[I.q.12.a.1.arg.1] It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on John 1:18, \"No man hath seen God at any time,\" says: \"Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what is increatable?\" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God: \"Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him.\"
\n[I.q.12.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nullus intellectus creatus possit Deum per essentiam videere. Chrysostomus enim, Super Joan., hom. xv, § 4, col. 357, 358, t. 13, ed. Vivès, exponens illud quod dicitur Joan., 1: Deum nemo vidit unquam, sic dicit: « Ipsum quod est Deus, non solum Prophetæ, sed nec Angeli viderunt, nec Archangeli. Quod enim creabilis est naturæ, qualiter videere poterit quod increabile est? » Dionysius etiam, De div. nom., cap. 1, § 5, 1 Ex versione Joannis Sarraceni, addito nomine « ratio. » Corderius, apud Migne, « cum neque sub sensum cadat, neque ejus sit imaginatio, nec col. 594, t. 4, loquens de Deo, dicit: « Neque sensus est ejus, neque phantasia, neque opinio, nec ratio, nec scientia. »
\n[I.q.12.a.1.arg.2] Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above (Question 7, Article 1). Therefore in Himself He is unknown.
\n[I.q.12.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne infinitum, in quantum hujusmodi, est ignotum. Sed Deus est infinitus, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo secundum se est ignotus.
\n[I.q.12.a.1.arg.3] Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is not intelligible; but above all intellect.
\n[I.q.12.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, intellectus creatus non est cognoscitivus nisi existentium. Primum enim quod cadit in apprehensione intellectus, est ens. Sed Deus non est existens, sed supra existentia, ut dicit Dionysius, De div. nom., c. xi, § 6, col. 954, t. 4. Ergo non est intelligibilis, sed est supra omnem intellectum.
\n[I.q.12.a.1.arg.4] Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God.
\n[I.q.12.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, cognoscentis ad cognitum oportet esse aliquam proportionem, cum cognitum sit perfectio cognoscentis. Sed nulla est proportio intellectus creati ad Deum, quia in infinitum distant. Ergo intellectus creatus non potest videre essentiam Dei.
\n[I.q.12.a.1.sc] It is written: \"We shall see Him as He is\" (1 John 2:2).
\n[I.q.12.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur I Joan., Ⅲ, 2: Videbimus eum sicuti est.
\n[I.q.12.a.1.co] Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light.
\nTherefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void.
\nHence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God.
\n[I.q.12.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, cum unum-quodque sit cognoscibile secundum quod est in actu, Deus, qui est actus purus absque omni permixtione potentiæ, quantum in se est, maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime cognoscibile in se, alicui intellectui cognoscibile non est, propter excessum intelligibilis supra intellectum; sicut sol, qui est maxime visibilis, videri non potest a vespertilione propter excessum luminis. Hoc igitur attendentes quidam posuerunt quod nullus intellectus creatus essentiam Dei videre potest. Sed hoc inconveniente dicitur. Cum enim ultima hominis beatitudo in altissima ejus operatione consistat, quæ est operatio intellectus, si nunquam essentiam Dei videre potest intellectus creatus, vel nunquam beatitudinem obtinebit, vel in alio ejus beatitudo consistit quam in Deo, quod est alienum a fide. In ipso enim est ultima perfectio rationalis creaturæ, quod est ei principium essendi; in tantum enim unumquodque perfectum est, in quantum ad suum principium attingit. Similiter etiam est praeter rationem. Inest enim homini naturale desiderium cognoscendi causam, cum intuetur effectum; et ex hoc admiratio in hominibus consurgit. Si igitur intellectus rationalis creaturæ pertingere non possit ad primam causam rerum, remanebit inane desiderium naturæ. Unde simpliciter concedendum est quod beati Dei essentiam videant.
\n[I.q.12.a.1.ad.1] Both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words cited, \"He is universally to all incomprehensible,\" etc. Chrysostom likewise after the words quoted says: \"He says this of the most certain vision ofthe Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the Son.\"
\n[I.q.12.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod utraque auctoritas loquitur de visione comprehensionis. Unde præmittit Dionysius dicens: « Omnibus ipse est universaliter incomprehensibilis, et neque sensus ejus est, etc. » Et Chrysostomus, eadem hom., § 2, col. 359, parum post verba prædicta subdit: « Visionem hic dicit certissimam Patris considerationem et comprehensionem tantam, quantam Pater habet de Filio. »
\n[I.q.12.a.1.ad.2] The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first way: as appears from what was said above (Question 7, Article 1).
\n[I.q.12.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod infinitum quod se tenet ex parte materiæ non perfectæ per formam, ignotum est secundum se, quia omnis cognitio est per formam; sed infinitum quod se tenet ex parte formæ non limitatæ per materiam, est secundum se maxime notum. Sic autem Deus est infinitus, et non primo modo, ut ex superioribus patet.
\n[I.q.12.a.1.ad.3] God is not said to be not existing as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch as He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which means that He is not comprehended.
\n[I.q.12.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus non sic dicitur non existens, quasi nullo modo sit existens, sed quia est supra omne existens, in quantum est suum esse. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod nullo modo possit cognosci; sed quod omnem cognitionem excedat; quod est ipsum non comprehendi.
\n[I.q.12.a.1.ad.4] Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God.
\n[I.q.12.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo certa habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram, secundum quod duplum, triplum, et aequale sunt species proportionis. Alio modo quælibet habitudo unius ad alterum proportio dicitur. Et sic potest esse proportio creaturæ ad Deum, in quantum se habet ad ipsum ut effectus ad causam, aut potentia ad actum; et secundum hoc intellectus creatus proportionatus esse potest ad cognoscendum Deum.
\n[I.q.12.a.2.arg.1] It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image by the created intellect. For it is written: \"We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and [Vulgate: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is\" (1 John 3:2).
\n[I.q.12.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod essentia Dei ab intellectu creato, per aliquam similitudinem videatur. Dicitur enim I Joan., Ⅲ, 2: Scimus quoniam cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, et* videbimus eum sicuti est.
\n[I.q.12.a.2.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): \"When we know God, some likeness of God is made in us.\"
\n[I.q.12.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit, IX De Trinit., cap. xi, col. 969, t. 8: « Cum Deum novimus, fit aliqua Dei similitudo in nobis. »
\n[I.q.12.a.2.arg.3] Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible; as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the intellect with the likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by some similitude.
\n[I.q.12.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu, sicut sensus in actu est sensibile in actu. Hoc autem non est, nisi in quantum informatur sensus similitudine rei sensibilis, et intellectus similitudine rei intellectæ. Ergo, si Deus ab intellectu creato videtur in actu, oportet quod per aliquam similitudinem videatur.
\n[I.q.12.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle says, \"We see through a glass and in an enigma [Douay: 'in a dark manner'],\" \"by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God.\" But to see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision, but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine essence is not seen through a similitude.
\n[I.q.12.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XV De Trinitate, cap. Ⅺ, col. 1069, t. 8, quod cum Apostolus dicit: Videmus nunc per speculum, et in ænigmate; « speculi, et ænigmatis nomine, quæcumque similitudines ab ipso significatæ intelligi possunt, quæ accommodatæ sunt ad intelligendum Deum. » Sed videre Deum per essentiam non est visio ænigmatica, vel specularis, sed contra eam dividitur. Ergo divina essentia non videtur per similitudines.
\n[I.q.12.a.2.co] Two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision--viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not there. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow that the seer would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from that one same thing.
\nNow it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellect power, and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since the intellective power of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is some kind of participated likeness of Him who is the first intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light, as it were, derived from the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude.
\nFirst, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), \"by the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known;\" as by the likeness of a body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created likeness whatever.
\nSecondly, because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown above (Question 3, Article 4), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God to the seer.
\nThirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself super-eminently whatever can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness; for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like thing. Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all; which is false.
\nTherefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the Psalm 35:10, \"In Thy light we shall see light.\" The essence of God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the divine essence itself as it really is.
\n[I.q.12.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ad visionem tam sensibilem quam intellectualem duo requiruntur; scilicet virtus visiva, et unio rei visæ cum visu. Non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per hoc quod res visa quodammodo est in vidente. Et in rebus quidem corporalibus apparet quod res visa non potest esse in vidente per suam essentiam, sed solum per suam similitudinem; sicut similitudo lapidis In Parmensi: « et ut. » — In edit.: « intelligibile. »: « speculativa. » Abelardus satis notus, Almariani, Arnoldus, Palamitæ, Armeni schismatici recentiores, post similes a S. Gregorio Magno, lib. XVIII Moral., c. xxviii, reprehensos, Deinaturam seu substantiam ab intellectu creato posse videri negarunt. Accuratiori expositione Palamitarum error indiget. Gregorius Palamas, monachus Græcus ac postea thessalonicensis episcopus, sæculo decimo quarto, suam acerrime ac pertinacissime propugnavit hæresim. Palamitæ, seu nomine alio, Hesychastæ, Euchitæ, Massiliani et Umbilicani, ad umbilicum depresso capite, contortis oculis, suppressoque spiritu, cum locum cordis mens reperisset, mirabilem se intueri lucem ac inexhausta frui voluptate delirabant. Hanc lucem increatam ac divinam esse affirmabant; eam tamen negabant esse Dei substantiam, quia substantiam Dei nullus, juxta illos, neque angelus, neque homo, neque naturaliter, neque supernaturaliter, aut videt, aut videre potest. est in oculo, per quam fit visio in actu, non autem ipsa substantia lapidis. Si autem esset una et eadem res quæ esset principium visivæ virtutis, et quæ esset res visa, oporteret videntem ab illa re et virtutem visivam habere, et formam per quam videret. Manifestum est autem quod Deus et est auctor intellectivæ virtutis, et ab intellectu videri potest. Et cum ipsa intellectiva virtus creaturæ non sit Dei essentia, relinquitur quod sit aliqua participata similitudo ipsius, qui est primus intellectus. Unde et virtus intellectualis creaturæ lumen quoddam intelligibile dicitur, quasi a prima luce derivatum, sive hoc intelligatur de virtute naturali, sive de aliqua perfectione superaddita gratiae vel gloriæ. Requiritur ergo ad videndum Deum aliqua Dei similitudo ex parte visivæ potentiæ, qua scilicet intellectus fit efficax ad videndum Deum. Sed ex parte visæ rei quam necesse est aliquo modo uniri videnti, per nullam similitudinem creatam Dei essentia videri potest. Primo quidem, quia, sicut dicit Dionysius, De div. nominibus, c. 1, § 4, col. 587, t. 4, « per similitudines inferioris ordinis rerum nullo modo superiora possunt cognosci; » sicut per speciem corporis non potest cognosci essentia rei incorporeæ. Multo igitur minus per speciem creatam quamcumque potest essentia Dei videri. Secundo, quia essentia Dei est ipsum esse ejus, ut supra ostensum est; quod nulli formæ creatæ competere potest. Non potest igitur aliqua forma creata esse similitudo repræsentans videnti Dei essentiam. Tertio, quia divina essentia est aliquod incircumscriptum, continens in se supere- 1 In Parmensi: « participativa. » 2 Sensum reddit ex proprio D. Thomas. 3 Non ut in editis: similitudo « ex parte » visivæ potentiæ; sed bene et simpliciter, similitudo « visivæ potentiæ. » Nulla enim similitudo rei visæ, scilicet essentia Dei, tenet essentia Dei locum « ex parte » visivæ potentiæ in visione beatifica; sed aliqua similitudo visivæ potentiæ, scilicet lumen gloriæ, superadditur intellectui ut sic comfortatus ipsam Dei speculetur essentiam. 4 In Parmensi: « intellectum in actu, per seipsam faciens intellectum in actu. » Procedit cognitio omnis a potentia cognoscente et ab objecto vel per se, vel per speciem impressam sui vicariam. Non autem confundenda est hæc species impressa, objecti vicaria, ex objecto a quo distinguitur emissa, cum specie expressa quæ verbum est ex visione ipsa jam supposita expressum. Quæritur utrum essentia Dei videatur per aliquam speciem impressam Dei vicariam, an vero per seipsam conminenter quidquid potest significari vel intelligi ab intellectu creato. Et hoc nullo modo per aliquam speciem creatam repræsentari potest; quia omnis forma creata est determinata secundum aliquam rationem vel sapientiae, vel virtutis, vel ipsius esse, vel alicujus hujusmodi. Unde dicere Deum per similitudinem videri, est dicere divinam essentiam non videri; quod est erroneum. Dicendum ergo quod ad videndum Dei essentiam requiritur aliqua similitudo visivæ potentiæ, scilicet lumen divinæ gloriæ comfortans intellectum ad videndum Deum; de quo dicitur in psalm. xxxv, 10: In lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Non autem per aliquam similitudinem creatam Dei essentia videri potest quæ ipsam divinam essentiam repræsentet ut ipse in se est.
\n[I.q.12.a.2.ad.1] That authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of the light of glory.
\n[I.q.12.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod auctoritas illa loquitur de similitudine quæ est per participationem luminis gloriæ.
\n[I.q.12.a.2.ad.2] Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth.
\n[I.q.12.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de cognitione Dei quæ habetur in via.
\n[I.q.12.a.2.ad.3] The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is united to the created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the intellect in act by and of itself.
\n[I.q.12.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod divina essentia est ipsum esse. Unde sicut aliæ formæ intelligibiles, quæ non sunt suum esse, uniuntur intellectui secundum aliquod esse, quo informant intellectum, et faciunt ipsum in actu; ita divina essentia unitur intellectui creato ut intellectum in actu per se ipsam, et faciens intellectum in actu.
\n[I.q.12.a.3.arg.1] It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye. For it is written (Job 19:26): \"In my flesh I shall see . . . God,\" and (Job 42:5), \"With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee.\"
\n[I.q.12.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod essentia Dei videri possit oculis corporalibus. Dicitur enim Job, xix, 26: In carne mea videbo Deum, etc.; et xlii, 5: Auditu auris audivi te, nunc autem oculus meus videt te.
\n[I.q.12.a.3.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): \"Those eyes\" (namely the glorified) \"will therefore have a greater power of sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see even incorporeal things.\" Now whoever can see incorporeal things, can be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see God.
\n[I.q.12.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit, ult. De civitate Dei, cap. xxix, § 3, col. 799, t. 7: « Vis itaque præpollentior oculorum erit illorum, » scilicet glorificatorum, « non ut acutius videant, quam quidam perhibentur videre serpentes vel aquilæ; quantalibet enim acrimonia cernendi eadem animalia vigeant, nihil aliud possunt videre quam corpora: sed ut videant et incorporalia. » Quicumque autem potest videre incorporalia, potest elevari ad videndum Deum. Ergo oculus glorificatus potest videre Deum.
\n[I.q.12.a.3.arg.3] Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the imagination. For it is written: \"I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne,\" etc. (Isaiah 6:1). But an imaginary vision originates from sense; for the imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen by a vision of sense.
\n[I.q.12.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Deus potest videri ab homine visione imaginaria. Dicitur enim Isa., vi, 1: Vidi Dominum sedentem super solium, etc. Sed visio imaginaria a sensu originem habet; phantasia enim est motus factus a sensu secundum actum, ut dicitur in III De anima, cap. iii, text. 160. Ergo Deus sensibili visione videri potest.
\n[I.q.12.a.3.sc] Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): \"No one has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic life, as visible things are seen by corporeal vision.\"
\n[I.q.12.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus in libro De videndo Deum, ad Paulin., ep. cxLVII, c. ix, § 22, col. 606, t. 2: « Deum nemo vidit unquam, vel in hac vita, sicut ipse est, vel in angelorum vita, sicut visibilia ista quæ corporali visione cernuntur. »
\n[I.q.12.a.3.co] It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later (78). Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For God is incorporeal, as was shown above (Question 3, Article 1). Hence He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect.
\n[I.q.12.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod impossibile est Deum videri sensu visus, vel quocumque alio sensu, aut potentia sensitivæ partis. Omnis enim potentia hujusmodi est actus corporalis organi, ut infra dicetur. Actus autem proportionatur ei cujus est actus. Unde nulla hujusmodi potentia potest se extendere ultra corporalia. Deus autem incorporeus est, ut supra ostensum est. Unde nec sensu, nec imaginatione videri potest, sed solo intellectu.
\n[I.q.12.a.3.ad.1] The words, \"In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour,\" do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh, but that man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the words, \"Now my eye seeth Thee,\" are to be understood of the mind's eye, as the Apostle says: \"May He give unto you the spirit of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the eyes of your heart\" may be \"enlightened\" (Ephesians 1:17-18).
\n[I.q.12.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum dicitur: In carne mea videbo Deum salvatorem meum; non intelligitur quod oculo carnis sit Deum visurus, sed quod in carne existens post resurrectionem visurus sit Deum.
\n[I.q.12.a.3.ad.2] Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally. This appears from what he says previously: \"Therefore they will have an altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they shall see that incorporeal nature;\" and afterwards he explains this, saying: \"It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising the functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it.\" Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see God, as now our eyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visible, but as the indirect object of the sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by some other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through, corporeal things, happens from two causes--viz. from the perspicuity of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory infused into the body after its renovation.
\n[I.q.12.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur inquirendo in verbis illis, et sub conditione. Quod patet ex hoc quod ibidem præmittitur: « Longe itaque potentiæ alterius erunt, » scilicet oculi glorificati, « si per eos videbitur incorporea illa natura; » sed postmodum hoc determinat dicens: « Valde credibile est, sic nos visuros mundana tunc corpora cæli novi et terræ novæ, ut Deum ubique præsentem, et universa etiam corporalia gubernantem, clarissima perspicuitate videamus; non sicut nunc invisibilia Dei per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta conspiuntur, sed sicut homines, inter quos viventes motusque vitales exercentes vivimus, mox ut aspicimus, non credimus vivere, sed videmus. » Ex quo patet quod hoc modo intelligit oculos glorificatos Deum visuros sicut nunc oculi nostri vident alicujus vitam. Vita autem non videtur oculo corporali, sicut per se visibile, sed sicut sensibile per accidens: quod quidem a sensu non cognoscitur, sed statim cum sensu ab aliqua alia virtute cognoscitiva. Quod autem statim visis corporibus divina presentia ex eis cognoscatur per intellectum, ex duobus contingit, scilicet ex perspicacitate intellectus, et ex refulgentia divinae claritatis in corporibus innovatis.
\n[I.q.12.a.3.ad.3] The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God according to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things.
\n[I.q.12.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in visione imaginaria non videtur Dei essentia, sed aliqua forma in imaginatione formatur, repræsentans Deum secundum aliquem mo- « Sic nos esse visuros — motusque vitales exserentes. » Corderius « speculum purum, clarissimum, totam in se recipiens (si dictu fas est) pulchritudinem boniformis deiformitatis. » Al: « ab angelo. » Quicumque Gentiles Deum corporeum esse credebant, consequenter Deum oculis corporeis posse videri dicebant; et similiter, propter eamdem rationem, Anthropomorphitæ. Quis autem his, etiam a longe, theologum catholicum vel unicum annumerare auderet? Non desunt tamen theologi catholici, præsertim e schola Carmelitarum calceatorum, qui cum magistro suo Bona Spes Deum posse videri et de facto videri affirmarunt oculo corporeo, non crasso quidem et materiali, sed glorificato, non per visionem corpoream, sed per visionem spiritualem ipsi visioni corporeæ unitam. Et e societate Valentia et Arriaga oculum corporeum qui vel natura sua, vel dono aliquo superaddito Deum videret, posse creari putavere. Nonne isti, renovationis tempore, ut dicitur, florentes, et Bona Spes sæculo decimo septimo docens, dum similitudinis, prout in Scripturis divinis divina per res sensibiles metaphorice describuntur.
\n[I.q.12.a.4.arg.1] It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): \"An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of God.\" But if a reflection is seen, the original thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power understands himself, it seems that by his own natural power he understands the Divine essence.
\n[I.q.12.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod aliquis intellectus creatus per sua naturalia divinam essentiam videre possit. Dicit enim Dionysius, De divin. nom., c. iv, § 22, col. 723, t. 4: « Angelus est speculum purum, clarissimum, suscipiens totam, si fas est dicere, pulchritudinem Dei. » Sed unumquodque videtur, dum videtur ejus speculum. Cum igitur Angelus per sua naturalia intelligat se ipsum, videtur quod etiam per sua naturalia intelligat divinam essentiam.
\n[I.q.12.a.4.arg.2] Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. But the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other intelligible things by his own natural power, much more can he understand God.
\n[I.q.12.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud quod est maxime visibile, fit minus visibile nobis propter defectum nostri visus vel corporalis, vel intellectualis. Sed intellectus angeli non patitur aliquem defectum. Cum ergo Deus secundum se sit maxime intelligibilis, videtur quod angelo sit maxime intelligibilis. Si igitur alia intelligibilia per sua naturalia intelligere potest, multo magis Deum.
\n[I.q.12.a.4.arg.3] Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above (Article 1). Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine essence.
\n[I.q.12.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sensus corporeus non potest elevari ad intelligendum substantiam incormanifestissime subtiliores sunt in hoc puncto quam Scholastici subtilitatis tam incusati? Contra quos sit: visio Dei est intellectiva, et, sicut omnis visio, vitalis est procedens ab intrinseco se movente: hoc fatentur omnes catholici, etiam Valentia, Arriaga et Carmelitæ; atqui oculus corporeus non est intrinsece intellectivus; ergo visio Dei quæ est intellectiva juxta catholicos omnes, etiam juxta Valentia, Arriaga et Carmelitas, ab oculo corporeo, quantumcumque corporeus oculus sit elevatus, procedere non potest tanquam ab intrinseco se movente; ergo ab oculo corporeo quantumcumque elevato procedere non potest vitaliter; ergo ab oculo corporeo quantumcumque elevato procedere non potest. — Quod enim non est intellectivum in actu primo, non potest esse intellectivum in actu secundo; atqui oculus corporeus non est intellectivus in actu primo; ergo non potest fieri intellectivus in actu secundo. — Si non implicaret visionem Dei immaterialem a potentia materiali quantumvis elevata vitaliter elici, brutum oculis suis Deum videre posset, sicque effici supernaturaliter beatum. Nil vel idem ad hæc reponi potest. poream, quia est supra ejus naturam. Si igitur videre Deum per essentiam sit supra naturam cujuslibet intellectus creati, videtur quod nullus intellectus creatus ad videndum Dei essentiam pertingere possit; quod est erroneum, ut ex supradictis patet, videtur ergo quod intellectui creato sit naturale divinam essentiam videre.
\n[I.q.12.a.4.sc] It is written: \"The grace of God is life everlasting\" (Romans 6:23). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine essence, according to the words: \"This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God,\" etc. (John 17:3). Therefore to see the essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not by nature.
\n[I.q.12.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom., vi, 23: Gratia Dei vita æterna. Sed vita æterna consistit in visione divinæ essentiae, secundum illud Joan., xvii, 3: Hæc est vita æterna, ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum*, etc. Ergo videre Dei essentiam convenit intellectui creato per gratiam, et non per naturam.
\n[I.q.12.a.4.co] It is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the mode of anything's being exceeds the mode of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of the knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being only in this one individual matter; as all bodies. But others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are not their own existence, but receive it; and these are the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent being. Therefore what exists only in individual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in the soul, called the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in individual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but according as they are abstracted therefrom by the considering act of the intellect; hence it follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects as universal; and this is beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are not in matter; but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the body. It follows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone; and this is beyond the natural power of any created intellect; for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is participated. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect, as an object made intelligible to it.
\n[I.q.12.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus per sua naturalia essentiam Dei videat. Cognitio enim contingit secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente. Cognitum autem est in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis. Unde cujuslibet cognoscentis cognitio est secundum modum suæ naturæ. Si igitur modus essendi alicujus rei cognitæ excedat modum naturæ cognoscentis, oportet quod cognitio illius rei sit supra naturam illius cognoscentis. Est autem multiplex modus essendi rerum. Quædam enim sunt quorum natura non habet esse nisi in hac materia individuali; et hujusmodi sunt omnia corporalia. Quædam vero sunt quorum naturae sunt per se subsistentes, non in materia aliqua, quæ tamen non sunt suum esse, sed sunt esse habentes. Et hujusmodi sunt substantiæ incorporeæ, quas angelos dicimus. Solius autem Dei proprius modus essendi est ut sit suum esse subsistens. Ea igitur quæ non habent esse nisi in materia individuali cognoscere est nobis connaturale, eo quod anima nostra, per quam cognoscimus, est forma alicujus materiæ. Quæ tamen habet duas virtutes cognoscitivas; unam, quæ est actus alicujus corporei organi, et huic connaturale est cognoscere res secundum quod sunt in materia individuali, unde sensus non cognoscit nisi singularia. Alia vero virtus cognoscitiva ejus est intellectus, qui non est actus alicujus organi corporalis. Unde per intellectum connaturale est nobis cognoscere naturas quæ quidem non habent esse nisi in materia individuali; non tamen secundum quod sunt in materia individuali, sed secundum quod abstrahuntur ab ea per considerationem intellectus; unde secundum intellectum possumus cognoscere hujusmodi res in universali, quod est supra facultatem sensus. Intellectui autem angelico connaturale est cognoscere naturas non in materia existentes; quod est supra naturalem facultatem intellectus animæ secundum statum præsentis vitæ, quo corpori unitur. Relinquitur ergo quod cognoscere ipsum esse subsistens sit connaturale soli intellectui divino, et quod sit supra facultatem naturalem cujuslibet intellectus creati: quia nulla creatura est suum esse, sed habet esse participatum. Non igitur potest intellectus creatus Deum per essentiam videre, nisi in quantum Deus per suam gratiam se intellectui creato conjungit ut intelligibile ab ipso.
\n[I.q.12.a.4.ad.1] This mode of knowing God is natural to an angel--namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself. But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above (Article 2). Hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.
\n[I.q.12.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod iste modus cognoscendi Deum est angelo connaturalis, ut scilicet cognoscat eum per similitudinem ejus in ipso angelo refulgentem. Sed cognoscere Deum per aliquam similitudinem creatam non est cognoscere essentiam Dei, ut supra ostensum est. Unde non sequitur quod angelus per sua naturalia possit cognoscere essentiam Dei.
\n[I.q.12.a.4.ad.2] The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it ought to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it does not possess the excellence which is in God.
\n[I.q.12.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod intellectus angeli non habet defectum, si defectus accipiatur privative, ut scilicet careat eo quod habere debet. Si vero accipiatur negative, sic quælibet creatura inventur deficiens, Deo comparata; unde non habet illam excellentiam quæ inventur in Deo.
\n[I.q.12.a.4.ad.3] The sense of sight, as being altogether material, cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel, although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.
\n[I.q.12.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod visus, quia omnino materialis est, nullo modo elevari potest ad aliquid immateriale. Sed intellectus noter, vel angelicus, quia secundum naturam a materia aliqualiter elevatus est, potest ultra suam naturam per gratiam ad aliquid altius elevari. Et hujus signum est, quod visus nullo modo potest in abstractione cognoscere id quod in concretione cognoscit; nullo enim modo potest percipere naturam nisi ut hanc; sed intellectus noter potest in abstractione considerare quod in concretione cognoscit. Etsi enim cognoscat res habentes formam in materia, tamen resolvit compositum in utrumque, et considerat ipsam formam per se. Et similiter intellectus anvel « naturalem, » et in idem redit in quantum essentia Dei per « nullam » simigeli, licet connaturale sit ei cognoscere esse concretum in aliqua natura, tamen potest ipsum esse secernere per intellectum, dum cognoscit quod aliud est ipse, et aliud est ejus esse. Et ideo, cum intellectus creatus per suam naturam natus sit apprehendere formam concretum et esse concretum in abstractione per modum resolutionis cujusdam, potest per gratiam elevari ut cognoscat substantiam separatam subsistentem, et esse separatum subsistens.
\n[I.q.12.a.5.arg.1] It seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible things. Now God is intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created light.
\n[I.q.12.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod intellectus creatus ad videndum essentiam Dei aliquo lumine creato non indigeat. Illud enim quod est per se lucidum in rebus sensibilibus, alio lumine non indiget, ut videatur. Ergo nec in intelligibilibus. Sed Deus est lux intelligibilis. Ergo non videtur per aliquod lumen creatum.
\n[I.q.12.a.5.arg.2] Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through a medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence.
\n[I.q.12.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, cum Deus videtur per medium, non videtur per suam essentiam. Sed cum videtur per aliquod lumen creatum, videtur per medium. Ergo non videtur per suam essentiam.
\n[I.q.12.a.5.arg.3] Further, what is created can be natural to some creature. Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light, such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that creature would not need any other light to see God; which is impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should require a superadded light in order to see the essence of God.
\n[I.q.12.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illud quod est creatum, nihil prohibet alicui creaturæ esse naturale. Si ergo per aliquod lumen creatum Dei essentia videtur, poterit illud lumen esse naturale alicui creaturæ; et ita illa creatura non indigebit aliquo alio lumine ad videndum Deum; quod est imposibile. Non est ergo necessarium quod omnis creatura ad videndum Dei essentiam, lumen superadditum requirat.
\n[I.q.12.a.5.sc] It is written: \"In Thy light we shall see light\" (Psalm 35:10).
\n[I.q.12.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in psalm. xxxv, 10: In lumine tuo videbimus lumen.
\n[I.q.12.a.5.co] Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the Apocalypse (Apocalypse 21:23): \"The glory of God hath enlightened it\"--viz. the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are made \"deiform\"--i.e. like to God, according to the saying: \"When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulgate: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is\" (1 John 2:2).
\n[I.q.12.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod omne quod elevatur ad aliquid quod excedit suam naturam, oportet quod disponatur aliqua dispositione ad talem formam. Cum autem aliquis intellectus creatus videt Deum per essentiam, ipsa essentia Dei fit forma intelligibilis intellectus. Unde oportet quod aliqua dispositione supernaturalis ei superaddatur ad hoc quod elevatur in tantam sublimitatem. 1 In codicibus deest: « Sicut si aer debeat accipere formam ignis, oportet quod disponatur aliqua dispositione ad talem formam. Cum autem aliquis intellectus creatus videt Deum per essentiam, ipsa essentia Dei fit forma intelligibilis intellectus. Unde oportet quod aliqua dispositione supernaturalis ei superaddatur ad hoc quod elevatur in tantam sublimitatem. » elevatur ad aliquid quod excedit suam naturam, oportet quod disponatur aliqua dispositione ad talem formam. Cum autem aliquis intellectus creatus videt Deum per essentiam, ipsa essentia Dei fit forma intelligibilis intellectus. Unde oportet quod aliqua dispositione supernaturalis ei superaddatur ad hoc quod elevatur in tantam sublimitatem. » 3 Cum essentia divina naturam cujusque creati intellectus excedat, indiget creatus intellectus ad Deum intuendum aliquo creato lumine. 4 Pelagius, Eunomius et eorum asseclæ docuerunt hominem solis naturæ viribus æternam assequi beatitudinem et salutem. Eunomius, Aetius, et ab his dicti Anomæi quarto sæculo, non solum Dei visionem, sed etiam Dei comprehensionem solis naturæ tribuebant viribus; porro comprehensio Dei est intellectio Dei infinita prout absolute et omni-
\n[I.q.12.a.5.ad.1] The created light is necessary to see the essence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler to act. Even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible of color.
\n[I.q.12.a.5.ad.2] This light is required to see the divine essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen, but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God.
\n[I.q.12.a.5.ad.3] The disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is made deiform, as is said in this article.
\n[I.q.12.a.7.arg.1] It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says (Philippians 3:12): \"But I follow after, if I may by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend'].\" But the Apostle did not follow in vain; for he said (1 Corinthians 9:26): \"I . . . so run, not as at an uncertainty.\" Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: \"So run that you may comprehend.\"
\n[I.q.12.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod videntes Deum per essentiam, ipsum comprehendant. Dicit enim Apostolus, Phil., III, 12: Sequor autem, si quo modo comprehendam. Non autem frustra sequebatur; dicit enim ipse, I Cor., IX, 26: Sic curro, non quasi in incertum. Ergo ipse comprehendit, et eadem ratione allii, quos ad hoc invitat dicens, I Cor., IX, 24: Sic currite, ut comprehendatis.
\n[I.q.12.a.7.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): \"That is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is hidden from the seer.\" But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is simple. Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.
\n[I.q.12.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ut dicit Augustinus, in lib. De videndo Deum, ad Paulin., epist. cxLVII, col. 606, t. 2: « Illud comprehenditur quod ita totum videtur, ut nihil ejus lateat videntem. » Sed si Deus per essentiam videtur, totus videtur, et nihil ejus latet videntem, cum Deus sit simplex. Ergo a quocumque videtur per essentiam, comprehenditur. 3. Si dicatur quod videtur totus, sed non totaliter; contra: « totaliter, » vel dicit modum videntis, vel modum rei visæ. Sed ille qui videt Deum per essentiam, videt eum totaliter, si significetur modus rei visæ, quia videt eum sicuti est, ut dictum est, similiter videt eum totaliter, si significetur modus videntis, quia tota virtute sua intellectus Dei essentiam videbit. Quilibet ergo videns Deum per essentiam, totaliter eum videbit; ergo eum comprehendet.
\n[I.q.12.a.7.arg.3] Further, if we say that He is seen as a \"whole,\" but not \"wholly,\" it may be contrarily urged that \"wholly\" refers either to the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the Divine essence. Therefore all who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him.
\n[I.q.12.a.7.sc] It is written: \"O most mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible in thought\" (Jeremiah 32:18-19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.
\n[I.q.12.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Jerem., xxxII, 18: Fortissime, magne et potens, Dominus exercituum nomen tibi. Magnus consilio, et incomprehensibilis cogitatu. Ergo comprehendi non potest.
\n[I.q.12.a.7.co] It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet \"for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great beatitude,\" as Augustine says (De Verb. Dim., Serm. xxxvii).
\nIn proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probably proof, it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears--Everything is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above (Article 7) is infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God.
\n[I.q.12.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod comprehendere Deum impossibile est cuicumque intellectui creato; attingere vero mente Deum qualiter esse beatos contendebat, quia per justi-tiam Christi omnibus aequalem justificantur.
\n[I.q.12.a.7.ad.1] \"Comprehension\" is twofold: in one sense it is taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and cannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this sense we now take comprehension. But in another sense \"comprehension\" is taken more largely as opposed to \"non-attainment\"; for he who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains to him. And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, \"I held him, and I will not let him go\" (Canticles 3:4); in this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way \"comprehension\" is one of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as vision responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment of desire.
\n[I.q.12.a.7.ad.2] God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition; but that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says the whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained.
\n[I.q.12.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non propter hoc Deus incomprehensibilis dicitur, quasi aliquid ejus sit quod videatur et aliquid quod non videatur; sed quia non ita perfecte videtur sicut visibilis est; sicut aliqua demonstrabilis propositio per aliquam probabilem rationem cognoscitur, nec est aliquid ejus quod non cognoscatur, nec subjectum, nec prædicatum, nec compositio; sed tota non ita perfecte cognoscitur sicut cognoscibilis est. Unde Augustinus definiendo comprehensionem, dicit quod totum comprehenditur videndo, quod ita vi- Primum hujus positionis membrum deest in editis. In Parmensi: « cum aliqua. » In Parmensi: « non. » Hic P. Nicolaï advertit textum S. Augustini ly « circumspici » quidem, non vero ly « vel circum-scribi » in editis additum habere. Sed nec nostri codices ly « vel circum-scribi » habent. « Tamen » in Contra Anomæos et alios. Contra etiam Augustinum de Roma, seu de Favaronibus, Romanum, archiepiscopum nazarenum in regno neapolitano, asserentem animam Christi tam clare et intensive videre Deum quam clare et intensive Deus ipse seipsum videt. Vasquez autem erronee contendit textus SS. Patrum adversus affirmantes essentiae divinæ comprehensibilitatem ab intellectu creato, intelligendos esse ac realiter esse de comprehensibilitate natudetur, ut nihil ejus lateat videntem; aut cujus fines circumspici possunt; tunc enim fines alicujus circumspiciuntur, quando ad finem in modo cognoscendi illam rem pervenitur.
\n[I.q.12.a.7.ad.3] The word \"wholly\" denotes a mode of the object; not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person can have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable, although he himself does not know it as demonstrated.
\n[I.q.12.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod totaliter dicit modum objecti, non quidem ita quod totus modus objecti non cadat sub cognitione, sed quia modus objecti non est modus cognoscentis. Qui igitur videt Deum per essentiam, videt hoc in eo, quod infinite existit, et infinite cognoscibilis est; sed tamen hic infinitus modus non competit ei, ut scilicet ipse infinite cognoscat; sicut aliquis probabiliter scire potest aliquam propositionem esse demonstrabilem, licet ipse eam demonstrative non cognoscat.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.arg.1] It seems that those who see the essence of God see all things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): \"What do they not see, who see Him Who sees all things?\" But God sees all things. Therefore those who see God see all things.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod videntes Deum per essentiam omnia in Deo videant. Dicit enim Gregorius, Dial., l. IV, c. xxxiii, col. 376, t. 3: « Quid est quod non videant, qui videntem omnia videent? » Sed Deus est videns omnia. Ergo qui vident Deum, omnia videent.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.arg.2] Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quicumque videt speculum, videt ea quæ in speculo resplendent. Sed omnia quæcumque fiunt vel fieri possunt, rali, non de supernaturali. Juxta doctrinam Patrum nec etiam supernaturaliter Deus qui infinite cognoscibilis est, infinite cognosci potest. Cæterum Petavio et Perrone si confidas, aliam ac recentiores Scholastici incomprehensibilitatis notionem Patres tradiderunt. Illis etenim sufficiebat ad comprehensionem plena notitia tum substantiæ Dei, tum eorum omnium quæ eminenter et virtualiter in ea continentur, ita ut nihil rei cognitæ lateat cognoscentem. Scholastici vero recentiores ad comprehensionem exigunt ut nihil in Deo sit quod non penitus cognoscatur, eo scilicet modo, quod tanta sit perfectio cognitionis quanta est in objecto perfectio cognoscibilisatis. Non bene video, fateor, quomodo quis essentiam Dei omniaque in ea eminenter et virtualiter contenta sic cognosceret quod nihil rei cognitæ cognoscentem lateret, quin non sit in cognoscente tanta perfectio cognitionis quanta est in objecto perfectio cognoscibilisatis. Unde pro subtilitate vana et inconsistenti distinctionem Petavii ac Perrone habeo, salva eorum reverentia. in Deo resplendent sicut in quodam speculo; ipse enim omnia in seipso cognoscit. Ergo quicumque videt Deum, videt omnia quae sunt et quae fieri possunt.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.arg.3] Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand the least, as is said in De Anima iii. But all that God does, or can do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can understand all that God does, or can do.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, rationalis creatura naturaliter omnia scire desiderat. Si igitur videndo Deum non omnia sciat, non quietatur ejus naturale desiderium; et ita videndo Deum non erit beata: quod est inconveniens. Videndo igitur Deum omnia scit.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.arg.4] Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things, its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees God knows all things.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.sc] The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not know all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), \"the inferior angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels.\" Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever sees the essence of God, does not know all things.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod angeli vident Deum per essentiam, et tamen non omnia sciunt. « Inferiores enim angeli purgantur a superioribus a nescientia, » ut dicit Dionysius, Cælest. hierar., c. vii, § 3, col. 210, t. 4. Ipsi enim nesciunt futura contingentia, et cogitationes cordium; hoc enim solius Dei est. Non ergo quicumque vident Dei essentiam, vident omnia.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.co] The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence, does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above (Article 7). Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, the more perfectly it sees God.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod intellectus creatus videndo divinam essentiam non videt in ipsa omnia quae facit Deus, vel facere potest. Manifestum est enim quod sic aliqua videntur in Deo, secundum quod sunt in ipso. Omnia autem alia sunt in Deo sicut effectus sunt virtute in sua causa. Sic igitur videntur alia in Deo sicut effectus in sua causa. Sed manifestum est quod quanto aliqua causa perfectius videtur, tanto plures ejus effectum in ipsa videri possunt. Qui enim habet intellectum elevatum, statim uno principio demonstrativo proposito, ex ipso multarum conclusionum cognitionem accipit; quod non contingit ei qui debilioris intellectus est, sed oportet quod ei singula explanentur. Ille igitur intellectus potest in causa cognoscere omnes causæ effectus et rationes effectuum, qui causam totaliter comprehendit. Nullus autem intellectus creatus totaliter Deum comprehendere potest, ut ostensum est. Nullus igitur intellectus creatus videndo Deum potest cognoscere omnia quae Deus facit, vel potest facere; hoc enim esset comprehendere ejus virtutem; sed horum, quae Deus facit, vel facere potest, tanto aliquis intellectus plura cognoscit, quanto perfectius Deum videt.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.ad.1] Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth all things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Gregorius loquitur quantum ad sufficientiam objecti, scilicet Dei, quod, quantum in se est, sufficienter continet omnia, et demonstrat; non tamen sequitur quod unusquisque videns ipsum omnia cognoscat, quia non perfecte comprehendit eum.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.ad.2] It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the mirror itself.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod videns speculum non est necessarium quod omnia in speculo videat, nisi speculum visu suo comprehendat.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.ad.3] Although it is more to see God than to see all things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been shown in this article that the more things are known in God according as He is seen more or less perfectly.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet majus sit videre Deum quam omnia alia, tamen majus est videre sic ipsum quod omnia in eo cognoscantur, quam videre sic ipsum quod non omnia, sed pauciora vel plura cognoscantur in eo. Jam enim ostensum est, quod multitudo cognitorum in Deo consequitur modum videndi ipsum, vel magis perfectum, vel minus perfectum.
\n[I.q.12.a.8.ad.4] The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely, the species and the genera of things and their types, and these everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): \"Unhappy the man who knoweth all these\" (i.e. all creatures) \"and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee alone.\"
\n[I.q.12.a.8.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod naturale desiderium rationalis creaturæ est ad sciendum omnia illa quae pertinent ad perfectionem intellectus; et hæc sunt species et genera rerum, et rationes earum, quae in Deo videbit quilibet videns essentiam divinam. Cognoscere autem aliqua singularia, et cogitata et facta eorum, non est de perfectione intellectus creati, nec ad hoc ejus naturale desiderium tendit; nec iterum cognoscere illa quae a Deo non sunt, sed fieri a Deo possunt. Si tamen solus Deus videretur, qui est fons, et principium totius esse et veritas, ita repleret naturale desiderium sciendi, quod nihil aliud quæeretur, et beatus esset. Unde dicit Augustinus, Confess., l. V, c. iv, col. 708, t. 4: « Infelix homo, qui scit omnia illa, » scilicet creaturas, « te tamen nescit! beatus autem qui te scit, etiamsi illa nesciat. Qui vero te et illa novit, non propter illa beatior est, sed propter te solum beatus. »
\n[I.q.12.a.9.arg.1] It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible, and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is informed by a similitude of the object, as the eye by the similitude of color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their similitudes.
\n[I.q.12.a.9.arg.1] Ad nonum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ea quæ videntur in Deo a videntibus divinam essentiam, per aliquas similitudines videantur. Omnis enim cognitio est per assimilationem cognoscentis ad cognitum; sic enim intellectus in actu fit intellectum in actu, et visus in actu sensibile in actu, in quantum ejus similitudine informatur, ut pupilla similitudine coloris. Si igitur intellectus videntis Deum per essentiam intelligat in Deo aliquas creaturas, oportet quod earum similitudinibus informetur.
\n[I.q.12.a.9.arg.2] Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul, seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34), remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he said: \"I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter\" (2 Corinthians 12:4). Therefore it must be said that certain similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the same way, when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it.
\n[I.q.12.a.9.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ea quæ prius vidimus, memoriter tenemus. Sed Paulus videns in raptu essentiam Dei, ut dicit Augustinus, Super Genes. ad litt., l. XII, c. Ⅲ et xxviii, t. 3, postquam desiit essentiam Dei videre recordatus est multorum quæ in illo raptu viderat; unde ipse dicit, quod audivi arcana verba, quæ non licet homini loqui, II Cor., xii, 4. Ergo oportet dicere quod aliquæ similitudines eorum quæ recordatus est, in ejus intellectu remanserunt; et eadem ratione, quando præsentialiter videbat Dei essentiam, eorum quæ in ipsa videbat, aliquas similitudines, vel species habebat.
\n[I.q.12.a.9.sc] A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror. Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or ideas.
\n[I.q.12.a.9.sc] Sed contra est quod per unam speciem videtur speculum, et ea quæ in speculo apparent. Sed omnia sic videntur in Deo sicut in quodam speculo intelligibili. Ergo si ipse Deus non videtur per aliquam similitudinem, sed per suam essentiam; nec ea quæ in ipso videntur, per aliquas similitudines sive species videntur.
\n[I.q.12.a.9.co] Those who see the divine essence see what they see in God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For as things which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object in two ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which resembles the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to know things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their similitudes pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other similitudes but by the Divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God Himself is seen.
\n[I.q.12.a.9.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod videntes Deum per essentiam, ea quæ in ipsa essentia Dei vident, non vident per aliquas species, sed per ipsam essentiam divinam ut intellectui eorum unitam. Sic enim cognoscitur unum-quoque, secundum quod similitudo ejus est in cognoscente: sed hoc contingit dupliiter. Cum enim quæcumque uni et eidem quidditative cognosci, quin eorum termini cognoscantur. Termini primarii a secundariis distinguuntur. Primarii sunt definiti ut ens creabile pro omni-potentia, ens scibile pro scientia, etc., et hi a beatis videntur. Secundarii sunt infiniti, et hos non necesse est a beatis omnes absque ulla exceptione videri. 1. Colligitur æquivalenter, col. 478. 2. Sic in cod.; in editis deest: « ut. » Videre per similitudinem seu speciem extra Verbum infusam, idem est ac videre causaliter. Videre absque specie seu similitudine, idem est ac videre formaliter. Visio formalis in Verbo fit, visio causalis extra Verbum. Alensis, S. Bonaventura,
\n[I.q.12.a.9.ad.1] The created intellect of one who sees God is assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the Divine essence, in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.
\n[I.q.12.a.9.ad.2] Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees God, by the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, which remained in Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this kind of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.
\n[I.q.12.a.10.arg.1] It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii): \"It may happen that many things are known, but only one is understood.\" But what is seen in God, is understood; for God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see all in Him at the same time.
\n[I.q.12.a.10.arg.1] Ad decimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod videntes Deum per essentiam non simul videant omnia quæ in ipso vident. Quia, secundum Philosophum, II Top., c. iv, in princ., « contingit multa scire, intelligere vero unum. » Sed ea quæ videntur in Deo, intelliguntur; intellectu enim videtur Deus. Ergo non contingit a videntibus Deum simul multa videri in Deo.
\n[I.q.12.a.10.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22,23), \"God moves the spiritual creature according to time\"--i.e. by intelligence and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God. Therefore those who see God understand and are affected successively; for time means succession.
\n[I.q.12.a.10.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit, VIII De Gen. ad litter., cap. xx, col. 388, t. 3, quod « Deus movet creaturam spiritualem per tempus, » hoc est, per intelligentiam et affectionem. Sed creatura spiritualis est angelus, qui Deum videt. Ergo videntes Deum successive intelligunt, et afficiuntur; tempus enim successionem importat.
\n[I.q.12.a.10.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): \"Our thoughts will not be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall see all we know at one glance.\"
\n[I.q.12.a.10.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XV De Trinitate, cap. xvi, col. 1079, t. 8: « Non erunt volubiles nostræ cogitationes, ab aliis in alia euntes, atque redeuntes; sed omnem scientiam nostram uno simul conspectu videbimus. »
\n[I.q.12.a.10.co] What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed by many diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence, when many things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all at the same time, if each one is understood by its own idea; whereas if all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood simultaneously. Now it was shown above that things seen in God, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by the one essence of God. Hence they are seen simultaneously, and not successively.
\n[I.q.12.a.10.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ea quæ videntur in Verbo, non successive, sed simul videntur. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est, quod ideo nos simul non possumus multa intelligere, quia multa per diversas species intelligimus. Diversis autem speciebus non potest intellectus unius simul actu informari ad intelligendum per eas; sicut nec unum corpus potest simul diversis figuris figurari. Unde contingit quod quando aliqua multa una specie intelligigi possunt, simul intelliguntur: sicut diversæ partes S. Thomas, Scotus et alii communiter dicunt beatos videre de facto creaturas in Verbo, et ideo formaliter, non causaliter, quamvis visio causalis sit possibilis. Vasquez et Nominales e contra volunt beatos non posse aliter creaturas in Verbo videre, nisi causaliter. Hic, ut apparet, peculiarem sibi fingunt de visione causali notionem, siquidem visio causalis non fit in Verbo sed extra Verbum. Intelligunt forsitan creaturas esse in Verbo ut in causa, sicque ibi videri, nec aliter ibi posse videri. Sed visio ista creaturarum in Verbo ut in causa, dum fit absque specie vel similitudine, vocatur apud theologos visio formalis, non causalis. Igitur quæstio est de nomine. Quidquid sit et in Verbo et extra Verbum beati vident, habentque utramque visionem, formalem scilicet et causalem, quia visio alicujus totius, si singulæ propriis specibus intelligantur, successive intelliguntur, et non simul; si autem omnes intelligantur una specie totius, simul intelligentur. Ostensum est autem, quod ea quæ videntur in Deo, non videntur singula per suas similitudines, sed omnia per unam essentiam Dei. Unde simul et non successive videntur.
\n[I.q.12.a.10.ad.1] We understand one thing only when we understand by one idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood simultaneously, as in the idea of a man we understand \"animal\" and \"rational\"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof.
\n[I.q.12.a.10.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sic unum tantum intelligimus, in quantum una specie intelligimus: sed multa una specie intellecta simul intelliguntur; sicut in specie hominis intelligimus animal et rationale, et in specie domus parietem et tectum.
\n[I.q.12.a.10.ad.2] As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in God, they see all at the same time.
\n[I.q.12.a.10.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Angeli, quantum ad cognitionem naturalem, qua cognoscunt res per species diversas eis inditas, non simul omnia cognoscunt, et sic moventur secundum intelligentiam per tempus; sed secundum quod vident res in Deo, simul eas vident.
\n[I.q.12.a.11.arg.1] It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence. For Jacob said: \"I have seen God face to face\" (Genesis 32:30). But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: \"We see now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face\" (1 Corinthians 13:12).
\n[I.q.12.a.11.arg.1] Ad undecimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod aliquis in hac vita possit Deum per essentiam videre. Dicit enim Jacob, Genes., xxxii, 30: Vidi Deum facie ad faciem. Sed videre facie ad faciem est videre per essentiam, ut patet per illud quod dicitur I Cor., xiii, 12: Videmus nunc per speculum et in ænigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Ergo Deus in hac vita per essentiam videri potest.
\n[I.q.12.a.11.arg.2] Further, the Lord said to Moses: \"I speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the Lord\" (Numbers 12:8); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it is possible to see the essence of God in this life.
\n[I.q.12.a.11.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Numer., xii, 8, dicit Dominus de Moyse: Ore ad os loquor ei, et palam causalis congruit naturæ quam gratia non destruit, nec gloria. « Per tempus movet conditum Spiritum ipse... Conditor Spiritus. » In textu Augustini: « Forşitan non erunt. » Sic cod.; sed in editis textus sacræ Scripturæ non habet: « et palam, » etc. Quod tamen minor argumentationis exigere videtur. Quæritur utrum quis unum vel plura attributa, unam vel tres personas divinas non videns essentiam Dei videre possit? Negant communiter Thomistæ, Scotistæ affirmant. Solutio contra Scotistas facilis. Visio enim beatifica est visio intuitiva Dei ut est in se subsistens, quidditative omnia quæ ad essentiam Dei pertinent attingens; atqui Deus ut et non per anigmata Dominum videt. Sed qui ore ad os loquitur Deo palam, et non per anigmata et figuras, videt Deum: sed hoc videre, est Deum per essentiam videre. Ergo aliquis in statu hujus vitæ potest Deum per essentiam videre.
\n[I.q.12.a.11.arg.3] Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): \"If we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our minds.\" He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, \"We judge of all things according to the divine truth\"; and (De Trin. xii) that, \"it is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind could not be incommutable.\" Therefore even in this life we see God Himself.
\n[I.q.12.a.11.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illud in quo alia omnia cognoscimus, et per quod de aliis judicamus, est nobis per se notum. Sed omnia etiam nunc in Deo cognoscimus; dicit enim Augustinus, XII Confess., cap. xxv, col. 840, t. 1: « Si ambo videmus verum esse quod dicis, et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico, ubi, quæso, illud videmus? Nec ego in te, nec tu in me; sed ambo in ipsa, quæ supra mentes nostras est, incommutabili veritate. » Idem etiam in lib. De vera religione, c. xxxi, col. 147, t. 3, dicit quod « secundum veritatem divinam de omnibus judicamus; » et De Trinit., l. XII, c. 11, col. 999, t. 8, dicit quod « rationis est judicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes incorporales et sempiternas; quæ nisi supra mentem essent, incommutabiles profecto non essent. » Ergo et in hac vita ipsum Deum videmus.
\n[I.q.12.a.11.arg.4] Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also says (Gen. ad lit. xiii, 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His essence, it follows that He is seen by us in His essence.
\n[I.q.12.a.11.arg.4] 4. Præterea, secundum Augustinum, XII De Genes. ad litteram, cap. xxiv, col. 474, t. 3, visione intellectuali videntur ea quæ sunt in anima per suam essentiam. Sed visio intellectualis est de rebus intelligibilibus, non per aliquas similitudines, sed per suas essentias, ut ipse ibidem dicit. Ergo cum Deus sit per essentiam suam in anima nostra, per essentiam suam videtur a nobis.
\n[I.q.12.a.11.sc] It is written, \"Man shall not see Me, and live\" (Exodus 32:20), and a gloss upon this says, \"In this mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His own nature.\"
\n[I.q.12.a.11.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod., xxxiii, 20: Non videbit me homo, et vivet; Glossa ord., col. 290, t. 1: « Quamdiu hic mortaliter vivitur, videri per quasdam imagines Deus potest, sed per ipsam naturæ suæ speciem non potest. »
\n[I.q.12.a.11.co] God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because, as was said above (Article 4), the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now it is evident that the Divine essence cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above (Question 2, Article 9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily senses divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine essence.
\n[I.q.12.a.11.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ab homine puro Deus videri per essentiam non potest, nisi ab hac vita mortali separetur. Cujus ratio est, quia, sicut supra dictum est, modus cognitionis sequitur modum naturæ rei cognoscentis. Anima autem nostra, quamdiu in hac vita vivimus, habet esse in materia corporali; unde naturaliter non cognoscit aliqua, nisi quæ habent formam in materia, est in se subsistens est unus, trinus, justus, misericors, sapiens, etc. Attributa insuper et personæ ad essentiam Dei ut est in se pertinent, ergo, etc. Glossa desumitur ex D. Gregorio, XVIII Mor., c. Liv, § 88, col. 92, t. 2. Ita codd. Alcan. et Camer. Al.: « Ut videatur vel quæ per hujusmodi cognosci possunt. Manifestum est autem quod per naturas rerum materialium divina essentia cognosci non potest. Ostensum est enim supra, quod cognitio Dei per quamcumque similitudinem creatam non est visio essentia ipsius. Unde impossibile est animæ hominis secundum hanc vitam viventis essentiam Dei videre. Et hujus signum est quod anima nostra quanto magis a corporalibus abstrahitur, tanto intelligibilium abstractorum fit capacior. Unde in somniis et in alienationibus a sensibus corporis magis divinæ revelationes percipiuntur, et prævisiones futurorum. Quod ergo anima elevetur usque ad supremum intelligibilium, quod est essentia divina, esse non potest, quamdiu hac mortali vita utitur.
\n[I.q.12.a.11.ad.1] According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, \"I have seen God face to face,\" this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary vision; as will later be explained (II-II, 174) in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state.
\n[I.q.12.a.11.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod secundum Dionysium, Cælest. hierar., c. iv, § 3, col. 179, t. 1, sic in Scripturis dicitur aliquos Deum vidisse, in quantum formatæ sunt aliquæ figuræ vel sensibiles vel imaginariæ, secundum aliquam similitudinem aliquod divinum repræsentantes. Quod ergo dicit Jacob: Vidi Deum facie ad faciem, referendum est non ad ipsam divinam essentiam, sed ad figuram, in qua repræsentabatur Deus. Et hoc ipsum ad quamdam prophetiae eminentiam pertinet, ut videatur loquens Deus, licet imaginaria visione, ut infra patebit, cum de gradibus prophetiae loquemur. Vel hoc dicit Jacob ad designandam quamdam eminentiam intelligibilis contemplationis supra omnem statum.
\n[I.q.12.a.11.ad.2] As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully in the question of rapture (II-II, 175).
\n[I.q.12.a.11.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut Deus miraculose aliquid supernaturaliter in rebus corporeis operatur, ita etiam supernaturaliter et præter communem ordinem, mentes aliquorum in hac carne viventium, sed non sensibus carnis utentium, usque ad visionem suæ essentiae elevavit; ut dicit Augustinus, lib. XII Super Genes. ad litteram, c. xxvi et xxvii, col. 476, t. 3, et in libro De videndo Deum, ad Paul., ep. cxlvii, c. xiii, col. 612, t. 2, de Moyse, qui fuit magister Judæorum, et de Paulo, qui fuit magister gentium. Et de hoc plenius tractabitur, cum de raptu ejus agemus. persona Dei loquentis vel loquens Deus. » Sic cod.; in editis vero: « intelligibilem. » In editis: « communem; » sed in supple: « videntium Deum, non Dei essentiam, in via. »
\n[I.q.12.a.11.ad.3] All things are said to be seen in God and all things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), \"The lessons of instruction can only be seen as it were by their own sun,\" namely God. As therefore in order to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible object, it is not necessary to see the essence of God.
\n[I.q.12.a.11.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnia dicimur in Deo videre, et secundum ipsum de omnibus judicare, in quantum per participationem sui luminis omnia cognoscimus et dijudicamus, nam et ipsum lumen naturale rationis participatio quædam est divini luminis; sicut etiam omnia sensibilia dicimur videre et judicare in sole, id est, per lumen solis. Unde dicit Augustinus, l. I Soliloquiorum, c. viii, col. 877, t. 4: « Disciplinarum spectamina videri non possunt, nisi aliquo velut suo sole illustrentur, » videlicet Deo. Sicut ergo ad videndum aliquid sensibiliter non est necesse quod videatur substantia solis; ita ad videndum aliquid intelligibiliter, non est necessarium quod videatur essentia Dei.
\n[I.q.12.a.11.ad.4] Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect. And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by presence, essence and power.
\n[I.q.12.a.11.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod visio intellectualis est eorum quæ sunt in anima per suam essentiam sicut intelligibilia in intellectu. Sic autem Deus est in anima beatorum, non autem in anima nostra, sed per præsentiam, essentiam et potentiam.
\n[I.q.12.a.12.arg.1] It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that \"reason does not grasp simple form.\" But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above (Question 3, Article 7). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.
\n[I.q.12.a.12.arg.2] Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge.
\n[I.q.12.a.12.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ratione naturali sine phantasmate nihil intelligit anima, ut dicitur in III De anima, t. 30, et De mem. et remin., « Disciplinarum spectamina... credendum est non posse intelligi, nisi ab alio quasi suo sole illustrentur. » Sic cod.; in editis: « Dei. » « Per justitiam fidei nutrita vegetetur. » Sic cod.; « in editis: Dei, virtutem causæ. » Sic cod.; in editis: « sunt ejus effectus... » et male; effectus enim cujuscumque causæ, non solius Dei, sunt a causa dependentes. Beguardi et Beguinæ prædicabant hominem in præsenti vita constitutum posse beatitudinem finalem assequi, juxta omnes perfectionis gradus quos habebit in patria. Certum est hominem purum in hac vita constitutum non posse de lege ordinaria videre Deum ut in se est. Non minus certum esse c. i. Sed Deus, cum sit incorporeus, phantasma in nobis esse non potest. Ergo cognosci non potest a nobis cognitione naturali.
\n[I.q.12.a.12.arg.3] Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): \"The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless purified by the justice of faith.\" Therefore God cannot be known by natural reason.
\n[I.q.12.a.12.arg.3] 3. Præterea, cognitio quæ est per rationem naturalem, communis est bonis et malis, sicut natura eis communis est. Sed cognitio Dei competit tantum bonis; dicit enim Augustinus, I De Trinitate, cap. ii, col. 822, t. 8, quod « humanæ mentis acies invalida in tam excellenti luce non figitur, nisi per justitiam fidei emundetur. » Ergo Deus per rationem naturalem cognosci non potest.
\n[I.q.12.a.12.sc] It is written (Romans 1:19), \"That which is known of God,\" namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, \"is manifest in them.\"
\n[I.q.12.a.12.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. i, 19: Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in illis, id est, quod cognoscibile est de Deo per rationem naturalem.
\n[I.q.12.a.12.co] Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know of God \"whether He exists,\" and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.
\nHence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all.
\n[I.q.12.a.12.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod naturalis nostra cognitio a sensu principium sumit. Unde tantum se nostra naturalis cognitio extendere potest, in quantum manuduci potest per sensibilia. Ex sensibilibus autem non potest usque ad hoc intellectus noter pertingere quod divinam essentiam videat; quia creaturæ sensibiles sunt effectus, Dei virtutem non adæquantes. Unde ex sensibilium cognitione non potest tota Dei virtus cognosci, et per consequens nec ejus essentia videri. Sed quia sunt effectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc perduci possumus ut cognoscamus de Deo an est, et ut cognoscamus de ipso ea quæ necesse est ei convenire, secundum quod est prima omnium causa, excedens omnia sua causata. Unde cognoscimus de ipso habitudinem ipsius ad creaturas, quod scilicet omnium est causa; et differentiam creaturarum ab ipso, quod scilicet ipse non est aliquid eorum quæ ab eo causantur; et quod hæc non removentur ab eo propter ejus defectum, sed quia superexcedit.
\n[I.q.12.a.12.ad.1] Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know \"what it is\"; but it can know \"whether it is.\"
\n[I.q.12.a.12.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio ad formam simplicem pertingere non potest, ut videtur Deum ut in se est ab homine viatore ex privilegio extraordinario posse videri. Sed inquiritur utrum aliquibus tale privilegium de facto fuerit a Deo concessum. Patri Henno si credas, negativam communius Scholastici tenent. D. Thomas tamen contrarium affirmat, Scotus ipse contrarium supponit, multique alii D. Thomæ et Scoto assentiunt. Quoad SS. Patres scinduntur; stant pro negativa Dyonisius, Iræneus, Nazianzenus, Leo, Chrysostomus, Gregorius Magnus, Hilarius, Cyrillus Alexandrinus, Beda, Prudentius; pro affirmativa, Augustinus, Ambrosius, Basilius, et alii. Ultimis adhæremus, credimusque Moysi et Paulo privilegium fuisse concessum, et a fortiori B. Mariæ virgini. De Benedicto dubitamus. sciat de ea quid est: potest tamen de ea cognoscere an est.
\n[I.q.12.a.12.ad.2] God is known by natural knowledge through the images of His effects.
\n[I.q.12.a.12.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deus naturali cognitione cognoscitur per phantasmata effectus sui.
\n[I.q.12.a.12.ad.3] As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i), retracting what he had said before: \"I do not approve what I said in prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth.' For it can be answered that many who are not pure can know many truths,\" i.e. by natural reason.
\n[I.q.12.a.12.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod cognitio Dei per essentiam, cum sit per gratiam, non competit nisi bonis: sed cognitio ejus quæ est per rationem naturalem, potest competere bonis, et malis; unde dicit Augustinus lib. I Retractationum, c. iv, col. 589, t. 4, retractans quod dixerat, lib. I Solil., cap. 1: « Non approbo quod in oratione dixi: Deus, qui non nisi mundos verum scire voluisti. Responderi enim potest multos etiam non mundos multa scire vera, » scilicet per rationem naturalem.
\n[I.q.12.a.13.arg.1] It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol. i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring of Him \"what He is,\" comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to us by grace than by natural reason.
\n[I.q.12.a.13.arg.2] Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that \"it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as screened round about by the many colored sacred veils.\" Therefore we cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason.
\n[I.q.12.a.13.arg.2] 2. Præterea, per rationem naturalem in cognitionem divinorum pervenire non possumus, nisi per phantasmata; similiter etiam nec secundum cognitionem gratiae. Dicit enim Dionysius, cap. 1 Cæl. hierarchix, § 2, col. 122, t. 4, quod « impossibile est nobis aliter lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvela- 1 Sic cod.; in edit.: « ut sciat an est. » 2 Sic cod.; in edit.: « ignorando de eo. » 3 Edit. Rom.: « sic etiam. » 4 Ex versione J. Scoti Erigenæ. Corderius: « Neque enim potest aliter divino-principalis ille radius nobis illucescere, nisi sacrorum varietate Ergo per gratiam non plenius cognoscimus Deum quam per rationem naturalem.
\n[I.q.12.a.13.arg.3] Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Ev.) that \"things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge.\" Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent knowledge of God by grace.
\n[I.q.12.a.13.arg.3] 3. Præterea, intellectus noster per gratiam fidei Deo adhæret. Fides autem non videtur esse cognitio; dicit enim Gregorius, in Homil. xxvi in Evang., col. 1202, § 8, t. 2, quod ea « quæ non videntur fidem habent, et non agnitionem ». Ergo per gratiam non additur nobis aliqua excellentior cognitio de Deo.
\n[I.q.12.a.13.sc] The Apostle says that \"God hath revealed to us His spirit,\" what \"none of the princes of this world knew\" (1 Corinthians 2:10), namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.
\n[I.q.12.a.13.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Apostolus I Cor., 11, 10: Nobis revelavit Deus per Spiritium suum, illa scilicet quæ nemo principum hujus sæculi novit, id est, philosophorum, ut exponit Glossa Hier., in illum loc.
\n[I.q.12.a.13.co] We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions.
\nNow in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard, \"This is My beloved Son\" (Matthew 3:17).
\n[I.q.12.a.13.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod per gratiam perfectior cognitio de Deo habetur a nobis quam per rationem naturalem. Quod sic patet: cognitio enim quam per naturalem rationem habemus, duo requirit, scilicet phantasmata ex sensibilibus accepta, et lumen naturale intelligibile, cujus virtute intelligibilies conceptiones ab eis abstrahimus. Et quantum ad utrumque juvatur humana cognitio per revelationem gratiae. Nam et lumen naturale intellectus comfortatur per infusionem luminis gratuiti; et interdum etiam phantasmata in imaginatione hominis formantur divinitus magis exprimentia res divinas quam ea quæ naturaliter a sensibilibus accipimus, sicut apparet in visionibus prophetalibus; et interdum etiam aliquæ res sensibiles formantur divinitus, aut etiam voces, ad aliquid divinum exprimendum; sicut in baptismo visus est Spiritus sanctus in specie columbæ, et vox Patris audita est: Hic est Filius meus dilectus, Matth., 11, 17.
\n[I.q.12.a.13.ad.1] Although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God \"what He is,\" and thus are united to Him as to one unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and One.
\n[I.q.12.a.13.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, licet per revelationem gratiae in hac vita non cognoscamus de Deo quid est, et sic ei quasi ignoto conjungamur, tamen plenius ipsum cognoscimus in quantum plures et excellentiores effectus ejus nobis demonstrantur; et in quantum ei aliqua attribuimus ex revelatione divina, ad quæ ratio naturalis non pertingit, ut Deum esse trinum et unum.
\n[I.q.12.a.13.ad.2] From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much the more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light.
\n[I.q.12.a.13.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex phantasmatibus vel a sensu acceptis secundum operimentorum anagogice obvelatus. » 6 Hæc glossa est interlinearis quæ habet: « Dæmonum, vel philosophorum, vel doctorum in lege. » naturalem ordinem, vel divinitus in imaginatione formatis, tanto excellentior cognitio intellectualis habetur, quanto lumen intelligibile in homine fortius fuerit; et sic per revelationem ex phantasmatibus plenior cognitio accipitur ex infusione divini luminis.
\n[I.q.12.a.13.ad.3] Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one object by the vision and understanding of first principles.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I.q.12.a.13.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum quod fides cognitio quædam est, in quantum intellectus determinatur per fidem ad aliquod cognoscibile. Sed hæc determinatio ad unum non procedit a visione credentis, sed a visione ejus cui creditur. Et sic in quantum deest visio, deficit a ratione cognitionis quæ est in scientia; nam scientia determinat intellectum ad unum per visionem et intellectum primorum principiorum.
\n