[I.q.45.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): \"To make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already.\"
\n[I.q.45.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod creare non sit ex nihilo aliquid facere. Dicit enim Augustinus Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum, lib. I, cap. xxiii, col. 633, t. 8: « Facere est quod omnino non erat; creare vero est ex eo quod jam erat, educendo 3 aliquid constituente. » — 2 — 3 Ordinando. »
\n[I.q.45.a.1.arg.2] Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good, and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among all actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being to being.
\n[I.q.45.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nobilitas actionis et motus ex terminis consideratur. Nobilior igitur est actio quæ ex bono in bonum est, et ex ente in ens, quam quæ est ex nihilo in aliquid. Sed creatio videtur esse nobilissima actio, et prima inter omnes actiones. Ergo non est ex nihilo in aliquid, sed magis ex ente in ens.
\n[I.q.45.a.1.arg.3] Further, the preposition \"from\" [ex] imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a statue is made from brass. But \"nothing\" cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something from nothing.
\n[I.q.45.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea hæc præpositio, ex, importat habitudinem alicujus causæ, et maxime materialis, sicut cum dicimus quod statua fit ex aere. Sed « nihil » non potest esse materia entis, nec aliquo modo causa ejus. Ergo creare non est ex nihilo aliquid facere.
\n[I.q.45.a.1.sc] On the text of Genesis 1, \"In the beginning God created,\" etc., the gloss has, \"To create is to make something from nothing.\"
\n[I.q.45.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod super illud Gen., 1: In principio creavit Deus cælum, etc., dicit 1 Glossa ord., In cap. 1 Gen., v. 4, col. 69, t. 4, quod « creare est aliquid ex nihilo facere. »
\n[I.q.45.a.1.co] As said above (Question 44, Article 2), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from \"not-man,\" and white from \"not-white.\" Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is from the \"not-being\" which is \"not-man,\" so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the \"not-being\" which is \"nothing.\"
\n[I.q.45.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, non solum oportet considerare emanationem alicujus entis particularis ab aliquo particulari agente, sed etiam emanationem totius entis a causa universali, quæ est Deus; et hanc quidem emanationem designamus nomine creationis. Quod autem procedit secundum emanationem particularem, non præsupponitur emanationi; sicut si generatur homo, non fuit prius homo, sed homo fit ex non homine, et album ex non albo. Unde si consideremus emanationem 2 totius entis universale a primo principio, impossibile est quod aliquod ens præsupponatur huic emanationi. Idem autem est nihil quod nullum ens. Sicut igitur generatio hominis est ex non ente, quod est non homo, ita creatio, quæ est emanatio totius esse, est ex non ente, quod est nihil.
\n[I.q.45.a.1.ad.1] Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in that way here, but as it is described above.
\n[I.q.45.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus æquivoce utitur nomine creationis, secundum quod creari dicuntur ea quæ in melius reformantur; ut cum dicitur aliquis creari in episcopum. Sic autem non loqui- 1 In Glossa ord. Strabi legitur æquivalenter tantum sub nomine Bedæ: « Qui fecisti mundum de materia informi. Materia facta est de nihilo, » etc. 2 Al: « consideretur emanatio totius entis universalis. » Creatio proprie est ab eo quod non est in eo quod est deductio; — unde Magister: creare est proprie de nihilo aliquid facere. Istud autem non esse vel nihilum intelligitur tripliciter: 1. Ut non esse non materiæ sed formæ tantum privationem dicit, et sic generatio est deductio de non esse ad esse; 2. Ut alicujus privationem secundum quid dicit, mur hic de creatione, sed sicut dictum est.
\n[I.q.45.a.1.ad.2] Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term \"wherefrom,\" but from the term \"whereto.\" Therefore a change is more perfect and excellent when the term \"whereto\" of the change is more noble and excellent, although the term \"wherefrom,\" corresponding to the term \"whereto,\" may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the privation of the substantial form, which is the term \"wherefrom\" in generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which is the term \"wherefrom\" in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration, because the term \"whereto\" is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term \"wherefrom\" is simply not-being.
\n[I.q.45.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod mutationes accipiunt speiem et dignitatem non a termino a quo, sed a termino ad quem. Tanto ergo perfectior et prior est aliqua mutatio, quanto terminus ad quem illius mutationis est nobilior et prior, licet terminus a quo, qui opponitur termino ad quem, sit imperfectior: sicut generatio simpliciter est nobilior et prior quam alteratio, propter hoc quod forma substantialis est nobilior quam forma accidentalis; tamen privatio substantialis formæ, quæ est terminus a quo in generatione, est imperfectior quam contra-rium, quod est terminus a quo in alteratione; et similiter creatio est perfectior et prior quam generatio et alteratio; quia terminus ad quem est tota substantia rei; id autem quod intelligitur ut terminus a quo est simpliciter non ens.
\n[I.q.45.a.1.ad.3] When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition \"from\" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only order; as when we say, \"from morning comes midday\"--i.e. after morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition \"from\" [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word \"nothing,\" or can be included in it. If taken in the first sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, \"It is made from nothing--i.e. it is not made from anything\"--as if we were to say, \"He speaks of nothing,\" because he does not speak of anything. And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the first way this preposition \"from\" [ex] implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the material cause, which is denied.
\n[I.q.45.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum dicitur aliquid ex nihilo fieri, hæc præpositio, ex, non designat causam materialem, sed ordinem tantum; sicut cum dicitur: Ex mane fit meridies, id est, post mane fit meridies. Sed intelligendum est quod hæc 'præpositio, ex, potest includere negationem importatam in hoc quod dico, nihil, vel includi ab ea. Si primo modo, tunc ordo remanet affirmatus, et ostenditur ordo ejus quod est, ad non esse præcedens. Si vero negatio includat præpositionem, tunc ordo negatur et est sensus: Fit ex nihilo, id est, non fit ex aliquo; sicut si dicatur: Iste loquitur de nihilo, quia non loquitur de aliquo. Et utroque modo verificatur, cum dicitur, ex nihilo aliquid fieri. Sed primo modo hæc præpositio, ex, importat ordinem, ut dictum est. Secundo modo importat habitudinem causæ materialis, quæ negatur.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that God cannot create anything, because, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient philosophers considered it as a commonly received axiom that \"nothing is made from nothing.\" But the power of God does not extend to the contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation and negation are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything from nothing, or create.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod non possit aliquid creari. Quia, secundum Philosophum, I Physic., text. 34, antiqui philosophi acceperunt ut communem conceptionem animi, ex nihilo nihil fieri. Sed potentia Dei non se extendit ad contraria primorum principiorum, utpote quod Deus faciat quod totum non sit majus sua parte, vel quod affirmatio et negatio sint simul veræ. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid ex nihilo facere, vel creare.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.arg.2] Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears by the definition of movement: for movement is the act of what is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing by God.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si creare est aliquid ex nihilo facere, ergo creari est aliquid fieri. Sed omne fieri est mutari. Ergo creatio est mutatio. Sed omnis mutatio est in subjecto aliquo, ut patet per definitionem motus; nam motus est actus existentis in potentia. Ergo est impossibile aliquid a Deo ex nihilo fieri.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.arg.3] Further, what has been made must have at some time been becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same time, is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already is: and so it would follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore when anything is made, its becoming precedes its having been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which the becoming is sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quod factum est, necesse est aliquando fieri. Sed non potest dici quod illud quod creatur, simul fiat et factum sit; quia in permanentibus quod fit non est; quod autem factum est, jam est. Simul ergo aliquid esset et non esset. Ergo si aliquid fit, fieri ejus præcedit factum esse. Sed hoc non potest esse, nisi præexistat subjectum, in quo sustentetur ipsum fieri. Ergo impossibile est aliquid fieri ex nihilo.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.arg.4] Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not happen that something is made from nothing.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, infinitam distantiam non est pertransire. Sed infinita distantia est inter ens et nihil. Ergo non contingit ex nihilo aliquid fieri.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.sc] It is said (Genesis 1:1): \"In the beginning God created heaven and earth.\"
\n[I.q.45.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Genes., 1, 4: In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram; ubi dicit Glossa ord., col. 69, t. 4, quod « creare est aliquid ex nihilo facere. »
\n[I.q.45.a.2.co] Not only is it not impossible that anything should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created by God, as appears from what has been said (44, 1). For when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by his action; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or brass, which are caused not by the action of art, but by the action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but presupposes matter. If therefore God did only act from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him. Now it has been shown above (44, 1,2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that God brings things into being from nothing.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod non solum non est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari, sed necesse est ponere a Deo omnia creata esse, ut ex præmissis habetur. Quicumque enim facit aliquid ex aliquo, illud ex quo facit, præsupponitur actioni ejus et non producitur per ipsam actionem; sicut artifex operatur ex rebus naturalibus, ut ex ligno et aere, quæ per artis actionem non causantur sed causantur per actionem naturæ; sed et ipsa natura causat res naturales quantum ad formam, sed præsupponit materiam. Si ergo Deus non ageret nisi ex aliquo præsupposito, sequeretur quod illud præsuppositum non esset causatum ab ipso. Ostensum est autem supra, quod nihil potest esse in entibus quod non sit a Deo, qui est causa universalis totius esse. Unde necesse est dicere quod Deus ex nihilo res in esse producit.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.ad.1] Ancient philosophers, as is said above (Question 44, Article 2), considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their action; whence came their common opinion that \"nothing is made from nothing.\" But this has no place in the first emanation from the universal principle of things.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod antiqui philosophi, sicut supra dictum est, non consideraverunt nisi emanationem effectuum particularium a causis particularibus, quas necesse est præsupponere aliquid in sua actione; et secundum hoc erat eorum communis opinio, « ex nihilo nihil fieri. » Sed tamen hoc locum non habet in prima emanatione ab universali rerum principio.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.ad.2] Creation is not change, except according to a mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should be different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial change, the subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding, so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide as to the substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text 20,21), it must follow that when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode of signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above (Question 13, Article 1), creation is signified by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing. And yet \"to make\" and \"to be made\" are more suitable expressions here than \"to change\" and \"to be changed,\" because \"to make\" and \"to be made\" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod creatio non est mutatio, nisi secundum modum intelligendi tantum. Nam de ratione mutationis est quod aliquid idem se habeat aliter nunc et prius. Nam quandoque quidem est idem ens actu aliter se habens nunc et prius, sicut in motibus secundum quantitatem et qualitatem, et ubi; quandoque vero est idem ens in potentia tantum, sicut in mutatione secundum substantiam, cujus subjectum est materia. Sed in creatione, per quam producitur tota substantia rei, non potest accipi aliquid idem aliter se habens nunc et prius, nisi secundum intellectum tantum; sicut si intelligatur aliqua res prius non fuisse totaliter, et postea esse. Sed cum actio et passio conveniant in una substantia motus, et different solum secundum habitudines diversas, ut dicitur in III Physicorum, text. 20 et 21, oportet quod subtracto motu, non remaneant nisi diversæ habitudines in creante et creato. Sed quia modus significandi sequitur modum intelligendi, ut dictum est, creatio significatur per modum mutationis; et propter hoc dicitur quod creare est ex nihilo aliquid facere; quamvis facere et fieri magis in hoc conveniant quam mutare et mutari; etiam tempore præcedere.; in edit.: « quod Deus non possit aliquid creare. » 2 Cajetanus, in Com.: « non solum est possibile. » deest in Parm. et in edit. quia facere et fieri important habitudinem causæ ad effectum et effectus ad causam, sed mutationem ex consequenti.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.ad.3] In things which are made without movement, to become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not the term of movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same time. In these things what is being made, is; but when we speak of its being made, we mean that it is from another, and was not previously. Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is being created and is already created at the same time.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in his quæ fiunt sine motu, simul est fieri et factum esse, sive talis factio sit terminus motus, sicut illuminatio (nam simul aliquid illuminatur et illuminatum est), sive non sit terminus motus, sicut simul formatur verbum in corde, et formatum est. Et in his quod fit, est cum dicitur fieri, sed significatur ab alio esse et prius non fuisse. Unde, cum creatio sit sine motu, simul aliquid creatur et creatum est.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.ad.4] This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a change existing between two forms.
\n[I.q.45.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod objectio illa procedit ex falsa imaginatione, ac si sit aliquod infinitum medium inter nihilum et ens: quod patet esse falsum. Procedit autem falsa hæc imaginatio ex eo quod creatio significatur ut quædam mutatio inter duos terminos existens.
\n[I.q.45.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that creation is not anything in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in the Creator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively is not anything in the creature.
\n[I.q.45.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod creatio non sit aliquid in creatura. Sicut enim creatio passive accepta attribuitur creaturæ, ita creatio active accepta attribuitur Creatori. Sed creatio active accepta non est aliquid in Creatore; quia sic sequeretur quod in Deo esset aliquid temporale. Ergo creatio passive accepta non est aliquid in creatura.
\n[I.q.45.a.3.arg.2] Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both: since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the creature, because in that case it would be necessary for the same reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the creature.
\n[I.q.45.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nihil est medium inter Creatorem et creaturam. Sed creatio significatur ut medium inter utrumque; non enim est Creator, cum non sit æterna: neque creatura, quia oporteret eadem ratione aliam ponere creationem, quia ipsa crearetur, et sic in infinitum. Creatio ergo non est aliquid.
\n[I.q.45.a.3.arg.3] Further, if creation is anything besides the created substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and also the term of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the accident, and preserves the accident; while the term is after the action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing.
\n[I.q.45.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si creatio est aliquid prætier substantiam creatam, oportet quod sit accidents ejus. Omne autem accidens est in subjecto. Ergo res creata esset subjectum creationis, et sic idem esset subjectum creationis et terminus; quod est impossibile, quia subjectum prius est accidente et conservat accidents. Terminus autem posterius est actione vel passione, cujus est terminus; et eo existente, cessat actio vel passio. Igitur ipsa creatio non est aliqua res.
\n[I.q.45.a.3.sc] It is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or accidental form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form, is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance, something in the thing created.
\n[I.q.45.a.3.sc] Sed contra, majus est fieri aliquid secundum totam substantiam quam secundum formam substantialem vel accidentalem. Sed generatio simpliciter vel secundum quid, qua fit aliquid secundum formam substantialem vel accidentalem, est aliquid in generato. Ergo multo magis creatio, qua fit aliquid secundum totam substantiam, est aliquid in creato. Respondeo, dicendum, quod creatio ponit aliquid in creato secundum relationem tantum; quia quod creatur non fit per motum vel per mutationem. Quod enim fit per motum vel mutationem, fit ex aliquo præxistente. Quod quidem contingit in productione particularibus aliquorum entium. Non autem potest hoc contingere in productione totius esse a causa universali omnium entium, quæ est Deus. Unde Deus creando producit res sine motu. Subtracto autem motu ab actione et passione, nihil remanet nisi relatio, ut dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quædam ad Creatorem ut ad principium sui esse; sicut in passione, quæ est cum motu, importatur relatio ad principium motus.
\n[I.q.45.a.3.co] Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement, or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement. Now when movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above (2, ad 2). Hence creation in the creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion, which implies movement, is implied a relation to the principle of motion.
\n[I.q.45.a.3.ad.1] Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real relation, as was said above (Question 13, Article 7) in treating of the divine names.
\n[I.q.45.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod creatio active significata significat actionem divinam, quæ est ejus essentia, cum relatione ad creaturam. Sed relatio in Deo ad creaturam non est realis, sed secundum rationem tantum; relatio vero creaturæ ad Deum est relatio realis, ut supra dictum est, cum de divinis nominibus ageretur. Ad secundum, dicendum, quod quia creatio significatur ut mutatio, sicut dictum est mutatio autem media quodam modo est inter movens et motum; ideo etiam creatio significatur ut media inter Creatorem et creaturam. Et tamen creatio passive accepta est in creatura, et est creatura. Neque tamen oportet quod aliqua alia creatione creetur; quia relationes, cum hoc ipsum quod sunt, ad aliquid dicantur, non referuntur per aliquas alias relationes, sed per 1 Ita cod. Alcan. Garcias, et Nicolaï; edit. Rom. et Patav., etc.: « similiter est fieri. » 2 Ita codd.; edit. Rom. et Nicolaï: « quod fit, est, sed cum dicitur fieri, significatur ab alio esse, » etc. seipsas; sicut etiam supra dictum est, cum de aequalitate personarum ageretur.
\n[I.q.45.a.3.ad.2] Because creation is signified as a change, as was said above (2, ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive creation is in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further creation in its creation; because relations, or their entire nature being referred to something, are not referred by any other relations, but by themselves; as was also shown above (42, 1, ad 4), in treating of the equality of the Persons.
\n[I.q.45.a.3.ad.3] The creature is the term of creation as signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real relation, and is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the part of the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of the creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the creature is it should be created; because creation imports a relation of the creature to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.
\n[I.q.45.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod creationis, secundum quod significatur ut mutatio, creatura est terminus; sed secundum quod vera est relatio, creatura est ejus subjectum, et prius ea in esse, sicut subjectum acci-dente; sed habet quamdam rationem pri-ritatis ex parte objecti ad quod dicitur, quod est principium creaturæ. Neque tamen opor-tet quod, quamdiu creatura sit, dicatur creari; quia creatio importat habitudinem creaturæ ad Creatorem cum quadam novi-itate seu inceptione.
\n[I.q.45.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that to be created does not belong to composite and subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv) it is said, \"The first of creatures is being.\" But the being of a thing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking does not belong to subsisting and composite things.
\n[I.q.45.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod creari non sit proprium compositorum et subsistentium. Dicitur enim in lib. De causis, prop. 4, in princ.: « Prima rerum creatarum est esse. » Sed esse rei creata non est subsistens. Ergo creatio proprie non est subsistentis et compositi.
\n[I.q.45.a.4.arg.2] Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own component parts. Therefore composite things are not created.
\n[I.q.45.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, creatur quod ex nihilo est. Composita autem non sunt ex nihilo, sed ex suis componentibus. Ergo compositis non competit creari.
\n[I.q.45.a.4.arg.3] Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore matter, and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.
\n[I.q.45.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illud proprie producitur per primam emanationem quod supponitur in secunda; sicut res naturalis producitur per generationem naturalem, quæ supponitur in operatione artis. Sed illud quod supponitur in generatione naturali, est materia. Ergo materia est quæ proprie creatur, et non compositum.
\n[I.q.45.a.4.sc] It is said (Genesis 1:1): \"In the beginning God created heaven and earth.\" But heaven and earth are subsisting composite things. Therefore creation belongs to them.
\n[I.q.45.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Genes., 1, 4: In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram. Cælum autem et terra sunt res compositæ subsistentes. Ergo horum proprie est creatio.
\n[I.q.45.a.4.co] To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown above (44, 2, ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has being--that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be \"of a being\" than \"a being.\" Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called rather \"concreated\" than \"created\" things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.
\n[I.q.45.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod creari est quoddam fieri, ut dictum est. Fieri autem ordinatur ad esse rei. Unde illis proprie convenit fieri et creari quibus convenit esse; quod quidem convenit proprie subsistenti-bus, sive sint simplicia, sicut substantiae separatæ, sive sint composita, sicut substantiae materiales. Illi enim proprie convenit esse quod habet esse, et est subsistens in suo esse. Formæ autem, et accidentia et alia hu-jusmodi non dicuntur entia quasi ipsa sint, sed quia eis aliquid est, ut albedo ea ratione dicitur ens, quia ea subjectum est album. Unde, secundum Philosophum, VII Metaph., text. 2, accidens magis proprie dicitur entis quam ens. Sicut igitur accidentia et formæ, et hujusmodi quæ non subsistunt, magis sunt coexistentia quam entia: ita magis debent dici concreata quam creata; proprie vero creata sunt subsistentia.
\n[I.q.45.a.4.ad.1] In the proposition \"the first of created things is being,\" the word \"being\" does not refer to the subject of creation, but to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because it is \"this\" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as was said above (Article 1). We use a similar way of speaking when we say that \"the first visible thing is color,\" although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is what is seen.
\n[I.q.45.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum dicitur: « Prima rerum creatarum est esse, » ly « esse » non importat substantiam creatam, sed importat propriam rationem objecti creationis. Nam ex eo dicitur aliquid creatum quod est ens, non ex eo quod est hoc ens, cum creatio sit emanatio totius esse ab ente universali, ut dictum est. Et est similis modus loquendi, sicut si diceretur quod primum visibile est color, quamvis illud quod proprie videtur, sit coloratum.
\n[I.q.45.a.4.ad.2] Creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the \"composite\" is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its principles.
\n[I.q.45.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod creatio non dicit constitutionem rei compositæ ex principiis præexistentibus: sed compositum sic dicitur creari, quod simul cum omnibus suis principiis in esse producitur.
\n[I.q.45.a.4.ad.3] This reason does not prove that matter alone is created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for creation is the production of the whole being, and not only matter.
\n[I.q.45.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa non probat quod sola materia creetur, sed quod materia non sit nisi ex creatione; nam creatio est productio totius esse, et non solum materiæ.
\n[I.q.45.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34), what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless can make their own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance like to itself. But immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it has no matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create.
\n[I.q.45.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod non solius Dei sit creare. Quia, secundum Philosophum, lib. II De anima, text. 34, perfectum est quod potest sibi simile facere. Sed creaturæ immateriales sunt perfectiores creaturis materialibus, quæ faciunt sibi simile; ignis enim generat ignem, et homo generat hominem. Ergo substantia immaterialis potest facere substantiam sibi similem. Sed substantia immaterialis non potest fieri nisi per creationem, cum non habeat materiam ex qua fiat. Ergo aliqua creatura potest creare.
\n[I.q.45.a.5.arg.2] Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker. But a \"contrary\" resists more than \"nothing.\" Therefore it requires more power to make (something) from its contrary, which nevertheless a creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore can a creature do this.
\n[I.q.45.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quanto major est resistentia ex parte facti, tanto major virtus requiritur in faciente. Sed plus resistit contrarium quam nihil. Ergo majoris virtutis est aliquid facere ex contrario, quod tamen creatura facit, quam aliquid facere ex nihilo. Multo magis igitur creatura hoc facere potest.
\n[I.q.45.a.5.arg.3] Further, the power of the maker is considered according to the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we proved above when treating of the infinity of God (7, 2,3,4). Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.
\n[I.q.45.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, virtus facientis consideratur secundum mensuram ejus quod fit. Sed ens creatum est finitum, ut supra probatum est, cum de Dei infinitate ageretur. Ergo ad producendum per creationem aliquid creatum, non requiritur nisi virtus finita. Sed habere virtutem finitam non est contra rationem creaturæ. Ergo non est imposibile creaturam creare.
\n[I.q.45.a.5.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good nor bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other creatures.
\n[I.q.45.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, De Trinit., lib. III, c. viii, § 43, col. 876, t. 8, quod neque boni neque mali angeli possunt esse creatores alicujus rei. Multo minus igitur aliæ creaturæ.
\n[I.q.45.a.5.co] It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according to what precedes (1), that to create can be the action of God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis prop., iii) that \"neither intelligence nor the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by divine operation.\" Now to produce being absolutely, not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone.
\nIt happens, however, that something participates the proper action of another, not by its own power, but instrumentally, inasmuch as it acts by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire. And so some have supposed that although creation is the proper act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the power of the first cause, can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that the first separate substance created by God created another after itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies. And in the same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that the latter can create ministerially, not by its own power.
\nBut such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause does not participate the action of the superior cause, except inasmuch as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal agent. If therefore it effects nothing, according to what is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any need of certain instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its own form, produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect, since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossible for any creature to create, either by its own power or instrumentally--that is, ministerially.
\nAnd above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it requires in its action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the very idea of creation.
\n[I.q.45.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod satis apparet in primo aspectu secundum præmissa, quod creare non potest esse propria actio nisi solius Dei. Oportet enim universaliores effectus in universaliores et priores causas reducere. Inter omnes autem effectus universalissimum est ipsum esse. Unde oportet quod sit proprius effectus primæ et universalissimum causæ, quæ est Deus. Unde etiam dicitur lib. De causis, prop. 3, quod « neque intelligentia nec anima nobis dat esse, nisi inquantum operatur operatione divina. » Producere autem esse absolute, non inquantum est hoc vel tale, pertinet ad rationem creationis. Unde manifestum est quod creatio est propria actio ipsius Dei. Contingit autem quod aliquid participet actionem propriam alicujus alterius, non virtute propria, sed instrumentaliter, inquantum agit in virtute alterius: sicut aer per virtutem ignis habet calefacere et ignire. Et secundum hoc aliqui opinati sunt quod, licet creatio sit propria actio universalis causæ, tamen aliqua inferiorum causarum, inquantum agit in virtute primæ causæ, potest creare. Et sic posuit Avicenna quod prima substantia separata creata a Deo creat aliam post se, et substantiam orbis et animam ejus; et quod substantia orbis creat materiam inferiorum corporum. Et secundum hunc etiam modum Magister dicit in v dist., IV Sent., § 3, quod Deus potest creaturæ communicare potentiam creandi, ut creet per ministerium, non propria auctoritate. Sed hoc esse non potest: quia causa secunda instrumentalis non participat actionem causæ superioris, nisi inquantum per aliquid sibi proprium dispositive operatur ad effectum principalis agentis. Si igitur nihil ibi ageret secundum illud quod est sibi proprium, frustra adhiberetur ad agendum. Nec oporteret esse determinata instrumenta determinatarum actionum. Sic enim videmus quod securis, scindendo lignum, quod habet ex proprietate suæ formæ, producit scamni formam, quæ est effectus proprius principalis agentis. Illud autem quod est proprius effectus Dei creantis, est illud quod præsupponitur omnibus aliis; scilicet esse absolute. Unde non potest aliquid aliud operari dispositive et instrumentaliter ad hunc effectum, cum creatio non sit ex aliquo præsupposito quod possit disponi per actionem instrumentalis agentis. Sic igitur imposibile est quod alicui creaturæ conveniat creare neque virtute propria, neque instrumentaliter, sive per ministerium. Et hoc præcipue inconveniens est dici de aliquo corpore, quod creet, cum nullum corpus agat nisi tangendo, vel movendo; et sic requirit in sua actione aliquid præexistens, quod possit tangi et moveri; quod est contra rationem creationis.
\n[I.q.45.a.5.ad.1] A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by applying it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause of himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate matter whereby he is an individual man. But as an individual man participates human nature, so every created being participates, so to speak, the nature of being; for God alone is His own being, as we have said above (7, 1,2). Therefore no created being can produce a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes \"being\" in \"this\": and so it is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing, before the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But in an immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything whereby it is this thing; because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has being, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its being, but only as regards some added perfection; as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, x). In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle says (Ephesians 3:15): \"From whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named.\" From which evidently appears that no created being can cause anything, unless something is presupposed; which is against the very idea of creation.
\n[I.q.45.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliquod perfectum participans aliquam naturam facit sibi simile, non quidem producendo absolute illam naturam, sed applicando eam ad aliquid. Non enim hic homo potest esse causa naturæ humanæ absolute, quia sic esset causa sui ipsius: sed est causa quod natura humana sit in hoc homine generato; et sic præsupponit in sua actione determinatam materiam, per quam est hic homo. Sed sicut homo participat humanam naturam, ita quodcumque ens creatum participat, ut ita dixerim, naturam essendi; quia solus Deus est suum esse, ut supra dictum est. Nullum igitur ens creatum potest producere aliquod ens absolute, nisi inquantum esse causat in hoc. Et sic oportet quod id per quod aliquid est hoc, præintelligatur actioni qua facit sibi simile. In substantia autem immateriali non potest præintelligi aliquid per quod sit hæc; quia est hæc per suam formam, per quam habet esse, cum sint formæ subsistentes. Igitur substantia immaterialis non potest producere aliam substantiam immaterialem sibi similem quantum ad esse ejus, sed quantum ad perfectionem aliquam superadditam; sicut si dicamus quod superior angelus illuminat inferiorem, ut Dionysius dicit, Cæl. hier., c. iv, § 3, col. 182, et c. x, § 2, col. 274, tom. I. Secundum quem modum etiam in cælestibus est paternitas, ut ex verbis Apostoli patet, Ephes., III, 15: Ex quo omnis paternitas in cælis et in terra nominatur. Et ex hoc etiam evidenter apparet quod nullum ens creatum potest causare aliquid, nisi præsupposito aliquo; quod repugnat rationi creationis.
\n[I.q.45.a.5.ad.2] A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality. And so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce, as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, whereby the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act; and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a much greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of much greater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary.
\n[I.q.45.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex contrario fit aliquid per accidens, ut dicitur in I Physic., text. 43 et seqq. Per se autem fit aliquid ex subjecto, quod est in potentia. Contrarium igitur resistit agenti inquantum impedit potentiam ab actu, in quem intendit reducere materiam agens; sicut ignis intendit reducere aquam in actum sibi similem, sed impeditur per formam et dispositiones contrarias quibus quasi ligatur potentia ne reducatur in actum; et quanto magis fuerit potentia ligata, tanto requiritur major virtus in agente ad reducendam materiam in actum; unde multo major potentia requiritur in agente, si nulla potentia præexistat. Sic ergo patet quod multo majoris virtutis est facere aliquid ex nihilo quam ex contrario.
\n[I.q.45.a.5.ad.3] The power of the maker is reckoned not only from the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being made; for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power, yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which appears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater power is required in the agent in proportion to the distance of the potentiality from the act, it follows that the power of that which produces something from no presupposed potentiality is infinite, because there is no proportion between \"no potentiality\" and the potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural agent, as there is no proportion between \"not being\" and \"being.\" And because no creature has simply an infinite power, any more than it has an infinite being, as was proved above (Question 7, Article 2), it follows that no creature can create.
\n[I.q.45.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod virtus facientis non solum consideratur ex substantia facti, sed etiam ex modo faciendi; major enim calor non solum magis, sed etiam citius calefacit. Quamvis igitur creare aliquem effectum finitum non demonstret potentiam infinitam, tamen creare ipsum ex nihilo demonstrat potentiam infinitam. Quod ex prædictis patet. Si enim tanto major vir-tus requiritur in agente, quanto potentia est magis remota ab actu, oportet quod virtus agentis ex nulla præsupposita potentia, quale agens est creans, sit infinita; quia nulla proportio est nullius potentiæ ad aliquam potentiam, quam præsupponit virtus agentis naturalis, sicut non entis ad ens. Et quia nulla creatura habet simpliciter potentiam infinitam sicut neque esse infinitum, ut supra probatum est, relinquitur quod nulla creatura possit creare.
\n[I.q.45.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that to create is proper to some Person. For what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is perfect is the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the divine Person is prior to the procession of the creature: and is more perfect, because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its principle; whereas the creature proceeds in imperfect similitude. Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of the processions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person.
\n[I.q.45.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod creare sit proprium alicujus personæ. Quod enim est prius, est causa ejus quod est post, et perfectum est causa imperfecti. Sed processio divinæ personæ est prior quam processio creaturæ, et magis perfecta; quia divina persona procedit in perfecta similitudine sui principii, creatura vero in imperfecta. Ergo processiones divinarum personarum sunt causa processionis rerum, et sic creare est proprium personæ.
\n[I.q.45.a.6.arg.2] Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever difference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them according to the processions and relations of the Persons. But the causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons; for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed that \"He is the Creator of all things visible and invisible\"; to the Son is attributed that by Him \"all things were made\"; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that He is \"Lord and Life-giver.\" Therefore the causation of creatures belongs to the Persons according to processions and relations.
\n[I.q.45.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, personæ divinæ non distinguuntur ab invicem, nisi per suas processiones et relationes. Quidquid igitur differenter attribuitur divinis personis hoc, convenit eis secundum processiones et relationes personarum. Sed causalitas creaturarum diversimode attribuitur divinis personis; Avicenna et quidam alii philosophi a Deo dixerunt fuisse causatam unam intelligentiam primam, tanquam causatum primum a quo alia intelligentia per creationem producitur. Sed ex nihilo simpliciter creatura quælibet nil educere potest, et hujus unam pulcherrimam rationem S. Bonaventura tradit dicens: « Quantum quis recipit ab aliquo, in tantum ei tenetur; sed quia creatio est in qua totum esse et tota substantia ex nihilo producitur, si quis hoc recipet a creatura, tunc ille teneretur ipsi creaturæ creanti ex toto. Ideo non fuit conveniens quod creatura crearet. » Rationes vero metaphysicæ variæ sunt. Juxta S. Bonaventuram, supra infinitam distantiam non nisi virtus infinita potest, sed inter nihilum et ens creationis terminos infinita distantia datur; ergo. — Sic Scotus etiam.
\n[I.q.45.a.6.arg.3] Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person, this does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect is caused by every essential attribute--viz. by power, goodness and wisdom--and thus does not belong to one more than to another. Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought not to be attributed to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished in creating according to relations and processions.
\n[I.q.45.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si dicatur quod causalitas creaturæ attenditur secundum aliquod attributum essentiale quod appropriatur alicui personæ, hoc non videtur sufficiens; quia quilibet effectus divinus causatur a quolibet attributo essentiali, scilicet potentia, bonitate et sapientia; et sic non magis pertinet ad unum quam ad aliud. Non debet ergo aliquis determinatus modus causalitatis attribui uni personæ magis quam alii, nisi distinguantur in creando secundum relationes et processiones.
\n[I.q.45.a.6.sc] Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things caused are the common work of the whole Godhead.
\n[I.q.45.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, De divin. nom., c. ii, § 1, col. 638, t. 1, quod communia totius divinitatis sunt omnia creabilia.
\n[I.q.45.a.6.co] To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle of action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any one Person, but is common to the whole Trinity.
\nNevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation of things. For as was said above (14, 8; 19, 4), when treating of the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the love of his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures inasmuch as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will.
\n[I.q.45.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod creare est proprie causare sive producere esse rerum. Cum autem omne agens agat sibi simile, principium actionis considerari potest ex actionis effectu; ignis enim est qui generat ignem. Et ideo creare convenit Deo secundum suum esse, quod est ejus essentia, quae est communis tribus personis. Unde creare non est proprium alicui personæ, sed commune toti Trinitati. Sed tamen divinæ personæ secundum rationem suæ processionis habent causalitatem respectu creationis rerum. Ut enim supra ostensum est, cum de Dei scientia et voluntate ageretur, Deus est causa rerum per suum intellectum et voluntatem, sicut artifex rerum artificiatarum. Artifex autem per verbum in intellectu conceptum, et per amorem suæ voluntatis ad aliquid relatum, operatur. Unde et Deus Pater operatus est creaturam per suum verbum, quod est Filius, et per suum amorem, qui est Spiritus sanctus. Et secundum hoc processiones personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum, inquantum includunt essentialia attributa, quæ sunt scientia et voluntas.
\n[I.q.45.a.6.ad.1] The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained.
\n[I.q.45.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod processiones divinarum personarum sunt causa creationis, sicut dictum est.
\n[I.q.45.a.6.ad.2] As the divine nature, although common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common to the three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both. Hence to be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not receive the power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said (John 1:3), \"Through Him all things were made,\" inasmuch as He has the same power, but from another; for this preposition \"through\" usually denotes a mediate cause, or \"a principle from a principle.\" But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both, is attributed that by His sway He governs, and quickens what is created by the Father through the Son. Again, the reason for this particular appropriation may be taken from the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated (39, 8, ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to Him to be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is said: \"Through Whom all things were made.\" And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to which belong both government, which brings things to their proper end, and the giving of life--for life consists in a certain interior movement; and the first mover is the end, and goodness.
\n[I.q.45.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut natura divina, licet sit communis tribus personis, ordine tamen quodam eis convenit, inquantum Filius accipit naturam divinam a Patre, et Spiritus sanctus ab utroque; ita etiam et virtus creandi, licet sit communis tribus personis, ordine tamen quodam eis convenit. Nam Filius habet eam a Patre, et Spiritus sanctus ab utroque. Unde creatorem esse attribuitur Patri, ut ei qui non habet virtutem creandi ab alio. De Filio autem dicitur, Joan., i, 3: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, inquantum habet eamdem virtutem, sed ab alio; nam hæc præpositio, per, solet denotare causam mediam, sive principium de principio. Sed Spiritui sancto, qui habet eamdem virtutem ab utroque, attribuitur quod dominando gubernet et vivificet quæ sunt creata a Patre per Filium. Potest etiam hujus attributionis communis ratio accipi ex appropriatione essentialium attributorum. Nam, sicut supra dictum est, Patri attribuitur et appropriatur potentia, quæ maxime manifestatur in creatione; et ideo attribuitur Patri creatorem esse. Filio autem appropriatur sapientia, per quam agens per intellectum operatur, et ideo dicitur de Filio: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt. Spiritui sancto autem appropriatur bonitas, ad quam pertinet gubernatio deducens res in debitos fines, et vivificatio; nam vita in interiori quodam motu consistit; primum autem movens est finis et bonitas.
\n[I.q.45.a.6.ad.3] Although every effect of God proceeds from each attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is naturally connected; thus the order of things is reduced to \"wisdom,\" and the justification of the sinner to \"mercy\" and \"goodness\" poured out super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to \"power.\"
\n[I.q.45.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, licet quilibet effectus Dei procedat ex quolibet attributorum, tamen reducitur unusquisque effectus ad illud attributum cum quo habet convenientiam secundum propriam rationem; sicut ordinatio rerum ad sapientiam; et justificatio impii, ad misericordiam et bonitatem se superabundanter diffundentem. Creatio vero, quæ est productio ipsius substantiæ rei, reducitur ad potentiam.
\n[I.q.45.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through its traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures, as was above stated (32, 1). Therefore there is no trace of the Trinity in creatures.
\n[I.q.45.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in creaturis non sit necesse inveniri vestigium Trinitatis. Per sua enim vestigia unumquodque investigari potest. Sed Trinitas personarum non potest investigari ex creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo vestigia Trinitatis non sunt in creatura.
\n[I.q.45.a.7.arg.2] Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some of their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the Trinity, it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity in each of these (properties): and so on to infinitude.
\n[I.q.45.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quidquid in creatura est, creatum est. Si igitur vestigium Trinitatis inventur in creatura secundum aliquas proprietates suas, et omne creatum habet vestigium Trinitatis, oportet in unaquaque illarum inventiri etiam vestigium Trinitatis; et sic in infinitum.
\n[I.q.45.a.7.arg.3] Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to the relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore in the creature is to be found a trace not of the Trinity but of the unity of essence.
\n[I.q.45.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, effectus non repræsentat nisi suam causam. Sed causalitas creaturarum pertinet ad naturam communem, non autem ad relationes quibus personæ distinguuntur et numerantur. Ergo in creatura non inventur vestigium Trinitatis, sed solum unitatis essentiæ.
\n[I.q.45.a.7.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), that \"the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures.\"
\n[I.q.45.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VI De Trin., c. x, col. 932, tom. VIII, quod Trinitatis vestigium in creaturis apparet.
\n[I.q.45.a.7.co] Every effect in some degree represents its cause, but diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the cause, but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is called a \"trace\": for a trace shows that someone has passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents fire generating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the representation of \"image.\" Now the processions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was said above (Article 27). For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in rational creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding.
\nBut in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form, whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the \"principle from no principle.\" According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is from the conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And therefore Augustine says (De Trin. vi 10) that the trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according \"as it is one individual,\" and according \"as it is formed by a species,\" and according as it \"has a certain relation of order.\" And to these also are reduced those three, \"number,\" \"weight,\" and \"measure,\" mentioned in the Book of Wisdom (9:21). For \"measure\" refers to the substance of the thing limited by its principles, \"number\" refers to the species, \"weight\" refers to the order. And to these three are reduced the other three mentioned by Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), \"mode,\" \"species,\" and \"order,\" and also those he mentions (QQ. 83, qu. 18): \"that which exists; whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees.\" For a thing exists by its substance, is distinct by its form, and agrees by its order. Other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above.
\n[I.q.45.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod omnis effectus aliqualiter repræsentat suam causam, sed diversimode. Nam aliquis effectus repræsentat solam causalitatem causæ, non autem formam ejus, sicut fumus repræsentat ignem; et talis repræsentatio videtur esse repræsentatio vestigii: vestigium enim demonstrat motum alicujus transeuntis, sed non qualis sit. Aliquis autem effectus repræsentat causam quantum ad similitudinem formæ ejus, sicut ignis generatus ignem generantem, et statua Mercurii Mercurium; et hæc est repræsentatio imaginis. Processiones autem divinarum personarum attenduntur secundum actus intellectus et voluntatis, sicut supra dictum est. Nam Filius procedit ut verbum intellectus, Spiritus sanctus ut amor voluntatis. In creaturis igitur rationalibus, in quibus est intellectus et voluntas, inventur repræsentatio Trinitatis per modum imaginis, in quantum inventur in eis verbum conceptum, et amor procedens. Sed in creaturis omnibus inventur repræsentatio Trinitatis per modum vestigii, inquantum in qualibet creatura inventur aliqua quæ necesse est reducere in divinas personas sicut in causam. Quælibet enim creatura subsistit in suo esse, et habet formam, per quam determinatur ad speciem, et habet ordinem ad aliquid aliud. Secundum igitur quod est quædam substantia creata, repræsentat causam et principium; et sic demonstrat personam Patris, qui est principium non de principio. Secundum autem quod habet quamdam formam et speciem, repræsentat Verbum, secundum quod forma artificiati est ex conceptione artificis. Secundum autem quod habet ordinem repræsentat Spiritum sanctum, inquantum est amor: quia ordo effectus ad aliquid alterum est ex voluntate creantis. Et ideo dicit Augustinus, De Trin., lib. VI, c. x, col. 932, tom. VIII, quod vestigium Trinitatis inventur in unaquaque creatura, secundum quod unum aliquid est, et secundum quod aliqua specie formatur, et secundum quod quem-dam ordinem tenet. Et ad hæc etiam reducuntur illa tria, numerus, pondus et mensura, quæ ponuntur Sap., xi. Nam mensura refertur ad substantiam rei limitatam suis principiis, numerus ad speciem, pondus ad ordinem. Et ad hæc tria reducuntur alia tria quæ ponit Augustinus in lib. De natura boni, c. Ⅲ, col. 553, t. 8: « Modus, species et ordo; » et ea quæ ponit in lib. LXXXIII Quæstionum, quæst. xviii, col. 45, tom. VI, « quo constat, quo discernitur, quo congruit. » Constat enim aliquid per suam substantiam, discernitur per formam, congruit per ordinem. Et in idem de facili reduci possunt quæcumque sic dicuntur.
\n[I.q.45.a.7.ad.1] The representation of the trace is to be referred to the appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a knowledge of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we have said (32, 1).
\n[I.q.45.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod repræsentatio vestigii attenditur secundum appropriata; per quem modum ex creaturis in Trinitatem divinarum personarum veniri potest, ut dictum est.
\n[I.q.45.a.7.ad.2] A creature properly speaking is a thing self-subsisting; and in such are the three above-mentioned things to be found. Nor is it necessary that these three things should be found in all that exists in the creature; but only to a subsisting being is the trace ascribed in regard to those three things.
\n[I.q.45.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod creatura est res proprie subsistens, in qua est prædicata tria invenire. Neque oportet quod in quolibet eorum quæ ei insunt, hæc tria inveniantur; sed secundum ea vestigium rei subsistenti attribuitur.
\n[I.q.45.a.7.ad.3] The processions of the persons are also in some way the cause and type of creation; as appears from the above (Article 6).
\n[I.q.45.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam processiones personarum sunt causa et ratio creationis aliquo modo, ut dictum est.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and thus in every operation of nature and art there is creation.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod creatio admisceatur in operibus naturæ et artis. In qualibet enim operatione naturæ et artis producitur aliqua forma. Sed non producitur ex aliquo, cum non habeat materiam partem sui. Ergo producitur ex nihilo; et sic in qualibet operatione naturæ et artis est creatio.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.arg.2] Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause. But in natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which is an active or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it must be produced by creation.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, effectus non est potior sua causa. Sed in rebus naturalibus non inventur aliquid agens nisi forma accidentalis, quæ est forma activa vel passiva. Non ergo per operationem naturæ producitur forma substantialis. Relinquitur igitur quod sit per creationem.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.arg.3] Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident in animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason applies to other things.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, natura facit sibi simile. Sed quædam inveniuntur generata in natura non ab aliquo sibi simili, sicut patet in animalibus generatis per putrefactionem. Ergo eorum forma non est a natura sed a creatione; et eadem ratio est de aliis.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.arg.4] Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If therefore in nature's productions there were not creation, it would follow that nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.arg.4] 4. Præterea quod non creatur non est creatura. Si igitur in his quæ sunt a natura non adjungatur creatio, sequitur quod ea quæ sunt a natura, non sunt creaturæ; quod est hæreticum.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.sc] Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creation.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus Super Genes. ad litt., lib. VI, c. vi, xi et xiv, col. 342, tom. III, distinguit opus propagationis, quod est opus naturæ, ab opere creationis.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.co] The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which, some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent. This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms pre-exist in matter, \"in potentiality,\" they asserted that they pre-exist \"simply.\" Others, however, said that the forms were given or caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of nature is joined creation. But this opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting, but is that by which a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone, as shown above (Article 4), it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be \"concreated.\" What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is the \"composite,\" which is made from matter.
\nHence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is presupposed to the work of nature.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hæc dubitatio inducitur propter formas, quas quidam posuerunt non incipere per actionem naturæ, sed prius in materia extitisse, ponentes latitationem formarum. Et hoc accidit eis ex ignorantia materiæ, quia nesciebant distinguere inter potentiam et actum. Quia enim formæ præexistunt in materia in potentia, posuerunt eas simpliciter præexistere. Alii vero posuerunt formas dari vel causari ab agente separato per modum creationis; et secundum hoc cuilibet operationi naturæ adjungitur creatio. Sed hoc accidit eis ex ignorantia formæ. Non enim considerabant quod forma naturalis corporis non est subsistens, sed quo aliquid est. Et ideo, cum fieri et creari non conveniat proprie nisi rei subsistenti, sicut supra dictum est, formarum non est fieri neque creari, sed concreatas esse. Quod autem proprie fit ab agente naturali est compositum, quod fit ex materia. Unde in operibus naturæ non admisceur creatio, sed præsupponitur aliquid ad operationem naturæ.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.ad.1] Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made, not as though they were made \"directly,\" but only \"indirectly.\"
\n[I.q.45.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod formæ incipiunt esse in actu, compositis factis, non quod ipse fiant per se, sed per accidens tantum.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.ad.2] The active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces its like according to quality, but according to species.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod qualitates activæ in natura agunt in virtute formarum substantialium; et ideo agens naturale non solum producit sibi simile secundum qualitatem, sed secundum speciem.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.ad.3] For the generation of imperfect animals, a universal agent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial power to which they are assimilated, not in species, but according to a kind of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are created by a separate agent. However, for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper agent is required, in the shape of a univocal generator.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ad generationem animalium imperfectorum sufficit agens universale, quod est virtus cælestis cui assimilantur non secundum species, sed secundum analogiam quamdam. Neque oportet dicere quod eorum formæ creantur ab agente separato. Ad generationem vero animalium perfectorum non sufficit agens universale, sed requiritur agens proprium, quod est generans univocum.
\n[I.q.45.a.8.ad.4] The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature are called creatures.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I.q.45.a.8.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod operatio naturae non est nisi ex præsuppositione principiorum creatorum; et sic ea quæ per naturam fiunt, creaturæ dicuntur.
\n