[I.q.42.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that equality is not becoming to the divine persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one in quantity as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the divine persons there is no quantity, neither continuous intrinsic quantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity, which we call place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of discrete quantity, because two persons are more than one. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.
\n[I.q.42.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod æqualitas non competat divinis personis. æqualitas enim attenditur secundum unum in quantitate, ut patet per Philosophum, V Metaph., text. 20. In divinis autem personis non inventur neque quantitas continua intrinseca, quæ dicitur magnitudo; neque quantitas continua extrinseca, quæ dicitur locus et tempus; neque secundum quantitatem discretam inventur in eis æqualitas, quia duæ personæ sunt plures quam una. Ergo divinis personis non convenit æqualitas.
\n[I.q.42.a.1.arg.2] Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we have said (39, 2). Now essence is signified by way of form. But agreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal. Therefore, we may speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not of equality.
\n[I.q.42.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, divinæ personæ sunt unius essentia, ut supra dictum est. Essentia autem significatur per modum formæ; convenientia autem in forma non facit æqualitatem, sed similitudinem. Ergo in divinis personis est dicenda similitudo, et non æqualitas.
\n[I.q.42.a.1.arg.3] Further, things wherein there is to be found equality, are equal to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But the divine persons cannot be said to be equal to one another. For as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): \"If an image answers perfectly to that whereof it is the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that which it represents cannot be said to be equal to the image.\" But the Son is the image of the Father; and so the Father is not equal to the Son. Therefore equality is not to be found among the divine persons.
\n[I.q.42.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in quibuscumque inventur æqualitas, illa sunt sibi invicem æqualia; quia æqualale dicitur æquali æqualale. Sed divinæ personæ non possunt sibi invicem dici æquales, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, De Trin., lib. VI, cap. x, col. 934, t. 8, « imago, si perfecte implet illud cujus est imago, ipsa coæquatur ei, non illud imagini suæ. » Imago autem Patris est Filius, et sic Pater non est æqualis Filio. Non ergo in divinis personis inventur æqualitas.
\n[I.q.42.a.1.arg.4] Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is common to the three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of the relations. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.
\n[I.q.42.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, æqualitas relatio quædam est. Sed nulla relatio est communis omnibus personis; cum secundum relationes personæ ab invicem distinguantur. Non ergo æqualitas divinis personis convenit.
\n[I.q.42.a.1.sc] Athanasius says that \"the three persons are co-eternal and co-equal to one another.\"
\n[I.q.42.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Athanasius in suo Symb. fid., col. 1583, t. 4, dicit quod « tres personæ coæternæ sibi sunt, et coæquales. »
\n[I.q.42.a.1.co] We must needs admit equality among the divine persons. For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15,16, 17), equality signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot admit anything greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius says (De Trin. i): \"They must needs admit a difference [namely, of Godhead] who speak of either increase or decrease, as the Arians do, who sunder the Trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus involving a plurality.\" Now the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else than His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any inequality in the divine persons, they would not have the same essence; and thus the three persons would not be one God; which is impossible. We must therefore admit equality among the divine persons.
\n[I.q.42.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est ponere æqualitatem in divinis personis; quia, secundum Philosophum, in X Metaph., t. 19, æquale dicitur quasi per negationem minoris et majoris; non autem possumus in divinis personis ponere aliquid majus et minus, quia, ut Boetius dicit in lib. De Trin., cap. 1, col. 1249, t. 2, « eos differentia, scilicet deitatis, comitatur qui vel augent, vel minuunt; ut Ariani, qui gradibus numerorum Trinitatem variantes distrahunt, atque in pluralitatem deducunt. » Cujus ratio est quia in æqualium non potest esse una quantitas numero. Quantitas autem in divinis non est aliud quam earum essentia. Unde relinquitur quod si esset aliqua in æqualitas in divinis personis, non esset in eis una essentia, et sic non essent tres personæ unus Deus: quod est impossibile. Oportet igituræ qualitatem ponere in divinis personis.
\n[I.q.42.a.1.ad.1] Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of \"bulk\" or dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal things, and has, therefore, no place in God. There is also quantity of \"virtue,\" which is measured according to the perfection of some nature or form: to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of something as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it is more or less, perfect in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured firstly by its source--that is, by the perfection of that form or nature: such is the greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak of great heat on account of its intensity and perfection. And so Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 18) that \"in things which are great, but not in bulk, to be greater is to be better,\" for the more perfect a thing is the better it is.
\nSecondly, virtual quantity is measured by the effects of the form. Now the first effect of form is being, for everything has being by reason of its form. The second effect is operation, for every agent acts through its form. Consequently virtual quantity is measured both in regard to being and in regard to action: in regard to being, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are of longer duration; and in regard to action, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act. And so as Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says: \"We understand equality to be in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one of them either precedes in eternity, or excels in greatness, or surpasses in power.\"
\n[I.q.42.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod duplex est quantitas. Una scilicet quæ dicitur quantitas molis vel quantitas dimensiva, quæ in solis rebus corporalibus est; unde in divinis personis locum non habet. Sed alia est quantitas virtutis, quæ attenditur secundum perfectionem alicujus naturæ vel formæ. Quæ quidem quantitas designatur secundum quod dicitur aliquid magis vel minus calidum, inquantum est perfectius vel minus perfectum in caliditate. Hujusmodi autem quantitas virtualis attenditur primo quidem in radice, id est, in ipsa perfectione formæ vel naturæ: et sic dicitur magnitudo specialis, sicut dicitur magnus calor propter suam intensionem et perfectionem. Et ideo dicit Augustinus, De Trin., lib. VI, cap. viii, col. 929, t. 8, quod « in his quæ non mole magna sunt, hoc est majus esse quod est — Quæsiere doctores scholastici utrum in divinis æqualitas sit unica numero, vel plurificetur? Juxta Richardum de Mediavilla, unica est, quia unicum fundamentum, essentiam scilicet divinam habet. Juxta Scotorellum plurificatur, quia penes perfectiones attributales quæ non sunt omnino idem extra intellectum accipitur. melius esse; » nam melius dicitur quod perfectius est. Secundo autem attenditur quantitas virtualis in effectibus formæ. Primus autem effectus formæ est esse; nam omnis res habet esse secundum suam formam. Secundus autem effectus est operatio; nam omne agens agit per suam formam. Attenditur igitur quantitas virtualis et secundum esse et secundum operationem. Secundum esse quidem, inquantum ea quæ sunt perfectioris naturæ, sunt majoris durationis. Secundum operationem vero, inquantum ea quæ sunt perfectioris naturæ, sunt magis potentia ad agendum. Sic igitur, ut Augustinus dicit, in lib. De fide ad Petr., cap. 1, § 4, col. 754, t. 6, « aqualitas intelligitur in Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto, inquantum nullus horum aut praecedit aternitate, aut excedit magnitudine, aut superat potestate. »
\n[I.q.42.a.1.ad.2] Where we have equality in respect of virtual quantity, equality includes likeness and something besides, because it excludes excess. For whatever things have a common form may be said to be alike, even if they do not participate in that form equally, just as the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said to be equal if one participates in the form more perfectly than another. And because not only is the same nature in both Father and Son, but also is it in both in perfect equality, therefore we say not only that the Son is like to the Father, in order to exclude the error of Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude the error of Arius.
\n[I.q.42.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ubi attenditur aqualitas secundum quantitatem virtualem aqualitas includit in se similitudinem, et aliquid plus, quia excludit excessum. Quæcumque enim communicant in una forma, possunt dici similia, etiamsi inæqualiter illam formam participant; sicut si dicatur aer esse similis igni in calore. Sed non possunt dici aqualia, si unum altero perfectius formam illam participet. Et quia non solum una est natura Patris et Filii, sed etiam neque perfecte est in utroque; ideo non solum dicimus Filium esse similem Patri, ut excludatur error Eunomii, sed etiam dicimus aqualem, ut excludatur error Arii.
\n[I.q.42.a.1.ad.3] Equality and likeness in God may be designated in two ways--namely, by nouns and by verbs. When designated by nouns, equality in the divine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the Son is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is because the divine essence is not more the Father's than the Son's. Wherefore, just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, and is therefore equal to the Father, so the Father has the greatness of the Son, and is therefore equal to the Son. But in reference to creatures, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): \"Equality and likeness are not mutual.\" For effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch as they have the form of their causes; but not conversely, for the form is principally in the cause, and secondarily in the effect.
\nBut verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is not in God, there is something that receives. Since, therefore, the Son receives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal to the Father, and not conversely, for this reason we say that the Son is equalled to the Father, but not conversely.
\n[I.q.42.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod aqualitas vel similitudo dupliciter potest significari in divinis, scilicet per nomina et per verba. Secundum quidem quod significatur per nomina, mutua aqualitas dicitur in divinis personis, et similitudo; Filius enim est aqualis et similis Patri, et e converso: et hoc ideo, quia essentia divina non magis est Patris quam Filii. Unde sicut Filius habet magnitudinem Patris, quod est esse eum aqualem Patri, ita Pater habet magnitudinem Filii, quod est esse eum aqualem Filio. Sed quantum ad creaturas, ut Dionysius dicit, De div. nom., cap. 1x, § 6, col. 914, t. 4, non recipitur conversio aqualitatis et similitudinis. Dicuntur enim causata similia causis, Lege Fulgentium, col. 674, cui restitutus est liber De fide. Ex versione Joannis Sarrasini colligitur. Corderius: « in causa vero ad effectus nequaquam admittemus istiusmodi reciprocationem (aqualitatis inquantum habent formam causarum, sed non e converso; quia forma principaliter est in causa, et secundario in causato. Sed verba significant aqualitatem cum motu. Et licet motus non sit in divinis, est tamen ibi accipere, quia Filius accipit a Patre, unde sit ei aqualis, et non e converso.
\n[I.q.42.a.1.ad.4] In the divine persons there is nothing for us to consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations in which they are distinct. Now equality implies both --namely, distinction of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to itself; and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons equal to one another, that they are of the same greatness and essence. Now it is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is not a real relation. Nor, again, is one relation referred to another by a further relation: for when we say that paternity is opposed to filiation, opposition is not a relation mediating between paternity and filiation. For in both these cases relation would be multiplied indefinitely. Therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons is not a real relation distinct from the personal relations: but in its concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the persons, and the unity of essence. For this reason the Master says (Sent. i, D, xxxi) that in these \"it is only the terms that are relative.\"
\n[I.q.42.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod in divinis personis nihil est considerare nisi essentiam, in qua communicant, et relationes, quibus distinguuntur. Æqualitas autem utrumque importat; scilicet distinctionem personarum, quia nihil sibi ipsi dicitur aqualale, et unitatem essentiae, quia ex hoc personae sunt sibi invicem aqualales, quod sunt unius magnitudinis et essentiae. Manifestum est autem quod idem ad seipsum non refertur aliqua relatione reali: nec iterum una relatio refertur ad alteram per aliquam aliam relationem. Cum enim dicimus quod paternitas opponitur filiationi, oppositio non est relatio media inter paternitatem et filiationem, quia utroque modo relatio multiplicaretur in infinitum. Et ideo aqualitas et similitudo in divinis personis non est aliqua relatio distincta a relationibus personalibus; sed in suo intellectu includit et relationes distinguentes personas, et essentiae unitatem. Et propterea Magister dicit in xxxi dist., I Sentent., quod in his appellatio tantum est relativa.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the person proceeding is not co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father. For Arius gives twelve modes of generation. The first mode is like the issue of a line from a point; wherein is wanting equality of simplicity. The second is like the emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent equality of nature. The third is like the mark or impression made by a seal; wherein is wanting consubstantiality and executive power. The fourth is the infusion of a good will from God; wherein also consubstantiality is wanting. The fifth is the emanation of an accident from its subject; but the accident has no subsistence. The sixth is the abstraction of a species from matter, as sense receives the species from the sensible object; wherein is wanting equality of spiritual simplicity. The seventh is the exciting of the will by knowledge, which excitation is merely temporal. The eighth is transformation, as an image is made of brass; which transformation is material. The ninth is motion from a mover; and here again we have effect and cause. The tenth is the taking of species from genera; but this mode has no place in God, for the Father is not predicated of the Son as the genus of a species. The eleventh is the realization of an idea [ideatio], as an external coffer arises from the one in the mind. The twelfth is birth, as a man is begotten of his father; which implies priority and posteriority of time. Thus it is clear that equality of nature or of time is absent in every mode whereby one thing is from another. So if the Son is from the Father, we must say that He is less than the Father, or later than the Father, or both.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.arg.2] Further, everything that comes from another has a principle. But nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is not eternal; nor is the Holy Ghost.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne quod est ex altero, habet principium. Sed nullum aeternum habet principium. Ergo Filius non est aeternus, neque Spiritus sanctus.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.arg.3] Further, everything which is corrupted ceases to be. Hence everything generated begins to be; for the end of generation is existence. But the Son is generated by the Father. Therefore He begins to exist, and is not co-eternal with the Father.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne quod corrumpitur, desinit esse. Ergo omne quod generatur, incipit esse; ad hoc enim generatur ut sit. Sed Filius est genitus a Patre. Ergo incipit esse, et non est coæternus Patri.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.arg.4] Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father, either He is always being begotten, or there is some moment in which He is begotten. If He is always being begotten, since, during the process of generation, a thing must be imperfect, as appears in successive things, which are always in process of becoming, as time and motion, it follows that the Son must be always imperfect, which cannot be admitted. Thus there is a moment to be assigned for the begetting of the Son, and before that moment the Son did not exist.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, si Filius genitus est a Patre, aut semper generatur, aut est dare aliquod instans suæ generationis. Si semper generatur, dum autem aliquid est in generari, est imperfectum, sicut patet in successivis, quæ sunt semper in fieri, ut tempus et motus, sequitur quod Filius semper sit imperfectus, quod est inconveniens. Est ergo dare aliquod instans generationis Filii. Ante illud ergo instans Filius non erat.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.sc] Athanasius declares that \"all the three persons are co-eternal with each other.\"
\n[I.q.42.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Athanasius, in suo Symb. fid., col. 1583, t. 4, dicit, quod « totæ tres personæ coæternæ sibi sunt. »
\n[I.q.42.a.2.co] We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the Father. In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which proceeds from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due to two reasons: one on the part of the agent, and the other on the part of the action. On the part of the agent this happens differently as regards free agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account of the choice of time; for as a free agent can choose the form it gives to the effect, as stated above (Question 41, Article 2), so it can choose the time in which to produce its effect. In natural agents, however, the same happens from the agent not having its perfection of natural power from the very first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as, for instance, a man is not able to generate from the very first. Considered on the part of action, anything derived from a principle cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when the action is successive. So, given that an agent, as soon as it exists, begins to act thus, the effect would not exist in the same instant, but in the instant of the action's termination. Now it is manifest, according to what has been said (41, 2), that the Father does not beget the Son by will, but by nature; and also that the Father's nature was perfect from eternity; and again that the action whereby the Father produces the Son is not successive, because thus the Son would be successively generated, and this generation would be material, and accompanied with movement; which is quite impossible. Therefore we conclude that the Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with both.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est dicere Filium esse coæternum Patri. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est quod aliquid ex principio existens posterius esse Codd. Alcan. et Camer.: « aequalitas spiritualitatis » al.: « simplicitatis spiritualis. » Al.: deest « ut. » — Ita cod. Alcan. cum duosuo principio potest contingere ex duobus: uno modo ex parte agentis, alio modo ex parte actionis. Ex parte agentis quidem, aliter in agentibus voluntariis, aliter in agentibus naturalibus. In agentibus quidem voluntariis propter electionem temporis; sicut enim in agentis voluntarii potestate est eligere formam quam effectui conferat, ut supra dictum est, ita in ejus potestate est eligere tempus in quo effectum producat. In agentibus autem naturalibus hoc contingit quia agens aliquod non a principio habet perfectionem virtutis naturalis ad agendum, sed ei advenit post aliquod tempus, sicut homo non a principio generare potest. Ex parte autem actionis impeditur ne id quod est a principio, simul sit cum suo principio, propter hoc quod actio est successiva. Unde, dato quod aliquod agens tali actione agere inciperet statim cum est, non statim in eodem instanti esset effectus, sed in instanti ad quod terminatur actio. Manifestum est autem, secundum præmissa, quod Pater non generat Filium voluntate, sed natura; et iterum quod natura Patris ab aeterno perfecta fuit; et iterum quod actio qua Pater producit Filium non est successiva, quia sic Filius Dei successive generaretur, ut esset ejus generatio materialis et cum motu; quod est imposibile. Relinquitur ergo quod Filius fuit quandocumque fuit Pater; et sic Filius est coæternus Patri, et similiter Spiritus sanctus utrique.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.ad.1] As Augustine says (De Verbis Domini, Serm. 38), no mode of the procession of any creature perfectly represents the divine generation. Hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many of these modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat supplied from another; and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus: \"Let Splendor tell thee that the co-eternal Son existed always with the Father; let the Word announce the impassibility of His birth; let the name Son insinuate His consubstantiality.\" Yet, above them all the procession of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly; the intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an intellect passing from potentiality to act; and this cannot be said of God.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. De verbis Domini, serm. cxvii, c. iv, v, vi, col. 664, t. 5, nullus modus processionis alicujus creaturæ perfecte repræsentat divinam generationem. Unde oportet ex multis modis colligere similudinem, ut quod deest ex uno aliqualiter suppleatur ex altero; et propter hoc dicitur in synodo ephesina: « Coexistere semper coæternum Patri Filium, splendor tibi denuntiet. Impassibilitatem nativitatis ostendat verbum. Consubstantialitatem, Filii nomen insinuet. » Inter omnia tamen expressius repræsentat processio verbi ab intellectu; quod quidem non est posterius eo a quo procedit, nisi sit talis intellectus qui exeat de potentia in actum; quod in Deo dici non potest.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.ad.2] Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but not the principle of origin.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aeternitas bus aliis, quibus adhæret Nicolaï; edit. Rom. et Patav.: « Generatus esset, et ejus generatio materialis, et cum motus esset; quod est imposibile. » excludit principium durationis, sed non principium originis.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.ad.3] Every corruption is a change; and so all that corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be. The divine generation, however, is not changed, as stated above (Question 27, Article 2). Hence the Son is ever being begotten, and the Father is always begetting.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnis corruptio est mutatio quædam; et ideo omne quod corrumpitur incipit non esse et desinit esse. Sed generatio divina non est transmutatio, ut dictum est supra 4.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.ad.4] In time there is something indivisible--namely, the instant; and there is something else which endures--namely, time. But in eternity the indivisible \"now\" stands ever still, as we have said above (10, 2 ad 1, 4 ad 2). But the generation of the Son is not in the \"now\" of time, or in time, but in eternity. And so to express the presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say that \"He is ever being born,\" as Origen said (Hom. in Joan. i). But as Gregory [Moral. xxix, 21] and Augustine [Super Ps. 2:7 said, it is better to say \"ever born,\" so that \"ever\" may denote the permanence of eternity, and \"born\" the perfection of the only Begotten. Thus, therefore, neither is the Son imperfect, nor \"was there a time when He was not,\" as Arius said.
\n[I.q.42.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod in tempore aliud est quod est indivisibile, scilicet instans, et aliud est quod est durans, scilicet tempus; sed in æternitate ipsum nunc indivisibile est et semper stans, ut supra dictum est. Generatio vero Filii non est in nunc temporis, aut in tempore, sed in æternitate; et ideo ad significandum præsentialitatem et permanentiam æternitatis potest dici quod semper nascitur, ut Origenes dixit, Hom. in Joann., t. I, col. 78, § 32, t. 4. Sed, ut Gregorius, Moral., lib. XXIX, cap. 1, col. 477, t. 2, et Augustinus, In psalm. II, col. 71, t. 4, ad hæc verba: Hodie genui te, dicunt, melius est quod dicatur semper natus, ut ly semper designet permanentiam æternitatis, et ly natus perfectionem geniti. Sic ergo Filius nec imperfectus est, nec erat 2 quando non erat, ut Arius dixit.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that among the divine persons there does not exist an order of nature. For whatever exists in God is the essence, or a person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not signify the essence, nor any of the persons, or notions. Therefore there is no order of nature in God.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in divinis personis non sit ordo naturæ. Quidquid enim in divinis est, vel est essentia vel persona vel notio. Sed ordo naturæ 3 non significat essentiam, neque aliquam personarum aut notionum. Ergo ordo naturæ non est in divinis.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.arg.2] Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes before another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But in the divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as declared by Athanasius. Therefore, in the divine persons there is no order of nature.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in quibuscumque est ordo naturæ, unum est prius altero, saltem secundum naturam et intellectum. Sed in divinis personis « nihil est prius et posterius, » ut Athanasius dicit in suo Symb. fidei, col. 1583, t. 4. Ergo in divinis personis non est ordo naturæ.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.arg.3] Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists. But there is no distinction in the divine nature. Therefore it is not subject to order; and order of nature does not exist in it.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quidquid ordinatur, distinguitur. Sed natura, in divinis non distinguitur. Ergo non ordinatur; ergo non est ibi ordo naturæ.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.arg.4] Further, the divine nature is the divine essence. But there is no order of essence in God. Therefore neither is there of nature.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, natura divina est ejus essentia. Sed non est in divinis ordo essentia. Ergo neque ordo naturæ.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.sc] Where plurality exists without order, confusion exists. But in the divine persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius says. Therefore in God order exists.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.sc] Sed contra, ubicumque est pluralitas sine ordine, ibi est confusio. Sed in divinis personis non est confusio, ut Athanasius dicit 4 in suo Symb. fidei, col. 1582, t. 4. Ergo est ibi ordo.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.co] Order always has reference to some principle. Wherefore since there are many kinds of principle--namely, according to site, as a point; according to intellect, as the principle of demonstration; and according to each individual cause--so are there many kinds of order. Now principle, according to origin, without priority, exists in God as we have stated (33, 1): so there must likewise be order according to origin, without priority; and this is called 'the order of nature': in the words of Augustine (Contra Maxim. iv): \"Not whereby one is prior to another, but whereby one is from another.\"
\n[I.q.42.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ordo semper dicitur per comparisonem ad aliquod principium. Unde sicut dicitur principium multipliciter; scilicet secundum situm, ut punctus; secundum intellectum, ut principium demonstrationis; et secundum causas singulas; ita etiam dicitur ordo. In divinis autem dicitur principium secundum originem absque prioritate, ut supra dictum est. Unde oportet ibi esse ordinem secundum originem absque prioritate. Et hic vocatur « ordo naturæ, » secundum Augustinum, lib. II Cont. Maxim., cap. xiv, col. 775, t. 8, « non quo alter sit prius altero, sed quo alter est ex altero 5. »
\n[I.q.42.a.3.ad.1] The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in general, not a special kind of origin.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ordo naturæ significat notionem originis in communi, non autem in speciali.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.ad.2] In things created, even when what is derived from a principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle still comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally considered as principle. If, however, we consider the relations of cause and effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding therefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the definition of the other. But in God the relations themselves are the persons subsisting in one nature. So, neither on the part of the nature, nor on the part the relations, can one person be prior to another, not even in the order of nature and reason.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in rebus creatis, etiam cum id quod est a principio sit suo principio coævum secundum durationem, tamen principium est prius secundum naturam et intellectum, si consideretur id quod est principium. Sed si considerentur ipsæ relationes causæ et causati, et principii et principiati, manifestum est quod relativa sunt simul natura et intellectu, inquantum unum est in definitione alterius. Sed in divinis ipsæ relationes sunt subsistentes personæ in una natura. Unde neque ex parte naturæ, neque ex parte relationum, una persona potest esse prior alia, neque etiam secundum naturam et intellectum.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.ad.3] The order of nature means not the ordering of nature itself, but the existence of order in the divine Persons according to natural origin.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ordo naturæ dicitur, non quod ipsa natura ordinetur, sed quod ordo in divinis personis attenditur secundum naturalem originem.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.ad.4] Nature in a certain way implies the idea of a principle, but essence does not; and so the order of origin is more correctly called the order of nature than the order of essence.
\n[I.q.42.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod natura quodammodo importat rationem principii, « origo naturæ. » etc. non autem essentiam; et ideo ordo originis melius nominatur ordo naturæ quam ordo essentiæ.
\n[I.q.42.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in greatness. For He Himself said (John 14:28): \"The Father is greater than I\"; and the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 15:28): \"The Son Himself shall be subject to Him that put all things under Him.\"
\n[I.q.42.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod Filius non sit æqualis Patri in magnitudine. Dicit enim ipse, Joan., xiv, 28: Pater major me est; et Apostolus, I Corinth., xv, 28: Ipse Filius subjectus erit illi qui sibi subjecit omnia.
\n[I.q.42.a.4.arg.2] Further, paternity is part of the Father's dignity. But paternity does not belong to the Son. Therefore the Son does not possess all the Father's dignity; and so He is not equal in greatness to the Father.
\n[I.q.42.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, paternitas pertinet ad dignitatem Patris. Sed paternitas non convenit Filio. Ergo non quidquid dignitatis habet Pater, habet Filius; ergo non est æqualis Patri in magnitudine.
\n[I.q.42.a.4.arg.3] Further, wherever there exist a whole and a part, many parts are more than one only, or than fewer parts; as three men are more than two, or than one. But in God a universal whole exists, and a part; for under relation or notion, several notions are included. Therefore, since in the Father there are three notions, while in the Son there are only two, the Son is evidently not equal to the Father.
\n[I.q.42.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ubicumque est totum et pars, plures partes sunt aliquid majus quam una tantum vel pauciores; sicut tres homines sunt aliquid majus quam duo vel unus. Sed in divinis videtur esse totum universale, et pars; nam sub relatione vel notione plures notiones continentur. Cum igitur in Patre sint tres notiones, in Filio autem tantum duæ, videtur quod Filius non sit æqualis Patri.
\n[I.q.42.a.4.sc] It is said (Philippians 2:6): \"He thought it not robbery to be equal with God.\"
\n[I.q.42.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Philipp., ii, 6: Non rapinam arbitratus est esse se æqualem Deo.
\n[I.q.42.a.4.co] The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of His nature. Now it belongs to the very nature of paternity and filiation that the Son by generation should attain to the possession of the perfection of the nature which is in the Father, in the same way as it is in the Father Himself. But since in men generation is a certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from potentiality to act, it follows that a man is not equal at first to the father who begets him, but attains to equality by due growth, unless owing to a defect in the principle of generation it should happen otherwise. From what precedes (27, 2; 33, 2,3), it is evident that in God there exist real true paternity and filiation. Nor can we say that the power of generation in the Father was defective, nor that the Son of God arrived at perfection in a successive manner and by change. Therefore we must say that the Son was eternally equal to the Father in greatness. Hence, Hilary says (De Synod. Can. 27): \"Remove bodily weakness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain and all human shortcomings, then every son, by reason of his natural nativity, is the father's equal, because he has a like nature.\"
\n[I.q.42.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est dicere Filium esse æqualem Patri in magnitudine. Magnitudo enim Dei non est aliud quam perfectio naturæ ipsius. Hoc autem est de ratione paternitatis et filiationis, quod Filius per generationem pertingat ad habendam perfectionem naturæ quæ est in Patre, sicut et Pater. Sed quia in hominibus generatio est transmutatio quædam exeuntis de potentia in actum, non statim a principio homo filius est æqualis patri generanti; sed per debitum incrementum ad æqualitatem perducitur, nisi aliter eveniat propter defectum principii generationis. Manifestum est autem ex dictis, quod in divinis est proprie et vere paternitas et filiatio. Nec potest dici quod virtus Dei Patris fuerit defectiva in generando, neque quod Dei Filius successive et per transmutationem ad perfectionem pervenerit. Unde necesse est dicere quod ab æterno fuerit et Patri æqualis in magnitudine. Unde et Hilarius dicit in lib. De syn., § 73, col. 528, t. 2: « Tolle corporum infirmitates, tolle conceptus initium, tolle dolores partus et omnem humanam necessitatem; omnis filius secundum naturalem nativitatem æqualitas patris est, quia est similitudo naturæ. »
\n[I.q.42.a.4.ad.1] These words are to be understood of Christ's human nature, wherein He is less than the Father, and subject to Him; but in His divine nature He is equal to the Father. This is expressed by Athanasius, \"Equal to the Father in His Godhead; less than the Father in humanity\": and by Hilary (De Trin. ix): \"By the fact of giving, the Father is greater; but He is not less to Whom the same being is given\"; and (De Synod.): \"The Son subjects Himself by His inborn piety\"--that is, by His recognition of paternal authority; whereas \"creatures are subject by their created weakness.\"
\n[I.q.42.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verba illa intelliguntur dicta de Christo, secundum humanam naturam, in qua minor est Patre, et ei subjectus; sed secundum naturam divinam æqualis est Patri; et hoc est quod Athanasius dicit in Symb. fid., col. 1583, t. 4: « æqualis Patri secundum divinitatem, minor Patre secundum humanitatem. » Sed, secundum Hilarium, De Trin., lib. IX, § 54, col. 325, t. 2: « Donantis auctoritate Pater major est; sed minor non est cui unum esse donatur; » et in lib. De synod., § 79, col. 532, t. 2, dicit quod « subjectio Filii, naturæ pietas est, » id est, recognitio auctoritatis paternæ; « subjectio autem cæterorum creationis infirmitas. »
\n[I.q.42.a.4.ad.2] Equality is measured by greatness. In God greatness signifies the perfection of nature, as above explained (1, ad 1), and belongs to the essence. Thus equality and likeness in God have reference to the essence; nor can there be inequality or dissimilitude arising from the distinction of the relations. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 13), \"The question of origin is, Who is from whom? but the question of equality is, Of what kind, or how great, is he?\" Therefore, paternity is the Father's dignity, as also the Father's essence: since dignity is something absolute, and pertains to the essence. As, therefore, the same essence, which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation, so the same dignity which, in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation. It is thus true to say that the Son possesses whatever dignity the Father has; but we cannot argue--\"the Father has paternity, therefore the Son has paternity,\" for there is a transition from substance to relation. For the Father and the Son have the same essence and dignity, which exist in the Father by the relation of giver, and in the Son by relation of receiver.
\n[I.q.42.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod æqualitas attenditur secundum magnitudinem. Magnitudo autem in divinis significat perfectionem naturæ, ut dictum est, et ad essentiam pertinet. Et ideo æqualitas in divinis et similitudo secundum essentialia attenditur; nec potest secundum distinctionem relationum in æqualitas vel dissimilitudo dici. Unde Augustinus dicit, Contra Maximinum, lib. II, c. xviii, col. 786, t. 8: « Originis quæstio est, quis de quo sit; æqualitatis autem, qualis aut quantus sit. » Paternitas igitur est dignitas Patris, sicut et essentia Patris. Nam dignitas absolutum est, et ad essentiam pertinet. Sicut igitur eadem essentia quæ in Patre est paternitas, in Filio est filiatio; ita eadem dignitas quæ in Patre est paternitas, in Filio est filiatio. Vere ergo dicitur quod quidquid dignitatis habet Pater, habet Filius; nec sequitur: Paternitatem habet Pater; ergo paternitatem habet Filius. Mutatur enim quid in ad aliquid. Eadem enim est essentia et dignitas Patris et Filii; sed in « Et » deest in edit. Colligitur abbreviate ex § 73. « Si igitur donantis auctoritate Pater major est, numquid per doni confessionem minor Filius est? Patre est secundum relationem dantis, in Filio secundum relationem accipientis.
\n[I.q.42.a.4.ad.3] In God relation is not a universal whole, although it is predicated of each of the relations; because all the relations are one in essence and being, which is irreconcilable with the idea of universal, the parts of which are distinguished in being. Persons likewise is not a universal term in God as we have seen above (Question 30, Article 4). Wherefore all the relations together are not greater than only one; nor are all the persons something greater than only one; because the whole perfection of the divine nature exists in each person.
\n[I.q.42.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod relatio in divinis non est totum universale, quam vis de singulis relationibus prædicetur; quia omnes relationes sunt unum secundum essentiam et esse; quod repugnat rationi universalis, cujus partes secundum esse distinguuntur. Et similiter persona, ut supra dictum est, non est universale in divinis. Unde neque omnes relationes sunt majus aliquid quam una tantum: nec omnes personæ majus aliquid quam una tantum: quia tota perfectio divinæ naturæ est in qualibet personarum.
\n[I.q.42.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that the Son and the Father are not in each other. For the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 23) gives eight modes of one thing existing in another, according to none of which is the Son in the Father, or conversely; as is patent to anyone who examines each mode. Therefore the Son and the Father are not in each other.
\n[I.q.42.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Filius non sit in Patre, et e converso. Philosophus enim in IV Phys., t. 23, ponit octo modos essendi aliquid in aliquo, et secundum nullum horum Filius est in Patre, aut e converso, ut patet discurrenti per singulos modos. Ergo Filius non est in Patre, nec e converso.
\n[I.q.42.a.5.arg.2] Further, nothing that has come out from another is within it. But the Son from eternity came out from the Father, according to Micheas v. 2: \"His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity.\" Therefore the Son is not in the Father.
\n[I.q.42.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nihil quod exivit ab aliquo, est in eo. Sed Filius ab æterno exivit a Patre, secundum illud Michææ, v, 2: Egressus ejus ab initio a diebus æternitatis. Ergo Filius non est in Patre.
\n[I.q.42.a.5.arg.3] Further, one of two opposites cannot be in the other. But the Son and the Father are relatively opposed. Therefore one cannot be in the other.
\n[I.q.42.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, unum oppositorum non est in altero. Sed Filius et Pater opponuntur relative. Ergo unus non potest esse in alio.
\n[I.q.42.a.5.sc] It is said (John 14:10): \"I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me.\"
\n[I.q.42.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., xiv, 10: Ego in Patre, et Pater in me est.
\n[I.q.42.a.5.co] There are three points of consideration as regards the Father and the Son; the essence, the relation, and the origin; and according to each the Son and the Father are in each other. The Father is in the Son by His essence, forasmuch as the Father is His own essence, and communicates His essence to the Son not by any change on His part. Hence it follows that as the Father's essence is in the Son, the Father Himself is in the Son; likewise, since the Son is His own essence, it follows that He Himself is in the Father in Whom is His essence. This is expressed by Hilary (De Trin. v), \"The unchangeable God, so to speak, follows His own nature in begetting an unchangeable subsisting God. So we understand the nature of God to subsist in Him, for He is God in God.\" It is also manifest that as regards the relations, each of two relative opposites is in the concept of the other. Regarding origin also, it is clear that the procession of the intelligible word is not outside the intellect, inasmuch as it remains in the utterer of the word. What also is uttered by the word is therein contained. And the same applies to the Holy Ghost.
\n[I.q.42.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in Patre et Filio tria est considerare: scilicet essentiam et relationem et originem; et secundum quodlibet istorum Filius est in Patre, et e converso. Secundum essentiam enim Pater est in Filio, quia Pater est sua essentia, et communicat suam essentiam Filio, non per aliquam suam transmutationem. Unde sequitur quod, cum essentia Patris sit in Filio, in Filio sit Pater: et similiter cum Filius sit sua 1. Sic in generatione Filii et naturam suam sequitur incorporalis atque indemutalis Deus, incorporalem atque indemutabilem Deum gignens. » Et § 38, col. 156, « subsistentem in eo Dei naturam essentia, sequitur quod sit in Patre, in quo est ejus essentia. Et hoc est quod Hilarius dicit, De Trin., lib. V, § 37, col. 155, t. 2: « Naturam suam, ut ita dicam, sequitur immutabilis Deus, immutabilem gignens Deum subsistentem. Ergo in eo Dei naturam intelligimus, cum in Deo Deus insit. » Secundum etiam relationes manifestum est quod unum oppositorum relative est in altero secundum intellectum. Secundum originem etiam manifestum est quod processio verbi intelligibilis non est ad extra, sed manet in dicente. Id etiam quod verbo dicitur, in verbo contiinetur; et eadem ratio est de Spiritu sancto.
\n[I.q.42.a.5.ad.1] What is contained in creatures does not sufficiently represent what exists in God; so according to none of the modes enumerated by the Philosopher, are the Son and the Father in each other. The mode the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be found in that whereby something exists in its originating principle, except that the unity of essence between the principle and that which proceeds therefrom is wanting in things created.
\n[I.q.42.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ea quae in creaturis sunt, non sufficienter repraesentant ea quæ Dei sunt; et ideo secundum nullum eorum modorum quos Philosophus enumerat, Filius est in Patre, aut e converso. Accedit tamen magis ad hoc modus ille secundum quem aliquid dicitur esse in principio originante, nisi quod deest unitas essentiae, in rebus creatis, inter principium et id quod est a principio.
\n[I.q.42.a.5.ad.2] The Son's going forth from the Father is by mode of the intereior procession whereby the word emerges from the heart and remains therein. Hence this going forth in God is only by the distinction of the relations, not by any kind of essential separation.
\n[I.q.42.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod exitus Filii a Patre est secundum modum processionis interioris, prout verbum exit a corde, et manet in eo. Unde motus iste in divinis est secundum solam distinctionem relationum, non secundum essentialem aliquam distantiam.
\n[I.q.42.a.5.ad.3] The Father and the Son are relatively opposed, but not essentially; while, as above explained, one relative opposite is in the other.
\n[I.q.42.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Pater et Filius opponuntur secundum relationes, non autem secundum essentiam, et tamen oppositorum relative unum est in altero, ut dictum est.
\n[I.q.42.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in power. For it is said (John 5:19): \"The Son cannot do anything of Himself but what He seeth the Father doing.\" But the Father can act of Himself. Therefore the Father's power is greater than the Son's.
\n[I.q.42.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Filius non sit aequalis Patri secundum potentiam. Dicitur enim Joan., v, 49: Non potest Filius a se facere quidquam nisi quod viderit Patrem facientem. Pater autem a se potest facere. Ergo Pater major est Filio secundum potentiam.
\n[I.q.42.a.6.arg.2] Further, greater is the power of him who commands and teaches than of him who obeys and hears. But the Father commands the Son according to John 14:31: \"As the Father gave Me commandment so do I.\" The Father also teaches the Son: \"The Father loveth the Son, and showeth Him all things that Himself doth\" (John 5:20). Also, the Son hears: \"As I hear, so I judge\" (John 5:30). Therefore the Father has greater power than the Son.
\n[I.q.42.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, major est potentia ejus qui intelligentes, cum in Deo Deus insit. » 3.; in edit.: « aliquid. » 3. præcipit et docet, quam ejus qui obedit et audit. Sed Pater mandat Filio, secundum illud Joan., xiv, 31: Sicut mandatum dedit mihi Pater, sic facio. Pater etiam docet Filium, secundum illud Joan., v, 20: Pater diligit Filium, et omnia demonstrat ei quæ ipse facit. Similiter et Filius audit, secundum illud Joan., v, 30: Sicut audio, judico. Ergo Pater est majoris potentiæ quam Filius.
\n[I.q.42.a.6.arg.3] Further, it belongs to the Father's omnipotence to be able to beget a Son equal to Himself. For Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 7), \"Were He unable to beget one equal to Himself, where would be the omnipotence of God the Father?\" But the Son cannot beget a Son, as proved above (Question 41, Article 6). Therefore the Son cannot do all that belongs to the Father's omnipotence; and hence He is not equal to Him power.
\n[I.q.42.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ad omnipotentiam Patris pertinet quod possit Filium generare sibi æqualem. Dicit enim Augustinus, Contra Maximinum, lib. II, cap. VII, col. 762, t. 8: « Si non potuit generare sibi æqualem, ubi est omnipotentia Dei Patris? » Sed Filius non potest generare Filium, ut supra ostensum est. Non ergo quidquid pertinet ad omnipotentiam Patris, potest Filius, et ita non est ei in potestate æqualis.
\n[I.q.42.a.6.sc] It is said (John 5:19): \"Whatsoever things the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner.\"
\n[I.q.42.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., v, 49: Quæcumque Pater fecerit, hæc et Filius similiter facit.
\n[I.q.42.a.6.co] The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in power. Power of action is a consequence of perfection in nature. In creatures, for instance, we see that the more perfect the nature, the greater power is there for action. Now it was shown above (Article 4) that the very notion of the divine paternity and filiation requires that the Son should be the Father's equal in greatness--that is, in perfection of nature. Hence it follows that the Son is equal to the Father in power; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost in relation to both.
\n[I.q.42.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est dicere Filium esse æqualem Patri in potestate. Potentia enim agendi consequitur perfectionem naturæ. Videmus enim in creaturis quod quanto aliquis habet perfectiorem naturam, tanto est majoris virtutis in agendo. Ostensum est autem supra, quod ipsa ratio divinæ paternitatis et filiationis exigit quod sit Filius æqualis Patri in magnitudine, id est, in perfectione naturæ. Unde relinquitur quod Filius sit æqualis Patri in potestate; et eadem ratio est de Spiritu sancto respectu utriusque.
\n[I.q.42.a.6.ad.1] The words, \"the Son cannot of Himself do anything,\" do not withdraw from the Son any power possessed by the Father, since it is immediately added, \"Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son doth in like manner\"; but their meaning is to show that the Son derives His power from the Father, of Whom He receives His nature. Hence, Hilary says (De Trin. ix), \"The unity of the divine nature implies that the Son so acts of Himself [per se], that He does not act by Himself [a se].\"
\n[I.q.42.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in hoc quod dicitur: Filius non potest a se facere quidquam, non subtrahitur Filio aliqua potestas quam habeat Pater, cum statim subdatur quod quæcumque Pater fecerit, Filius similiter facit; sed ostenditur quod Filius habet potestatem a Patre, a quo habet naturam. Unde dicit Hilarius, De Trin., lib. IX, § 48, col. 349, t. 2: « Naturæ divinæ hæc unitas est, ut ita per se agat Filius, quod non a se agat. »
\n[I.q.42.a.6.ad.2] The Father's \"showing\" and the Son's \"hearing\" are to be taken in the sense that the Father communicates knowledge to the Son, as He communicates His essence. The command of the Father can be explained in the same sense, as giving Him from eternity knowledge and will to act, by begetting Him. Or, better still, this may be referred to Christ in His human nature.
\n[I.q.42.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in demonstratione Patris et auditione Filii non intelligitur nisi quod Pater communicat scientiam Filio, sicut et essentiam. Et ad idem potest referri mandatum Patris, per hoc quod ab æterno dedit ei scientiam et voluntatem agendorum, eum generando. Vel potius referendum est ad Christum secundum humanam naturam.
\n[I.q.42.a.6.ad.3] As the same essence is paternity in the Father, and filiation in the Son: so by the same power the Father begets, and the Son is begotten. Hence it is clear that the Son can do whatever the Father can do; yet it does not follow that the Son can beget; for to argue thus would imply transition from substance to relation, for generation signifies a divine relation. So the Son has the same omnipotence as the Father, but with another relation; the Father possessing power as \"giving\" signified when we say that He is able to beget; while the Son possesses the power of \"receiving,\" signified by saying that He can be begotten.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I.q.42.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut eadem essentia quæ in Patre est paternitas, in Filio est filiatio; ita eadem est potentia qua Pater generat, et qua Filius generatur. Unde manifestum est quod quidquid potest Pater, potest Filius, non tamen sequitur quod possit generare, sed mutatur quid in ad aliquid. Nam generatio significat relationem in divinis. Habet ergo Filius eamdem potentiam quam Pater, sed cum alia relatione; quia Pater habet eam ut dans, et hoc significatur cum dicitur quod potest generare; Filius autem habet eam ut accipiens; et hoc significatur cum dicitur quod potest generari.
\n