[I.q.66.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): \"I find two things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless,\" and he says that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby, he says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore the matter of all corporeal things is the same.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod una sit materia informis omnium corporalium. Dicit enim Augustinus, Confess., lib. XII, c. xii, col. 832, t. 4: « Duo reperio quæ fecisti: unum quod erat formatum, alterum quod erat informe. » Et hoc dicit esse terram invisibilem et incompositam, per quam dicit significari materiam rerum corporalium. Ergo una est materia omnium corporalium.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10): \"Things that are one in genus are one in matter.\" But all corporeal things are in the same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all bodies is the same.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in V Metaph., text. 40, quod illa quæ sunt unum in genere, sunt unum in materia. Sed omnia corporalia conveniunt in genere corporis. Ergo omnium corporalium est una materia.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.arg.3] Further, different acts befit different potentialities, and the same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the same form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, diversus actus fit in diversa potentia, et unus in una. Sed omnium corporum est una forma, scilicet corporeitas. Ergo omnium corporalium est materia una.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.arg.4] Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in potentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter considered in itself is the same in all corporeal things.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, materia in se considerata est Elicitur ex pleniori contextu quem videas loco citato. Juxta D. Thomam, Deus materiam nudam stantem sine quacumque forma creare non potuisset. Scotistis hæc positio non placet; inter potentiam objectivam ad esse et potentiam subjectivam ad formale, consequenter inter actum entitativum et actum formalem distinguunt. Unde, secundum illos, in actu entitativo, non in actu formali, materia nuda esset. Ergo, secundum Scotistas, materia prima absque quacumque forma absoluta creari potuit. Quamdam tamen formam respectivam necessariam respectu Dei Scotus admittit. Qui materiam sine forma potest capere capiat; item capiat qui potest formam respectivam quæ etiam respectu alterius formæ creatæ forma non esset. solum in potentia. Sed distinctio est per formas. Ergo materia in se considerata est una tantum omnium corporalium.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.sc] Things of which the matter is the same are mutually interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said (De Gener. i, text. 50). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act upon each other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.sc] Sed contra, quæcumque conveniunt in materia, sunt transmutabilia ad invicem, et agunt et patiuntur ab invicem, ut dicitur in I De generatione, a text. 50 ad 54. Sed corpora cælestia et inferiora non sic se habent ad invicem. Ergo corum materia non est una.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.co] On this question the opinions of philosophers have differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies are of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four elements have one common matter, as their mutual generation and corruption prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the same. But the fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed by Plato, not to the condition of matter, but to the will of the artificer, God, Whom he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies: \"By your own nature you are subject to dissolution, but by My will you are indissoluble, for My will is more powerful than the link that binds you together.\" But this theory Aristotle (De Caelo i, text. 5) disproves by the natural movements of bodies. For since, he says, the heavenly bodies have a natural movement, different from that of the elements, it follows that they have a different nature from them. For movement in a circle, which is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not by contraries, whereas the movements of the elements are mutually opposite, one tending upwards, another downwards: so, therefore, the heavenly body is without contrariety, whereas the elemental bodies have contrariety in their nature. And as generation and corruption are from contraries, it follows that, whereas the elements are corruptible, the heavenly bodies are incorruptible. But in spite of this difference of natural corruption and incorruption, Avicebron taught unity of matter in all bodies, arguing from their unity of form. And, indeed, if corporeity were one form in itself, on which the other forms that distinguish bodies from each other supervene, this argument would necessarily be true; for this form of corporeity would inhere in matter immutably and so far all bodies would be incorruptible. But corruption would then be merely accidental through the disappearance of successive forms--that is to say, it would be corruption, not pure and simple, but partial, since a being in act would subsist under the transient form. Thus the ancient natural philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was some actual being, such as air or fire. But supposing that no form exists in corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath generation and corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of corruptible and incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it is in itself, is in potentiality to form.
\nConsidered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is in act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to all other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more perfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves. For potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in potentiality to a perfect form, and \"vice versa.\" Matter, therefore, whilst existing under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in potentiality to the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the latter, it has both form and the privation of form; for want of a form in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation. But this condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore impossible that bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature incorruptible, should possess the same matter.
\nNeither can we say, as Averroes [De Substantia Orbis ii.] imagines, that a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven--beings in potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that its form is a separate substance united to it as its motive force. For it is impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it be act and form, or be something which has act or form. Setting aside, then, in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed with motive power, if the heavenly body is not something having form--that is, something composed of a form and the subject of that form--it follows that in its totality it is form and act. But every such thing is something actually understood, which the heavenly bodies are not, being sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly bodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form alone which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the point at issue to inquire whether this is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form perfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no potentiality with respect to being, but only to place, as Aristotle [De Coelo i, text. 20 says. So, then, the matter of the heavenly bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, in so far as they agree in the character of potentiality.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hoc fuerunt diversæ opiniones philosophorum. Plato enim et omnes philosophi ante Aristotelem posuerunt omnia corpora esse de natura quatuor elementorum. Unde, cum quatuor elementa communicent in una materia, ut mutua generatio et corruptio in eis ostendit, per consequens sequebatur quod omnium corporum sit materia una. Quod autem quædam corpora sint incorruptibilia, Plato, in Timæo, a princ., adscribebat non conditioni materiæ, sed voluntati artificis, scilicet Dei, quem introducit corporibus cælestibus dicentem: « Natura vestra estis dissolubilia, voluntate autem mea indissolubilia, quia voluntas mea major est nexu vestro. » Hanc autem positionem Aristoteles, lib. I De cælo, a text. 3 ad 19, reprobat per motus naturales corporum. Cum enim corpus cæleste habeat naturalem motum diversum a naturali motu elementorum, sequitur quod ejus natura sit alia a natura quatuor elementorum. Et sicut motus circularis qui est proprius corporis cælestis caret contrarietate, motus autem elementorum sunt invicem contrarii, ut qui est sursum, et qui est deorsum; ita corpus cæleste est absque contrarietate, corpora vero elementaria sunt cum contrarietate. Et quia corruptio et generatio sunt ex contrariis, sequitur quod secundum suam naturam corpus cæleste sit incorruptibile, elementa vero sunt corruptibilia. Sed, non obstante hac differentia corruptibilitatis et incorruptibilitatis naturalis, Avicebron posuit unam materiam omnium corporum, attendens ad unitatem formæ corporalis. Sed si forma corporeitatis esset una forma per se, cui supervenirent aliæ formæ, quibus corpora distinguuntur, haberet necessitatem quod dicitur, quia illa forma immutabiliter materiæ inhæret, et quantum ad illam esset omne corpus incorruptibile; sed corruptio accideret per remotionem sequentium formarum, quæ non esset corruptio simpliciter, sed secundum quid: quia privationi substerneretur aliquod ens actu. Sicut etiam accidebat antiquis naturalibus, qui ponebant subjectum corporum aliquod ens actu, puta ignem, aut aerem, aut aliqid hujusmodi. Supposito autem quod nulla forma quæ sit in corpore corruptibili, remaneat, ut substracta generationi et corruptioni, sequitur de necessitate quod non sit eadem materia corporum corruptibilium et incorruptibilium. Materia enim secundum id quod est, est in potentia ad formam. Oportet ergo quod materia secundum se considerata sit in potentia ad formam omnium illorum quorum est materia communis. Per unam autem formam non fit in actu nisi quantum ad illam formam. Remanet ergo in potentia quantum ad formas omnium. Nec hoc excluditur, si una illarum formarum sit perfection et continens in se virtute alias; quia potentia, quantum est de se, indifferenter se habet ad perfectum et ad imperfectum. Unde, sicut quando est sub forma imperfecta est in potentia ad formam perfectam, ita e converso. Sic ergo materia, secundum quod est sub forma incorruptibilis corporis, erit ad huc in potentia ad formam corruptibilis corporis; et cum non habeat eam in actu, erit simul sub forma et privatione, quia carentia formæ in eo quod est in potentia ad formam, est privatio. Hæc autem dispositio est corruptibilis corporis. Impossible ergo est quod corporis corruptibilis et incorruptibilis per naturam sit una materia. Nec tamen dicendum est, ut Averroes fingit in lib. De substantia orbis, cap. II, quod ipsum corpus cæleste sit materia cæli, ens in potentia ad ubi, et non ad esse, et forma ejus sit substantia separata, quæ unitur ei ut motor; quia imposibile est ponere aliqod ens actu, quin vel ipsum totum sit actus et forma, vel habeat actum seu formam. Semota ergo per intellectum substantia separata quæ ponitur motor, si corpus cæleste non est habens formam, quod est componi ex forma et subjecto formæ, sequitur quod sit totum forma et actus. Omne autem tale est intellectum in actu, quod de corpore cælesti dici non potest, cum sit sensibile. Relinquitur ergo quod materia cor- In; in poris cælestis secundum se considerata non est in potentia nisi ad formam quam habet. Nec refert ad propositum, quæcumque sit illa, sive anima, sive aliquid aliud. Unde illa forma sic perficit illam materiam quod nullo modo in ea remanet potentia ad esse, sed ad ubi tantum, ut Aristoteles dicit, lib. I De cælo, a text. 20 ad 32. Et sic non est eadem materia corporis cælestis et elementorum, nisi secundum analogiam, secundum quod conveniunt in ratione potentiae.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.ad.1] Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato, who does not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say that formless matter is one with the unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of corporeal creatures.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus sequitur in hoc opinionem Platonis non ponentis quintam essentiam. Vel dicendum, quod materia informis est una unitate ordinis, sicut omnia corpora sunt unum in ordine creaturæ corporeæ.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.ad.2] If genus is taken in a physical sense, corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on account of their different modes of potentiality, as is said in Metaph. x, text. 26. Logically considered, however, there is but one genus of all bodies, since they are all included in the one notion of corporeity.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod si genus consideretur physice, corruptibilia et incorruptibilia non sunt in eodem genere propter diversum modum potentiæ in eis, ut dicitur X Metaph., text. 26. Secundum autem logicam considerationem est unum genus omnium corporum propter unam rationem corporeitatis.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.ad.3] The form of corporeity is not one and the same in all bodies, being no other than the various forms by which bodies are distinguished, as stated above.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod forma corporeitatis non est una in omnibus corporibus, cum non sit alia a formis quibus corpora distinguuntur, ut dictum est.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.ad.4] As potentiality is directed towards act, potential beings are differentiated by their different acts, as sight is by color, hearing by sound. Therefore for this reason the matter of the celestial bodies is different from that of the elemental, because the matter of the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental form.
\n[I.q.66.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum potentia dicatur ad actum, ens in potentia est diversum ex hoc ipso quod ordinatur ad diversum actum, sicut visus ad colorem, et auditus ad sonum. Unde ex hoc ipso materia cælestis corporis est alia a materia elementi, quia non est in potentia ad formam elementi.
\n[I.q.66.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the empyrean heaven was not created at the same time as formless matter. For the empyrean, if it is anything at all, must be a sensible body. But all sensible bodies are movable, and the empyrean heaven is not movable. For if it were so, its movement would be ascertained by the movement of some visible body, which is not the case. The empyrean heaven, then, was not created contemporaneously with formless matter.
\n[I.q.66.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod cælum empyreum non sit concreatum materiæ informi. Cælum enim empyreum, si est aliquid, oportet quod sit corpus sensibile. Omne autem corpus sensibile est mobile; cælum autem empyreum non est mobile, quia motus ejus deprehenderetur per motum Juxta Guillermum, omnium corporum est materia una, et ratio materiæ una. Ex quo, ut ait Pelbartus, defectus patet S. Thomæ qui praelegit Averroem sequi ponentem cælestia in materia a alicujus corporis apparentis, quod minime apparet. Non ergo cælum empyreum est aliquid materiæ informi concreatum.
\n[I.q.66.a.3.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that \"the lower bodies are governed by the higher in a certain order.\" If, therefore, the empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies, it must necessarily exercise some influence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to be the case, especially as it is presumed to be without movement; for one body cannot move another unless itself also be moved. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.
\n[I.q.66.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in III De Trinitate, cap. iv, col. 873, t. 8, quod « inferiora corpora per superiora quodam ordine reguntur. » Si ergo cælum empyreum est quoddam supremum corpus, oportet quod habeat aliquam influentiam in inferiora corpora. Sed hoc non videtur; præsertim si ponatur immobile, cum nullum corpus moveat nisi motum. Non est ergo cælum empyreum materiæ informi concreatum. 3. Si dicatur quod cælum empyreum est locus contemplationis, non ordinatum ad naturales effectus, contra Augustinus dicit, De Trinit., lib. IV, c. xx, col. 908, t. 8. quod, « nos, secundum quod mente aliquid æternum capimus, non in hoc mundo sumus. » Ex quo patet quod contemplatio mentem supra corporalia elevat. Non ergo contemplationi locus corporeus deputatur.
\n[I.q.66.a.3.arg.3] Further, if it is held that the empyrean heaven is the place of contemplation, and not ordained to natural effects; on the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): \"In so far as we mentally apprehend eternal things, so far are we not of this world\"; from which it is clear that contemplation lifts the mind above the things of this world. Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of contemplation.
\n[I.q.66.a.3.arg.4] Further, among the heavenly bodies exists a body, partly transparent and partly luminous, which we call the sidereal heaven. There exists also a heaven wholly transparent, called by some the aqueous or crystalline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher heaven, it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then the air would be constantly illuminated, and there would be no night. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.
\n[I.q.66.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, inter corpora cælestia inventur aliquod corpus partim diaphanum et partim lucidum, scilicet cælum sidereum. Invenitur etiam aliquod cælum totum diaphanum, quod aliqui nominant cælum aqueum vel crystallinum. Si ergo est aliud superius cælum, oportet quod sit totum lucidum. Sed hoc esse non potest; quia sic continue aer illuminaretur, nec unquam nox esset. Non ergo cælum empyreum materiæ informi est concreatum.
\n[I.q.66.a.3.sc] Strabus says that in the passage, \"In the beginning God created heaven and earth,\" heaven denotes not the visible firmament, but the empyrean or fiery heaven.
\n[I.q.66.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Strabus dicit, col. 68, t. 1, quod cum dicitur: In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram, « cælum dicit, non visible firmamentum, sed empyreum, id est, igneum. »
\n[I.q.66.a.3.co] The empyrean heaven rests only on the authority of Strabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of whom agree in one respect, namely, in holding it to be the place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede say that as soon as created it was filled with angels; and Basil [Hom. ii. in Hexaem.] says: \"Just as the lost are driven into the lowest darkness, so the reward for worthy deeds is laid up in the light beyond this world, where the just shall obtain the abode of rest.\" But they differ in the reasons on which they base their statement. Strabus and Bede teach that there is an empyrean heaven, because the firmament, which they take to mean the sidereal heaven, is said to have been made, not in the beginning, but on the second day: whereas the reason given by Basil is that otherwise God would seem to have made darkness His first work, as the Manicheans falsely assert, when they call the God of the Old Testament the God of darkness. These reasons, however, are not very cogent. For the question of the firmament, said to have been made on the second day, is solved in one way by Augustine, and in another by other holy writers. But the question of the darkness is explained according to Augustine [Gen. ad lit. i; vii.], by supposing that formlessness, signified by darkness, preceded form not by duration, but by origin. According to others, however, since darkness is no creature, but a privation of light, it is a proof of Divine wisdom, that the things it created from nothing it produced first of all in an imperfect state, and afterwards brought them to perfection. But a better reason can be drawn from the state of glory itself. For in the reward to come a two-fold glory is looked for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in the human body to be glorified, but in the whole world which is to be made new. Now the spiritual glory began with the beginning of the world, in the blessedness of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the saints. It was fitting, then, that even from the beginning, there should be made some beginning of bodily glory in something corporeal, free at the very outset from the servitude of corruption and change, and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation, after the Resurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that heaven is called the empyrean, i.e. fiery, not from its heat, but from its brightness. It is to be noticed, however, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9,27) says that Porphyry sets the demons apart from the angels by supposing that the former inhabit the air, the latter the ether, or empyrean. But Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as sidereal, to be fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal, taking ethereal to denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle understands it, swiftness of movement (De Coel. i, text. 22). This much has been said to prevent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained an empyrean heaven in the sense understood by modern writers.
\n[I.q.66.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cælum empyreum non invenitur positum nisi per auctoritates Strabi et Bedæ, et iterum per auctoritatem Basilii. In cujus positione quantum ad aliquid conveniunt, scilicet quantum ad hoc quod sit locus beatorum. Dicit enim Strabus, et etiam Beda, lib. I Hexameron, in I Gen., v. 1, col. 43, t. 2, quod « statim factum angelis est repletum. » Basilius etiam dicit in Hom. II Hexam.: « Sicut damnati in te-nebras ultimas abiguntur, ita remuneratio pro dignis operibus restauratur in ea luce corruptibilibus et elementis distingui, cum tamen melius et subtilius locutus sit ponens materiam ejusdem rationis in cælestibus et elementis. — De hoc nos nil decernendum judicamus. quæ est extra mundum, et ibi quietis domicilium sortientur. » Differunt autem quantum ad rationem ponendi. Nam Strabus et Beda ponunt cælum empyreum ea ratione, quia firmamentum, per quod cælum empyreum intelligunt, non in principio, sed secunda die dicitur factum. Basilius vero ea ratione ponit, ne videatur simpliciter Deus opus suum a tenebris inchoasse; quod Manichaei calumniantur, Deum veteris Testamenti Deum tenebrarum nominantes. Hæ autem rationes non sunt multum co-gentes. Nam quæstio de firmamento, quod legitur factum in secunda die, aliter solvitur ab Augustino, et aliter ab aliis sanctis. Quæstio autem de tenebris solvitur secundum Augustinum, I Sup. Genes. ad litt., cap. xv, col. 257, et lib. VII, cap. xxvii, col. 370, t. 3, per hoc quod informitas, quæ per tenebras significatur, non præcessit duratione formationem, sed origine. Secundum alios vero, cum tenebræ non sint creatura aliqua sed privatio lucis, divinæ sapientiae attestatur, ut ea quæ produxit ex nihilo, primo in statu imperfectionis institueret, et postmodum ea perduceret ad perfectum. Potest autem convenientior ratio sumi ex ipsa conditione gloriæ. Expectatur enim in futura remuneratione duplex gloria, scilicet spiritualis et corporalis, non solum in corporibus humanis glorificandis sed etiam in toto mundo innovando. Inchoata est autem spiritualis gloria ab ipso mundi principio in beatitudine angelorum, quorum æqualitas sanctis promittitur. Unde conveniens fuit ut etiam a principio corporalis gloria inchoaretur in aliquo corpore, quod etiam a principio fuerit absque servitute corruptionis et mutabilitatis, et totaliter lucidum, sicut tota creatura corporalis expectatur post resurrectionem futura. Et ideo illud cælum dicitur empyreum, id est, igneum, non ab ardore, sed a splendore. Sciendum est autem quod Augustinus, X De civ. Dei, cap. 1x, col. 287, et c. xxvii, col. 304, etc., t. 7, dicit quod Porphyrius discernebat a dæmonibus angelos, ut aerea loca esse dæmonum, ætherea vero vel empyrea diceret angelorum. Sed Porphyrius, tanquam Platonicus, cælum istud sidereum igneum esse existimabat; et ideo empyreum nominabat, vel æthereum, secundum quod nomen ætheris sumitur ab inflammatione, et non secundum quod sumitur a velocitate motus, ut Aristoteles dicit, I De cælo, text. 22. Quod pro tanto dictum sit, ne aliquis opinetur, Augustinum cælum empyreum posuisse, sicut nunc ponitur a modernis.
\n[I.q.66.a.3.ad.1] Sensible corporeal things are movable in the present state of the world, for by the movement of corporeal creatures is secured by the multiplication of the elements. But when glory is finally consummaed, the movement of bodies will cease. And such must have been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean.
\n[I.q.66.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod corpora sensibilia sunt mobilia secundum ipsum statum mundi, quia per motum creaturæ corporalis procuratur elementorum multiplicatio. Sed in ultima consummatione gloriæ cessabit corporum motus; et talem oportuit esse a principio dispositionem cæli empyrei.
\n[I.q.66.a.3.ad.2] It is sufficiently probable, as some assert, that the empyrean heaven, having the state of glory for its ordained end, does not influence inferior bodies of another order--those, namely, that are directed only to natural ends. Yet it seems still more probable that it does influence bodies that are moved, though itself motionless, just as angels of the highest rank, who assist [Infra, 112, 3], influence those of lower degree who act as messengers, though they themselves are not sent, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier. xii). For this reason it may be said that the influence of the empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven, and is moved, produces therein not something that comes and goes as a result of movement, but something of a fixed and stable nature, as the power of conservation or causation, or something of the kind pertaining to dignity.
\n[I.q.66.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod satis probabile est quod cælum empyreum, secundum quosdam, cum sit ordinatum ad statum gloriæ, non habet influentiam in inferiora corpora, quæ sunt sub alio ordine, utpote ordinata ad naturalem rerum decursum. Probabilius tamen videtur dicendum, quod, sicut supremi angeli qui assistunt, habent influentiam super medios et ultimos qui mittuntur, quamvis ipsi non mittantur, secundum Dionysium, cap. viii Cæl. hierarch., § 4, col. 238, t. 4, ita cælum empyreum habet influentiam super corpora quæ moventur, licet ipsum non moveatur. Et propter hoc potest dici quod influit in primum cælum quod movetur, non aliquid transiens et adveniens per motum, sed aliquid fixum et stabile, puta virtutem continendi et causandi vel aliquid hujusmodi ad dignitatem pertinens.
\n[I.q.66.a.3.ad.3] Corporeal place is assigned to contemplation, not as necessary, but as congruous, that the splendor without may correspond to that which is within. Hence Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) says: \"The ministering spirit could not live in darkness, but made his habitual dwelling in light and joy.\"
\n[I.q.66.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod locus corporeus deputatur contemplationi, non propter necessitatem sed propter congruitatem, ut exterior claritas interiori conveniat. Unde Basilius dicit, Hom. 11 in Hexam., quod « ministrator spiritus non poterat degere in tenebris, sed in luce, et lætitia degendi sibi habitum possidebat. »
\n[I.q.66.a.3.ad.4] As Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.): \"It is certain that the heaven was created spherical in shape, of dense body, and sufficiently strong to separate what is outside it from what it encloses. On this account it darkens the region external to it, the light by which itself is lit up being shut out from that region. \"But since the body of the firmament, though solid, is transparent, for that it does not exclude light (as is clear from the fact that we can see the stars through the intervening heavens), we may also say that the empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun does, but of a more subtle nature. Or it may have the brightness of glory which differs from mere natural brightness.
\n[I.q.66.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod, sicut Basilius dicit, ibid., constat « factum esse cælum rotunditate conclusum, habens corpus spissum, et adeo validum, ut possit ea quæ extrinsecus habentur, ab interioribus separare. Ob hoc necessario post se regionem relictam carentem luce constituit, utpote fulgore, qui superradiabat, excluso. » Sed quia corpus firmamenti, etsi sit solidum, est tamen diaphanum, quod lumen non impedit ut patet per hoc quod lumen stellarum videmus non obstantibus mediis Nicolaï: « cursum. » cælis, potest aliter dici, quod habet lucem cælum empyreum non condensatam, ut radios emittat, sicut corpus solis, sed magis subtilem; vel habet claritatem gloriæ, quæ non est conformis cum claritate naturali.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that time was not created simultaneously with formless matter. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): \"I find two things that Thou didst create before time was, the primary corporeal matter, and the angelic nature.\" Therefore time was not created with formless matter.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod tempus non sit concreatum materiæ informi. Dicit enim Augustinus, Confess., lib. XII, c. xii, col. 834, t. 4, ad Deum loquens: « Duo reperio, quæ fecisti carentia temporibus, scilicet materiam primam corporalem, et naturam angelicam. » Non ergo tempus est concreatum materiæ informi.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.arg.2] Further, time is divided by day and night. But in the beginning there was neither day nor night, for these began when \"God divided the light from the darkness.\" Therefore in the beginning time was not.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, tempus dividitur per diem et noctem. Sed a principio nec nox, nec dies erat; sed postmodum, cum divisit Deus lucem a tenebris. Ergo a principio non erat tempus.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.arg.3] Further, time is the measure of the firmament's movement; and the firmament is said to have been made on the second day. Therefore in the beginning time was not.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, tempus est numerus motus firmamenti, quod legitur factum secundo die. Ergo non a principio erat tempus.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.arg.4] Further, movement precedes time, and therefore should be reckoned among the first things created, rather than time.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, motus est prior tempore. Magis igitur debebat numerari inter primo creata quam tempus.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.arg.5] Further, as time is the extrinsic measure of created things, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time, must be reckoned among the things first created.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.arg.5] 5. Præterea, sicut tempus est mensura extrinseca, ita et locus. Non ergo magis debet computari inter primo creata tempus quam locus.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.sc] Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3): \"Both spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time.\"
\n[I.q.66.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, Super Genes. ad litt., quod spiritualis et corporalis creatura est creata in principio temporis.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.co] It is commonly said that the first things created were these four--the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless corporeal matter, and time. It must be observed, however, that this is not the opinion of Augustine. For he (Confess. xii, 12) specifies only two things as first created--the angelic nature and corporeal matter--making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these two, namely, the angelic nature and formless matter, precede the formation, by nature only, and not by duration; and therefore, as they precede formation, so do they precede movement and time. Time, therefore, cannot be included among them. But the enumeration above given is that of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded by duration its form, and this view postulates the existence of time as the measure of duration: for otherwise there would be no such measure.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod communiter dicitur, quatuor esse primo creata, scilicet naturam angelicam, cælum empyreum, materiam corporalem informem et tempus. Sed attendendum est quod hoc dictum non procedit secundum Augustini opinionem. Augustinus enim, ubi supra, ponit duo primo creata, scilicet « naturam angelicam » et « materiam corporalem, » nulla mentione facta de cælo empyreo. Hæc autem duo, scilicet natura angelica et materia informis, præcedunt formationem non duratione, sed natura; et sicut natura præcedunt formationem, ita etiam et motum et tempus. Unde tempus non potest eis connumerari. Procedit autem prædicta enumeratio secundum opinionem aliorum sanctorum ponentium, quod informitas materiæ duratione præcessit formationem, et tunc pro illa duratione necesse est ponere tempus aliquod; aliter enim mensura durationis accipi non posset.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.ad.1] The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion that the angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or nature.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus hoc dicit ea ratione qua natura angelica et materia informis præcedunt origine, seu natura tempus.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.ad.2] As in the opinion of some holy writers matter was in some measure formless before it received its full form, so time was in a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished into day and night.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut secundum alios sanctos materia erat quodammodo informis, et postea fuit formata, ita tempus quodammodo fuit informe, et postmodum formatum et distinctum per diem et noctem.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.ad.3] If the movement of the firmament did not begin immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the measure, not of the firmament's movement, but of the first movement of whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure of the firmament's movement, in so far as this is the first movement. But if the first movement was another than this, time would have been its measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind. And it must be granted that forthwith from the beginning, there was movement of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and affections in the angelic mind: while movement without time cannot be conceived, since time is nothing else than \"the measure of priority and succession in movement.\"
\n[I.q.66.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod si motus firmamenti non statim a principio incepit, tunc tempus quod præcessit, non erat numerus motus firmamenti, sed cujuscumque primi motus. Accidit enim tempori quod sit numerus motus firmamenti, inquantum hic motus est primus motuum. Si autem esset alius motus primus, illius motus mensura esset tempus, quia omnia mensurantur primo sui generis. Oportet autem dicere, statim a principio fuisse aliquem motum, ad minus secundum successionem conceptionum et affectionum in mente angelica. Motum autem non est intelligere sine tempore, cum nihil aliud sit tempus quam numerus prioris et posterioris in motu.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.ad.4] Among the first created things are to be reckoned those which have a general relationship to things. And, therefore, among these time must be included, as having the nature of a common measure; but not movement, which is related only to the movable subject.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod inter primo creata computantur ea quæ habent generalelem habitudinem ad res: et ideo computari debuit tempus, quod habet rationem communis mensuræ, non autem motus, qui comparatur solum ad subjectum mobile.
\n[I.q.66.a.4.ad.5] Place is implied as existing in the empyrean heaven, this being the boundary of the universe. And since place has reference to things permanent, it was created at once in its totality. But time, as not being permanent, was created in its beginning: even as actually we cannot lay hold of any part of time save the \"now.\"
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I.q.66.a.4.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod locus intelligitur in cælo empyreo omnia continente. Et quia locus est de permanentibus, concreatus est totus simul; tempus autem, quod non est permanens, concreatum est in suo principio; sicut etiam modo nihil est accipere in actu de tempore nisi nunc.
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