[I.q.55.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the angels know all things by their substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that \"the angels, according to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are happening upon earth.\" But the angel's nature is his essence. Therefore the angel knows things by his essence.
\n[I.q.55.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod angeli cognoscant per suam substantiam. Dicit enim Dionysius, De div. nom., cap. vii, § 2, col. 870, t. 4, quod « angeli sciunt ea quæ sunt in terra, secundum propriam naturam mentis; » sed natura angeli est ejus essentia. Ergo angelus per suam essentiam res cognoscit.
\n[I.q.55.a.1.arg.2] Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, text. 51; De Anima iii, text. 15), \"in things which are without matter, the intellect is the same as the object understood.\" But the object understood is the same as the one who understands it, as regards that whereby it is understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as the angels, the medium whereby the object is understood is the very substance of the one understanding it.
\n[I.q.55.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, secundum Philosophum, in XII Metaph., text. 54, et in III De anima, text. 45: « In his quæ sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur. » Id autem quod intelligitur est idem intelligenti, ratione ejus quo intelligitur. Ergo in his 2 Corderius: « Angelos quoque Scriptura testatur ea scire quæ in terra sunt, non secundum sensus illa cognoscentes quæ sensibilia sunt, sed secundum virtutem ac naturam mentis deiformis. » quæ sunt sine materia, sicut sunt angeli, id quo intelligitur, est ipsa substantia intelligentis.
\n[I.q.55.a.1.arg.3] Further, everything which is contained in another is there according to the mode of the container. But an angel has an intellectual nature. Therefore whatever is in him is there in an intelligible mode. But all things are in him: because the lower orders of beings are essentially in the higher, while the higher are in the lower participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that God \"enfolds the whole in the whole,\" i.e. all in all. Therefore the angel knows all things in his substance.
\n[I.q.55.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne quod est in altero, est in eo per modum ejus in quo est. Sed angelus habet naturam intellectualem. Ergo quidquid est in ipso, est in eo per modum intelligibilem. Sed omnia sunt in eo: quia inferiora in entibus sunt in superioribus essentialiter; superiora vero sunt in inferioribus participative: et ideo dicit Dionysius, cap. iv De div. nom., § 7, col. 703, t. 1, quod « Deus tota in totis congregat, » id est, « omnia in omnibus. » Ergo angelus omnia in sua substantia cognoscit.
\n[I.q.55.a.1.sc] Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"the angels are enlightened by the forms of things.\" Therefore they know by the forms of things, and not by their own substance.
\n[I.q.55.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, in eodem cap., § 1, col. 695, t. 1, quod « angeli illuminantur rationibus rerum. » Ergo cognoscunt per rationes rerum, et non per propriam substantiam.
\n[I.q.55.a.1.co] The medium through which the intellect understands, is compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it is by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may be perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary for all things to which the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is that in things which are corruptible, the form does not perfectly complete the potentiality of the matter: because the potentiality of the matter extends to more things than are contained under this or that form. But the intellective power of the angel extends to understanding all things: because the object of the intellect is universal being or universal truth. The angel's essence, however, does not comprise all things in itself, since it is an essence restricted to a genus and species. This is proper to the Divine essence, which is infinite, simply and perfectly to comprise all things in Itself. Therefore God alone knows all things by His essence. But an angel cannot know all things by his essence; and his intellect must be perfected by some species in order to know things.
\n[I.q.55.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod illud quo intellectus intelligit comparatur ad intellectum intelligentem ut forma ejus, quia forma est quo agens agit. Oportet autem, ad hoc quod potentia perfecte compleatur per formam, quod omnia contineantur sub forma ad quæ potentia se extendit; et inde est quod in rebus corruptibilibus forma non perfecte complet potentiam materiæ, quia potentia materiæ ad plura se extendit quam sit continentia formæ hujus vel illius. Potentia autem intellectiva angeli se extendit ad intelligendum omnia; quia objectum intellectus est ens, vel verum commune. Ipsa autem essentia angeli non comprehendit in se omnia, cum sit essentia determinata ad genus et ad speciem. Hoc autem proprium est essentia divinæ, quæ infinita est, ut in se simpliciter omnia comprehendat perfecte. Et ideo solus Deus cognoscit omnia per suam essentiam; angelus autem per suam essentiam non potest omnia cognoscere, sed oportet intellectum ejus aliquibus speciebus perfici ad res cognoscendas.
\n[I.q.55.a.1.ad.1] When it is said that the angel knows things according to his own nature, the words \"according to\" do not determine the medium of such knowledge, since the medium is the similitude of the thing known; but they denote the knowing power, which belongs to the angel of his own nature.
\n[I.q.55.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum dicitur angelus secundum suam naturam res cognoscere, ly secundum non determinat medium cognitionis, quod est similitudo cogniti, sed virtutem cognoscitivam, quæ convenit angelo secundum suam naturam.
\n[I.q.55.a.1.ad.2] As the sense in act is the sensible in act, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 53, not so that the sensitive power is the sensible object's likeness contained in the sense, but because one thing is made from both as from act and potentiality: so likewise the intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act, not that the substance of the intellect is itself the similitude by which it understands, but because that similitude is its form. Now, it is precisely the same thing to say \"in things which are without matter, the intellect is the same thing as the object understood,\" as to say that \"the intellect in act is the thing understood in act\"; for a thing is actually understood, precisely because it is immaterial.
\n[I.q.55.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut sensus in actu est sensibile in actu, ut dicitur in II De anima, text. 53, non ita quod ipsa vis sensitiva sit ipsa similitudo sensibilis quæ est in sensu, sed quia ex utroque fit unum sicut ex actu et potentia; ita et intellectus in actu dicitur esse intellectum in actu, non quod substantia intellectus sit ipsa similitudo per quam intelligit, sed quia illa intellectum est forma ejus. Idem est autem quod dicitur: In his quæ sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur; ac si diceretur quod intellectus in actu, est intellectum in actu. Ex hoc enim aliquid est intellectum in actu quod est immateriale.
\n[I.q.55.a.1.ad.3] The things which are beneath the angel, and those which are above him, are in a measure in his substance, not indeed perfectly, nor according to their own proper formality--because the angel's essence, as being finite, is distinguished by its own formality from other things--but according to some common formality. Yet all things are perfectly and according to their own formality in God's essence, as in the first and universal operative power, from which proceeds whatever is proper or common to anything. Therefore God has a proper knowledge of all things by His own essence: and this the angel has not, but only a common knowledge.
\n[I.q.55.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ea quæ sunt infra angelum, et ea quæ sunt supra ipsum, sunt quodam modo in substantia ejus, non quidem perfecte neque secundum propriam rationem, cum angeli essentia, finita existens, secundum propriam rationem ab aliis distinguatur; sed secundum quamdam rationem communem. In essentia autem Dei sunt omnia perfecte et secundum propriam rationem sicut in prima et universali virtute operativa, a qua procedit quidquid est in quacumque re vel proprium vel commune. Et ideo Deus per essentiam suam habet propriam cognitionem de rebus omnibus, non autem angelus, sed solam communem.
\n[I.q.55.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the angels understand by species drawn from things. For everything understood is apprehended by some likeness within him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing in another is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the likeness is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so that it is caused by such thing. All knowledge, then, of the person understanding must either be the cause of the object understood, or else caused by it. Now the angel's knowledge is not the cause of existing things; that belongs to the Divine knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary for the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to be derived from things.
\n[I.q.55.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod angeli intelligent per species a rebus acceptas. Omne enim quod intelligitur, per aliquam sui similitudinem in intelligente intelligitur. Similitudo autem alicujus in altero existens aut est ibi per modum exemplaris, ita quod illa similitudo sit causa rei; aut est ibi per modum imaginis, ita quod sit causata a re. Oportet enim quod omnis scientia intelligentis vel sit causa rei intellectæ, vel causata a re. Sed scientia angeli non est causa rerum existentium in natura, sed sola divina scientia. Ergo oportet quod omnes species per quas intelligit intellectus angelicus, sint a rebus acceptæ. Corderius: « Propriis rerum rationibus illustrantur. » Sic cod.; non ut in Parm. et in edit.: « Cum dicitur angelum. »
\n[I.q.55.a.2.arg.2] Further, the angelic light is stronger than the light of the active intellect of the soul. But the light of the active intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore the light of the angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible things. So there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel understands through species drawn from things.
\n[I.q.55.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, lumen angelicum est fortius quam lumen intellectus agentis in anima. Sed lumen intellectus agentis abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus. Ergo lumen intellectus angelici potest abstrahere species etiam ab ipsis rebus sensibilibus; et ita nihil prohibet dicere quod angelus intelligat per species a rebus acceptas.
\n[I.q.55.a.2.arg.3] Further, the species in the intellect are indifferent to what is present or distant, except in so far as they are taken from sensible objects. Therefore, if the angel does not understand by species drawn from things, his knowledge would be indifferent as to things present and distant; and so he would be moved locally to no purpose.
\n[I.q.55.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, species quæ sunt in intellectu, indifferenter se habent ad præsens et distans, nisi quatenus a rebus sensibilibus accipiuntur. Si ergo angelus non intelligit per species a rebus acceptas, ejus cognitio indifferenter se haberet ad propinqua et distantia; et ita frustra secundum locum movetur.
\n[I.q.55.a.2.sc] Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the \"angels do not gather their Divine knowledge from things divisible or sensible.\"
\n[I.q.55.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, De div. nom., cap. vii, § 2, col. 867, t. 4, quod « angeli non congregant divinam cognitionem a rebus divisibilibus aut a sensibilibus. »
\n[I.q.55.a.2.co] The species whereby the angels understand are not drawn from things, but are connatural to them. For we must observe that there is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual substances and the distinction and order of corporeal substances. The highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which is fully perfected by the form; whereas in the lower bodies the potentiality of matter is not entirely perfected by the form, but receives from some agent, now one form, now another. In like fashion also the lower intellectual substances --that is to say, human souls--have a power of understanding which is not naturally complete, but is successively completed in them by their drawing intelligible species from things. But in the higher spiritual substances--that is, the angels--the power of understanding is naturally complete by intelligible species, in so far as they have such species connatural to them, so as to understand all things which they can know naturally.
\nThe same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances. The lower spiritual substances--that is, souls--have a nature akin to a body, in so far as they are the forms of bodies: and consequently from their very mode of existence it behooves them to seek their intelligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies; otherwise they would be united with bodies to no purpose. On the other hand, the higher substances--that is, the angels--are utterly free from bodies, and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible nature; consequently they attain their intelligible perfection through an intelligible outpouring, whereby they received from God the species of things known, together with their intellectual nature. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8): \"The other things which are lower than the angels are so created that they first receive existence in the knowledge of the rational creature, and then in their own nature.\"
\n[I.q.55.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod species per quas angeli intelligunt, non sunt a rebus acceptæ, sed eis connaturales. Sic enim oportet intelligere distinctionem et ordinem spiritualium substantiarum sicut est distinctio et ordo corporalium. Suprema autem corpora habent potentiam in sui natura totaliter perfectam per formam. In corporibus autem inferioribus potentia materiæ non totaliter perficitur per formam, sed accipit nunc unam, nunc aliam formam ab aliquo agente. Similiter et inferiores substantiae intellectivæ, scilicet animæ humanæ, habent potentiam intellectivam non completam naturaliter; sed completur in eis successive per hoc quod accipiunt species intelligibiles a rebus. Potentia vero intellectiva in substantii spiritualibus superioribus, id est, in angelis, naturaliter completa est per species intelligibiles, inquantum habent species intelligibiles connaturales ad omnia intelligenda quæ naturaliter cognoscere possunt. Et hoc etiam ex ipso modo essendi hujusmodi substantiarum apparet. Substantiæ enim spirituales inferiores, scilicet animæ, habent esse affine corpori inquantum sunt corporum formæ; et ideo ex ipso modo essendi competit eis ut a corporibus et per corpora suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequantur; alioquin frustra corporibus unirentur. Substantiæ vero superiores, id est angeli, sunt a corporibus totaliter absolutæ, immaterialiter et in esse intelligibili subsistentes; et ideo suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequuntur per intelligibilem effluxum, quo a Deo species rerum cognitarum acceperunt simul cum intellectuali natura. Unde Augustinus dicit, II Super Gen. ad litteram, cap. vii, col. 269, t. 3, quod « cætera quæ infra » angelos « sunt, ita causantur, ut prius fiant in cognitione rationalis creaturæ, ac deinde in genere suo. »
\n[I.q.55.a.2.ad.1] There are images of creatures in the angel's mind, not, indeed derived from creatures, but from God, Who is the cause of creatures, and in Whom the likenesses of creatures first exist. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, \"As the type, according to which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God before the creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of the same type exists first in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the very fashioning of the creature.\"
\n[I.q.55.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in mente angeli sunt similitudines creaturarum, non ab ipsis creaturis, sed a Deo, qui est creaturarum causa, et in quo primo similitudines rerum existunt. Unde Augustinus dicit in eodem lib., loc. prox. cit., quod, sicut « ratio qua creatura conditur, prior est in Verbo Dei, quam ipsa creatura quæ conditur, sic et ejusdem rationis cognitio prius fit in creatura intellectuali, ac deinde est ipsa conditio creaturæ. »
\n[I.q.55.a.2.ad.2] To go from one extreme to the other it is necessary to pass through the middle. Now the nature of a form in the imagination, which form is without matter but not without material conditions, stands midway between the nature of a form which is in matter, and the nature of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from matter and from material conditions. Consequently, however powerful the angelic mind might be, it could not reduce material forms to an intelligible condition, except it were first to reduce them to the nature of imagined forms; which is impossible, since the angel has no imagination, as was said above (Question 54, Article 5). Even granted that he could abstract intelligible species from material things, yet he would not do so; because he would not need them, for he has connatural intelligible species.
\n[I.q.55.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod de extremum non pervenitur nisi per medium. Esse autem formæ in imaginatione, quod est quidem sine materia, non tamen sine materialibus conditionibus, medium est inter esse formæ quæ est in materia et esse formæ quæ est in intellectu per abstractionem a materia et a conditionibus materialibus. Unde, quantumcumque sit potens intellectus angelicus, non posset formas materials reducere ad esse intelligibile, nisi prius reduceret eas ad esse formarum imaginatarum; quod est imposibile, cum careat imaginatione, ut dictum est. Dato etiam quod posset abstrahere species intelligibiles a rebus materialibus, non tamen abstraheret, quia non indigeret eis, cum habeat species intelligibiles connaturales.
\n[I.q.55.a.2.ad.3] The angel's knowledge is quite indifferent as to what is near or distant. Nevertheless his local movement is not purposeless on that account: for he is not moved to a place for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, but for the purpose of operation.
\n[I.q.55.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod cognitio angeli indifferenter se habet ad distans et propinquum secundum locum: non tamen propter hoc modus ejus localis est frustra; non enim movetur localiter ad cognitionem accipiendam, sed ad operandum aliquid in loco.
\n[I.q.55.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the higher angels do not understand by more universal species than the lower angels. For the universal, seemingly, is what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not understand by species abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less universal.
\n[I.q.55.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod superiores angeli non intelligant per species magis universales quam inferiores. Universale enim esse videtur quod a particularibus abstrahitur. Sed angeli non intelligunt per species a rebus abstractas. Ergo non potest dici quod species intellectus angelici sint magis vel minus universales.
\n[I.q.55.a.3.arg.2] Further, whatever is known in detail is more perfectly known than what is known generically; because to know anything generically is, in a fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If, therefore, the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower, it follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the lower; which is not befitting.
\n[I.q.55.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quod cognoscitur in speciali, perfectius cognoscitur quam quod cognoscitur in universali; quia cognoscere aliquid in universali est quodammodo medium inter potentiam et actum. Si ergo angeli superiores cognoscunt per formas magis universales quam inferiores, sequitur quod angeli superiores habeant scientiam magis imperfectam quam inferiores; quod est inconveniens.
\n[I.q.55.a.3.arg.3] Further, the same cannot be the proper type of many. But if the higher angel knows various things by one universal form, which the lower angel knows by several special forms, it follows that the higher angel uses one universal form for knowing various things. Therefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each; which seems unbecoming.
\n[I.q.55.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, idem non potest esse propria ratio multorum. Sed si angelus superior cognoscat per unam formam universalem diversa quæ inferior angelus cognoscit per plures formas speciales, sequitur quod angelus superior utitur una forma universali ad cognoscendum diversa. Ergo non poterit Juxta S.
\n[I.q.55.a.3.sc] Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the higher angels have a more universal knowledge than the lower. And in De Causis it is said that the higher angels have more universal forms.
\n[I.q.55.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, xii cap. Cæl. hier., § 2, col. 291, t. 4, quod superiores angeli participant scientiam magis in universali quam inferiores; et in lib. De causis dicitur, prop. x, quod angeli superiores habent formas magis universales.
\n[I.q.55.a.3.co] For this reason are some things of a more exalted nature, because they are nearer to and more like unto the first, which is God. Now in God the whole plenitude of intellectual knowledge is contained in one thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by which God knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in created intellects in a lower manner, and less simply. Consequently it is necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what God knows by one, and by so many forms the more according as the intellect is lower.
\nThus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects. Therefore his forms must be more universal; each one of them, as it were, extending to more things. An example of this can in some measure be observed in ourselves. For some people there are who cannot grasp an intelligible truth, unless it be explained to them in every part and detail; this comes of their weakness of intellect: while there are others of stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few.
\n[I.q.55.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ex hoc sunt in rebus aliqua superiora, quod sunt uni primo, quod est Deus, propinquiora et similiora. In Deo autem tota plenitudo intellectalis cognitionis continetur in uno, scilicet in essentia divina per quam Deus omnia cognoscit. Quæ quidem intelligibilis plenitudo in intelligibilibus creaturis inferiori modo et minus simpliciter invenitur. Unde oportet quod ea quæ Deus cognoscit per unum, inferiores intellectus cognoscant per multa; et tanto amplius per plura, quanto amplius intellectus inferior fuerit. Sic igitur quanto angelus fuerit superior, tanto per pauciores species universalitatem intelligibilium apprehendere poterit; et ideo oportet quod ejus formæ sint universaliores, quasi ad plura se extendentes unaquæque earum. Et de hoc exemplum aliqualiter in nobis perspici potest. Sunt enim quidam qui veritatem intelligibilem capere non possunt, nisi eis particulatim per singula explicetur: et hoc quidem ex debilitate intellectus eorum contingit. Alii vero, qui sunt fortioris intellectus, ex paucis multa capere possunt. speciem apud nos habemus, contra S. Thomam asserentem species propter intellectus materialitatem, seu potentialitatem requiri. Juxta S. Thomam, angeli rerum cognitarum species simul cum intellectuali natura acceperunt, et eos intellectum agentem et possibilem habere negandum est.
\n[I.q.55.a.3.ad.1] It is accidental to the universal to be abstracted from particulars, in so far as the intellect knowing it derives its knowledge from things. But if there be an intellect which does not derive its knowledge from things, the universal which it knows will not be abstracted from things, but in a measure will be pre-existing to them; either according to the order of causality, as the universal ideas of things are in the Word of God; or at least in the order of nature, as the universal ideas of things are in the angelic mind.
\n[I.q.55.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod accidit universali ut a singularibus abstrahatur, in quantum intellectus illud cognoscens a rebus cognitionem accipit. Si vero sit aliquis intellectus a rebus cognitionem non accipiens, universale ab eo cognitum non erit abstractum a rebus, sed quodam modo ante res præexistens, vel secundum ordinem causæ, sicut universales rerum rationes sunt in Verbo Dei, vel saltem ordine naturæ, sicut universales rerum rationes sunt in intellectu angelico.
\n[I.q.55.a.3.ad.2] To know anything universally can be taken in two senses. In one way, on the part of the thing known, namely, that only the universal nature of the thing is known. To know a thing thus is something less perfect: for he would have but an imperfect knowledge of a man who only knew him to be an animal. In another way, on the part of the medium of such knowledge. In this way it is more perfect to know a thing in the universal; for the intellect, which by one universal medium can know each of the things which are properly contained in it, is more perfect than one which cannot.
\n[I.q.55.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cognoscere aliquid in universali dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo ex parte rei cognitæ, ut scilicet cognoscatur solum universalis natura rei; et sic cognoscere aliquid in universali est imperfectius: imperfecte enim cognosceret hominem qui cognosceret de eo solum quod est animal. Alio modo ex parte medii cognoscendi; et sic perfectius est cognoscere aliquid in universali; perfection enim est intellectus qui per unum universale medium potest singula propria cognoscere, quam qui non potest.
\n[I.q.55.a.3.ad.3] The same cannot be the proper and adequate type of several things. But if it be eminent, then it can be taken as the proper type and likeness of many. Just as in man, there is a universal prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues; which can be taken as the proper type and likeness of that prudence which in the lion leads to acts of magnanimity, and in the fox to acts of wariness; and so on of the rest. The Divine essence, on account of Its eminence, is in like fashion taken as the proper type of each thing contained therein: hence each one is likened to It according to its proper type. The same applies to the universal form which is in the mind of the angel, so that, on account of its excellence, many things can be known through it with a proper knowledge.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I.q.55.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod idem non potest esse plurium propria ratio adæquata; sed, si sit excellens, potest idem accipi ut propria ratio et similitudo diversorum; sicut in homine est universalis prudentia quantum ad omnes actus virtutum; et potest accipi ut propria ratio et similitudo particularis prudentia, quæ est in leone, ad actus magnanimitatis, et ejus quæ est in vulpe ad actus cautelæ et sic de aliis. Similiter essentia divina accipitur propter sui excellentiam ut propria ratio singulorum quæ sunt in ea; unde singula ei similantur secundum proprias rationes. Et eodem modo dicendum est de ratione universali quæ est in mente angeli, quod per eam, propter ejus excellentiam, multa cognosci possunt propria cognitione.
\n