæ elementorum sub virtutibus activis corporum cælestium ordinantur. Proprium autem effectum virtutum elementarium interdum virtus cælestis efficit absque actione elementi, sicut patet quum sol calefacit absque ignis actione. Multo igitur magis et divina virtus absque actione causarum creatarum potest producere\n\nproprios effectus earum. Si autem quis dicat quod, quum ordinem istum rebus Deus indiderit, non potest esse absque mutatione ipsius ut praeter ordinem ab ipso institutum operetur in rebus, effectus absque propriis causis producendo, ex ipsa rerum natura refelli potest. Ordo enim inditus rebus a Deo secundum id est quod in rebus frequenter accidere solet, non autem ubique, vel secundum id quod est semper; multa enim naturalium causarum effectus suos producunt eodem modo ut frequenter, non autem ut semper; nam quandoque, licet ut in paucioribus, aliter accidit, vel propter defectum virtutis agentis vel propter materiae indispositionem vel propter aliquid fortius agens, sicut quum natura in homine generat digitum sextum. Non tamen propter hoc deficit aut mutatur Providentiae ordo; nam et hoc ipsum quod naturalis ordo institutus secundum ea quæ sunt frequenter quandoque deficiat, Providentiae subest divinæ. Si ergo per aliquam virtutem creatam fieri potest ut ordo naturalis mutetur ab eo quod est frequenter ad id quod est raro, absque mutatione Providentiae divinæ, multo magis divina virtus quandoque aliquid facere potest, sine Providentiae suæ præjudicio, praeter ordinem naturalibus inditum\n\nrebus a Deo. Hoc enim ipsum ad suæ virtutis manifestationem facit interdum; nullo enim modo melius manifestari potest quod tota natura divinæ subjecta est voluntati quam ex hoc quod quandoque Ipse praeter ordinem naturæ aliquid operatur; ex hoc enim apparet quod ordo rerum processit a Deo, non per necessitatem naturæ, sed per liberam voluntatem. Nec debet hæc ratio frivola reputari, quod Deus aliquid facit in natura ad hoc quod Deus se mentibus hominum manifestet, quum supra (c. xvii) ostensum sit quod omnes creaturæ corporales ad naturam intellectualem ordinantur quodammodo sicut in finem. Ipsius autem intellectualis naturæ finis est divina cognitio, ut in superioribus est ostensum (c. xxv). Non est ergo mirum si, ad cognitionem de Deo intellectuali naturæ præbendam, sit aliqua mutatio in natura corporali.\n\nsunt contra naturæ. Considerandum tamen videtur quod, licet Deus interdum præter ordinem rebus inditum aliquid operetur, nihil tamen\n\nfacit contra naturam. 1. Quum enim Deus sit actus purus, omnia vero alia habeant aliquid de potentia admixtum, oportet quod Deus comparetur ad omnia sicut movens ad Sic A, B, C, D, E, F. — Edit.: « Repelli. » A: « Providentiae divinæ subjacet. » A, B, C, D, E, F: « Multo magis divinæ virtutis auctoritas. » A: « Deus divinaque cognitio. » motum et activum ad id quod est in potentia. Quod autem est in potentia, secundum ordinem naturalem, respectu alicujus agentis, si aliquid imprimatur in ipsum ab illo non est contra naturam simpliciter, etsi sit aliquando contrarium particulari formæ quæ corrumpitur per actionem hujusmodi; quum enim generatur ignis et corrumpitur aer igne agente, est generatio et corruptio naturalis. Quidquid igitur a Deo fit in rebus creatis non est contra naturam, etsi videatur esse contra ordinem\n\nproprium alicujus naturæ. 2. Adhuc, Quum Deus sit primum agens ut supra (l. I, c. xiii; l. II, c. vi) ostensum est, omnia quæ sunt post ipsum sunt quasi quædam instrumenta ipsius. Ad hoc autem sunt instrumenta instituta ut deserviant actioni principalis agentis, dum moventur ab ipso; unde talis instrumenti materia et forma esse debet ut sit competens actioni quam intendit principale agens; et propter hoc non est contra naturam instrumenti ut moveatur a principali agente, sed est ei maxime conveniens. Neque ergo est contra naturam quum res creatæ moventur qualitercumque a Deo; sic enim institutæ sunt\n\nut ei deserviant. 3. Præterea, In agentibus etiam corporalibus, hoc videtur quod motus qui sunt in istis inferioribus corporibus ex impressione superiorum non sunt violenti neque contra naturam, quamvis non videantur convenientes motui naturali quem corpus inferius habet secundum proprietatem suæ formæ; non enim dicimus quod fluxus et refluxus maris sit motus violentus, quum sitex impressione cælestis corporis, licet naturalis motus aquæ sit solum ad unam partem, scilicet ad medium. Multo igitur magis, quidquid a Deo fit in qualibet creatura non potest dici violentum\n\nneque contra naturam. 4. Item, Prima mensura essentiae et naturæ cujuslibet rei est Deus, sicut primum ens, quod est omnibus causa essendi. Quum autem per mensuram de unaquaque re sumatur judicium, oportet hoc naturale dici unicuique rei per quod conformatur suæ mensuræ. Hoc igitur erit naturale unicuique rei quod a Deo ei inditum est; ergo et si adhuc eidem rei a Deo aliquid aliter imprimatur, non\n\nest contra naturam. 5. Amplius, Omnes creaturæ comparantur ad Deum sicut artificiata ad artificem, sicut ex præmissis (l. II, c. xxiv) patet; unde tota natura est sicut quoddam artificiatum divinæ artis. Non est autem contra rationem artificii si artifex aliquid aliter operetur in suo artificio, etiam postquam ei primam formam dedit. Neque ergo est contra naturam si Deus in rebus naturalibus aliter operetur aliquid quam consuetus\n\ncursus naturæ habet. Hinc est quod Augustinus dicit : « Deus creator et conditor omnium naturarum nihil contra naturam facit; « quia id est naturale cuique rei quod « facit , a quo est omnis modus , numerus, ordo naturæ», Contra Faustum Manich. l. XXVI, c. .\n\ncv, a. viii.) Hæc autem quæ præter ordinem communiter in rebus statutum quandoque divinitus fiunt « miracula « dici solent; admiramur enim aliquid, quum, effectum videntes, causam ignoramus. Et, quia causa una et eadem a quibusdam interdum est cognita et a quibusdam incognita, inde contingit quod videntium simul aliquem effectum aliqui mirantur et aliqui non mirantur; astrologus enim non miratur, videns eclipsim solis, quia cognoscit causam; ignarus autem hujus scientiæ necesse habet admirari, causam ignorans. Sic igitur est aliquid mirum quoad hunc, non autem quantum ad illum. Illud ergo simpliciter mirum est quod habet causam simpliciter occultam; et hoc sonat nomen « miraculi », ut scilicet sit de se admiratione plenum, non quoad hunc vel quoad illum tantum. Causa autem simpliciter occulta omni homini est Deus. Probatum est enim supra (c. xvii) quod ejus essentiam nullus homo in statu hujus vitæ intellectu capere po- « Deus autem creator et conditor omnium naturarum nihil contra naturam facit; id enim erit cuique rei naturale quod ille fecerit, a quo est omnis modus, numerus, ordo naturæ. » (Contra Faustum Manich., l. XXVI, c. . Ed. L. Vivès, tom. XXVI, p. 272-73.) Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, et cod. Berg. — Edit.: « Id enim erit cuique rei naturale quod ille fecerit. » Sic B, C, D, et cod. Berg. — Edit.: « Motus. » A omittit: « Intellectu. » test. Illa igitur simpliciter miracula dicenda sunt quæ divinitus fiunt praeter ordinem communiter\n\nservatum in rebus. Horum autem miraculorum diversi sunt gradus et ordines. Nam summum gradum inter miracula tenent in quibus aliquid fit a Deo quod naturam numquam facere potest, sicut quod duo corpora sint simul, et quod sol retrocedat aut stet, quod mare divisum transeuntibus iter praebeat. Et inter hæc etiam ordo attenditur; nam quanto majora sunt illa quæ Deus operatur et quanto magis sunt remota a facultate naturæ, tanto miraculum majus est; sicut majus est miraculum quod sol retrocedat quam\n\nquod mare dividatur. Secundum autem gradum in miraculis tenent illa in quibus Deus aliquid facit quod natura facere potest, sed non per illum ordinem. Opus enim naturæ est quod aliquod animal vivat, videat et ambulet; sed quod post mortem vivat, post cæcitatem videat, post debilitatem claudus ambulet, hoc natura facere non potest, sed Deus interdum miraculose operatur. Inter hæc etiam miracula gradus attenditur secundum quod id quod fit magis est a\n\nfacultate naturæ remotum. Tertius autem gradus miraculorum est quum Deus facit quod consuetum est fieri operatione naturæ, tamen absque naturæ principiis operantibus; sicut quum aliquis a febre curabili per naturam virtute divina curatur, et quum pluit sine operatione principiorum naturæ.\n\niv.) Ex praemissis autem ostendi potest quod solus Deus\n\npotest facere miracula. 1. Quod enim est sub ordine totaliter constitutum non potest praeter ordinem illum operari. Omnis autem creatura est constituta sub ordine quem Deus in rebus statuit. Nulla ergo creatura potest supra hunc ordinem operari; quod\n\nest miracula facere. 2. Item, Quando aliqua virtus finita proprium effectum operatur ad quem determinatur, non est miraculum, licet posset esse mirum alicui qui illam virtutem non comprehendit; sicut mirum videtur ignaris quod magnes trahit ferrum vel quod aliquis parvus piscis sit retinens navem. Omnis autem creaturæ potentia est limitata ad aliquem determinatum effectum vel ad aliquos. Quidquid ergo virtute cujuscumque creaturæ fiat, non potest dici miraculum proprie, etsi sit mirum creaturæ virtutem illius non comprehendenti; quod autem fit a virtute divina quæ, quum sit infinita, de se incomprehensibilis est,\n\nvere miraculum est. 3. Amplius, Omnis creatura in sua actione requirit subjectum aliquod in quod agat; solius autem Dei est ex nihilo aliquid facere, ut supra ostensum est (l. II, c. xxi). Nihil autem quod requirit in sua actione subjectum potest agere nisi illa ad quæ subjectum est in potentia; hoc enim agens in subjectum aliquod operatur ut educat illud de potentia in actum . Nulla igitur creatura, sicut nec creare potest, ita nec agere potest in aliqua re nisi quod est in potentia illius rei. Fiunt autem multa miracula divinitus, dum in re aliqua fit divina virtute quod non est in potentia illius rei; sicut quod mortuus reviviscat, et quod sol retrocedat, et quod duo corpora sint simul. Hæc igitur miracula nulla virtute\n\ncreata fieri possunt. 4. Adhuc, Subjectum in quod agitur ordinem habet, et ad agens quod reducitipsum de potentia in actum, et ad actum in quem reducitur. Sicut ergo subjectum aliquod est in potentia ad aliquem determinatum actum et non ad quemlibet, ita non potest reduci de potentia in actum determinatum nisi per agens aliquod determinatum. Requiritur enim agens diversimode ad reducendum in diversum actum; nam, quum aer sit in potentia ignis et aqua, alio agente fit actu ignis et alio aqua. Similiter etiam patet quod materia corporalis in aliquem actum perfectum non reducitur a sola virtute universali agente, sed oportet esse aliquod agens proprium per quod determinetur impressio universalis virtutis ad determinatum effectum. In actum autem minus perfec- A: « Comprehendent. » F: « Divina, quum sit infinita. » A: « In se incomprehensibile est. — Amplius, etc. » — B: « Vere miraculum est, de se incomprehensibile est. » — D: « De se incomprehensibile, vere miraculum est. » A: « Ad actum. » A: « Alio agente fit ac ignis et actu aqua. » — C: « Alio creante. » — B: « Et actu aqua. » tum reduci potest materia corporalis sola virtute universali absque particulari agente. Animalia enim perfecta non solum generantur ex sola virtute cælesti, sed ad hoc requiritur determinatum semen; ad generationem vero quorumdam imperfectorum animalium sola virtus cælestis sufficit sine semine. Effectus igitur qui in his inferioribus fiunt, si sint nati fieri a causis universalibus superioribus, sine operatione causarum particularium inferiorum, non est miraculum si sic fiant; sicut non est miraculum quod animalia ex putrefactione sine semine nascantur; si autem non sunt nati fieri per solas causas superiores, requiruntur ad eorum complementum causæ inferiores particulares. Quum autem aliquis effectus producitur ab aliqua causa superiori, mediantibus propriis principiis, non est miraculum. Nullo igitur modo virtute superiorum creaturarum aliqua\n\nmiracula fieri possunt. 5. Amplius, Ejusdem rationis esse videtur quod aliquid operetur ex subjecto, et quod operetur id ad quod est in potentia subjectum, et quod ordinate operetur per determinata media; nam subjectum non fit in potentia propinqua ad ultimum, nisi quum fuerit actu in medio; sicut cibus non est statim in potentia caro, sed quum fuerit conversus in sanguinem. Omnis autem creatura necesse habet uti subjecto ad hoc quod aliquid faciat; nec potest facere nisi ad quod subjectum est in potentia, ut ostensum est (l. II, c. xxi). Ergo non potest facere aliquid, nisi subjectum reducat in actum per determinata media. Miracula igitur, quæ sunt ex hoc quod aliquis effectus producitur non illo ordine quo naturaliter fieri potest, virtute creaturæ\n\nfieri non possunt. 6. Adhuc, Inter species motus ordo quidam naturalis attenditur; nam primus motuum est motus localis, unde et causa aliorum exsistit; primum enim, in quolibet genere, causa invenitur eorum quæ in illo genere consequuntur. Omnis autem effectus qui in his inferioribus producitur, per aliquam generationem vel alterationem necesse est ut producatur. Oportet igitur quod, per aliquid localiter motum, hoc proveniat, si fiat ab aliquo agente incorporali, quod propriie localiter moveri non possit. Effectus autem qui fiunt a substantiis incorporeis, per corporea instrumenta, non sunt miraculosi, corpora enim non operantur nisi naturaliter. Non igitur substantiæ incorporeæ creatæ possunt aliqua miracula facere propria virtute, et multo minus substantiæ corporeæ, quarum omnis\n\nactio naturalis est. Solius igitur Dei est miracula facere; ipse enim est superior ordine quo universa continentur, sicut a cujus Providentia totus hic ordo fluit; ejus etiam virtus, quum sit omnino infinita, non determinatur ad aliquem specialem effectum, neque ad hoc quod effectus ilius producatur aliquo determinato\n\nmodo vel ordine. Hinc est quod dicitur de Deo: Qui facit mirabilia magna solus, Psalm. cxxxv, 4.\n\nQuod substantiae spirituales aliqua miracula operantur, quæ tamen non sunt vere miracula. (I, q. cx, a. iv.) Fuit autem positio Avicennæ, De anima, l. VI, c. 11 et l. VIII, c. ult., quod substantiis separatis multo magis obedit materia ad productionem alicujus effectus quam contrariis agentibus in natura; unde ponit quod ad apprehensionem prædictarum substantiarum sequitur interdum effectus aliquis in istis inferioribus, vel pluviarum, vel sanitatis alicujus infirmi, absque aliquo corporeo agente medio. Cujus quidem signum ab anima nostra acceptit, quæ quum fuerit fortis in sua imaginatione, ad solam apprehensionem immutatur corpus; sicut quum quis ambulans super trabem in alto positam cadit de facili, quia imaginatur casum ex timore; non autem caderet, si esset trabes illa posita super terram, unde casum timere non posset. Manifestum est autem quod ad solam apprehensionem animæ calescit corpus, sicut accidit in concupiscentibus vel iratis; aut etiam infrigidatur sicut accidit in timentibus. Quandoque etiam immutatur ex forti apprehensione ad aliquam ægritudinem, puta febrem vel etiam lepram. Et per hunc modum dicit quod, si anima sit A, B, C, D, E, F omittunt: « Uti. », et cod. Berg. pura, non subjecta corporalibus passionibus et fortis in sua apprehensione, obedit apprehensioni ejus, non solum corpus proprium, sed corpora etiam exteriora; adeo quod ad ejus apprehensionem sanetur aliquis infirmus, vel aliquid aliud hujusmodi. Et hoc ponit esse causam fascinationis, quia anima alicujus, vehementer affecta in malevolentia, habet impressionem documenti in aliquem, maxime puerum, qui, propter corporis teneritudinem, est facile susceptivus impressionum. Unde vult quod multo amplius ad apprehensionem substantiarum separatarum, quas ponit animas vel motores orbium, sequantur alicui effectus in istis inferioribus absque actione alicujus corporalis agentis. Hæc autem positio satis consona est aliis suis positionibus. Ponit enim quod omnes formæ substantiales effluant in hæc inferiora a substantia separata, et quod corporalia agentia non sunt nisi disponentia materiam ad suscipiendam impressionem agentis separati; quod quidem non est verum, secundum Aristotelis doctrinam, qui probat, Metaphys. VII, c. vIII, quod formæ quæ sunt in materia non sunt a formis separatis, sed a formis quæ sunt in materia; sic enim inventur similitudo inter faciens et factum. Exemplum etiam quod sumitur de impressione animæ in corpus non multum adjuvat ejus intentionem. Non enim ex apprehensione sequitur aliqua immutatio corporis, nisi apprehensioni adjuncta fuerit affectio aliqua, ut gaudii vel timoris vel concupiscentiae aut alterius passionis; hujusmodi autem passiones accidunt cum aliquo determinato motu cordis, ex quo sequitur ulterius immutatio totius corporis, vel secundum motum localem, vel secundum alterationem aliquam; unde adhuc remanet quod apprehensio spiritualis non alterat corpus, nisi mediante motu locali. Quod autem de fascinatione inducit non ob hoc accidit quod apprehensio unius immediate immutet corpus alterius, sed quia, mediante motu cordis, immutat corpus conjunctum, cujus immutatio pervenit ad oculum, a quo infici potest aliquid extrinsecum, præcipue si sit facile mutabile, sicut etiam oculus menstruatæ inficit speculum. Substantia igitur spiritualis creata propria virtute nullam formam inducere potest in materiam corporalem, quasi materia ad hoc sibi obediente ut exeat in actum alicujus formæ, nisi per motum localem alicujus corporis. Est enim hoc in virtute substantiae spiritualis creata ut corpus obediat sibi ad motum localem; movendo autem localiter aliquod corpus, adhibere potest aliqua naturaliter activa ad effectus aliquos producendos, sicut etiam ars fabrilis adhibet ignem ad mollificationem ferri. Hoc autem non est miraculosum proprie loquendo. Unde relinquitur quod substantiae spirituales creata non facient miracula, propria virtute. Dico autem « propria virtute, » quia nihil prohibet hujusmodi substantias spirituales, in quantum agunt virtute divina, miracula facere; quod etiam ex hoc videtur quod unus ordo Angelorum specialiter deputatur, ut Gregorius dicit, Homil, XXXIV, in Evang. ad miracula facienda, qui etiam dicit, Dial. l. II, c. xxxi, quod quidam sancti interdum miracula facient ex potestate, non solum ex intercessione. Considerandum tamen est quod, quum res aliquas naturales vel Angeli vel da-mones adhibent ad aliquos determinatos effectus, utuntur eis quasi instrumentis quibusdam, sicut medicus utitur ut instrumentis aliquibus herbis ad sanandum. Ex instrumento autem procedit non solum suæ virtuti correspondens effectus, sed etiam aliquid ultra propriam virtutem, in quantum agit in virtute principalis agentis; serra enim et securis non possunt « facere» lectum, nisi in quantum agunt ut motæ ab arte et ad talem effectum; nec calor naturalis posset carnem generare, nisi virtute animæ vegetabilis, quæ utitur ipso quasi quodam instrumento. Conveniens est igitur quod ex ipsis rebus naturalibus proveniant aliqui altiores effectus, ex hoc quod spirituales substantiae eis utuntur quasi instrumentis quibusdam. Sic ergo, licet tales effectus simpliciter miracula dici non possint, quia ex naturalibus causis provenient, mirabiles tamen red- A omittit: « Pura. » « Virtutes vocantur illi spiritus per quos signa et miracula frequentius fiunt. » (Homiliarum in Evang. lib. II, Homil. xxxiv, n. 10, tom. II, col. 1251.) « Ecce est, Petre, quod dixi, quia hi qui Omnipotenti Deo familiarius serviunt, aliquando mira facere etiam ex potestate possunt. » (Dialog. l. II, c, 31. Patrol. lat., tom. LXVI, col. 190.) duntur nobis dupliciter: uno modo, ex hoc quod per spirituales substantias tales causæ, modo nobis inconsueto, ad proprios effectus apponuntur; unde ingeniosorum artificum opera mira redduntur, quum ab aliis non percipitur qualiter operantur; alio modo, ex hoc quod cauæ naturales, appositæ ad effectus aliquos producendos, aliquid virtutis sortiuntur ex hoc quod sunt instrumenta spiritualium substantiarum; et hoc magis accedit ad rationem miraculi.\n\nimpressione cælestium corporum. Fuerunt autem quidam dicentes quod hujusmodi opera nobis mirabilia quæ per artes magicas fiunt non ab aliquibus spiritualibus fiunt substantiis, sed ex virtute cælestium corporum; cujus signum videtur quod ab exercentibus hujusmodi opera stellarum certus situs consideratur; adhibentur etiam quædam herbarum et aliarum corporalium rerum auxilia, quasi ad praeparandum inferiorem materiam ad suscipiendam\n\ninfluentiam virtutis cælestis. Hoc autem expresse adversatur apparentibus. 1. Quum enim non sit possibile ex aliquibus corporeis principiis intellectum causari, ut supra (c. Lxxxiv) probatum est, impossibile est quod effectus qui sunt proprii intellectualis naturæ ex virtute cælestis corporis causentur. In hujusmodi autem operationibus magorum apparent quædam quæ sunt propria rationalis creaturæ opera; redduntur enim responsa de furtis sublatis et de aliis hujusmodi; quod non posset fieri, nisi per intellectum. Non igitur est verum omnes hujusmodi effectus sola virtute\n\ncælestium corporum causari. 2. Præterea, Ipsa loquela proprius actus est rationalis naturæ. Apparent au- 1 A: « Accidens. » 2 Cod. Berg.: « Creaturæ. » 3 A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg.: « Videant. » 4 A omittit: « Fiat. » « Secundum Augustinum LXXXIII quæstionum, aliter faciunt magi, scilicet per privatos contractus quos cum dæmonibus inierunt, eis sacrificando; aliter Christiani boni per publicam justitiam, invocatione scilicet divinæ auctoritatis. Aliter mali per signa privatæ justitiae, utpote invocando nomen Christi; sicut quod equum meum habeas, potest contingere vel quia judex tibi ad tem aliqui colloquentes hominibus in prædictis operantibus et ratiocinantes de diversis. Non est igitur possibile quod hujusmodi fiant sola\n\nvirtute cælestium corporum. Si quis autem dicat quod hujusmodi apparentiae non sunt secundum sensum exteriorem, sed secundum imaginationem tantum, hoc quidem primo non videtur verum. Non enim alicui apparent formæ imaginatæ quasi res veræ, nisi fiat alienatio ab exterioribus sensibus; quia non potest esse quod similitudinibus attendatur tanquam rebus, nisi ligato naturali judicio sensus. Hujusmodi autem collocutiones et apparitiones fiunt ad homines qui utuntur libere sensibus exterioribus. Non est igitur possibile quod hujusmodi visa vel audita sint\n\nsecundum imaginationem tantum. Deinde, Ex quibuscumque formis imaginatis non potest alicui provenire intellectualis cognitio ultra facultatem naturalem vel acquisitam sui intellectus; quod et in somnis patet, in quibus, etsi sit aliqua præsignatio futurorum, non tamen quicumque videns somnia eorum significata intelligit. Per hujusmodi autem visa vel audita quæ apparent in operibus magorum, plerumque advenit alicui intellectualis cognitio aliquorum quæ sui intellectus facultatem exceedunt, sicut revelatio occultorum thesaurorum, manifestatio futurorum; et quandoque etiam de aliquibus documentis scientiae alicujus aliquibus vera respondentur. Oportet ergo quod vel illi apparentes et colloquentes non videantur secundum imaginationem tantum, vel saltem quod hoc fiat virtute alicujus intellectus superioris quod homo per hujusmodi imaginationes in cognitionem talium adducatur, et non fiat hoc solum\n\nvirtute cælestium corporum. 3. Adhuc, Quod virtute cælestium corporum fit est effectus naturalis; nam 1 A: « Accidens. » 2 Cod. Berg.: « Creaturæ. » 3 A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg.: « Videant. » 4 A omittit: « Fiat. » « Secundum Augustinum LXXXIII quæstionum, aliter faciunt magi, scilicet per privatos contractus quos cum dæmonibus inierunt, eis sacrificando; aliter Christiani boni per publicam justitiam, invocatione scilicet divinæ auctoritatis. Aliter mali per signa privatæ justitiae, utpote invocando nomen Christi; sicut quod equum meum habeas, potest contingere vel quia judex tibi ad judicavit sua auctoritate, vel justius auctoritate judicis: et sic haberes equum per publicam justitiam; alio modo ex privato contractu, sicut vendendo, vel dono; vel quia falsum diceres, ita scilicet esse mandatum a judge. Tunc enim timore mandati darem equum. Et sic mali Christiani aliquando faciunt miracula invocando indigne nomen divinum, cui tamen nomini cedit poestas dæmonum. Unde etiam boni possunt facere miracula quæ exceedunt facultatem totius naturæ: non sic mali. » (Ex cod. G. de F.) formæ naturales sunt quæ in inferioribus causantur ex virtute cælestium corporum. Quod igitur nulli rei potest esse naturale non potest fieri virtute cælestium corporum. Quædam autem talia fieri dicuntur per operationes prædictas: sicut quod ad praesentiam alicujus quæcumque sera ei pandatur; quod aliquis invisibilis reddatur; et multa hujusmodi narrantur. Non est igitur possibile hoc fieri\n\nvirtute cælestium corporum. 4. Amplius, Cuicumque virtute cælestium corporum confertur quod posterius est, confertur et ei quod prius est. Moveri autem per se consequitur ad habere animam; animatorum enim proprium est quod moveant seipsa. Impossibile est igitur fieri virtute cælestium corporum quod aliquid inanimatum per se moveatur. Fieri autem hoc per magicas artes dicitur quod aliqua statua per se moveatur aut vocem emittat. Non est igitur possibile quod effectus magicarum artium\n\nfiat virtute cælesti. Si autem dicatur quod statua illa sortitur aliquod principium vitæ virtute cælestium corporum, hoc est impossibile. Principium enim vitæ, in omnibus viventibus, est forma substantialis; vivere enim est esse viventibus, ut Philosophus dicit, De anima, II, c. iv. Impossibile est autem quod aliquid recipiat aliquam formam substantialem de novo, nisi amittat formam quam prius habuit; generatio enim unius est corruptio alterius. In fabricatione autem alicujus statuæ non adjicitur aliqua forma substantialis, sed fit transmutatio solum secundum figuram, quæ est accidens; manet enim forma cupri vel alicujus hujusmodi. Non igitur est possibile quod hujusmodi statuæ sortiantur\n\naliquod principium vitæ. 5. Adhuc, Si aliquid per principium vitæ moveatur, necesse est quod habeat sensum; movens enim est sensus vel intellectus; intellectus autem in generabilibus et corruptilibus non est sine sensu. Sensus autem non potest esse ubi non est tactus, nec tactus sine organo medie temperato; talis autem temperies non inventur in lapide vel cera vel metallo, ex quo fit statua. Non est igitur possibile quod hujusmodi statuæ moveantur per\n\nprincipium vitæ. 6. Amplius, Viventia perfecta non solum generantur ex virtute cælesti, sed etiam ex semine; homo enim generat hominem et sol. Quæ autem virtute cælesti sine semine generantur sunt animalia generata ex putrefactione, quæ inter alia ignobiliora sunt. Si igitur per virtutem cælestem solam hujusmodi statuæ sortiuntur principium vitæ, per quod moveant seipsa, oportet ea esse ignobi-lissima inter animalia; quod tamen esset falsum, si per principium vitæ intrinse-cum operarentur; nam in earum actibus apparent nobiles operationes, quum respondeant de occultis. Non est igitur possibile quod operentur vel moveantur\n\nper principium vitæ. 7. Item, Effectum naturalem virtute cælestium corporum productum contingit inventiri absque artis operatione; etsi enim aliquo artificio aliquis operetur ad generationem ranarum vel aliquorum hujusmodi, contingit tamen generari ranas absque omni artificio. Si ergo virtute cælestium corporum hujusmodi statuæ, quæ per artem necromanticam fiunt, sortiantur principium vitæ, erit inventire generationem talium absque hujusmodi arte. Hoc autem non inventur. Manifestum est igitur quod hujusmodi statuæ non habent principium vitæ neque moventur\n\nvirtute cælestis corporis. Per hoc autem excluditur positio Hermetis, qui sic dixit, ut Augustinus refert: « Deus ut effector est deorum cælestium, ita homo fictor est deorum qui in templis sunt humana proximitate contenti…; statuas dico animatas sensu et spiritu plenas tantaque facientes et talia; statuas futurorum præscias, easque sorte, vate, somniis multisque aliis rebus prædicentes; imbecillitates hominibus facientes, eosque curantes, tristitiam lae titiamque pro meritis dantes» De civitate Dei,\n\nVIII, c. xxiii. Hæc autem positio auctoritate divina destruitur; dicitur enim: Simulacra gen- 1 A et cod. Berg. : « Etiam. » 2 A: « Emittit. » 3 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Nigromanticam. » 4 A: « Easdem de somniis et multis: » 5 A: « Et imbecillitates. » 6 Sic A, et Cod. Berg. — Edit. : « Eas. » 7 A: « Tristitiam et laetitiam. » 8 A, B, C, D, et cod. Berg. : « Dantes pro meritis. » 9 « Statuas animatas » omisso: « dico. » — « Pro meritis » omisso: « dantes. » — Ed. L. Vivès, tom. XXIII, p. 740. tium argentum et aurum, opera manuum hominum; os habent, et non loquentur, Psalm. cxiii, 12 et 13; neque enim est spiritus in ore\n\nipsorum, Psalm. cxxxiv, 17. Non videtur autem omnino negandum quin in prædictis ex virtute cælestium corporum aliquid virtutis esse possit, ad illos tamen solos effectus quos virtute cælestium corporum aliqua corpora producere possunt.\n\noperationes efficaciam habeant. Investigandum autem relinquitur unde artes magicæ efficaciam habent; quod quidem facile perpendi potest, si modus\n\noperationis earum attendatur. In suis enim operationibus utuntur vocibus quibusdam significativis ad determinatos effectus producendos. Vox autem in quantum est significativa, non habet virtutem nisi ex aliquo intellectu, vel ex intellectu proferentis vel ex intellectu ejus ad quem profertur: ex proferentis quidem intellectu, sicut si aliquis in tellectus sit tantæ virtutis quod sua conceptione res possit causare, quam quidem conceptionem, vocis officio, producendis effectibus quodammodo præsentat; ex intellectu autem ejus ad quem sermo dirigitur, sicut quum, per significationem vocis in intellectum receptam, audiens inducitur ad aliquid faciendum. Non autem potest dici quod voces illæ significativæ a magis prolatæ efficaciam habent ex intellectu proferentis. 1. Quum enim virtus essentiam consequatur, virtutis diversitas essentialium principiorum diversitatem ostendit. Intellectus autem communiter hominum hujus dispositionis invenitur quod ejus cognitio ex rebus causatur magis quam sua conceptione res causare possit. Siigitur sint aliqui homines qui verbis conceptionem sui intellectus exprimentibus res possint transmutare propria virtute, erunt alterius speciei et\n\ndicentur æquivoce homines. 2. Amplius, Virtus faciendi non acquiritur per disciplinam, sed solum cognitio aliquid faciendi. Per disciplinam autem aliqui acquirunt quod hujusmodi operationes magicas efficiant. Non est igitur A, et cod. Berg. — « Habeant. » — C: « Efficaci qui habent. » « Diversi dæmones possunt intelligi cogi dupliciter: uno modo per aliquam superiorem virtutem, quæ eis necessitatem faciendi inducat, alio modo per modum illectionis, sicut homines dicuntur ad aliquid cogi cujus concupiscentia illiciuntur. Neutro autem modo rebus corporalibus per se loquendo dæmones cogi possunt nisi supponantur habere corpora naturaliter sibi unita, et per consequens habere sensibiles affectiones ad modum aliorum animalium. Sic enim cogi possent utroque modo, virtute corporali, et corporum cælestium, ex quorum impressionibus in aliquas passiones inducerentur, et etiam corporum inferiorum in quibus delectarentur. Sed hæc sunt falsa. Unde dicendum aliter quod dæmones, per quos magicae artes complementum habent, et coguntur et aliciuntur. Coguntur quidem a superiori, quando quidem ab ipso Deo, quando vero a sanctis, et angelis, et hominibus virtute Dei. Nam ad ordinem potestatum pertinere dicitur dæmones arcere. Sancti autem homines, sicut dono virtutum participant in quantum miracula faciunt, ita dono potestatum in quantum dæmones ejiciunt. Coguntur etiam interdum ab ipsis superioribus dæmonibus, quæ quidem sola coactio per magicas artes fieri non potest. Sed coguntur quasi allecti per magicas artes, non quidem rebus corporalibus propter se ipsas, sed propter aliquid aliud. Primo quia per hujusmodi res corporales sciunt facilius posse compleri effectum ad quem invocantur, et hoc appetunt, ut scilicet eorum virtus admirabilis habeatur. Et propter hoc sub certa constellatione advocati magis adveniunt. Secundo in quantum hujusmodi corporalia sunt signa aliquorum spiritualium quibus delectantur. Quia enim homines in signum subjectionis Deo sacrificium offerunt, et prostrationes faciunt, gaudent hujusmodi reverentiae signa sibi exhiberi. Alliciuntur autem dæmones diversis signis, secundum quod diversis vitiis ipsorum magis conveniunt. Tertio alliciuntur his rebus corporalibus in quantum homines per eas in peccatum adducuntur; et inde est quod alliciuntur mendaciis, et his quae homines in errorem vel peccatum inducere possunt. Si ergo Salomon exorcismos suos eo tempore fecit quo erat in statu salutis, potuit in illis esse vis cogendi dæmones ex virtute divina; si autem tempore illo quo idola adoravit, ut intelligatur eum per magicas artes fecisse, non fuit in illis exorcismis vis cogendi dæmones, nisi modo prædicto. Aliquando ergo advocati per ea quae odiunt, sicut per virginitatem imprecantis, vel per aliqua quae reverentiam Dei sonant, sicut per invocationem divinæ majestatis, adveniunt, ut ex hoc in suæ divinitatis opinionem homines advocent, quia mendacia amant, et ut dent intelligere quod non sint a divina justitia omnino exclusi. Non enim sic divinitatem appetunt ut summo Deo velint aquari omnino, sed sub eo divinitatis cultum sibi ab hominibus exhiberi gaudent, licet etiam frequenter per mendacia, quae derogant scientiae eorum advocentur, tamen ex hoc non coguntur, sed hoc ipsum est eis delectabile, quod homines in mendaciis confidant: nam et ipse est mendax et pater ejus. » (Ex cod. G. de F.) Titulus in C desideratur. in eis ad hujusmodi effectus producendos virtus aliqua, sed\n\ncognitio sola. Si quis autem dicat quod hujusmodi homines a sua nativitate ex virtute stellarum sortiuntur præ cæteris virtutem prædictam, ita quod, quantumcumque alii instruantur qui hoc ex nativitate non habent, efficaces in hujusmodi operibus esse non possunt, primo quidem dicendum est quod corpora cælestia super intellectum imprimere non possunt ut supra (c. lxxxiv) ostensum est. Non igitur ex virtute stellarum sortiri potest intellectus alicujus hanc virtutem, quod repræsentatio suæ conceptionis per vocem\n\nsit alicujus effectiva. Si autem dicatur quod etiam imaginatio aliquid in prolatione vocum significativarum operatur, super quam possunt corpora cælestia imprimere, quum hujusmodi operatio sit per organum corporale, hoc non potest esse quantum ad omnes effectus qui per hujusmodi artes fiunt. Ostensum est enim (c. lxxxv) quod non possunt omnes effectus virtute stellarum produci. Ergo neque virtute stellarum aliquis sortiri potest hanc virtutem ut\n\neosdem effectus producat. Relinquitur igitur quod hujusmodi effectus compleantur per aliquem intellectum ad quem sermo proferentis per hujusmodi voces dirigitur. Hujus autem signum est; nam hujusmodi significativæ voces quibus magi utuntur invocationes sunt, supplicationes, adjurationes, aut etiam imperia quasi\n\nad alterum colloquentis. 3. Item, In observationibus hujus artis utuntur quibusdam characteribus et figuris determinatis. Figura autem nullius actionis principium est neque passionis : alias mathematica corpora essent activa et passiva. Non ergo potest per figuras determinatas disponi materia ad aliquem naturalem effectum suscipiendum ; non ergo utuntur magi figuris aliquibus quasi dispositionibus. Relinquitur ergo quod utuntur eis solum quasi signis : non enim est aliquid determinatum dare. Signis autem non utimur nisi ad alios intelligentes. Habent ergo magicæ artes efficaciam ab illo intelligente ad quem\n\nsermo magi dirigitur. Si quis autem dicat quod figuræ aliquæ appropriantur aliquibus cælestium corporum, et ita corpora inferiora determinan-tur per aliquas figura ad aliquorum cælestium corporum impressions suscipiendas, videtur non rationabiliter dici. 1. Non enim ordinatur aliquod patiens ad suscipiendas impressiones agentis nisi per hoc quod est in potentia. Illa ergo tantum determinant ipsum ad specialem impressionem suscipiendam per quæ in potentia fit quodammodo. Per figuras autem non disponitur materia ut sit in potentia ad aliquam formam, quia figura abstrahit secundum suam rationem ab omni materia et forma sensibili, quum sit quoddam mathematicum. Non ergo per figuras et characteres determinatur aliquod corpus ad suscipiendam aliquam\n\ninfluentiam cælestis corporis. 2. Præterea, Figuræ aliquæ appropriantur corporibus cælestibus ut effectus ipsa-rum; nam figuræ inferiorum causantur a corporibus cælestibus. Prætæ autem artes non utuntur characteribus aut figuris quasi effectibus cælestium corporum, sed sunt effectus hominis operantis per artem. Appropriatio igitur figurarum ad aliqua cælestia corpora nihil ad\n\nproposi-tum facere videtur. 3. Item, Per figuras non disponitur aliqua materia naturalis ad formam, ut ostensum est. Corpora igitur in quibus sunt impressæ hujusmodi figuræ sunt ejusdem habilitatis ad recipiendum influentiam cælestem cum aliis corporibus ejusdem speciei. Quod autem aliquid agat in unum eorum quæ sunt æqualiter disposita, propter aliquid sibi appropriatum ibi inventum, et non in aliud, non est operantis per necessitatem naturæ, sed per electionem. Patet ergo quod hujusmodi artes, figuris utentes ad effectus aliquos producendos, non habent efficaciam ab aliquo agente per naturam, sed ab aliqua intellectuali substantia\n\nper intellectum agente. Hoc etiam demonstrat et ipsum nomen quod talibus figuris imponunt, « characteres » eas dicentes ; character enim signum est, in quo datur intelligi quod figuris hujusmodi non utuntur nisi ut signis exhibitis\n\nalicui intellectuali naturæ. Quia vero figuræ in artificialibus sunt quasi formæ specificæ, potest aliquis dicere quod nihil prohibet quin constitutionem figuræ, quæ dat speciem imagini, consequatur aliqua virtus ex influentia cœlesti, non secundum quod figura est, sed secundum quod causat speciem artificiati quod adipiscitur virtutem ex stellis. Sed de litteris quibus inscribitur aliquid in imagine vel aliis characteribus nihil aliud potest dici quam quod signa sunt; unde non habent ordinem nisi ad aliquem intellectum. Quod etiam ostenditur per sacrificia, prostrationes et alia hujusmodi quibus utuntur, quæ non possunt esse nisi signa reverentia exhibitæ alicui intellectuali naturæ.\n\nQuod substantia intellectualis quæ efficaciam præstat magicis operibus non est bona. Est autem alterius inquirendum quæ sit hæc intellectualis natura cujus virtute tales operationes fiunt. Et primo quidem apparet quod non sit bona et laudabilis. 4. Præstare enim patrocinium aliquibus quæ sunt contraria virtuti non est alicujus intellectus bene dispositi. Hoc autem fit ex hujusmodi artibus; fiunt enim plerumque adulteria, furta, homicidia, et alia hujusmodi maleficia procurantur; unde utentes his artibus « malefici » vocantur. Non est ergo bene disposita, secundum virtutem, intellectualis natura cujus auxilio hujusmodi artes innituntur. 2. Item, Non est intellectus bene dispositi, secundum virtutem, familiarem esse et patrocinium exhibere sceleratis, non quibuslibet optimis viris. Hujusmodi autem artibus utuntur plerumque homines scelerati. Non est igitur intellectualis natura cujus auxilio hæ artes efficaciam habent bene disposita secundum virtutem. 3. Adhuc, Intellectus bene dispositi est reducere homines in ea quæ sunt hominum propria bona, quæ quidem sunt bona rationis. Abducere igitur ab istis, pertrahendo ad aliqua minima bona, est intellectus indecenter dispositi. Per hujusmodi autem artes non adipiscuntur homines aliquem profectum in bonis ractionis, quæ sunt scientiæ et virtutes, sed in quibusdam minimis, sicut in inven-tione furtorum et in deprehensione latronum et his similibus. Non igitur substantiæ intellectivæ quarum auxilio hæ artes utuntur sunt bene disposita secundum virtutem. 4. Amplius, In operationibus prædictarum artium illusio quædam videtur et irrationabilitas; requirunt enim hujusmodi artes hominem re venerea non attrectatum, quum tamen plerumque adhibeantur ad illicitos concubitus conciliandos. In operatione autem intellectus bene dispositi nihil irrationale et sibi diversum apparet. Non igitur hujusmodi artes utuntur patrocinio intellectus bene dispositi secundum virtutem. 5. Præterea, Non est bene dispositus, secundum intellectum, qui per aliqua scelera commissa provocatur ad auxilium alicui ferendum. Hoc autem fit in istis artibus; nam aliqui in exsecutione harum leguntur innocentes pueros occidisse. Non igitur sunt boni intellectus quorum auxilio ista fiunt. 6. Item, Bonum proprium intellectus est veritas. Quum igitur boni sit bonum adducere, cujuslibet intellectus bene dispositi esse videtur alios perducere ad veritatem. In operibus autem magorum plerumque fiunt quibus ludificentur homines et decipiantur. Intellectus igitur cujus auxilio utuntur non est bene dispositus secundum morem. 7. Adhuc, Intellectus bene dispositi est reducere homines in ea quæ sunt hominum propria bona, quæ quidem sunt bona rationis. Abducere igitur ab istis, pertrahendo ad aliqua minima bona, est intellectus indecenter dispositi. Per hujusmodi autem artes non adipiscuntur homines aliquem profectum in bonis ractionis, quæ sunt scientiæ et virtutes, sed in quibusdam minimis, sicut in inven-tione furtorum et in deprehensione latronum et his similibus. Non igitur substantiæ intellectivæ quarum auxilio hæ artes utuntur sunt bene disposita secundum virtutem. 8. Amplius, Non videtur esse habentis intellectum bene dispositum ut, si sit superior, imperanti sibi subdatur sicut inferior, aut, si sit inferior, ut sibi ab eo quasi superiori supplicari patiatur. Magi — F, D, et cod. Berg: « Anebriotem. » autem invocant eos quorum auxilio utuntur, suppliciter, quasi superiores; quum autem advenerint, imperant eis quasi inferioribus. Nullo igitur modo videntur esse bene dispositi secundum intellectum. Per hoc autem excluditur error Gentilium, qui hujusmodi operationes diis attribuebant.\n\nQuod substantia intellectualis cujus auxilio magicæ artes utuntur non est mala secundum suam naturam. Non est autem possibile quod sit naturalis malitia in substantiis intellectuales secundum suam naturam essent malæ, naturaliter in malum tenderent. Non igitur per accidens, sed per se, tenderent ad malum. Hoc autem est impossibile; ostensum est enim supra (c. xvi) quod omnia per se tendunt ad bonum et nihil tendit ad malum nisi per accidens. Non igitur hujusmodi intellectuales substantiæ sunt secundum suam naturam malæ. 2. Adhuc, Quidquid est in rebus oportet quod causa vel causatum sit; alioquin, ad alia ordinem non haberent. Aut igitur hujusmodi substantiæ sunt causa tantum aut etiam causata. — Si causæ tantum 1: malum autem non potest esse causa alicujus, nisi per accidens, ut supra (c. xiv) ostensum est; omne autem quod est per accidens oportet reduci ad id quod est per se; oportet igitur quod in eis sit aliud prius quam eorum malitia, per quod sint causæ. Primum autem in unoquoque est ejus natura et essentia. Non igitur secundum suam naturam sunt malæ hujusmodi substantiæ. — Idem etiam sequitur, si sint causata: nam nullum agens agit nisi intendens ad bonum; malum ergo non potest esse effectus alicujus causæ, nisi per accidens. Quod autem causatur per accidens tantum non potest esse secundum naturam, quum omnis natura determinatum modum habeat quo procedit in esse. Non est igitur possibile quod hujusmodi substantiæ sint malæ secundum suam naturam. 3. Amplius, Unumquodque entium habet proprium esse secundum modum suæ naturæ. Esse autem, in quantum hujusmodi, est bonum; cujus signum est quod omnia esse appetunt. Si igitur hujusmodi substantiæ secundum suam naturam essent malæ, nullum esse haberent. 4. Item, Ostensum est supra (l. II, c. xv) quod nihil potest esse quin a primo ente esse habeat; et quod primum ens est summum bonum (l. I, c. xli). Quum autem omne agens, in quantum hujusmodi, agat sibi simile, oportet quod ea quæ a primo ente sunt bona sint. Prædictæ igitur substantiæ, secundum quod sunt et naturam aliquam habent, non possunt esse malæ. 5. Amplius, Impossibile est aliquid esse quod sit universaliter privatum participione boni; quum enim idem sit appetibile et bonum, si aliquid esset omnino expers boni, nihil haberet in se appetibile; unicuique autem est appetibile suum esse. Oportet igitur quod, si aliquid secundum suam naturam dicatur malum, hoc non sit quasi simpliciter malum, sed quia est malum huic vel quantum ad hoc; sicut venenum non est simpliciter malum, sed huic cui est nocivum; unde quod est alii venenum est alteri cibus. Hoc autem contingit ex eo quod bonum particulare, quod est proprium hujus, contrarium est bono particulari, quod est proprium alterius; sicut calor, qui est proprium ignis, est contrarius frigori, quod est bonum aquæ, et destruit ipsum. Illud igitur quod secundum suam naturam ordinatur in bonum, non particulare, sed simpliciter, impossibile est quod secundum hunc modum possit naturaliter dici malum. Tale autem est omnis intellectus; nam ejus bonum est in propria operatione, quæ est universalium et eorum quæ sunt simpliciter. Non est igitur possibile quod aliquis intellectus secundum suam naturam sit malus, non solum simpliciter, sed nec etiam secundum quid. 6. Item, In unoquoque habente intellectum, naturali ordine intellectus movet appetitum; proprium enim objectum voluntatis est bonum intellectum; bonum 1 omisso: « Tantum. » autem voluntatis est in eo quod sequitur intellectum, sicut in nobis bonum est quod est secundum rationem; quod autem præter hoc, malum est. Naturali igitur ordine, substantia intellectualis vult bonum. Impossibile est igitur quod illæ substantia intellectuales quarum auxilio magicæ artes utuntur sint naturaliter malæ. 7. Præterea, Quum voluntas tendat in bonum intellectum naturaliter, sicut in proprium objectum et finem, impossibile est quod aliqua intellectualis substantia malam secundum naturam habeat voluntatem, nisi naturaliter intellectus erret circa judicium boni. Nullus autem intellectus talis potest esse; falsa enim judicia in operationibus intellectus sunt sicut monstra in rebus naturalibus, quæ non sunt secundum suam naturam, sed præter naturam; nam bonum intellectus et ejus finis naturalis est cognitio veritatis. Impossibile est igitur quod aliquis intellectus sit qui naturaliter in judicio veri decipiatur. Neque igitur possibile est quod sit aliqua substantia intellectualis habens naturaliter malam voluntatem. 8. Adhuc, Nulla potentia cognoscitiva deficit a cognitione sui objecti, nisi propter aliquem defectum aut corruptionem suam, quum secundum propriam rationem ad cognitionem talis objecti ordineur; sicut visus non deficit a cognitione coloris, nisi aliqua corruptione circa ipsum exsistente. Omnis autem defectus et corruptio est præter naturam quia natura intendit esse et perfectionem rei. Impossibile est igitur quod sit aliqua virtus cognoscitiva quæ naturaliter deficiat a recto judicio sui objecti. Proprium autem objectum intellectus est verum. Impossibile est igitur quod sit aliquis intellectus naturaliter circa cognitionem veri oberrans. Neque igitur voluntas aliqua naturaliter potest a bono deficere. Hoc etiam auctoritate sacræ Scripturæ confirmatur; dicitur enim: Omnis creatura Dei bona, I Tim. iv, 4; unde: Vidit Deus cuncta quæ fecerat, et erant valde bona, Gen. i, 34. Per hoc autem excluditur error Mani- 1 A omittit: « Impossibile est igitur quod sit aliqua virtus cognoscitiva quæ naturaliter deficiat a recto judico sui objecti. Proprium autem objectum intellectus est verum. Impossibile est igitur quod sit aliquis intellectus naturaliter circa cognitionem veri. » 2 — Cod. Berg.: « Anebriotem. » 3 4 tem quod quis intelligit, non errat; ex defectu enim intelligendi provenit omnis error. Non potest igitur esse aliquis error in cognitione substantiarum talium. Nullum autem voluntatis peccatum potest esse absque errore, quia voluntas semper tendit in bonum apprehensum; unde, nisi in apprehensione boni erretur, non potest in voluntate esse peccatum. Videtur igitur quod, in hujusmodi substantiis, non possit esse voluntatis peccatum. 2. Adhuc, In nobis, peccatum voluntatis accidit circa ea de quibus in universali scientiam veram habemus, per hoc quod in particulari impeditur judicium rationis ex aliqua passione rationem ligante. Hæ autem passiones in dæmonibus esse non possunt, quia hæ passiones sunt partis sensitivæ, quæ nullam habet operationem sine organo corporali. Si igitur hujusmodi substantiæ separatæ habent rectam scientiam in universali, impossibile est quod per defectum cognitionis in particulari voluntas in malum tendat. 3. Amplius, Nulla virtus cognoscitiva circa proprium objectum decipitur, sed solum circa extraneum; visus enim non decipitur in judicio colorum; sed, dum homo per visum judicat de sapore vel de specie rei, in hoc deceptio accidit. Proprium autem objectum intellectus est quidditas rei. In cognitione igitur intellectus deceptio accidere non potest, si puras rerum quidditates apprehendat; sed omnis deceptio intellectus accidere videtur ex hoc quod apprehendit formas rerum permixtis phantasmatibus, ut in nobis accidit. Talis autem modus cognoscendi non est in substantiis intellectualibus corpori non unitis, quia phantasmata non possunt esse absque corpore. Non est igitur possibile quod, in substantiis separatis, accidat error in cognitione; ergo neque peccatum voluntatis. 4. Item, In nobis, falsitas accidit in operatione intellectus componentis et dividentis, ex hoc quod non absolute rei quidditatem apprehendit, sed rei apprehensæ aliquid componit. In operatione autem intellectus, qua apprehendit quod quid est, non accidit falsum, nisi per accidens, secundum quod in hac etiam operatione permiscetur aliquid de operatione intellectus componentis et dividentis; quod quidem contingit in quantum intellectus noter, non statim, sed quodam inquisitionis ordine, ad cognoscendam quidditatem rei alicujus pertingit; sicut quum primo apprehendimus animal, et, dividentes per oppositas differentias, altera relicta, unam generi apponimus, quousque perveniamus ad diffusionem speciei; in quo quidem processu potest falsitas accidere, si accipiatur ut differentia generis id quod non est differentia. Sic autem procedere ad cognoscendum de aliquo quod quid est, est intellectus ratiocinando discurrentis de uno ad aliud; quod non competit substantiis intellectualibus separatis, ut supra (l. II, c. ci) ostensum est. Non videtur igitur quod possit aliquis error accidere in cognitione hujusmodi substantiarum; unde nec in voluntate earum peccatum accidere potest. 5. Præterea, Quum nullius rei appetitus tendat nisi in proprium bonum, impossibile videtur quod id cujus est singulariter unum solum bonum in suo appetitu erret; et propter hoc, etsi peccatum accidat in rebus naturalibus propter defectum contingentem in exsecutione appetitus, nunquam tamen peccatum accidit in appetitu naturali; semper enim lapis tendit deorsum, sive perveniat sive impediatur. In nobis autem, peccatum accidit in appetendo, quia, quum sit natura nostra composita ex spirituali et corporali, sunt in nobis plura bona; aliud enim est bonum nostrum secundum intellectum, et aliud secundum sensum vel etiam secundum corpus; horum autem diversorum quae sunt hominis bona ordo quidam est, secundum quod id quod est minus principale ad principalius referendum est; unde peccatum voluntatis in nobis accidit, quum, tali ordine non servato, appetimus id quod est nobis bonum secundum quid contra id quod est nobis bonum simpliciter. Talis autem compositio et diversitas bonorum non est in substantiis separatis; quinimo omne eorum bonum est secundum intellectum. Non est igitur in eis possibile quod sit peccatum voluntatis, ut videtur. 6. Adhuc, In nobis, peccatum voluntatis accidit ex superabundantia vel defectu in quorum medio virtus consistit; unde, in his in quibus non est accipere superabundantiam et defectum, sed solum medium, non contingit voluntatem peccare; nullus enim peccare potest in appetendo justitiam, nam ipsa justitia medium quoddam est. Substantiæ autem intellectuales separatæ non possunt apetere nisi bona intellectualia; ridiculum est enim dicere quod bona corporalia appetant qui secundum suam naturam incorporei sunt, aut bona sensibilia quibus non est sensus. In bonis autem intellectualibus non est accipere superabundantiam; nam secundum se media sunt superabundantiæ et defectus, sicut verum est medium inter duos errores, quorum unus est secundum plus, alter secundum minus; unde et sensibilia et corporalia bona per hoc in medio sunt quod secundum rationem sunt. Non videtur igitur quod substantiæ intellectuales separatæ secundum voluntatem peccare possint. 7. Amplius, Magis a defectibus remota videtur substantia incorporea quam corporalis. In substantiis autem corporeis quæ sunt a contrarietate remotæ, nullus defectus accidere potest, scilicet in corporibus cœlestibus. Multo igitur minus, in substantiis separatis et a contrarietate remotis et a materia et a motu, ex quibus videtur defectus aliquis posse contingere, aliquod peccatum contingere potest.\n\npeccatum, et qualiter. Quod autem in dæmonibus sit peccatum voluntatis, manifestum est ex auctoritate sacræ Scripturæ; dicitur enim quod ab initio diabolus peccat, I, Joann, 118; et de diabolo dicitur quod est mendax, et pater mendacii et quod homicida erat ab initio, Joann. v119, 44; et dicitur quod invidia diaboli mors introivit in\n\norbem terrarum, Sap. 11, 24. Si quis autem sequi vellet Platonico-rum positiones, facilis esset via ad solvendum prædicta. Dicunt enim dæmones esse animalia corpore aerea; et sic, quum habeant sibi corpora unita, potest in eis esse etiam pars sensitiva; unde et passiones quæ nobis sunt causa peccati eis attribuunt, scilicet iram et odium et alia hujusmodi; propter quod dicit Apuleius quod sunt\n\nanimo passiva. Propter hoc etiam quod uniti corporibus perhibentur, secundum positionem Platonis, forte posseteis aliud genus cognitionis poni quam intellectus; nam, secundum Platonem, etiam anima sensitiva incorruptibilis est; unde oportet quod habeat operationem cui non communicet corpus; et sic nihil prohibet operationem sensitivæ animæ inveniri in substantia aliqua intellectuali, quamvis corpori non unita, et, per consequens, passiones; et sic manet in eis eadem radix peccandi quæ\n\nest in nobis. Sed utrumque præmissorum est impossibile. Quod enim non sint aliquæ aliæ substantiæ intellectuales unitæ corporibus, praeter animas humanas, ostensum est supra (l. II, c. xc). Quod autem operationes sensitivæ animæ non possint esse sine corpore, hinc apparet quod, corrupto aliquo organo sentiendi, corrumpitur operatio una sensus, sicut, corrupto oculo, visio deficit; propter quod, corrupto organo tactus, sine quo non potest esse animal, oportet\n\nquod animal moriatur. Ad evidentiam autem præmissæ dubitationis considerandum est quod, sicut est ordo in causis agentibus, ita etiam in causis finalibus, ut scilicet secundarius finis a principali dependeat, sicut secundarium agens a principali dependet. Accidit autem peccatum in causis agentibus quando secundarium agens exit ab ordine principalis agentis; sicut, quum tibia deficit propter suam curvitatem ab exsecutione motus quem virtus appetitiva imperabat, sequitur claudicatio. Sic igitur et in causis finalibus, quum finis secundarius non continetur sub ordine principalis finis, est peccatum voluntatis, cujus objectum est\n\nbonum et finis. Quælibet autem voluntas naturaliter vult illud quod est proprium volentis bonum, scilicet ipsum esse perfectum, et non potest contrarium hujus velle. In illo igitur volente nullum potest peccatum voluntatis accidere cujus bonum est ultimus finis; quod non continetur sub alterius finis ordine, sed sub ejus ordine omnes alii fines continentur. Hujusmodi autem volens est Deus, cuju s esseest summa bonitas, quæ est ultimus finis. In Deo igiturpeccatum voluntatis esse\n\nnon potest. n quocumque autem alio volente, cujus proprium bonum necesse est sub ordine 1 Sic A. B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. : « In quibus. » — B : « Sensibilia quibus non est XII. alterius boni contineri, potest peccatum accidere voluntatis, si in sua natura consideretur. Licet enim naturalis inclinatio voluntatis insit unicuique volenti ad volendum et amandum suiipsius perfectionem, ita quod contrarium hujus velle non possit, non tamen sic est ei inditum naturaliter ut ita ordinet suam perfectionem in alium finem quod ab eo deficere non possit, quum finis superior non sit suæ naturæ proprius, sed superioris naturæ. Relinquitur igitur suo arbitrio quod propriam perfectionem in superiorem ordinet finem. In hoc enim differunt voluntatem habentia ab his quæ voluntate carent quod habentia voluntatem ordinant se et sua in finem, unde et liberi arbitrii esse dicuntur; quæ autem voluntate ca- 1 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Consideratur. » « In homine secundum statum lapsum num-quam videtur esse malitia in voluntate nisi pracedat error in ratione; unde secundum Philosophum omnis malus est ignorans, et hoc ex eo quod scit in universali, et ignorat in particulari. Vel scit habitu, et ignorat actu. Vel scit actu, ignorat autem in pertractando, propter passiones quæ ligant rectam rationem, sicut ebrietas. Sic autem in angelis non potuit esse peccatum, quia in eis non sunt passiones, nec scire in universali vel in habitu, nec discursus, nec ligatur in eis intellectus. Diabolus etiam non peccavit appetendo malum ex quo sequitur corruptio speciei, nec appetivit aliquid sibi non conveniens ex quo sequeretur corruptio modi, quia appetivit quod habuisset si stetisset; sed peccavit appetendo id alio modo quam debuit, ut scilicet haberet beatitudinem ex naturalibus suis tantum, et sic peccavit non ex corruptione speciei vel modi, sed ordinis. Licet enim angelus non habeat passiones nec intelligat cum discursu, tamen non intelligit omnia simul, et ita licet suum peccatum non careat modo et specie, tamen caret ordine, quia cum non intellexit omnia simul, cogitavit quædam, scilicet excellentiam naturalium et beatitudinem, amittens cognitionem, quod ex naturalibus sibi non competit beatitudo. Ideo appetivit inordinate, quod ex naturalibus haberet. Non ergo ex errore rationis peccavit voluntas, sed ex omissione cognitionis. Et hoc adscribendum est voluntati, quæ voluit quod ratio cogitaverit tantum unum, et omitteret cogitare aliud, quod videtur contigisse ex intenso appetitu illius boni, quod in tantum appetitur ut non videretur curare quo ordine esset ad illud perveniendum. Et infecta fuit voluntas inordinate appetendo, saltem causaliter antequam erraret intellectus in judicando, imo et inordinatus appetitus obtenebrat intellectum. Sed adhuc videtur difficultas remanere, quia sicut ad hoc quod aliquis inclinatur in aliquid per voluntatem, oportet quod apprehendat id sub ratione boni, ita ad hoc quod appetat illud secundum aliquem ordinem, oportet quod apprehendat illum ordinem tanquam bonum et sibi possibilem. Nec videtur sufficere ad peccandum non apprehendere ordinem debitum sive inclinari in aliud non secundum ordinem debitum, nisi rent non ordinant se in finem, sed ordinantur a superiori agente, quasi ab alio acta in finem, non\n\nautem a seipsis. Potuit igitur in voluntate substantiæ separatæ esse peccatum ex hoc quod proprium bonum et perfectionem in ultimum finem non ordinavit, sed inhæsit proprio bono ut fini ; et, quia ex fine necesse est ut regulæ actionis sumantur, necesse est ut ex seipsa, in qua finem constituit, alia regulariter disponeret, et ut ejus voluntas ab alio superiori non regularetur; hoc autem soli Deo debetur. Et secundum hoc intelligendum est quod appetit Dei aqualitatem; non quidem ut bonum suum esset divino bono aqualale; hoc enim in intellectu ejus cadere non poterat, et, hoc appetendo, appeteret se non esse, Cum enim cognoverit se esse creaturam factam, sive creatam a Deo. Nihil autem factum a Deo potest ei aquari, ideo directe, aqualitatem Dei non potuit appetere, sed indirecte appetivit, quia appetivit id quo habito esset Deus: cum enim beatitudo consistat in aperta Dei visione, in cognitorum simultate, in voluntatis ad malum inflexibilitate, appetendo beatitudinem ex naturalibus appetivit esse Deus. Objectum enim naturaliter proportionatum intellectui est quidditas creata; et ideo intellectus qui ex suis naturalibus quum distinctio specierum secundum diversos gradus rerum proveniat, ut ex supradictis (l. II, c, xxxix et xl) apparet. Velle autem alios regulare et voluntatem suam a superiori non regulari est velle præesse et quodammodo non subjici, quod est peccatum superbiæ; unde convenienter dicitur quod primum peccatum dæmonis fuit superbia. Sed, quia ex uno errore circa principium varius et multiplex error consequitur, ideo ex prima ordinatione voluntatis quæ fuit in dæmone consecutum est multiplex peccatum in voluntate ipsius, et odii ipsius ad Deum ut resistentem suæ superbiæ et punien-tem justissime suam culpam, et invidiæ ad hominem, et\n\nmulta alia hujusmodi. Considerandum est etiam quod, quum proprium alicujus bonum habet ordinem ad plura superiora, liberum est volenti ut ab ordine alicujus superiorum recedat et alterius ordinem non derelinquat, sive sit superior, sive sit inferior; sicut miles, qui ordinatur sub rege et sub duce exercitus, potest voluntatem suam ordinare in bonum ducis et non regis, aute converso; sed, si dux ab ordine regis recedat, bona erit voluntas militis recedentis a voluntate ducis et dirigentis voluntatem suam in regem, mala autem voluntas militis sequentis voluntatem ducis contra voluntatem regis; ordo enim inferioris principii dependet ab ordine superioris. Substantiæ autem separatæ non solum ordinantur sub Deo, sed una etiam earum ordinatur sub alia, a prima usque ad ultimam, ut ostensum est (l. II, c. xcv); et, quia in quolibet volente sub Deo potest esse peccatum voluntatis, si in sua natura consideretur, possibile fuit quod aliqua de superioribus, aut etiam suprema inter omnes peccaret secundum voluntatem. Et hoc quidem satis probabile est; non enim in suo bono quievisset sicut in fine, nisi suum bonum valde perfectum esset. cognoscit essentiam Dei, oportet quod sit supra modum creaturæ. Hoc autem non est nisi Deus, quia in creatura se habet ad determinatum modum essendi, ideo etiam species in ea determinat modum repræsentandi. Illud ergo quod omnia simul intelligit ex naturalibus, oportet quod sit esse indeterminatum, imo quod sit omne esse; et hoc solum est Deus. Illud etiam solum non potest facere malum ex naturalibus cujus natura est esse regulam rectam, sed hoc est solus Deus. Alia autem regulata sunt ab eo, et ideo sicut ille qui vult facere lineam rectam ad exemplar sui necesse est quod ipse sit linea recta, ita, etc. A omittit: « Superbia. » A, B, C, D, E, F: « Constitutum. » Potuit igitur fieri quod de inferioribus aliquæ per propriam voluntatem bonum suum ordinarent in ipsam, recedentes a divino ordine, quæ similiter peccaverunt; aliæ vero, servantes in motu suæ voluntatis divinum ordinem, ab ordine peccantis, quamvis superioris secundum naturæ ordinem, recte recederent. — Quomodo vero in bonitate vel malitia immobiliter utrorumque voluntas perseverat, ostendetur (l. IV, c. xcii et xciii); hoc enim pertinet ad pœnas vel præmia\n\nbonorum vel malorum. Hoc autem differt inter hominem et substantiam separatam quod, in uno homine, sunt plures appetitivæ virtutes, quarum una sub altera ordinatur; quod quidem in substantiis separatis non contingit; una tamen earum est sub altera. Peccatum autem in voluntate contingit, qualiter-cumque appetitus inferior deflectatur. Sicut igitur peccatum in substantiis separatis esset per hoc quod aliqua earum inferior deflecteretur ab ordine alicujus superioris sub ordine divino manentis, ita in homine uno contingit peccatum dupliciter: Uno modo, per hoc quod voluntas humana bonum proprium non ordinat in Deum, quod quidem peccatum est commune sibi et substantiæ separatæ; alio modo, per hoc quod bonum inferioris appetitus non regulatur secundum superiorem, puta quando delectabilia carnis, in quæ concupiscibilis tendit, volumus non secundum ordinem rationis; hujusmodi autem peccatum non contingit in substantiis separatis esse.\n\nrationum præmissarum. Sic ergo hæc quæ objecta sunt non\n\ndifficile est solvere. 1. Non enim cogimur dicere quod error fuit in intellectu substantiæ separatæ, ju- A: « Odii scilicet ad resistentem » B: « Odii ipsius non resistentem et puniciantem. » — C, E, F: « Odii ipsius ut resistentem. » D: « Odii ipsius ad Deum ut resistentem » Sed. « ad Deum » ex alia manu scriptum est ad oram codicis. A: « Autem. » A, B: « Hic ergo. » « Bene enim novit quod ex quo creatura erat non potuit esse nisi subesset Deo, et ideo voluit quod Deus influeret in suis operibus naturalibus. Sicut etiam agit in omni actione agens naturalis; et ideo appetitiv quod Deus non influeret per gratiam in operibus suis gratuitis, imo quod haberet ea naturaliter. » dicando aliquid bonum quod bonum non sit, sed non considerando bonum superius, ad quod proprium bonum referendum erat: cujus quidem considerationis ratio potuit esse voluntas in proprium bonum intense conversa; est enim liberum voluntati in hoc vel 1 in illud magis\n\nvel minus converti. 2. Patet etiam quod non appetiit aliquod bonum, nisi unum quod est sibi proprium; sed in hoc fuit peccatum quod praetermisit superius bonum, in quod debuit ordinari; sicut enim in nobis peccatum est ex hoc quod bona inferiora, scilicet corporis, appetimus absque ordine rationis, ita in diabolo peccatum fuit in hoc quod proprium bonum non retulit ad divinum\n\nbonum. 3. Patet etiam quod medium virtutis etiam praetermisit, in quantum se superiori ordini non subdidit; et sic plus dedit sibi quam debuit, Deo autem minus quam ei deberetur, cui omnia debent esse subjecta, ut primæ regulæ ordinanti. 4. Manifestum est igitur quod in pecato illo non est praetermissum medium per superabundantiam passionis, sed solum per inæqualitatem justitiæ, quæ est circa operationes; in substantiis enim separatis operationes esse possunt, passiones\n\nvero nequaquam. 5. Nec etiam oportet quod, si in superioribus corporibus nullus potest esse defectus, propter hoc in substantiis separatis peccatum esse non possit. Corpora enim et omnia quæ ratione carent aguntur tantum, et non agunt seipsa; non enim sui actus dominium habent; unde non possunt exire a regula primi ipsa agentis et moventis, nisi per hoc quod rectitudinem primæ regulæ sufficienter recipere non possunt; quod quidem contingit ex indispositione materiæ; et propter hoc superiora corpora, in quibus indispositio materiæ locum non habet, nunquam a rectitudine primæ regulæ deficere possunt. Substantiæ vero rationales sive intellectuales non tantum aguntur, sed etiam agunt se ad proprios actus; quod quidem tanto magis invenitur in eis quanto perfectior est ipsarum natura; quorum enim natura est perfectior, est et perfectior eorum virtus in agendo; unde naturæ perfectio non impedit quin peccatum in eis accidere possit modo prædicto, ex hoc scilicet quod sibiipsis inhærent, ordinem superioris agentis non attendentes.\n\nsubduntur. Ex his quidem quæ supra (c. Lxxvi) determinata sunt, manifestum est quod divina Providentia ad omnia se extendit; oportet tamen aliquam rationem Providentiæ specialem observari circa intellectuales et rationales naturas præ aliis creaturis. Præcellunt enim alias creaturas, et in perfectione naturæ, et in dignitate finis. In perfectione quidem naturæ, quia sola creatura rationalis habet dominium sui actus, libere se agens ad operandum; cæteræ vero creaturæ ad opera propria magis aguntur quam agant, ut ex supra dictis (c. cx) patet. In dignitate autem finis, quia sola creatura intellectualis ad ipsum ultimum finem universi sua operatione pertingit, scilicet cognoscendo et amando Deum; aliæ vero creaturæ ad finem ultimum pertingere non possunt, nisi per aliqualem similitudinis ipsius participationem. Omnis autem ratio operis variatur secundum diversitatem finis et eorum quæ operationi subjiciuntur, sicut ratio operandi per artem diversa est secundum diversitatem finis et materiæ; aliter enim operatur medicus ad aegritudinem pellendam et ad sanitatem conservandam 2, atque aliter in corporibus diversimode complexionatis 3; et similiter oportet, in regimine civitatis, diversam rationem ordinis observari secundum diversas conditiones eorum qui subjiciuntur regimini et secundum diversa ad quæ ordinantur; oportet enim aliter disponi milites ut sint præparati ad pugnam, et artifices ut bene se habeant circa sua opera. Sic igitur et alia est ordinis ratio secundum quam creaturæ rationales Providentiæ divinæ subduntur, et alia secundum quam ordinantur cæteræ creaturæ.\n\nQuod creaturæ rationales gubernantur propter seipsas, aliæ vero in ordine ad eas. Primum igitur, ipsa cognitio intellec- 1 omisso: « Vel in illud magis vel minus. » 2 3 tualis naturæ secundum quam est domina sui actus, Providentiae curam requirit, qua sibi propter se provideatur; aliorum vero conditio, quæ non habet dominium sui actus, hoc indicat quod eis non propter ipsa cura impendatur, sed velut ad alia ordinatis. 4. Quod enim ab altero tantum agitur rationem instrumenti habet, quod vero per se agit habet rationem principalis agentis. Instrumentum autem non quæri-tur propter seipsum, sed ut eo principale agens utatur; unde oportet quod omnis operationis diligentia quæ circa instrumenta adhibetur ad principale agens referatur sicut ad finem; quod autem circa principale agens vel ab ipso vel ab alio adhibetur, in quantum est principale agens, propter ipsum est. Disponuntur ergo a Deo intellectuales creaturæ quasi propter se procuratæ, creaturæ vero aliæ quasi ad rationales creaturas ordinatæ. 2. Adhuc, Quod dominium sui actus habet liberum est in agendo; liber enim est qui sui causa est, quod autem quadam necessitate ab alio agitur ad operandum, servituti subjectum est. Omnis igitur alia creatura naturaliter servituti subjecta est, sola vero natura intellectualis libera est. In quolibet autem regimine, liberis providetur propter seipsos, servis autem ut sint in usum liberorum. Sic igitur per divinam Providentiam intellectualibus creaturis providetur propter se, cæteris autem creaturis propter ipsas. 3. Amplius, Quandocumque sunt aliqua ordinata ad finem aliquem, si qua inter illa ad finem pertingere non possunt per seipsa, oportet ea ordinari ad illa quæ finem consequuntur, quæ propter se ordinantur in finem; sicut finis exercitus est victoria, quam milites consequuntur per proprium actum pugnando, qui soli propter se in exercitu quæruntur; omnes autem alii, ad alia officia deputati; puta ad custodiendum equos, ad operandum arma, propter milites in exercitu quæruntur. Constat autem ex præmisis (c. xvii) finem ultimum universi Deum esse, quem sola intellectualis natura consequitur in seipso, eum scilicet cognoscendo et amando, ut ex dictis (c. xxv) patet. Sola igitur intellectualis natura est propter se quæsita in universo,alia autem omnia propter ipsam. 4. Item, In quolibet toto, partes principales propter se exiguntur ad constitutionem totius, aliæ vero ad conservationem vel ad aliquam meliorationem earum. Inter omnes autem partes universi nobiliores sunt intellectuales creaturæ, quia magis ad similitudinem divinam accedunt. Naturæ ergo intellectuales sunt propter se a divina Providentia procuratæ, alia vero omnia propter ipsa. 5. Præterea, Manifestum est partes omnes ordinari ad perfectionem totius; non enim est totum propter partes, sed partes propter totum sunt. Naturæ autem intellectuales majorem habent affinitatem ad totum quam aliæ naturæ; nam una-quæque intellectualis substantia est quodammodo omnia, in quantum totius entis comprehensiva est suo intellectu; quæ-libet autem alia substantia particularem solam entis participationem habet. Convenienter igitur alia propter substantias intellectuales providentur a Deo. 6. Adhuc, Sicut agitur unumquodque cursu naturæ, ita natum est agi. Sic autem videmus res cursu naturæ currere quod substantia intellectualis omnibus aliis utitur propter se: vel ad intellectus perfectionem, quia in eis veritatem speculatur; vel ad suæ virtutis exsecutionem et scientiae explicationem, ad modum quo artifex explicat artis suæ conceptionem in materia corporali; vel etiam ad corporis sustentationem quod est unitum animæ intellectuali, sicut in hominibus patet. Manifestum est igitur quod propter substantias intellectuales omnia divinitus providentur. 7. Amplius, Quod aliquis propter se quærit semper illud quærit; quod enim propter se est semper est; quod vero aliquis propter aliud quærit non opus est quod semper quærat, sed secundum quod competit ei propter quod quæritur. Esse autem rerum ex divina voluntate pro-fluxit, ut ex superioribus (l. II, c. xi) est manifestum. Quæ igitur semper sunt in entibus sunt propter se a Deo volita; quæ autem non semper sunt, non propter se, sed propter aliud. Substantiæ autem intellectuales maxime accedunt ad hoc quod sint semper, quia sunt incorrupti-biles; sunt autem mutabiles solum se-, et cod. Berg.: « Illud. » cundum electionem. Ergo substantiae intellectuales gubernantur propter se, aliæ vero propter ipsas. Non est autem ei quod præmissis rationibus est ostensum contrarium quod omnes partes universi ad perfectionem totius ordinentur. Sic enim ad perfectionem totius omnes partes ordinantur in quantum una deservit alteri; sicut in corpore humano apparet quod pulmo in hoc est de perfectione corporis quod deservit cordi; unde non est contrarium pulmonem esse propter cor et propter totum animal; et similiter non est contrarium alias naturas esse propter intellectuales et propter perfectionem universi; si enim deessent ea quæ requirit substantiae intellectualis perfectio, non esset universum completum. Similiter etiam prædictis non obviat quod individua sunt propter proprias species. Per hoc enim quod ad suas species ordinantur, ordinem habent ulterius ad intellectualem naturam; non enim aliquod corruptibilium ordinatur ad hominem propter unum individuum hominis tantum, sed propter totam humanam speciem. Toti autem humanæ speciei non posset aliquod corruptibilium deservire, nisi secundum suam speciem totam. Ordo ergo quo corruptibilia ordinantur ad hominem requirit quod individua ordinentur ad speciem. Per hoc autem quod dicimus substantias intellectuales propter se a divina Providentia ordinari, non intelligimus quod ipsa ulterius non referantur in Deum et ad perfectionem universi. Sic igitur propter se procurari dicuntur et aliapropter ipsa, quia bona quæ propter divinam Providentiam sortiuntur non eis sunt data propter alterius utilitatem; quæ vero aliis dantur, in corum usum ex divina ordinatione cedunt. Hinc est quod dicitur: Ne videas solem et lunam et omnia astra cæli, et errore deceptus adores ea, et colas quæ creavit Dominus Deus tuus in ministerium cunctis gentibus quæ sub cælo sunt, Deuter, iv, 19; et dicitur: Omnia subjecisti sub pedibus ejus, oves et boves universas, insuper et pecora campi, Psalm. viii, 8; et: Tu autem, dominator virtutis, cum tranquillitate judicas, et cum magna reverentia disponis nos, Sap. xii, 18. Per hoc autem excluditur error ponentium homini esse peccatum si animalia bruta occidat; ex divina enim Providentia naturali ordine in usum hominis ordinantur; unde absque injuria homo eis utitur, occidendo vel quolibet alio modo; propter quod et Dominus dixit ad Noe: Et omne quod movetur et vivit erit vobis in cibum; quasi olera virentia tradidi vobis omnia, Gen. ix, 3. Si qua vero in sacra Scriptura inventantur prohibentia aliquid crudelitatis in animalia bruta committi, sicut de ave cum pullis non occidenda, hoc fit: vel ad removendum hominis animum a crudelitate in homines exercenda, ne aliquis exercendo crudelia circa bruta, ex hoc procedat ad homines; vel quia in temporale damnum hominis provenit animalibus illata læsio, sive inferentis sive alterius; vel propter aliquam significationem, sicut Apostolus, I Cor. ix, 7 et seqq. exponit illud Deuteronomii, xxv, 4, de non ligando ore bovis triturantis.\n\nhominibus leges dantur. Ex hoc autem apparet quod necessaria fuit homini divinitus legem dari. 1. Sicut enim actus irrationalium creaturarum diriguntur a Deo, ea ratione qua ad speciem pertinent, ita actus hominum diriguntur a Deo, secundum quod ad individuum pertinent, ut ostensum est (c. cvxiii). Sed actus creaturarum irrationalium, prout ad speciem pertinent, diriguntur a Deo quadam naturali inclinatione, quæ naturam speciei consequitur. Ergo supra hoc dandum est aliquid hominibus quo in suis personalibus actibus dirigantur; et hoc dicimus\n\nlegem. 2. Adhuc, Rationalis creatura, ut dictum est (c. cxiii), sic divinæ Providentia subditur quod etiam similitudinem quam- 1 A, C: « Provenirent. » 2 A: « Rationales et. » dam divinæ Providentiae participat, in quantum se in suis actibus et alia gubernare potest. Id autem quo aliquorum actus gubernantur dicitur lex. Conveniens igitur fuit a Deo\n\nhominibus legem dari. 3. Item, Quum lex nihil aliud sit quam quaedam ratio et regula operandi, illis solum convenit dari legem qui sui operis rationem cognoscunt. Hoc autem convenit solum rationali creaturæ. Soli igitur rationali creaturæ fuit\n\nconveniens dari legem. 4. Præterea, Illis danda est lex in quibus est agere et non agere. Hoc autem convenit soli rationali creaturæ. Sola igitur rationalis creatura\n\nest susceptiva legis. 5. Amplius, Quum lex nihil aliud sit quam ratio operis, cujuslibet autem operis ratio a fine sumatur, ab eo unusquisque legis capax suscipit legem a quo ad finem perducitur, sicut inferior artifex ab architectone et miles a duce exercitus. Sed creatura rationalis finem suum ultimum in Deo et a Deo consequitur, ut ex superioribus (c. xvii et xxv) patet. Fuit igitur conveniens a Deo\n\nlegem hominibus dari. Hinc est quod dicitur : Dabo legem meam in visceribus eorum, Jerem. xxxi, 33; et : Scribam ei multiplices leges meas, Oseæ, viii, 12.\n\nhominem in Deum. Ex hoc autem sumi potest ad quid lex divinitus\n\ndata principaliter tendat. 1. Manifestum est enim quod unusquisque legislator ad suum finem principaliter per leges homines dirigere intendit, sicut dux exercitus ad victoriam et rector civitatis ad pacem. Finis autem quem Deus intendit est ipsemet Deus. Lex igitur divina hominem principaliter in Deum ordinare\n\nintendit. 2. Adhuc, Lex, sicut dictum est (c. cxiv), est quaedam ratio divinæ Providentiae gubernantis, rationali creaturæ proposita. Sed gubernatio providentis Dei singula ad proprios fines ducit. Per legem igitur divinitus datam homo ad suum finem præcipue ordinatur. Finis autem humanæ creaturæ est adhærere Deo; in hoc enim felicitas ejus consistit, ut supra (c. xxxvii) ostensum est. Ad hoc igitur principaliter lex divina hominem dirigit\n\nut Deo adhæreat. 3. Amplius, Intentio cujuslibet legislatoris est eos quibus legem dat facere bonos; unde præcepta legis debent esse de actibus virtutum. Illi igitur actus a lege divina præcipue intenduntur qui sunt optimi. Sed, inter omnes humanos actus, illi sunt optimi quibus homo adhæret Deo, utpote fini propinquiores. Ergo ad hos actus præcipue lex\n\ndivina ordinat homines. 4. Item, Illud præcipuum debet esse in lege ex quo lex efficaciam habet. Sed lex divinitus data ex hoc apud homines efficaciam habet quod homo subditur Deo; non enim aliquis alicujus regis lege arcatur qui ei subditus non est. Hoc igitur præcipuum in divina lege esse debet ut mens\n\nhumana Deo adhæreat. Hinc est quod dicitur : Et nunc, Israel, quid Dominus Deus tuus petit a te, nisi ut timeas Dominum Deum tuum, et ambules in viis ejus, et diligas eum, ac servias Domino Deo tuo in toto corde tuo, et in tota anima tua? Deuter. x, 12.\n\nest dilectio Dei. Quia vero intentio divinæ legis ad hoc principaliter est ut homo Deo adhæreat, homo autem potissime adhæret Deo per amorem, necesse est quod intentio divinæ legis principaliter\n\nordinetur ad amandum. Quod autem per amorem homo maxime Deo adhæreat, manifestum est. 1. Duo enim sunt in homine quibus Deo potest adhærere, intellectus scilicet et voluntas; nam secundum inferiores animæ partes Deo adhærere non potest, sed inferioribus rebus. Adhæsio autem quæ est per intellectum completionem recipit per eam quæ est voluntatis, quia per voluntatem homo quodammodo quiescit in eo quod intellectus apprehendit. 1 A omittit : « Fini. » 2 E : « Legis ad legem. » — F : « Aliquis acus legis regis legem arctatur. » — B, D : « Legem. » — C : « Ad legem, » sed « Ad » ex alia manu scriptum est. — E : « Arctatur alterius cui. » 3 A, F omittunt : « Dei. » — B, C, E : « Cognitio Dei. » Voluntas autem adhæret alicui rei vel propter amorem vel propter timorem, sed differenter; nam ei quidem cui inhæret propter timorem adhæret propter aliud, ut scilicet evitet malum, quod, si non adhæreat ei, imminet; ei vero cui adhæret propter amorem adhæret propter seipsum. Quod autem est propter se principalius est eo quod est propter aliud. Adhæsio igitur amoris ad Deum est potissimus modus ei adhærendi. Hoc igitur est potissime intentum\n\nin divina lege. 2. Item, Finis cujuslibet legis, et præcipue divinæ, est homines facere bonos. Homo autem dicitur bonus ex eo quod habet voluntatem bonam, per quam reducit in actum quidquid boni in ipso est; voluntas autem bona est ex eo quod vult bonum, et præcipue maximum bonum, quod est finis; quanto igitur hujusmodi bonum magis voluntas vult, tanto magis homo est bonus. Sed magis vult homo id quod vult propter amorem quam id quod vult propter timorem tantum; nam quod vult propter timorem tantum dicitur mixtum involuntario, sicut aliquis vult in mari projectionem mercium propter timorem. Ergo amor summi boni, scilicet Dei, maxime facit bonos, et est maxime intentum\n\nin divina lege. 3. Præterea, Bonitas hominis est per virtutem; virtus enim est quæ bonum facit habentem; unde et lex intendit homines facere virtuosos, et præcepta legis sunt de actibus virtutum. Sed de conditione virtutis est ut virtuosus et firmiter et delectabiliter operetur; hoc autem facit maxime amor; nam ex amore aliquid firmiter et delectabiliter facimus. Amor igitur boni est ultimum intentum\n\nin lege divina. 4. Adhuc, Legislatores imperio legis editæ movent eos quibus lex datur. In omnibus autem quæ moventur ab aliquo primo movente, tanto aliquid perfectius movetur quanto magis participat de motione primi moventis et de similitudine ipsius. Deus autem, qui est legis divinæ dator, omnia facit propter suum amorem. Qui igitur hoc modo tendit in ipsum, scilicet amando, perfectissime movetur in ipsum. Omne autem agens intendit perfectionem in eo quod agit. Hic igitur est finis totius legislatoris ut homo Deum amet.\n\nHinc est quod dicitur: Finis præcepti est charitas, I Tim. 1, 5; et dicitur quod maximum et primum mandatum, in lege, est: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum, Matth. xxii, 38 et 37. Unde est etiam quod lex nova, tanquam perfectior, dicitur lex amoris; lex autem vetus, tanquam imperfectior, dicitur lex timoris.\n\nad dilectionem proximi. Ex hoc autem sequitur quod divina lex\n\ndilectionem proximi intendat. 1. Oportet enim unionem esse affectus inter eos quibus est unus finis communis. Communicant autem homines in uno ultimo fine beatitudinis, ad quem divinitus ordinantur. Oportet igitur quod uniantur homines ad\n\ninvicem mutua $^3$ dilectione. 2. Adhuc, Quicumque diligit aliquem, consequens est ut etiam diligat dilectos ab eo et eos qui conjuncti sunt ei. Homines autem dilecti sunt a Deo, quibus sui ipsius fruitionem, quasi ultimum finem, prædisposuit $^4$. Oportet igitur ut, sicut aliquis fit dilector Dei, ita etiam\n\nfiat dilector proximi. 3. Amplius, Quum homo sit naturaliter animal sociale, indiget ab aliis hominibus adjuvari ad consequendum proprium finem; quod convenientissime fit dilectione mutua inter homines exsistente. Ex lege igitur Dei, quæ homines in ultimum finem dirigit, præcipitur in\n\nnobis mutua dilectio. 4. Item, Ad hoc quod homo divinis vacet, indiget tranquillitate et pace. Ea vero quæ pacemperturbare possunt, præcipue per dilectionem mutuam tolluntur. Quum igitur lex divina ad hoc ordinet homines ut divinis vacent, necessarium est quod ex lege divina in hominibus\n\nmutua dilectio procedat. 5. Præterea, Lex divina profertur homini in auxilium legis naturalis. Est autem omnibus hominibus naturale ut se invicem diligant; cujus signum est quod, quodam naturali instinctu, homo cuili- $^1$ A: « Per amorem vel per. » — C, D, E, F: « Per amorem vel propter. » $^2$ Sic A, B, C, D, E, etc. — Edit. omittunt: « Etiam. » $^3$ A: « Unione et dilectione. » $^4$ A: « Disposuit. » Titulus in C et F desideratur. bet homini etiam ignoto subvenit in necessitate, puta revocando $^1$ ab errore viæ, erigendo a casu et $^2$ aliis hujusmodi, ac si omnis homo omni homini esset familiaris et amicus. Igitur $^3$ ex divina lege mutua\n\ndilectio hominibus præcipitur. Hinc est quod dicitur : Hoc est præceptum meum, ut diligatis invicem, Joann. xv, 12; Hoc mandatum habemus a Deo, ut qui diligit Deum diligat et fratrem suum, I Joann. iv, 24, et dicitur quod secundum mandatum est : Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum, Matth. xxii, 39.\n\nrectam fidem obligantur. Ex hoc autem apparet quod per divinam legem homines ad\n\nrectam fidem obligantur. 1. Sicut enim amationis corporalis principium est visio, quæ est per oculum corporalem, ita etiam dilectionis spiritualis initium esse oportet visionem intelligibilem diligibilis spiritualis. Visio autem illius intelligibilis spiritualis, quod est Deus, in præsenti haberi non potest a nobis nisi per fidem, eo quod naturalem rationem excedit; et præcipue secundum quod in ejus fruitione nostra beatitudo consistit. $^4$ Igitur ex lege divina in\n\nfidem rectam inducimur $^5$. 2. Item, Lex divina ad hoc ordinat hominem ut sit totaliter subditus Deo. Sed, sicut homo subditur Deo amando, quantum ad voluntatem, ita subditur Deo credendo, quantum ad intellectum; non autem credendo aliquid falsum, quia a Deo, qui est veritas, nullum falsum homini proponi potest; unde qui credit aliquid falsum non credit Deo. Ex lege igitur divina ordinantur homines\n\nad fidem rectam. 3. Adhuc, Quicumque errat circa aliquod quod est de essentia rei non cognoscit illam rem, sicut si aliquis apprehenderet animal irrationale, æstimans hoc esse hominem, non cognosceret hominem; secus autem esset, si erraret circa aliquod accidentium ejus. Sed, in compositis, qui errat circa aliquod principium essentialium, etsi non cognoscat rem simpliciter, tamen cognocit eam secundum quid, sicut qui existimat hominem esse animal irrationale cognoscit eum secundum genus suum; in simplicibus autem, hoc non potest accidere, sed quilibet error totaliter excludit cognitionem rei. Deus autem est maxime simplex. Ergo quicumque errat circa Deum non cognoscit Deum, sicut qui credit Deum esse corpus, nullo modo cognoscit Deum, sed apprehendit aliquid aliud loco Dei. Secundum autem quod aliquid cognoscit, secundum hoc amatur et desideratur. Qui ergo errat circa Deum, nec amare potest Deum, nec desiderare ipsum ut finem. Quum igitur lex divina ad hoc tendat, ut homines ament et desiderent Deum, oportet quod lege divina homines obligentur ad rectam fidem\n\nhabendam de Deo. 4. Amplius, Falsa opinio ita se habet in intelligibilis sicut vitium virtuti oppositum in moralibus; nam bonum intellectus est verum. Sed ad legem divinam pertinet vitia prohibere. Ergo ad eam etiam pertinet falsas opiniones de Deo et de his quæ\n\nsunt Dei excludere. Hinc est quod dicitur : Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo, Hebr. xi, 6; et, antequam alia præcepta legis ponantur, præstituitur recta fides de Deo, quum dicitur : Audi Israël : Dominus Deus noster, Dominus unus\n\nest, Deuter. vi, 4. Per hoc autem excluditur error quorumdam dicentium quod nihil refert ad salutem hominis cum quacumque fide serviat Deo.\n\ndirigitur in Deum. Quia vero connaturale est homini ut per sensus cognitionem accipiat et difficillimum est sensibilia transcendere, provisum est divinitus homini ut etiam in sensibilibus rebus divinorum ei commemoratio fieret, ut per hoc hominis intentio magis revocaretur ad divina, cujus mens non est valida ad divina\n\nin seipsis contemplanda. Et propter hoc instituta sunt sensibilia sacrificia, quæ homo Deo offert, non propter quod Deus eis indigeat, sed $^1$ A : « Removendo. » $^2$ A : « Et in hiis hujusmodi. » $^3$ A : « Ergo. » $^4$ A, B, C, D, E, F : « Oportet igitur. » $^5$ A, C, D, E, F : « Inducamur. » — B : « Reducantur. » ut repræsentetur homini quod seipsum et omnia sua debet referre in ipsum sicut, in finem, et sicut in creatorem et gubernatorem\n\net dominum universorum. — Adhibentur etiam homini quædam sanctificationes per quasdam res sensibiles, quibus homo lavatur, aut ungitur $^1$, aut pascitur, aut potatur cum sensibilium verborum prolatione, ut homini repræsentetur per sensibilia intelligibilium donorum processum in ipso ab extrinseco fieri a Deo, cujus nomen\n\nsensibilibus vocibus exprimitur. — Exercentur etiam ab hominibus quædam sensibilia opera, non quibus Deum excitent, sed quibus seipsos provocent in divina, sicut prostrationes, genuflexiones, vocales clamores et cantus; quæ non fiunt quasi Deus his indiigeat, qui omnia novit et cujus voluntas est immutabilis, et affectum mentis et etiam motum corporis non propter se acceptat; sed propter nos facimus, ut per hæc sensibilia opera intentio nostra dirigatur in Deum et affectio ascendatur; simul etiam per hoc Deum profitemur animæ et corporis auctorem, cui et spiritualia et\n\ncorporalia obsequia axhibemus. Propter hoc non est mirum si hæretici, qui corporis nostri Deum esse auctorem negant, hujusmodi corporalia obsequia Deo fieri reprehendunt. In quo etiam apparet quod se homines esse non memineunt, dum sensibilium sibi repræsentationem necessariam non judicant ad interiorem cognitionem et affectionem; nam experimento apparet quod per corporales actus anima excitatur ad aliquam cognitionem vel affectionem; unde manifestum est convenienter etiam corporalibus quibusdam nos uti ad mentis nostra\n\nelevationem in Deum. In his autem corporalibus Deo exhibendis cultus Dei consistere dicitur. Illa enim « colere » dicimur quibus per nostra opera studium adhibemus; circa Deum autem adhibemus studium nostro actu, non quidem ut proficiamus ei, sicut quum alias res nostris operibus colere dicimur, sed quia per hujusmodi actus proficimus in Deum. Et quia per interiores actus directe in Deum tendimus, ideo interioribus actibus proprie Deum colimus; sed tamen et exteriores actus ad cultum Dei pertinent, in quantum per hujusmodi actus mens nostra elevatur in Deum, ut\n\ndictum est. Hinc est quod Dei cultus « religio » nominatur, quia hujusmodi actibus quodammodo homo se ligat ut ab eo non evagetur, et quia etiam quodam naturali instinctu se obligatum sentit Deo ut suo modo reverentiam ei impendat, a quo est sui esse et\n\nomnis boni principium. Hinc est etiam quod religio nomen acceptit « pietatis »; nam pietas est per quam honorem debitum parentibus impendimus; unde convenienter quod Deo parenti omnium honor exhibetur pietatis esse videtur; propter quod qui his quæ ad divinum cultum pertinent\n\nadversantur « impii » dicuntur. Quia vero Deus non solum est nostri esse causa et principium, sed totum nostrum esse in potestate ipsius est, et totum quod in nobis et ipsi debemus; ac, per hoc quod vere Dominus noster est, id quod in honorem Dei\n\nexhibemus « servitium » dicitur. Est autem Deus Dominus, non per accidens, sicut omnis homo, sed per naturam. Ideo aliter debetur servitium Deo et aliter homini, cui per accidens subdimur, et qui habet aliquod particulare in rebus dominium, et id $^2$ a Deo derivatur $^3$; unde servitium quod debetur Deo specialiter apud Græcos « latria $^4$ » vocatur.\n\nDeo est exhibendus. Fuerunt autem aliqui qui latriæ cultum non solum primo rerum principio exhibendum existimaverunt, sed omnibus etiam creaturis quæ supra homines sunt. — Unde quidam, licet opinarentur Deum esse unum primum et universale rerum principium, latriam tamen exhibendam estimaverunt primo quidem, post summum Deum, substantiis intellectualibus cælestibus, quas deos etiam vocabant, sive essent substantiæ omnino a corporibus separatæ, sive essent animæ orbium aut stellarum; secundo etiam, quibusdam substantiis intellectualibus, quas unitas esse credebant corporibus aereis, quos dæmones esse dicebant, et tamen, quia supra homines eos esse credebant, sicut A, C: « Inungitur. » A, B, C, D, E, F omittunt: « Id. » Cod. Berg.: « Derivatum. » Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. corpus aereum est supra terrestre, hujusmodi etiam substantias colendas divino cultu ab hominibus ponebant, et in comparatione ad homines deos illos esse dicebant, quasi medios inter homines et deos; et quia animas bonorum, per hoc quod a corpore separantur, in statum altiorem quam sit status præsentis vitæ transire credebant, etiam animabus mortuorum, quas « heroicas » aut « manes » vocabant, divinum cultum\n\nexhibendum esse opinabantur. — Quidam vero, Deum esse animam mundi æstimantes, crediderunt quod toti mundo et singulis ejus partibus esset cultus divinitatis exhibendus; non tamen propter corpus, sed propter animam, quam Deum esse dicebant; sicut et homini sapienti honor exhibetur, non propter corpus,\n\nsed propter animam. — Quidam vero etiam ea quæ infra hominem sunt secundum naturam homini tamen colenda esse dicebant divino cultu, in quantum in eis participatur aliquid virtutis superioris naturæ; et, quum quasdam imagines per homines factas sortiri crederent aliquam virtutem supernaturalem, vel ex influentia cœlestium corporum, vel ex præsentia aliquorum spirituum, dicebant his imaginibus divinum cultum esse exhibendum, quas etiam imagines deos vocabant; propter quod et idololatræ sunt dicti, quia latriæ cultum idolis,\n\nid est imaginibus, impendebant. Est autem irrationabile ponentibus unum tantum principium separatum cultum divinum alteri exhibere. 1. Cultum enim Deo exhibemus, ut dictum est (c. cxix), non quia ipse hoc indigeat, sed ut in nobis firmetur etiam per sensibilia opinio vera de Deo. Opinio autem de hoc quod Deus sit unus supra omnia exaltatus, per sensibilia firmari non potest in nobis, nisi per hoc quod ei aliquid separatum exhibemus, quod dicimus cultum divinum. Patet ergo quod vera opinio de uno principio debilitatur, si cultus divinus pluribus\n\nexhibeatur. 2. Præterea, Sicut dictum est supra (c. cxxi), hujusmodi cultus exterior homini necessarius est ad hoc quod anima hominis excitetur in spiritualem reveren-tiam Dei. Ad hoc autem quod animus hominis ad aliquid moveatur, multum operatur consuetudo; nam ad consueta facilius movemur. Habet autem hoc humana consuetudo quod honor qui exhibetur ei qui summum locum in republica tenet, puta regi vel imperatori, nulli alii exhibetur. Est igitur animus hominis exercitandus ad hoc quod æstimet esse unum summum rerum principium, per hoc quod exhibeat ei quod nulli alteri exhibetur; et hoc\n\ndicimus latriæ cultum. 3. Item, Si cultus latriæ alicui deberetur quia est superior, et non quia summus, quum hominum unus alio sit superior et etiam Angelorum, sequeretur quod unus homo exhibere latriam alteri deberet et Angelus Angelo; et, quum ille inter homines qui superior est quantum ad unum sit inferior quantum ad aliud videtur quod mutuo sibi homines latriam exhibent;\n\nquod est inconveniens. 4. Adhuc, Secundum hominum consuetudinem pro speciali beneficio specialis retributio deberetur. Est autem quoddam speciale beneficium quod homo a Deo summo percipit, scilicet creationis suæ; ostensum est enim (l. II, c. xxi) quod solus Deus creator est. Debet ergo homo aliquid speciale Deo reddere in recognitionem beneficii specialis; et hoc\n\nest latriæ cultus. 5. Amplius, Latria servitium dicitur; servitium autem domino deberetur. Dominus autem proprie et vere est qui aliis præcepta operandi dispensat et a nullo regulam operandi sumit; qui enim exse-quitur quod a superiori fuerit dispositum magis est minister quam dominus. Deus autem, qui est summum rerum principium, per suam Providentiam omnia ad debitas actiones disponit, ut supra (c. lxiv) ostensum est; unde, in sacra Scriptura, et Angeli et superiora corpora ministrare dicuntur, et Deo, cujus ordinationem ex-sequuntur, et nobis, in quorum utilitatem actiones eorum provenient. Non est igitur cultus latriæ, qui summo deberetur Domino, exhibendus nisi\n\nsummo rerum principio. 6. Item, Inter alia quæ ad latriam per Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J. — Edit. : « Heroas. » Sic A, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. : « Specialem. » Sic A, B, C, D, E, E, et cod. Berg. — Edit. : « Sumit facultatem. » tinent, singulare videtur esse sacrificium; nam genuflexiones, prostrationes et alia hujusmodi honoris indicia etiam hominibus exhiberi possunt, licet alia intentione quam Deo; sacrificium autem nullus offerendum censuit alicui, nisi quia eum Deum aestimavit aut aestimare se finxit. Exterius autem sacrificium representativum est interioris veri sacrificii, secundum quod mens humana seipsam Deo offert. Offert autem se mens nostra Deo, scilicet quasi suæ creationis principio, quasi suæ operationis auctori, quasi suæ beatitudinis fini; quæ quidem conveniunt soli summo rerum principio. Ostensum est autem supra (l. II, c. Lxxxvi) quod animæ rationalis causa creatrix solus Deus summus est; ipse enim solus hominis voluntatem potest inclinare ad quod-cumque voluerit, ut supra (c. Lxxxix et xc) ostensum est. Patet etiam ex superioribus (c. xxxvii et lxii) quod in ejus solius fruitione ultima hominis consistit felicitas. Soli igitur summo Deo homo sacrificium et latriæ cultum offerre debet, non autem\n\nsubstantiis quibuscumque spiritualibus. Licet autem positio quæ ponit Deum summum non esse aliud quam animam mundi magis a veritate recedat, ut supra ostensum est, illa vero quæ ponit Deum separatum esse et ab ipso exsistere omnes alias intellectuales substantias, sive separatas sive corpori conjunctas, sit vera, hæc tamen positio rationabilius movetur ad exhibendum latriæ cultum diversis. Exhibendo enim latriæ cultum diversis rebus, videntur uni summo Deo latriam exhibere, ad quem, secundum eorum positionem, diversæ partes mundi comparantur sicut ad animam hominis diversa corporis membra. Sed etiam ei ratio obviat. 1. Dicunt enim mundo non esse exhibendum latriæ cultum ratione corporis, sed ratione animæ, quam Deum esse dicunt. Licet autem corpus mundi divisibile sit in partes diversas, anima tamen indivisibilis est. Non est igitur divinitatis cultus diversis rebus exhibendus,\n\nsed uni tantum. 2. Adhuc, Si mundus ponitur animam habere quæ totum animet et omnes partes ipsius, non potest hoc intelligi de anima nutritiva vel sensitiva, quia harum partium animæ operationes non competunt omnibus partibus universi. Dato etiam quod mundus haberet ani-mam sensitivam vel nutritivam, non propter hujusmodi animas deberetur ei latriæ cultus, sicut nec brutis animalibus nec plantis. Relinquitur ergo quod hoc quod dicunt, Deum, cui debetur latria, esse animam mundi, intelligatur de anima intellectuali; quæ quidem anima non est perfectio determinatarum partium corporis, sed aliquo modo respicit totum; quod etiam in nostra anima, quæ est ignobilior, patet; non enim intellectus habet aliquod organum corporale, ut probatur in tertio De anima, c. II et III. Non igitur exhibendus esset cultus divinitatis diversis partibus mundi, sed toti mundo, propter animam ejus,\n\nsecundum eorum radicem. 3. Amplius, Si, secundum eorum positionem, una tantum sit anima quæ totum mundum animat et partes omnes ipsius (mundus autem non dicitur Deus nisi propter animam), erit ergo unus tantum Deus, et sic cultus divinitatis non debetur, nisi tantum uni. — Si vero sit una anima totius et diversæ partes iterum habeant diversas animas, oportet eos dicere quod animæ partium sub anima totius ordinentur; eadem enim est proportio perfectionum et perfectibilium. Exsistentibus autem pluribus substantiis intellectualibus ordinatis, illi tantum debetur latriæ cultus quæ summum locum in eis tenet, ut ostensum est contra aliam positionem. Non erit igitur exhibendus latriæ cultus partibus mundi,\n\nsed solum toti. 4. Præterea, Manifestum est quasdam partes mundi non habere animam propria. Eis igitur non erit exhibendus latriæ cultus. Et tamen ipsi colebant animas et mundi elementa, scilicet terram, aquam, ignem et alia\n\nhujusmodi inanimata corpora. 5. Item, Manifestum est quod superius non debet inferiori latriæ cultum. Homo autem superior est, ordinæ naturæ, ad minus omnibus inferioribus corporibus quanto perfectiorem habet formam. Non igitur ab homine esset exhibendus latriæ cultus inferioribus corporibus, si propter proprias eorum animas\n\neis cultus deberetur. Eadem etiam inconvenientia sequi necesse est, si quis dicat quod singulæ partes mundi habeant proprias animas, non autem totum habet aliquam animam communem. Oportebit enim quod suprema pars mundi habeat animam nobilio- rem, cui soli, secundum præmissa,\n\ndebetur latriæ cultus. His autem positionibus irrationabilior est illa quæ dicit imaginibus esse latriæ cultum exhibendum. 1. Si enim hujusmodi imagines habent virtutem aut aliquam dignitatem ex corporibus cælestibus, non propter hoc debetur eis latriæ cultus, quum nec ipsis corporibus cælestibus debeatur, nisi forte propter eorum animas, ut quidam posuerunt. Hæ autem imagines ponuntur virtutem aliquam consequi ex corporibus cælestibus secundum eorum\n\ncorporalem virtutem. 2. Præterea, Manifestum est quod non consequuntur ex cælestibus corporibus tam nobilem perfectionem sicut est anima rationalis. Sunt ergo infra gradum dignitatis cujuslibet hominis. Non igitur ab homine debetur eis\n\naliquis cultus. 3. Adhuc, Causa potior est effectu. Harum autem imaginum factores sunt homines. Non igitur homo debet\n\neis aliquem cultum. Si autem dicatur quod hujusmodi imagines habent aliquam virtutem aut dignitatem ex hoc quod eis adhærent aliquæ spirituales substantia, hoc etiam non sufficit, quum nulli spirituali substantia debeatur latriæ cultus,\n\nnisi soli summæ. 4. Præterea, Nobiliori modo anima rationalis adhæret corpori hominis quam aliqua spiritualis substantia adhæreat prædictis imaginibus; adhuc igitur homo remanet in majori dignitate\n\nquam prædictæ imagines. 5. Adhuc, Quum hujusmodi imagines interdum ad aliquos noxios effectus fiant, manifestum est quod, si per aliquas spirituales substantias effectus sortiantur, illæ spirituales substantia sint vitiosæ; quod etiam manifestius probatur per hoc quod responsionibus decipiunt et aliqua contraria virtuti exigunt a suis cultoribus; et sic sunt bonis hominibus inferiores. Non ergo eis\n\ndebetur latriæ cultus. Manifestum est ergo ex dictis quod latriæ cultus soli uni summo Deo debetur. — Hinc est quod dicitur: Qui immolat diis occidetur, præter quam Domino soli, Exod. xxii, 20; et: Dominum Deum tuum timembis, et illi soli servies, Deuter. vi, 13; et dicitur de Gentilibus: Dicentes enim se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt; et mutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis, et volucrum, et quadrupedum, et serpentum, Rom. i, 22 et 23; et infra: Qui commutaverunt veritatem Dei in mendacium, et coluerunt et servierunt creaturæ potius quam Creatori, qui est benedictus in secula.\n\nAmen. Ibid. xxi. Quia ergo indebitum est quod latriæ cultus alteri exhibeatur quam primo rerum principio, ad indebita autem incitare non est nisi rationalis creaturæ male dispositæ, manifestum est quod ad prædictas indebitas culturas instinctu dæmonum homines provocati fuerunt, qui se etiam loco Dei hominibus colendos exhibuerunt, divinum appetentes honorem. Hinc est quod dicitur: Omnes dii gentium dæmonia, Psalm. xcv, 5; et: Quæ immolant, gentes, dæmoniis immolant et non Deo,\n\nI Cor. x, 20. Quia igitur est principalis legis divinæ intentio ut homo Deo subdatur et ei singularem reverentiam exhibeat, non solum corde, sed etiam ore et opere corporali, ideo primitus in Exodo, ubii lex divina proponitur, interdicitur cultus plurium deorum, ubii dicitur: Non habebis deos alienos coram me. Non facies tibi sculptile neque omnem similitudinem, Exod. xx, 3 et 4. — Secundo indicitur homini ne irreverenter divinum nomen ore pronuntiet, ad confirmationem scilicet alicu-jus falsi; et hoc est quod dicitur: Non assumes nomen Domini Dei tui in vanum, Ibid. xx, 7. — Tertio indicitur requies secundum aliquod tempus ab exterioribus exercitiis, ut mens divinæ contemplationi vacet; et ideo dicitur: Memento ut diem Sabbati sanctifices, Ibid. xx, 8.\n\ncorporalia et sensibilia. 1. Sicut autem per corporalia et sensibilia mens hominis elevari potest in Deum, si quis eis in reverentiam Dei debito modo utatur, ita etiam eorum indebitus usus vel mentem a Deo totaliter abstrahit, dum in inferioribus rebus constituitur voluntatis finis, vel mentis intentionem a Deo retardat, dum ultra quam necesse sit ad hujusmodi res afficimur. Est autem divina lex ad hoc principaliter data ut homo adhæreat Deo. Pertinet igitur ad legem divinam ordinare hominem circa corporalium et sensibilium\n\naffectionem et usum. 2. Adhuc, Sicut mens hominis ordinatur sub Deo, ita corpus sub anima ordinatur, et inferiores vires sub ratione. Pertinet autem ad divinam Providentiam, cujus quidem ratio, homini a Deo proposita, divina lex est, ut singula suum ordinem teneant. Est igitur sic homo ordinandus lege divina ut inferiores vires rationi subdantur, et corpus animæ, et exteriores res ad\n\nnecessitatem homini deserviant. 3. Amplius, Quælibet lex recte proposita inducit ad virtutem. Virtus autem in hoc consistit quod tam inferiores affectiones quam corporalium rerum usus ratione regulentur. Est igitur hoc\n\nlege divina statuendum. 4. Præterea, Ad unumquemque legislatorem pertinet lege statuere ea sine quibus lex observari non potest. Quum autem lex rationi proponatur, homo legem non sequeretur nisi alia omnia quæ pertinent ad hominem rationi subderentur. Pertinet igitur ad legem divinam præcipere ut omnia quæ sunt\n\nhominis rationi subdantur. Hinc est quod dicitur: Rationabile obsequium vestrum, Rom., xii, 4; et: Hæc est voluntas Dei, sanctificatio vestra,\n\nI Thess. iv, 3. Per hoc autem excluditur quorumdam error dicentium illa solum esse peccata quibus proximus aut offenditur aut scandalizatur.\n\nmatrimonium sit naturale. Ex hoc autem apparet vanam esse rationem quorumdam dicentium fornicationem simplicem non esse peccatum. Dicunt enim: Sit aliqua mulier a viro soluta, quæ sub nullius potestate, vel patris, vel alicujus alterius exsistat; si quis ad eam accedat, ea volente, non facit illi injuriam, quia sibi placet, et sui corporis habet potestatem; et alteri non facit injuriam, quia sub nullius potestate esse ponitur; non videtur\n\nigitur esse peccatum. Non autem videtur esse responsio sufficiens, si quis dicat quod facit injuriam Deo. Non enim Deus a nobis offenditur, nisi ex eo quod contra nostrum bonum agimus, ut dictum est (c. cxxi). Hoc autem non apparet contra hominis bonum. Unde ex hoc non videtur Deo\n\naliqua injuria fieri. — Similiter etiam non videtur sufficiens responsio quod per hoc fiat injuria proximo, qui scandalizatur. Contingit enim de aliquo quod secundum se non est peccatum aliquem scandalizari, et sic sit peccatum per accidens. Nunc autem non agimus an fornicatio simplex sit peccatum per accidens,\n\nsed per se. Oportet igitur ex superioribus solutionem inquirere. Dictum est enim (c. xvi) quod Deus uniuscujusque curam habet secundum id quod est ei bonum. Est autem bonum uniuscujusque quod finem suum consequatur, malum autem ejus est quod a debito fine divertat. Sicut autem in toto, ita et in partibus considerari oportet, ut scilicet unaquæque pars hominis et quilibet actus ejus finem debitum sortiatur. Semen autem, etsi sit superfluum quantum ad individui conservationem, est tamen necessarium quantum ad propagationem speciei; alia vero superflua, ut egestio, urina, sudor et similia, ad nihil necessaria sunt; unde ad bonum hominis pertinet solum quod emittantur; non solum autem hoc requiritur in semine, sed ut emittatur ad generationis utilitatem, ad quam coitus ordinatur. Frustra autem esset hominis generatio, nisi et debita nutritio sequeretur, quia generatum non remaneret, debita nutritione subtracta. Sic igitur ordinata debet esse seminis emissio ut sequi possit, et generatio conveniens,\n\net geniti educatio. Ex quo patet quod contra hominis bonum est omnis emissio seminis tali modo quod generatio sequi non possit; et, si ex proposito hoc agatur, oportet esse peccatum. Dico autem modum ex quo generatio sequi non potest secundum se, sicut omnis emissio seminis sine naturali conjunctione maris et feminæ; propter quod hujusmodi peccata contra naturam dicuntur. Si autem per accidens generatio ex emissione seminis sequi non posset, hoc non est contra naturam, nec 1 A: « Recta proposita. » — B: « Res ratione proposita. » 2 A: « Quod secundum rationem rectam. » 3 A: « Et cum sui corporis habeat... alteri peccatum, sicut si contingat\n\nmulierem sterilem esse. Similiter etiam oportet contra bonum hominis esse si semen taliter emittatur quod generatio sequi possit 1, sed educatio conveniens impediatur. 1. Est enim considerandum quod, in animalibus in quibus sola femina sufficit ad prolis educationem, mas et femina post coitum nullo tempore commandent, sicut patet in canibus. Quæcumque vero animalia sunt in quibus femina non sufficit ad educationem prolis, mas et femina simul post coitum commandent quousque necessarium est ad prolis educationem et instructionem; sicut patet in quibusdam avibus, quarum pulli non statim postquam nati sunt possunt cibum sibi quærere; quum enim avis non nutriat lacte 2 pullos (quod in promptu est, velut a natura præparatum, sicut in quadrupedibus accidit), sed oporteat quod cibum alienum pullis quærat, et præter hoc in cibando eos foveat, non sufficeret ad hoc sola femella; unde ex divina Providentia est naturaliter inditum mari in talibus animalibus, ut commaneat femellæ ad educationem fœtus. Manifestum est autem quod, in specie humana, femina minime sufficeret sola ad prolis educationem, quum necessitas humanæ vitæ multa requirat quæ per unum solum parari non possunt. Est igitur conveniens, secundum naturam humanam, ut homo post coitum mulieri commaneat et non statim abscedat, indifferenter ad quam-cumque accedens, sicut\n\napud fornicantes accidit. Non autem huic rationi obstat quod aliqua mulier suis divitiis potens est ut sola nutriat fœtum; quia rectitudo naturalis in humanis actibus non est secundum ea quæ per accidens contingunt in uno individuo, sed secundum ea quæ\n\ntotam speciem consequuntur. 2. Rursus, Considerandum est quod, in specie humana, proles non indiget solum nutritione quantum ad corpus, ut in aliis animalibus, sed etiam instructione quantum ad animam; nam alia animalia habent naturaliter suas prudentias, quibus sibi providere possunt; homo autem ratione vivit, quem per longi temporis experimentum ad prudentiam per venire oportet; unde necesse est ut filii a parentibus quasi jam expertis instruantur. Nec hujusmodi instructionis sunt capaces mox geniti, sed post longum tempus, et præcipue quum ad annos discretionis perveniunt. Ad hanc etiam instructionem longum tempus requiritur; et tunc etiam, propter impetus passionum, quibus corrumpitur æstimatio prudentiae, indigent, non solum instructione, sed etiam repressione. Ad hoc autem mulier sola non sufficit, sed magis in hoc requiritur opus maris, in quo est, et ratio perfectior ad instruendum, et virtus potentior ad castigandum. Oportet igitur, in specie humana, non per parvum tempus insistere promotioni prolis, sicut in avibus, sed per magnum spatium vitæ. Unde, quum necessarium sit marem feminæ commanere in omnibus animalibus quousque opus patris necessarium est proli, naturale est homini quod, non ad modicum tempus, sed diuturnam societatem habeat vir ad determinatam mulierem. Hanc autem societatem matrimonium vocamus. Est igitur matrimonium homini naturale; et fornicarius coitus, qui est præter matrimonium, est contra hominis bonum; et propter hoc oportet\n\nipsum esse pecatum. Nec tamen oportet reputari leve pecatum esse si quis seminis emissionem procuret præter debitum generationis et educationis finem, propter hoc quod aut leve aut nullum peccatum est si quis aliqua sui corporis parte utatur ad alium usum quam ad eum ad quem est ordinata secundum naturam, ut siquis, verbi gratia, manibus ambulet, aut pedibus operetur aliquid manibus operandum; quia per hujusmodi inordinatos usus bonum hominis non multum impeditur; inordinata vero seminis emissio repugnat bono naturæ, quod est conservatio speciei; unde, post peccatum homicidii, quo natura humana jam in actu exsistens destruitur, hujusmodi genus peccati videtur secundum locum tenere, quo impeditur\n\ngeneratio humanæ naturæ. Hæc autem quæ præmissa sunt divina auctoritate firmantur. Quod enim emissio seminis ex qua proles sequi non potest sitillicita patet; dicitur enim : Cum masculo non commiscearis coitu femineo, quia abominatio est. Cum omni pecore non coibis Levit., xviii, 22 et 23; et : Neque molles ne- 1 A, B, C, D, E, F: « Posset. » 2 A: « Nutriat lacte, quod lac in promptu est a natura. » que masculorum concubitores... regnum Dei possidebunt,\n\nI, Cor. vi, 10. — Quod etiam fornicatio et omnis coitus praeter propriam uxorem sit illicitus patet; dicitur enim: Non erit meretrix de filiabus Israel nec scortator de filiis Israel, Deuter. xxxiii 17; et: Attendetibi ab omni fornicatione, et præter uxorem tuam nunquam patiaris crimen scire, Tob. iv, 13; et: Fugite fornicationem,\n\nI. Cor. iv, 18. Per hoc autem excluditur error dicentium in emissione seminis non esse majus peccatum quam in aliarum superfluitatum emissione, et dicentium fornicationem non esse peccatum.\n\nQuod matrimonium debet esse indivisibile. (I D. xxxiii, q. xi, a. i.) Si quis autem recte consideret, prædicta ratio non solum ad hoc perducere videtur, ut societas maris et feminæ, quam matrimonium appellamus, sit diuturna, sed etiam quod sit per totam vitam. 1. Possessiones enim ad conservationem naturalis vitæ ordinantur; et, quia naturalis vita, quæ conservari non potest in patre perpetuo, quasi quadam successione secundum speciei similitudinem conservatur in filio, secundum naturam est conveniens ut in his quæ sunt patris succedat et filius. Naturale est igitur ut sollicitudo patris ad filium maneat usque ad finem vitæ suæ. Si igitur sollicitudo patris de filio causat, etiam in avibus, commanentiam maris et feminæ, ordo naturalis requirit quod usque ad finem vitæ, in humana specie, pater et mater simul commaneant. 2. Videtur etiam æquitati repugnare si prædicta societas dissolvatur. Femina enim indiget mare, non solum propter generationem, sicut in aliis animalibus, sed etiam propter gubernationem, quia mas est et ratione perfectior et virtute fortior. Mulier vero ad viri societatem assumitur propter necessitatem generationis; cessante igitur fecunditate mulieris et decore, impeditur ne ab alio assumatur. Si quis igitur, mulierem assumens tempore juventutis, quo et decor et fecunditas ei adsunt, eam dimittere posset postquam ætate provecta fuerit, damnum inferret mulieri contra naturalem æquitatem. 3. Item, Manifeste apparet inconveniens si mulier virum dimittere posset, quum mulier naturaliter viro subjecta sit tanquam gubernatori. Non est autem in potestate ejus qui alteri subjicitur ut ab ejus regimine discedat. Contra naturalem igitur ordinem esset si mulier virum deserere posset. Si ergo vir deserere posset mulierem, non esset, æqua societas viri ad mulierem, sed servitus quædam ex parte mulieris. 4. Præterea, Naturalis quædam sollicitudo inest hominibus de certitudine prolis; quod propter hoc necessarium est, quia filius diuturna patris gubernatione indiget. Quæcumque igitur certitudinem prolis impediunt sunt contra naturalem instinctum humanæ speciei. Si autem vir posset mulierem dimittere, vel mulier virum, et alteri copulari, impediretur certitudino prolis, dum mulier a primo cognita postmodum a secundo cognosceretur. Est igitur contra naturalem instinctum speciei humanæ quod mulier a viro separetur. Sic igitur, non solum diuturnam, sed individuam oportet esse, in humana specie, maris et feminæ conjunctionem. 5. Amplius, Amicitia, quanto major est, tanto debet esse firmior et diuturnior. Inter virum autem et uxorem maxima amicitia esse videtur; adunantur enim, non solum in actu carnalis copulæ, quæ etiam inter bestias quamdam suavem amicitiam facit, sed ad totius domesticæ conversationis consortium; unde, in signum hujus, homo propter uxorem et patrem et matrem dimittit, ut dicitur in Genesi, ii, xxv. Inconveniens est igitur quod matrimonium sit omnino dissolubile. 6. Ulterius autem considerandum est quod, inter naturales actus, sola generatio ad bonum commune ordinatur; nam comestio et aliarum superfluitatum emissio ad individuum pertinent, generatio vero ad conservationem speciei. Unde, quum lex instituatur ad bonum commune, ea quæ pertinent ad generationem prolis oportet legibus ordinari, et divinis et humanis. Leges autem positæ oportet quod ex naturali instinctu procedant, si humanæ sunt, sicut et in scientiis demonstrativis omnis humana inventio ex principiis naturaliter cognitis initium sumit; si autem divinæ sunt, non solum instinctum naturæ explicant, sed etiam defectus naturalis instinctus supplent, sicut ea quæ divinitus revelantur superant naturalis rationis capacitatem. Quum igitur instinctus naturalis sit in specie humana ad hoc quod conjunctio maris et feminæ sit individua, et quod sit una unius, oportuit hoc lege humana ordinatum esse. Lex autem divina supernaturalem quamdam rationem apponit ex significatione inseparabilis conjunctionis Christi et Ecclesiæ, quæ est una unius. Sic igitur inordinationes circa actum generationis non solum instinctui naturali repugnant, sed etiam leges divinas et humanas transgrediuntur; unde ex hoc etiam magis circa hoc peccatur ex inordinatione quam circa sumptionem cibi aut alterius hujusmodi. Quia vero necesse est ad id quod est optimum in homine alia omnia ordinari, conjunctio maris et feminæ non solum sic est ordinata legibus secundum quod ad prolem generandam pertinet, ut est in aliis animalibus, sed etiam secundum quod convenit ad bonos mores, quos ratio recta disponit, vel quantum ad hominem secundum se, vel secundum quod homo est pars domesticæ familiæ aut civilis societatis. Ad quos quidem bonos mores pertinet individua conjunctio maris et feminæ; sic enim fidelior amor unius ad alterum erit, dum cognoscunt se indivisibiliter conjunctos; erit etiam utriusque sollicitior cura in rebus domesticis, dum se perpetuo commansuros in earumdem rerum possessione æstimant; subtrahuntur etiam ex hoc discordiarum origines, quas oporteret accidere, si vir uxorem dimitteret, inter eum et propinquos uxoris, et firmior inter affines dilectio; tolluntur etiam adulteriorum occasiones, quæ darentur, si vir uxorem dimittere posset, aut e converso; per hoc enim daretur via facilior sollicitandi matrimonia aliena. Hinc est quod dicitur: Dico autem vocis, quia quicumque dimiserit uxorem suam, nisi ob fornicationem, et aliam duxerit, mœchatur; et qui dimissam duxerit, mœchatur, Matth xix, 9; et: Iis autem qui matrimonio juncti sunt, præcipio, non ego, sed Dominus, uxorem a viro non discedere, I. Cor. vii, 10. Per hoc autem excluditur consuetudo dimittentium uxores. Quod tamen in veteri lege permissum fuit Judæis propter eorum duritiam, quia scilicet proni erant ad occisionem uxorum. Permissum ergo fuit minus malum ad excludendum majus malum.\n\nunius ad unam. 1. Considerandum autem videtur quod innatum est mentibus omnium animalium quæ coitu utuntur quod consortium in compari non compatiuntur; unde proter coitum pugnæ in animalibus existunt. Et quidem quantum ad omnia animalia est una communis ratio, quia quod-libet animal desiderat libere frui voluptate coitus, sicut et voluptate cibi; quæ quidem libertas impeditur per hoc quod ad unam plures accedant, ant e converso; sicut in libertate cibo fruendi impeditur aliquod animal, si cibum quem ipsum sumere cupit aliud animal usurpet; et ideo similiter propter cibum et propter coitum animalia pugnant. In hominibus autem est ratio specialis, quia, ut dictum est (c. cxxiii), homo naturaliter desiderat certus esse de prole; quæ quidem certitudo omnino tolleretur, si plures essent unius. Ex naturali igitur instinctu procedit quod\n\nsit una unius. Sed in hoc differentia consideranda est. Quantum enim ad hoc quod una femina a pluribus maribus non cognoscatur, utraque prædictarum rationum concurrit; sed quantum ad hoc quod unus mas plures feminas non cognoscat, non facit ratio secunda; non enim certitudo prolis impeditur, si unus mas plures feminas cognoscat; facit autem contra hoc ratio prima; nam sicut libertas utendi femina tollitur a mare, si femina habeat alium, ita et eadem libertas a femina tollitur, si mas habeat plures. Etideo, quia certitudo prolis est principale bonum quod ex matrimonio quæriur, nulla lex aut consuetudo humana permisit quod una esset plurium uxor. Fuit etiam hoc inconveniens reputatum 1 A: « Oportet. » 2 A, B, C, D, F: « Fit firmior. » — E: « Sit firmior. » apud antiquos Romanos, de quibus refert Valerius Maximus, De memor. dictis, l. II, c. I, quod credebant nec propter sterilitatem fidem\n\nconjugalem debere dissolvi. 2. Item, In omni animalis specie in quo patri inest aliqua sollicitudo de prole, unus mas non habet nisi unam feminam, sicut patet in omnibus avibus quæ simul nutriunt pullos; non enim sufficeret unus mas auxilium præstare in educatione prolis pluribus feminis. In animalibus autem in quibus maribus nulla est sollicitudo de prole, indifferenter mas habet plures feminas et femina habet plures mares, sicut in canibus, gallinis et hujusmodi. Quum autem masculo, inter omnia animalia, sit magis cura de prole in specie humana, manifestum est quod naturale est homini quod unus mas unam feminam habeat,\n\net e converso. 3. Adhuc, Amicitia in quadam æqualitate consistit. Si igitur mulieri non licet habere plures viros, quia hoc est contra certitudinem prolis, liceret autem viro habere plures uxores, non esset liberalis amicitia uxoris ad virum, sed quasi servilis. Et hæc etiam ratio experimento comprobatur, quia, apud viros habentes plures uxores, uxores\n\nquasi ancillæ habentur. 4. Præterea, Amicitia intensa non habetur ad multos, ut patet per Philosophum, Ethicor. VIII, c. vii. Si igitur uxor habet unum virum tantum, vir autem plures uxores, non erit æqualis amicitia ex utraque parte. Non igitur erit amicitia liberalis, sed quodammodo\n\nservilis. 5. Amplius, Sicut dictum est (c. cxxii), matrimonium in hominibus oportet ordinari secundum quod competit ad bonos mores. Est autem contra bonos mores quod unus habeat plures uxores, quia ex hoc consequitur discordia in domestica familia, ut experimento patet. Non est igitur conveniens quod unus homo\n\nhabeat plures uxores. Hinc est quod dicitur : Erunt duo in carne\n\nuna, Gen. ii, 24. Per hoc autem excluditur consuetudo habentium plures uxores, et opinio Platonis, qui posuit uxores debere esse communes; quem in nova lege secutus est Nicolaus, unus ex septem diaconi bus.\n\nfieri inter propinquos. Propter hujusmodi etiam causas rationabiles, ordinatum est legibus quod certæ personæ a matrimonio excludantur , quæ secundum\n\noriginem sunt conjunctæ. 1. Nam, Quum in matrimonio sit diversarum personarum conjunctio, illæ personæ quæ debent se reputare quasi unum propter eamdem originem convenienter a matrimonio excluduntur, ut, dum se per hoc unum esse recognoscunt,\n\nferventius se diligant. 2. Item, Quum ea quæ inter virum et uxorem aguntur quamdam naturalem verecundiam habeant, ab his mutuo agendis illas personas prohiberi oportuit quibus propter conjunctionem sanguinis reverentia debetur. Quæ quidem ratio videur in veteri lege inducta, propter hoc quod dicitur : Turpitudinem sororis tuæ... non revelabis, Levit. xviii, 9; et\n\nsimiliter de aliis. 3. Præterea, Ad corruptionem bonorum morum pertinet quod homines sint nimis dediti voluptatibus coitus, quia, quum hæc voluptas maxime mentem absorbeat, impediretur ratio ab his quæ recte agenda essent. Sequeretur autem nimius voluptatis usus, si liceret homini per coitum conjungi illis personis quibus commorandi habet necessitatem, sicut sororibus et aliis propinquis; quia talibus occasio coitus subtrahi non posset. Conveniens igitur fuit bonis moribus ut talis\n\nconjunctio legibus inhiberetur. 4. Adhuc, Delectatio coitus maxime corrumpit æstimationem prudentiæ. Multiplicatio igitur talis delectationis repugnat bonis moribus. Talis autem delectatio augetur per amorem personarum quæ conjunguntur. Esset igitur contra-rium bonis moribus propinquis conjungi, quia in eis conjungeretur amor qui est ex communione originis et connutritione Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. omittunt : « Habet. » B : « Non erit aliquis ex utraque. » A : « Amicitia aut liberalis. » A, B, C, D, E, F : « Debeat. » Sic A, B, C, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. « Excluduntur. » A : « Et simile est. » A : « Carnis. » amori concupiscentiae; et, multiplicato amore, necesse est magis\n\nanimam delectationibus subdi. 5. Amplius, In societate humana hoc est maxime necessarium ut sit amicitia inter multos. Multiplicatur autem amicitia inter homines, dum personæ extraneæ per matrimonia colligantur. Conveniens fuit igitur legibus ordinari quod matrimonia contraherentur cum extraneis personis, et\n\nnon cum propinquis. 6. Adhuc, Inconveniens est ut illis personis aliquis socialiter conjungatur quibus naturaliter debet esse subjectus. Naturale autem est quod aliquis parentibus sit subjectus. Ergo inconveniens esset quod cum parentibus aliquis matrimonium contraheret, quum in matrimonio sit\n\nquædam conjunctio socialis. Hinc est quod dicitur: Omnis homo ad proximam sanguinis sui non\n\naccedet, Levit. xviii, 6. Per hoc autem excluditur consuetudo eorum qui propinquis suis\n\nse carnaliter commiscent. Sciendum est autem quod, sicut naturalis inclinatio est ad ea quæ sunt ut in pluribus, ita et lex posita est secundum id quod in pluribus accidit. Non est autem prædictis rationibus contrarium si in aliquo aliter possit accidere; non enim propter bonum unius debet prætermitti bonum multorum, quum bonum multitudinis semper sit divinius quam bonum unius. Ne tamen defectus qui in aliquo posset accidere omnino absque medela remaneat, residet apud legislatores et eis similes auctoritas dispensandi in eo quod communiter est statutum, secundum quod est necessarium in aliquo casu particulari. Et, si quidem lex sit humana, per homines similem potestatem habentes dispensari potest. Si autem lex sit divinitus posita, auctoritate divina dispensatio fieri potest; sicut, in veteri lege, ex dispensatione indultum videtur uxores plures habere et concubinas, et uxoris repudium.\n\ncommixtio sit peccatum. 1. Sicut autem contra rationem est ut aliquis carnali conjunctione utatur contra id quod convenit proli generandæ et educandæ, ita etiam secundum rationem est quod aliquis carnali conjunctione utatur secundum quod congruit ad generationem et educationem prolis. Lege autem divina hæc solum prohibita sunt quæ rationi adversantur, ut ex supradictis (c. cxxii-cxxv) patet. Inconveniens est igitur dicere quod omnis carnalis\n\nconjunctio sit peccatum. 2. Adhuc, Quum membra corporis sint quædam animæ instrumenta, cujuslibet membri finis est usus ejus, sicut et cujuslibet alterius instrumenti. Quorumdam autem membrorum corporis usus est carnalis commixtio. Carnalis igitur commixtio est finis quorumdam membrorum corporis. Id autem quod est finis aliquarum naturalium rerum non potest esse secundum se malum, quia ea quæ naturaliter sunt ex divina Providentia ordinantur ad finem, ut ex supradictis (c. cvii) patet. Impossibile est igitur quod carnalis commixtio sit\n\nsecundum se mala. 3. Amplius, Naturales inclinationes insunt rebus a Deo, qui cuncta movet. Impossibile est igitur quod naturalis inclination alicujus speciei sit ad id quod est secundum se malum. Sed omnibus animalibus perfectis inest naturalis inclination ad conjunctionem carnalem. Impossibile est igitur quod carnalis commixtio sit\n\nsecundum se mala. 4. Item, Illud sine quo non potest esse aliquid quod est bonum et optimum, non est secundum se malum. Sed perpetuitas speciei non conservatur in animalibus, nisi per generationem, quæ est ex commixtione carnali. Impossibile est igitur quod commixtio carnalis sit\n\nsecundum se mala. Hinc est quod dicitur: Mulier non peccat si nubat,\n\nI Cor. vii, 36. Per hoc autem excluditur error quorumdam dicentium omnem carnalem conjunctionem esse illicitam; unde to- A, B, C, D, E: « Est. » A, B, C, D, E, F: « Illud. » E omittit: « Autem. » taliter matrimonium et nuptias damnant; quorum quidam hoc ideo dicunt quia credunt corporalia 1, non a bono, sed a malo principio esse.\n\npeccatum secundum se. 1. Sicut autem venereorum usus absque peccato est, si secundum rationem fiat, ita etiam et usus ciborum. Fit autem unumquodque secundum rationem quando ordinatur secundum quod congruit debito fini. Finis autem debitus sumptionis ciborum est conservatio corporis per nutrimentum. Quicumque igitur cibus hoc facere potest, absque peccato potest sumi. Nullius igitur cibi sumptio secundum\n\nse est peccatum. 2. Adhuc, Nullius rei usus secundum se malus est, nisi res ipsa secundum se mala sit. Nullus autem cibus secundum naturam malus est, quia omnis res secundum suam naturam bona est, ut supra ostensum est (c. vii); potest autem aliquis cibus esse alicui malus, in quantum contrariatur salubritati ipsius secundum corpus. Nullius igitur cibi sumptio, secundum quod est talis res, est peccatum secundum se; sed potest esse peccatum, si praeter rationem aliquis ipso utatur\n\ncontra 2 suam salutem. 3. Amplius, Uti rebus ad hoc ad quod sunt non est secundum se malum. Sunt autem plantæ propter animalia; animalium vero quædam propter alia, et omnia propter hominem, sicut ex superioribus (c. Lxxxi) patet. Uti igitur vel plantis vel animalium carnibus, vel ad esum vel ad quidquid aliud sunt homini utilia, non est\n\nsecundum se peccatum. 4. Item, Defectus peccati ab anima derivatur ad corpus, et non e converso; peccatum enim dicimus secundum quod deordinatur voluntas. Cibi autem immediate ad corpus pertinent, non ad animam. Non igitur ciborum sumptio secundum se potest esse peccatum, nisi quatenus repugnat rectitudini voluntatis. Quod quidem contingit; uno modo, propter repugnantiam ad proprium finem ciborum, sicut quum aliquis, propter delectationem quæ est in cibis, utitur cibis contrariantibus corporis saluti, vel secundum speciem ciborum vel secundum quantitatem; alio modo secundum quod repugnat conditioni ejus qui utitur cibis, vel eorum cum quibus conversatur, puta quum quis accuratius cibis 3 utitur quam sua facultas sustineat, et aliter quam eorum mores habeant cum quibus convivit; tertio modo secundum quod cibi sunt aliqua lege prohibiti, propter aliquam causam specialem: puta, in veteri lege, quidam cibi prohibebantur propter significationem; in Ægypto prohibebatur antiquitus comestio carnis bovinæ, ne agricultura impediretur; vel etiam secundum quod aliquæ regulæ prohibent aliquibus 4 cibis uti,\n\nad concupiscentiam refrenandam. Hinc est quod Dominus dicit: Non quod intrat in os coinquinat hominem Matth. xv, 11; et ducitur: Omne quod in macello venit manducate, nihil interrogantes, propter conscientiam, I Cor. x, 25; et ducitur: Omnis creatura Dei bona est, et nihil rejiiciendum quod cum gratiarum actione percipitur,\n\nI Tim. iv, 4. Per hoc autem excluditur quorumdam error, qui usum quorumdam ciborum secundum se dicunt esse illicitum; de quibus Apostolus dicit ibidem: In novissimis temporibus, discedent quidam a fide, attendentes spiritibus erroris et doctrinis dæmoniorum... prohibentium nubere, abstinere a cibis quos Deus creavit ad perciipendum cum gratiarum actione, I\n\nTim. iv, 1 et 3. Quia vero usus ciborum et venereorum non est secundum se illicitus, sed solum secundum quod exit ab ordine rationis illicitus esse potest, ea vero quæ exterius possidentur necessaria sunt ad sumptionem ciborum, ad educationem prolis et sustentationem familiæ, et ad alias corporis necessitates, consequens est quod nec secundum se etiam divitia-rum possessio est illicita, si ordo rationis servetur, ita scilicet quod juste homo possideat quæ habet, et quod in eis finem voluntatis suæ non constituat, et quod eis debito modo utatur ad suam et aliorum utilitatem. Hinc est quod Apostolus divites non condemnat, sed eis certam regulam divi- 1 Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, etc. — Edit. : « Temporalia. » 2 Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, Parm. et Edit. : « Se-cundum. » 3 A : « Carioribus. » 4 A, B, C, D : « Quibusdam. » tiis utendi tradit 1, dicens : Divitibus hujus sæculi præcipe non sublime sapere, neque sperare in incerto divitiarum, sed in Deo vivo, qui præstat nobis omnia abunde ad fruendum, bene agere, divites fieri in bonis operibus, facile tribuere, communicare, I Tim. vi, 17 et 18; et : Beatus dives qui inventus est sine macula et qui post aurum non abiit, nec speravit in pecunia et\n\nthesauris, Eccli. xxxi, 8. Per hoc etiam excluditur quorumdam error, qui, ut Augustinus dicit : « Apostolicos se arrogantissime vocaverunt, eo quod in suam communionem non acciperent utentes conjugibus et res proprias possidentes, quales habet catholica Ecclesia et monachos et clericos plurimos; sed ideo isti hæreticti sunt quoniam, se ab Ecclesia separantes, nullam spem putant eos habere qui utuntur his rebus quibus ipsi carent, » De hæresib. c. xl 2.\n\nad proximum ordinatur. 1. Ex his ergo quæ dicta sunt manifestum est quod secundum legem divinam homo inducitur ut ordinem rationis servet in omnibus quæ in ejus usum venire possunt. Inter omnia autem quæ in usum hominis veniunt, præcipua sunt etiam alii homines. Homo autem naturaliter animal sociale est; indiget enim multis quæ per unum solum parari non possunt. Oportet igitur quod ex lege divina instituatur homo ut secundum ordinem rationis se habeat\n\nad alios homines. 2. Adhuc, Finis divinæ legis est ut homo Deo adhæreat. Juvatur autem unus homo in hoc ex alio, tam quantum ad cognitionem, quam etiam quantum ad affectionem; juvant enim se homines mutuo in cognitione veritatis, et unus alium provocat ad bonum et retrahit a malo; unde dicitur : Ferrum ferro exacuitur, et homo exacuit faciem amici sui, Proverb. xxvii, 17; et : Melius est duos esse simul quam unum; habent enim emolumentum societatis suæ; si unus ceciderit, ab altero fulcietur. Væ soli! quia, quum ceciderit, non habet sublevantem se. Et si dormie-rint duo, fovebuntur mutuo; unus quomodo calefiet ? Et si quispiam prævaluerit contra unum, duo resistunt ei, Eccles, iv, 9-12. Oportuit igitur lege divina ordinari societatem\n\nhominum ad invicem. 3. Amplius, Lex divina est quædam ratio divinæ Providentiæ ad homines gubernandos. Ad divinam autem Providentiam pertinet singula quæ ei subsunt sub debito ordine continere, ut scilicet suum locum et gradum teneat unumquodque. Lex igitur divina sic homines ad invicem ordinat, ut unusquisque suum ordinem teneat; quod est homines pace habere ad invicem; « pax enim » hominum « nihil aliud est quam » ordinata concordia, « ut Augustinus dicit, De civit. Dei, l. XIX, c. xiii, Ed. L Vivès,\n\ntom. XXIV p. 510.) 4. Item, Quandocumque aliqua ordinantur sub aliquo, oportetilla concorditer esse ordinata ad invicem; alias, se invicem impedirent in consecutione 3 finis communis; sicut patet in exercitu, qui concorditer ordinatur ad victoriam, quæ est finis ducis. Unusquisque autem homo per legem divinam ordinatur ad Deum. Oportuit igitur per legem divinam inter homines, ne se invicem impedirent, ordinatam\n\nconcordiam esse, quæ est pax. Hinc est quod dicitur : Qui posuit fines tuos pacem, Psalm. cxLVII, 3; et Dominus dicit : Hæc locutus sum vobis ut in me pacem\n\nhabuatis, Joann. xvi, 33. Tunc autem ordinata concordia inter homines servatur, quando unicuique quod suum est redditur; quod est justitiæ 4; et ideo dicitur : Opus justitiæ pax, Is. xxxii, 17. Oportuit igitur per legem divinam justitiæ præcepta dari, ut unusquisque alteri redderet quod suum est, et abstineret a nocumentis ei 5 inferendis. Inter homines autem maxime est aliquis parentibus debitor; et ideo, inter præcepta legis quæ nos ad proximum ordinant, ponitur : Honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam, Exod. xx, 12; in quo intelligitur præcipi ut tam parentibus quam etiam aliis unusquisque reddat quod debet, secundum illud : Reddite omnibus debita, Rom. xiii, 7. Deinde ponuntur præcepta quibus præcipitur abstinendum esse a nocumentis proximo inferendis, ut neque factis eum offendamus in persona propria, 1 A, B, C, D, E, F : « Tradidit. » 2 « Apostolici qui se isto nomine... » (Ed L. Vivès, tom. XXV, p. 224.) 5 A : « A consecutione boni. » 4 A : « Opus. » 5 A, B, C, D, E, F : « Alteri. » quia dictum est: Non occides, Exod. xx, 13; neque in persona conjuncta, quia scriptum est: Non mæchaberis, Ibid. xx, 14; neque etiam in exterioribus rebus, quia scriptum est: Non furtum facies, Ibid. xx, 15; prohibemur etiam ne contra justitiam proximum verbo offendamus, quia scriptum est: Non loqueris contra proximum falsum testimonium, Ibid. xx, 16. Et, quia Deus etiam cordium judex est, prohibemur ne corde proximum offendamus, concupiscendo scilicet uxorem aut\n\naliquam rem ejus. Ad hujusmodi autem justitiam observandam, quæ lege divina statuitur, dupliciter homo inclinatur: uno modo, ab interiori; alio modo, ab exteriori. Ab interiori quidem, dum homo voluntarius est ad observandum ea quæ præcipit lex divina; quod quidem fit per amorem hominis ad Deum et proximum; qui enim diligit aliquem, sponte et delectabiliter ei reddit quod debet et etiam liberaliter superaddit; unde tota legis impletio ex dilectione dependet, secundum illud Apostoli: Plenitudo legis est dilectio, Rom. xiii, 10; et Dominus dicit quod in his duobus mandatis, scilicet in dilectione Dei et proximi, universa lex pendet, Matth. xxii, 40. Sed, quia aliqui interius non sunt sic dispositi ut ex seipsis sponte faciant quod lex jubet, ab exteriori trahendi sunt ad justitiam legis implendam; quod qui dem fit dum timore pœnarum, non liberaliter, sed serviliter legem implent; unde dicitur: Quum feceris judicia tua in terra, scilicet puniendo malos, justitiam discent habitatores orbis, Is. xxvi, 9. Alii vero sic sunt dispositi, ut ex seipsis sponte faciant quod\n\nlex jubet. Secundi igitur sibi ipsi sunt lex, habentes charitatem, quæ eos loco legis inclinat et liberaliter operari facit. Lex igitur exterior non fuit necessarium quod propter eos poneretur; sed propter illos qui ex seipsis non inclinantur ad bonum; unde dicitur: Lex justo non est posita, sed injustis, I Tim. 1, 9; quod non est sic intelligendum quasi justi non teneantur ad legem implendam, ut quidam male intellexerunt, sed quia isti inclinantur ex seipsis ad justitiam facien-dam, etiam sine lege.\n\nquasi lege posita. Ex præmissis autem apparet quod ea quæ divina lege præcipiuntur rectitudi-nem habent, non solum quia sunt lege posita, sed\n\netiam secundum naturam. 1. Ex præceptis enim legis divinæ mens hominis ordinatur sub Deo, et omnia alia quæ sunt in homine sub ratione. Hoc autem naturalis ordo requirit quod inferiora superioribus subdantur. Sunt igitur ea quæ lege divina præcipiuntur secundum\n\nse naturaliter recta. 2. Præterea, homines ex divina Providentia sortiuntur naturale judicatorium rationis, ut principium propriarum operationum. Naturalia autem principia ad ea ordinantur quæ sunt naturaliter. Sunt igitur aliquæ operationes naturaliter homini convenientes, quæ sunt secundum se rectæ, et non solum\n\nquasi lege posita. 3. Præterea, Quorumcumque est natura determinata, oportet esse operationes determinatas quæ illinaturæ conveniant; propria enim operatio uniuscujusque naturam ipsius sequitur. Constat autem hominum naturam esse determinatam. Oportet igitur operationes esse aliquas secundum se\n\nhomini convenientes. 4. Adhuc, Cuicumque est aliquid naturale, oportet etiam esse naturale id sine quo illud haberi non potest; natura enim non deficit in necessariis. Est autem homini naturale quod sit animal sociale; quod ex hoc ostenditur, quod unus homo solus non sufficit ad omnia quæ sunt humanæ vitæ necessaria. Ea igitur sine quibus societas humana conservari non potest sunt homini naturaliter convenientia. Hujusmodi autem sunt: unicuique quod suum est conservare, et ab injuriis abstinere. Sunt igitur aliqua in humanis actibus naturaliter recta. 5.\n\nAmplius, Supra ostensum est (c. Lxxxi) quod omnis homo naturaliter hoc habet quod utatur rebus inferioribus ad suæ vitæ necessitatem. Est autem aliqua mensura determinata secundum quam usus prædictarum rerum humanæ vitæ est conveniens; quæ quidem mensura si prætermittatur, fit homini nocivum, sicut A: « Dependet. » — A: « Indispositi autem. » B: « Sicut dispositi ut ex seipsis. » A, B, C, D, E, F: « Primi igitur. » A: « Quasi sunt. » apparet in sumptione inordinata ciborum. Sunt igitur aliqui actus\n\nhomini naturaliter convenientes. 6. Item, Secundum naturalem ordinem, corpus hominis est propter animam, et inferiores virtutes animæ propter rationem, sicut et in aliis rebus materia est propter formam, et instrumenta propter principalem agentem. Ex eo autem quod est ad aliud ordinatum, dicitur ei auxilium provenire, non autem aliquod impedimentum. Estigitur naturaliter rectum quod sic procuretur ab homine corpus et inferiores vires animæ ut ex hoc, et actus rationis, et bonum ipsius minime impediatur magis autem juvetur. Si autem secus accideret, erit naturaliter peccatum. Violentiae igitur et comessationes et inordinatus venereorum usus, per quæ actus rationis impeditur, et subdi passionibus, quæ liberum judicium rationis esse non sinunt,\n\nsunt naturaliter mala. 7. Præterea, Unicuique naturaliter conveniunt ea quibus tendit in suum finem naturalem; quæ autem e contrario se habent sunt ei naturaliter inconvenientia. Ostensum est autem supra (c. cxv) quod homo naturaliter ordinatur in Deum, sicut in finem. Ea igitur quibus homo inducitur in cognitionem et amorem Dei sunt naturaliter recta; quæcumque vero e contrario se habent sunt\n\nnaturaliter homini mala. Patet igitur quod bonum et malum, in humanis actibus, non solum sunt secundum legis positionem, sed etiam\n\nsecundum naturalem ordinem. Hinc est quod dicitur judicia Domini sunt vera justificata in\n\nsemetipsa, Psalm. xviii, 10. Per hoc autem excluditur positio dicentium quod justa et recta sunt secundum legem posita.\n\nin lege divina. Quia vero optimum hominis est ut mente Deo adhæreat et rebus divinis, im- Quod divinum regimen ad homines est sicut regimen paternum. Videtur autem paternum regimen aliquam similitudinem habere cum divino regimine. Nam etiam pater curam habet de filio, non solum quantum ad ea in quibus ordinatur ad alios, sicut rex, sed etiam quantum ad ea quæ pertinent ad ipsum secundum se, quod de Deo etiam supra (lib. III, cap. xciii) ostensum est: et hoc rationaliter accidit; nam sicut Deus, ita et pater naturalem originem homini præstat. Unde divinum regimen et paternum ad aliquem hominem extenditur, non solum secundum quod polliticus est, sed etiam secundum quod in sua natura subsistit. In hoc tamen utrumque regimen differt. Quod paternum regimen ad illa tantum se extendere potest quæ in homine apparent exterius; divinum autem regimen etiam ad ea quæ interius sunt. Cura enim alicujus non potest esse de his quæ ipsum latent; homines autem occulta cordium latent quæ Deo sunt manifesta, ut ex superioribus (lib. I, cap. lix) patet. Requirit igitur Deus ab homine non solum quod exterius agat, sed etiam qualiter exterius afficiatur, et quid facere velit, et quid ex his quæ facit intendat. Circa hæc autem hominis cura esse non potest, nisi quatenus per exteriores actus interior dispositio explicatur. Unusquisque autem curam habet aliquorum secundum quod ad ipsum pertinent; nam quod de his quæ ad ipsum non pertinent curam gerat, ut curiosus vituperatur. Alio vero ordine unus homo est pertinens ad alterum, alio autem ad Deum. Unus enim homo ad alterum pertinet, vel secundum naturalem originem quæ per corporis traductionem fit, vel per aliquam operum exteriorum conjunctionem: secundum interiores enim actus homo non potest alteri communicare, nisi mediantibus actibus exterioribus. Homo autem pertinet ad Deum secundum quod ab ipso originem habet, cujus quidem originis ratio et naturalem; quæ autem e contrario se habent sunt ei naturaliter inconvenientia. Ostensum est autem supra (c. cxv) quod homo naturaliter ordinatur in Deum, sicut in finem. Ea igitur quibus homo inducitur in cognitionem et amorem Dei sunt naturaliter recta; quæcumque vero e contrario se habent sunt naturaliter homini mala. Patet igitur quod bonum et malum, in humanis actibus, non solum sunt secundum legis positionem, sed etiam secundum naturalem ordinem. Hinc est quod dicitur judicia Domini sunt vera justificata in semetipsa, Psalm. xviii, 10. Per hoc autem excluditur positio dicentium quod justa et recta sunt secundum legem posita. De consiliis quæ dantur in lege divina. Quia vero optimum hominis est ut mente Deo adhæreat et rebus divinis, im- ordo attendi potest secundum similitudinem hominis ad Deum: unumquodque enim agit sibi simile. Magis autem accedit homo ad Dei similitudinem secundum animam quam secundum corpus; maxime autem secundum mentem. Unde manifestum est quod in origine hominis, secundum quod a Deo procedit, principale intentum est mens, et propter eam producuntur a Deo aliæ partes animæ; et propter animam producitur corpus: sic igitur Deo præcipue cura est de mente hominis. Consequenter autem de aliis partibus animæ, et post has de corpore: et hinc est quod per mentem homo ultimum finem attingit, qui est humana felicitas, ut supra (lib. III, cap. xxxvii) ostensum est. Alia vero quæ sunt in homine, organice deserviunt ad beatitudinem percipiendam. Ex his igitur apparet quod hominum regimen curam habet de interioribus secundum quod ordinantur ad exteriora, et per ea explicantur: Deus autem e converso curam habet de exterioribus secundum quod ordinantur ad interiora, maxime quantum ad mentem, per quam homo est capax felicitatis: felicitas autem humana consistit in fruitione Dei, sicut supra (loco citato) ostensum est. Ad hoc igitur ordinatur tota cura quam habet Deus de homine, ut mens ejus præparetur ad divinam fruitionem, ad quam præparetur fide, spe et caritate. Per fidem enim disponitur mens hominis ut cognoscat Deum aliquid supra se esse; per spem autem comfortatur ut tendat in ipsum, tanquam in suum bonum; per caritatem figitur in ipso ut immobiliter ei adhæreat: omnia igitur quæ Deus ab homine requirit in hac vita, ad ista ordinantur. Hinc est quod dicitur, Deut. x, 12: Et nunc, Israel, quid Dominus Deus tuus petit a te, nisi ut timeas Dominum Deum tuum et ambules in viis ejus? et pª Corinth. xii, 13: Nunc autem manent fides, spes et charitas, tria hæc. Quia vero humana mens secundum suam naturam inter cæteras intellectuales naturas etiam possibile autem est quod homo intense circa diversa occupetur, ad hoc quod liberius feratur in Deum mens hominis dantur in divina lege consilia, quibus homines ab occupationibus præsentis perfection est; quanto autem aliquid est perfectius, tanto est virtuosius ad tendendum in suum finem; manifestum est quod mens humana infirmior est secundum suam naturam ad tendendum in Deum, qui est finis omnium entium, quam superiores angelorum mentes: et hæc quidem infirmitas quantum ad duo potest attendi. Primo quidem quantum ad debilitatem virtutis intellectivæ quæ est in anima humana, in comparatione ad superiores intellectuales substantias: non enim potest immediate in ipsam intelligibilem veritatem tendere, sed oportet quod eam ex sensibilibus colligat, ut ex superioribus (lib. III, capp. xLI et cxIX) patet. Secundo vero quantum ad impedimenta quibus retrahitur, ne totaliter possit in Deum ferri; quæ quidem impedimenta, ex parte corporis sunt, cujus sustentationi et quieti curam impendere oportet, et ex parte inferiorum virium animæ. Nam commotiones phantasmatum et perturbationes passionum perturbant quietem mentis, quæ est necessaria ad hoc quod mens libere feratur in Deum. Et hæc quidem impedimenta totaliter ab homine tolli non possunt, quamdiu in mortali corpore vivit: oportet enim quod ad ea quæ sunt necessaria mortali vitæ intendat; per quod impeditur ne actu in Deum semper tendere possit. Sic autem moderari oportet impedimenta prædicta, ut saltem intentio quæ est ad Deum mente hominis non rumpatur; et quanto plus fieri potest quod etiam actu mens feratur in Deum, tanto vita hominis perfectior erit utpote fini intimior. Et per hoc etiam, quod actu fertur mens in Deum, roboratur intensio ejus ad ipsum; quæ necesse esset annullari nisi aliquando actu ferretur mens in eum ipsum. Ad hoc igitur omnia divinæ legis præcepta et consilia ordinantur, ut homini præbeanur auxilia quibus mens ejus feratur in Deum, et ut impedimenta tollantur. Quantum autem ad utrumque horum, indiget homo pace et concordia cum aliis hominibus. Indiget enim unus homo juvari ab alio; et in his quæ ad sustentationem vitæ et incolumitatem pertinent; et ad hoc quod unus alium accendat et provocet et instruat ad hoc quod feratur in Deum. Pace enim et concordia sublata per contentiones et pugnas oportet inquietari mentem hominis, et sic ab illo motu in Deum impediri. Et ideo lex divina ea providit circa homines per quæ pax et concordia inter eos conservari possit: conservatur autem pax et concordia per justitiam, quæ consistit in hoc quod unicuique reddantur et conserventur quæ sibi debentur. Cum enim, naturaliter non solum una, sed quælibet res bonum suum velit acquirere et conservare; sequitur ex necessitate discordia voluntatum, ubi unus hoc alterum privet; ex quo ulterius procedunt contentiones et pugnæ. Præcipit igitur lex divina ut homini reddatur quod sibi debetur, sicut parentibus honor; et eadem ratione unicuique quod sibi competit: præcipit etiam ut nulli in suo bono nocumentum aut impedimentum inferatur: neque verbo, dum prohibit falsum testimonium; neque facto circa propriam personam, dum prohibit homicidium; neque circa personam vitæ, quantum possibile est, retrahantur, terrenam, vitam agentes. Hoc autem non est ita necessarium homini ad justitiam, ut sine eo justitia esse non possit; non enim virtus et justitia tollitur, si homo conjunctam, dum prohibit adulterium; neque circa res, dum prohibit furtum. Et quia Deus non solum quantum ad exteriora, sed etiam quantum ad interiora hominum curam habet; incuriam uxoris, servorum et cæterarum aliarum reum lex divina prohibit: quod ad legem humanam non pertinet. Non autem sufficit pacem et concordiam inter homines per justitiae præcepta conservari, nisi ulterius inter eos fundetur dilectio. Per justitiam sufficienter hominibus providetur, ut unus alteri non inferat impedimentum: non autem ad hoc, quod uni ab aliis inferatur auxilium in his quiibus indiget. Quia forte aliquis indiget auxilio alterius in his in quibus nullus ei tenetur per justitiae debitum; aut si forte aliquis ei tenetur, non reddit. Oportuit igitur ad hoc quod se invicem homines adjuvarent, etiam præceptum mutuæ dilectionis hominibus superinduci, per quam unus alio auxilium ferat etiam in his in quibus ei non tenetur secundum justitiae debitum. Præterea, quod ex debito justitiae fit, quamdam necessitatem habet: quod autem ex dilectione fit, liberaliter exhibetur. Ad hoc igitur, quod cum quadam promptitudine etiam operatio justitiae impleatur, necessarium fuit præceptum mutuæ dilectionis. Adhuc, lex data, sive divinitus sive humanitus, inclinationi naturali respondet, et eam perficit, sicut supra dictum est. Inest autem homini naturalis inclinatio ad omnium hominum dilectionem. Hoc autem monstrat quod homo exhibit in periculis, etiam ignotis, auxilium, et in erroribus viarum directionem. Necessarium igitur fuit lege divina præceptum dilectionis dari, quod ad omnes homines extenderetur. Item, mentem hominis necesse est in divina dilectione fundari, ut supra dictum est. Ex divina autem dilectione, ex necessitate in homine sequitur hominum dilectio: nam qui vere diligit aliquem, diligit ea quæ sunt ejus; omnis autem homo est alteri quasi quædam imago Ejus, et valde potens Ipso frui. Oportet igitur ut qui diligit Deum, diligat etiam proximum. Amplius, oportet amicos in voluntate concordare. Deus autem homines diligit sicut sua opera, in quibus seipsum præbet fruendum: dilectio igitur Dei etiam hominis dilectionem requirit. Hinc est quod dicitur pª Joannis iv, 21: Hoc mandatum habemus, ut qui diligit Deum, diligat et fratrem suum. Et Joan. xv, 12: Hoc est præceptum meum, ut diligatis invicem, sicut dilexi vos. Patet autem ex prædictis, quod dilectio sufficit ad opera justitiae facienda. Unde omnia præcepta legis, quæ ordinantur ad justitiam,ordinantur etiam ad dilectionem, propter quod dicitur prima Thimoth. pº 5: Finis præcepti caritas est. Facit autem aliquid amplius dilectio, quam justitiae debitum, et quantum ad hoc, quod instigat ad promptius operandum, et quantum ad hoc quod inducit ab subveniendum illis, quibus non tenemur ex justitiae debito; et etiam in quibus eis non tenemur, licet sit nobis ad eos aliqua conjunctio; et ulterius in quantum ad hoc, quod se extendit ad illos cum quibus nulla est secundum ordinem rationis corporalibus et terrenis rebus utatur; et ideo hujusmodi divinæ legis admonitiones dicuntur consilia, et non præcepta, in quantum suadetur homini ut propter meliora mi-nobis in vita conjunctio; imo etiam ad illos qui contrarii nobis sunt, in quantum fundatur in dilectione divina, quæ ad omnes homines est. Et inde est, quod dicitur Rom. xiii, 10, quod plenitudo legis est dilectio; ad quam plenitudinem insinuandam dantur nobis a Deo præcepta et consilia de operibus misericordiae, de dilectione inimicorum, et subventione eorum, et de aliis hujusmodi quæ supra justitiam habundant. Quia vero præcepta justitiae quæ sunt supra posita, dilectionem proximi requirunt, quæ ex dilectione Dei dependet, sine qua, recedente fide et spe, non potest mens humana debito modo in Deum tendere; manifestum est quod præmissa de necessitate ab homine requiruntur ita quod eis prætermissis homo ab ordine qui est ad Deum totaliter separetur. Vita autem hominis dicitur esse secundum finem ad quem ordinatur. Nam qui finem vitæ suæ in voluptatibus constituunt, dicuntur agere vitam voluptuosam: qui autem finem suum in contemplatione veritatis constituunt, dicuntur sequi vitam contemplativam: unde et qui finem suum in fruitione divina constituunt, vita eorum est Deo adhærere. Hæc autem est simpliciter vita hominis: nam ad hunc finem homo naturaliter ordinatur, ut supra (lib. III, cap. xxxvii) ostensum est. Ex aliis autem finibus dependet vita hominis secundum quid; in quantum alii fines non sunt homini impositi ex natura sed ex electione. Cum igitur mors vitæ opponatur; mors quædam hominis est, cum ab ordine qui est ad Deum separatur. Unde et peccata quibus homo a tali ordine deficit, dicuntur peccata mortalia; et illa legis documenta quibus ad promissa justitiae, caritatis, spei et fidei homines obligantur, dicuntur præcepta vel prohibitiones: quia sunt de necessitate observanda. Sicut autem ad hoc quod mens feratur in Deum necessaria est pax quæ est ad proximos cum quibus homo debet convivere et ab eis juvari, ita necessaria est ad hoc pax homini quantum ad ea quæ sunt in seipso. Unde consequenter considerandum videtur homini qualiter mentis quies seu tranquillitas impediatur, et qualiter divina lege impedimenta removeantur. Est autem considerandum, quod mens impeditur quominus libere feratur in Deum, dupliciter. Uno modo, per hoc quod aliæ potentiæ inferiores in suis actibus intenduntur. Cum enim una potentia in suo actu roboretur, trahit ad se intentionem hominis, quæ non potest simul ad plura dispergi: unde necesse est quod alia potentia, vel totaliter impediatur in suo actu, vel quod ejus actus diminuatur. Inferiores autem vires, dico vires sensitivas: tam apprehensivas, ut quoscumque sensus exteriores et interiores, ut phantasiam et alias vires consequentes; quam etiam appetitivas, ut irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Unde cum fuerit fortis delectatio in sensu aut multi motus in phantasia, vel in venereis inclinatio concupiscibilis, aut irascibilis in aliud, necesse est quod mens in suo actu impediatur quonimus feratur in Deum. Alio modo, ex parte ipsius mentis, per hoc quod circa aliqua alia occupetur. Non enim una potentia in plura\n\nob-nus bona prætermittat. Occupatur autem humana sollicitudo, secundum communem modum humanæ vitæ, erga tria: Primo quidem, circa propriam personam, quid agat aut ubi conversetur; secundojecta potest simul perfecte moveri. Sed quia mens utitur inferioribus viribus quasi instrumentis, cum ei obediunt, et circa diversa occupari potest in ordine ad unum ad cujus apprehensionem per illa juvatur; intelligendum est eatenus mentem per inferiores vires aut per occupationem ejus circa alias impediri quominus feratur in Deum, in quantum illa ad motum mentis in Deum non ordinantur: alioquin, per prædicta, mens hominis ab hoc quod feratur libere in Deum non impeditur sed magis juvatur. Si quidem occupationem mentis circa alia homo non potest omnino vitare, per hoc quod oportet eum sollicitari circa ea quæ sunt necessaria vitæ corporali, sunt tamen hujus sollicitudinis in hominibus gradus varii quorum quidem primus consistit in hoc, quod homo sollicitatur circa ea quæ sunt vitæ corporalis, quantum communis modus humanæ vitæ requirit, ut scilicet providat in necessariis sibi, uxori, filiis, et aliis personis ad eum pertinentibus secundum statum suum: et hic quidem sollicitudinis gradus licitus est et quasi homini connaturalis. Secundus autem gradus est cum homo amplius sollicitatur circa prædicta, quam communis modus humanæ vitæ requirit secundum statum proprium; non tamen hæc sollicitudo in tantum procedit, quod homo propter ipsam ab ordine qui est in Deum recedat, transgrediendo præcepta justitiae et caritatis. In hoc quidem pecatum manifestum est, cum propriam mensuram homo excedat; non tamen mortale, quia contra præcepta justitiae et caritatis nihil molitur. Dici-tur autem peccatum veniale, quasi facile remissibile, tum quia, manenti in ordine ad finem si error aliquis accidat, de facili patet via dirigendi; sicut in scientiis speculativis, si aliquis habet veram conceptionem de principiis, de facili potest per ea corrigere si quos errores circa conclusiones patiatur. Finis autem in activis est sicut principium in speculativis: tum etiam quia in amicitia manenti de facili remittitur si quid deli-quit: tum etiam quia non est facile omnino modum tenere et in nullo excedere. Unde qui regulam rationis quæ sumitur ex fine, a corde suo non abjicit, licet in his quae regulanda sunt non omnimode rectitudinem servet, non est multum culpandus, sed venia dignus. Tertius autem gradus est, cum sollicitudo præmissa in tantum excrescit, quod anima omnino ab ordine qui est in Deum recedit, transgrediendo præcepta justitiae et caritatis, fidei, et spei, sine quibus mens hominis non potest ordinari in Deum: et hoc manifeste peccatum mortale est. Quartus autem gradus est, quando e contrario sollicitudo hominis sistit infra communem modum humanæ vitæ; quod quidem si ex remissione animi, aut ex aliqua indebita intensione fiat, ad ignaviam reputatur. Utrumque enim transgrediendi medium culpabile est. Si autem ad hoc, ut rebus melioribus vacetur, scilicet ut mens feratur libere ad divina, perfectius est humana virtute: ad quam quidem perfectionem sic tradendam homini præcepta data non fuerunt, sed magis consilia ad provocandum. — (Ex cod. Berg.) autem, circa personas sibi conjunctas, praecipue uxorem et filios; tertio, circa res exteriores procurandas quibus homo indiget ad sustentationem vitæ. Ad amputandam igitur sollicitudinem circa res exteriores, datur homini in lege divina consilium paupertatis, ut scilicet res hujus mundi abjiciat, quibus animus ejus sollicitudine aliqua implicari posset; hinc est quod Dominus dicit: Si vis perfectus esse, vade, vende quæ habes, et da pauperibus..., et veni, sequere me, Matth. xix, 21. Ad amputandum autem sollicitudinem uxoris et filiorum, datur homini consilium de virginitate vel continentia; hinc est quod dicitur: De virginibus autem praecptum Domini non habeo; consilium autem do, I Cor. vii, 35; et hujusmodi consilii rationem assignans, subdit: Qui sine uxore est sollicitus est quæ Domini sunt, quomodo placeat Deo. Qui autem cum uxore est sollicitus est quæ sunt mundi, quomodo placeat uxori, et divisus est, Ibid. vii, 32 et 33. Ad amputandam autem sollicitudinem hominis etiam circa seipsum, datur consilium obedientiæ, per quam homo dispositionem suorum actuum committit superiori; propter quod dicitur: Obedite praecpositis vestris et subjacete eis. Ipsi enim pervigilant, quasi rationem pro animabus vestris\n\nreddituri, Hebr. xiii, 17. Quia vero summa perfectio humanæ vitæ in hoc consistit quod mens hominis Deo vacet, ad hanc autem mentis vacationem praedicta tria maxime videntur disponere, convenienter ad perfectionis statum pertinere videntur, non quasi ipsæ sint perfectiones, sed quia sunt dispositiones quædam ad perfectionem, quæ consistit in hoc quod Deo vacetur. Et hoc expresse ostendunt verba Domini paupertatem suadentis, quum dicit: Si vis perfectus esse, vade, vende quæ habes, et da pauperibus..., et veni, sequere me, Matth. xix, 21, quasi in sua sequela\n\nvitam perfectionis constituens. Possunt etiam dici perfectionis effectus et signa. Quum enim mens vehementer amore et desiderio alicujus rei afficitur, consequens est quod alia postponat. Ex hoc igitur quod mens hominis amore et desiderio ferventer in divina fertur, in quo perfectionem constare manifestum est, consequitur quod omnia quæ ipsum pos- * Pro\n\ndilectione. ** Despi ciet. Quia igitur praedicta tria dispositiones ad perfectionem sunt et effectus et signa, convenienter qui praedicta tria Deo vovent in statu\n\nperfectionis esse dicuntur. Perfectio autem ad quam praedicta disponunt in vacatione mentis circa Deum consistit; unde et praedictorum professores «Religiosi» dicuntur, quasi se Deo et sua in modum cujusdam sacrificii dedicantes: et quantum ad res, per paupertatem; et quantum ad corpus, per continentiam; et quantum ad voluntatem, per obedientiam Religio igitur in cultu divino consistit, ut supra dictum est.\n\nimpugnantium voluntariam paupertatem. Fuerunt autem aliqui paupertatis propositum improbantes, contra evangelicam doctrinam; quorum primus Vigilanius inventur; quem tamen postmodum aliqui sunt secuti, dicentes se esse legis doctores non intelligentes neque quæ loquuntur, neque de quibus affirmant, I Tim. 1, 7, qui ad hoc his et similibus\n\nrationibus sunt inducti: 1. Naturalis enim appetitus requirit ut unumquodque animal sibi provideat in necessariis suæ vitæ; unde animalia quæ non quolibet tempore anni necessaria suæ vitæ invenire possunt, quodam naturali instinctu ea quæ sunt suæ vitæ necessaria congregant illo tempore quo inveniri possunt, et ea conservant, sicut patet de apibus et formicis. Homines autem ad suæ 1 A: « Et. » 2 A: « Stare. » 3 Sic A, B, C, D, E, et cod. Berg. — F: « De erroribus. » — Edit.: « Rationes impugnantium. » vitæ conservationem multis indigent quæ non omni tempore inveniri possunt. Inest igitur naturaliter homini quod congreget et conservet ea quæ sunt sibi necessaria. Est igitur contra legem naturalem omnia congregata\n\ndispergere per paupertatem. 2. Adhuc, Naturalem affectum habent omnia ad ea quibus esse suum conservatur, in quantum omnia esse appetunt. Sed per substantiam exteriorum bonorum vita hominis conservatur. Sicut igitur ex naturali lege unusquisque suam vitam conservare tenetur, ita et exteriorem substantiam. Sicut est ergo contra legem naturæ quod aliquis sibi manum injiciat, ita et quod aliquis et necessaria vitæ sibi subtrahat\n\nper voluntariam paupertatem. 3. Amplius, Naturaliter homo est animal sociale, ut supra dictum est (c. cxxviii). Societas enim inter homines conservari non posset, nisi unus alium juvaret. Est igitur naturale hominibus quod unus alium in necessitatibus juvet. Ab hoc autem auxilio ferendo se faciunt impotentes qui exteriorem substantiam abjiciunt, per quam plurimum aliis auxilium fertur. Est igitur contra naturalem instinctum et contra amicitiæ et charitatis bonum quod homo per voluntariam paupertatem omnem\n\nsubstantiam mundi abjiciat. 4. Item, Si habere substantiam hujus mundi malum est, bonum est autem proximos liberare a malo, malum autem eos in malum inducere, consequens est quod dare alicui indigenti substantiam hujus mundi sit malum, auferre autem habenti bonum sit; quod inconveniens est. Est igitur bonum habere substantiam mundi. Eam igitur per voluntariam paupertatem totaliter\n\nabjicere malum est. 5. Præterea, Occasiones malorum vitandæ sunt. Est autem paupertas occasio mali, quia propter eam ad furta, adulationes, perjuria et his similia aliqui inducuntur. Non est igitur paupertas voluntarie assumenda, sed magis ne\n\nadveniat vitanda. 6. Amplius, Quum virtus consistat in medio, utroque extremo corrumpitur. Est autem virtus liberalitas quædam quæ dat danda et retinet retinenda; vitium autem est in minus illiberalitas, quæ retinet retinenda et non retinenda; est autem et vitium in plus quod omnia dentur; quod faciunt qui voluntarie paupertatem assumunt. Est ergo hoc vitiosum et\n\nprodigalitati simile. Hæ autem rationes auctoritate sacræ Scripturæ confirmari videntur; dicitur enim: Mendicitatem et divitias ne dederis mihi; tribue tantum victui meo necessaria; ne forte satiatus illiciar ad negandum, et dicam: Quis est Dominus? Aut egestate compulsus, furer et perjurem nomen Dei mei, Proverb. xxx, 8 et 9.\n\nRationes 3 impugnantium particulares modos vivendi in paupertate. Videtur autem hæc quæstio magis urgere, si quis specialius exsequatur modos quibus necesse est vivere eos qui voluntariam paupertatem sectantur. Est enim unus modus vivendi, quod possessiones singulorum vendantur et de pretio omnes communiter vivant; quod quidem sub Apostolis servatum videtur in Jerusalem; dicitur enim: Quotquot possessores agrorum aut domorum erant, vendentes afferebant pretia eorum quæ vendebant, et ponebant ante pedes Apostolorum. Dividebatur autem singulis prout cuique opus erat, Act. Apost. iv, 34 et 35. — Hic 4 autem modus non videtur efficaciter providere humanæ vitæ. Primo quidem, quia non est facile 5 quod plures etiam habentes 6 et magnas possessiones hanc vitam assumant, et, si conferatur inter multos pretium quod ex possessionibus paucorum divitum assumptum est, non sufficiet in multum tempus; deinde, quia possibile et facile est hujusmodi pretium, vel fraude dispensatorum, vel furto 7 aut 8 rapina deperire 9. Remanebunt igitur illi qui talem 1 Sic A, et cod. Berg. — 2 Sic cod. Berg. — Sic E et edit. — Sed edit. omittunt: « Virtutem » loco cujus E habet: « Eam. » 3 — Idem habent B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg., excepto quod E habet: « De diverso modo; » F omittit: « Eorum; » Cod. Berg. omittit: « Diversis » et habet: « Sequuntur. » 4 — — sed scriptum est in D ex alia manu ad oram codicis. 5 7 8 9 paupertatem sectantur absque sustentatione vitæ. 2. Item, Multa accidentia sunt quibus homines coguntur locum mutare. Non igitur erit facile providere his quos oportet forte per diversa loca dispergi, de pretio assumpto de possessionibus in commune redacto. Est autem alius modus, ut possessiones habeant communes, ex quibus singulis provideatur prout cuique opus fuerit, sicut in monasteriis plurimis observatur. — Sed nec hujusmodi modus videtur conveniens. 1. Possessiones enim terrenæ sollicitudinem afferunt, et propter procurationem fructuum, et propter defensionem earum contra fraudes et violentias; et tanto majorem et a pluribus oportet haberi sollicitudinem quanto majores possessiones esse oportet quæ sufficiant ad plurium sustentationem. Deperit, igitur hoc modo finis voluntariæ paupertatis, ad minus quantum ad multos, quos oportet esse circa procurandas possessiones sollicitos. 2. Item, Communis possessio solet esse causa discordiæ; non enim videntur litigare qui nihil habent commune, ut Hispani et Persæ, sed qui simul habent aliquid commune; propter quod etiam inter fratres sunt jurgia. Discordia autem maxime impedit vacationem mentis circa divina, ut dictum est (c. cxxviii). Videtur igitur iste modus vivendi impedire finem voluntariæ paupertatis. Adhuc autem est tertius modus vivendi ut de laboribus manuum suarum vivant qui voluntariam paupertatem sectantur; quem quidem vivendi modum Paulus Apostolus sequebatur, et aliis observandum suo exemplo et institutione dimisit; diciur enim: Neque gratis panem manducavimus ab aliquo, sed in labore et in fatigatione, nocte et die operantes, ne quem vestrum gravaremus. Non quasi non habuerimus potestatem, sed ut nosmetipsos formam daremus vobis ad imitandum nos. Nam et quum essemus apud vos, hoz denuntiabamus vobis, quoniam si quis non vult laborare, ne manducet II Thessal., III, 8-10. — Sed nec iste modus vivendi videtur esse conveniens. 1. Labor enim manualis necessarius est ad sustentationem vitæ, secundum quod per ipsum aliquid acquiritur. Vanum autem videtur quod quis, relinquens illud quod necessarium est, iterum acquirere laboret. Si igitur post voluntariam paupertatem est necessarium iterum acquirere unde aliquis sustentetur per laborem manualem, vanum fuit illa dimittere omnia quæ habebat ad sustentationem vitæ. 2. Adhuc, Voluntaria paupertas ad hoc consulitur ut per eam aliquis disponatur ad expeditius sequendum Christum, per hoc quod a sollicitudinibus secularibus liberatur. Majorem autem sollicitudinem requirere videtur quod aliquis proprio labore sibi victum acquirat quam quod his quæ habuit utatur ad sustentationem vitæ, et pracipe si habuit possessiones moderatas aut etiam aliqua mobilia ex quibus in promptu erat ut sumeret victus necessaria. Non igitur vivere de laboribus manuum videtur esse conveniens proposito assumentium voluntariam paupertatem. 3. Adhuc autem accedit quod etiam Dominus, sollicitudinem terrenorum a discipulis removens, sub similitudine volucrum et liliorum agri videtur eis laborem interdicere manualem; dicit enim: Respicite volatilia cæli quoniam non serunt neque metunt neque congregant in horrea, Matth. vi, 26; et iterum: Considerate lilia agri, quomodo crescunt; non laborant neque nent, Ibid. vi, 28. Videtur autem hic modus vivendi insufficiens. 1. Nam multi sunt perfectionem vitæ desiderantes, quibus non suppetit facultas aut ars ut possint labore manuum vitam transigere, quia non sunt in his nutriti nec instructi. Sic enim melioris conditionis essent ad perfectionem vitæ capessendam rustici et opifices quam qui sapientiae studio vacaverunt et in divitiis et in deliciis, quas propter Christum deserunt, sunt nutriti. Contingit etiam aliquos voluntariam paupertatem assumentes infirmari aut alias impediri quominus operari possint. Sic ergo remanerent destituti necessariis vitæ. 2. Item, Non modici temporis labor sufficit ad necessaria vitæ quærenda; quod patet in multis qui totum tempus ad hoc expendunt, vixtamen sufficientem sustentationem acquirere possunt. Si autem voluntariam paupertatem sectantes oporte- A omittit: « Etiam. » ret labore manuali victum acquirere, sequeretur quod circa hujusmodi laborem majus tempus suæ vitæ consumerunt, et, per consequens, impedirentur ab aliis magis necessariis actionibus, quæ etiam magnum tempus requirunt, sicut sunt studium sapientiæ, et doctrina, et hujusmodi alia spiritualia exercitia. Et sic paupertas voluntaria magis impediret perfectionem vitæ quam ad ipsam disponeret. Si quis autem dicat quod labor manualis necessarius est ad tollendum otium, hoc non sufficit ad propositum. 1. Melius enim esset tollere otium per occupationes in virtutibus moralibus, qui bus deserviunt organice divitiæ, puta in eleemosynis faciendis et aliis hujusmodi, quam per laborem manualem. 2. Præterea, Vanum esset dare consilium de paupertate ad hoc solum quod homines pauperes facti abstinerent ab otio, vitam suam laboribus manualibus occupantes, nisi ad hoc daretur quod nobilioribus exercitiis vacarent quam illis quæ sunt secundum vitam communem hominum. Si vero aliquis dicat quod necessarius est labor manualis ad carnis concupiscentias domandas, hoc non est ad propositum. 1. Quærimus enim utrum sit necessarium quod victum per manualem laborem voluntariam paupertatem sectantes acquirant. 2. Præterea, Possibile est multis aliis modis domare concupiscentias carnis, scilicet per jejunia, vigilias et alia hujusmodi. Labore etiam manuali ad hunc finem uti possent etiam divites, qui non habent necesse laborare propter victum quærendum. Invenitur autem et alius modus vivendi, ut scilicet voluntarium paupertatem sectantes vivant de his quæ ab aliis inferuntur, qui ad hanc perfectionem voluntariæ paupertatis proficere volunt, divitias retinentes. Et hunc modum videtur Dominus cum suis discipulis observasse; legitur enim quod mulieres quædam sequebantur Christum et ministrabant ei de facultatibus suis, Luc. viii, 3. — Sed iste etiam modus vivendi non videtur conveniens. 1. Non enim videtur rationabile quod aliquis dimittat sua et vivat de alieno. 2. Præterea, Inconveniens videtur quod aliquis ab aliquo accipiat et nihil ei rependat; in dando enim et recipiendo æqualitas justitiæ servatur. Potest autem sustineri quod illi de his quæ ab aliis inferuntur vivant qui eis serviunt in aliquo officio; propter quod et ministri altaris et prædicatores, qui doctrinam et alia divina populo dant, non inconvenienter videntur ab eis sustentationem vitæ accipere: Dignus enim est operarius cibo suo, ut Dominus dicit, Matth. x, 10; propter quod Apostolus dicit quod Dominus ordinavit iis qui Evangelium annuntiant, de Evangelio vivere, I Cor. ix, 14; sicut qui altari serviunt cum altari participant, Ibid. ix, 13. Illi ergo qui in nullo officio populo ministrant, inconveniens videtur si a populo necessaria vitæ accipiant. 3. Item, Iste modus vivendi videtur esse aliis damnosus. Sunt enim quidam quos ex necessitate oportet aliorum beneficiis sustentari, qui propter paupertatem et infirmitatem sibi non possunt sufficere; quorum beneficia oportet quod diminuantur, si illi qui voluntarie paupertatem assumunt ex his quæ ab aliis dantur debeant sustentari, quum homines non sufficiant nec sint prompti ad subveniendum magnæ multitudini pauperum; unde et Apostolus mandat quod, si aliquis habet viduam ad se pertinentem, eam sustentet, ut Ecclesia sufficiat his quæ vere viduæ sunt, I Tim. v, 16. Est igitur inconveniens ut homines paupertatem eligentes hunc modum vivendi assumant. 4. Adhuc, Ad perfectionem virtutis maxime requiritur animi libertas; hac enim sublata, de facili homines alienis peccatis communicant, vel expressse consentiendo, aut per adulationem leniendo, vel saltem dissimulando. Huic autem libertati magnum præjudicium generatur ex prædicto modo vivendi; non enim po-test esse quin homo vereatur offendere eum cujus beneficiis vivit. Prædictus igitur modus vivendi impedit perfectionem virtutis, quæ est finis voluntariæ paupertatis, et ita non videtur competere voluntarie pauperibus. 5. Amplius, Ejus quod ex alterius voluntate dependet facultatem non habemus., et cod. Berg. — C, D, E, F omittunt: « Ille » aut: « Iste. », et cod. Berg. Sed ex voluntate dantis dependet quod ex propriis det. Non igitur sufficienter providetur, in facultate sustentationis vitæ, voluntariis pauperibus per hunc modum vivendi. 6. Præterea, Necesse est quod pauperes, qui ex his quæ ab aliis dantur sustentari debent, necessitates suas aliis exponant et necessaria petant. Hujusmodi autem necessitas reddit contemptibiles mendicantes et etiam graves; homines enim superiores se aestimant illis qui per eos sustentari necesse habent, et cum difficultate dant plurimi. Oportet autem eos qui perfectionem vitæ assumunt in reverentia haberi et diligi, ut sic homines eos facilius imitentur et virtutis statum aemulentur; si autem contrarium accidat, etiam virtus ipsa contemnitur. Est igitur nocivus modus ex mendicitate vivendi his qui, propter perfectionem virtutis, voluntarie paupertatem assumunt. 7. Præterea, Perfectis viris non solum sunt vitanda mala, sed etiam ea quæ mali speciem habent; nam Apostolus dicit: Ab omni specie mala abstinete vos, I Thessal. v, 22; — et Philosophus dicit Et hic., iv, 1 quod virtuosus non solum debet fugere turpia, sed etiam ea quæ turpia videntur. Mendicitas autem habet speciem mali, quum multi propter quæstum mendicent. Non est igitur hic modus vivendi perfectis viris assumendus. 8. Item, Ad hoc datur consilium de paupertate voluntaria ut mens hominis, a sollicitudine terrenorum remota, liberius Deo vacet.\n\nsit bona. Ut autem præmissorum (c. cxxx) veritas manifestetur, quid de paupertate sentien-dum sit ex divitiis consideremus. Exteriores quidem divitiæ sunt necessariæ ad bonum virtutis, quum per eas sustentemus corpus et aliis subveniamus. Oportet autem quod ea quæ sunt ad finem ex fine bonitatem accipiant. Necesse est 1 Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. omittunt: « Ea. » 2 A, B, C, D, E, F omittunt: « Lucri. » ergo quod exteriores divitiæ sint aliquod bonum hominis, non tamen principale, sed quasi 1 secundarium; nam finis principaliter est bonum, alia vero secundum quod ordinantur in finem. Propter hoc, quibusdam visum est quod virtutes sint maxima bona hominis, exteriores autem divitiæ quædam minima bona. Oportet autem quod ea quæ sunt ad finem modum accipiant secundum exigentiam finis. In tantum igitur divitiæ bonæ sunt in quantum proficiunt ad usum virtutis. Si vero iste modus excedatur, ut impediatur usus virtutis, non jam inter bona computanda sunt, sed inter mala. Unde accidit quibusdam bonum esse habere divitias, qui eis utuntur ad virtutes; quibusdam vero malum est eas habere, qui per eas a virtute retrahuntur, vel nimia sollicitudine vel nimia affectione ad ipsas vel etiam mentis elatione\n\nex eis consurgente. Sed, quum sint virtutes activæ vitæ et contemplativæ, aliter utræque divitiis exterioribus indigent. Nam virtutes contemplativæ indigent ad solam sustentationem naturæ, virtutes autem activæ indigent, et ad hoc, et ad subveniendum aliis cum quibus convivendum est. Unde et contemplativa vita etiam in hoc perfectior est quia paucioribus indiget; ad quam quidem vitam videtur pertinere quod totaliter homo divinis rebus vacet; quam quidem perfectionem doctrina Christi homini suadet. Unde hanc perfectionem sectantibus minimum de exterioribus divitiis sufficit, quantum scilicet necesse est ad sustentationem naturæ; unde et Apostolus dicit: Habentes solum alimenta, et quibus tegamur, his contenti sumus, I\n\nTim. vi, 8. Paupertas igitur laudabilis est, in quantum hominem liberat ab illis vitiis quibus aliqui per divitias implicantur. In quantum autem sollicitudinem tollit quæ ex divitiis consurgit, est utilis quibusdam, qui scilicet sunt ita dispositi, ut circa meliora occupentur, quibusdam vero 2 nociva, qui, ab hac sollicitudine liberati, in pejores occupationes cadunt; unde Gregorius: « Sæpe qui occupati bene humanis usibus viverent, gladio suæ quietis extincti sunt » Moral. l. VII. In quantum vero paupertas bonum quod ex divitiis provenit, scilicet subventionem aliorum et sustentationem propriam, impedit, simpliciter malum est; nisi in quantum subventio qua in temporalibus proximis subveniunt per majus bonum potest recompensari, scilicet per hoc quod homo divitiis carens liberius potest divinis et spiritualibus vacare; bonum autem sustentationis propriæ adeo necessarium est, quod nullo alio bono recompensari potest; nullius enim boni obtentu debet homo sibi\n\nsustentationem vitæ subtrahere. Paupertas igitur talis laudabilis est, quum homo, a sollicitudinibus terrenis liberatus, liberius divinis et spiritualibus vacat; ita tamen quod cum ea remaneat facultas homini per licitum modum sustentandi seipsum, ad quod non multa requiruntur; et quanto modus vivendi in paupertate minorem sollicitudinem exigit, tanto paupertas est laudabilior, non autem quanto paupertas fuerit major; non enim paupertas secundum se bona est, sed in quantum liberat ab illis quibus homo impeditur quominus spiritualibus intendat; unde, secundum modum quo homo per eam liberatur ab impedimentis prædictis, est mensura bonitatis ipsius. Et hoc est commune omnibus exterioribus, quia in tantum bona sunt in quantum proficiunt ad virtutem, non autem secundum seipsa.\n\ninductarum contra paupertatem. His autem visis, rationes prædictas quibus paupertas impugnatur dissolvere\n\nnon est difficile. 1. Quamvis enim homini naturaliter insit appetitus congregandi ea quæ sunt necessaria ad vitam, ut prima ratio proponebat, non tamen hoc modo quod oporteat quemlibet circa hoc opus occupari. Nec enim in apibus omnes eidem vacant officio, sed quædam colligunt mel, quædam ex cera domos constituent; reges etiam circa hæc opera non occupantur. Et similiter necesse est in hominibus esse; quia enim multa necessaria sunt ad hominis vitam, ad quæ unus homo per se sufficere non posset, necessarium est per diversos diversa fieri, puta ut quidam sint agricultores; quidam animalium custodes; quidam aedificatores, et sic de aliis; 1 A: « Quasi necessariam. » 2 A: « Autem. » et, quia vita hominum non solum indiget corporalibus, sed magis spiritualibus, necessarium est etiam ut quidam vacent spiritualibus rebus ad meliorationem aliorum, quos oportet a cura temporalium absolutos esse. 2. Hæc autem distributio diversorum officiorum in diversas personas fit divina Providentia, secundum quod quidam magis inclinantur ad hoc officium\n\nquam ad alia. Sic ergo patet quod qui temporalia relinquunt non sibi subtrahunt sustentationem vitæ, ut secunda ratio proponebat. Remanet enim eis spes probabilis suæ vitæ sustentandæ, vel ex labore proprio, vel ex aliorum beneficiis, sive accipiant ea in possessionibus communibus, sive in victu quotidiano; sicut enim quod per amicos possumus per nos aliqualiter possumus, ut Philosophus dicit, Ethic. VIII, 14, ita et quod ab amicis habetur a\n\nnobis aliqualiter habetur. 3. Oportet autem inter homines ad invicem esse amicitiam, secundum quod sibi invicem subserviunt, vel in spiritualibus vel in terrenis officiis. Est autem majus subvenire alteri in spiritualibus quam in temporalibus quanto spiritualia sunt temporalibus potiora et magis necessaria ad finem beatitudinis consequendum. Unde qui subtrahit sibi facultatem subveniendi aliis in temporalibus per voluntariam paupertatem, ut acquirat spiritualia per quæ utilius potest aliis subvenire, non facit contra bonum societatis humanæ, ut tertia\n\nratio concludebat. 4. Patet etiam exprædictis (c. cxxxiii) quod divitiæ quoddam bonum hominis sunt, secundum quod ordinantur ab bonum rationis, non autem secundum se; unde nihil prohibet paupertatem melius esse, si per eam ad perfectius bonum aliquid ordinatur; et sic\n\nsolvitur quarta ratio. 5. Et, quia neque divitiæ, neque paupertas, neque aliud exteriorum est secundum se hominis bonum, sed solum secundum quod ordinantur ab bonum rationis, nihil prohibet ex quolibet eorum aliquod vitium oriri, quando non veniunt in usum hominis secundum regulam rationis; nec tamen propter hoc sunt simpliciter mala judicanda, sed malus usus eorum; et sic neque paupertas est abjicienda propter aliqua vitia quæ ex ea accidentaliter quando procedunt, ut quinta\n\nratio ostendere videbatur. 6. Hinc etiam considerandum est quod medium virtutis non accipitur secundum quantitatem exteriorum quæ in usum veniunt, sed secundum regulam rationis; unde quandoque contingit quod illud quod est extremum secundum quantitatem rei exterioris secundum regulam rationis est medium. Neque enim est aliquis qui admajora tendat quam magnanimus, vel qui in sumptibus magnificum magnitudine superet; medium ergo dicitur, non quantitate sumptus aut alicujus hujusmodi, sed in quantum non transcendit regulam rationis, nec ab ea deficit; quæ quidem regula non solum metitur quantitatem rei quæ in usum venit, sed conditionem personæ et intentionem ejus, opportunitatem loci et temporis, et alia hujusmodi quæ in actibus virtutum requiruntur. Non igitur aliquis per voluntariam paupertatem contrariatur virtuti, quamvis omnia deserat; nec hoc prodigaliter facit, quum hoc faciat debito fine et aliis conditionibus debitis servatis, plus enim est seipsum morti exponere, quod tamen aliquis per virtutem fortitu-dinis operatur, debitas circumstantias servans quam omnia sua relinquere, debito fine. Et sic\n\nsolvitur ratio sexta. Quod autem ex verbis Salomonis inducitur non est contrarium. Manifestum est enim quod loquitur de coacta paupertate, quæ furandi solet esse occasio.\n\nassumunt voluntariam paupertatem. Post hoc autem considerandum est de modis quibus oportet vivere eos qui\n\npaupertatem voluntariam sectantur. Et primus quidem modus, scilicet quod de pretio possessionum vendita-rum omnes communiter vivant, sufficiens est, non tamen ad longum tempus. Et ideo Apostoli hunc modum vivendi fide-libus in Jerusalem instituebant, quia prævidebant per Spiritum Sanctum quod non diu in Jerusalem simul commorari A, B, C, D, E, F: « Transcendunt... deficiunt. » Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. : XII. deberent, tum propter persecutiones et injurias eis inferendas a Judæis, tum etiam propter instantem destructionem civitatis et gentis. Unde non fuit necessarium nisi ad modicum tempus fidelibus providere; et propter hoc, transeuntes ad gentes, in quibus firmanda et perduratura erat Ecclesia, hunc modum vivendi\n\nnon leguntur instituisse. Non autem est contra hunc modum vivendi fraus quæ potest per dispensatores committi; hoc enim est commune in omni modo vivendi in quibus aliqui ad invicem convivunt; in hoc autem tanto minus quanto difficilius contingere videatur quod perfectionem vitæ sectantes fraudem committant. Adhibetur etiam contra hoc remedium per providam fidelium dispensatorum institutionem; unde sub Apostolis electi sunt Stephanus et alii qui ad hoc officium\n\nidonei reputabantur. Est autem et secundus modus vivendi conveniens voluntariam paupertatem sectantibus, ut scilicet de\n\npossessionibus communibus vivant. 1. Nec per hunc modum aliquid deferit perfectionis ad quam tendunt paupertatem voluntariam assumentes. Potest enim fieri per unius vel paucorum sollicitudinem ut possessiones modo debito procurentur; et sic alii, absque temporalium sollicitudine remanentes, libere possunt spiritualibus vacare, quod est fructus voluntariæ paupertatis. Nec etiam illis deferit aliquid de perfectione vitæ qui hanc sollicitudinem pro aliis assumunt; quod enim amittere videntur in defectu quietis recuperant in obsequio charitatis, in quo etiam\n\nperfectio vitæ consistit. 2. Nec etiam propter hunc modum vivendi concordia tollitur occasione communium possessionum; tales enim debent voluntariam paupertatem assumere qui temporalia contemnant, et tales pro temporalibus communibus discordare non possunt; præsertim quum ex temporalibus nihil præter necessaria vitæ debeant exspectare, et quum dispensatores oporteat esse fideles. Nec, propter hoc quod aliqui hoc modo vivendi abutantur, hic modus vivendi potest improbari, quum etiam bonis mali utantur male, sicut et malis\n\nboni bene utuntur. Tertius etiam modus vivendi paupertatem voluntariam assumentibus convenit, ut scilicet de labore\n\nmanuum vivant. 1. Non enim vanum est temporalia di- mittere ut iterum acquirantur per laborem manuum, sicut prima ratio in contrarium proponebat, quia divitiarum possessio et sollicitudinem requirebat in procurando, vel saltem in custodiendo, et affectum hominis ad se trahebat; quod non accidit, dum sibi quis per laborem manuum quotidianum\n\nvictum acquirere studet. 2. Patet autem quod ad acquirendum per laborem manuum victum, quantum sufficit ad naturæ sustentationem, modicum tempus sufficit et modica sollicitudino necessaria est; sed ad divitias congregandas vel superfluum victum quærendum per laborem manuum, sicut seculares artifices intendunt, oportet multum tempus impendere et magnam sollicitudinem adhibere; in quo patet solutio\n\nsecundæ rationis. 3. Considerandum est autem quod Dominus in Evangelio non laborem prohibit, sed sollicitudinem mentis pro necessariis vitæ; non enim dixit: « Nolite laborare, » sed: Nolite solliciti esse; quod a minori probat. Si enim ex divina Providentia sustentantur aves et lilia, quæ inferioris conditionis sunt, et non possunt laborare illis operibus quibus homines sibi necessarium victum acquirunt, multo magis providebit hominibus, qui sunt dignioris conditionis, et quibus dedit facultatem per proprios labores victum quærendi; ut sic non oporteat anxia sollicitudine de necessariis vitæ affligi. Unde patet quod, per verba Domini quæ inducebantur, huic modo\n\nvivendi non derogatur. Nec etiam iste modus vivendi potest reprobari per hoc quod non sufficiat. 1. Quia hoc ut in paucioribus accidit quod aliquis non possit tantum labore manuum acquirere quod sufficiat ad necessariis vitum, vel propter infirmitatem vel propter aliquid hujusmodi. Non est autem propter defectum qui in paucioribus accidit aliqua ordinatio repudianda; hoc enim et in naturalibus et etiam in voluntariis ordinationibus accidit; nec est aliquis modus vivendi per quem ita provideatur homini quin quando possit deficere; nam et divitiæ furto aut rapina possunt auferri, sicut et qui de labore manuum vivit potest debilitari. Remanet tamen aliquod remedium circa prædictum modum vivendi, ut scilicet ei cujus labor ad proprium victum non sufficit subveniatur, vel per alios ejusdem societatis qui plus laborare possunt quam eis necessarium sit, vel etiam per eos qui divitias possident, secundum legem charitatis et amicitiae naturalis, qua unus homo alteri subvenit indigenti. Unde et quum Apostolus dixissei: Si quis non vult operari, nec manducet, II Thessal. 111, 10, propter alios qui sibi non sufficiunt ad victum quærendum proprio labore, subdit admonitionem ad alios, dicens: Vos autem nolite\n\ndeficere benefacientes, Ibid. 111, 13. 2. Quum etiam ad victum necessarium pauca sufficiant, non oportet eos qui modicis sunt contenti magnum tempus occupare in necessariis quærendis labore manuum; et ita non impediuntur multum ab aliis operibus spiritualibus, propter quæ paupertatem voluntariam assumpserunt; et praecipue quum, manibus operando, possint de Deo cogitare et eum laudare et alia hujusmodi facere, quæ singulariter sibi viventes observare oportet. Sed, ne omnino in spiritualibus operibus impediantur, possunt etiam aliorum\n\nfidelium beneficiis adjuvari. 1. Licet autem voluntaria paupertas non assumatur propter otium tollendum aut carnem macerandam opere manuali, quia hoc et divitias possidentes facere possunt, non tamen est dubium quin labor manualis ad prædicta valeat, etiam sub modica victus necessitate. 2. Tamen otium per alias occupationes utiliores potest auferri et carnis concupiscentia validioribus remediis edomari; unde, propter hujusmodi, non imminet necessitas laborandi his qui alias habent vel habere possunt unde licite vivant; sola enim necessitas victus cogit manibus operari; unde et Apostolus dicit: Si quis non vult operari,\n\nnec manducet, Thessal. 111, 10. Quartus etiam modus vivendi, de his quæ ab aliis inferuntur, est conveniens aliis qui\n\nvoluntariam paupertatem assumunt. 1. Non enim hoc est inconveniens ut qui sua dimisit propter aliquod quod in utilitatem aliorum vergit, de his quæ ab aliis dantur sustentetur. Nisi enim hoc esset, societas humana permanere non posset; si enim aliquis circa sua propria tantum sollicitudinem gereret, non esset qui communi utilitati deserviret. Optimum est igitur bonorum societati quod illi qui, praætermissa propriorum cura, utilitati communi deserviunt ab his quorum utilitati deservinnt sustententur; propter hoc enim et milites de stipendiis aliorum vivunt, et rectoribus reipublicæ de communi providentur. Qui autem voluntariam paupertatem assumunt ut Christum sequantur, ad hoc utique omnia dimitunt ut communi utilitati deserviant, sapientia et eruditione et exemplo populum illustrantes, vel oratione\n\net intercessione sustentantes. 2. Ex quo etiam patet quod non turpiter vivunt de his quæ ab aliis dantur, ex quo ipsi majora rependunt, ad sustentationem temporalia accipientes et in spiritualibus aliis proficientes. Unde et Apostolus: Vestra abundantia, scilicet in temporalibus, illorum inopiam suppleat; et: Ut et illorum abundantia, scilicet in spiritualibus, vestræ inopiæ sit supplementum, II Cor. viii, 14. Qui enim alterum juvat particeps fit operis ejus in bono\n\net in malo. 3. Dum autem exemplis suis alios provocant ad virtutes, fit ut hi qui eorum exemplis proficiunt minus ad divitias afficiantur, dum vident alios propter perfectionem vitæ divitias omnino deserere. Quanto autem aliquis minus divitias amat et est virtuti magis intentus, tanto facilius divitias in aliorum necessitate distribuit. Unde qui paupertatems voluntariam assumentes, de his quæ ab aliis dantur vivunt, magis fiunt aliis pauperibus utiles, alios ad misericordiae opera verbis et exemplis provocando, quam fiant damnosi, ad sustentationem vitæ\n\naliorum beneficia accipientes. 4. Patet etiam quod homines in virtute perfecti, quales esse oportet qui paupertatem voluntariam sectantur, divitias contemnentes, libertatem animi non perdunt propter aliqua modica quæ ad sustentationem vitæ ab aliis accipiunt; quum homo libertatem animi non perdat nisi propter ea quæ in affectu suo dominantur; unde propter ea quæ homo contemnit, si sibi dentur,\n\nlibertatem non perdit. 5. Licet autem sustentatio eorum qui A omittit: « Eis. » A: « Contemnere et. » Sic A, B, C, D, E, F: — Edit.: « Necessitate. » A: « Liberalitatem. » B, C, E, F: « Perdit. » B: « Per ea. » vivunt de his quæ ab aliis dantur ex voluntate dantium dependeat, non tamen propter hoc insufficiens est ad sustentandam vitam pauperum Christi. Non enim dependet ex voluntate unius, sed ex voluntate multorum; non est autem probabile quod, in multitudine fidelis populi, non sint multi qui prompto animo subveniant necessitatibus eorum quos in reverentia habent,\n\npropter perfectionem virtutis. 6. Non est autem inconveniens si etiam necessitates suas exponant et necessaria petant, vel pro aliis, vel pro se; hoc enim et Apostoli fecisse leguntur non solum ab illis quibus prædicabant necessaria accipientes, quod magis potestatis erat quam mendicitatis, propter ordinationem Domini, ut qui Evangelio deserviunt de Evangelio vivant, sed etiam pro pauperibus qui erant in Jerusalem, qui, sua dimittentes, in paupertate vivebant, nec tamen gentibus prædicabant, sed eorum spiritualis conversatio poterat illis valere a quibus sustentabantur; unde et Apostolus talibus, non ex necessitate, sed ex voluntate dantium, persuadet eleemosynis subveniendum; quod nihil est aliud quam mendicare. Hæc autem mendicitas non reddit homines contemptibiles, si moderate fiat ad necessitatem, non ad superfluitatem, et sine importunitate, considerata conditione personarum a quibus petitur et loci et temporis; quod necesse est observari ab his qui\n\nperfectionem vitæ sectantur. 7. Ex quo etiam patet quod talis mendicitas non habet aliquam speciem turpitudinis, quam haberet si cum importunitate et indiscrete fieret ad\n\nsuperfluitatem vel voluptatem. Manifestum est autem quod mendicitas cum quadam abjectione fit; sicut enim pati ignobilius est quam agere, ita accipere quam dare, et regi obedire quam gubernare et imperare, quamvis, propter aliquid adjunctum, posset recompensatio fieri. Ea vero quæ abjectionis sunt sponte assumere ad humilitatem pertinet, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum quod necessarium est; quum enim humilitas sit virtus, nihil indiscrete operatur. Non est igitur humilitatis, sed stultitiae, si quis quodcumque abjectum assumpserit; sed si id quod necessarium est fieri propter virtutem aliquis propter abjectionem non recusat, puta si charitas exigat quod proximis aliquod abjectum officium im-pendatur, hoc propter humilitatem aliquis non recuset. Si igitur necessarium est, ad perfectionem pauperis vitæ sec-tandum, quod aliquis mendicet, hanc abjectionem ferre humilitatis est. Quandoque etiam abjecta assumere virtutis est, etsi nostrum hoc officium non requirat, ut alios nostro exemplo provocemus, quibus incumbit, ut id facilius ferant; nam et dux interdum militis officio fungitur, ut alios provocet. Quandoque etiam abjectis utimur per virtutem ut medicina quadam; puta, si alicujus animus ad immoderatam excellentiam sit pronus, utiliter debita moderatione servata abjectis utitur vel sponte vel ab aliis impositis, ad elationem animi comprimendam, dum per hæc quæ gerit sibi ipsi quodammodo parificat etiam infimos homines qui circa\n\nvilia officia occupantur. 8. Est autem omnino irrationabilis error illorum qui putant omnem sibi sollicitudinem a Domino interdictam de victu quæ-rendo. Omnis enim actus sollicitudinem requirit; si igitur homo nullam sollicitudinem de rebus temporalibus habere debet, sequitur quod nihil temporale agere debeat; quod neque possibile neque rationabile est observari; Deus enim unicuique rei ordinavit actiones secundum proprietatem suæ naturæ. Homo autem ex spirituali et corporali natura conditus est. Necessarium est igitur, secundum divinam ordinationem, ut corporales actiones exercat et spiritualibus intendat; et tanto perfection est quanto plus spiritualibus intenditur. Non est igitur modus perfectionis humanæ quod nihil corporale agatur; quia, quum corporales actiones ordinentur ad ea quæ sunt necessaria ad conservationem vitæ, si quis eas prætermittit, vitam suam negligit, quam quilibet conservare tenetur. Exspectare autem a Deo subsidium in quibus se aliquis potest per propriiam actionem juvare, prætermissa propria actione, est insipientis et Deum tentantis; hoc enim ad divinam bonitatem pertinet ut rebus provideat, non immediate omnia faciendo, sed alia movendo ad proprias actiones ut supra (c. Lxxvii) dictum est. Non est igitur exspectandum a Deo ut, omni actione propria qua sibi aliquis subvenire potest prætermissa, Deus ei subveniat; hoc enim divinæ ordinationi repugnat\n\net bonitati ipsius. Sed quia, licet in nobis sit agere, non tamen in nobis est ut actiones nostræ de- bitum finem consequantur, propter impedimenta quæ possunt contingere. Hoc dispositioni divinæ subjacet quid cuique ex actione sua proveniat. Præcipit ergo Dominus nos non debere esse sollicitos de eo quod ad nos non pertinet, scilicet de eventibus nostrarum actionum; non autem prohibuit nos esse sollicitos de eo quod ad nos pertinet, scilicet de nostro opere. Non igitur contra præceptum Domini agit qui de iis quæ ab ipso agenda sunt sollicitudinem habet, sed ille qui sollicitus est de his quæ possuntemergere etiamsi ipse proprias actiones exsequatur, ita quod debitas actiones prætermittat ad obviandum hujusmodi eventibus, contra quos debemus in Dei Providentia sperare, per quam etiam aves et herbæ sustentantur; talem enim sollicitudinem habere videtur pertinere ad errorem Gentilium, qui divinam Providentiam negant. Propter quod Dominus concludit quod non simus solliciti in crastinum, Matth. vi, 34; per quod non prohibuit quin conservaremus ea quæ sunt nobis in crastinum necessaria suo tempore, sed ne de futuris eventibus sollicitarem cum quadam desperatione divini auxilii, vel ne præoccupet hodie sollicitudinem quæ erit habenda in crastino, quia quælibet dies suam sollicitudinem habet; unde subditur: Sufficit diei\n\nmalitia sua, Ibid. Sic igitur patet quod diversis modis convenientibus vivere possunt qui voluntariam paupertatem sectantur; inter quos ille laudabilior est qui magis a sollicitudine temporalium et occupatione circa ea hominis animum reddit immunem.\n\nDe errore illorum qui perpetuam continentiam impugnant. Sicut autem contra paupertatis perfectionem, ita et contra continentiae bonum quidam perversi sensus homines sunt locuti. Quorum quidem bonum continentiae his et similibus rationibus excludere nituntur. 1. Viri enim et mulieris conjunctio ad bonum speciei ordinatur. Divinius autem est bonum speciei quam bonum individui. Magis ergo peccat qui omnino abstinet ab actu quo conservatur species quam peccaret si abstineret ab actu quo conservatur individuum, sicut sunt comestio, potus et alia hujusmodi. 2. Adhuc, Ex divina ordinatione dantur homini membra ad generationem apta, et etiam vis concupiscibilis incitans, et alia hujusmodi ad hoc ordinata. Videtur igitur contra divinam ordinationem agere qui omnino ab actu generationis abstinet. 3. Item, Si bonum est quod unus contineat, melius est quod multi, et optimum quod omnes. Sed ex hoc sequitur quod genus humanum deficiat. Non igitur bonum est quod aliquis homo omnino contineat. 4. Amplius, Castitas, sicut et aliæ virtutes, in medio consistit. Sicut igitur contra virtutem agit qui omnino concupiscentias insequitur et intemperatus est, ita contra virtutem agit qui omnino a concupiscentiis abstinet et insensibilis est. 5. Præterea, Non est possibile quin in homine concupiscentiæ venereorum aliquæ oriantur, quum naturales sint. Resistere autem omnino concupiscentiis, et quasi continuam pugnam habere, majorem inquietudinem animo tribuit quam si aliquis moderate concupiscentiis uteretur. Quumigitur inquietudo animi maxime perfectioni virtutis repugnet, videtur perfectionivirtutis adversari quod aliquis perpetuam continentiam servet. Hæc igitur contra perpetuam continentiam objici videntur. Quibus etiam adjungi potest præceptum Domini quod primis parentibus legitur esse datum: Crescite, et multiplicamini, et replete terram, Gen. 1, 28, et 1x, 7; quod non est remotum, sed magis videtur a Domino in Evangelio esse confirmatum, ubi dicit: Quod Deus conjunxit homo non separet, Matth. xix, 6, de conjunctione matrimonii loquens. Contra autem hoc præceptum expresse faciunt qui perpetuam continentiam servant. Videtur igitur non esse licitum perpetuam continentiam servare. Hoc autem non difficile est solvere secundum ea quæ præmissa sunt. 1, et cod. Berg. 4 5, et cod. Berg. 4. Considerandum enim est quod alia ratio est habenda in his quæ ad necessitatem uniuscujusque hominis pertinent, atque alia in his quæ pertinent ad multitudinis necessitatem. In his enim quæ ad uniuscujusque necessitatem pertinent, oportet quod cuilibet provideatur; hujusmodi autem sunt cibi et potus et alia quæ ad sustentationem individui pertinent; unde necessarium est quod quilibet cibo et potu utatur. In his autem quæ necessaria sunt multitudini, non oportet quod cuilibet de multitudine attribuatur, neque etiam est possibile; patet enim multa esse necessaria multitudini hominum, ut sunt cibus, potus, indumentum, domus et alia hujusmodi, quæ impossibile est quod per unum procurentur; et ideo diversorum oportet esse diversa officia, sicut etiam in corpore diversa membra ad diversos actus ordinantur. Quia igitur generatio non est de necessitate individui, sed de necessitate totius speciei, non est necessarium quod omnes homines actibus generationis vacent, sed quidam ab his actibus abstinentes aliis officiis mancipentur, puta militiæ vel contemplationi. 2. Ex quo patet solutio ad secundum. Ex divina enim Providentia dantur homini ea quæ sunt toti speciei necessaria; nec tamen oportet quod quilibet homo quolibet illorum utatur; data est enim homini industria aedificandi et virtus ad pugnandum, nec tamen oportet quod omnes sint aedificatores aut milites. Similiter, licet sit homini divinitus provisa virtus generativa et ea quæ ad actum ejus ordinantur, non tamen oportet quod quilibet actui generationis intendat. 3. Unde etiam patet solutio ad tertium. Ab his enim quæ sunt necessaria, quamvis, quantum ad singulos, melius sit quod abstineat, melioribus deditus, non tamen est bonum quod omnes abstineant; sicut et in ordine universi apparet; quamvis enim substantia spiritualis sit melior quam corporalis, non tamen esset melius universum in quo essent solum substantia spirituales, sed imperfectius; et, quamvis sit melius oculus pede in corpore animalis, non tamen esset perfectum animal nisi haberet oculum et pedem. Ita etiam nec multitudo humani generis haberet statum perfectum, nisi essent aliqui intendentes generationis actibus, et aliqui ab his abstinentes et contemplationi vacantes. 4. Quod autem quarto objicitur, quod necesse est virtutem in medio esse, solvitur per id quod supra (c. cxxxiv) jam de paupertate dictum est. Medium enim virtutis non accipitur semper secundum quantitatem rei quæ ordinatur ratione, sed secundum regulam rationis, quæ debitum finem attingit et circumstantias convenientes metitur. Et sic ab omnibus venereorum delectationibus abstinere, praeter rationem, vitium insensibilitatis dicitur; si autem secundum rationem fiat, virtus est, quæ etiam communem hominis modum excedit; facit enim homines esse in divinæ quadam similitudinis participatione; unde virginitas Angelis dicitur esse cognata. 5. Ad quintum dicendum quod sollicitudo et occupatio quam habent hi qui conjugio utuntur de uxoribus, filiis et necessariis vitæ acquirendis, est continua; inquietatio autem quam homo patitur ex pugna concupiscentiarum est ad aliquam horam, quæ etiam minoratur per hoc quod eis aliquis non consentit; nam, quanto magis aliquis delectabilibus utitur, tanto magis crescit in eo delectabilis appetitus; debilitantur enim concupiscentiae per abstinentiam et alia exercitia corporalia quæ conveniunt his qui continentiæ propositum habent. Usus etiam corporalium delectabilium magis abducit mentem a sua altitudine et impedit a contemplatione spiritualium quam inquietudo quæ provenit in resistendo concupiscentiis horum delectabilium, quia per usum delectabilium, et maxime venereorum, mens maxime carnalibus inhæret, quum delectatio faciat quiescere appetitum in re delectabili; et ideo his qui ad contemplationem divinorum et cujusque veritatis intendunt maxime no civum est venereis deditos esse et maxime utile ab eis abstinere. Nihil autem prohibet, quamvis universaliter dicatur uni homini melius esse continentiam servare quam matrimonio uti, quin alicui illud melius sit. Unde et Dominus, facta de continentia mentione, dicit: Non omnes capiunt verbum istud sed qui potest capere capiat, Matth. xix, 11 et 12. Ad id autem quod de præcepto primis parentibus dato ultimo positum est patet responsio per ea quæ dicta sunt. Præceptum enim illud respicit inclinationem naturalem quæ est in hominibus ad conservandam speciem per actum generationis; quod tamen non est necessarium per omnes exsequi, sed per aliquos, ut dictum est. Sicut autem non expedit cuilibet omni tempore actui generationis vacare, ita nec expedit ab eo omni tempore abstinere, maxime quando necessaria erat multiplicatio generationis, vel propter hominum paucitatem, sicut in principio, quando humanum genus cæpit multiplicari, sive propter paucitatem fidelis populi, quando oportebat ipsum per carnalem generationem multiplicari, ut fuit in Veteri Testamento. Et ideo consilium de continentia perpetua observanda reservatum est temporibus Novi Testamenti, quando spiritualis populus per spiritualem generationem multiplicatur.\n\nqui vota impugnant. Quibusdam autem visum est stultum esse obligare se voto ob obediendum alicui, aut ad quodcumque servandum. Unumquodque enim bonum, quanto liberius agitur, tanto virtuosius esse videtur. Quanto autem ex majori necessitate quis ad aliquid observandum adstringitur, tanto minus libere id agere videtur. Videtur igitur derogari laudabilii tati virtuosorum actuum, per hoc quod ex necessitate obedientiæ\n\nvel voti fiunt. Videntur autem hujusmodi homines necessitatis rationem ignorare. 1. Est enim triplex necessitas: Quædam coactionis, et hæc laudem virtuosorum actuum diminuit, quia voluntario contrariatur; coactum enim est quod est voluntati contrarium. — Est autem quædam necessitas ex interiori inclinatione procedens, et hæc laudem virtuosi actus non minuit, sed auget; facit enim voluntatem magis intense tendere in actum virtutis; patet enim quod habitus virtutis quanto fuerit perfectior, tanto vehementius voluntatem facit tendere in bonum virtutis et minus ab eo deficere; quod, si ad finem perfectionis devenerit, quamdam necessitatem infert ad bene agendum, sicut est in beatis, qui peccare non possunt, ut infra patebit (l. IV, c. xcii); nec tamen propter hoc aut libertati voluntatis aliquid deperit\n\naut actus bonitati. — Est autem alia necessitas ex fine, sicut quum dicitur alicui necesse esse habere navem ut transeat mare; patet autem quod nec hujusmodi necessitas libertatem voluntatis diminuit, nec actuum bonitatem; quin potius, quod quis agit quasi necessarium ad finem ex hoc ipso laudabile est, et tanto laudabilius quanto finis\n\nfuerit melior. Necessitas autem observandi quae quis vovit, aut obediendi ei cui se supposuit non est necessitas coactionis; sed nec etiam ex interiori inclinatione proveniens, sed ex ordine ad fi nem'; est enim necessarium voventi hoc vel illud agere, si debet votum impleri aut E: « Perfectionis scilicet mentis. » A, B, C, D, E, F omittunt: « Bono imperfectiori mente. » E: « Contra eos qui matrimonium virginitati aqualisant. » — Cod. Berg.: « Contra eos qui vota impugnant. » A: « Et quod de virtute diminuat votum quia. » E: « Quidam quis. » — F: « Quidem quis. » — A, B, C, D: « Quidem. » — B: « Aliquis, potius agit. » — C, D: « Quis potius agit. » — A: « Si quid agitur. » obedientia servari. Quum igitur hi fines laudabiles sint, utpote quibus homo se Deo subjicit, necessitas prædicta nihil diminuit\n\nde laude virtutis. 2. Est autem ulterius considerandum quod, dum implentur aliqua quæ quis vovit, vel quæ sibi præcipiuntur ab eo cui se subdidit propter Deum, majori laude et remuneratione sunt digna. Contingit enim unum actum duorum vitiorum esse, dum actus unius vitii ad finem alterius vitii ordinatur; ut, quum quis furatur ut fornicetur, actus quidem secundum speciem suam est avaritiae, secundum intentionem vero luxuriæ. Eodem autem modo et in virtutibus contingit quod actus unius virtutis ad aliam virtutem ordinatur; sicut, quum quis dat sua ut cum altero amicitiam habeat charitatis, actus quidem ex sua specie est liberalitatis, ex fine autem charitatis. Hujusmodi autem actus majorem laudem habet ex amore virtutis, scilicet ex charitate, quam ex liberalitate; unde, etsi remittatur in eo quod liberalitatis est, ex eo quod ad charitatem ordinatur laudabilior et majori mercede dignus erit quam si liberalius ageretur, non in\n\nordine ad charitatem. Ponamus ergo aliquem opus aliquod virtutis agentem, puta jejunantem vel continentem se a venereis; et quidem, si absque voto hoc faciat, erit actus vel castitatis vel abstinentiae; si autem ex voto, refertur ulterius ad aliam virtutem, cujus est Deo aliquid vovere, scilicet ad religionem, quæ potior est castitate vel abstinentia, utpote faciens nos recte habere ad Deum. Erit ergo actus continentiæ vel abstinentiae laudabilior in eo quod ex voto facit, etiam si non ita delectetur in abstinentia vel continentia, ex eo quod delectatur in potiori virtute,\n\nquæ est religio. 3. Item, Id quod potissimum est in virtute est debitus finis; nam ex fine principaliter ratio boni manat. Si ergo finis fuerit eminentior, etiam si in actu aliquis se remissius habet, erit ejus actus virtuosior; sicut, sialiquis proponat propter bonum virtutis longam viam agere, alius autem brevem, laudabilior erit qui majus aliquid propter virtutem intendit, licet in progressuviæ lentus procedat. Si autem aliquis facit aliquid propter Deum, illum actum Deo offert; sed si ex voto hoc faciat, non solum actum, sed etiam potentiam offert Deo, et sic patet quod propositum suum est ad aliquid majus Deo exhibendum. Erit ergo actus ejus virtuosior ratione majoris boni intenti, etsi exsecutione\n\nalius videatur ferventior. 4. Præterea, Voluntas præcedens actum manet virtute in tota consecutione actus, et ipsum laudabilem reddit, etiam quando de proposito voluntatis, propter quod actum incipit, in exsecutione operis non cogitabat; non enim oportet quod qui propter Deum aliquod iter arripuit in qualibet parte itineris de Deo cogitet actu. Patet autem quod ille qui vovit se aliquid facturum intensius illud voluit quam qui simpliciter facere disponit; quia non solum facere voluit, sed voluit se firmare, ut non deficeret a faciendo. Ex hac igitur voluntatis intensione redditur exsecutio voti cum intensione quadam laudabilis, etiam quando voluntas vel non actu fertur in opus,\n\nvel fertur remisse. Sic ergo laudabilius fit quod ex voto fit quam quod fit sine voto, cæteris tamen paribus.\n\nLxxiii, a. II.) Ex his autem manifestum est quod neque omnia bona opera, neque omnia pecata sunt paria. 1. Consilium enim non datur nisi de meliori bono. Dantur autem consilia, in lege divina, de paupertate, continentia et aliis hujusmodi, ut supra (c. cxxx) dictum est. Hæc igitur meliora sunt quam matrimonio uti et temporalia possidere, secundum quæ tamen contingit virtuose agere, ordine rationis servato, ut supra (c. cxxxiv) ostensum est. Non igitur omnes actus\n\nvirtutum sunt pares. 2. Adhuc, Actus speciem recipiunt ex objectis. Quanto igitur objectum est melius, tanto et actus erit virtuosior secundum speciem suam. Finis autem melior est his quæ sunt ad finem; quorum tanto aliquid melius est quanto est fini propinquius. Inter actus igitur humanos ille est optimus qui in ultimum finem, scilicet Deum, immediate fertur; post quem tanto actus melior est se- Sic A, B, C, D, E, F, et cod. Berg. — Edit. : « Autem. » A: « Ordinetur. » A: « Incedat. » cundum suam speciem quanto objectum\n\nest Deo propinquius. 3. Amplius, Bonum in actibus humanis est secundum quod ratione regulantur. Contingit autem aliquos aliis ad rationem magis accedere, quando actus qui sunt ipsius rationis magis habent de boo rationis quam actus inferiorum virium, quibus ratio imperat. Sunt igitur inter actus humanos\n\naliqui aliis meliores. 4. Item, Præcepta legis optime ex dilectione implentur, ut supra (c. cxxviii) dictum est. Contingit autem aliquem alio ex majori dilectione quod faciendum est facere. Erit igitur virtuosorum actuum\n\nunus alio melior. 5. Præterea, Si ex virtute actus hominis boni redduntur, contingit autem intentionem etiam eamdem majorem esse in uno quam in alio, oportet ergo quod humanorum actuum sit\n\nunus alio melior. 6. Item, Si ex virtutibus actus humani boni redduntur, oportet meliorem esse actum qui est melioris virtutis. Contingit autem virtutem unam altera meliorem esse: puta magnificentiam liberalitate, et magnanimitatem moderantia. Erit igitur humanorum actuum\n\nunus alio melior. Hinc est quod dicitur: Qui matrimonio jungit virginem suam bene facit; et qui non jungit melius facit, I\n\nCor. vii, 38. Et eisdem etiam rationibus apparet quod non omnia peccata sunt paria, quum per unum peccatum magis discedatur a fine quam per aliud, et magis pervertatur ordo rationis, et majus\n\nnocumentum proximo inferatur. Hinc est quod dicitur: Sceleratiora fecisti illis in omnibus viis\n\ntuis, Ezech. xvi, 47. Per hoc autem excluditur quorumdam error dicentium omnia merita et\n\npeccata esse paria. Quod tamen omnes virtuosi actus sint aequales, ex hoc videbatur aliquam rationem habere, quia omnis actus virtuosus est ex fine boni; unde, si omnium bonorum actuum est idem finis boni, oportet omnes\n\naequaliter bonos esse. Licet autem sit unus finis ultimus boni, actus tamen qui ex illo bonitatem habent diversum bonitatis gradum accipiunt; est enim in his bonis quæ ad ul- timum finem ordinantur differentia graduum, secundum quod quædam sunt aliis meliora et fini ultimo propinquiora. Unde, in voluntate et actibus ejus, gradus bonitatis erit secundum diversitatem bonorum ad quæ terminatur voluntas et ejus actus, licet ultimus\n\nfinis sit idem. Similiter etiam, quod omnia peccata sunt paria, videtur ex hoc habere rationem, quia peccatum n actibus humanis accidit ex hoc solo quod aliquis præterit regulam rationis; ita autem præterit regulam rationis qui in modico a ratione recedit sicut qui in magno; videtur igitur peccatum aequale, sive in modico sive\n\nin magno peccetur. — Huic autem rationi videtur suffragari quod in humanis judiciis agitur. Nam, si alicui statuatur limes quem non transgrediatur, nihil refert apud judicem sive multum sive modicum sit transgressus, sicut non refert, ex quo pugil limites campi exivit, utrum parum an longius progrediatur; ex quod igitur regulam rationis pertransiit, non refert utrum in modico vel in\n\nmagno ipsam transiverit. Sed si quis diligenter inspiciat, in omnibus quorum perfectio et bonum in quadam commensuratione consistit, quanto magis a debita commensuratione receditur, tanto majus erit malum; sicut sanitas consistit in debita commensuratione humorum, et pulchritudo in debita proportione membrorum, veritas autem in commensuratione intellectus vel sermonis ad rem. Patet autem quod quanto est major inæqualitas in humoribus, tanto est major infirmitas; et quanto est major inordinatio in membris, tanto est major turpitudo; et quanto magis a veritate receditur, tanto est major falsitas; non enim est tam magna falsitas aestimantis tria esse quinque, sicut ejus qui aestimat tria esse centum. Bonum autem virtutis in quadam commensuratione consistit; est enim medium, secundum debitam limitationem circumstantiarum, inter contraria vitia constitutum. Quanto igitur magis ab hac harmonia receditur, tanto\n\nest major malitia. Non est autem simile virtutem transgredi et terminos a judice positos transire. Nam virtus est secundum se bonum; A, B, C, D, E, F: « Regulatur. » A, B, C, D, E, F: « Gradus. » A: « Invenitur, ad quæ bona. » A, B, C, D, F: « Sint. » unde virtutem transgredi est secundum se malum; et ideo oportet quod magis a virtute recedere sit majus malum. Transgredi autem terminum a judice positum non est secundum se malum, sed per accidens, in quantum scilicet est prohibitum. In his autem quæ sunt per accidens, non est necessarium quod, si simpliciter sequitur ad simpliciter, et magis sequatur ad magis, sed solum in his quæ sunt per se; non enim sequitur, si album est musicum, quod magis album sit magis musicum; sequitur autem, si album est disgregativum visus, quod magis album sit\n\nmagis disgregativum visus. Est autem hoc inter peccatorum differentias attendendum, quod quoddam est mortale et quoddam veniale. Mortale autem est quod animam spirituali vita privat; cujus quidem vitæ ratio ex duobus sumi potest, secundum similitudinem vitæ naturalis. Vivit enim corpus naturaliter per hoc quod animæ unitur, quæ est ei principium vitæ; corpus autem vivificatum per animam ex seipso movetur, sed corpus mortuum vel immobile manet, vel ab exteriori tantum movetur. Sic igitur et voluntas hominis, quum per rectam intentionem ultimo fini conjungitur, quod est ejus objectum et quodammodo forma 1, viva est; et, quum per directionem Deo et proximo inhæret, ex interiori principio movetur ad agendum 2. Recta autem intentione ultimi finis et dilectione remota, fit anima velut mortua et non movetur ex seipsa ad agendum recta; sed vel omnino ab eis agendis desistit, vel ad ea agendum solum ab exteriori inducitur, scilicet metu pœnarum. Quæcumque igitur peccata intentioni ultimi finis et dilectioni opponuntur mortalia sunt; si vero, his salvis, aliquis in aliquo recto ordine rationis deficiat, non erit mortale peccatum, sed veniale.\n\nQuod 3 actus hominis puniuntur et 4 præ-miantur a Deo. Ex præmissis autem manifestum est 1 2 3 Deest titulus in B. 4 5 quod actus hominis puniuntur vel præ-miantur a Deo. 1. Ejus enim est punire vel præmiare cujus est legem imponere; legis enim 5 latores per præmia et pœnas observantiam legis inducunt. Sed ad divinam Providentiam pertinet ut legem hominibus ponat 6, ut ex supra dictis (c. cxiv) patet. Ergo ad Deum pertinet homines punire vel præmiare. 2. Præterea, Ubicumque est aliquis debitus ordo ad finem, oportet quod ordo ille ad finem ducat, recessus autem ab ordine finem excludat 7; ea enim quæ sunt ex fine necessitatem sortiuntur ex fine, ut scilicet ea necesse sit esse, si finis debeat sequi, et, eis absque impedimento exsistentibus, finis consequatur 8. Deus autem imposuit actibus hominum ordinem aliquem in respectu ad finem boni, ut ex prædictis (c. xvi et xvii) patet. Oportet igitur quod, si ordo ille recte positus est, incedentes per illum ordinem finem boni consequantur, quod est præmiari; recedentes autem ab illo ordine per peccatum a fine boni excludi, quod est puniri. 3. Adhuc, Sicut res naturales ordini divinæ Providentiae subduntur, ita et actus humani, ut ex prædictis (c. xc) patet. Utrobique autem convenit debitum ordinem servari, vel etiam prætermitti; hoc tamen interest quod observatio vel transgressio debiti ordinis est in potestate humanæ voluntatis constituta, non autem in potestate naturalium rerum est quod a debito ordine deficiant vel ipsum sequantur. Oportet autem effectus causis per convenientiam respondere. Sicut igitur res naturales, quum in eis debitus ordo naturalium principiorum et actionum servatur, sequitur 9 ex necessitate naturæ conservatio et bonum in ipsis, corruptio autem et malum, quum a debito et naturali ordine receditur, ita etiam in rebus humanis oportet quod, quum homo voluntarie servat ordinem legis divinitus impositæ, consequatur bonum, non velut ex necessitate, sed ex dispensatione gubernantis, quod est præmiari; et, e converso, malum, quum ordo legis fuerit prætermissus, et hoc est puniri. 4. Amplius, Ad perfectam Dei bonita- 6 7 8 9 tem pertinet quod nihil inordinatum in rebus relinquat; unde, in rebus naturalibus videmus contingere quod omne malum sub ordine alicujus boni conclu-ditur; sicut corruptio aeris est ignis generatio, et occisio ovis est pastus lupi. Quum igitur actus humani divinæ Providentia subdantur, sicut et res naturales, oportet malum quod accidit in humanis actibus sub ordine alicujus boni concludi. Hoc autem convenientissime fit per hoc quod peccata puniuntur; sic enim sub ordine justitiæ, quæ ad aequalitatem reducit, comprehenduntur ea quæ debitam quantitatem excedunt. Excedit autem homo debitum suæ quantitatis gradum, dum voluntatem suam divinæ voluntati præfert, satisfaciendo ei contra ordinem Dei; quæ quidem inaequalitas tollitur, dum contra voluntatem suam homo aliquid pati cogitur secundum ordinationem divinam. Oportet igitur quod peccata humana puniantur divinitus, et eadem ratione bona facta remunerationem accipiant. 5. Item, Divina Providentia non solum disponit rerum ordinem, sed etiam movet omnia ad ordinis ab ea dispositi exsecutionem, ut supra ostensum est (c. lxvii). Voluntas autem a suo objecto movetur, quod est bonum vel malum. Ad divinam igitur Providentiam pertinet quod hominibus bona proponat in pra-mium, ut voluntas ad recte volendum moveatur, et mala proponat in pœnam, ad hoc quod inordinationem vitet. 6. Præterea, divina Providentia hoc modo res ordinavit quod una alteri prosit. Convenientissime autem homo proficit ad finem boni, tam ex bono alterius hominis quam ex malo, dum excitatur ad bene agendum per hoc quod videt bene operantes præmiari, et dum revocatur a male agendo per hoc quod videt male agentes puniri. Ad divinam igitur Providentiam pertinet quod mali puniantur et boni præmientur. Hinc est quod dicitur: Ego sum Dominus Deus tuus..., visitans iniquitatem patrum in filios..., et faciens misericordiam in millia his qui diligunt me et custodiunt præcepta mea, Exod. xx, 5 et 6; et: 1 A, C omittunt: « Oportet. 2 —: « Divinam. » 4 — 5 6 Sic A, — — edit.: « Magis hominis bonum. » Sed, quia de ratione pœnæ est, non solum quod sit privativa boni, sed etiam quod sit contraria voluntati, non autem cujuslibet hominis voluntas existimat bona secundum quod sunt, contingit interdum quod id quod est majoris boni privativum est minus contrarium voluntati, et, propter hoc, minus pœnale esse videtur; et inde est quod plures homines, qui bona sensibilia et corporalia magis aestimant et cognoscunt quam intellectualia et spiritualia, plus timent corporales pœnas quam spirituales; secundum quorum aestimationem contrarius ordo videtur pœnarum ordini supradicto. Apud hos enim maxima pœna aestimantur lae-siones corporis et damna rerum exteriorum; deordinatio autem animæ, et damnum virtutis, et amissio fruitionis divinæ, in qua consistit ultima hominis felicitas, aut modicum aut nihil reputatur ab eis. Hinc autem procedit quod hominum peccata a Deo puniri non aestimant, quia vident plerumque peccatores incolumitate corporis vigere et exteriori fortuna potiri, quibus interdum homines virtuosi privantur; quod recte considerantibus mirum videri non debet. Quum enim omnia exteriora ad interiora ordinentur, corpus autem ad animam, in tantum exteriora et corporalia bona sunt homini bona in quantum ad bonum rationis proficiunt; secundum vero quod bonum rationis impediunt, homini vertuntur in malum. Novit autem rerum dispositor Deus mensuram virtutis humanæ; unde interdum homini virtuoso corporalia et exteriora bona ministrat in adjutorium virtutis, et in hoc ei beneficium præstat. Interdum vero ei prædicta subtrahit, eo quod considerat homini illi esse ad impedimentum virtutis et fruitionis divinæ; ex hoc autem exteriora bona vertuntur homini in malum, ut dictum est; unde et eorum amissio, eadem ratione, homini vertitur in bonum. Si igitur omnis pœna malum est, non est autem malum hominem exterioribus et corporalibus bonis privari, secundum quod expedit ad profectum virtutis, non erit homini virtuoso pœna si privetur exterioribus bonis in adjumentum virtutis; e contrario autem erit malis in pœnam si eis exteriora bona conceduntur, quibus provocantur ad malum. Unde dicitur quod creaturæ Dei in odium factæ sunt, et in tentationem animabus hominum, et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium, Sap. xiv, 41. Quia vero de ratione pœnæ est, non solum quod sit malum, sed etiam quod sit contrarium voluntati, amissio corporalium et exteriorum bonorum, etiam quando est homini in profectum virtutis et non in malum, dicitur pœna, abusive, ex eo quod est contra voluntatem. Ex inordinatione autem hominis contingit quod homo non aestimet res secundum quod sunt, sed corporalia spiritualibus praefat. Inordinatio autem talis aut est culpa, aut ex aliqua culpa praecedente procedens 8. Unde consequenter patet quod pœna non sit in homine, etiam secundum quod est contra voluntatem, nisi culpa praecedente. Hæc etiam ex alio patet, quia ea quæ sunt secundum se bona non verterentur homini in malum per abusum, nisi aliqua inordinatione in homine exsistente. Item, Quod oporteat ea quæ voluntas acceptat, eo quod sunt naturaliter bona, homini subtrahi ad profectum virtutis, provenit ex aliqua hominis deordinatione, quæ vel est culpa, vel sequitur culpam. Manifestum est enim quod per peccatum praecedens fit quædam inordinatio in affectu humano, ut facilius postmodum ad peccatum inclinetur. Non ergo est absque culpa etiam quod oportet hominem adjuvari ad bonum virtutis per id quod est ei quodammodo pœnale, id est in quantum est absolute contra voluntatem ipsius, licet quandoque sit volitum secundum quod ratio respicit finem. Sed de hac inordinatione, in natura humana exsistente ex peccato originali, posterius dicetur; nunc autem id tantum manifestum sit quod Deus punit homines pro peccatis, et quod non punit absque culpa. 2 3: « Est. » 5 6 7 8\n\npræmia sunt æqualia. 4. Quum autem divina justitia id exigat quod, ad æqualitatem in rebus servandam, pro culpis pœnæ reddantur et pro bonis actibus præmia, oportet, si est gradus in virtuosis actibus et in peccatis, ut ostensum est (c. cxxxix), quod sit etiam gradus præmiorum et pœnarum. Aliter enim non servaretur æqualitas, si non plus peccanti major pœna aut melius agenti majus præmium redderetur. Ejusdem enim rationis esse videtur quod differenter retribuatur secundum differentiam boni et mali, et secundum differentiam boni et melioris, vel\n\nmali et pejoris. 2. Præterea, Talis est æqualitas distributivæ justitiæ ut inæqualia inæqualibus reddantur. Non ergo esset justa recompensatio per pœnas et præmia, si omnia præmia et omnes\n\npœnæ essent æquales. 3. Adhuc, Præmia et pœnæ a legislatore proponuntur ut homines a malis ad bona trahantur, ut ex supradictis (c. cxL) patet. Oportet autem homines non solum trahi ad bona et retrahi a malis, sed etiam bonos allici ad meliora et malos retrahi a pejoribus; quod non fieret, si præmia et pœnæ essent æqualia. Oportet igitur et pœnas et\n\npræmia inæqualia esse. 4. Amplius, Sicut per dispositiones naturales aliquis disponitur ad formam, ita per opera bona et mala aliquis disponitur ad pœnas et præmia. Sed hoc habet ordo quem divina Providentia statuit in rebus, quod magis disposita perfectiorem formam consequuntur. Ergo, secundum diversitatem bonorum operum vel malorum, oportet quod sit diversitas\n\npœnarum et præmiorum. 5. Item, Contingit excessum esse in operibus bonis et malis dupliciter: uno modo, secundum numerum, prout unus alio habet opera plura, bona vel mala, alio modo, secundum qualitatem operum, prout unus alio vel melius vel pejus opus habet. Oportet autem quod excessui qui est secundum numerum operum respondeat excessus præmiorum vel pœnarum; alias, non fieret recompensatio in divino judicio pro omnibus quæ quis agit, si aliqua mala remanerent impunita et aliqua bona irremunerata. Pari ergo ratione, excessui qui est secundum inæqualitatem operum inæqualitas præmiorum\n\net pœnarum respondet. Hinc est quod dicitur: Pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus, Deuter., xxv, 2. In mensura contra mensuram, quum abjectus fuerit judicabis\n\neam, (Isai. xxvii, 8. Per hoc autem excluditur error quorumdam dicentium in futuro omnia præmia et pœnas esse æqualia.\n\nad ultimum finem. 1. Est autem ex prædictis manifetume quod dupliciter contingit peccare: uno modo sic quod totaliter intentio metisit avertatur ab ordine ad Deum qui es ultimus bonorum; et hoc est' peccatum mortale; alio modo sic quod, manente ordine humanæ mentis ad ultimum finem, impedimentum aliquod afferatur, quo retardatur ne libere tendat in finem; et hoc dicitur peccatum veniale. Si ergo secundum differentiam peccatorum oportet esse differentiam pœnarum (c. cxLIII), consequens est quod ille qui mortaliter peccat sit puniendus sic quod excidat ab hominis fine; qui autem peccat venialiter, non ita quod excidat, sed ita quod retardetur, aut difficultatem patiatur in adipiscendo finem; sic enim justitiæ servatur æqualitas ut, quomodo homo peccando voluntarie a fine se divertit, ita pœnaliter contra suam voluntatem in\n\nfinis adeptione impediatur. 2. Adhuc, Sicut est voluntasin hominibus, ita est inclination naturalis in rebus naturalibus. Si autem ab aliqua re naturali tollatur inclination ejus ad finem omnino finemillum consequui non potest; sicut corpus grave, quum gravitatem amiserit per corruptionem et factum fuerit leve, non perveniet ad medium; si autem fuerit in suo motu impeditum, inclinatione ad finem manente, remoto prohibente, perveniet ad finem. In eo autem qui peccat mortaliter, omnino avertitur intentio vo- luntatis a fine ultimo; in illo autem qui venialiter peccat, manet intentio conversa ad finem, sed aliqualiter impeditur ex hoc quod plus debito inhæret his quæ sunt ad finem. Igitur ei qui peccat mortaliter hæc pœna debetur ut omnino excludatur a consecutione finis; ei autem qui peccat venialiter, quod difficultatem aliquam patiatur antequam\n\nad finem perveniat. 3. Amplius, Quum aliquis consequitur aliquod bonum quod non intendebat, est a fortuna et casu. Si igitur ille cujus intentio est aversa a fine ultimo finem ultimum assequatur, erit hoc a fortuna et casu. Hoc autem inconveniens est, quia ultimus finis est bonum intellectus fortuna autem intellectui repugnat, quia fortuita absque ordinatione intellectus; proveniunt; inconveniens autem est quod intellectus suum finem consequatur non per viam intelligibilem. Non ergo consequetur finem ultimum qui peccans mortaliter habet intentionem aversam\n\nab ultimo fine. 4. Item, Materia non consequitur formam ab agente, nisi fuerit ad formam disposita convenienter. Finis autem et bonum est perfectio voluntatis, sicut forma materiæ. Voluntas igitur non consequetur ultimum finem, nisi fuerit disposita convenienter. Disponitur autem ad finem voluntas per intentionem et desiderium finis. Non igitur consequetur finem cujus intentio\n\na fine avertitur. 5. Præterea, In his quæ sunt ordinata ad finem, talis habitudo inventur quod, si finis est vel erit, necesse est ea quæ sunt ad finem fore; si autem ea quæ sunt ad finem non sunt, nec finis erit; si enim finis esse potest, etiam non existentibus illis quæ sunt ad finem, frustra per hujusmodi media quæritur finis. Ostensum est autem apud omnes quod homo per opera virtutum, in quibus præcipuum est intentio finis debiti, consequitur suum ultimum finem, qui est felicitas. Si ergo aliquis contra virtutem agat, ab intentione ultimi finis aversus, conveniens est quod\n\nultimo fine privetur. Hinc est quod dicitur: Discedite a me, omnes qui operamini iniquitatem, Psalm. vi, 9, et Matth. vii, 23.\n\nin æternum privatur. Oportet autem hanc pœnam qua quis privatur ultimo\n\nfine esse interminabilem. 1. Privatio enim alicujus non est nisi quando natum est haberi; non enim catulus mox natus dicitur visu privatus. Ultimum autem finem non est homo aptus natus consequi in hac vita, ut probatum est (c.xlviii). Privatio ergo hujusmodifinis oportet quod sit pœna post hanc vitam. Sed post hanc vitam non remanet homini facultas adipiscendi ultimum finem; anima enim indiget corpore ad consecuitionem sui finis, in quantum per corpus perfectionem acquirit, et in scientia et in virtute; anima autem, postquam fuerit a corpore separata, non redit iterum ad hunc statum quod per corpus perfectionem accipiat, sicut dicebant transcorporationem ponentes, contra quod superius (l. II, c. lxxxiii) disputatum est. Necesse est igitur quod ille qni hac pœna punitur ultimo fine privetur, et in\n\næternum privatus remaneat. 2. Adhuc, Si quis privatur eo quod est in natura ejus ut habeatur, imposibile est illud reparari, nisi fiat resolutio in præjacentem materiam, ut iterum aliud de novo generetur, sicut quum animal amittit visum aut alium sensum. Impossible est autem quod id quod jam generatum est iterum generetur, nisi primum corrumpatur; et tunc ex eadem materia poterit aliud iterum generari, non idem numero, sed specie. Res autem spiritualis, ut anima vel Angelus, non potest resolvi per corruptionem in aliquam præjacentem materiam, ut iterum generetur illud idem specie. Si igitur privetur eo quod est in natura ipsius ut habeat, oportet quod in perpetuum maneat talis privatio. Est autem in natura animæ et Angeli ordo ad ultimum finem, qui est Deus. Si ergo ab hoc ordine decidat per aliquam pœnam, in perpetuum\n\ntalis pœna manebit. 3. Item, Naturalis æquitas hoc habere videtur quod unusquisque privetur bono contra quod agit; ex hoc enim reddit s A, C: « Si aliquis. » — B, D, E, F: « Si aliquid. » A, B, D, E, F: « Integrum. » — C: « Ad in- tegrum. » A: « Aliud numero, idem autem. » A, B, C, D, E: « Reddidit. » tali bono indignum; et inde est quod, secundum civilem justitiam, qui contra rempublicam peccat societate reipublicæ privatur omnino, vel per mortem vel per exsilium perpetuum; nec attenditur quanta fuerit mora temporis in peccando, sed quid sit contra quod peccavit. Eadem autem est comparatio totius vitæ præsen-tis ad rempublicam terrenam, et totius æternitatis ad societatem beatorum, qui, ut supra (c. lxiii) ostensum est, ultimo fine æternaliter potiuntur. Qui ergo contra ultimum finem peccat et contra charitatem, per quam est societas beatorum et tendentium in beatitudinem, inæternum debet puniri, quamvis aliqua brevi\n\ntemporis mora peccaverit. 4. Præterea, Apud divinum judicium voluntas pro facto computatur; quia, sicut homines vident ea quæ exterius aguntur, ita Deus inspicit hominum corda. Qui autem propter aliquod temporale bonum aversus est ab ultimo fine, qui in æternum possidetur, præposuit fruitionem temporalem illius boni temporalis æternæ fruitioni ultimi finis; unde patet quod multo magis voluisset in æternum illo bono temporali frui. Ergo, secundum divinum judicium, ita puniri debet ac si æternaliter peccasset. Nulli autem dubium est quin pro æterno peccato æterna pœna debeatur. Debetur igitur ei qui ab ultimo fine\n\navertitur pœna æterna. 5. Adhuc, Eadem justitiæ ratione pœna peccatis redditur et bonis actius præmium. Præmium autem virtutis est beatitudo, quæquidem est æterna, ut supra (c. lxii) ostensum est. Ergo et pœna qua quis a beatitudine excluditur\n\ndebet esse æterna. Hinc est quod dicitur: Ibunt hi in supplicium æternum; justi autem in vitam\n\næternam, Matth. xxv, 46. Per hoc autem excluditur error dicentium pœnas malorum quando esse terminandas. Quæ quidem positio ortum habuisse videtur a positione quorumdam philosophorum, qui dicebant omnes pœnas purgatorias esse, et\n\nita quandoque terminandas. Videbatur autem hoc persuasibile: — tum ex humana consuetudine; pœna enim humanis legibus inferuntur ad emendationem vitiorum; unde sicut medicinæ quædam sunt; — tum etiam ratione; si enim pœna non propter aliud inferretur a puniente, sed propter se tantum, sequeretur quod in pœnis propter se delectaretur; quod bonitati divinæ non congruit; oportet igitur pœnas propter aliud inferri, nec videtur alius convenientior finis quam emendatio vitiorum. Videtur igitur convenienter dici omnes pœnas purgatorias esse, et, per consequens, quandoque terminandas, quum etiam illud quod est purgabile accidentale sit ratione creaturæ et possit removeri\n\nabsque consumptione substantiæ. Est autem concedendum quod pœna inferuntur a Deo, non propter se, quasi Deus in ipsis delectetur, sed propter aliud, scilicet propter ordinem imponendum creaturis, in quo bonum universi consistit. Exigit autem hoc ordo rerum ut proportionaliter omnia divinitus dispensentur; propter quod dicitur in libro Sapientiæ, xi, 24, quod Deus « omnia » facit in pondere, numero et mensura. Sicut autem præmia proportionaliter respondent actibus virtuosis, ita pœna peccatis; et quibusdam peccatis proportionantur pœna sempiternæ, ut ostensum est. Infligit igitur Deus pro quibusdam peccatis pœnas æternas, ut debitus ordo servetur in rebus, qui\n\nejus sapientiam demonstrat. Si quis tamen concedat omnes pœnas ad emendationem vitiorum induci, et non propter aliud, non tamen propter hoc cogitur ponere omnes pœnas purgatorias et terminabiles esse. Nam et secundum leges humanas aliqui morte puniuntur, non quidem ad emendationem sui, sed aliorum; hinc est quod dicitur: Pestilente flagellato, stultus sapientior erit, Proverb. xix, 25. Quidam etiam secundum humanas leges a civitate perpetuo exsilio excluduntur, ut, eis subtractis, civitas purior reddatur, unde dicitur: Ejice derisorem, et exibit cum eo jurgium, cessabuntque causæ et contumelix, Ibid. xxii, 40. Nihil igitur prohibet, etiam si pœna nonnisi ad emendationem morum adhibeantur, quin secundum divinum judicium aliqui debeant a societate bonorum perpetuo separari et in æternum puniri, ut ex perpetuæ pœna timore homines A: « Intendentium. » A: « Deus. » A, B, C, D, E, F: « Enim. » peccare desistant et bonorum societas purior ex eorum separatione reddatur, sicut dicitur: Non intrabit in eam, id est in Jerusalem cælestem, per quam designatur societas bonorum, aliquod coinquatum, aut abominationem faciens et mendacium, Apoc. xxi, 27.\n\nexperientiam alicujus 2 nocivi. Non solum autem qui contra Deum peccant puniendi sunt per hoc quod a beatitudine perpetuo excludantur, sed etiam per experimentum alicujus nocivi. 1. Pœna enim debet proportionaliter culpæ respondere, ut supra (c. cxliv) ostensum est. In culpa autem non solum avertitur mens ab ultimo fine, sed etiam indebite convertitur in alia quasi in fines. Non solum ergo puniendus est qui peccat per hoc quod excludatur a fine, sed etiam per hoc quod ex aliis\n\nrebus sentiat nocumentum. 2. Amplius, Pœna inferuntur pro culpis, ut timore pœnarum homines a peccatis retrahantur, ut supra (c. cxliv) dictum est. Nullus autem timet amittere id quod non desiderat adipisci; qui ergo habent voluntatem aversam ab ultimo fine non timent excludi ab illo. Non ergo per solam exclusionem ab ultimo fine a peccando revocarentur. Oportet igitur peccantibus aliam pœnam adhiberi,\n\nquam timeant peccantes. 3. Item, Si quis eo quod est ad finem inordinate utitur, non solum fine privatur, sed etiam aliud nocumentum incurrit, ut patet in cibo inordinate assumpto, qui non solum sanitatem non affert, sed etiam aegritudinem inducit. Qui autem in rebus creatis finem constituit eis non utitur secundum quod debet, referendo scilicet ad ultimum finem. Non ergo solum debet puniri per hoc quod beatitudine careat, sed etiam per hoc quod aliquod nocumentum\n\nab ipsis experiatur. 4. Præterea, sicut recte agentibus debentur bona, ita perverse agentibus debentur mala. Sed illi qui recte agunt in fine ab eis intento percipiunt perfectionem et gaudium. E contrario ergo debetur hæc pœna peccantibus, ut ex his in quibus sibi finem constituunt afflictionem\n\nacci-piant et nocumentum. Hinc est quod divina Scriptura peccatoribus comminatur, non solum exclusionem a gloria, sed etiam afflictionem ex aliis rebus; dicitur enim: Discedite a me, maledicti, in ignem æternum, qui paratus est Diabolo et angelis ejus, Matth. xxv, 44; et: Pluet super peccatores laqueos; ignis et sulphur et spiritus procellarum, pars calicis\n\neorum, Psalm. x, 7. Per hoc autem excluditur opinio Alga-zelis, qui posuit quod peccatoribus hæc sola pœna reddetur quod affligentur per amissionem 3 ultimi finis.\n\nQuod judicibus licet pœnas inferre. (II-II. q. Lxiv, a. ii et iii.) Quia vero pœnas a Deo inflictas aliqui parvipendunt, propter hoc quod, sensibilibus dediti, solum ea quæ videntur curant, ideo per divinam Providentiam ordinatum est ut in terris sint homines qui, per pœnas sensibiles et præsentes, alios ad observantiam justitiæ cogant; quos manifestum est non peccare, dum malos puniunt. 1. Nullus enim peccat ex hoc quod justitiam facit. Justum autem est malos puniiri, quia per 4 pœnam culpa ordinatur, ut ex supradictis (c. cxl) patet. Non igitur judices peccant malos puniendo. 2. Adhuc, Homines qui in terris super alios constituuntur sunt quasi divinæ Providentiae exsecutores; Deus enim, per suæ Providentiae ordinem, per superiora inferiora exsequitur, ut ex supradictis (c. lxxxviii et lxxix) patet. Nullus autem, ex hoc quod exsequitur ordinem divinæ Providentiae, peccat. Habet autem hoc ordo Providentiae ut boni præmientur et mali puniantur, ut ex supradictis (c. cxl) patet. Non igitur homines qui aliis præsunt peccant ex hoc quod bonos remunerant et puniunt malos. 3. Amplius, Bonum non indiget malo, sed e converso. Illud igitur quod est necessarium ad conservationem boni non potest esse secundum se malum. Ad conservationem autem concordiae inter homines necessarium est quod pœna malis infligantur. Punire igitur malos non est secundum se malum. 1 Titulus in B desideratur. 2 4 4. Item, Bonum commune melius est quam bonum particulare unius. Subtrahendum est igitur bonum particulare, ut conservetur bonum commune. Vita autem quorumdam pestiferorum impedit commune bonum, quod est concordia societatis humanæ. Subtrahendi igitur sunt hujusmodi homines per mortem ab hominum societate. 5. Præterea, Sicut medicus in sua operatione intendit sanitatem, quæ consistit in ordinata concordia humorum, ita rector civitatis intendit in sua operatione pacem, quæ consistit in civium ordinata concordia. Medicus autem abscindit membrum putridum bene et utiliter, si per ipsum immineat corruptio corporis. Juste igitur et absque peccato rector civitatis homines pestiferos occidit, ne pax civitatis turbetur. Hinc est quod dicit Apostolus: Nescitis quia modicum fermentum totam massa corrumpit? I Cor. v, 6. Et post pauca subdit: Auferte malum ex vobis ipsis, Ibid. 13; et dicitur de potestate terrena quod non sine causa gladium portat; Deienim minister est, vindex in iram ei qui malum agit, Rom. xiii, 4; et dicitur: Subjecti estote omni humanæ creaturæ propter Deum, sive regi, quasi præcellenti, sive ducibus, tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum, I Petr. ii, 13 et 14. Per hoc autem excluditur error quorumdam dicentium vindictas corporales non licite 4 fieri, qui ad sui fulcimentum erroris inducunt quod dicitur: Non occides, Exod. xx, 13. — Inducunt etiam quod dicitur quod dominus ministris volentibus zizaniam colligere de medio tritici respondit: Sinite utraque crescere usque ad messem, Matth. xiii, 30. Per zizaniam autem filii nequam intelliguntur; per messem autem, seculi finis, ut ibidem dicitur. Non igitur mali subtrahendi sunt de medio bonorum per occisionem. — Inducunt etiam quod homo, quamdiu in mundo est, potest in melius transmutari. Non ergo est per occasionem subtrahendus a mundo, sed ad pœnitentiam reservandus. Hæc autem frivola sunt. Nam in lege quæ dicit: Non occides, postmodum subditur: Maleficos non patieris vivere, Exod. xxii, 18; ex quo datur intelligi occisionem hominum injustam prohibitam esse; quod etiam ex verbis Domini apparet; nam, quum dixisset: Audistis quia dictum est antiquis: Non occides, subjunxit: Ego autem dico vobis: Quia omnis qui irascitur fratri suo, reus erit judicio, etc., Matth. v, 21 et 22. Ex quo dat intelligere illam occisionem esse prohibitam quæ procedit ex ira, non autem illam quæ procedit ex zelo justitiæ. — Quod etiam Dominus dicit: Sinite utraque crescere usque ad messem, qualiter intelligendum sit apparet per illud quod sequitur: Ne forte colligentes zizania, eradicetis simul cum eis et triticum, Matth. xiii, 29. Ibi ergo interdicitur malorum occisio ubi hoc sine periculo bonorum fieri non potest; quod plerumque contingit quando mali nondum discernuntur a bonis per manifesta peccata, vel quando timetur periculum ne mali multos bonos post se trahant. — Quod vero mali, quamdiu vivunt, emendari possunt, non prohibet quin juste possint occidi; quia periculum quod de eorum vita imminet est majus et certius quam bonum quod de eorum emendatione expectatur. Habent etiam in ipso mortis articulo facultatem ut per pœnitentiam convertantur ad Deum. Quod si adeo sunt obstinati quod etiam in mortis articulo cor eorum a malitia non recedat, satis probabiliter æstimari potest quod nun-quam a malitia resipiscant.\n\nv.) Quia vero ex superioribus (c. lxxviii-lxxxi) manifestum est quod divina Providentia aliter disponit creaturas rationales quam res alias, secundum quod in conditione naturæ propriæ ab aliis different, restat ostendendum quod, etiam ex dignitate finis, altioris gubernationis modus a divina\n\nProvidentia eis adhibetur. 1. Manifestum est autem quod, secundum convenientiam suæ naturæ, ad altiorem participationem finis perveniunt. Quia enim intellectualis naturæ sunt, per suam operationem intelligibilem veritatem attingere possunt; quod aliis rebus 1 Sic A, B, C, D. — Edit.: « Licere. » XII. non competit quæ intellectu carent. Et secundum quod ad intelligibilem veritatem naturali operatione perveniunt , manifestum est eis aliter provideri divinitus quam aliis rebus, in quantum homini datus est intellectus et ratio, per quæ veritatem et discernere et investigare possit. Datæ sunt etiam ei vires sensitivæ, et interiores et exteriores, quibus ad investigandam veritatem adjuvetur. Datus est etiam ei loquelæ usus, per cujus officium veritatem quam aliquis mente concipit alteri manifestare possit; ut sic homines seipsos juvent in cognitione veritatis, sicut et in aliis rebus necessariis vitæ, quum sit homo\n\nanimal naturaliter sociale. Sed ulterius ultimus finis hominis in quadam veritatis cognitione constitutus est, quæ naturalem facultatem ipsius excedit, ut scilicet ipsam primam veritatem videat in seipsa, sicut supra (c. xxxvii et lxiii) ostensum est. Hoc autem inferioribus creaturis non competit, ut scilicet ad finem pervenire possint qui eorum facultatem naturalem excedat. Oportet igitur ut etiam ex hoc fine attendatur diversus gubernationis modus circa homines et alias inferiores creaturas; ea enim quæ sunt ad finem necesse est fini esse proportionata. Si igitur homo ordinatur in finem qui ejus facultatem naturalem excedit, necesse est ei aliquod auxilium divinitus adhiberi supernaturale, per quod\n\ntendat in finem. 2. Adhuc, Res inferioris naturæ in id quod est proprium superioris naturæ non potest perduci nisi virtute illius superioris naturæ; sicut luna, quæ ex se non lucet, fit lucida virtute et actione solis; et aqua, quæ per se non calet, fit calida virtute et actione ignis. Videre autem ipsam primam veritatem in seipsa ita transcendit facultatem humanæ naturæ, quod est proprium solius Dei, ut supra (c. lii) ostensum est. Indiget igitur homo auxilio divino ad hoc quod in\n\ndictum finem perveniat. 3. Item, Unaquæque res per operationem suam ultimum finem consequitur. Operatio autem virtutem sortitur ex principio operante; unde per actionem seminis generatur aliquid in determinata specie, cujus virtus in semine præexsistit. Non potest igitur homo per operationem suam pervenire in ultimum finem suum, qui transcendit facultatem natu-ralium potentiarum, nisi ejus operatio ex divina virtute efficaciam capiat ad finem prædictum. 4.\n\nAmplius, Nullum instrumentum secundum virtutem propriæ formæ potest ad ultimam perducere perfectionem, sed solum secundum virtutem principalis agentis, quamvis secundum propriam virtutem aliquam dispositionem facere possit ad ultimam perfectionem; a serra enim, secundum rationem propriæ formæ, est sectio ligni, sed forma scamni est ab arte, quæ utitur instrumento; similiter resolutio et consumptio in corpore animalis est a calore ignis, sed generatio carnis et determinatio augmenti et alia hujusmodi sunt ab anima vegetabili, quæ utitur calore igneo sicut instrumento. Sub Deo autem, qui est primus intellectus et volens, ordinantur omnes intellectus et voluntates sicut instrumenta sub principali agente. Oportet igitur quod eorum operationes efficaciam non habeant respectu ultimæ perfectionnis, quæ est adeptio finalis beatitudinis, nisi per virtutem divinam. Indiget igitur rationalis natura divino auxilio ad\n\nconsequendum ultimum finem. 5. Præterea, Homini sunt impedimenta plurima perveniendi ad finem. Impeditur enim debilitate rationis, quæ de facili trahitur in errorem, per quem a recta via perveniendi in finem excluditur. Impeditur etiam ex passionibus partis sensitivæ, et ex affectionibus quibus ad sensibilia et inferiora trahitur; quibus quanto magis inhæret, longius ab ultimo fine distat; hæc enim infra hominem sunt, finis autem superior eo exsistit. Impeditur etiam plerumque corporis infirmitate ab exsecutione virtuosorum actuum, quibus ad beatitudinem tenditur. Indiget igitur auxilio divino homo ne per hujusmodi impedimenta totaliter ab\n\nultimo fine deficiat. Hinc est quod dicitur : Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit illum, Joann. vi, 44; et : Sicut palmes non potest ferre fructum a semet-ipso, nisi manserit in vite, sic nec vos, nisi in me\n\nmanseritis, Joan. xv, 4. Per hoc autem excluditur error Pelagianorum, qui dixerunt quod per solum liberum arbitrium homo poterat Dei gloriam promereri.\n\ncogitur ad virtutem. Posset autem videri alicui quod per divinum auxilium aliqua coactio homini inferatur ad bene agendum, ex hoc quod dictum est: Nemo venit ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum, Joann. vi, 44; et ex hoc quod dicitur: Quicumque Spiritu Dei aguntur, ii sunt filii Dei, Rom. viii, 14, et: Charitas Christi urget nos, II Cor. v, 14; « trahi » enim et « agi » et « urgeri »\n\ncoactionem importare videntur. Hoc autem non esse verum manifeste ostenditur. 1. Divina enim Providentia rebus omnibus providet secundum modum earum, ut supra (c. cxLVII) ostensum est. Est autem proprium homini et omni rationali creaturæ quod voluntarie agat et suis actibus dominetur, ut ex supra-dictis (l. II, c. xLVII et xLVIII) patet; huic autem coactio contrariatur. Non igitur Deus suo auxilio hominem cogit\n\nad recte agendum. 2. Adhuc, Divinum auxilium sic intelligitur ad bene agendum homini adhiberi quod in nobis nostra opera operatur sicut causa prima operatur operationes causarum secundarum, et agens principale operatur actionem instrumenti; unde dicitur: Omnia opera nostra operatus es in nobis, Domine, Isai. xxvi, 12. Causa autem prima causat operationem causæ secundæ secundum modum ipsius. Ergo et Deus causat in nobis nostra opera secundum modum nostrum, qui est ut voluntarie et non coacte agamus. Non divino igitur auxilio aliquis cogitur\n\nad recte agendum. 3. Amplius, Homo per voluntatem ordinatur in finem; objectum enim voluntatis est bonum et finis. Auxilium autem divinum nobis ad hoc præcipue impenditur ut consequamur finem. Ejus ergo auxilium non excludit a nobis actum voluntatis, sed ipsum præcipue in nobis facit, unde et Apostolus dicit: Deus est qui operatur in vobis et velle et perficere, pro bona voluntate, Philipp. ii, 13. Coactio autem excludit in nobis actum voluntatis; coacte enim agimus cujus contrarium volumus. Non ergo Deus suo auxilio nos cogit\n\nad recte agendum. 4. Item, Homo pervenit ad ultimum suum finem per actus virtutum; felicitas enim virtutis præmium ponitur. Actus autem coacti non sunt actus virtutum; nam in virtute præcipuum est electio, quae sine voluntario esse non potest, cui violentum contrarium est. Non igitur divinitus homo cogitur\n\nad recte agendum. 5. Præterea, Ea quæ sunt ad finem debent esse fini proportionata. Finis autem ultimus, qui est felicitas, non competit nisi voluntarie agentibus, qui sunt domini sui actus; unde neque inanimata neque bruta animalia felicia dicimus, sicut nec fortunata aut infortunata, nisi secundum metaphoram. Auxilium igitur quod homini datur divinitus ad felicitatem\n\nconsequendam non est coactivum. Hinc est quod dicitur: Considera quod hodie proposuerim in conspectu tuo vitam et bonum, et, e contrario, mortem et malum; ut diligas Dominum Deum tuum et ambules in viis ejus... Si autem aversum fuerit cor tuum, et audire nolueris..., prædico tibi hodie quod pereas, Deuter. xxx, 55-18; et dicitur: Ante hominem vita et mors, bonum et malum; quod placuerit ei, dabitur illi, Eccli. xv, 18.\n\nQuod prædictum auxilium homo promereri non potest ( I-II, q. cxiv, a. v. ) Ex prædictis autem manifeste ostenditur quod auxilium divinum homo promereri non potest. 1. Quælibet enim res ad id quod supra ipsam est materialiter se habet. Materia autem non movet seipsam ad suam perfectionem, sed oportet quod ab alio moveatur. Homo igitur non movet seipsum ad hoc quod adipiscatur divinum auxilium, quod supra ipsum est, sed potius ad hoc adipiscendum a Deo movetur. Motio autem moventis præcedit motum mobilis, ratione et causa. Non igitur propter hoc datur nobis auxilium divinum quia nos ad illud per bona opera promovemur, sed potius nos ideo per bona opera proficimus quia divino auxilio prævenimur. — E, F, C, D omittunt: 2. Adhuc, Agens instrumentale non disponit ad perfectionem inducendam a principali agente, nisi secundum quod agit ex virtute principalis agentis; sicut calor ignis non magis præparat materiam ad formam carnis quam ad aliam formam, nisi in quantum agit in virtute animæ. Sed anima nostra operatur sub Deo sicut agens instrumentale sub principali agente. Non igitur potest se anima præparare ad suscipiendum effectum divini auxilii, nisi secundum quod agit ex virtute divina. Prævenitur igitur divino auxilio ab bene operandum magis quam divinum auxilium præveniat, quasi merendo illud vel se præparando ad illud. 3. Amplius, Nullum agens particulare potest universaliter prævenire. 2 actionem primi universalis agentis, eo quod omnis actio particularis agentis originem habeat ab universali agente; sicut, in istis inferioribus, omnis 4 motus prævenitur a motu cælesti. Sed anima humana ordinatur sub Deo sicut particulare agens sub universali. Impossibile est ergo esse aliquem rectum motum in ipsa quem non præveniat actio divina; unde et Dominus dicit: Sine me nihil potestis facere, Joann. xv, 5. 4. Item, Merces proportionatur merito, quum in retributione mercedis aqualitas justitiæ observetur. Effectus autem divini auxilii, qui facultatem naturæ excedit, non est proportionatus actibus quos homo ex naturali facultate producit. Non igitur per hujusmodi actus potest homo prædictum auxilium mereri. 5. Præterea, Cognitio præcedit voluntatis motum. Cognitio autem supernaturalis finis est homini 5 a Deo, quum per rationem naturalem in ipsum attingere homo non possit, eo quod facultatem naturalem excedat. Oportet ergo quod motus voluntatis nostræ in ultimum finem auxilium divinum præveniat. Hinc est quod dicitur: Non ex operibus justitiæ quæ fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit, Tit. 111, 5; et: Non volentis, scilicet velle, neque currentis, scilicet currere, sed miserentis est Dei, Rom. 1x, 16, quia scilicet oportet quod ad bene volendum et operandum homo divino præveniatur auxi-: « Vel se. » 2 ex alia manu ad oram codicis. 3 4 5 6 7 et operatur circa omnem creaturam; ipsum enim esse creaturæ et omnis ejus perfectio est a Deo volente et operante, ut supra (l. I, c. xxix et xxx, et l. II, c. xv) ostensum est; unde dicitur: Diligis omnia quæ sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quæ fecisti, Sap. xi, 25. Sed specialis ratio divinæ dilectionis ad illos consideratur quibus auxilium præbet ad hoc quod consequentur bonum quod ordinem naturæ eorum excedit, scilicet perfectam fruitionem, non alicujus boni creati, sed suiipsius. Hoc igitur auxilium convenienter dicitur gratia, non solum quia gratis datur, ut ostensum est (c. cxlix), sed etiam quia hoc auxilio homo, speciali quadam prærogativa, redditur Deo gratus; unde et Apostolus dicit: Prædestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum..., secundum propositum voluntatis suæ, in laudem gloriæ gratia suæ, in qua gratificavit nos in dilecto Filio suo, Ephes. 1, 5. Oportet autem hanc gratiam aliquid in homine gratificato esse, quasi quamdam formam et perfectionem ipsius. 1. Quod enim in aliquem finem dirigitur oportet quod habeat continuum ordinem in ipsum, nam movens continue mutat, quousque mobile per motum finem sortiatur. Quum igitur auxilio divinæ gratia homo dirigatur in ultimum finem ut ostensum est (c. cxLVII), oportet quod continue homo isto auxilio potiatur, quousque ad finem perveniat. Hoc autem non esset, si prædictum auxilium participaret homo secundum aliquem motum aut passionem, et non secundum aliquam formam manentem et quasi quiescentem in ipso; motus enim et passio talis non esset in homine nisi quando actu converteretur in finem; quod non continue ab homine agitur, ut præcipue patet in dormientibus. Est ergo gratia gratum faciens aliqua forma et perfectior in homine manens, etiam quando non operatur. 2. Adhuc, Dilectio Dei est causativa boni quod in nobis est, sicut dilectio hominis provocatur et causatur ex aliquo bono quod in dilecto est. Sed homo provocatur ad specialiter aliquem diligendum propter aliquod speciale bonum in dilecto præexsistens. Ergo, ubi ponitur specialis dilectio Dei ad hominem, oportet quod consequenter ponatur aliquod speciale bonum homini a Deo collatum. Quum igitur, secundum prædicta, gratia gratum faciens designet specialem dilectionem Dei ad hominem, oportet quod aliqua specialis bonitas et perfectio per hoc homini inesse designetur. 3. Amplius, Unumquodque ordinatur in finem sibi convenientem secundum rationem suæ formæ; diversarum enim specierum diversi sunt fines. Sed finis in quem homo dirigitur per auxilium divinæ gratia est supra naturam humanam. Ergo oportet quod homini superaddatur aliqua supernaturalis forma et perfectio, per quam convenienter ordinetur in finem prædictum. 4. Item, Oportet quod homo ad ultimum finem per proprias operationes perveniat. Unumquodque autem operatur secundum propriam formam. Oportet igitur, ad hoc quod homo perducatur in ultimum finem per proprias operationes, quod superaddatur ei aliqua forma, ex qua ejus operationes aliquam efficaciam accipiant promerendi ultimum finem. 5. Præterea, Divina Providentia omnibus providet secundum modum suæ naturæ, ut ex supradictis (c. cxLVII) patet. Est autem hic modus proprius hominibus quod ad perfectionem suarum operationum oportet eis inesse, super naturales potentias, quasdam perfectiones et habitus, quibus quasi connaturaliter et faciliter et delectabiliter bonum et bene operentur. Igitur auxilium gratia, quod homo a Deo consequitur ad pervenien-dum in ultimum finem, aliquam formam et perfectionem homini inesse designat. Hinc est quod gratia Dei in Scriptura quasi lux quædam designatur; dicit enim Apostolus: Eratis aliquando tenebræ; nunc autem lux in Domino, Ephes. v, 8. Decenter autem perfectio per quam homo promovetur in ultimum finem, quæ in Dei visione consistit, dicitur lux, quæ est principium videndi. Per hoc autem excluditur opinioorumdam dicentium quod gratia Dei nihil in homine ponit, sicut nihil in aliquo ponitur ex hoc quod dicitur gratiam regis habere, sed solum in rege diligente. Patet ergo eos fuisse deceptos ex hoc quod non attenderunt differentiam inter dilectionem divinam et humanam; divina enim dilectio est causativa boni quod in aliquo diligit, non semper autem humana.\n\nQuod divina gratia causat in nobis finem. Ex hoc autem quod divina gratia caritatem in nobis causat, necessarium est quod etiam in nobis fides per gratiam causetur. A, B, C, D, E, F omittunt: « Et gravia. » A omittit: « Ex. » 4. Motus enim quo per gratiam in ultimum finem dirigimur est voluntarius, non violentus, ut supra (c. cxlviii) ostensum est. Voluntarius autem motus in aliquid esse non potest, nisi sit cognitum. Oportet igitur quod per gratiam in nobis cognitio ultimi finis præstituatur, ad hoc quod voluntarie dirigamur in ipsum. Hæc autem cognitio non potest esse secundum apertam visionem in statu isto, ut supra (c. xlvii et xlviii) probatum est. Oportet igitur quod sit cognitio per fidem. 2. Amplius, In quolibet cognoscente, modus cognitionis consequitur modum propriæ naturæ; unde alius modus cognitionis est Angeli, hominis et bruti animalis, secundum quod eorum naturæ diversæ sunt, ut ex præmissis (l. II, c. xcvi) patet. Sed homini, ad consequendum ultimum finem, additur aliqua perfectio super propriam naturam, scilicet gratia, ut ostensum est (c. cxlvii). Oportet igitur quod etiam super cognitionem naturalem hominis addatur in eo aliqua cognitio quæ rationem naturalem excedat; et hæc est cognitio fidei, quæ est de his quæ non videntur per rationem naturalem. 3. Item, Quandocumque ab aliquo agente movetur aliquid ad id quod est proprium illi agenti, oportet quod a principio ipsum mobile subdatur impressionibus agentis imperfecte, quasi alienis et non propriis sibi, quousque fiant ei propriæ in termino motus; sicut lignum abigne primo 4 calefit, et ille calor non est proprius ligno, sed præter naturam ipsius; in fine autem, quando jam lignum ignitum est, fit ei calor proprius et connaturalis; et similiter, quum aliquis a magistro docetur, oportet quod a principio conceptiones magistri recipiat, non quasi eas per se intelligens, sed per modum credulitatis, quasi supra suam capacitatem existentes; in fine autem, quando jam edoctus fuerit, eas poterit intelligere. Sicut autem ex dictis (c. cxlvii) patet, auxilio divinæ gratia dirigimur in ultimum finem; ultimus autem finis est manifesta visio primæ veritatis in seipsa, ut supra (c. xxxvii et xlviii) ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod, antequam ad istum finem veniatur, intellectus hominis Deo subdatur per modum credulitatis, divina gratia hoc faciente. 4. Præterea, In principio hujus operis (l. II, c. v), positæ sunt utilitates propter quas necessarium fuit divinam veritatem hominibus per modum credulitatis proponi. Ex quibus etiam concludi potest quod necessarium fuit fidem esse divinæ gratia effectum in nobis. Hinc est quod Apostolus dicit: Gratia estis salvati per fidem, et hoc non ex vobis; Dei enim donum est, Ephes. ii, 8. Per hoc autem excluditur error Pelagianorum, qui dicebant quod initium fidei in nobis non erat a Deo, sed a nobis.\n\nnobis spem beatitudinis 3. Ex eisdem etiam 4 ostendi potest quod oportet in nobis per gratiam spem\n\nfuturæ beatitudinis causari. 1. Dilectio enim quæ est ad alios provenit in homine ex dilectione hominis ad seipsum, in quantum ad amicum aliquis se habet sicut ad se. Diligit autem aliquis seipsum in quantum vult sibi bonum 5, sicut alium diligit in quantum vult ei bonum. Oportet ergo quod homo, per hoc quod circa proprium bonum afficitur, perducatur ad hoc quod afficiatur circa bonum alterius. Per hoc igitur quod aliquis ab alio sperat bonum, fit homini via ut illum diligit a quo bonum sperat secundum seipsum quando diligens bonum ejus vult, etiam si nihil ei inde proveniat. Quum igitur per gratiam gratum facientem causetur in homine quod Deum propter se diligat, consequens fuit ut etiam per gratiam homo spem de Deo adipisceretur. Amicitia vero qua quis alium secundum se diligit, etsi non sit propter propriam utilitatem, habet tamen multas utilitates consequentes, secundum quod unus amicorum alteri subvenit ut sibiipsi; unde oportet quod, quum aliquis alium diligit et co- 4 A: « Proprie. » — B, C, D, E, F: « Proprio. » 2 Titulus in B desideratur. 5 A, C, D, E, F omittunt: « Beatitudinis. » 4 A: « Autem » — B omittit: « Etiam. » gnoscit se ab eo diligi, de eo spem ha-beat. Per gratiam autem ita constituitur homo Dei dilector, secundum charitatis affectum, quod etiam instruitur per fidem quod a Deo prædiligatur $^4$, secundum illud quod habetur: In hoc est charitas: non quasi nos dilexerimus Deum, sed quoniam ipse prior dilexit nos, I Joann. iv, 10. Consequitur igitur ex dono gratiae quod homo de Deo spem habeat. Ex quo etiam patet quod, sicut spes est præparatio hominis ad veram Dei dilectionem, ita et, e converso, ex charitate homo\n\nin spe confirmatur. 2. Amplius, In omni diligente causatur desiderium ut uniatur suo dilecto, in quantum possibile est; et hinc est quod delectabilissimum est amicis convivere. Si ergo per gratiam homo Dei dilector constituitur, oportet quod in eo causetur desiderium unionis ad Deum, secundum quod possibile est. Fides autem, quae causatur ex gratia, declarat possibile esse unionem hominis ad Deum secundum perfectam fruitionem, in qua beatitudo consistit. Hujus igitur fruitionis desiderium in homine consequitur ex Dei dilectione. Sed desiderium rei alicujus molestat animam desiderantis, nisi adsit spes de consequendo. Conveniens igitur fuit ut in hominibus, in quibus Dei dilectio et fides causatur per gratiam, etiam causetur spes\n\nfuturæ beatitudinis adipiscendæ. 3. Item, In his quæ ordinantur ad aliquem finem desideratum, si aliqua difficultas emerserit, solatium affert spes de fine consequendo; sicut amaritudinem medicinæ aliquis leviter fert propter spem sanitatis. In processu autem quo in beatitudinem tendimus, quæ est finis omnium desideriorum nostrorum $^2$, multa difficilia imminent sustinenda; nam virtus per quam ad beatitudinem itur, circa difficilia est. Ad hoc igitur ut levius et promptius homo in beatitudinem tenderet, necessarium fuit ei spem de\n\nobtinenda beatitudine adhibere. 4. Præterea, Nullus movetur ad finem ad quem aestimat esse impossibile pervenire. Ad hoc ergo quod aliquis pergat in finem aliquem, oportet quod afficiatur ad finem illum tanquam possibile haberi; et hic est affectus spei. Quum igi-tur per gratiam homo dirigatur in ultimum finem beatitudinis, necessarium fuit ut per gratiam imprimeretur humano affectui spes\n\nde beatitudine consequenda. Hinc est quod dicitur: Regeneravit nos in spem vivam..., in hereditatem..., immarcessibilem, conservatam in cælis, I Petr. i, 3 et 4; et dicitur: Spe salvi facti sumus, Rom. viii, 24.\n\nDe donis gratiae gratis datæ; de divinationibus dæmonum. (I-II, q. cxi, a iv.) Quia vero ea quæ homo per se non videt cognoscere non potest, nisi ea recipiat ab eo qui videt, fides autem est de his quæ non videmus, oportet cognitionem eorum de quibus est fides ab eo derivari qui ea per se videt.\n\ncix, a. x.) Indiget etiam homo divinæ gratiae auxilio ad hoc quod\n\nperseveret in bono. 1. Omne enim quod de se est variabile, ad hoc quod figatur in uno indiget auxilio alicujus moventis immobilis. Homo autem variabilis est, et de malo in bonum, et de bono in malum. Ad hoc igitur quod immobiliter perseveret in bono, quod est perseverare,\n\nindiget auxilio divino. 2. Adhuc, Ad illud quod excedit vires liberi arbitrii indiget homo auxilio divinæ gratiae. Sed virtus liberi arbitrii non se extendit ad hunc effectum qui est perseverare finaliter in bono. Quod sic patet: Potestas enim liberi arbitrii est respectu eorum quæ sub electione cadunt. Quod autem eligitur est aliquod par-ticulare operabile; particulare autem operabile est quod est hic et nunc. Quod igitur cadit sub potestate liberi arbitrii est aliquid ut nunc operandum. Perseverare autem non dicit aliquid ut nunc operabile, sed continuationem operationis per totum tempus. Iste igitur effectus, qui est perseverare in bono, est supra potestatem liberi arbitrii. Indiget igitur homo, ad perseverandum in bono,\n\nauxilio divinæ gratiae. 3. Amplius, Licet homo per voluntatem et liberum arbitrium sit dominus sui actus, non tamen est dominus suarum naturalium potentiarum; et ideo, licet liber sit ad volendum vel ad non volendum aliquid, non tamen volendo facere potest quod voluntas, in eo quod vult, ad id quod vult vel eligit immobiliter se habeat. Hoc autem requiritur ad perseverantiam, ut scilicet voluntas in bono immobiliter permaneat. Perseverantia igitur non est in potestate liberi arbitrii. Oportet igitur adesse homini auxilium divinæ gratiae ad\n\nhoc ut perseveret. 4. Præterea, Si sunt plura agentia successive, quorum scilicet unum agat post actionem alterius, continuitas actionis istorum, non potest causari ex aliquo uno istorum, quia nullum eorum semper agit; nec ex omnibus, quia non simul agunt; unde oportet quod causetur ab aliquo superiori quod semper agat, sicut Philosophus probat, in octavo Physicorum c. vi, quod continuitas generationis in animalibus causatur ab aliquo superiori sempiterno. Ponamus autem aliquem perseverantem in bono. In eo igitur sunt multi motus liberi arbitrii in bonum tendentes, sibi invicem sucedentes usque ad finem. Hujus igitur continuationis boni, quod est perseverantia, non potest esse causa aliquis istorum motuum, quia nullus eorum semper durat; nec omnes simul, quia, quum non simul sint, non possunt simul aliquid causare. Relinquitur ergo quod ista continuatio causetur ab aliquo superiori. Indiget igitur homo auxilio superioris gratiae ad\n\nperseverandum in bono. 5. Item, Si sunt multa ordinata ad unum finem, totus ordo eorum, quousque pervenerint ad finem, est a primo agente dirigente in finem. In eo autem qui per- 1 C: « Aliquis et. » — « Aliquid ut nunc. Perseverare. » severat in bono sunt multi motus et multæ actiones pertingentes ad unum finem. Oportet igitur quod totus ordo istorum motuum et actionum causetur a primo dirigente in finem. Ostensum est autem (c. cxLVII) quod per auxilium divinæ gratiae diriguntur in ultimum finem. Igitur per auxilium divinæ gratiae est totus ordo et continuatio bonorum operum in eo qui\n\nperseverat in bono. Hinc est quod dicitur : Qui cæpit in vobis opus bonum, perficiet usque in diem Jesu Christi, Philipp. 1, 6; et : Deus omnis gratiae, qui vocavit nos in externam gloriam suam in Christo Jesu, modicum passos ipse perficiet, confirmabit solidabitque,\n\nI Petr. v, 10. — Inveniuntur etiam in sacra Scriptura multæ orationes quibus a Deo petitur perseverantia; sicut in Psalmista : Perfice gressus meos in semitis tuis, ut non moveantur vestigia mea. Psalm. xvI, 6; et : Jesus Christus, et Deus et Pater noter..., exhortetur corda vestra et confirmet in omni opere et sermone bono, II Thessal. 11, 15 et 16. Hoc etiam ipsum in oratione dominica petitur, maxime quum dicitur : Adveniat regnum tuum, Matth. vI, 10; non enim nobis adveniet regnum Dei, nisi in bono fuerimus perseverantes. Derisorium autem esset aliquid a Deo petere cujus ipse dator non esset. Est igitur perseverantia\n\nhominis a Deo. Per hoc autem excluditur error Pelagianorum, qui dixerunt quod, ad perseverandum in bono, sufficit homini liberum arbitrium, nec ad hoc\n\nindiget auxilio gratiae. Sciendum tamen est quod, quum ille qui gratiam habet petat a Deo ut perseveret in bono, sicut liberum arbitrium non sufficit ad istum effectum, qui est perseverare in bono, sine exteriori Dei auxilio, ita nec ad hoc sufficit aliquis habitus nobis infusus. Habitus enim qui nobis infunduntur divinitus, secundum statum præsentis vitæ, non auferunt a libero arbitrio totaliter mobilitatem ad malum, licet per eos liberum arbitrium aliquiliter stabiliatur in bono. Et ideo, quum dicimus hominem indigere, ad perseverandum finaliter, auxilio gratiae, non intelligimus quod, supra gratiam habitualem prius infusam ad bene operandum, alia desuper infundatur ad perseverandum; sed intelligimus quod, habitis omnibus habitibus gratuitis, adhuc indiget homo divinæ Providentiae auxilio exterius gubernantis.\n\ncix, a. vii.) Ex his autem apparet quod per auxilium gratiae homo, etiam si non perseveraverit, sed in peccatum ceciderit, potest\n\nreparari ad bonum. 1. Ejusdem enim virtutis est continuare salutem alicujus et interruptam reparare; sicut enim per virtutem naturalem continuatur sanitas in corpore, ita per eamdem virtutem naturalem sanitas interrupta reparatur Homo autem perseverat in bono, auxilio divinæ gratiae, ut (c. clv) ostensum est. Igitur, si per peccatum lapsus fuerit, ejusdem gratiae\n\nauxilio poterit reparari. 2. Adhuc, Agens quod non requirit dispositionem in subjecto potest suum effectum imprimere in subjectum qualitercumque dispositum; et propter hoc Deus, qui in agendo non requirit subjectum dispositum, potest absque dispositione subjecti formam naturalem inducere, utpote dum cæcum illuminat et mortuum vivificat, et sic de similibus. Sed, sicut non requirit dispositionem naturalem in subjecto corporeo, ita non requirit meritum in voluntate ad gratiam conferendam, quia sine meritis datur, ut ostensum est (c. cxlix). Ergo gratiam gratum facientem, per quam peccata tolluntur, Deus alicui conferre potest, etiam postquam a gratia\n\ncecidit per peccatum. 3. Amplius, hæc sola homo recuperare amissa non potest quæ per generationem ei adveniunt, sicut potentias naturales et membra, eo quod homo non potest iterum generari. Auxilium autem gratiae datur homini, non per generationem, sed postquam jam est. Potest igitur, post amissionem gratiae per peccatum, iterum reparari\n\nad peccata delenda. 4. Item, Gratia est quædam habitualis dispositio in anima, ut ostensum est (c. cl). Sed habitus acquisiti per actus, si amittantur, possunt iterum reacquiri per actus, per quos acquisiti sunt. Multo igitur 1 A: « Qui. » 2 Sic A, B, C, D, E, F. — Edit.: « Ea. » magis gratia Deo con jungens et a peccato liberans, si amittatur, divina\n\noperatione reparari potest. 5. Præterea, In operibus Dei non est aliquid frustra, sicut nec in operibus naturæ; hoc enim et natura habet a Deo. Frustra autem aliquid moveretur, nisi posset pervenire ad finem motus. Necessarium est ergo quod id quod natum est moveri ad aliquem finem sit possibile venire in illum finem. Sed homo, post-quam in peccatum cecidit, quamdiu status hujus vitæ durat, remanet in eo aptitudo ut moveatur ad bonum; cujus signa sunt desiderium de bono et dolor de malo, quæ adhuc in homine remanent post peccatum. Est igitur possibile hominem post peccatum iterum redire ad bonum; quod gratia\n\nin homine operatur. 6. Amplius, Nulla potentia passiva inventur in rerum natura quæ non possit reduci in actum per aliquam potentiam activam naturalem. Multo igitur minus est aliqua potentia in anima humana quæ non sit reducibilis in actum per potentiam activam divinam. Manet autem in anima humana, etiam post peccatum, potentia ad bonum, quia per peccatum non tolluntur potentiæ naturales quibus anima ordinatur ad suum bonum. Potest igitur per divinam potentiam reparari in bono, et sic auxilio gratia homo potest\n\nconsequi remissionem pecatorum. Hinc est quod dicitur: Si fuerint peccata vestra ut coccinum, quasi nix dealbauntur, Is. 1, 18; et: Universa delicta operit charitas, Proverb. x, 12. Hoc etiam quotidie a Domino non frustra petimus, dicentes: Dimitte nobis debita\n\nnostra, Matth. vi, 12. Per hoc autem excluditur error Novatianorum, qui dixerunt quod de peccatis quæ post Baptismum peccat homo veniam consequi non potest.\n\nQuod homo a peccato liberari non potest nisi per gratiam. (I -II, q. ciii, a. vii.) Ex eisdem etiam ostendi potest quod homo a peccato mortali resurgere non potest, nisi per gratiam. 1. Per peccatum enim mortale homo ab ultimo fine avertitur. In ultimum autem finem homo non ordinatur nisi per gratiam. Per solam igitur gratiam homo potest a peccato resurgere. 2. Adhuc, Offensa nonnisi per dilectionem tollitur. Sed per peccatum mortale homo offensam Dei incurrit; dicitur enim quod Deus peccatores odit, in quantum vult eos privare ultimo fine quem his quos diligit præparat. Non ergo homo potest a mortali peccato resurgere, nisi per gratiam, per quam fit quædam amicitia inter Deum et hominem. 3. Adhuc etiam induci possunt omnes rationes superius (c. cxLVII) positæ de gratiae necessitate. Hinc est quod dicitur: Ego sum ipse qui deleo iniquitates tuas propter me, Isai. xLiii, 25; et: Remisisti iniquitatem plebis tuæ; operuisti omnia peccata eorum, Psal. lxxxiv, 3. Per hoc autem excluditur error Pelagianorum, qui dixerunt hominem posse a peccato resurgere per liberum arbitrium.\n\nQualiter homo a peccato liberatur. 1. Quia vero homo non potest ad unum oppositorum redire nisi recedat ab alio, ad hoc quod homo auxilio gratiae ad statum rectitudinis redeat, necessarium est quod a peccato, per quod a rectitudine declinaverat, recedat. Et, quia homo in ultimum finem dirigitur et ab eo avertitur præcipue per voluntatem, non solum necessarium est quod homo exteriori actu a peccato recedat, peccare desinens, sed etiam quod recedat voluntate, ad hoc quod per gratiam a peccato resurgat. Voluntate autem homo a peccato recedit dum et de præterito pœnitet et futurum vitare proponit. Necessarium est igitur quod homo a peccato resurgens et de peccato præterito pœnitet et futura vitare proponat. Si enim homo non proponeret potentiæ naturales quibus anima ordinatur ad suum bonum per liberum arbitrium. 7 Titulus in A et B desideratur. 8 — desistere a peccato non esset peccatum secundum se contrarium voluntati; si vero vellet desistere a peccato, non tamen doleret de peccato præterito, non esset illud idem peccatum quod fecit contrarium voluntati. Est autem contrarius motus quo ab aliquo receditur motui quo ad illud pervenitur, sicut dealbatio contraria est denigrationi. Unde oportet quod per contraria voluntas recedat a peccato his per quæ in peccatum inclinata fuit. Fuit autem inclinata in peccatum per appetitum et delectationem circa res inferiores. Oportet igitur quod a peccato recedat per aliqua pœnalia, quibus affligatur propter hoc quod peccavit; sicut enim per delectationem tracta fuit voluntas ad consensum peccati, sic per pœnas confirmatur in abominatione peccati. 2. Item, Videmus quod etiam bruta animalia a maximis voluptatibus retrahuntur per dolores verberum. Oportet autem eum qui de peccato resurgit non solum detestari peccatum præteritum, sed etiam vitare futurum. Est igitur conveniens ut affligatur pro peccato, ut sic magis confirmetur in proposito vitandi peccata. 3. Præterea, Ea quæ cum labore et pœna acquirimus magis amamus et diligentius conservamus; unde illi qui per proprium laborem acquirunt pecunias minus eas expendunt quam qui sine labore accipiunt, vel a parentibus, vel quocumque alio modo. Sed homini resurgenti a peccato hoc maxime necessarium est, ut statum gratiae et Dei amorem diligenter conservet, quem negligenter per peccatum amisit. Est ergo conveniens ut laborem et pœnam sustineat pro peccatis commissis. 4. Adhuc, Ordo justitiæ hoc requirit, ut peccato pœna reddatur. Ex hoc autem quod ordo servatur in rebus, sapientia Dei gubernantis apparet. Pertinet igitur ad manifestationem divinæ bonitatis et Dei gloriam quod pro peccato pœna reddatur. Sed peccator peccando contra ordinem divinitus institutum facit, leges 4 Dei prætergrediendo. Est igitur conveniens ut hoc recompenset in seipso puniendo quod prius peccaverat; sic enim totaliter extra inordinationem 2 constituetur. Per hoc ergo patet quod, postquam homo per gratiam remissionem peccati consecutus est et ad statum gratiae reductus, remanet obligatus ex Dei justitia ad aliquam pœnam pro peccato commisso. Quam quidem pœnam si propria voluntate a se exegerit, per hoc Deo satisfacere dicitur, in quantum cum labore et pœna ordinem divinitus institutum 3 exequitur, pro peccato se puniendo, quem peccando transgressus fuerat, propriam voluntatem sequendo. Si autem a se hanc pœnam non exigat, quum ea quæ divinæ Providentiae subjacent inordinata remanere non possint, hæc pœna infligetur ei a Deo; nec talis pœna satisfactoria dicetur, quum non fuerit ex electione patientis, sed dicetur purgatoria, quia alio puniente quasi purgabitur, dum quidquid inordinatum fuit in eo ad debitum ordinem reducetur. Hinc est quod Apostolus dicit: Si nosmetipsos dijudicaremus, non utique judicaremur. Dum judicamur autem, a Domino corripimur, ut non cum hoc mundo damemur, I Cor. xi, 34 et 32. Considerandum tamen quod, quum mens a peccato avertitur, tam vehemens potest esse peccati displicentia et inhæsio mentis ad Deum, quod non remanebit obligatio ad aliquam pœnam. Nam, ut ex prædictis colligi potest, pœna quam quis patitur post peccati remissionem ad hoc necessaria est ut mens firmius bono inhæreat, homine per pœnas castigato; pœnæ enim medicinæ quædam sunt, et ut etiam ordo justitiæ servetur, dum qui peccavit sustinet pœnam. Dilectio autem ad Deum sufficit mentem hominis firmare in bono, præcipue si vehemens fuerit; displicentia autem culpæ præteritæ, quum fuerit intensa, magnum affert dolorem. Unde per vehementiam dilectionis Dei et odii peccati præteriti excluditur necessitas satisfactoria vel purgatoriæ pœnæ; et, si non sit tanta vehementia quod totaliter pœnam excludat, tamen, quanto vehementior fuerit, tanto minus de pœna sufficiet. Quod vero per amicos facimus per nos ipsos facere videmur, quia amicitia ex duobus facit unum per affectum, et præcipue dilectio charitatis; et ideo, sicut per seipsum, ita et per alium potest aliquis satisfacere Deo, præcipue quum necessitas fuerit; nam et pœnam quam ami- 1 2 cus propter ipsum patitur reputat aliquis ac si ipse pateretur; et sic pœna ei non deest dum patienti amico compatitur, et tanto amplius quanto ipse est ei causa patiendi. — Et iterum affectio charitatis in eo qui pro amico patitur facit magis satisfactionem Deo acceptam quam si pro se pateretur; hoc enim est promptæ charitatis, illud autem est necessitatis. Ex quo accipitur quod unus pro alio satisfacere potest, dummodo uterque in charitate fuerit. Hinc est quod Apostolus dicit: Alter alterius onera portate, et sic adimplebitis legem Christi, Galat. vi, 2.\n\npossit. Quum autem, sicut ex præmissis (c. cxLVII) habetur, in finem ultimum aliquis dirigi non possit, nisi auxilio divinæ gratiae, sine qua etiam nullus potest habere ea quæ sunt necessaria ad tendendum in ultimum finem, sicut est fides, spes, dilectio et perseverantia (c. CLI-clV), potest alicui videri quod non sit homini imputandum si prædictis careat, præcipue quum auxilium divinæ gratiae mereri non possit, nec ad Deum converti, nisi Deus eum convertat; nulli enim imputatur quod ab alio dependet. Quod si hoc concedatur, plura inconvenientia consequi manifestum est. Sequetur enim quod ille qui fidem non habet, nec spem, nec dilectionem Dei, nec perseverantiam in bono, non sit pœna dignus, quum expresse dicatur: Qui incredulus est Filio non videbit vitam; sed ira Dei manet super eum, Joann. III, 36. — Et, quum nullus ad beatitudinis finem sine præmissis perveniat, sequetur ulterius quod aliqui homines sint qui nec beatitudinem consequantur, nec pœnam patiantur a Deo; cujus contrarium ostenditur ex eo quod dicitur quod omnibus in divino judicio existentibus dicetur: Venite... possidete paratum vobis regnum; vel: Discedite... in ignem æternum,\n\nMatth. xxv, 34 et 41. Ad hujus dubitationis solutionem considerandum est quod, licet aliquis per motum liberi arbitrii divinam gratiam nec promereri nec acquirere possit, potest tamen seipsum impedire ne eam recipiat; dicitur enim de quibusdam: Dixerunt Deo: Recede a nobis, et scientiam viarum tuarum nolumus, Job, xxI, 14; et: Ipsi fuerunt rebelles lumini, Ibid. xxiv, 13. Et quum hoc sit in potestate liberi arbitrii, impedire divinæ gratiae receptionem vel non impedire, non immerito in culpam imputatur ei qui impedimentum præstat gratiae receptioni; Deus enim, quantum in se est, paratus est omnibus gratiam dare; omnes enim homines vult salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire, ut dicitur, I Tim. II, 4. Sed illi soli gratia privantur qui in seipsis gratiae impedimentum præstant; sicut, sole mundum illuminante, in culpam imputatur ei qui oculos claudit si ex hoc aliquod malum sequatur, licet videre non possit nisi lumine solis præveniatur. Quod homo in peccato existens sine gratia peccatum vitare non potest. Quod autem dictum est, in potestate liberi arbitrii esse ne impedimentum gratiae præstet, competit his in quibus naturalis potentia integra fuerit. Si autem, per inordinationem præcedentem, declinaverit ad malum, non erit omnino in potestate ejus nullum impedimentum gratiae præstare; etsi enim ad aliquod momentum ab aliquo peccati actu particulari possit abstinere propria potestate, sitamen diu sibi relinquitur, in peccatum cadet, per quod gratiae impedimentum præstatur. 1. Quum enim mens hominis a statu rectitudinis declinaverit, manifestum est quod recessit ab ordine debiti finis. Illud igitur quod deberet esse in affectu præcipuum, tanquam ultimus finis, efficitur minus dilectum illo ad quod mens inordinate conversa est, sicut in ultimum finem. Quandocumque igitur occurrerit aliquid conveniens inordinato fini, repugnans fini debito, eligetur, nisi reducatur ad debitum ordinem, ut finem debitum omnibus præferat; quod est gratiae effectus. Dum autem eligitur, aliquid quod repugnat ultimo fini, impedimentum præstat gratiae, quae dirigit in finem. Unde manifestum est quod post peccatum non potest homo abstinere ab omni peccato, antequam per gratiam ad debitum ordinem reducatur. 2. Præterea, Quum mens inclinata fuerit ad aliquid, non se jam habet αqualiter ad utrumque oppositorum, sed magis ad illud ad quod est inclinata. Illud autem ad quod mens magis se habet eligit, nisi per rationis discussionem ab eo quadam sollicitudine abducatur; unde et in repentinis signum interioris habitus præcipue accipi potest. Non est autem possibile mentem hominis continue in ea vigilantia esse ut per rationem discutiat quidquid debet velle vel agere. Unde consequitur quod mens aliquando eligat id ad quod est inclinata inclinatione manente; et ita, si inclinata fuerit in peccatum, non stabit diu quin peccet, impedimentum gratia præstans, nisi ad statum rectitudinis reducatur. 3. Adhuc etiam operantur impetus corporalium passionum, et appetibilia secundum sensum, et plurimæ passiones, et occasiones male agendi, quibus de facili homo provocatur ad peccandum, nisi retrahantur per firmam inhæsionem ad ultimum finem, quam gratia facit. Unde apparet stulta Pelagianorum opinio, qui dicebant hominem in peccato exsistentem sine gratia possevitare peccata. Cujus contrarium apparet hoc quod Psalmista petit : Quum defecerit virtus mea, ne derelinquas me, Psalm. LXX, 9; et Dominus orare nos docet : Et ne nos inducas in tentationem, sed libera nos a malo, Matt. vi, 13. Quamvis autem illi qui in peccato sunt vitare non possint per propriam potestatem quin impedimentum gratia præstent vel ponant, ut ostensum est (c. clix), nisi auxilio gratia præveniantur, nihilominus tamen hoc eis imputatur ad culpam, quia hic defectus ex culpa præcedente in eis relinquitur; sicut ebrius ab homicidio non excusatur quod per ebrietatem committit, quam sua culpa incurrit. Præterea, licet ille qui est in peccato non habeat hoc in propria potestate omnino quod vitet peccatum, habet tamen potestatem nunc vitare hoc vel illud peccatum, ut dictum est (c. clv); unde quodcumque committit voluntarie committit, et ita non immerito ei imputatur ad culpam.\n\nin peccato relinquit. Licet autem ille qui peccat impedimentum gratia præstet, et, in quantum ordo rerum exigit, gratiam non deberet recipere, tamen, quia Deus præter ordinem rebus inditum operari potest, sicut quum cæcum illuminat vel mortuum resuscitat, interdum ex abundantia bonitatis suæ etiam eos qui impedimentum gratia præstant auxilio suo prævenit, avertens eos a malo et convertens ad bonum; et, sicut non omnes cæcos illuminat, nec omnes languidos sanat, ut et in illis quos curat opus virtutis ejus appareat et in aliis ordo naturæ servetur, ita non omnes qui gratiam impediunt auxilio suo prævenit ut avertantur a malo et convertantur ad bonum, sed aliquos, in quibus vult suam misericordiam apparere, ita quod in aliis justitiæ ordo manifestetur. Hinc est quod Apostolus dicit : Deus volens ostendere iram et notam facere potentiam suam, sustinuit in multa patientia vasa iræ apta in interitum, ut ostenderet divitias gloriæ suæ in vasa misericordiæ, quæ præparavit in gloriam,\n\nRom. ix, 20 et 23. Quum autem Deus hominum qui in eisdem peccatis detinentur hos quidem præveniens convertat, illos autem sustineat, sive permittat secundum ordinem rerum procedere, non est ratio inquirenda quare hos convertat et non illos; hoc enim ex simplici ejus voluntate dependet, sicut ex simplici ejus voluntate processit quod, quum omnia fierent ex nihilo, quædam facta sunt aliis digniora, et sicutex simplici voluntate procedit artificis ut ex eadem materia similiter disposita quædam vasa format ad nobiles usus et quædam ad ignobiles. Hinc est quod Apostolus dicit : Annon habet potestatem figulus luti ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in\n\ncontumeliam? Rom. ix, 21. Per hoc autem excluditur error Origenis, qui dicebat hos ad Deum converti et non alios, propter aliqua opera quæ animæ eorum fecerant antequam corporibus unirentur (περιὰρχών, l. III,c. 1); quæ quidem positio in secundo libro diligentius improbata est (l. II, c. Lxxxiii et Lxxxiv). 1 A: « Alios. » 2 A: « Facta sunt. » 5 Sic A, B, C, D, E, F. — Edit. omittunt: « In secundo libro diligentius. »\n\nest causa peccandi. Quamvis autem quosdam peccatores Deus ad se non convertat, sed in peccatis secundum eorum merita eos relinquat, non tamen eos\n\nad peccandum inducit. 1. Homines enim peccant per hoc quod deviant ab Ipso, qui est ultimus finis, ut ex superioribus (c. cxliii et clvii) patet. Quum autem omne agens agat ad proprium finem et sibi convenientem, impossibile est quod, Deo agente, aliqui avertantur ab ultimo fine, qui Deus est. Impossibile igitur est quod Deus\n\naliquos peccare faciat. 2. Item, Bonum causa mali esse non potest. Sed peccatum est hominis malum; contrariatur enim proprio hominis bono, quod est vivere secundum rationem. Impossibile est igitur quod Deus sit\n\nalicui causa peccandi. 3. Præterea, Omnis sapientia et bonitas hominis derivatur a sapientia et bonitate divina, sicut quædam similitudo Ipsius. Repugnat autem sapientia et bonitati humanæ quod aliquem peccare faciat. Igitur\n\nmulto magis divinæ. 4. Adhuc, Peccatum omne ex aliquo defectu provenit proximi agentis, non autem ex influentia primi agentis; sicut peccatum claudicationis provenit ex indispositione tibiæ, non autem ex virtute motiva, quum tamen ex ea sit quidquid de perfectione motus in claudicatione apparet. Proximum autem agens peccati humani est voluntas. Est igitur defectus peccati ex voluntate hominis, non autem ex Deo, qui est primus agens, a quo tamen est quidquid ad perfectionem actionis pertinet\n\nin actu peccati. Hinc est quod dicitur: Non dicas: Ille me implanavit; non enim necessarii sunt ei homines impii, Eccli. xv, 12; et infra: Nemini mandavit impie agere, et nemini dedit spatium peccandi, Ibid. xv, 21; et dicitur: Nemo, quum tentatur, dicat quoniam a Deo tentatur; Deus enim intentator\n\nmalorum est, Jacob. 1, 13. Inveniuntur tamen quædam in Scripturis, ex quibus videtur quod Deus sit aliquibus causa peccandi; dicitur enim: Ego induravi cor ejus (Pharaonis) et servorum illius, Exod. x, 1; et: Excæca cor populi hujus, et aures ejus aggrava, et oculos ejus claude, ne forte videat oculis suis..., et convertatur, et sanem eum, Isai. vi, 10; et: Errare nos fecisti de viis tuis; indurasti cor nostrum, ne timerem te, Ibid. Lxiii, 17; et dicitur: Tradidit ilos Deus in reprobum sensum, ut faciant ea quæ non conveniunt, Rom. 1, 28. Quæ omnia secundum hoc intelligenda sunt, quod Deus aliquibus non confert auxilium ad vitandum peccatum, quod\n\naliis quibusdam confert. Hoc autem auxilium est non solum infusio gratiae, sed etiam exterior custodia, per quam occasiones peccandi homini ex divina Providentia tolluntur et provocantia ad peccatum comprimuntur. Adjuvat etiam Deus hominem contra peccatum per naturale lumen rationis et alia naturalia bona quæ homini confert. Quum ergo hæc auxilia aliquibus subtrahit pro merito suæ actionis, secundum quod ejus justitia exigit, dicitur eos obdurare, vel excæcare, vel aliquid eorum quæ dicta sunt.\n\net electione divina. Quia vero ostensum est quod divina operatione aliqui diriguntur in ultimum finem per gratiam adjuti, aliqui vero eodem auxilio gratiae deserti ab ultimo fine decidunt (c. clxi), omnia autem quæ a Deo aguntur ab æterno per ejus sapientiam provisa et ordinata sunt, ut supra (c. xciv) ostensum est, necesse est prædictam hominum distinctionem ab æterno a Deo esse ordinatam. Secundum ergo quod quosdam ab æterno præordinavit ut dirigendos in ultimum finem, dicitur eos prædestinasse; unde Apostolus dicit: Qui prædestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum..., secundum propositum voluntatis suæ, Ephes. 1, 5. Illos autem quibus ab æterno disposuit se gratiam non daturum dicitur reprobasse vel odio habuisse, secundum illud quod habetur: Dilexi Jacob, Esau autem odio habui, Malach. 1, 2 et 3. Ratione vero ipsius distinctionis, se- A: « Et divinæ. » Sic A, B, C, D, E, F. — Edit.: « Dispositione. » A: « Facere. » A: « Probatione. » cundum quod quosdam reprobavit et quosdam prædestinavit, attenditur divina electio, de qua dicitur: *Elegit nos in ipso ante\n\nmundi constitutionem*, Ephes. 1, 4. Sic igitur patet quod prædestinatio et electio et reprobatio est quædam pars divinæ Providentia, secundum quod homines ex divina Providentia ordinantur in ultimum finem; unde per eadem manifestum esse potest quod prædestinatio et electio necessitatem non inducunt, quibus et supra (c. Lxxii) ostensum est quod divina Providentia contingentiam a\n\nrebus non aufert. Quod autem prædestinatio et electio causam non habeant ex aliquibus huma-nis meritis, potest fieri manifestum, non solum ex hoc quod gratia Dei, quæ est prædestinationis effectus, meritis non prævenitur, sed omnia merita præcedit humana, ut ostensum est (c. cxlix); sed etiam manifestari potest ex hoc quod divina voluntas et Providentia est prima causa eorum quæ fiunt. Nil autem potest esse causa voluntatis et Providentia divinæ, licet effectuum Providentia, et similiter prædestinationis, unus possit\n\nalterius esse causa. *Quis enim*, ut Apostolus dicit, prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? *Quoniam ex ipso*, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia, ipsi gloria in sæcula sæculorum*. Amen, Rom. xi, 35 et 36. *Sic omnes codd. – Edit. omittunt: « Sæculorum.»*"
      }
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