[I.q.10.a.1.arg.1] It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: \"Eternity is the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life.\" For the word \"interminable\" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word \"interminable\" ought not to be found.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sit conveniens definitio æternitatis quam Boetius ponit, V De consol., pros. vi, col. 858, t. 1, dicens, quod « æternitas est interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio. » Interminabile enim negative « Omnes intellectiles ac intelligentes substantiæ... ab omni corruptione ac morte, et materia dicitur. Sed negatio non est de ratione nisi eorum quæ sunt deficientia, quod æternitati non competit. Ergo in definitione æternitatis non debet poni « interminabile. »
\n[I.q.10.a.1.arg.2] Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word \"life\" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather the word \"existence.\"
\n[I.q.10.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, æternitas durationem quamdam significat. Duratio autem magis respicit esse quam vitam. Ergo non debuit poni in definitione æternitatis vita, sed magis esse.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.arg.3] Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be \"whole.\"
\n[I.q.10.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, totum dicitur quod habet partes. Hoc autem æternitati non competit, cum sit simplex. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur « tota. »
\n[I.q.10.a.1.arg.4] Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it is said, \"His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity\" (Micah 5:2); and also it is said, \"According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity\" (Romans 16:25). Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, plures dies non possunt esse simul, nec plura tempora. Dicitur vero Michææ, v, 2: Egressus ejus ab initio a diebus æternitatis; et ad Rom., xvI, 25: Secundum revelationem mysterii temporibus æternis taciti. Ergo æternitas non est tota simul.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.arg.5] Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is \"whole,\" it is superfluously described as \"perfect.\"
\n[I.q.10.a.1.arg.5] 5. Præterea, totum et perfectum sunt idem. Posito igitur quod sit « tota, » superflue additur quod sit « perfecta. »
\n[I.q.10.a.1.arg.6] Further, duration does not imply \"possession.\" But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.arg.6] 6. Præterea, « possessio » ad durationem non pertinet. Æternitas autem quædam duratio est. Ergo æternitas non est possessio.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.co] As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by \"before\" and \"after.\" For since succession occurs in every movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity.
\nFurther, those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.
\nThus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable--that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut in cognitionem simplicium oportet nos venire per composita, ita in cognitionem æternitatis oportet nos venire per tempus, quod nihil aliud est quam numerus motus secundum prius et posterius. Cum enim in quolibet motu sit successio, et una pars post alteram, ex hoc quod numeramus prius et posterius in motu apprehendimus tempus; quod nihil aliud est quam numerus prioris et posterioris in motu. In eo autem quod caret motu et semper eodem modo se habet non est accipere prius et posterius. Sicut igitur ratio temporis consistit in numeratione prioris et posterioris in motu; ita in apprehensione uniformitatis ejus quod est omnino extra motum, consistit ratio æternitatis. Item ea dicuntur tempore mensurari quæ principium et finem habent in tempore, ut dicitur in IV Physic., text. 70; et hoc, ideo quia in omni eo quod movetur, est accipere aliquod principium, et aliquem finem. Quod vero est omnino immutabile, sicut nec successionem, ita nec principium aut finem habere potest. Sic ergo ex duobus notificatur æternitas. Primo ex hoc quod id quod est in æternitate est interminabile, id est, principio et fine carens, ut terminus ad utrumque referatur. Secundo per hoc quod ipsa æternitas successione caret, tota simul existens.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.ad.1] Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as \"a point is that which has no parts.\" Yet this is not to be taken as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod simplicia consueverunt per negationem definiri, sicut punctum est cujus pars non est, quod non ideo est, quod negatio est de essentia eorum, sed quia intellectus noster, qui primo apprehendit composita, in cognitionem simplicium pervenire non potest nisi per remotionem compositionis.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.ad.2] What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being. Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illud quod est vere æternum, non solum est ens, sed vivens: et ipsum vivere se extendit quodam modo ad operationem, non autem esse. Processio autem durationis videtur attendi secundum operationem magis quam secundum esse; unde et tempus est numerus motus.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.ad.3] Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod æternitas dicitur tota, non quia habet partes, sed in quantum nihil ei deest.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.ad.4] As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously whole, is called by names implying time and succession.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod sicut Deus, cum sit incorporeus, nominibus rerum corporalium metaphorice in Scripturis nominatur, sic æternitas tota simul existens, nominibus temporalibus successivis.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.ad.5] Two things are to be considered in time: time itself, which is successive; and the \"now\" of time, which is imperfect. Hence the expression \"simultaneously-whole\" is used to remove the idea of time, and the word \"perfect\" is used to exclude the \"now\" of time.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod in tempore est duo considerare: scilicet ipsum tempus, quod est successivum; et nunc temporis, quod est imperfectum. Dicit ergo « tota simul » ad removendum tempus, et « perfecta » ad excludendum nunc temporis.
\n[I.q.10.a.1.ad.6] Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity, we use the word \"possession.\"
\n[I.q.10.a.1.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod illud quod possidetur firmiter et quiete habetur; ad designandam ergo immutabilitatem et indeficientiam æternitatis, usus est nomine possessionis.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.arg.1] It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, \"The now that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;\" and Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) \"that God is the author of eternity.\" Therefore God is not eternal.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod Deus non sit aternus. Nihil enim factum potest dici de Deo. Sed aternitas est aliquid factum; dicit enim Boetius, lib V De consol., pros. vi, col. 858, t. 4, quod « nunc fluens facit tempus, nunc stans facit aternitatem; » et Augustinus dicit in lib. LXXXIII Quæstionum, q. xxii, col. 16, t. 6, quod « Deus est auctor aternitatis. » Ergo Deus non est aternus.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.arg.2] Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), \"God is before eternity and He is after eternity\": for it is written that \"the Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [Douay: 'for ever and ever']\" (Exodus 15:18). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quod est ante aternitatem, et post aternitatem, non mensuratur aternitate. Sed « Deus est ante aternitatem, » ut dicitur in libro De causis, prop. 2, « et post aternitatem; » dicitur enim Exod., xv, 18, quod Dominus regnabit in aternum, et ultra. Ergo esse aternum non convenit Deo.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.arg.3] Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, aternitas mensura quædam est. Sed Deo non convenit esse mensuratum. Ergo non competit ei esse aternum.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.arg.4] Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, in aternitate non est præsens, præteritum vel futurum, cum sit tota simul, ut dictum est. Sed de Deo dicuntur in Scripturis verba præsentis temporis, præteriti vel futuri. Ergo Deus non est aternus.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.sc] Athanasius says in his Creed: \"The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal.\"
\n[I.q.10.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Athanasius, in suo symb. De confess. fidei, t. IV, col. 1582: « Æternus Pater, aternus Filius, aternus Spiritus sanctus. »
\n[I.q.10.a.2.co] The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ratio aternitatis consequitur immutabilitatem, sicut ratio temporis consequitur motum, ut ex dictis patet. Unde, cum Deus sit maxime immutabilis, sibi maxime competit esse aternum. Nec solum est aternus, sed est sua aternitas; cum tamen nulla alia res sit sua duratio; quia non est suum esse. Deus autem est suum esse uniforme: unde, sicut est sua essentia, ita est sua aternitas.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.ad.1] The \"now\" that stands still, is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the \"now,\" so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the \"now\" standing still. When Augustine says that \"God is the author of eternity,\" this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates His immutability.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod « nunc » stans dicitur facere aternitatem secundum nostram apprehensionem. Sicut enim caucoexistit nisi singulis temporis partibus divisim sumptis, et sibi mutuo succeedentibus, sicut statua in littore immota singulis navibus successive transuntibus tota coexistit. Secundum vero Thomistas haec comparatio aternitatis et statuæ nimium claudicat; nam pro aternitate sensu thomistico intellecta naves non successive transeunt, sed ipsa aternitas virtualiter se extendit navibus in tempore transeuntibus, ita ut sit navibus illis physice realiterque præsens, transitum eorum non execatur in nobis apprehensio temporis, eo quod apprehendimus fluxum ipsius « nunc, » ita causatur in nobis apprehensio aternitatis in quantum apprehendimus « nunc » stans. Quod autem dicit Augustinus quod « Deus est auctor aternitatis, » intelligitur de aternitate participata. Eo enim modo communicat Deus suam aternitatem aliquibus, quo et suam immutabilitatem. Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum. Nam Deus dicitur esse ante aternitatem, prout participatur a substantiis immaterialibus. Unde et ibidem dicitur quod « intelligentia parificatur aternitati. » Quod autem dicitur in Exod.: Dominus regnabit in aternum, et ultra, sciendum quod aternum accipitur ibi pro sæculo, sicut habet alia translatio. Sic igitur dicitur quod regnabit ultra aternum, quia durat ultra quodcumque sæculum, id est, ultra quamcumque durationem datam. Nihil est enim aliud sæculum quam periodus cujuslibet rei, ut dicitur in lib. I De cælo, text. 100. Vel dicitur etiam ultra aternum regnare, quia si etiam aliquid aliud semper esset, ut motus cæli secundum quosdam philosophos, tamen Deus ultra regnat, in quantum ejus regnum est totum simul.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.ad.2] From this appears the answer to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that \"intelligence is equal to eternity.\" In the words of Exodus, \"The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond,\" eternity stands for age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i.e. beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo i. Or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously whole.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.ad.3] Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod aternitas non est aliud quam ipse Deus. Unde non dicitur Deus aternus, quasi sit aliquo modo mensuratus; sed accipitur ibi ratio mensuræ secundum apprehensionem nostram tantum.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.ad.4] Words denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered through present, past and future.
\n[I.q.10.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod verba diversorum temporum attribuuntur Deo, in quantum ejus aternitas omnia tempora includit; non quod ipse varietur per præsens, præteritum et futurum.
\n[I.q.10.a.3.arg.1] It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that \"those who instruct many to justice,\" shall be \"as stars unto perpetual eternities [Douay: 'for all eternity']\" (Daniel 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.
\n[I.q.10.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod esse aternum non sit soli Deo proprium. Dicitur enim Danielis, xii, 3, quod tando; Thomistarum judicio, præsentiam illam necessario exigit possessio tota simul et perfecta quam aternitas importat. Hic pro mensura actu distincta a mensurato vox mensura accipitur, et inisto sensu aternitas non est mensura Dei. Æternitatem motus Aristoteles asserere videur in VIII Phys., c. 1, et cæli, motusque cæli perpetuitatem in I De cælo, c. 11. Avicenna, De cælo et mundo, c. 1v, cælum dicit esse sempiternum. * Multos. qui ad justitiam erudiunt plurimos*, erunt quasi stellæ in perpetuas æternitates. Non autem essent plures æternitates, si solus Deus esset æternus. Non igitur solus Deus est æternus.
\n[I.q.10.a.3.arg.2] Further, it is written \"Depart, ye cursed into eternal [Douay: 'everlasting'] fire\" (Matthew 25:41). Therefore God is not the only eternal.
\n[I.q.10.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Matth., xxv, 41, dicitur: Ite*, maledicti, in ignem æternum; non igitur solus Deus est æternus.
\n[I.q.10.a.3.arg.3] Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal.
\n[I.q.10.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne necessarium est æternum. Sed multa sunt necessaria, sicut omnia principia demonstrationis, et omnes propositiones demonstrativæ. Ergo non solus Deus est æternus.
\n[I.q.10.a.3.sc] Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that \"God is the only one who has no beginning.\" Now whatever has a beginning, is not eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.
\n[I.q.10.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Hieronymus ad Damasum, ep. xv, col. 357, § 4, t. 1: « Deus solus est qui exordium non habet. » Quidquid autem exordium habet, non est æternum. Solus ergo Deus est æternus.
\n[I.q.10.a.3.co] Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above (Question 9, Article 1). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, \"it standeth for ever\" (Ecclesiastes 1:4). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (Psalm 75:5) the hills are called \"eternal\" and we read \"of the fruits of the eternal hills.\" (Deuteronomy 33:15). Some again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because \"as regards that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints,\" as Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, \"This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God,\" etc. (John 17:3).
\n[I.q.10.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod æternitas vere et proprie in solo Deo est, quia æternitas immutabilitatem consequitur, ut ex dictis patet. Solus autem Deus est omnino immutabilis, ut est superius ostensum. Secundum tamen quod aliqua ab ipso immutabilitatem percipiunt, secundum hoc aliqua ejus æternitatem sortiuntur adeo quod nunquam esse desinunt; et secundum hoc dicitur, Eccles. 1, 4, de terra, quod in æternum stat. Quædam etiam æterna in Scripturis dicuntur propter diuturnitatem durationis, licet corruptibilia sint; sicut in psal. Lxxv, 5, dicuntur montes æterni, et Deuteronom., xxxiii, 15, etiam dicitur: De pomis collium æternorum. Quædam autem amplius participant de ratione æternitatis, in quantum habent intransmutabilitatem vel secundum esse, vel ulterius secundum operationem, sicut angeli et beati qui verbo fruuntur; quia quantum ad illam visionem Verbi non sunt in sanctis volubiles cogitationes ut dicit Au- Hic legitur in editis: « Et sic æternitas angelis attribui potest, secundum illud ps. Lxxv, 5: Illuminans tu mirabiliter a montibus æternis. » Sed hæc in codicibus non invenimus, et rationabiliter, quia de æternitate angelorum infra loquitur D. Thomas, et insuper quia textus ille non de angelis sed de apostolis intelligitur. « Fortassis etiam volubiles non erunt nostræ cogitationes ab aliis in alia euntes atque redeuntes, sed omnem scientiam nostram uno simul conspectu videbimus. » Aristoteles æternitatem mundi posuit, non taemen ex intentione, ut aliqui non indocti credunt; contradicebat enim tantum quibusdam philosophis antiquis modo quodam impossibili mundum incepisse dicentibus. Quidquid sit, Græcorum veterum plures hylozoismum seu æternitatem materiæ ad-gustinus, XV De Trinitate, c. xvi, col. 1079, § 26, t. 8. Unde et videntes Deum dicuntur habere vitam æternam, secundum illud Joan., xvii, 3: Hæc est vita æterna, ut cognoscant te solum Deum verum, etc.
\n[I.q.10.a.3.ad.1] There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.
\n[I.q.10.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod dicuntur multæ æternitates, secundum quod sunt multi participantes æternitatem ex ipsa Dei contemplatione.
\n[I.q.10.a.3.ad.2] The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according to the words \"To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters\" (Job 24:19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm \"Their time will be for ever\" (Psalm 80:16).
\n[I.q.10.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ignis inferni dicitur æternus propter interminabilitatem tantum. Est tamen in pœnis eorum transmutatio, secundum illud Job, xiv, 19: Ad nimium calorem transibunt ab aquis nivium. Unde in inferno non est vera æternitas, sed magis tempus, secundum illud psal. Lxxx, 16: Erit tempus eorum in sæcula.
\n[I.q.10.a.3.ad.3] Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal.
\n[I.q.10.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod necessarium significat quemdam modum veritatis. Verum autem, secundum Philosophum, VI Metaphys., text. 8, est in intellectu. Secundum hoc igitur vera et necessaria sunt æterna, quia sunt in intellectu æterno, qui est intellectus divinus solus; unde non sequitur quod aliquid extra Deum sit æternum.
\n[I.q.10.a.4.arg.1] It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together, considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity.
\n[I.q.10.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod æternitas non sit aliud a tempore. Impossibile est enim duas esse mensuras durationis simul, nisi una sit pars alterius. Non enim sunt simul duo dies, vel duæ horæ; sed dies et hora sunt simul, quia hora est pars diei. Sed æternitas et tempus sunt mittebant, quam æternitatem Moyses etiam ab Egyptiis edoctus admisisset, in primoque Genesis capitulo docuisset, quando narrat secundum translationem græcam Deum non creasse sed fecisse cælum et terram, id est cælo et terræ formam deisse; unde Scholastici ex mala interpretatione Moysis creationem ex nihilo primi somniassent, Moysis calumniatoribus istis si confidas: sed hæc sunt contra Moysen et fidem catholicam novatorum quorumdam diabolica inventa. Porro ante hæreticos omnes creationem ex nihilo renuere ausus est Hermogenes. Hominum autem, bestiarum et plantarum animas esse Deo coæternas Manichæi praedicabant. Albanenses postea, et, teste Capponi, Arnoldistæ æternitatem mundi asseverarunt, quos hodie insensati non pauci sequuntur. simul: quorum utrumque quodam modo mensuram durationis importat. Cum igitur aternitas non sit pars temporis, quia aternitas excedit tempus, et includit ipsum: videtur quod tempus sit pars aternitatis et non sit aliud ab aternitate.
\n[I.q.10.a.4.arg.2] Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the \"now\" of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the \"now\" of time. But the \"now\" of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different from time.
\n[I.q.10.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, secundum Philosophum in IV Phys., text. 104 et 121, « nunc » temporis manet idem in toto tempore. Sed hoc vide-tur constituere rationem aternitatis, quod sit idem indivisibiliter se habens in toto decursu temporis. Ergo aternitas est « nunc » temporis. Sed « nunc » temporis non est aliud secundum substantiam a tempore. Ergo aternitas non est aliud secundum substantiam a tempore.
\n[I.q.10.a.4.arg.3] Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being--that is, of the divine being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either eternity or is a part of eternity.
\n[I.q.10.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut mensura primi motus est mensura omnium motuum, ut dicitur in IV Physic., text. 133, ita videtur quod mensura primi esse sit mensura omnis esse. Sed aternitas est mensura primi esse quod est esse divinum. Ergo aternitas est mensura omnis esse. Sed esse rerum corruptibilium mensuratur tempore. Ergo tempus vel est aternitas, vel aliquid aternitatis.
\n[I.q.10.a.4.sc] Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a \"before\" and an \"after.\" Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing.
\n[I.q.10.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod aternitas est tota simul. In tempore autem est prius et posterius. Ergo tempus et aternitas non sunt idem.
\n[I.q.10.a.4.co] It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time.
\nAnother reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities; because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.
\n[I.q.10.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod manifestum est tempus et aternitatem non esse idem. Sed hujus diversitatis rationem quidam assignaverunt ex hoc quod aternitas caret principio et fine, tempus autem habet principium et finem. Sed hæc est differentia per accidens, et non per se: quia dato quod tempus semper fuerit et semper futurum sit, secundum positionem eorum qui motum cæli ponunt sempiternum, adhuc remanebit differentia inter aternitatem et tempus, ut dicit Boetius, De consolat., lib. V, prosa vi, col. 859, t. 4, ex hoc quod aternitas est tota simul, quod tempori non convenit: quia aternitas est mensura esse permanentis, tempus vero est mensura motus. Si tamen prædicta differentia attendatur quantum ad mensurata, et non quantum ad mensuras, sic habet aliquam rationem; quia solum illud mensuratur tempore quod habet principium et finem in tempore, ut dicitur in IV Phys., text. 120. Unde si motus cæli semper duraret, tempus non mensuraret ipsum secundum suam totam durationem, cum infinitum non sit mensurabile, sed mensuraret quamlibet circulationem, quæ habet principium et finem in tempore. Potest tamen et aliam rationem habere ex parte istarum mensurarum, si accipiatur finis et principium in potentia; quia, etiam dato quod tempus semper duret, tamen possibile est signare in tempore et principium et finem, accipiendo aliquas partes ipsius, sicut dicimus principium et finem diei vel anni, quod non contingit in aternitate. Sed tamen istæ differentia consequuntur eam, quæ est per se et primo, differentiam, per hoc quod aternitas est tota simul, non autem tempus.
\n[I.q.10.a.4.ad.1] Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity.
\n[I.q.10.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si tempus et aternitas essent mensuræ unius generis; quod patet esse falsum ex his quorum est tempus et aternitas.
\n[I.q.10.a.4.ad.2] The \"now\" of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its \"now\" corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time, but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise the flow of the \"now\" as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the \"now\" of time.
\n[I.q.10.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod « nunc » temporis est idem subjecto in toto tempore, sed differens ratione, eo quod sicut tempus respondet motui, ita « nunc » temporis respondet mobili; mobile autem est idem subjecto in toto decursu temporis, sed differens ratione, in quantum est hic et ibi, et ista alternatio est motus. Similiter fluxus ipsius « nunc » secundum quod alternatur ratione, est tempus. Æternitas autem manet eadem et subjecto et ratione: unde aternitas non est idem quod « nunc » temporis.
\n[I.q.10.a.4.ad.3] As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.
\n[I.q.10.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut aternitas est propria mensura ipsius esse, ita tempus est propria mensura motus: unde secundum quod aliquod esse recedit a permanentia essendi et subditur transmutationi, secundum hoc recedit ab aternitate et subditur tempori. Esse ergo rerum corruptibilium, quia est transmutabile, non mensuratur aternitate, sed tempore: tempus enim mensurat non solum quæ transmutantur in actu, sed quæ sunt transmutabilia; unde non solum mensurat motum, sed etiam quietem, quæ est ejus quod natum est moveri, et non movetur.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.arg.1] It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that \"God moves the spiritual through time.\" But aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod aevum non sit aliud a tempore. Dicit enim Augustinus, VIII Super Gen. ad litt., cap. xx, col. 388, t. 3, quod « Deus movet creaturam spiritualem per tempus. » Sed aevum dicitur esse mensura spiritualium substantiarum. Ergo tempus non differt ab avo.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.arg.2] Further, it is essential to time to have \"before\" and \"after\"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole, as was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written (Sirach 1:1) that eternal \"Wisdom is before age.\" Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has \"before\" and \"after\"; and thus it is the same as time.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, de ratione temporis est quod habeat prius et posterius: de ratione vero aternitatis est quod sit tota simul, ut dictum est. Sed aevum non est aternitas: dicitur enim, Eccli., 1, 1, quod Sapientia aterna est ante aevum. Ergo non est totum simul, sed habet prius et posterius; et ita est tempus.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.arg.3] Further, if there is no \"before\" and \"after\" in aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no difference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows that it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si in avo non est prius et posterius, sequitur quod in aviternis non differat esse vel fuisse vel futurum esse. Cum igitur sit impossibile aviterna non fuisse, sequitur quod impossibile sit ea non futura esse: quod falsum est, cum Deus possit ea reducere in nihilum.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.arg.4] Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.arg.4] 4. Præterea, cum duratio aviternorum sit infinita ex parte post; si aevum sit totum simul, sequitur quod aliquod creatum sit infinitum in actu; quod est impossibile. Non ergo aevum differt a tempore.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.sc] Boethius says (De Consol. iii) \"Who commandest time to be separate from aeviternity.\"
\n[I.q.10.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Boetius, lib. III De consol., metro 1x, col. 758, t. 4: «... Qui tempus ab avo Ire jube... »
\n[I.q.10.a.5.co] Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end. This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding article; because even if aeviternal things had always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished from eternity, and from time.
\nOthers assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact that eternity has no \"before\" and \"after\"; but that time has both, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has \"before\" and \"after\" without innovation and veteration. This theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For since \"before\" and \"after\" of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity has \"before\" and \"after,\" it must follow that with the receding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to the things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing measured, there follows \"before\" and \"after\" in the measure, as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain \"before\" and \"after.\" We say then that since eternity is the measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or consists in change; and these things are measured by time, as are all movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, who have an unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness of intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean between eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this way time has \"before\" and \"after\"; aeviternity in itself has no \"before\" and \"after,\" which can, however, be annexed to it; while eternity has neither \"before\" nor \"after,\" nor is it compatible with such at all.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod aevum differt a tempore et aternitate, medium existens inter illa. Sed horum differentiam aliqui sic assignant dicentes, quod aternitas principio et fine caret, aevum habet principium, sed non habet finem, tempus autem habet principium et finem. Sed hæc differentia est per accidens, sicut supra dictum est, quia si etiam semper aviterna fuissent, et semper futura essent, ut aliqui ponunt, vel etiamsi quandoque deficerent, quod Deo possibile esset, adhuc aevum distingueretur ab aternitate et tempore. Alii vero assignant differentiam inter hæc tria per hoc quod aternitas non habet prius et posterius: tempus autem habet prius et posterius cum innovatione et veteratione, aevum habet prius et posterius sine innovatione et veteratione. Sed hæc positio implicat contradictoria. Quod quidem manifeste apparet, si innovatio et veteratio referantur ad ipsam mensuram ubi prius et posterius durationis non possunt esse simul. Si aevum habet prius et posterius, oportet quod, priori parte aevi recedente, posterior de novo adveniat; et sic erit innovatio in ipso avo, sicut in tempore. Si vero referatur ad mensurata, adhuc sequitur inconveniens. Ex hoc quod res temporalis inveteratur tempore habet esse transmutabile, et ex transmutabilitate mensurati est prius et posterius in tempore, ut patet ex IV Phys., text. 410 et 417. Si igitur ipsum aviternum non sit inveterabile nec innovabile, hoc erit, quia esse ejus est intransmutabile. Mensura ergo ejus non habebit prius et posterius. Est ergo dicendum, quod, cum aternitas sit mensura esse permanentis; secundum quod aliquid recedit a permanentia essendi, secundum hoc recedit ab aternitate. Quædam autem sic recedunt a permanentia essendi, quod esse eorum est subjectum transmutationis, vel in transmutatione consistit; et hujusmodi mensurantur tempore, sicut omnis motus, et etiam esse omnium corruptibilium. Quædam vero recedunt minus a permanentia essendi, quia esse eorum nec in transmutatione consistit, nec est subjectum transmutationis; tamen habent transmutationem adjunctam vel in actu, vel in potentia: sicut patet in corporibus cælestibus, quorum esse substantiale est intransmutabile; tamen esse intransmutabile habent cum transmutabile secundum locum; et similiter patet de angelis, quod scilicet habent esse intransmutabile, cum transmutabile secundum electionem, quantum ad naturam eorum pertinet, et cum transmutabile intelligentiarum et affectionum et locorum suo modo; et ideo hujusmodi mensurantur avo, quod est medium inter aternitatem, et tempus. Esse autem quod mensuratur aternitate, nec est « Per tempus movet conditum Spiritum ipse... Conditor Spiritus. » Non ut in Parmensi...: « Quod si habent esse intransmutabile, quantum ad eorum naturam per-tinet, cum transmutabile secundum electionem.» — Nam primo in isto textu sensus remanet suspensus, et præterea, transmutabilitas secundum electionem sicut et esse intransmutabile ad angelorum naturam pertinet. mutabile, nec mutabilitati adjunctum. Sic ergo tempus habet prius et posterius; aevum autem non habet in se prius et posterius, sed ei conjungi possunt; aternitas autem non habet prius neque posterius, neque ea compatitur.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.ad.1] Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are measured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod creaturæ spirituales quantum ad affectiones et intelligentias, in quibus est successio, mensurantur tempore. Unde et Augustinus ibidem, loco cit. in arg., dicit quod per tempus moveri, est per affectiones moveri. Quantum vero ad eorum esse naturale, mensurantur aevo; sed quantum ad visionem gloriæ, participant aternitatem.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.ad.2] Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not eternity, because \"before\" and \"after\" are compatible with it.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aevum est totum simul, non tamen est aternitas: quia compatitur secum prius et posterius.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.ad.3] In the very being of an angel considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards accidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power, God can make the existence of an angel not future; but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in ipso esse angeli in se considerato non est differentia praeteriti et futuri, sed solum secundum adjunctas mutationes. Sed quod dicimus angelum esse vel fuisse vel futurum esse differt secundum acceptionem intellectus nostri, qui accipit esse angeli per comparationem ad diversas partes temporis. Et cum dicit, angelum esse vel fuisse, supponit aliquid cum quo ejus oppositum non subditur divinæ potentiæ. Cum vero dicit, futurum esse, nondum supponit aliquid. Unde cum esse et non esse angeli subsit divinæ potentiæ; absolute considerando, potest Deus facere quod esse angeli non sit futurum; tamen non potest facere quod non sit, dum est: vel quod non fuerit, postquam fuit.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.ad.4] The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature.
\n[I.q.10.a.5.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod duratio aevi est infinita, quia non finitur tempore. Sic autem esse aliquod creatum infinitum, quod non finitum quodam alio, non est inconveniens.
\n[I.q.10.a.6.arg.1] It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: \"Majesty and power of ages are with Thee, O Lord.\"
\n[I.q.10.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sit tantum unum aevum. Dicitur enim in apocryphis Esdræ: Majestas et potestas aevo- 1 Esdras, lib. III, c. iv, v. 40, introducit Zoroba-bel de veritate magnalia loquentem, et dicentem: Et non est in judicio ejus iniquum, sed fortitudo, et regnum, et potestas, et majestas omnium aevorum. 2 Sic cod. in edit.: « Quia unus angelus non est causa alterius. » versitas eorum quæ recipiunt ex influxu primi principii. Alii vero assignant causam unitatis temporis ex parte materiæ primæ, quæ est primum subjectum motus, cujus mensura est tempus. Sed neutra assignatio sufficiens videtur; quia ea quæ sunt unum principio, vel subjecto, et maxime remoto, non sunt unum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Est ergo vera ratio unitatis temporis unitas primi motus, secundum quem, cum sit simplicissimus, omnes alii mensurantur, ut dicitur in X Metaphys., text. 3. Sic igitur tempus ad illum motum comparatur, non solum ut mensura ad mensuratum, sed etiam ut accidens ad subjectum; et sic ab eo recipit unitatem. Ad alios autem motus comparatur solum ut mensura ad mensuratum. Unde secundum eorum multitudinem non multiplicatur, quia una mensura separata multa mensurari possunt. Hoc igitur habito, sciendum quod de substantiis spiritualibus duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt, quod omnes processorunt a Deo in quadam aequalitate, ut Origenes dixit, lib. I Periarchon, cap. v, col. 176, t. 1, vel etiam multæ earum, ut quidam posuerunt. Alii vero dixerunt, quod omnes substantiæ spirituales processorunt a Deo quodam gradu et ordine; et hoc videtur sentire Dionysius, qui dicit, Cæl. hier., c. x, § 3, col. 274, t. 1, quod inter substantias spirituales sunt primæ, mediæ et ultimæ, etiam in uno ordine angelorum. Secundum igitur primam opinionem necesse est dicere, quod sunt plura aeva, secundum quod sunt plura aeviterna prima aequalia. Secundum autem secundam opinionem oporteret dicere, quod sit unum aevum tantum; quia cum unumquodque mensuretur simplicissimo sui generis, ut dicitur in X Met., text. 4, oportet quod esse omnium aeviternorum mensuretur per esse primi aeviterni, quod tanto est simplicius, quanto prius. Et quia secunda opinio verior est, ut infra ostendetur, concedimus ad præsens unum esse aevum tantum.
\n[I.q.10.a.6.arg.2] Further, different genera have different measures. But some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
\n[I.q.10.a.6.arg.3] Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
\n[I.q.10.a.6.arg.4] Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time for all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
\n[I.q.10.a.6.sc] Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is aeviternity one only.
\n[I.q.10.a.6.co] A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities. Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of spiritual things.
\nNow some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a number, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others assert that the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of the first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured.
\nThis being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later (47, 2); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity.
\n[I.q.10.a.6.ad.1] Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when we mean ages.
\n[I.q.10.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aevum aliquando accipitur pro sæculo, quod est periodus durationis alicujus rei; et sic discuntur multa aeva, sicut multa sæcula.
\n[I.q.10.a.6.ad.2] Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a changeless being, and are thus measured by aeviternity.
\n[I.q.10.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod licet corpora cælestia et spiritualia differant in ge-nere naturæ, tamen conveniunt in hoc quod habent esse intransmutabile; et sic mensurantur aevo.
\n[I.q.10.a.6.ad.3] All temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first measured by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.
\n[I.q.10.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod nec omnia temporalia simul incipiunt; et tamen omnium est unum tempus propter primum, quod mensuratur tempore; et sic omnia aeviterna habent unum aevum propter primum, etiamsi non omnia simul incipiant.
\n[I.q.10.a.6.ad.4] For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple than the rest.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I.q.10.a.6.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod ad hoc quod aliqua mensurentur per aliquod unum, non requiritur quod illud unum sit causa omnium eorum, sed quod sit simplicius.
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