[I.q.34.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that Word in God is not a personal name. For personal names are applied to God in a proper sense, as Father and Son. But Word is applied to God metaphorically, as Origen says on (John 1:1), \"In the beginning was the Word.\" Therefore Word is not a personal name in God.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod Verbum in divinis non sit nomen personale. mine, nullo addito, relatum. Nomina enim personalia proprie dicuntur in divinis, ut Pater et Filius. Sed Verbum metaphorice dicitur in divinis, ut Origenes dicit, Super Joan., cap. 1, col. 22, t. 4, sup. illud: In principio erat Verbum. Ergo Verbum non est personale in divinis.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.arg.2] Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 10), \"The Word is knowledge with love;\" and according to Anselm (Monol. lx), \"To speak is to the Supreme Spirit nothing but to see by thought.\" But knowledge and thought, and sight, are essential terms in God. Therefore Word is not a personal term in God.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, secundum Augustinum, in lib. IX De Trinit., cap. x, col. 969, t. 8: «Verbum est notitia cum amore,» et secundum Anselmum, in Monol., c. Lxiii, col. 208, t. 4: «Dicere, summo Spiritui nihil aliud est quam cogitando intueri.» Sed notitia et cogitatio et intuitus in divinis essentialiter dicuntur. Ergo Verbum non dicitur personaliter in divinis.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.arg.3] Further, it is essential to word to be spoken. But, according to Anselm (Monol. lix), as the Father is intelligent, the Son is intelligent, and the Holy Ghost is intelligent, so the Father speaks, the Son speaks, and the Holy Ghost speaks; and likewise, each one of them is spoken. Therefore, the name Word is used as an essential term in God, and not in a personal sense.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, de ratione Verbi est quod dicatur. Sed secundum Anselmum, ibidem, cap. Lxiii, col. 209, t. 4, sicut Pater est intelligens, et Filius est intelligens, et Spiritus sanctus est intelligens, ita Pater est dicens, Filius est dicens, et Spiritus sanctus est dicens; et similiter quilibet eorum dicitur. Ergo nomen Verbi essentialiter dicitur in divinis, et non personaliter.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.arg.4] Further, no divine person is made. But the Word of God is something made. For it is said, \"Fire, hail, snow, ice, the storms which do His Word\" (Psalm 148:8). Therefore the Word is not a personal name in God.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, nulla persona divina est facta. Sed Verbum Dei est aliquid factum. Dicitur enim in psal. cxLViii, 8: Ignis, grando, nix, glacies, spiritus procellarum, quæ faciunt verbum ejus. Ergo Verbum non est nomen personale in divinis.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): \"As the Son is related to the Father, so also is the Word to Him Whose Word He is.\" But the Son is a personal name, since it is said relatively. Therefore so also is Word.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus in VII De Trin., cap. π, col. 936, t. 8: «Sicut Filius refertur ad Patrem, ita et Verbum ad id cujus est Verbum.» Sed Filius est nomen personale, quia relative dicitur. Ergo et Verbum.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.co] The name of Word in God, if taken in its proper sense, is a personal name, and in no way an essential name.
\nTo see how this is true, we must know that our own word taken in its proper sense has a threefold meaning; while in a fourth sense it is taken improperly or figuratively. The clearest and most common sense is when it is said of the word spoken by the voice; and this proceeds from an interior source as regards two things found in the exterior word--that is, the vocal sound itself, and the signification of the sound. For, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i) vocal sound signifies the concept of the intellect. Again the vocal sound proceeds from the signification or the imagination, as stated in De Anima ii, text 90. The vocal sound, which has no signification cannot be called a word: wherefore the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the fact the it signifies the interior concept of the mind. Therefore it follows that, first and chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the vocal sound is called a word. Damascene mentions these three kinds of words (De Fide Orth. i, 17), saying that \"word\" is called \"the natural movement of the intellect, whereby it is moved, and understands, and thinks, as light and splendor;\" which is the first kind. \"Again,\" he says, \"the word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word, but is uttered in the heart;\" which is the third kind. \"Again,\" also, \"the word is the angel\"--that is, the messenger \"of intelligence;\" which is the second kind. Word is also used in a fourth way figuratively for that which is signified or effected by a word; thus we are wont to say, \"this is the word I have said,\" or \"which the king has commanded,\" alluding to some deed signified by the word either by way of assertion or of command.
\nNow word is taken strictly in God, as signifying the concept of the intellect. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 10): \"Whoever can understand the word, not only before it is sounded, but also before thought has clothed it with imaginary sound, can already see some likeness of that Word of Whom it is said: In the beginning was the Word.\" The concept itself of the heart has of its own nature to proceed from something other than itself--namely, from the knowledge of the one conceiving. Hence \"Word,\" according as we use the term strictly of God, signifies something proceeding from another; which belongs to the nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the divine persons are distinguished by origin (27, 3,4,5). Hence the term \"Word,\" according as we use the term strictly of God, is to be taken as said not essentially, but personally.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nomen verbi in divinis si proprie sumatur, est nomen personale; et nullo modo essentiale. Ad cujus evidentiam sciendum est quod verbum tripliciter quidem in nobis proprie dicitur; quarto autem modo dicitur improprie, sive figurative. Manifestius autem et communius in nobis dicitur verbum quod voce profertur, quod quidem ab interiori procedit, quantum ad duo quæ in verbo ex- «Nihil autem aliud est summa Spiritui hujus-modi dicere, quam quasi cogitando intueri.» «Sicut enim Filius ad Patrem refertur, non ad seipsum dicitur; ita et Verbum ad eum cujus Verbum est refertur, cum dicitur Verbum.» Desunt in codd. quos vidimus, excepto cod. uno xv sæculi, quæ in edit. sequuntur: «dicens quod verbum dicitur« naturalis intellectus motus, secundum quem movetur, et intelligit, et cogitat, velut lux et splendor,» quantum ad priteriori inveniuntur, scilicet vox ipsa et significatio vocis. Vox enim significat intellectus conceptum, secundum Philosophum, in lib. I Perih., in princ., et iterum vox ex significatione vel imaginatione procedit, ut in lib. II De anima dicitur, text. 90. Vox autem quæ non est significativa, verbum dici non potest. Ex hoc ergo dicitur verbum vox exterior, quia significat interiorem mentis conceptum. Sic igitur primo et principaliter interior mentis conceptus verbum dicitur; secundario vero ipsa vox interioris conceptus significativa; tertio vero ipsa imaginatio vocis verbum dicitur. Et hos tres modos verbi ponit Damascenus in lib. I De fide orthod., cap. xiii, col. 858, t. 1. Dicitur autem figurative quarto modo verbum id quod verbo significatur, vel efficitur, sicut consuevimus dicere: Hoc est verbum quod dixi tibi, vel quod mandavit rex, demonstrato aliquo facto quod verbo significatum est, vel simpliciter enuntiantis, vel etiam imperantis. Dicitur autem proprie verbum in Deo, secundum quod verbum significat conceptum intellectus. Unde Augustinus dicit in XV De Trin., cap. x, col. 1071, t. 8: «Quisquis potest intelligere verbum non solum antequam sonet, verum etiam antequam sonorum ejus imagines cogitatione involvantur, jam potest videre aliquam Verbi illius similitudinem, de quo dictum est: In principio erat Verbum.» Ipse autem conceptus cordis de razione sua habet quod ab alio procedat, scilicet a notitia concipientis. Unde Verbum, secundum quod proprie dicitur in divinis, significat aliquid ab alio procedens, quod pertinet ad rationem nominum personalium in divinis, eo quod personæ divinæ distinguuntur secundum originem, ut dictum est. Unde oportet quod nomen Verbi, secundum quod proprie in divinis accipitur, non sumatur essentialiter, sed personaliter tantum.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.ad.1] The Arians, who sprang from Origen, declared that the Son differed in substance from the Father. Hence, they endeavored to maintain that when the Son of God is called the Word, this is not to be understood in a strict sense; lest the idea of the Word proceeding should compel them to confess that the Son of God is of the same substance as the Father. For the interior word proceeds in such a manner from the one who pronounces it, as to remain within him. But supposing Word to be said metaphorically of God, we must still admit Word in its strict sense. For if a thing be called a word metaphorically, this can only be by reason of some manifestation; either it makes something manifest as a word, or it is manifested by a word. If manifested by a word, there must exist a word whereby it is manifested. If it is called a word because it exteriorly manifests, what it exteriorly manifests cannot be called word except in as far as it signifies the interior concept of the mind, which anyone may also manifest by exterior signs. Therefore, although Word may be sometimes said of God metaphorically, nevertheless we must also admit Word in the proper sense, and which is said personally.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Ariani, quorum fons Origenes invenitur, posuerunt Filium alium a Patre esse in diversitate mum. Rursus « verbum est quod non verbo profertur, sed in corde pronuntiatur, » quantum ad tertium. Rursus etiam « verbum est angelus, id est, nuntius intelligentiæ, » quantum ad secundum. » Arianorum fons Origenes.—Ex Epiphanio qui vocat Origenem « Arii Pater » in Epistola ad Joanem Hierosolymitanum, inter opera Hieronymi a quo latine reddita est. substantiæ. Unde conati sunt, cum Filius Dei Verbum dicitur, astruere non esse proprie dictum, ne sub ratione Verbi procedentis cogerentur fateri Filium Dei non esse extra substantiam Patris. Nam verbum interius sic a dicente procedit, quod in ipso manet. Sed necesse est, si ponitur verbum Dei metaphorice dictum, quod ponatur verbum Dei proprie dictum. Non enim potest aliquid metaphorice verbum dici nisi ratione manifestationis; quia vel manifestat, sicut verbum, vel est verbo manifestatum. Si autem est manifestatum verbo, oportet ponere verbum quo manifestetur. Si autem dicitur verbum, quia exterius manifestat ea quæ exterius manifestantur, non dicuntur verba, nisi in quantum significant interiorem menis conceptum, quem aliquis etiam per exteriora signa manifestat. Etsi ergo verbum aliquando dicatur metaphorice in divinis, tamen oportet ponere verbum proprie dictum, quod personaliter dicatur.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.ad.2] Nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to God personally, except word alone; for word alone signifies that which emanates from another. For what the intellect forms in its conception is the word. Now, the intellect itself, according as it is made actual by the intelligible species, is considered absolutely; likewise the act of understanding which is to the actual intellect what existence is to actual being; since the act of understanding does not signify an act going out from the intelligent agent, but an act remaining in the agent. Therefore when we say that word is knowledge, the term knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing intellect, or any one of its habits, but stands for what the intellect conceives by knowing. Hence also Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1) that the Word is \"begotten wisdom;\" for it is nothing but the concept of the Wise One; and in the same way It can be called \"begotten knowledge.\" Thus can also be explained how \"to speak\" is in God \"to see by thought,\" forasmuch as the Word is conceived by the gaze of the divine thought. Still the term \"thought\" does not properly apply to the Word of God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16): \"Therefore do we speak of the Word of God, and not of the Thought of God, lest we believe that in God there is something unstable, now assuming the form of Word, now putting off that form and remaining latent and as it were formless.\" For thought consists properly in the search after the truth, and this has no place in God. But when the intellect attains to the form of truth, it does not think, but perfectly contemplates the truth. Hence Anselm (Monol. lx) takes \"thought\" in an improper sense for \"contemplation.\"
\n[I.q.34.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod nihil eorum quæ ad intellectum pertinent, personaliter dicitur in divinis, nisi solum verbum; solum enim verbum significat aliquid ab alio emanans. Id enim quod intellectus in concipiendo format, est verbum. Intellectus autem ipse, secundum quod est per speciem intelligibilem in actu, consideratur absolute: et similiter intelligere, quod ita se habet ad intellectum in actu, sicut esse ad ens in actu; non enim intelligere significat actionem ab intelligente exeuntem, sed in intelligente manentem. Cum ergo dicitur quod verbum est notitia, non accipitur notitia pro actu intellectus cognoscentis, vel pro aliquo ejus habitu, sed pro eo quod intellectus concipit cognoscendo. Unde et Augustinus dicit, lib. VII De Trin., cap. II, col. 936, t. 8, quod « Verbum est sapientia genita »; quod nihil aliud est quam ipsa conceptio sapientis, quæ etiam pari modo notitia genita dici potest. Et per eumdem modum potest intelligi, quod dicere, Deo sit cogitando intueri, inquantum scilicet intuitu cogitationis divinæ concipitur Verbum Dei. Cogitationis tamen no- 3 —; in edit.: « res in verbo intellecta. »; in edit.: « verbo, quod concipit intelligendo lapidem, dicit. » 7 Sic omnes codd. quos vidimus. Deest igitur quod in edit. inventur: « sed solum informatio quædam in intellectu nostro, prout intellectus noster fit in actu per formam rei intellectæ. In Deo autem importat omnimodam identitatem; quia in Deo est omnino idem intellectus et intellectum, ut supra ostensum est. — 9 In sic sola persona quæ profert verbum est dicens in divinis, cum tamen singula personarum sit intelligens et intellecta, et per consequens Verbo dicta.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.ad.3] As, properly speaking, Word in God is said personally, and not essentially, so likewise is to \"speak.\" Hence, as the Word is not common to the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, so it is not true that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one speaker. So Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): \"He who speaks in that co-eternal Word is understood as not alone in God, but as being with that very Word, without which, forsooth, He would not be speaking.\" On the other hand, \"to be spoken\" belongs to each Person, for not only is the word spoken, but also the thing understood or signified by the word. Therefore in this manner to one person alone in God does it belong to be spoken in the same way as a word is spoken; whereas in the way whereby a thing is spoken as being understood in the word, it belongs to each Person to be spoken. For the Father, by understanding Himself, the Son and the Holy Ghost, and all other things comprised in this knowledge, conceives the Word; so that thus the whole Trinity is \"spoken\" in the Word; and likewise also all creatures: as the intellect of a man by the word he conceives in the act of understanding a stone, speaks a stone. Anselm took the term \"speak\" improperly for the act of understanding; whereas they really differ from each other; for \"to understand\" means only the habitude of the intelligent agent to the thing understood, in which habitude no trace of origin is conveyed, but only a certain information of our intellect; forasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form of the thing understood. In God, however, it means complete identity, because in God the intellect and the thing understood are altogether the same, as was proved above (14, 4,5). Whereas to \"speak\" means chiefly the habitude to the word conceived; for \"to speak\" is nothing but to utter a word. But by means of the word it imports a habitude to the thing understood which in the word uttered is manifested to the one who understands. Thus, only the Person who utters the Word is \"speaker\" in God, although each Person understands and is understood, and consequently is spoken by the Word.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.ad.4] The term \"word\" is there taken figuratively, as the thing signified or effected by word is called word. For thus creatures are said to do the word of God, as executing any effect, whereto they are ordained from the word conceived of the divine wisdom; as anyone is said to do the word of the king when he does the work to which he is appointed by the king's word.
\n[I.q.34.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod verbum sumitur ibi figurative, prout significatum vel effectus verbi dicitur verbum. Sic enim creaturæ dicuntur facere verbum Dei, inquantum exequuntur effectum aliquem, ad quem ordinantur ex verbo concepto divinæ sapientiae; sicut aliquis dicitur facere verbum Regis, dum facit opus ad quod ex verbo Regis instigatur.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that \"Word\" is not the proper name of the Son. For the Son is a subsisting person in God. But word does not signify a subsisting thing, as appears in ourselves. Therefore word cannot be the proper name of the person of the Son.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Verbum non sit proprium nomen Filii. Filius enim est persona subsistens in divinis. Sed Verbum non significat rem subsistentem, ut in nobis patet. Ergo Verbum non potest esse proprium nomen personæ Filii.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.arg.2] Further, the word proceeds from the speaker by being uttered. Therefore if the Son is properly the word, He proceeds from the Father, by way only of utterance; which is the heresy of Valentine; as appears from Augustine (De Haeres. xi).
\n[I.q.34.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Verbum prolatione quadam procedit a dicente. Si ergo Filius est propri Verbum, non procedit a Patre, nisi per modum prolationis: quod est hæresis Valentini, ut patet per Augustinum, in lib. De hæresibus, § 11, col. 28, t. 8.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.arg.3] Further, every proper name of a person signifies some property of that person. Therefore, if the Word is the Son's proper name, it signifies some property of His; and thus there will be several more properties in God than those above mentioned.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne nomen proprium ali-cujus personæ significat proprietatem ali-quam ejus. Si igitur Verbum sit proprium nomen Filii, significabit ali-quam proprietatem ejus; et sic erunt plures proprietates in divinis quam quæ supra enumeratæ sunt.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.arg.4] Further, whoever understands conceives a word in the act of understanding. But the Son understands. Therefore some word belongs to the Son; and consequently to be Word is not proper to the Son.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, quicumque intelligit, intelligendo concipit verbum. Sed Filius intelligit. Ergo Filii est aliquod verbum; et sic non est proprium Filii esse Verbum. 1 Optime notat Nicolaï in textu græco D. Basilii differre voces quas uniformiter « Verbum » reddit latinus interpres: Filius dicitur Λόγος, Spiritus autem Πημα, « quasi causale Verbum Filii procedens extra ipsum in creaturas quas producit. » — Nicolaï. Scotistæ communiter tenent quod in divinis nullum est verbum essentiale sed tantum personale, quod videlicet est proprium personæ genitæ. Unde Guillermus dicit de S. Thoma qui ponit in Sententiis quod verbum sumitur dupliciter scilicet
\n[I.q.34.a.2.arg.5] Further, it is said of the Son (Hebrews 1:3): \"Bearing all things by the word of His power;\" whence Basil infers (Cont. Eunom. v, 11) that the Holy Ghost is the Son's Word. Therefore to be Word is not proper to the Son.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.arg.5] 5. Præterea, Hebr., 1, 3, dicitur de Filio: Portans omnia verbo virtutis suæ; ex quo Basilius 1, lib. V contra Eunom., accipit quod Spiritus sanctus sit verbum Filii. Non est ergo proprium Filii esse Verbum.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 11): \"By Word we understand the Son alone.\"
\n[I.q.34.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VI De Trinit., cap. 11, col. 925, t. 8: « Verbum solus Filius accipitur. »
\n[I.q.34.a.2.co] \"Word,\" said of God in its proper sense, is used personally, and is the proper name of the person of the Son. For it signifies an emanation of the intellect: and the person Who proceeds in God, by way of emanation of the intellect, is called the Son; and this procession is called generation, as we have shown above (Question 27, Article 2). Hence it follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in God.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Verbum proprie dictum in divinis personaliter accipitur, et est proprium nomen personæ Filii; significat enim quamdam emanationem intellectus. Persona autem quæ procedit in divinis secundum emanationem intellectus, dicitur Filius; et hujusmodi processio dicitur generatio, ut supra ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod solus Filius proprie dicatur Verbum in divinis.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.ad.1] \"To be\" and \"to understand\" are not the same in us. Hence that which in us has intellectual being, does not belong to our nature. But in God \"to be\" and \"to understand\" are one and the same: hence the Word of God is not an accident in Him, or an effect of His; but belongs to His very nature. And therefore it must needs be something subsistent; for whatever is in the nature of God subsists; and so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that \"the Word of God is substantial and has a hypostatic being; but other words [as our own] are activities if the soul.\"
\n[I.q.34.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in nobis non est idem esse et intelligere. Unde illud quod habet in nobis esse intelligibile non pertinet ad naturam nostram. Sed esse Dei est ipsum ejus intelligere. Unde Verbum Dei non est aliquod accidens in ipso, vel aliquis effectus ejus, sed pertinet ad ipsam naturam ejus; et ideo oportet quod sit aliquid subsistens, quia quidquid est in natura Dei, subsistit; et ideo Damascenus, lib. I Orth. fid., cap, xiii, col. 858, t. 4, dicit quod « Verbum Dei est substantiale, et in hypostasi ens; reliqua vero verba, » scilicet nostra, « virtutes sunt animæ. »
\n[I.q.34.a.2.ad.2] The error of Valentine was condemned, not as the Arians pretended, because he asserted that the Son was born by being uttered, as Hilary relates (De Trin. vi); but on account of the different mode of utterance proposed by its author, as appears from Augustine (De Haeres. xi).
\n[I.q.34.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non propter hoc error Valentini est damnatus, quia Filiium dixit prolatione natum, ut Ariani caulumniabantur, sicut Hilarius refert De Trin., lib. VI, § 9, col. 162, t. 2, sed propter varium modum prolationis quem posuit, sicut patet per Augustinum.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.ad.3] In the term \"Word\" the same property is comprised as in the name Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): \"Word and Son express the same.\" For the Son's nativity, which is His personal property, is signified by different names, which are attributed to the Son to express His perfection in various ways. To show that He is of the same nature as the Father, He is called the Son; to show that He is co-eternal, He is called the Splendor; to show that He is altogether like, He is called the Image; to show that He is begotten immaterially, He is called the Word. All these truths cannot be expressed by only one name.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in nomine Verbi eadem proprietas importatur quæ in nomine Filii. Unde dicit Augustinus, VII De Trin., cap. 11, col. 936, t. 8: « Eo dicitur Verbum quo Filius. » Ipsa enim nativitas Filii, quæ est proprietas personalis ejus, di-essentialiter et sic est commune tribus, et notionaliter, et sicut secunda persona, quod sanctus doctor non bene posuit, salva sua reverentia, quia ubicumque Scriptura et sancti doctores antiqui de verbo loquuntur, semper eo utuntur notionaliter non essentialiter. Cæterum hic ad tertium concedit D. Thomas quod proprie loquendo verbum dicitur personaliter in divinis et non essentialiter. — Contrarium sustinuit Rabbi Moyses, scilicet verbum dici essentialiter tantum, non personaliter. versis nominibus significatur, quæ Filio attribuuntur ad exprimendum diversimode perfectionem ejus. Nam, ut ostendatur connaturalis Patri, dicitur Filius; ut ostendatur coæternus, dicitur splendor, ut ostendatur omnino similis, dicitur imago; ut ostendatur immaterialiter genitus, dicitur Verbum. Non autem potuit unum nomen inveniri per quod omnia ista designarentur.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.ad.4] To be intelligent belongs to the Son, in the same way as it belongs to Him to be God, since to understand is said of God essentially, as stated above (14, 2,4). Now the Son is God begotten, and not God begetting; and hence He is intelligent, not as producing a Word, but as the Word proceeding; forasmuch as in God the Word proceeding does not differ really from the divine intellect, but is distinguished from the principle of the Word only by relation.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod eo modo convenit Filio esse intelligentem quo convenit ei esse Deum. Est autem Filius Deus genitus, non autem generans Deus; unde est quidem intelligens, non ut producens Verbum, sed ut Verbum procedens, prout scilicet in Deo Verbum procedens secundum rem non differt ab intellectu divino, sed relatione distinguitur a principio Verbi.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.ad.5] When it is said of the Son, \"Bearing all things by the word of His power\"; \"word\" is taken figuratively for the effect of the Word. Hence a gloss says that \"word\" is here taken to mean command; inasmuch as by the effect of the power of the Word, things are kept in being, as also by the effect of the power of the Word things are brought into being. Basil speaks widely and figuratively in applying Word to the Holy Ghost; in the sense perhaps that everything that makes a person known may be called his word, and so in that way the Holy Ghost may be called the Son's Word, because He manifests the Son.
\n[I.q.34.a.2.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod cum de Filio dicitur: Portans omnia verbo virtutis suæ, verbum figurate accipitur pro effectu verbi. Unde Glossa interlinearis ibi dicit quod verbum sumitur pro imperio, inquantum scilicet ex effectu virtutis Verbi est quod res conserventur in esse; sicut ex effectu virtutis Verbi est quod res producantur in esse. Quod vero Basilius interpretatur verbum pro Spiritu sancto, improprie et figurate locutus est, prout verbum alicujus dici potest omne illud quod est manifestativum ejus, ut sic ea ratione dicatur Spiritus sanctus verbum Filii, quia manifestat Filium.
\n[I.q.34.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the name 'Word' does not import relation to creatures. For every name that connotes some effect in creatures, is said of God essentially. But Word is not said essentially, but personally. Therefore Word does not import relation to creatures.
\n[I.q.34.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod in nomine Verbi non importetur respectus ad creaturam. Omne enim nomen connotans effectum in creatura essentialiter in divinis dicitur. Sed Verbum non dicitur essentialiter, sed personaliter, ut dictum est. Ergo Verbum non importat respectum ad creaturam. Et sicut Dei scientia, Dei quidem est cognoscitiva tantum, creaturarum autem cognoscitiva et factiva; ita Verbum Dei, ejus quod in Deo Patre est, est expressivum tantum; creaturarum vero est expressivum et operativum; et propter hoc dicitur in psal. xxxii, 9: Dixit et facta sunt; quia importatur in Verbo ratio factiva eorum quae Deus facit.
\n[I.q.34.a.3.arg.2] Further, whatever imports relation to creatures is said of God in time; as \"Lord\" and \"Creator.\" But Word is said of God from eternity. Therefore it does not import relation to the creature.
\n[I.q.34.a.3.arg.3] Further, Word imports relation to the source whence it proceeds. Therefore, if it imports relation to the creature, it follows that the Word proceeds from the creature.
\n[I.q.34.a.3.arg.4] Further, ideas (in God) are many according to their various relations to creatures. Therefore if Word imports relation to creatures, it follows that in God there is not one Word only, but many.
\n[I.q.34.a.3.arg.5] Further, if Word imports relation to the creature, this can only be because creatures are known by God. But God does not know beings only; He knows also non-beings. Therefore in the Word are implied relations to non-beings; which appears to be false.
\n[I.q.34.a.3.sc] Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 63), that \"the name Word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also relation to those beings which are made through the Word, by His operative power.\"
\n[I.q.34.a.3.co] Word implies relation to creatures. For God by knowing Himself, knows every creature. Now the word conceived in the mind is representative of everything that is actually understood. Hence there are in ourselves different words for the different things which we understand. But because God by one act understands Himself and all things, His one only Word is expressive not only of the Father, but of all creatures.
\nAnd as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as regards God, whereas as regards creatures, it is both cognitive and operative, so the Word of God is only expressive of what is in God the Father, but is both expressive and operative of creatures; and therefore it is said (Psalm 32:9): \"He spake, and they were made;\" because in the Word is implied the operative idea of what God makes.
\n[I.q.34.a.3.ad.1] The nature is also included indirectly in the name of the person; for person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Therefore the name of a divine person, as regards the personal relation, does not imply relation to the creature, but it is implied in what belongs to the nature. Yet there is nothing to prevent its implying relation to creatures, so far as the essence is included in its meaning: for as it properly belongs to the Son to be the Son, so it properly belongs to Him to be God begotten, or the Creator begotten; and in this way the name Word imports relation to creatures.
\n[I.q.34.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in nomine personæ includitur etiam natura obliomnes quos vidimus. Desunt igitur quæ sequuntur in edit.: « cum intelligere essentialiter dicatur in divinis, ut dictum est. » In « Sed hoc loco melius verbum interpretamur, ut significetur non solum ad Patrem respectus, sed ad illa etiam, » etc. que; nam persona est « rationalis naturæ individua substantia. » In nomine igitur personæ divinæ, quantum ad relationem personalem, non importatur respectus ad creaturam, sed importatur in eo quod pertinet ad naturam. Nihil tamen prohibet, in quantum includitur in significatione ejus essentia, quod importetur respectus ad creaturam. Sicut enim proprium est Filio quod sit Filius; ita proprium est ei quod sit genitus Deus vel genitus creator: et per hunc modum importatur relatio ad creaturam in nomine Verbi.
\n[I.q.34.a.3.ad.2] Since the relations result from actions, some names import the relation of God to creatures, which relation follows on the action of God which passes into some exterior effect, as to create and to govern; and the like are applied to God in time. But others import a relation which follows from an action which does not pass into an exterior effect, but abides in the agent--as to know and to will: such are not applied to God in time; and this kind of relation to creatures is implied in the name of the Word. Nor is it true that all names which import the relation of God to creatures are applied to Him in time; but only those names are applied in time which import relation following on the action of God passing into exterior effect.
\n[I.q.34.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum relationes consequantur actiones, quædam nomina important relationem Dei ad creaturam, quæ consequitur actionem Dei in exteriorem effectum transeuntem, sicut creare et gubernare; et talia dicuntur de Deo ex tempore; quædam vero relationem quæ consequitur actionem non transeuntem in exteriorem effectum, sed manentem in agente, ut scire et velle; et talia non dicuntur de Deo ex tempore; et hujusmodi relatio ad creaturam importatur in nomine Verbi. Nec est verum quod nomina importantia relationem Dei ad creaturas omnia dicantur ex tempore; sed sola illa nomina quæ important relationem consequentem actionem Dei in exteriorem effectum transeuntem, ex tempore dicuntur.
\n[I.q.34.a.3.ad.3] Creatures are known to God not by a knowledge derived from the creatures themselves, but by His own essence. Hence it is not necessary that the Word should proceed from creatures, although the Word is expressive of creatures.
\n[I.q.34.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod creaturæ non cognoscuntur a Deo per scientiam a creaturis acceptam, sed per essentiam suam. Unde non oportet quod a creaturis procedat Verbum, licet Verbum sit expressivum creaturarum.
\n[I.q.34.a.3.ad.4] The name of Idea is imposed chiefly to signify relation to creatures; and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to God; and it is not said personally. But the name of Word is imposed chiefly to signify the speaker, and consequently, relation to creatures, inasmuch as God, by understanding Himself, understands every creature; and so there is only one Word in God, and that is a personal one.
\n[I.q.34.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod nomen ideæ principaliter est impositum ad significandum respectum ad creaturam; et ideo pluraliter dicitur in divinis, neque est personale. Sed nomen Verbi principaliter impositum est ad significandam relationem ad dicentem, et ex consequenti ad creaturas, inquantum Deus, intelligendo se, intelligit omnem creaturam; et propter hoc in divinis est unicum tantum Verbum et personaliter dictum.
\n[I.q.34.a.3.ad.5] God's knowledge of non-beings and God's Word about non-beings are the same; because the Word of God contains no less than does the knowledge of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14). Nevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of beings, but is expressive and manifestive of non-beings.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I.q.34.a.3.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod eo modo quo scientia Dei est non entium, et Verbum Dei est non entium; quia non est aliquid minus in Verbo Dei quam in scientia Dei, ut Augustinus dicit, lib. XV De Trin., cap. xiv, col. 1076, t. 8. Sed tamen Verbum est entium, ut expressivum et factivum; non entium autem, ut expressivum et manifestativum.
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