[I.q.39.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as person. For whenever essence is the same as person or \"suppositum,\" there can be only one \"suppositum\" of one nature, as is clear in the case of all separate substances. For in those things which are really one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But in God there is one essence and three persons, as is clear from what is above expounded (28, 3; 30, 2). Therefore essence is not the same as person.
\n[I.q.39.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in divinis essentia non sit idem quod persona. In quibuscumque enim essentia est idem quod persona, seu suppositum, opor-tet quod sit tantum unum suppositum unius naturæ, ut patet in omnibus substantiis separatis; eorum enim quæ sunt idem re, unum multiplicari non potest quin multiplicetur et reliquum. Sed in divinis est una essentia et tres personæ, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo essentia non est idem quod persona.
\n[I.q.39.a.1.arg.2] Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and negation are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct, whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not the same.
\n[I.q.39.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, affirmatio et negatio simul et semel non verificantur de eodem. Sed affirmatio et negatio verificantur de essentia et persona: nam persona est distincta, essentia vero non est distincta. Ergo persona et essentia non sunt idem.
\n[I.q.39.a.1.arg.3] Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But person is subject to essence; whence it is called \"suppositum\" or \"hypostasis.\" Therefore person is not the same as essence.
\n[I.q.39.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nihil subjicitur sibiipsi. Sed persona subjicitur essentia, unde suppositum vel hypostasis nominatur. Ergo persona non est idem quod essentia.
\n[I.q.39.a.1.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): \"When we say the person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VII De Trin., cap. VI, col. 943, t. 8: «Cum dicimus personam Patris non aliud dicimus quam substantiam Patris. »
\n[I.q.39.a.1.co] The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (Question 3, Article 3) that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as \"suppositum,\" which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), \"relation multiplies the Trinity of persons,\" some have thought that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be \"adjacent\"; considering only in the relations the idea of \"reference to another,\" and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown above (Question 28, Article 2) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated (29, 4), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.
\n[I.q.39.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod considerantibus divinam simplicitatem, quæstio ista in manifesto habet veritatem. Ostensum est enim supra, quod divina simplicitas hoc requirit quod in Deo sit idem essentia et suppositum, quod in substantiis intellectualibus nihil est aliud quam persona. Sed difficultatem videtur ingerere quod multiplicatis personis divinis essentia retinet unitatem. Et quia, ut Boetius dicit, lib. I De Trinit., cap. VI, col. 1255, t. 2, relatio multiplicat personarum Trinitatem, posuerunt aliqui hoc modo in divinis differre essentiam et personam, quo et relationes dicebant esse assistentes, considerantes in relationibus solum quod ad alterum sunt, et non quod res sunt. Sed, sicut supra ostensum est, sicut relationes in rebus creatis accidentaliter insunt, ita in Deo sunt ipsa essentia divina. Ex quo sequitur quod in Deo non sit aliud essentia quam persona secundum rem, et tamen quod personæ realiter ab invicem distinguantur. Persona enim, ut dictum est supra, significat relationem prout est subsistens in natura divina. Relatio autem ad essentiam comparata non differt re, sed ratione tantum. Comparata autem ad oppositam relationem habet virtute oppositionis Ita Rom. edit. et Nicolaï. Patav. ambæ: «quorum relationes. » realem distinctionem. Et sic remanet una essentia, et tres personæ.
\n[I.q.39.a.1.ad.1] There cannot be a distinction of \"suppositum\" in creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles; because in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between them they distinguish the \"supposita\"; and yet the essence is not distinguished, because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence.
\n[I.q.39.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in creaturis non potest esse distinctio suppositorum per relationes, sed oportet quod sit per essentialia principia, quia relationes non sunt subsistentes in creaturis. In divinis autem relationes sunt subsistentes; ideo, secundum quod habent oppositionem ad invicem, possunt distinguere supposita; neque tamen distinguitur essentia, quia relationes ipsæ non distinguuntur ab invicem, secundum quod sunt realiter idem cum essentia.
\n[I.q.39.a.1.ad.2] As essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the other.
\n[I.q.39.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod inquantum essentia et persona in divinis differunt secundum intelligentiæ rationem, sequitur quod aliquid possit affirmari de uno quod negatur de altero, et per consequens quod supposito uno non supponatur alterum.
\n[I.q.39.a.1.ad.3] Divine things are named by us after the way of created things, as above explained (13, 1,3). And since created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of the specific nature, it follows that individuals are called \"subjects,\" \"supposita,\" or \"hypostases.\" So the divine persons are named \"supposita\" or \"hypostases,\" but not as if there really existed any real \"supposition\" or \"subjection.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod rebus divinis nomina imponimus secundum modum reum creatarum, ut supra dictum est. Et quia naturæ rerum creatarum individuan-tur per materiam quæ subjicitur naturæ speciei, inde est quod individua dicuntur subjecta, vel supposita, vel hypostases. Et propter hoc etiam divinæ personæ supposita vel hypostases nominantur, non quod ibi sit aliqua suppositio vel subjectio secundum rem.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.arg.1] It would seem not right to say that the three persons are of one essence. For Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost \"are indeed three by substance, but one in harmony.\" But the substance of God is His essence. Therefore the three persons are not of one essence.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.arg.2] Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are of one essence. Therefore this should not be asserted.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, non est affirmandum aliquid de divinis quod auctoritate Scripturæ sacræ non est expressum, ut patet per Dionysium, 1 cap. De div. nominib., § 1, col. 587, t. 4. Sed nunquam in Scriptura sacra exprimitur quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt unius essentia. Ergo hoc non est asserendum.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.arg.3] Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine essence. It suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of one nature.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, natura divina est idem quod essentia. Sufficeret ergo dicere, ut videtur, quod tres personæ sunt unius naturæ.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.arg.4] Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the essence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore it does not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one essence.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, non consuevit dici quod persona sit essentia, sed magis quod essentia sit personæ. Ergo neque convenienter vide-tur dici quod tres personæ sunt unius essentia.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.arg.5] Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that we do not say that the three persons are \"from one essence [ex una essentia],\" lest we should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and the persons in God. But prepositions which imply transition, denote the oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three persons are \"of one essence [unius essentiae].\"
\n[I.q.39.a.2.arg.5] 5. Præterea, Augustinus, l. VII De Trin., cap. vi, col. 943, t. 8, dicit quod « non dicius tres personas esse ex una essentia, ne intelligatur in divinis aliud esse essentia et persona. » Sed sicut præpositiones sunt transitivæ, ita et obliqua. Ergo pari ratione non est dicendum quod tres personæ sunt unius essentia.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.arg.6] Further, nothing should be said of God which can be occasion of error. Now, to say that the three persons are of one essence or substance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary says (De Synod.): \"One substance predicated of the Father and the Son signifies either one subsistent, with two denominations; or one substance divided into two imperfect substances; or a third prior substance taken and assumed by the other two.\" Therefore it must not be said that the three persons are of one substance.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.arg.6] 6. Præterea, id quod potest esse erroris occasio, non est in divinis dicendum. Sed cum dicuntur tres personæ unius essentia, vel substantia, datur erroris occasio; quia, ut Hilarius dicit in lib. De synod., ad can. xxvii, § 68, col. 526, t. 2, « una substantia Patris et Filii prædicata, aut unum qui duas nuncupationes habet, subsistentem significat, aut divisam unam substantiam duas imperfectas fecisse substantias, aut tertiam priorem substantiam, quæ a duobus et usurpata sit et assumpta. » Non est ergo dicendum tres personas esse unius substantia.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.sc] Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the word homoousion, which the Council of Nicaea adopted against the Arians, means that the three persons are of one essence.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. II Contra Maximinum, cap. xix, col. 772, t. 8, quod hoc nomen ômuòσιον, quod in concilio nicæno adversus Arianos firmatum est, idem significat, quod tres personas esse unius essentia.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.co] As above explained (13, 1,2), divine things are named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, for in that way it knows them not; but in a way that belongs to things created. And as in the objects of the senses, whence the intellect derives its knowledge, the nature of the species is made individual by the matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is the \"suppositum\" of the form; so also in God the essence is taken as the form of the three persons, according to our mode of signification. Now in creatures we say that every form belongs to that whereof it is the form; as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we do not say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form, unless some adjective qualifies the form; as when we say: \"That woman is of a handsome figure,\" or: \"This man is of perfect virtue.\" In like manner, as in God the persons are multiplied, and the essence is not multiplied, we speak of one essence of the three persons, and three persons of the one essence, provided that these genitives be understood as designating the form.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, intellectus noster res divinas nominat, non secundum modum earum, quia sic eas cognoscere non potest, sed secundum modum in rebus creatis inventum. Et quia in rebus sensibilibus, a quibus intellectus noster scientiam capit, natura alicujus speciei per materiam individuatur, Non sunt verba Hilarii, sed Patrum antiochenæ synodi, cujus symbolum refert Hilarius. « Tres autem personas ex eadem essentia non dicimus, quasi aliud ibi sit quod essentia est, aliud quod persona. » Juxta Gilbertum Porretanum, nil in Deo, nil personis intrinsecum proprietates personales ponunt, sicut nec relationes ex mutua comparatione v. g.: Adæ et Abel, aliquid eis intrinsecum ponunt. et sic natura se habet ut forma, individuum autem ut suppositum formæ; propter hoc etiam in divinis, quantum ad modum significandi, essentia significatur ut forma trium personarum. Dicimus autem in rebus creatis formam quamcumque esse ejus cujus est forma, sicut sanitatem vel pulchritudinem esse hominis alicujus. Rem autem habentem formam non dicimus esse formæ; nisi cum adjectione alicujus adjectivi quod designat illam formam; ut cum dicimus: Ista mulier est egregia formæ: iste homo est perfectæ virtutis. Et similiter quia in divinis, multiplicatis personis, non multiplicatur essentia, dicimus unam essentiam esse trium personarum, et tres personas unius essentia, ut intelligantur isti genitivi construi in designatione formæ.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.ad.1] Substance is here taken for the \"hypostasis,\" and not for the essence.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod substantia sumitur pro hypostasi, et non pro essentia.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.ad.2] Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ in so many words that the three persons are of one essence, nevertheless we find it so stated as regards the meaning; for instance, \"I and the Father are one (John 10:30),\" and \"I am in the Father, and the Father in Me (John 10:38)\"; and there are many other texts of the same import.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod licet tres personas esse unius essentiae non inveniatur in sacra Scriptura per hæc verba, inventur tamen quantum ad hunc sensum, sicut ibi, Joan., x, 30: Ego et Pater unum sumus, et, ibid. x, 38: Ego in Patre, et Pater in me est*; et per multa alia haberi potest idem.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.ad.3] Because \"nature\" designates the principle of action while \"essence\" comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give heat; but only those things can be said to be of \"one essence\" which have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying that the three persons are \"of one essence,\" than by saying they are \"of one nature.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quia natura designat principium actus, essentia vero ab essendo dicitur; possunt dici aliqua unius naturæ, quæ conveniunt in aliquo actu, sicut omnia calefacientia; sed unius essentiae dici non possunt nisi quorum est unum esse. Et ideo magis exprimitur unitas divina per hoc quod dicitur quod tres personæ sunt unius essentiae, quam si diceretur quod sunt unius naturæ.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.ad.4] Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated as belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say \"the virtue of Peter.\" On the other hand, the thing having form is not wont to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify or designate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one signifying the form, and the other signifying the determination of the form, as, for instance, when we say, \"Peter is of great virtue [magnae virtutis],\" or else one genitive must have the force of two, as, for instance, \"he is a man of blood\"--that is, he is a man who sheds much blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence signifies a form as regards the person, it may properly be said that the essence is of the person; but we cannot say the converse, unless we add some term to designate the essence; as, for instance, the Father is a person of the \"divine essence\"; or, the three persons are \"of one essence.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod forma absolute accepta consuevit significari ut ejus cujus est forma, ut virtus Petri; e converso autem res habens formam aliquam non consuevit significari ut ejus, nisi cum volumus determinare sive designare formam. Et tunc requiruntur duo genitivi, quorum unus significet formam et alius determinationem formæ; ut si dicatur: Petrus est magnæ virtutis. Vel etiam requiritur unus genitivus habens vim duorum genitivorum; ut cum dicitur: Vir sanguinum est iste, id est, effusor multi sanguinis. Quia igitur essentia etc. divina significatur ut forma respectu personæ, convenienter essentia personæ dicitur; non autem e converso, nisi aliquid addatur ad designationem essentia, ut si dicatur quod Pater est persona divinæ essentiae, vel quod tres personæ sunt unius essentiae.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.ad.5] The preposition \"from\" or \"out of\" does not designate the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an efficient or material cause; which causes are in all cases distinguished from those things of which they are the causes. For nothing can be its own matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a thing may be its own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So, when we say, \"three persons of one essence,\" taking essence as having the habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is different from person, which we should mean if we said, \"three persons from the same essence.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.2.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod hæc propositio ex vel de, non designat habitudinem causæ formalis, sed magis habitudinem causæ efficientis, vel materialis. Quæ qui dem causæ in omnibus distinguuntur ab his quorum sunt causæ. Nihil enim est sua materia, neque aliquid est suum principium activum; aliquid tamen est sua forma, ut patet in omnibus rebus immaterialibus. Et ideo per hoc quod dicimus tres personas unius essentiae significando essentiam in habitudine formæ, non ostenditur aliud esse essentia quam persona, quod ostenderetur, si diceremus tres personas ex eadem essentia.
\n[I.q.39.a.2.ad.6] As Hilary says (De Synod.): \"It would be prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do away with them, just because some do not think them holy. So if some misunderstand homoousion, what is that to me, if I understand it rightly? . . . The oneness of nature does not result from division, or from union or from community of possession, but from one nature being proper to both Father and Son.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.2.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod, sicut Hilarius dicit in lib. De synod., § 85, col. 538, t. 2, « male sanctis rebus præjudicatur, si quia non sanctæ a quibusdam habentur, esse non debeant. Sic si male intelligitur ὀμουσιον, quid ad me bene intelligentem. » Et sup., § 71, col. 527: « Sic ergo una substantia ex una geniti proprietate, non sit autem ex proportione, aut ex unione, aut ex communione. »
\n[I.q.39.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that essential names, as the name \"God,\" should not be predicated in the singular of the three persons, but in the plural. For as \"man\" signifies \"one that has humanity,\" so God signifies \"one that has Godhead.\" But the three persons are three who have Godhead. Therefore the three persons are \"three Gods.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod nomina essentialia, ut hoc nomen, Deus, non prædicentur singulariter de tribus personis, sed pluraliter. Sicut enim homo significatur ut habens humanitatem, ita Deus significatur ut habens deitatem. Sed tres personæ sunt tres habentes deitatem. Ergo tres personæ sunt tres diii.
\n[I.q.39.a.3.arg.2] Further, Genesis 1:1, where it is said, \"In the beginning God created heaven and earth,\" the Hebrew original has \"Elohim,\" which may be rendered \"Gods\" or \"Judges\": and this word is used on account of the plurality of persons. Therefore the three persons are \"several Gods,\" and not \"one\" God.
\n[I.q.39.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Gen., 1, ubi dicitur: In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram, he Bene quidem: unius essentiae, unius deitatis, in eadem essentia; non vero: ex eadem, vel de eadem essentia, per eamdem essentiam. braica veritas habet סירת, quod potest interpretari dii sive judices. Et hoc dicitur propter pluralitatem personarum. Ergo tres personae sunt plures dii, et non unus Deus.
\n[I.q.39.a.3.arg.3] Further, this word \"thing\" when it is said absolutely, seems to belong to substance. But it is predicated of the three persons in the plural. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): \"The things that are the objects of our future glory are the Father, Son and Holy Ghost.\" Therefore other essential names can be predicated in the plural of the three persons.
\n[I.q.39.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, hoc nomen, res, cum absolute dicatur, videtur ad substantiam pertinere. Sed hoc nomen pluraliter prædicatur de tribus personis; dicit enim Augustinus, in lib. I De doct. christiana, cap. v, col. 21, tom. III: « Res quibus fruendum est, sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. » Ergo et alia nomina essentialia pluraliter prædicari possunt de tribus personis.
\n[I.q.39.a.3.arg.4] Further, as this word \"God\" signifies \"a being who has Deity,\" so also this word \"person\" signifies a being subsisting in an intellectual nature. But we say there are three persons. So for the same reason we can say there are \"three Gods.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, sicut hoc nomen, Deus, significat habentem deitatem, ita hoc nomen, persona, significat subsistentem in natura aliqua intellectuali. Sed dicimus tres personas. Ergo eadem ratione dicere possumus tres deos.
\n[I.q.39.a.3.sc] It is said (Deuteronomy 6:4): \"Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut., vi, 4: Audi Israel, Dominus Deus tuus, Deus* unus est.
\n[I.q.39.a.3.co] Some essential names signify the essence after the manner of substantives; while others signify it after the manner of adjectives. Those which signify it as substantives are predicated of the three persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. Those which signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three persons in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives signify something by way of substance, while adjectives signify something by way of accident, which adheres to a subject. Now just as substance has existence of itself, so also it has of itself unity or multitude; wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon the form signified by the name. But as accidents have their existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality from their subject; and therefore the singularity and plurality of adjectives depends upon their \"supposita.\" In creatures, one form does not exist in several \"supposita\" except by unity of order, as the form of an ordered multitude. So if the names signifying such a form are substantives, they are predicated of many in the singular, but otherwise if they adjectives. For we say that many men are a college, or an army, or a people; but we say that many men are collegians. Now in God the divine essence is signified by way of a form, as above explained (2), which, indeed, is simple and supremely one, as shown above (3, 7; 11, 4). So, names which signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are predicated of the three persons in the singular, and not in the plural. This, then, is the reason why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are \"three men\"; whereas we do not say the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are \"three Gods,\" but \"one God\"; forasmuch as in the three \"supposita\" of human nature there are three humanities, whereas in the three divine Persons there is but one divine essence. On the other hand, the names which signify essence in an adjectival manner are predicated of the three persons plurally, by reason of the plurality of \"supposita.\" For we say there are three \"existent\" or three \"wise\" beings, or three \"eternal,\" \"uncreated,\" and \"immense\" beings, if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense. But if taken in a substantive sense, we say \"one uncreated, immense, eternal being,\" as Athanasius declares.
\n[I.q.39.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nominum essentialium quædam significant essentiam substantive, quædam vero adjective. Ea quidem quæ substantive essentiam significant, prædicantur de tribus personis singulariter tantum, et non pluraliter; quæ vero adjective essentiam significant, prædicantur de tribus personis in plurali. Cujus ratio est quia nomina substantiva significant aliquid per modum substantiae, nomina vero adjectiva significant aliquid per modum accidentis quod inhæret subjecto. Substantia autem sicut per se habet esse, ita per se habet unitatem vel multitudinem; unde et singularitas vel pluralitas nominis substantivi attenditur secundum formam significatam per nomen. Accidentia autem sicut esse habent in subjecto, ita ex subjecto suscipiunt unitatem vel multitudinem; et ideo in adjectivis attenditur singularitas et pluralitas secundum supposita. In creaturis autem non invenitur una forma in pluribus suppositis, nisi unitate ordinis, ut forma multitudinis ordinatæ. Unde nomina significantia talem formam, si sint substantiva, prædicantur de pluribus in singulari, non autem si sint adjectiva; dicimus enim quod multi homines sunt collegium, vel exercitus, aut populus; dicimus tamen quod plures homines sunt collegiati. In divinis autem essentia divina significatur per modum formæ, ut dictum est, quæ quidem simplex est, et maxime una, ut supra osten-sum est. Unde nomina significantia divinam essentiam substantive, singulariter et non pluraliter de tribus personis prædicantur. Hæc igitur est ratio quare Socratem et Platonem et Ciceronem dicimus tres homines: Patrem autem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum non dicimus tres deos, sed unum Deum; quia in tribus suppositis humanæ naturæ sunt tres humanitates; in tribus autem personis est una divina essentia. Ea vero quæ significant essentiam adjective, prædicantur pluraliter de tribus propter pluralitatem suppositorum. Dicimus enim tres existentes, vel tres sapientes, aut tres aternos et increatos et immensos, si adjecve sumantur. Si vero substantive sumantur, dicimus unum increatum, immensum et aternum, ut Athanasius dicit in Symbolo fidei, col. 4582, t. 4.
\n[I.q.39.a.3.ad.1] Though the name \"God\" signifies a being having Godhead, nevertheless the mode of signification is different. For the name \"God\" is used substantively; whereas \"having Godhead\" is used adjectively. Consequently, although there are \"three having Godhead,\" it does not follow that there are three Gods.
\n[I.q.39.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet Deus significet habentem deitatem, est tamen alius modus significandi. Nam Deus dicitur substantive; sed habens deitatem dicitur adjective. Unde, licet sint tres habentes deitatem, non tamen sequitur quod sint tres dii.
\n[I.q.39.a.3.ad.2] Various languages have diverse modes of expression. So as by reason of the plurality of \"supposita\" the Greeks said \"three hypostases,\" so also in Hebrew \"Elohim\" is in the plural. We, however, do not apply the plural either to \"God\" or to \"substance,\" lest plurality be referred to the substance.
\n[I.q.39.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod diversæ linguæ habent diversum modum loquendi. Unde sicut propter pluralitatem suppositorum Græci dicunt tres hypostases; ita et in hebræo dicitur pluraliter. Nos autem non dicimus pluraliter neque deos neque substantias, ne pluralitas ad substantiam referatur.
\n[I.q.39.a.3.ad.3] This word \"thing\" is one of the transcendentals. Whence, so far as it is referred to relation, it is predicated of God in the plural; whereas, so far as it is referred to the substance, it is predicated in the singular. So Augustine says, in the passage quoted, that \"the same Trinity is a thing supreme.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod hoc nomen, res, est de transcendentibus. Unde secundum quod pertinet ad relationem, pluraliter prædicatur in divinis; secundum vero quod pertinet ad substantiam, singulariter prædicatur. Unde Augustinus dicit, ibidem, loc. cit. in arg., quod « eadem Trinitas quædam summa res est. »
\n[I.q.39.a.3.ad.4] The form signified by the word \"person\" is not essence or nature, but personality. So, as there are three personalities--that is, three personal properties in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost--it is predicated of the three, not in the singular, but in the plural.
\n[I.q.39.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum quod forma significata per hoc nomen, persona, non est essentia vel natura, sed personalitas. Unde cum sint tres personalitates, id est, tres personales proprietates in Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto, non singulariter sed pluraliter prædicatur de tribus.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot stand for the person, so that we can truly say \"God begot God.\" For, as the logicians say, \"a singular term signifies what it stands for.\" But this name \"God\" seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be predicated in the plural, as above explained (3). Therefore, since it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for person.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nomina essentialia concretiva non possunt supponere pro persona, ita quod hæc sit vera: Deus genuit Deum. Quia, ut sophistæ dicunt, « terminus singularis idem significat et supponit. » Sed hoc nomen, Deus, videtur esse terminus singularis, cum pluraliter prædicari non possit, ut dictum est. Ergo cum significet essentiam, videtur quod supponat pro essentia, et non pro persona.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.arg.2] Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in the predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense signified in the predicate. But when I say, \"God creates,\" this name \"God\" stands for the essence. So when we say \"God begot,\" this term \"God\" cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for person.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea terminus in subjecto positus non restringitur per terminum positum in prædicato ratione significationis, sed solum ratione temporis consignificati. Sed cum dico: Deus creat, hoc nomen, Deus, supponit pro essentia. Ergo cum dicitur: Deus genuit, non potest iste terminus, Deus, ratione prædicati notionalis supponere pro persona.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.arg.3] Further, if this be true, \"God begot,\" because the Father generates; for the same reason this is true, \"God does not beget,\" because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God who begets, and there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows that there are two Gods.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si hæc est vera: Deus genuit, quia Pater generat, pari ratione hæc erit vera: Deus non generat, quia Filius non generat. Ergo est Deus generans et Deus non generans, et ita videtur sequi quod sint duo diii.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.arg.4] Further, if \"God begot God,\" He begot either God, that is Himself, or another God. But He did not beget God, that is Himself; for, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1), \"nothing begets itself.\" Neither did He beget another God; as there is only one God. Therefore it is false to say, \"God begot God.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, si Deus genuit Deum, aut se Deum aut alium Deum. Sed non se Deum, quia, ut Augustinus dicit in I De Trinit., cap. 1, col. 820, t. 8, « nulla res generat seipsam, » neque alium Deum, quia non est nisi unus Deus. Ergo hæc est falsa: Deus genuit Deum.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.arg.5] Further, if \"God begot God,\" He begot either God who is the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then God the Father was begotten. If God who is not the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father: which is false. Therefore it cannot be said that \"God begot God.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.4.arg.5] 5. Præterea, si Deus genuit Deum, aut Deum qui est Deus Pater, aut Deum qui non est Deus Pater. Si Deum qui est Deus Pater, ergo Deus Pater est genitus. Si Deum qui non est Deus Pater, ergo Deus est qui non est Deus Pater, quod est falsum. Non ergo potest dici, quod Deus genuit Deum.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.sc] In the Creed it is said, \"God of God.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod in symbolo dicitur: « Deum de Deo. »
\n[I.q.39.a.4.co] Some have said that this name \"God\" and the like, properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, which requires that in God, He \"who possesses\" and \"what is possessed\" be the same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name God, is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way of expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no less than the thing signified. Hence as this word \"God\" signifies the divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name \"man\" signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this word \"God,\" from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for person, as does the word \"man.\" So this word \"God\" sometimes stands for the essence, as when we say \"God creates\"; because this predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form signified--that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person, either for only one, as when we say, \"God begets,\" or for two, as when we say, \"God spirates\"; or for three, as when it is said: \"To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God,\" etc. (1 Timothy 1:17).
\n[I.q.39.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt quod hoc nomen, Deus, et similia, proprie secundum suam naturam supponunt pro essentia, sed ex adjuncto notionali trahuntur ad supponendum pro persona. Et hæc opinio processisse videtur ex conside- 1. Nulla enim omnino res est quæ seipsam gignat ut sit. 2. Parm.: « pro persona, vel una..., vel duabus..., ratione divinæ simplicitatis, quæ requirit quod in Deo idem sit habens et quod habetur. Et sic habens deitatem, quod significat hoc nomen, Deus, est idem quod deitas. Sed in proprietatibus locutionum non tan-tum attendenda est res significata, sed etiam modus significandi. Et ideo quia nomen, Deus, significat divinam essentiam ut in habente ipsam, sicut hoc nomen, homo, humanitatem significat in supposito; alii melius dixerunt quod hoc nomen, Deus, ex modo significandi habet ut proprie possit supponere pro persona, sicut et hoc nomen, homo. Quandoque ergo hoc nomen, Deus, supponit pro essentia, ut cum dicitur: Deus creat; quia hoc prædicatum competit subjecte ratione formæ significatæ, quæ est deitas. Quandoque vero supponit personam, ut unam tantum, ut cum dicitur: Deus generat; vel duas, ut cum dicitur: Deus spirat; vel tres, ut cum dicitur: Regi sæculorum immortali, invisibili, soli Deo honor et gloria, I Timoth., 1, 17.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.ad.1] Although this name \"God\" agrees with singular terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be found in several \"supposita.\" So it need not always stand for the essence it signifies.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod iste terminus, Deus, licet conveniat cum terminis singularibus in hoc quod forma significata non multiplicatur, convenit tamen cum terminis communibus in hoc quod forma significata inventur in pluribus suppositis. Unde non oportet quod semper supponat pro essentia quam significat.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.ad.2] This holds good against those who say that the word \"God\" does not naturally stand for person.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod objectio illa procedit contra illos qui dicebant quod hoc nomen, Deus, non habet naturalem suppositionem pro persona.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.ad.3] The word \"God\" stands for the person in a different way from that in which this word \"man\" does; for since the form signified by this word \"man\"--that is, humanity--is really divided among its different subjects, it stands of itself for the person, even if there is no adjunct determining it to the person--that is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of the human nature, however, is not a reality, but is only in the consideration of the mind. Hence this term \"man\" does not stand for the common nature, unless this is required by some adjunct, as when we say, \"man is a species\"; whereas the form signified by the name \"God\"--that is, the divine essence--is really one and common. So of itself it stands for the common nature, but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the person. So, when we say, \"God generates,\" by reason of the notional act this name \"God\" stands for the person of the Father. But when we say, \"God does not generate,\" there is no adjunct to determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase means that generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something be added belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition, for instance, \"God begotten does not beget,\" is true. Consequently, it does not follow that there exists a \"God generator,\" and a \"God not generator\"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons; as, for instance, if we were to say, \"the Father is God the generator\" and the \"Son is God the non-generator\" and so it does not follow that there are many Gods; for the Father and the Son are one God, as was said above (Article 3).
\n[I.q.39.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliter se habet hoc nomen, Deus, ad supponendum pro persona, et hoc nomen, homo. Quia enim forma significata per hoc nomen, homo, id est, humanitas, realiter dividitur in diversis suppositis, per se supponit pro persona, etiamsi nihil addatur quod determinet ipsum ad personam, quæ est suppositum distinctum. Unitas autem sive communitas humanæ naturæ non est secundum rem, sed solum secundum considerationem. Unde iste terminus, homo, non supponit pro natura communi, nisi propter exigentiam ali-cujus additi, ut cum dicitur: Homo est species. Sed forma significata per hoc nomen, Deus, scilicet essentia divina, est una et communis secundum rem. Unde per se supvel tribus. 3. Ita cod.; ponit pro natura communi, sed ex adjuncto terminatur ejus suppositio ad personam. Unde cum dicitur: Deus generat, ratione actus notionalis supponit hoc nomen, Deus, pro persona Patris. Sed cum dicimus: Deus non generat, nihil additur quod determinet hoc nomen ad personam Filii; unde datur intelligi quod generatio repugnet divinæ naturæ. Sed si addatur aliquid pertinens ad personam Filii, vera erit locutio, ut si dicatur: Deus genitus non generat. Unde non sequitur: Est Deus generans, et Deus non generans, nisi ponatur aliquid pertinens ad personam, ut puta si dicamus: Pater est Deus generans, et Filius est Deus non generans. Et ita non sequitur quod sint plures dii; quia Pater et Filius sunt unus Deus, ut dictum est.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.ad.4] This is false, \"the Father begot God, that is Himself,\" because the word \"Himself,\" as a reciprocal term, refers to the same \"suppositum.\" Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi ad Maxim.) that \"God the Father begot another self [alterum se],\" forasmuch as the word \"se\" is either in the ablative case, and then it means \"He begot another from Himself,\" or it indicates a single relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is, however, either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would really mean, \"He begot another most like to Himself.\" Likewise also it is false to say, \"He begot another God,\" because although the Son is another than the Father, as above explained (31, 2), nevertheless it cannot be said that He is \"another God\"; forasmuch as this adjective \"another\" would be understood to apply to the substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition \"He begot another God\" is tolerated by some, provided that \"another\" be taken as a substantive, and the word \"God\" be construed in apposition with it. This, however, is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for fear of giving occasion to error.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod hæc est falsa: Pater genuit se Deum, quia ly se, cum sit reciprocum, refert idem suppositum. Neque est contrarium quod Augustinus dixit in Epist. clxx, ad Maxim., col. 747, t. 2, quod « Deus Pater genuit alterum se; » quia ly se, vel est casus ablativi, ut sit sensus: Genuit alterum a se; vel facit relationem simplicem, et sic refert identitatem naturæ; sed est impropria vel emphatica locutio, ut sit sensus: Genuit alterum simillimum sibi. Similiter et hæc est falsa: Genuit alium Deum; quia, licet Filius sit alius a Patre, ut supra dictum est, non tamen est dicendum quod sit alius Deus; quia intelligeretur quod hoc adjectivum, alius, poneret rem suam circa substantivum quod est Deus, et sic significaretur distinctio deitatis. Quidam tamen concedunt istam: Genuit alium Deum; ita quod ly alius sit substantivum, et ly Deus appositive construatur cum eo, nempe alium qui est Deus. Sed hic est improprius modus loquendi, et evitandus, ne detur occasio erroris.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.ad.5] To say, \"God begot God Who is God the Father,\" is wrong, because since the word \"Father\" is construed in apposition to \"God,\" the word \"God\" is restricted to the person of the Father; so that it would mean, \"He begot God, Who is Himself the Father\"; and then the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false. Wherefore the negative of the proposition is true, \"He begot God Who is not God the Father.\" If however, we understand these words not to be in apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the contrary, the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is false; so that the meaning would be, \"He begot God Who is God Who is the Father.\" Such a rendering however appears to be forced, so that it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false, and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus said that both the negative and affirmative are false, because this relative \"Who\" in the affirmative proposition can be referred to the \"suppositum\"; whereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the \"suppositum.\" Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that \"to be God the Father\" is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the negative sense is that \"to be God the Father,\" is to be removed from the Son's divinity as well as from His personality. This, however, appears to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to negation.
\n[I.q.39.a.4.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod hæc est falsa: Deus genuit Deum, qui est Deus Pater; quia cum ly Pater appositive construatur cum ly Deus, restringit ipsum ad standum pro persona Patris: ut sit sensus: Genuit Deum qui est ipse Pater; et sic Pater esset genitus, quod est falsum. Unde negativa est vera: Genuit Deum qui non est Pater ejus. Si tamen intelligeretur constructio non esse appositiva sed aliquid esse interponendum, tunc e converso affirmativa esset vera, et negativa falsa, ut sit sensus: Genuit Deum qui est Deus, qui est Pater; sed hæc est extorta expositio. Unde melius est quod simpliciter affirmativa negetur, et negativa concedatur. Præpositivus tamen dixit quod tam negativa quam affirmativa est falsa; quia hoc relativum, qui, in affirmativa potest referre suppositum, sed in negativa refert et significatum et suppositum. Unde sensus affirmativæ est, quod esse Deum Patrem conveniat personæ Filii. Negativæ vero sensus est, quod esse Deum Patrem non solum removeat a persona Filii, sed etiam a divinitate ejus. Sed hoc irrationabile videtur, cum secundum Philosophum, lib. II Periher., cap. ult., de eodem de quo est affirmatio, possit etiam esse negatio.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that abstract essential names can stand for the person, so that this proposition is true, \"Essence begets essence.\" For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): \"The Father and the Son are one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken singly Wisdom is from Wisdom, as essence from essence.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nomina essentialia in abstracto significata possint supponere pro persona, ita quod hæc sit vera: Essentia generat essentiam. Dicit enim Augustinus, De Trinit., lib. VII, c. 11, col. 936, t. 8: « Pater et Filius sunt una sapientia, quia una essentia, et singillatim sapientia de sapientia, sicut essentia de essentia. »
\n[I.q.39.a.5.arg.2] Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is generated. Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is generated.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, generatis nobis vel corruptis, generantur vel corrumpuntur ea quæ in nobis sunt. Sed Filius generatur. Ergo cum essentia divina sit in Filio, videtur quod essentia divina generetur.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.arg.3] Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is clear from what is above explained (3, 3). But, as was shown, it is true to say that \"God begets God.\" Therefore this is also true: \"Essence begets essence.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea idem est Deus et essentia divina, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed hæc est vera: Deus generat Deum, sicut dictum est. Ergo hæc est vera: Essentia generat essentiam.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.arg.4] Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence can stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.arg.4] 4. Præterea, de quocumque prædicatur aliquid potest supponere pro illo. Sed essentia divina est Pater. Ergo essentia potest supponere pro persona Patris; et sic essentia generat. etc.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.arg.5] Further, the essence is \"a thing begetting,\" because the essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is not begetting, the essence will be \"a thing begetting,\" and \"not begetting\": which cannot be.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.arg.5] 5. Præterea, essentia est res generans, quia est Pater, qui est generans. Si igitur essentia non sit generans, erit essentia res generans et non generans; quod est impossibile.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.arg.6] Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): \"The Father is the principle of the whole Godhead.\" But He is principle only by begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the Godhead.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.arg.6] 6. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in IV De Trinit., cap. xx, col. 908, t. 8: « Pater est principium totius deitatis. » Sed non est principium nisi generando, vel spirando. Ergo Pater generat, vel spirat deitatem.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): \"Nothing begets itself.\" But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only, since nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence. Therefore the essence does not beget essence.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in I De Trin., cap. 1, col. 820, tom. III, quod « nulla res generat seipsam. » Sed si essentia generat essentiam, non generat nisi seipsam, cum nihil sit in Deo quod distinguatur a divina essentia. Ergo essentia non generat essentiam.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.co] Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in asserting that as we can say \"God begot God,\" so we can say \"Essence begot essence\": considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity God is nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong, because if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of its signification as above stated (4). Now although \"God\" is really the same as \"Godhead,\" nevertheless the mode of signification is not in each case the same. For since this word \"God\" signifies the divine essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can of its own nature stand for person. Thus the things which properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of this word, \"God,\" as, for instance, we can say \"God is begotten\" or is \"Begetter,\" as above explained (4). The word \"essence,\" however, in its mode of signification, cannot stand for Person, because it signifies the essence as an abstract form. Consequently, what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would imply distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the \"supposita.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hoc erravit abbas Joachim, asserens quod sicut dicitur: Deus genuit Deum, ita potest dici quod essentia genuit essentiam, considerans quod propter divinam simplicitatem non est aliud Deus quam divina essentia. Sed in hoc deceptus fuit, quia ad veritatem locutionum non solum oportet considerare res significatas, sed etiam modum significandi, ut dictum est. Licet autem secundum rem sit idem Deus quod deitas, non tamen est idem modus significandi utrobique. Nam hoc nomen, Deus, quia significat divinam essentiam in habente, ex modo suæ significationis naturaliter habet quod possit supponere pro persona. Et sic ea quæ sunt propria personarum, possunt prædicari de hoc nomine, Deus, ut dicatur, quod Deus est genitus vel generans, sicut dictum est. Sed hoc nomen, essentia, non habet ex modo suæ significationis quod supponat pro persona; quia significat essentiam ut formam abstractam. Et ideo ea quæ sunt propria personarum, quibus ab invicem distinguuntur, non possunt essentiae attribui. Significaretur enim quod esset distinctio in essentia divina, sicut est distinctio in suppositis.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.ad.1] To express unity of essence and of person, the holy Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis than the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus, for instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or even by personal names; as when we find \"essence from essence\"; or \"wisdom from wisdom\"; we should take the sense to be, \"the Son\" who is essence and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom. Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain order should be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the persons because actions belong to \"supposita.\" So \"nature from nature,\" and \"wisdom from wisdom\" are less inexact than \"essence from essence.\"
\n[I.q.39.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ad exprimendam unitatem essentiæ et personæ, sancti doctores aliquando expressius locuti sunt quam proprietas locutionis patiatur. Unde hujusmodi locutiones non sunt extendendæ, sed exponendæ, ut scilicet nomina abstracta exponantur per concreta, vel etiam per no- « Totius divinitatis, vel, si melius dicitur, deitatis, principium Pater est. » « Nulla enim omnino res est quæ seipsam gimina personalia, ut cum dicitur: Essentia de essentia; vel sapientia de sapientia, sit sensus: Filius, qui est essentia et sapientia, est de Patre, qui est essentia et sapientia. In his tamen nominibus abstractis est quidam ordo attendendus; quia ea quæ pertinent ad actum, magis propinque se habent ad personas, quia actus sunt suppositorum. Unde minus impropria est ista: Natura de natura, vel sapientia de sapientia, quam: Essentia de essentia.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.ad.2] In creatures the one generated has not the same nature numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically distinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and ceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted accidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten either directly or accidentally.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in creaturis generatum non accipit naturam eamdem numero quam generans habet, sed aliam habet numero, quæ incipit in eo esse per generationem de novo, et desinit esse per corruptionem; et ideo generatur et corrumpitur per accidens; sed Deus genitus eamdem naturam numero accipit quam generans habet; et ideo natura divina in Filio non generatur neque per se, neque per accidens.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.ad.3] Although God and the divine essence are really the same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of signification, we must speak in a different way about each of them.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet Deus et divina essentia sint idem secundum rem, tamen ratione alterius modi significandi, oportet loqui diversimode de utroque.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.ad.4] The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode of identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not follow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification being different. This objection would hold good as regards things which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod essentia divina prædicatur de Patre per modum identitatis propter divinam simplicitatem; nec tamen sequitur quod possit supponere pro Patre, propter diversum modum significandi. Ratio autem procederet in illis quorum unum prædicatur de altero, sicut universale de particulari.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.ad.5] The difference between substantive and adjectival names consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them, whereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is considered in the light of \"suppositum,\" whereas the adjective indicates something added to the \"suppositum.\" Therefore substantive personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a distinct essence; but it belongs to the \"suppositum\" implied in the substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot say that the \"essence is begetting\"; yet we can say that the \"essence is a thing begetting,\" or that it is \"God begetting,\" if \"thing\" and God stand for person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently there exists no contradiction in saying that \"essence is a thing begetting,\" and \"a thing not begetting\"; because in the first case \"thing\" stands for person, and in the second it stands for the essence.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod hæc est differentia inter nomina substantiva et adjectiva, quia nomina substantiva ferunt suum suppositum, adjectiva vero non, sed rem significatam ponunt circa substantivum. Unde sophistæ dicunt quod nomina substantiva supponunt, adjectiva vero non supponunt, sed copulant. Nomina igitur personalia substantiva possunt de essentia prædicari propter identitatem. Neque sequitur quod proprietas personalis distinctam determinet essentiam. Sed ponitur circa suppositum importatum per nomen substantivum. Sed notionalia et personalia adjectiva non possunt prædicari de essentia, nisi aliquo substantivo adjuncto. Unde non possumus dicere quod essentia est generans; possumus tamen dicere quod essentia est res generans, vel Deus genegnat ut sit. » Ita in edit. Rom. et Patav.; Nicolaï: « distincta. » rans, si res et Deus supponant pro persona, non autem si supponant pro essentia. Unde non est contradictio, si dicitur quod essentia est res generans et res non generans, quia primo res tenetur pro persona, secundo pro essentia.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.ad.6] So far as Godhead is one in several \"supposita,\" it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So when we say, \"the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead,\" the term Godhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as it is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow that He is His own principle; as one of the people may be called the ruler of the people without being ruler of himself. We may also say that He is the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or spirating it, but as communicating it by generation and spiration.
\n[I.q.39.a.5.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod deitas, in quantum est una in pluribus, habet quamdam convenientiam cum forma nominis collectivi. Unde cum dicitur: Pater est principium totius deitatis, potest sumi pro universitate personarum, inquantum scilicet in omnibus personis divinis ipse est principium. Nec oportet quod sit principium sui ipsius, sicut aliquis de populo dicitur rector totius populi, non tamen sui ipsius. Vel potest dici quod est principium totius deitatis, non quia eam generet et spiret, sed quia eam generando et spirando communicat.
\n[I.q.39.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that the essential names should not be appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in faith should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome says, \"careless words involve risk of heresy\" [In substance Ep. lvii.]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are common to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may be supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they are appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than to the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be appropriated to the persons.
\n[I.q.39.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nomina essentialia non sint approprianda personis. Quod enim potest vergere in errorem fidei, vitandum est in divinis; quia, ut Hieronymus dicit: « Ex verbis inordinate « Credimus in unum Deum Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum... Hunc unum Deum et hanc unam esse divini nominis Trinitatem. » De hoc dicto Hieronymi, vide notam ad q. xxxi, art. 2, in corp. prolatis incurritur hæresis. » Sed ea quæ sunt communia tribus personis appropriare alicui, potest vergere in errorem fidei, quia potest intelligi quod vel illi tantum personæ conveniat quod ei appropriatur, vel quod magis conveniat ei quam aliis. Ergo essentialia attributa non sunt approprianda personis.
\n[I.q.39.a.7.arg.2] Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to another; since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially when expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the persons.
\n[I.q.39.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, essentialia attributa in abstracto significata significant per modum formæ. Sed una persona non se habet ad aliam ut forma; cum forma ab eo cujus est forma, supposito non distinguatur. Ergo essentialia attributa, maxime in abstracto significata, non debent appropriari personis.
\n[I.q.39.a.7.arg.3] Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for property is included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the persons; as what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons.
\n[I.q.39.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, proprium prius est appropriato; proprium enim est de ratione appropriati. Sed essentialia attributa secundum modum intelligendi sunt priora personis, sicut commune est prius proprio. Ergo essentialia attributa non debent esse appropriata.
\n[I.q.39.a.7.sc] the Apostle says: \"Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God\" (1 Corinthians 1:24).
\n[I.q.39.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit, I Cor., 1, 24: Christum Dei virtutem, et Dei sapientiam.
\n[I.q.39.a.7.co] For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons. For although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by demonstration, as was above expounded (32, 1), nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us. Now the essential attributes of God are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason than the personal properties; because we can derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures which are sources of knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain regarding the personal properties, as was above explained (32, 1). As, therefore, we make use of the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures for the manifestation of the divine persons, so also in the same manner do we make use of the essential attributes. And such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use of the essential attributes is called \"appropriation.\"
\nThe divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the things which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who proceeds by way of intellect, as Word. In another way by dissimilitude; as power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because fathers by reason of old age are sometimes feeble; lest anything of the kind be imagined of God.
\n[I.q.39.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ad manifestationem fidei conveniens fuit essentialia attributa personis appropriari. Licet enim Trinitas personarum demonstratione probari non possit, ut supra dictum est; convenit tamen ut per aliqua magis manifesta declaretur. Essentialia vero attributa sunt nobis magis manifesta secundum rationem quam propriia personarum; quia ex creaturis ex quibus cognitionem accipimus, possumus per certitudinem devenire in cognitionem essentialium attributorum, non autem in cognitionem personalium proprietatum, ut supra dictum est. Sicut igitur similitudine vestigii vel imaginis in creaturis inventa utimur ad manifestationem divinarum personarum, ita et essentialibus attributis. Et hæc manifestatio personarum per essentialia attributa appropriatio nominatur. Possunt autem manifestari personæ divinæ per essentialia attributa dupliciter. Uno modo per viam similitudinis, sicut ea quæ pertinent ad intellectum appropriantur Filio, qui procedit per modum intellectus ut Verbum. Alio modo per modum dissimilitudinis, sicut potentia appropriatur Patri, ut Augustinus; in edit.: « conveniant cui appropriatur, vel quod magis conveniant ei quam aliis.» Ita cod. Alcan. cum edit. Rom. et Patav.; at Mss. Camer., theologi Lovanienses et Duaceni, ac dicit, quia apud nos patres solent esse propter senectutem infirmi, ne tale aliquid suspicemur in Deo.
\n[I.q.39.a.7.ad.1] The essential attributes are not appropriated to the persons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to make the persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as above explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather manifestation of the truth.
\n[I.q.39.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod essentialia attributa non sic appropriantur personis ut eis esse propria asserantur, sed ad manifestandum personas per viam similitudinis vel dissimilitudinis, ut dictum est. Unde nullus error fidei sequitur, sed magis manifestatio veritatis.
\n[I.q.39.a.7.ad.2] If the essential attributes were appropriated to the persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would follow that one person would be as a form as regards another; which Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together only can be called wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the Son is called the Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both together are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His own essence.
\n[I.q.39.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod si sic appropriantur essentialia attributa personis quod essent eis propria, sequeretur quod una persona se haberet ad aliam in habitudine formæ: quod excludit Augustinus, De Trinit., lib. VI, cap. 11, col. 925, t. 8, ostendens, quod Pater non est sapientia quam genuit, quasi solus Filius sit sapientia; ut sic Pater et Filius simul tantum possint dici sapientia, non autem Pater sine Filio. Sed Filius dicitur sapientia Patris, quia est sapientia de Patre sapientia. Uterque enim per se est sapientia, et simul ambo una sapientia. Unde Pater non est sapiens sapientia quam genuit, sed sapientia quae est sua essentia.
\n[I.q.39.a.7.ad.3] Although the essential attribute is in its proper concept prior to person, according to our way of understanding; nevertheless, so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to prevent the personal property from being prior to that which is appropriated. Thus color is posterior to body considered as body, but is naturally prior to \"white body,\" considered as white.
\n[I.q.39.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet essentiale attributum secundum rationem propriam sit prius quam persona secundum modum intelligendi, tamen, inquantum habet rationem appropriati, nihil prohibet proprium personæ esse prius quam appropriatum; sicut color posterius est corpore, inquantum est corpus; prius tamen est naturaliter corpore albo, inquantum est album.
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