[I.q.78.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are not fittingly described--namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and generative. For these are called \"natural\" forces. But the powers of the soul are above the natural forces. Therefore we should not class the above forces as powers of the soul.
\n[I.q.78.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inconvenienter partes vegetativæ assignentur, scilicet « nutritivum, augmentativum et generativum. » Hujusmodi enim vires dicuntur naturales. Sed potentiæ animæ sunt supra vires naturales. Ergo hujusmodi vires non debent poni potentiæ animæ.
\n[I.q.78.a.2.arg.2] Further, we should not assign a particular power of the soul to that which is common to living and non-living things. But generation is common to all things that can be generated and corrupted, whether living or not living. Therefore the generative force should not be classed as a power of the soul.
\n[I.q.78.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ad id quod est commune viventibus et non viventibus non debet aliqua potentia animæ deputari. Sed generatio est communis omnibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus, tam viventibus quam non viventibus. Ergo vis generativa non debet poni potentia animæ.
\n[I.q.78.a.2.arg.3] Further, the soul is more powerful than the body. But the body by the same force gives species and quantity; much more, therefore, does the soul. Therefore the augmentative power of the soul is not distinct from the generative power.
\n[I.q.78.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, anima potentior est quam natura corporea 4. Sed natura corporea eadem virtute activa dat speciem et debitam quantitatem. Ergo multo magis anima; non est ergo alia potentia animæ augmentativa a generativa. 4 Rom. edit., Patav. et Nicolai: « Animæ pars est potentior quam natura corporea. »
\n[I.q.78.a.2.arg.4] Further, everything is preserved in being by that whereby it exists. But the generative power is that whereby a living thing exists. Therefore by the same power the living thing is preserved. Now the nutritive force is directed to the preservation of the living thing (De Anima ii, 4), being \"a power which is capable of preserving whatever receives it.\" Therefore we should not distinguish the nutritive power from the generative.
\n[I.q.78.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, unaquæque res conservatur in esse per id quod esse habet. Sed potentia generativa est per quam acquiritur esse viventis. Ergo per eamdem res viva conservatur. Sed ad conservationem rei viventis ordinatur vis nutritiva, ut dicitur in II De anima, text. 48. Est enim « potentia potens salvare suscipiens ipsam. » Non debet ergo distingui nutritiva potentia a generativa.
\n[I.q.78.a.2.sc] The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2,4) that the operations of this soul are \"generation, the use of food,\" and (cf. De Anima iii, 9) \"growth.\"
\n[I.q.78.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in II De anima, text. 34, 46 et 47, quod « opera hujus animæ sunt generare, et alimento uti, et iterum augmentum facere. »
\n[I.q.78.a.2.co] The vegetative part has three powers. For the vegetative part, as we have said (1), has for its object the body itself, living by the soul; for which body a triple operation of the soul is required. One is whereby it acquires existence, and to this is directed the \"generative\" power. Another is whereby the living body acquires its due quantity; to this is directed the \"augmentative\" power. Another is whereby the body of a living thing is preserved in its existence and in its due quantity; to this is directed the \"nutritive\" power.
\nWe must, however, observe a difference among these powers. The nutritive and the augmentative have their effect where they exist, since the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and nutritive powers which exist in one and the same soul. But the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same body but in another; for a thing cannot generate itself. Therefore the generative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive soul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things, although in a more excellent and more universal manner; for that which is highest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest in the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore, of these three powers, the generative has the greater finality, nobility, and perfection, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4), for it belongs to a thing which is already perfect to \"produce another like unto itself.\" And the generative power is served by the augmentative and nutritive powers; and the augmentative power by the nutritive.
\n[I.q.78.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod tres sunt potentiae vegetativæ partis. Vegetativum enim, ut dictum est, habet pro objecto ipsum corpus vivens per animam; ad quod quidem corpus triplex animæ operatio est necessaria. Una quidem, per quam esse acquirat, et ad hoc ordinatur potentia generativa. Alia vero per quam corpus vivum acquirit debitam quantitatem, et ad hoc ordinatur vis augmentativa. Alia vero per quam corpus viventis salvatur et in esse et in quantitate debita, et ad hoc ordinatur vis nutritiva. Est tamen quædam differentia attendenda inter has potentias. Nam nutritiva et augmentativa habent suum effectum in eo in quo sunt; quia ipsum corpus unitum animæ augetur et conservatur per vim augmentativam et nutritivam in eadem anima existentem. Sed vis generativa habet effectum suum non in eodem corpore, sed in alio; quia nihil est generativum sui ipsius. Et ideo vis generativa quodammodo appropinquat ad dignitatem animæ sensitivæ quæ habet operationem in res exteriores, licet excellenti modo et universaliori. « Supremum enim inferioris naturæ attingit id quod est infimum superioris, » ut patet per Dionysium, in vui cap. De div. nom., § 3, col. 874, tom. I. Et ideo inter istas tres potentias finalior et principalior et perfectior est generativa, ut dicitur in II De anima, text. 49: « Est enim rei jam perfectæ facere alteram qualis ipsa est. » Generativæ autem deserviunt et augmentativa et nutritiva; augmentativæ vero nutritiva.
\n[I.q.78.a.2.ad.1] Such forces are called natural, both because they produce an effect like that of nature, which also gives existence, quantity and preservation (although the above forces accomplish these things in a more perfect way); and because those forces perform their actions instrumentally, through the active and passive qualities, which are the principles of natural actions.
\n[I.q.78.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hujus modi vires dicuntur naturales tum quia habent effectum similem naturæ, quæ etiam dat esse et quantitatem et conservationem, licet hæ vires habebant hoc altiori modo; tum quia hæ vires exercent suas actiones instrumentaliter per qualitates activas et passivas, quæ sunt naturalium actionum principia.
\n[I.q.78.a.2.ad.2] Generation of inanimate things is entirely from an extrinsic source; whereas the generation of living things is in a higher way, through something in the living thing itself, which is the semen containing the principle productive of the body. Therefore there must be in the living thing a power that prepares this semen; and this is the generative power.
\n[I.q.78.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod generatio in rebus inanimatis est totaliter ab extrin-seco; sed generatio viventium est quodam altiori modo per aliquid ipsius viventis, quod est semen, in quo est aliquod principium corporis formativum. Et ideo oportet esse aliquam potentiam rei viventis per quam semen hujusmodi præparetur; et hæc est vis generativa.
\n[I.q.78.a.2.ad.3] Since the generation of living things is from a semen, it is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be generated. For this reason it must have a power in the soul, whereby it is brought to its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is generated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent; therefore it receives at once its nature and its quantity, according to the condition of the matter.
\n[I.q.78.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quia generatio viventium est ex aliquo semine, oportet quod in principio animal generetur parvæ quantitatis; et propter hoc necesse est quod habeat potentiam animæ, per quam ad debitam quantitatem perducatur. Sed corpus inanimatum generatur ex materia determinata ab agente extrinseco; et ideo simul recipit speciem et quantitatem, secundum materiae conditionem.
\n[I.q.78.a.2.ad.4] As we have said above (Article 1), the operation of the vegetative principle is performed by means of heat, the property of which is to consume humidity. Therefore, in order to restore the humidity thus lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food is changed into the substance of the body. This is also necessary for the action of the augmentative and generative powers.
\n[I.q.78.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod, sicut jam dictum est, operatio vegetativi principii completur mediante calore, cujus est humidum consumere; et ideo ad restaurationem humidi deperditi necesse est habere potentiam nutritivam, per quam alimentum convertatur in substantiam corporis: quod etiam est necessarium ad actus virtutis augmentativæ et generativæ.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.arg.1] It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior senses. But there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, as powers are distinguished by their objects, it seems that the senses are multiplied according to the number of the kinds of accidents.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur quinque sensus exteriores. Sensus enim est cognoscitivus accidentium. Sunt autem multa genera accidentium. Cum ergo potentiæ distinguantur per objecta, videtur quod sensus multiplicentur secundum numerum qui est in generibus accidentium.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.arg.2] Further, magnitude and shape, and other things which are called \"common sensibles,\" are \"not sensibles by accident,\" but are contradistinguished from them by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 6). Now the diversity of objects, as such, diversifies the powers. Since, therefore, magnitude and shape are further from color than sound is, it seems that there is much more need for another sensitive power than can grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps color or sound.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, magnitudo et figura et alia, quæ dicuntur sensibilia communia, non sunt sensibilia per accidens, sed contra ea dividuntur in II De anima, text. 63 et 64. Diversitas autem per se objectorum diversificat potentias. Cum ergo plus different magnitudo et figura a colore, quam sonus; videtur quod multo magis debeat esse alia potentia sensitiva cognoscitiva magnitudinis aut figuræ, quam coloris et soni.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.arg.3] Further, one sense regards one contrariety; as sight regards white and black. But the sense of touch grasps several contraries; such as hot or cold, damp or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a single sense but several. Therefore there are more than five senses.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, unus sensus est unius contrarietatis, sicut visus albi et nigri. Sed tactus est cognoscitivus plurium contrarietatum, scilicet calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci, et hujusmodi. Ergo non est sensus unus, sed plures; ergo plures sensus sunt quam quinque.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.arg.4] Further, a species is not divided against its genus. But taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should not be classed as a distinct sense of touch.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, species non dividitur contra genus. Sed gustus est tactus quidam. Ergo non debet poni alter sensus præter tactum.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.sc] The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 1): \"There is no other besides the five senses.\"
\n[I.q.78.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in II De anima, text. 128, quod « non est alter sensus præter quinque. »
\n[I.q.78.a.3.co] The reason of the distinction and number of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other of the elements preponderate, as water, air, or the like. By others it has been assigned to the medium, which is either in conjunction or extrinsic and is either water or air, or such like. Others have ascribed it to the various natures of the sensible qualities, according as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from complexity. But none of these explanations is apt. For the powers are not for the organs, but the organs for the powers; wherefore there are not various powers for the reason that there are various organs; on the contrary, for this has nature provided a variety of organs, that they might be adapted to various powers. In the same way nature provided various mediums for the various senses, according to the convenience of the acts of the powers. And to be cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities does not pertain to the senses, but to the intellect.
\nThe reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and \"per se.\" Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation is what is \"per se\" perceived by the sense, and according to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified.
\nNow, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration.
\nBut in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in \"sight\" while in others we find not only spiritual but also a natural immutation; either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of the object we find natural immutation, as to place, in sound which is the object of \"hearing\"; for sound is caused by percussion and commotion of air: and we find natural immutation by alteration, in odor which is the object of \"smelling\"; for in order to exhale an odor, a body must be in a measure affected by heat. On the part of an organ, natural immutation takes place in \"touch\" and \"taste\"; for the hand that touches something hot becomes hot, while the tongue is moistened by the humidity of the flavored morsel. But the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective operations by any natural immutation unless indirectly.
\nNow, the sight, which is without natural immutation either in its organ or in its object, is the most spiritual, the most perfect, and the most universal of all the senses. After this comes the hearing and then the smell, which require a natural immutation on the part of the object; while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). Touch and taste are the most material of all: of the distinction of which we shall speak later on (ad 3,4). Hence it is that the three other senses are not exercised through a medium united to them, to obviate any natural immutation in their organ; as happens as regards these two senses.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod rationem distinctionis et numeri sensuum exteriorum quidam accipere voluerunt ex parte organorum, in quibus aliquod elementorum dominatur, vel aqua vel aer vel aliquid hujusmodi; quidam autem ex parte medii, quod est vel conjunctum vel extrinsecum, et hoc vel aer, vel aqua, vel aliquid hujusmodi; quidam autem ex diversa natura sensibilium qualitatum, secundum quod est qualitas simplicis corporis vel sequens complexionem. Sed nihil istorum conveniens est. Non enim potentiæ sunt propter organa, sed organa propter potentias; unde non propter hoc sunt diversæ potentiæ, quia sunt diversa organa, sed ideo natura instituit diversitatem in organis, ut congruerent diversitati potentiarum. Et similiter diversa media diversis sensibus attribuit, secundum quod erat conveniens ad actus potentiarum. Naturas autem sensibilium qualitatum cognoscere non est sensus, sed intellectus. Accipienda est ergo ratio numeri et distinctionis exteriorum sensuum, secundum illud quod proprie et per se ad sensum pertinet. Est autem sensus quædam potentia passiva, quæ nata est immutari ab exteriori sensibili. Exterius ergo immutativum est quod per se a sensu percipitur, et secundum cujus diversitatem sensitivæ potentiæ distinguuntur. Est autem duplex immutatio: una naturalis et alia spiritualis. Naturalis quidem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse naturale, sicut calor in calefacto; spiritualis autem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse spirituale, ut forma coloris in pupilla, quæ non fit per hoc colorata. Ad operationem autem sensus requiritur immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio formæ sensibilis fiat in organo sensus, alioquin, si sola immutatio naturalis sufficeret ad sentiendum, omnia corpora naturalia sentirent, dum alterantur. Sed in quibusdam sensibus invenitur immutatio spiritualis tantum, sicut in visu; in quibusdam autem cum immutatione spirituali etiam naturalis, vel ex parte objecti tantum, vel etiam ex parte organi. Ex parte autem objecti invenitur transmutatio naturalis secundum locum quidem in sono, qui est objectum auditus; nam sonus ex percussione causatur, et aeris commotione: secundum alterationem vero in odore, qui est objectum olfactus; oportet enim per calidum alterari aliquo modo corpus, ad hoc quod spiret odorem. Ex parte autem organi est immutatio naturalis in tactu et gustu; nam et manus tangens calida calefit, et lingua humectatur per humiditatem saporum. Organum vero olfactus aut auditus nulla naturali immutatione immutatur in sentiendo, nisi per accidens. Visus autem, qui est absque immutatione naturali organi et objecti, est maxime spiritualis, et perfectior inter omnes sensus et communior, et post hunc auditus, et deinde olfactus, qui habent immutationem naturalem ex parte objecti. Motus autem localis est perfectior et naturaliter prior quam motus alterationis, ut probatur in VIII Phys., text. 55. Tactus autem et gustus sunt maxime naturales, de quorum distinctione post dicetur. Et inde est quod alii tres sensus non fiunt per medium conjunctum, ne aliqua naturalis transmutatio pertingat ad organum, ut accidit in his duobus sensibus.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.ad.1] Not every accident has in itself a power of immutation but only qualities of the third species, which are the principles of alteration: therefore only suchlike qualities are the objects of the senses; because \"the senses are affected by the same things whereby inanimate bodies are affected,\" as stated in Phys. vii, 2.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non omnia accidentia habent vim immutativam secundum se, sed solæ qualitates tertiæ speciei, secundum quas contingit alteratio; et ideo solæ hujusmodi qualitates sunt objecta sensuum; quia, ut dicitur in VII Phys., text. 13, « secundum eadem alteratur sensus, secundum quae alterantur corpora inanimata. »
\n[I.q.78.a.3.ad.2] Size, shape, and the like, which are called \"common sensibles,\" are midway between \"accidental sensibles\" and \"proper sensibles,\" which are the objects of the senses. For the proper sensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since they are qualities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles are all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is clear that they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity, since the notion of shape consists of fixing the bounds of magnitude. Movement and rest are sensed according as the subject is affected in one or more ways in the magnitude of the subject or of its local distance, as in the movement of growth or of locomotion, or again, according as it is affected in some sensible qualities, as in the movement of alteration; and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a way, to sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the proximate subject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of color. Therefore the common sensibles do not move the senses first and of their own nature, but by reason of the sensible quality; as the surface by reason of color. Yet they are not accidental sensibles, for they produce a certain variety in the immutation of the senses. For sense is immuted differently by a large and by a small surface: since whiteness itself is said to be great or small, and therefore it is divided according to its proper subject.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod magnitudo et figura et hujusmodi, quae dicuntur communia sensibilia, sunt media inter sensibilia per accidens et sensibilia propria, quae sunt objecta sensuum. Nam sensibilia propria primo et per se immutant sensum, cum sint Edit. Nicolaï: « materiales. » qualitates alterantes; sensibilia vero communia omnia reducuntur ad quantitatem. Et de magnitudine quidem et numero patet quod sunt species quantitatis; figura autem est qualitas circa quantitatem, cum consistat ratio figuræ in terminatione magnitudinis; motus autem et quies sentiuntur, secundum quod subjectum uno modo vel pluribus modis se habet secundum magnitudinem subjecti vel localis distantiæ, quantum ad motum augmenti et motum localem, vel etiam secundum sensibiles qualitates, ut in motu alterationis. Et sic sentire motum et quietem est quodammodo sentire unum et multa. Quantitas autem est proximum subjectum qualitatis alterativæ, ut superficies est subjectum coloris. Et ideo sensibilia communia non movent sensum primo et per se, sed ratione sensibilis qualitatis, ut superficies ratione coloris. Nec tamen sunt sensibilia per accidens, quia hujusmodi sensibilia aliquam diversitatem faciunt in immutatione sensus. Alio enim modo immutatur sensus a magna superficie et a parva; quia etiam ipsa albedo dicitur magna vel parva; et ideo dividitur secundum proprium subjectum.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.ad.3] As the Philosopher seems to say (De Anima ii, 11), the sense of touch is generically one, but is divided into several specific senses, and for this reason it extends to various contrarieties; which senses, however, are not separate from one another in their organ, but are spread throughout the whole body, so that their distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives the sweet and the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, but not in the whole body; so it is easily distinguished from touch. We might also say that all those contrarieties agree, each in some proximate genus, and all in a common genus, which is the common and formal object of touch. Such common genus is, however, unnamed, just as the proximate genus of hot and cold is unnamed.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus videtur dicere in II De anima, text. 106 et deinc., sensus tactus est unus genere, sed dividitur in multos sensus secundum speciem, et propter hoc est diversarum contrarietatum, qui tamen non separantur ab invicem secundum organum, sed per totum corpus se concomitantur; et ideo eorum distinctio non apparet. Gustus autem, qui est perceptivus dulcis et amari, concomitatur tactum in lingua, non autem per totum corpus, et ideo de facili a tactu distinguitur. Posset tamen dici quod omnes illæ contrarietates singulæ conveniunt in uno genere proximo et omnes in uno genere communi, quod est objectum tactus secundum rationem communem. Sed illud genus commune est innominatum, sicut etiam genus proximum calidi et frigidi est innominatum.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.ad.4] The sense of taste, according to a saying of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9), is a kind of touch existing in the tongue only. It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from the species of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is one sense only, on account of the common formality of its object: we must say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason of a different formality of immutation. For touch involves a natural, and not only a spiritual, immutation in its organ, by reason of the quality which is its proper object. But the organ of taste is not necessarily immuted by a natural immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper object, so that the tongue itself becomes sweet and bitter: but by reason of a quality which is a preamble to, and on which is based, the flavor, which quality is moisture, the object of touch.
\n[I.q.78.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod sensus gustus, secundum dictum Philosophi, II De anima, text. 28 et 94, est quædam species tactus quæ est in lingua tantum. Non autem distinguitur a tactu in genere, sed a tactu quantum ad alias species quæ per totum corpus diffunduntur. Si vero tactus sit unus sensus tantum propter unam rationem communem objecti, dicendum erit quod secundum rationem diversam immutationis dis-tinguitur gustus a tactu. Nam tactus immutatur naturali immutatione, et non solum spirituali, quantum ad organum suum, secundum qualitatem quæ ei proprie objicitur; gustus autem organum non immutatur de necessitate naturali immutatione secundum qualitatem quæ ei proprie objicitur, ut scilicet lingua fiat dulcis vel amara, sed secundum præambulam qualitatem in qua funda-tur sapor; scilicet secundum humorem, qui est objectum tactus.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the interior senses are not suitably distinguished. For the common is not divided against the proper. Therefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers, in addition to the proper exterior senses.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod interiores sensus inconvenienter distinguentur. Commune enim non dividitur contra proprium. Ergo sensus communis non debet enumerari inter vires interiores sensitivas præter sensus exteriores proprios.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.arg.2] Further, there is no need to assign an interior power of apprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffices. But the proper and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things; for each sense judges of its proper object. In like manner they seem to suffice for the perception of their own actions; for since the action of the sense is, in a way, between the power and its object, it seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its own vision, as being nearer to it, than the color; and in like manner with the other senses. Therefore for this there is no need to assign an interior power, called the common sense.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ad id ad quod sufficit sensus proprius et exterior non oportet ponere ali-quam vim apprehensivam interiorem. Sed ad judicandum de sensibilibus sufficiunt sensus proprii et exteriores; unusquisque enim sensus judicat de proprio objecto. Similiter etiam videntur sufficere ad hoc quod percipiant suos actus; quia, cum actio sensus sit quodammodo medium inter potentiam et objectum, videtur quod multo magis visus possit suam visionem, tanquam sibi propinquiorem, percipere, quam colorem, et sic de aliis. Non ergo necessarium fuit ad hoc ponere interiorem potentiam, quæ dicatur sensus communis.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.arg.3] Further, according to the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin. i), the imagination and the memory are passions of the \"first sensitive.\" But passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore memory and imagination should not be assigned as powers distinct from the senses.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, secundum Philosophum, lib. De memor. et reminisc., cap. 1, « phantasticum et memorativum sunt passiones primi sensitivi. » Sed passio non dividitur contra subjectum. Ergo memoria et phantasia non debent poni aliæ potentiæ præter sensum communem.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.arg.4] Further, the intellect depends on the senses less than any power of the sensitive part. But the intellect knows nothing but what it receives from the senses; whence we read (Poster. i, 8), that \"those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge.\" Therefore much less should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call the \"estimative\" power, for the perception of intentions which the sense does not perceive.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, intellectus minus dependet a sensu quam quæcumque potentia sensitivæ partis. Sed intellectus nihil cognoscit nisi accipiendo a sensu; unde dicitur in I Poster., text. 33, quod « quibus deest unus sensus, deficit una scientia. » Ergo multo minus debet poni una potentia sensitivæ partis ad percipiendas intentiones sensuum quas non percipit sensus, quam vocant aestimativam.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.arg.5] Further, the action of the cogitative power, which consists in comparing, adding and dividing, and the action of the reminiscence, which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for the sake of inquiry, is not less distant from the actions of the estimative and memorative powers, than the action of the estimative is from the action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add the cognitive and reminiscitive to the estimative and memorative powers, or the estimative and memorative powers should not be made distinct from the imagination.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.arg.5] 5. Præterea, actus cogitativæ, qui est conferre et componere et dividere, et actus reminiscitivæ, qui est quodam syllogismo uti ad inquirendum, non minus distant ab actu aestimativæ et memorativæ, quam actus aestimativæ ab actu phantasiae. Debent ergo vel cogitativa et reminiscitiva poni aliæ vires præter aestimativam et memorativam; vel aestimativa et memorativa non debent poni aliæ vires præter phantasiam.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.arg.6] Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7,24) describes three kinds of vision; namely, corporeal, which is the action of the sense; spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy; and intellectual, which is an action of the intellect. Therefore there is no interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the imagination.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.arg.6] 6. Præterea, Augustinus, XII Super Gen. ad litt., cap. vi, etc., col. 458, t. 3, ponit tria genera visionum: scilicet corporalem, quæ fit per sensum; et spiritualem quæ fit per imaginationem, sive phantasiam; et intellectualem, quæ fit per intellectum. Non est ergo aliqua vis interior quæ sit media inter sensum et intellectum, nisi imaginativa tantum.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.sc] Avicenna (De Anima iv, 1) assigns five interior sensitive powers; namely, \"common sense, phantasy, imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers.\"
\n[I.q.78.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Avicenna in suo libro De anima ponit quinque potentias sensitivas interiores, scilicet « sensum communem, phantasiam, imaginativam, aestimativam et memorativam. »
\n[I.q.78.a.4.co] As nature does not fail in necessary things, there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for the life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be reduced to the same one principle, they must be assigned to diverse powers; since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the soul's operation.
\nNow we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action follow apprehension, an animal would not be moved to seek something absent: the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect animals, which are moved by progression, for they are moved towards something apprehended and absent. Therefore an animal through the sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things, when it is actually affected by them, but it must also retain and preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things, reduced to diverse principles; for moist things are apt to receive, but retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things. Wherefore, since the sensitive power is the act of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible things must be distinct from the power which preserves them.
\nAgain we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there would be no need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages and uses, or disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not on account of its color or shape, but as a natural enemy: and again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but because they are useful for building its nest. Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive. And some distinct principle is necessary for this; since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by the sensible, which is not the case with the perception of those intentions.
\nThus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the \"proper sense\" and the \"common sense\" are appointed, and of their distinction we shall speak farther on (ad 1,2). But for the retention and preservation of these forms, the \"phantasy\" or \"imagination\" is appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the \"estimative\" power is appointed: and for the preservation thereof, the \"memorative\" power, which is a storehouse of such-like intentions. A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in some such intention, for instance, that something is harmful or otherwise. And the very formality of the past, which memory observes, is to be reckoned among these intentions.
\nNow, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals; for they are similarly immuted by the extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above intentions: for other animals perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of ideas. Therefore the power by which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called the \"cogitative,\" which by some sort of collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is also called the \"particular reason,\" to which medical men assign a certain particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past; but also \"reminiscence\" by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions. Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative, a fifth power, which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when from the imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this action in his book De sensu et sensibilibus (viii). So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part--namely, the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum natura non deficiat in necessariis, oportet esse tot actiones animæ sensitivæ, quot sufficiant ad vitam animalis perfecti. Et quæcumque harum actionum non possunt reduci in unum principium, requirunt diversas potentias; cum potentia animæ nihil aliud sit quam proximum principium operationis animæ. Est autem considerandum, quod ad vitam animalis perfecti requiritur quod non solum apprehendat rem ad præsentiam sensibilis, sed etiam in ejus absentia; alioquin, cum animalis motus et actio sequantur apprehensionem, non moveretur animal ad inquirendum aliquid absens: cujus contrarium apparet maxime in animalibus perfectis, quæ moventur motu processivo: moventur enim ad aliquid absens apprehensum. Oportet ergo quod animal per animam sensitivam non solum recipiat species sensibilium cum præsentialiter immutatur ab eis, sed etiam eas retineat et conservet. Recipere autem et retinere reducuntur in corporalibus ad diversa principia; nam humida bene recipiunt et male retinent; e contrario autem est de siccis. Unde, cum potentia sensitiva sit actus organi corporalis, oportet esse aliam potentiam quæ recipiat species sensibilium, et quæ conservet. Rursus considerandum est, quod si animal moveretur solum propter delectabile et contristabile secundum sensum, non esset necessarium ponere in animali nisi apprehensionem formarum quas percipit sensus, in quibus delectatur aut horret. Sed necessarium est animali ut quærat aliqua vel fugiat, non solum quia sunt convenientia vel non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed etiam propter aliquas alias commoditates et utilitates sive documenta; sicut ovis videns lu-pum venientem fugit, non propter indecentiam coloris vel figuræ, sed quasi inimicum naturæ; et similiter avis colligit paleam, non quia delectet sensum, sed quia est utilis ad nidificandum. Necessarium est ergo animali quod percipiat hujusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit sensus exterior; et hujus perceptionis oportet esse aliquod aliud principium; cum perceptio formarum sensibilium sit ex immutatione sensibilii, non autem perceptio intentionum prædictarum. Sic ergo ad receptionem formarum sensibilium ordinatur sensus proprius et communis, de quorum distinctione post dicetur. Ad harum autem formarum retentionem aut conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, quæ idem sunt; est enim phantasia sive imaginatio quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum. Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quæ per sensum non accipiuntur ordinatur vis aestimativa; ad conservandum autem eas vis memorativa, quæ est thesaurus quidam hujusmodi intentionum; cujus signum est, quod principium memorandi fit in animalibus ex aliqua hujusmodi intentione; puta, quod est nocivum, vel conveniens. Et ipsa ratio præteriti, quam attendit memoria, inter hujusmodi intentiones computatur. Considerandum est autem quod quantum ad formas sensibiles non est differentia inter hominem et alia animalia; similiter enim immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus; sed quantum ad intentiones prædictas differentia est. Nam alia animalia percipiunt hujusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu; homo autem per quamdam collationem. Et ideo quæ in aliis animalibus di- 1 Al.: deest « sensuum. » 2 Ita cum cod. Parisiens. et Alcan. editi plurimi; Rom. edit.: « Phantasia, sive imaginatio, quasi citur aestimativa naturalis, in homine dicitur cogitativa, quae per collationem quamdam hujusmodi intentiones adinvenit. Unde etiam dicitur ratio particularis, cui medici assignant determinatum organum, scilicet mediam partem capitis. Est enim collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio intellectiva est collativa intentionum universalium. Ex parte autem memorativæ non solum habet memoriam, sicut cætera animalia, in subita recordatione præteritorum, sed etiam reminiscentiam, quasi syllogistice inquirendo præteritorum memoriam, secundum individuales intentiones. Avicenna vero ponit quintam potentiam mediam inter aestimativam et imaginativam, quae componit et dividit formas imaginatas; ut patet cum ex forma imaginata auri et forma imaginata montis componimus unam formam montis aurei, quem nonquam vidimus. Sed ista operatio non apparet in aliis animalibus ab homine, in quo ad hoc sufficit virtus imaginativa. Cui etiam hanc actionem attribuit Averroes in libro quodam quem fecit de sensu et sensibilibus. Et sic non est necesse ponere nisi quatuor vires interiores sensitivæ partis, scilicet sensum communem, et imaginationem, aestimativam et memorativam.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.ad.1] The interior sense is called \"common\" not by predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sensus interior non dicitur communis per prædicationem, sicut genus, sed sicut communis radix et principium exteriorum sensuum.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.ad.2] The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for instance, by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet: because what discerns between two things must know both. Wherefore the discerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense; to which, as to a common term, all apprehensions of the senses must be referred: and by which, again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted, in which immutation the action of sight is completed, and from immutation follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sensus proprius judicat de sensibili proprio, discernendo ipsum ab aliis quæ cadunt sub eodem sensu; sicut discernendo album a nigro vel a viridi. Sed discernere album a. dulci non potest neque visus neque gustus; quia oportet quod qui inter aliqua discernit, utrumque cognoscat. Unde oportet ad sensum communem pertinere discretionis judicium, ad quem referantur sicut ad communem terminum, omnes apprehensiones sensuum, a quo etiam percipiantur actiones sensuum, sicut cum aliquis videt se videre. Hoc enim non potest fieri per sensum proprium, qui non cognoscit nisi formam sensibilis a quo immutatur; in qua immutatione perficitur visio, et ex qua immutatione sequitur alia immutatio in sensu communi qui visionem percipit.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.ad.3] As one power arises from the soul by means of another, as we have seen above (Question 77, Article 7), so also the soul is the subject of one power through another. In this way the imagination and the memory are called passions of the \"first sensitive.\"
\n[I.q.78.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut una potentia oritur ab anima, alia mediante, ut supra dictum est, ita etiam anima subjicitur alii potentiæ mediante alia; et secundum hunc modum phantasticum et memorativum dicuntur passiones primi sensitivi.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.ad.4] Although the operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In like manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect manner.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod, licet intellectus operatio oriatur a sensu, tamen in re apprehensa per sensum intellectus multa cognoscit quæ sensus percipere non potest; et similiter aestimativa, licet inferiori modo.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.ad.5] The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them. Therefore they are not distinct powers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod illam eminentiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in homine, non per id quod est proprium sensitivæ partis, sed per aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, secundum quamdam refluentiam. Et ideo non sunt aliæ vires, sed eædem perfectiores quam sint in aliis animalibus.
\n[I.q.78.a.4.ad.6] Augustine calls that vision spiritual which is effected by the images of bodies in the absence of bodies. Whence it is clear that it is common to all interior apprehensions.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I.q.78.a.4.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod Augustinus spiritualem visionem dicit esse quæ fit per similitudines corporum in absentia corporum. Unde patet quod communis est omnibus interioribus apprehensionibus.
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