[I.q.2.a.1.arg.1] It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), \"the knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all.\" Therefore the existence of God is self-evident.
\n[I.q.2.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Deum esse sit per se notum. Illa enim nobis dicuntur per se nota quorum cognitio nobis naturaliter inest, sicut patet de primis principiis. Sed, sicut dicit Damascenus, lib. I De fide orthod., cap. I, col. 790, t. 1, « om-nibus cognitio existendi Deum naturaliter est inserta. » Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.
\n[I.q.2.a.1.arg.2] Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word \"God\" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word \"God\" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition \"God exists\" is self-evident.
\n[I.q.2.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illa dicuntur esse per se nota quæ statim, cognitis terminis, cognoscuntur: quod Philosophus attribuit primis demonstrationum principiis, in I Post., cap. II. Scito enim quid est totum et quid est pars, statim scitur quod omne totum majus est sua parte. Sed intellecto quid significet hoc « Nemo mortalium est, cui non hoc ab eo naturaliter insitum sit, ut Deum esse cognoscat, » et c. III, col. 794, « insitum nobis a natura est, ut Deum esse noscamus. » nomen Deus, statim habetur, quod Deus est. Significatur enim hoc nomine id quo majus significari non potest: majus autem est quod est in re et intellectu, quam quod est in intellectu tantum: unde, cum, intellecto hoc nomine Deus, statim sit in intellectu, sequitur etiam quod sit in re. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.
\n[I.q.2.a.1.arg.3] Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition \"Truth does not exist\" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth itself: \"I am the way, the truth, and the life\" (John 14:6) Therefore \"God exists\" is self-evident.
\n[I.q.2.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, veritatem esse est per se notum; quia qui negat veritatem esse, concedit veritatem non esse: si enim veritas non est, verum est veritatem non esse; si autem est aliquid verum, oportet quod veritas sit. Deus autem est ipsa veritas; Joan., xiv, 6: Ego sum via, veritas* et vita. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.
\n[I.q.2.a.1.sc] No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition \"God is\" can be mentally admitted: \"The fool said in his heart, There is no God\" (Psalm 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.
\n[I.q.2.a.1.sc] Sed contra nullus potest cogitare oppositum ejus quod est per se notum, ut patet per Philosophum, in IV Metaphys., text. 9, et I Post., text. ult., ad med. illius, et text. 5, circa fin., circa prima demonstrationis principia. Cogitari autem potest oppositum ejus quod est Deum esse, secundum illud Ps. LII, 1: Dixit insipiens in corde suo: Non est Deus. Ergo Deum esse non est per se notum.
\n[I.q.2.a.1.co] A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as \"Man is an animal,\" for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: \"Whether all that is, is good\"), \"that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space.\" Therefore I say that this proposition, \"God exists,\" of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (3, 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature — namely, by effects.
\n[I.q.2.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod contingit aliquid esse per se notum dupliciter. Uno modo secundum se et non quoad nos, alio modo secundum se et quoad nos. Ex hoc enim aliqua propositio est per se nota, quia prædicatum includitur in ratione subjecti, ut: Homo est animal; nam animal est de ratione hominis. Si igitur notum sit omni- Sed cod. habent: «veritatem non esse,» sicut et parmensis quae, juxta nos, si pro teste primam partem Summæ theologicæ retinemus, cæteris editionibus est accuratior. Liber An bonum sit omne quod est, vel Quomodo substantiæ in co quod sint bonæ sint, solet inscribi De hebdomadibus, ob prima verba: Postulas ut ex hebdomadibus nostris. Propositio qualiscumque dupliciter potest esse per se nota: 1° quoad se; 2° quoad nos.
\n[I.q.2.a.1.ad.1] To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.
\n[I.q.2.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cognoscere Deum esse, in aliquo communi sub quadam confusione, est nobis naturaliter insertum, in quantum scilicet Deus est hominis beatitudo; homo enim naturaliter desiderat beatitudinem; et quod naturaliter desideratur ab homine naturaliter cognoscitur ab eodem. Sed hoc non est simpliciter cognoscere Deum esse, sicut cognoscere venientem non est cognoscere Petrum, quamvis sit Pein statu præsenti, intellectusque intuitive videntes de quibus hic non agitur, rationabiliter distinguunt, intellectibusque intuitive videntibus affirmationem Deus est per se notam esse asserunt. — Tournely vero et Witasse ad propositum affirmative respondent, magno numero Patrum testimonia congerentes.
\n[I.q.2.a.1.ad.2] Perhaps not everyone who hears this word \"God\" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word \"God\" is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.
\n[I.q.2.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod forte ille qui audit hoc nomen « Deus » non intelligit significari aliquid quo majus cogitari non possit, cum quidam crediderint Deum esse corpus. Dato autem quod quilibet intelligat hoc nomine « Deus » significari hoc quod dicitur, scilicet id quo majus cogitari non potest; non tamen propter hoc sequitur, quod intelligat id quod significatur per nomen esse in rerum natura, sed in apprehensione intellectus tantum. Nec potest argui quod sit in re, nisi daretur quod sit in re aliquid quo majus cogitari non potest; quod non est datum a ponentibus Deum non esse.
\n[I.q.2.a.1.ad.3] The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.
\n[I.q.2.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod veritatem esse, in communi, est per se notum; sed primam veritatem esse, hoc non est per se notum quoad nos.
\n[I.q.2.a.2.arg.1] It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Hebrews 11:1). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.
\n[I.q.2.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod Deum esse non sit demonstrabilie. Deum enim esse est articulus fidei. Sed ea quae sunt fidei non sunt demonstrabilia, quia demonstratio facit scire, fides autem de non apparentibus est, ut patet per Apostolum ad Hebræos, xi. Ergo Deum esse non est demonstrabilie. Argumentum istud, quod in hodiernis scholis nimis viget sub nomine argumenti ontologici, primus omnium edidit S. Anselmus Cantuariensis; illud postea Cartesius suum fecit. Quibusdam autem Scotistis non satis displicet, quamvis ex ipso Deum esse quoad nos per se notum absque discursu inferre renuant prudenter; si enim, inquiunt, res ita se haberet, nonne ad probandam Dei existentiam integrum Anselmus tractatum composuisset? Sanctus vero Thomas quem Thomistæ more suo sequuntur argumentum ontologicum Anselmi reprobat, optime quidem; nam, ens majus omni ente excogitabili concipis, num conceptus tuus tale ens a possibilitate ad realitatem transire facit? Chimæram concipis, num chimæræ conceptus tuus dat existentiam? Frustra replicares conceptui chimæræ conceptum hujus entis assimilari non posse, quia, ut plusquam gratuito dicis, chimæræ conceptus absque chimæræ existentia in mente mea generari posse intelligitur, ast nullo modo conceptus hujus entis quod necessario ens infinitum
\n[I.q.2.a.2.arg.2] Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.
\n[I.q.2.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, medium demonstrationis est quod quid est. Sed de Deo non possumus scire quid est, sed solum quid non est, ut dicit Damascenus, lib. I De orthod. fide, cap. iv, col. 798, t. 4. Ergo non possumus demonstrare Deum esse.
\n[I.q.2.a.2.arg.3] Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.
\n[I.q.2.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si demonstraretur Deum esse, hoc non esset nisi ex effectibus ejus. Sed effectus ejus non sunt proportionati ei, cum ipse sit infinitus, et effectus finiti; finiti autem ad infinitum non est proportio. Cum ergo causa non possit demonstrari per effectum sibi non proportionatum, videtur quod Deum esse non possit demonstrari.
\n[I.q.2.a.2.sc] The Apostle says: \"The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made\" (Romans 1:20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we must know of anything is whether it exists.
\n[I.q.2.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit ad Rom., 1, 20: Invisibilia Dei, per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. Sed hoc non esset, nisi per ea quæ facta sunt, posset demonstrari Deum esse; primum enim quod oportet intelligi de aliquo, est, an sit.
\n[I.q.2.a.2.co] Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called \"a priori,\" and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration \"a posteriori\"; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.
\n[I.q.2.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex est demonstratio. Una quæ est per causam, et dicitur « propter quid, » et hæc est per priora simpliciter; alia est per effectum, et dicitur demonstratio « quia, » et hæc est per ea quæ sunt priora quoad nos. Cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est manifestior quam sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem causæ. Ex quolibet autem effectu potest demonstrari propriam causam ejus esse, si tamen effectus sint magis noti quoad nos; quia cum effectus dependeant a causa, posito effectu, necesse est causam præexistere. Unde Deum esse secundum quod non est per se notum quoad nos, demonstrabilie est per effectus nobis notos.
\n[I.q.2.a.2.ad.1] The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.
\n[I.q.2.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deum est; errat qui talia putat; etenim conceptus tuus hujus entis nil aliud est quam idea negativa infiniti quae in mente mea ex finitorum existentia generatur; video namque in finitis perfectiones quasdam limitibus non carentes; mens mea, suppressis limitibus omnibus, in unum perfectiones omnes congerit, sicque, eodem modo ac chimæræ conceptum, entis omni ente excogitabili majoris, seu entis infiniti conceptum sibi fingit; quo pacto de tali fictione ad hujus entis existentiam legitime concluderes? Ultra demonstrationem propter quid seu a priori, et demonstrationem quia seu a posteriori, tertiam demonstrationis speciem quae duabus primis, scilicet a priori et a posteriori in unum coactis, constat, quamque vocant demonstrationem a simultaneo, aliqui logici novatores prædicant. Inventum istud D. Thomas ignoravit, nec nos tamen omnino respuendum arbitramur, licet juxta doctoris nostri sensum per solam demonstrationem a posteriori existentiam Dei certis argumentis stabiesse, et alia hujusmodi, quæ per rationem naturalem nota possunt esse de Deo, ut dicitur Rom., 1, non sunt articuli fidei, sed præambula ad articulos. Sic enim fides præ-supponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia naturam et ut perfectio perfectibile; nihil tamen prohibet id quod per se demonstrabile est et scibile, ab aliquo accipi ut credibile, qui demonstrationem non capit.
\n[I.q.2.a.2.ad.2] When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word \"God\".
\n[I.q.2.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, cum demonstratur causa per effectum, necesse est uti effectu loco definitionis causa ad probandum causam esse: et hoc maxime contingit in Deo, quia, ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse est accipere pro medio quid significet nomen, non autem quod quid est, quia quæstio « quid est » sequitur quæstionem « an est. » Nomina autem imponuntur ab effectibus, ut postea ostendetur, unde, demonstrando Deum esse per effectum, accipere possumus pro medio quid significet hoc nomen Deus.
\n[I.q.2.a.2.ad.3] From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.
\n[I.q.2.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod per effectus non proportionatos causa non potest perfecta cognitio de causa haberi, sed tamen ex quocumque effectu potest manifeste nobis demonstrari causam esse, ut dictum est, et sic ex effectibus Dei potest demonstrari Deum esse, licet per eos non perfecte possimus eum cognoscere secundum suam essentiam. liri posse credamus. Nonnulli vero, sive fluentis, sive jam effluxorum sæculorum, nullam stricte talem de existentia Dei demonstrationem adsurui posse contendunt: sic tempore P. Nicolaï. auctor libri cui titulus: Analys s divinæ Providentiae, auctoresque quarumdam thesium propalabant quod Quantumcumque ctament creaturæ Deum esse, suadent non probant, eo quod problematicæ tantum probat.ones ex eurum aspectu sumi possint. Huic imprudentiae, quam impium dogma P. Nicolaï appellat, qu.dam hodierni, scientiis mathematicis nimium tribuentes, probatis etiam in operibus, favere videntur. Alii autem, F. Lamennais et Bautain, qui sese retractavit, antesignanis, existentiam Dei sola fide, et ex revelatione de qua nos humanis generis auctoritas indubios facit, esse tenendam atque credendam docuerunt: hos sancta Sedes apostolica damnavit. Nomina non omnia sed quædam imponuntur etiam creaturis ex effectibus, quia creaturas etiam sape saepius ex effectibus cognoscimus. Si sic proprius effectus est illius causa ut alterius esse non possit. — Nicolaï. Nomine Dei veniebat olim etiam apud ipsos atheos substantia quædam intelligens, summe ac infinite in omni genere perfecta, quam quidem
\n[I.q.2.a.3.arg.1] It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word \"God\" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.
\n[I.q.2.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod Deus non sit. Quia si unum contrariorum fuerit infinitum, totaliter destrueret aliud. Sed hoc intelligitur in hoc nomine Deus, quod sit quoddam bonum infinitum. Si ergo Deus esset, nullum malum inveniretur. Invenitur autem malum in mundo. Ergo Deus non est.
\n[I.q.2.a.3.arg.2] Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.
\n[I.q.2.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quod potest compleri per pauciora principia, non fit per plura. Sed videtur quod omnia quæ apparent in mundo, possunt compleri per alia principia, supposito quod Deus non sit; quia ea quæ sunt naturalia, reducuntur in principium quod est natura; ea vero quæ sunt a proposito, reducuntur in principium quod est ratio humana, vel voluntas. Nulla igitur necessitas est ponere Deum esse.
\n[I.q.2.a.3.sc] It is said in the person of God: \"I am Who am.\" (Exodus 3:14)
\n[I.q.2.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod., Ⅲ, 14, ex persona Dei: Ego sum qui sum.
\n[I.q.2.a.3.co] The existence of God can be proved in five ways.
\nThe first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
\nThe second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
\nThe third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.
\nThe fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But \"more\" and \"less\" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.
\nThe fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.
\n[I.q.2.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Deum esse, quinque viis probari potest. Prima et manifestior via est quæ sumitur ex parte motus. Certum est enim, et isti athei impossibilem in re esse dicebant, vel rerum omnium universitatem esse somniabant. Hodie nonnulli ex atheis nostris nomine Dei nil aliud nisi ideam pure subjectivam designant, ex qua insania, sicut ex atheismo radicali, facilis autotheismo via paratur. Nos autem ad significandum objectum reale quoddam, substantiam videlicet illam intelligentem et in omni genere infinite perfectam de qua superius, nomen Dei usurpamus; hujus existentiam contra atheos quinque potissimum rationibus S.
\n[I.q.2.a.3.ad.1] As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): \"Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil.\" This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.
\n[I.q.2.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, in Enchir., cap. xi, col. 236, t. 6: « Deus cum summe bonus sit, ullo modo sineret mali aliquid esse in operibus suis, nisi esset adeo omnipotens, et bonus, ut bene faceret et de malo. » Hoc ergo ad infinitam Dei beatitudinem 2 pertinet, ut esse permittat mala, et ex eis eliciat bona.
\n[I.q.2.a.3.ad.2] Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I.q.2.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum natura propter determinatum finem operetur ex directione alicujus superioris agentis; necesse est ea quæ a natura fiunt, etiam in Deum reducere sicut in primam causam. Similiter etiam quæ ex proposito fiunt, oportet reducere in aliquam altiorem causam, quæ non sit ratio, et voluntas humana; quia hæc mutabilia sunt, et defectibilia: oportet autem omnia mobilia et deficere possibilia reduci in aliquod primum principium immobile et per se necessarium, sicut ostensum est.
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