[I.q.54.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is his substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the active intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect is its own action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and from his Commentator [Averroes, A.D. 1126-1198]. Therefore much more is the angel's substance his action--that is, his act of understanding.
\n[I.q.54.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod intelligere angeli sit ejus substantia. Angelus enim est sublimior et simplicior quam intellectus agens animæ. Sed substantia intellectus agentis est sua actio, ut patet III De anima, per Aristotelem, et ejus Commentatorem, text. 19. Ergo multo fortius substantia angeli est ejus actio, quæ est intelligere.
\n[I.q.54.a.1.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text 39) that \"the action of the intellect is life.\" But \"since in living things to live is to be,\" as he says (De Anima ii, text 37), it seems that life is essence. Therefore the action of the intellect is the essence of an angel who understands.
\n[I.q.54.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in XII Metaph., text. 39, quod « actio intellectus est vita. » Sed cum vivere sit esse viventibus, ut dicitur in II De anima, text. 37, videtur quod vita sit essentia. Ergo actio intellectus est essentia intelligentis angeli.
\n[I.q.54.a.1.arg.3] Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not differ from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are the same, at least in so far as he understands his own essence. Therefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect and the thing understood, is one with the substance of the angel who understands.
\n[I.q.54.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si extrema sunt unum, medium non differt ab eis; quia extremum magis distat ab extremo, quam medium. Sed in angelo idem est intelligens 1 et intelterialiter tempus est quantitas. Sed quia motus angeli non dependet ex motu cæli, sed ex voluntate angeli, tempus quod mensurat motum angeli non est idem, non habet eumdem influxum, eamdem librationem cum tempore quod mensurat motum cæli et omnia corporalia, siquidem a motore distincto procedit. 1 — 2 — 3 4 Sic cod.; in edit. omittitur: « non, » nec bene. En sensus: Abstractum secundum Logicos dicit solam formam in se: « castitas, veritas; » concrelectum, ad minus inquantum intelligit essentiam suam. Ergo intelligere quod cadit medium inter intelligens 2 et intellectum, est idem cum substantia angeli intelligentis.
\n[I.q.54.a.1.sc] The action of anything differs more from its substance than does its existence. But no creature's existence is its substance, for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was said above (Question 3, Article 4). Therefore neither the action of an angel, nor of any other creature, is its substance.
\n[I.q.54.a.1.sc] Sed contra, plus differt actio rei a substantia ejus quam ipsum esse ejus. Sed nullius creati esse est ejus substantia; hoc enim solius Dei proprium est, ut ex superioribus patet. Ergo neque angeli neque alterius creaturæ 3 sua actio est sua substantia.
\n[I.q.54.a.1.co] It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of any creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the actuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a substance or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is not a pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as His existence and His action.
\nBesides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists. Consequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from God's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in itself, nor from the substance of another angel.
\nAlso, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; for this comes about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding.
\n[I.q.54.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod impossibile est quod actio angeli vel cujuscumque alterius creaturæ, sit ejus substantia. Actio enim est proprie actualitas virtutis, sicut esse est actualitas substantiae vel essentiae. Impossibile est autem quod aliquid quod non est purus actus, sed aliquid habet de potentia admixtum, sit sua actualitas, quia actualitas potentialitati repugnat. Solus autem Deus est actus purus. Unde in solo Deo sua substantia est suum esse et suum agere. Præterea, si intelligere angeli esset ejus substantia, oporteret quod intelligere angeli esset subsistens. Intelligere autem subsistens non potest esse nisi unum, sicut nec aliquod abstractum non 4 subsistens. Unde unius angeli substantia non distingueretur neque a substantia Dei, quæ est ipsum intelligere subsistens, neque a substantia alterius angeli. Si etiam angelus ipse esset suum intelligere, non possent esse gradus in intelligendo perfectius et minus perfecte, cum hoc contingat propter diversam participationem ipsius intelligere.
\n[I.q.54.a.1.ad.1] When the active intellect is said to be its own action, such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because, since its very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in itself, action accompanies it: which cannot be said of the passive intellect, for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to act.
\n[I.q.54.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum dicitur quod intellectus agens est sua actio, est prædicatio non per essentiam, sed per concomitantiam; quia cum sit in actu ejus substantia, statim, quantum est in se, concomitatur ipsa actio; quod non est de intellectu possibili, qui non habet actiones, nisi postquam fuerit factus in actu. tum dicit formam cum substrato: « castum, verum. » Porro, ut ait Augustinus, lib. I, Solil., « non casto castitas, sed castitate fit castum; et cum casto quis moritur, non moritur castitas. » Unde castitas, quod est abstractum non subsistens, est una, et casti possunt esse multi. Si autem castitas esset subsistens non in aliquo subjecto vel substrato, sed in se, esset pariter una; et ideo D. Thomas dicit: intelligere angeli est quid abstractum; si illud intelligere esset in se subsistens non in aliquo subjecto a se distincto, esset unum illud intelligere, sicut omne abstractum non subsistens est unum.
\n[I.q.54.a.1.ad.2] The relation between \"life\" and \"to live\" is not the same as that between \"essence\" and \"to be\"; but rather as that between \"a race\" and \"to run,\" one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if \"to live\" is \"to be,\" that \"life\" is \"essence.\" Although life is sometimes put for the essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. x), \"Memory and understanding and will are one essence, one life\": yet it is not taken in this sense by the Philosopher, when he says that \"the act of the intellect is life.\"
\n[I.q.54.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod vita non hoc modo se habet ad vivere, sicut essentia ad esse, sed sicut cursus ad currere, quorum unum significat actum in abstracto, aliud in concreto. Unde non sequitur, si vivere sit esse, quod vita sit essentia; quamvis etiam quandoque vita pro essentia ponatur, secundum quod Augustinus dicit in lib. X De Trinit., cap. xi, col. 998, t. 8, et lib. IX, cap. iv, col. 963, etc., quod « memoria et intelligentia et voluntas sunt una essentia, una vita. » Sed sic non accipitur a Philosopho, cum dicit quod actus intellectus est vita.
\n[I.q.54.a.1.ad.3] The action which is transient, passing to some extrinsic object, is really a medium between the agent and the subject receiving the action. The action which remains within the agent, is not really a medium between the agent and the object, but only according to the manner of expression; for it really follows the union of the object with the agent. For the act of understanding is brought about by the union of the object understood with the one who understands it, as an effect which differs from both.
\n[I.q.54.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod actio quæ transit in aliquid extrinsecum, est realiter media inter agens et subjectum recipiens actionem; sed actio quæ manet in agente, non est realiter medium inter agens et objectum, sed secundum modum significandi tantum. Realiter vero consequitur unionem objecti cum agente; ex hoc enim quod intellectum fit unum cum intelligente, consequitur intelligere quasi quidam effectus differens ab utroque.
\n[I.q.54.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that in the angel to understand is to exist. For in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 37). But to \"understand is in a sense to live\" (De Anima ii, text. 37). Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.
\n[I.q.54.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod intelligere angeli sit ejus esse. Vivere enim viventibus est esse, ut dicitur in II De anima, text. 37. Sed intelligere est quoddam vivere, ut in eodem dicitur, text. 43. Ergo intelligere angeli est ejus esse.
\n[I.q.54.a.2.arg.2] Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect to effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the form by which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.
\n[I.q.54.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut se habet causa ad causam, ita effectus ad effectum. Sed forma per quam angelus est, est eadem cum forma per quam intelligit ad minus seipsum. Ergo ejus intelligere est idem cum ejus esse.
\n[I.q.54.a.2.sc] The angel's act of understanding is his movement, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not movement. Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand.
\n[I.q.54.a.2.sc] Sed contra, intelligere angeli est motus ejus, ut patet per Dionysium, De div. nom., cap. iv, § 8, col. 703, t. 4. Sed esse non est motus. Ergo esse angeli non est intelligere ejus.
\n[I.q.54.a.2.co] The action of the angel, as also the action of any creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text. 16), there is a twofold class of action; one which passes out to something beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting; and another which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such actions nothing outside is changed, but the whole action takes place within the agent. It is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be the agent's very existence: because the agent's existence is signified as within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from the agent into the thing done. But the second action of its own nature has infinity, either simple or relative. As an example of simple infinity, we have the act \"to understand,\" of which the object is \"the true\"; and the act \"to will,\" of which the object is \"the good\"; each of which is convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will, of themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives its species from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things; as sight does to all things visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted to one in genus and species; God's being alone is simply infinite, comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Hence the Divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its own act of will.
\n[I.q.54.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod actio angeli non est ejus esse, neque actio alicujus creaturæ. Duplex enim est actionis genus, ut dicitur IX Metaph., text. 16: una scilicet quæ transit in aliquid exterius, inferens ei passionem, sicut urere et secare; alia vero actio est quæ non transit in rem exteriorem, sed manet in ipso agente, sicut sentire, intelligere et velle; per hujusmodi enim actionem non mutatur aliquid extrinsecum, sed totum in ipso agente agitur. De prima ergo actione manifestum est quod non potest esse ipsum esse agentis; nam esse agentis significatur intra ipsum; actio autem talis est effluxus ab agente in actum. Secunda autem actio de sui ratione habet infinitatem vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem, sicut intelligere, cujus objectum est verum et velle, cujus objectum est bonum; quorum utrumque convertitur cum ente; et ita intelligere et velle, quantum est de se, habent se ad omnia, et utrumque recipit speciem ab objecto. Secundum quid autem infinitum est sentire, quod se habet ad omnia sensibilia, sicut visus ad omnia visibilia. Esse autem cujus-libet creaturæ est determinatum ad unum secundum genus et speciem. Esse autem solius Dei est simpliciter infinitum, in se omnia comprehendens, ut dicit Dionysius, De div. nom., c. v, § 4, col. 818, t. 1. Unde solum esse divinum, est divinum intelligere et divinum velle.
\n[I.q.54.a.2.ad.1] Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the living subject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one whereby something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher says that to understand is, in a sense, to live: for there he distinguishes the various grades of living things according to the various functions of life.
\n[I.q.54.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod vivere quandoque sumitur pro ipso esse viventis, quando vero pro operatione vitæ, id est, per quam demonstratur aliquid esse vivens. Et hoc modo Philosophus dicit quod intelligere est vivere quoddam; ibi enim distinguuit diversos gradus viventium secundum diversa opera vitæ.
\n[I.q.54.a.2.ad.2] The essence of an angel is the reason of his entire existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding, since he cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently in its own specific nature as such an essence, it is compared to the existence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is compared as included in the idea of a more universal object, namely, truth and being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form is the same, yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding according to the same formality. On this account it does not follow that in the angel \"to be\" is the same as 'to understand.'
\n[I.q.54.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ipsa essentia angeli est ratio totius ejus esse, non autem est ratio totius ejus intelligere, quia non omnia intelligere potest per suam essentiam; et ideo secundum propriam rationem, inquantum est talis essentia, comparatur ad ipsum esse angeli; sed ad ejus intelligere comparatur secundum rationem universalioris objecti, scilicet veri vel entis. Et sic patet quod licet sit eadem forma, non tamen secundum eamdem rationem est principium essendi et intelligendi. Et propter hoc non sequitur quod in angelo sit idem esse et intelligere. QUÆST. LIV, ART. II, III ET IV.
\n[I.q.54.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of understanding is not different from his essence. For, \"mind\" and \"intellect\" express the power of understanding. But in many passages of his writings, Dionysius styles angels \"intellects\" and \"minds.\" Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence.
\n[I.q.54.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod virtus vel potentia intellectiva in angelo non sit aliud quam sua essentia. Mens enim et intellectus nominant potentiam intellectivam. Sed Dionysius in pluribus locis suorum librorum, cap. 11, vi et xii Cælest. hierarch., et cap. vii et ix De div. nom., nominat ipsos angelos intellectus et mentes. Ergo angelus est sua potentia intellectiva.
\n[I.q.54.a.3.arg.2] Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which is besides the essence of anything, we call it accident. But \"a simple form cannot be a subject,\" as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been previously said (50, 2).
\n[I.q.54.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si potentia intellectiva in angelo est aliquid præter ejus essentiam, oportet quod sit accidents; hoc enim dicimus esse accidens alicujus, quod est præter ejus essentiam. Sed forma simplex subjectum esse non potest, ut Boetius dicit in lib. De Trin., c. 11, col. 1250, t. 2. Ergo angelus non est forma simplex; quod est contra præmissa.
\n[I.q.54.a.3.arg.3] Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the angelic nature \"nigh unto Himself,\" while He made primary matter \"nigh unto nothing\"; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler nature than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of intelligence.
\n[I.q.54.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit, XII Confess., cap. vii, col. 828. t. 1, quod « Deus fecit angelicam naturam prope se, materiam autem primam prope nihil. » Ex quo videtur quod angelus sit simplicior quam materia prima, utpote Deo propinquior. Sed materia prima est sua potentia. Ergo multo magis angelus est sua potentia intellectiva.
\n[I.q.54.a.3.sc] Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that \"the angels are divided into substance, power, and operation.\" Therefore substance, power, and operation, are all distinct in them.
\n[I.q.54.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, Angelicæ hier., c. xi, § 2, col. 283, t. 1, quod « angeli dividuntur in substantiam, virtu-tem et operationem. » Ergo aliud est in eis substantia, et aliud virtus, et aliud operatio.
\n[I.q.54.a.3.co] Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been already said (44, 1). Now the act to which the operative power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not the same as to exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel's essence is not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation.
\n[I.q.54.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nec in angelo, neque in aliqua creatura virtus vel potentia operativa est idem quod sua essentia. Quod sic patet. Cum enim potentia dicatur ad actum, oportet quod secundum diversitatem actuum sit diversitas potentiarum; propter quod dicitur quod proprius actus correspondet propriæ potentiæ. In omni autem creato essentia « Forma quæ est sine materia non poterit esse subjectum. » « Tu eras, et aliud nihil unde fecisti cælum et terram, duo quædam: unum prope te, alterum prope nihil. » differt ab ejus esse, et comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Actus autem ad quem comparatur potentia operativa, est operatio. In angelo autem non est idem intelligere et esse; nec aliqua alia operatio, aut in ipso aut in quocumque alio creato, est idem quod ejus essentia. Unde essentia angeli non est ejus potentia intellectiva, nec alicujus creati essentia est ejus operativa potentia.
\n[I.q.54.a.3.ad.1] An angel is called \"intellect\" and \"mind,\" because all his knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a soul is partly intellectual and partly sensitive.
\n[I.q.54.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod angelus dicitur intellectus et mens, quia tota ejus cognitio est intellectualis. Cognitio autem animæ partim est intellectualis et partim sensitiva.
\n[I.q.54.a.3.ad.2] A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject of accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of accident; and especially of such accident as follows the species: for such accident belongs to the form--whereas an accident which belongs to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole species, results from the matter, which is the principle of individuation. And such a simple form is an angel.
\n[I.q.54.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod forma simplex quæ est actus purus, nullius accidentis potest esse subjectum; quia subjectum comparatur ad accidens ut potentia ad actum; et hujusmodi est solus Deus; et de tali forma loquitur ibi Boetius. Forma autem simplex quæ non est suum esse, sed comparatur ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum, potest esse subjectum accidentis, et præcipue ejus quod consequitur speciem. Hujusmodi enim accidens pertinet ad formam. Accidens vero quod est individui, non consequens totam speciem, consequitur materiam, quæ est individuationis principium; et talis forma simplex est angelus.
\n[I.q.54.a.3.ad.3] The power of matter is a potentiality in regard to substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards accidental being. Hence there is no comparison.
\n[I.q.54.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod potentia materiae est ad ipsum esse substantiale, et non potentia operativa. Unde non est simile.
\n[I.q.54.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that there is both an active and a passive intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 17) that, \"in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something whereby it can become all things, and there is something whereby it can make all things.\" But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel.
\n[I.q.54.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in angelo sit intellectus agens et possibilis. Dicit enim Philosophus, in III De anima, text. 17, quod sicut in omni natura est aliquid quo est omnia fieri, et aliquid quo est omnia facere, ita etiam in anima. Sed angelus est natura quædam. Ergo in eo est intellectus agens et possibilis. Sive Cælest. hier. Loco « substantiae, » Corderius habet « essentiam. » Sic cod.; in edit.: « sed ad esse accidentale. »
\n[I.q.54.a.4.arg.2] Further, the proper function of the passive intellect is to receive; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active intellect, as is made clear in De Anima iii, text. 2,3,18. But an angel receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a lower one. Therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect.
\n[I.q.54.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, recipere est proprium intellectus possibilis; illuminare autem est proprium intellectus agentis, ut patet in III De anima, text. 2, 3 et 18. Sed angelus recipit illuminationem a superiori, et illuminat inferiorem. Ergo in eo est intellectus agens et possibilis.
\n[I.q.54.a.4.sc] The distinction of active and passive intellect in us is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the passive intellect as colors to the sight; but to the active intellect as colors to the light, as is clear from De Anima iii, text. 18. But this is not so in the angel. Therefore there is no active and passive intellect in the angel.
\n[I.q.54.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod in nobis intellectus agens et possibilis est per comparisonem ad phantasmata, quæ quidem comparantur ad intellectum possibile ut colores ad visum, ad intellectum autem agentem ut colores ad lumen, ut patet ex III De anima, eod. text. 18. Sed hoc non est in angelo. Ergo in angelo non est intellectus agens et possibilis.
\n[I.q.54.a.4.co] The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in us is derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in potentiality, and not actually. Hence there must exist some power, which, previous to the act of understanding, is in potentiality to intelligible things, but which becomes actuated in their regard when it apprehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. This is the power which is denominated the passive intellect. The necessity for admitting an active intellect is due to this--that the natures of the material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul, as immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in potentiality so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently it is necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such natures actually intelligible: and this power in us is called the active intellect.
\nBut each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with regard to such things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their intelligible objects in potentiality, but they are actually such; for they first and principally understand immaterial things, as will appear later (84, 7; 85, 1). Therefore there cannot be an active and a passive intellect in them, except equivocally.
\n[I.q.54.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necessitas ponendi intellectum possibile in nobis fuit propter hoc quod nos invenimur quandoque intelligentes in potentia et non in actu. Unde oportet esse quamdam virtutem quæ sit in potentia ad intelligibilia ante ipsum intelligere; sed educitur in actum eorum, cum fit sciens, et ulterius, cum fit considerans. Et hæc virtus vocatur intellectus possibilis. Necessitas autem ponendi intellectum agentem fuit, quia naturæ rerum materialium, quas non intelligimus, non subsistunt extra animam immateriales et intelligibiles in actu, sed sunt solum intelligibiles in potentia extra animam existentes. Et ideo oportuit esse aliquam virtutem quæ faceret illas naturas intelligibiles actu; et hæc virtus dicitur intellectus agens in nobis. Utraque autem necessitas deest in angelis; quia neque sunt quandoque intelligentes in potentia tantum, respectu eorum quæ naturaliter intelligunt: neque intelligibilia eorum sunt intelligibilia in potentia, sed in actu. Intelligunt enim primo et principaliter res immateriales, ut infra patebit; et ideo non potest in eis esse intellectus agens et possibilis, nisi æquivoce.
\n[I.q.54.a.4.ad.1] As the words themselves show, the Philosopher understands those two things to be in every nature in which there chances to be generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not generated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence there is not need for admitting an active and a passive intellect in them.
\n[I.q.54.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Philosophus intelligit illa duo esse in omni natura in qua contingit esse generari vel fieri, ut ipsa verba demonstrant. In angelis autem non generatur scientia, sed naturaliter adest. Unde non oportet ponere in eis agens et possibile.
\n[I.q.54.a.4.ad.2] It is the function of the active intellect to enlighten, not another intellect, but things which are intelligible in potentiality, in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be actually intelligible. It belongs to the passive intellect to be in potentiality with regard to things which are naturally capable of being known, and sometimes to apprehend them actually. Hence for one angel to enlighten another does not belong to the notion of an active intellect: neither does it belong to the passive intellect for the angel to be enlightened with regard to supernatural mysteries, to the knowledge of which he is sometimes in potentiality. But if anyone wishes to call these by the names of active and passive intellect, he will then be speaking equivocally; and it is not about names that we need trouble.
\n[I.q.54.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod intellectus agentis est illuminare, non quidem alium intelligentem, sed intelligibilia, inquantum per abstrationem facit ea intelligibilia actu. Ad intellectum autem possibilem pertinet esse in potentia respectu naturalium cognoscibilium, et quandoque fieri in actu. Unde quod angelus illuminat angelum, non pertinet ad rationem intellectus agentis; neque ad rationem intellectus possibilis pertinet quod illuminatur de supernaturalibus mysteriis, ad quæ cognoscenda quando est in potentia. Si quis autem velit hæc vocare intellectum agentem et possibilem, æquivoce dicet; nec de nominibus est curandum.
\n