[I.q.26.a.1.arg.1] It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) \"is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things.\" But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude does not belong to God.
\n[I.q.26.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod beatitudo Deo non conveniat. « Beatitudo » enim, secundum Boetium, De consol., lib. III, prosa II, col. 724, t. 4, « est status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus. » Sed congregatio bonorum non habet locum in Deo, sicut nec compositio. Ergo Deo non convenit beatitudo.
\n[I.q.26.a.1.arg.2] Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not apply to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.
\n[I.q.26.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, beatitudo, sive felicitas, est præmium virtutis, secundum Philosophum, in I Ethic., cap. IX, paulo a princ. Sed Deo non convenit præmium, sicut nec meritum. Ergo nec beatitudo.
\n[I.q.26.a.1.sc] The Apostle says: \"Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords.\" (1 Timothy 6:15).
\n[I.q.26.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Apostolus I ad Timoth., ultimo, 45: Quem suis temporibus ostendet Deus beatus, et solus potens, Rex regum et Dominus dominantium.
\n[I.q.26.a.1.co] Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. All of these things belong in a most excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence. Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree.
\n[I.q.26.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod beatitudo maxime Deo convenit. Nihil enim aliud sub nomine beatitudinis intelligitur nisi bonum perfectum intellectualis naturæ, cujus est suam sufficientiam cognoscere in bono quod habet; et cui competit ut ei contingat aliquid vel bene vel male, et sit suarum operationum domina. Utrumque autem istorum excellentissime Deo convenit, scilicet perfectum esse et intelligentem. Unde beatitudo maxime convenit Deo.
\n[I.q.26.a.1.ad.1] Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above (4, 2; 13, 4), in simplicity and unity.
\n[I.q.26.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aggregatio bonorum est in Deo, non per modum compositionis, sed per modum simplicitatis; quia quæ in creaturis multiplicia sunt, in Deo præx existunt simpliciter et unite, ut supra dictum est.
\n[I.q.26.a.1.ad.2] It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit.
\n[I.q.26.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod esse præmium virtutis accidit beatitudini vel felicitati, in quantum aliquis beatitudinem acquirit, sicut esse terminum generationis accidit enti, in quantum exit de potentia in actum. Sicut igitur Deus habet esse, quamvis non generetur, ita habet beatitudinem, quamvis non mereatur.
\n[I.q.26.a.2.arg.1] It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which is according to essence, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not to His intellect.
\n[I.q.26.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Deus non dicatur beatus secundum intellectum. Beatitudo enim est summum bonum. Sed bonum dicitur in Deo secundum essentiam, quia bonum respicit esse quod est secundum essentiam, secundum Boetium, in lib. De hebdom., col. 1314, t. 2. Ergo et beatitudo dicitur in Deo secundum essentiam, et non secundum intellectum.
\n[I.q.26.a.2.arg.2] Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude is said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to His intellect.
\n[I.q.26.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, beatitudo habet rationem finis. Finis autem est objectum voluntatis, sicut et bonum. Ergo videtur quod Deus dicatur esse beatus secundum voluntatem, et non secundum intellectum. Sic cod. et Boetius; in
\n[I.q.26.a.2.sc] Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): \"He is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise.\" To be in glory, however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect to our intellect, because \"vision is the whole of the reward,\" as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His intellect.
\n[I.q.26.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, XXXII Moralium, cap. vi, col. 339, t. 2, super illud Job, xl: Circumda tibi decorem: «Ipse gloriosus est, qui dum seipso perfruitur, accidentis laudis indigens non est. » Esse autem gloriosum significat esse beatum. Cum igitur Deo fruamur secundum intellectum, quia visio est tota merces, ut dicit Augustinus, lib. XXII De civit. Dei, cap. xxix, col. 797, t. 7, videtur quod beatitudo dicatur in Deo secundum intellectum.
\n[I.q.26.a.2.co] Beatitude, as stated above (Article 1), is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding. Now in God, to be and to understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the assimilation to His beatitude.
\n[I.q.26.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod beatitudo, sicut dictum est, significat bonum perfectum intellectualis naturæ; et inde est quod sicut unaquæque res appetit suam perfectionem, ita et intellectualis natura naturaliter appetit esse beata. Id autem quod est perfectissimum in qualibet intellectuali natura, est intellectualis operatio secundum quam capit quodam modo omnia. Unde cujuslibet intellectualis naturæ creatæ beatitudo consistit in intelligendo. In Deo autem non est aliud esse et intelligere secundum rem, sed tantum secundum intelligentiæ rationem. Attribuenda ergo est Deo beatitudo secundum intellectum, sicut et aliis beatis, qui per assimilationem ad beatitudinem ipsius beati dicuntur.
\n[I.q.26.a.2.ad.1] This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.
\n[I.q.26.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ex illa ratione probatur quod Deus sit beatus secundum suam essentiam, non autem quod beatitudo ei conveniat secundum rationem essentiæ, sed magis secundum rationem intellectus.
\n[I.q.26.a.2.ad.2] Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. Whence in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of the intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect.
\n[I.q.26.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod beatitudo, cum sit bonum, est objectum voluntatis: objectum autem præintelligitur actui potentiæ. Unde secundum modum intelligendi prius quiddam est beatitudo divina quam actus voluntatis in ea requiescentis. Et hoc non potest esse nisi actus intellectus. Unde in actu intellectus attenditur beatitudo.
\n[I.q.26.a.3.arg.1] It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above (6, 2 and 4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above (Question 11, Article 3). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God Himself.
\n[I.q.26.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod Deus sit beatitudo cujuslibet beati. Deus « Præmium fidei nobis visio ista servatur. » De civit. Dei. Expressius autem in v. 16 ps. xc, t. 4, col. 1170, § 13, ad hæc verba: Et attendam illi sa-enim est summum bonum, ut supra ostensum est. Impossibile est autem esse plura summa bona, ut etiam ex superioribus patet. Cum igitur de ratione beatitudinis sit quod sit summum bonum, videtur quod beatitudo non sit aliud quam Deus.
\n[I.q.26.a.3.arg.2] Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to God. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone.
\n[I.q.26.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, beatitudo est finis rationalis naturæ ultimus. Sed esse ultimum finem rationalis naturæ soli Deo convenit. Ergo beatitudo cujuslibet beati est solus Deus.
\n[I.q.26.a.3.sc] The beatitude of one is greater than that of another, according to 1 Corinthians 15:41: \"Star differeth from star in glory.\" But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different from God.
\n[I.q.26.a.3.sc] Sed contra, beatitudo unius est major beatitudine alterius, secundum illud I Cor., xv, 41: Stella differt a stella* in claritate. Sed Deo nihil est majus. Ergo beatitudo est aliquid aliud quam Deus.
\n[I.q.26.a.3.co] The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely, the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered on the side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): \"Blessed is he who knoweth Thee, though he know nought else.\" But as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures; but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing.
\n[I.q.26.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod beatitudo intellectualis naturæ consistit in actu intellectus; in quo duo possunt considerari, scilicet objectum actus, quod est intelligibile, et ipse actus, qui est intelligere. Si igitur beatitudo consideretur ex parte ipsius objecti, sic solus Deus est beatitudo, quia ex hoc solo est aliquis beatus quod Deum intelligit, secundum illud Augustini, Confess., lib. V, cap. iv, col. 708, t. 4: « Beatus est qui te novit, etiamsi alia ignoret. » Sed ex parte actus intelligentis beatitudo est quid creatum in creaturis beatis; in Deo autem est etiam secundum hoc aliquid increatum.
\n[I.q.26.a.3.ad.1] Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is their supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate.
\n[I.q.26.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod beatitudo, quantum ad objectum est summum bonum simpliciter: sed quantum ad actum, in creaturis beatis est summum bonum non simpliciter, sed in genere bonorum partici-pabilium a creatura.
\n[I.q.26.a.3.ad.2] End is twofold, namely, \"objective\" and \"subjective,\" as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the \"thing itself\" and \"its use.\" Thus to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, or rather fruition, of the thing.
\n[I.q.26.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod finis est duplex scilicet cujus et quo, ut Philosophus ipse dicit, lib. I Magn. mor., cap. Ⅲ, scilicet ipsa res, et usus rei; sicut avaro est finis pecunia, et acquisitio pecuniæ. Creaturæ igitur rationalis est quidem Deus finis ultimus ut res; beatitudo autem creata, ut usus vel magis fruitio rei.
\n[I.q.26.a.4.arg.1] It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.
\n[I.q.26.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod beatitudo divina non complectatur omnes beatitudines. Sunt enim quædam beatitudines falsæ. Sed in Deo nihil potest esse falsum. Ergo divina beatitudo non complectitur omnem beatitudinem.
\n[I.q.26.a.4.arg.2] Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now none of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.
\n[I.q.26.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quædam beatitudo secundum quosdam consistit in rebus corporalibus, sicut voluptatibus, divitiis et hujusmodi; quæ quidem Deo convenire non possunt, cum sit incorporeus. Ergo beatitudo ejus non complectitur omnem beatitudinem.
\n[I.q.26.a.4.sc] Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above (Question 4, Article 2). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes.
\n[I.q.26.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod beatitudo est perfectio quædam. Divina autem perfectio complectitur omnem perfectionem, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo divina beatitudo complectitur omnem beatitudinem.
\n[I.q.26.a.4.co] Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists in delight, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency, which is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dignities, the government of all things; and in place of fame, He possesses the admiration of all creatures.
\n[I.q.26.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidquid est desiderabile in quacumque beatitudine, vel vera, vel falsa, totum eminentius in divina beatitudine præxistit. De contemplativa enim felicitate habet continuam et certissiam contemplationem sui et omnium aliorum; de activa vero gubernationem totius universi. De terrena vero felicitate, quæ consistit in voluptate, divitiis, potestate, dignitate, et fama, secundum Boetium, lib. III De cons., prosa III, etc., col. 731, t. 4, habet gaudium de se et de omnibus aliis pro delectatione; pro divitiis habet omnimodam sufficientiam quam divitiæ promittunt, pro potestate omnipotentiam, pro dignitate omnium regimen, pro fama vero admirationem totius creaturæ.
\n[I.q.26.a.4.ad.1] A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.
\n[I.q.26.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod beatitudo aliqua secundum hoc est falsa, secundum quod deficit a ratione veræ beatitudinis, et sic non est in Deo; sed quidquid habet de similitudine quantumcumque tenui beatitudinis, totum præxistit in divina beatitudine.
\n[I.q.26.a.4.ad.2] The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.
\nWe have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I.q.26.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bona quæ sunt in corporalibus corporaliter, in Deo sunt spiritualiter secundum modum suum. Et hæc dicta sufficiant de his quæ pertinent ad divinæ essentiae unitatem. 1 Sic cod.; in 2 Sic cod.; in edit.: « consideratis autem his quæ ad divinæ essentiae unitatem pertinent, restat considerare de his quæ pertinent ad Trinitatem personarum in divinis. Et quia personæ divinæ secun-
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