[I.q.83.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever has free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for it is written (Romans 7:19): \"For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do.\" Therefore man has not free-will.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo non sit liberi arbitrii. Quicumque enim est liberi arbitrii, facit quod vult. Sed homo non facit quod vult; dicitur enim Rom., vii, 19: Non enim quod volo bonum hoc ago, sed quod odi malum illud facio *. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.arg.2] Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power: for it is written (Romans 9:16): \"It is not of him that willeth\"--namely, to will--\"nor of him that runneth\"--namely, to run. Therefore man has not free-will.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quicumque est liberi arbitrii, ejus est velle et non velle, operari et non operari. Sed hoc non est hominis; dicitur enim ad Rom., ix, 16: Non est volentis, scilicet velle, neque currentis, scilicet currere. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.arg.3] Further, what is \"free is cause of itself,\" as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will, for it is written (Proverbs 21:1): \"The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it\" and (Philippians 2:13): \"It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish.\" Therefore man has not free-will.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, liberum est quod sui causa est, ut dicitur in I Metaph., cap. ii, circa med. Quod ergo movetur ab alio non est liberum. Sed Deus movet voluntatem; dicitur enim Prov., xxi, 4: Cor regis in manu Dei, et quocumque voluerit *, vertet illud; et Phil., ii, 13: Deus est qui operatur in nobis * Bonum hoc facio, sed quod nolo malum hoc ago. * Domini; quocumque... in clinabit. * Vobis et velle. velle * et perficere. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.arg.4] Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own actions. But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written (Jeremiah 10:23): \"The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to walk.\" Therefore man has not free-will.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, quicumque est liberi arbitrii, est dominus suorum actuum. Sed homo non est dominus suorum actuum, quia, ut dicitur Jerem., x, 23, Non est in homine * via ejus, nec viri est ut dirigat gressus suos. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.arg.5] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): \"According as each one is, such does the end seem to him.\" But it is not in our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end, and therefore we are not free in so doing.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.arg.5] 5. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., cap. v, a med.: «Qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei. » Sed non est in potestate nostra aliquales esse, sed hoc nobis est a natura. Ergo naturale est nobis quod aliquem finem sequamur; non ergo ex libero arbitrio.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.sc] It is written (Sirach 15:14): \"God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel\"; and the gloss adds: \"That is of his free-will.\"
\n[I.q.83.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli., xv, 14: Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum * in manu consilii sui, Glossa, col. 4199, t. 1, id est « in libertate arbitrii. »
\n[I.q.83.a.1.co] Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod homo est liberi arbitrii; alioquin frustra essent consilia, exhortationes, præcepta, prohibitiones, præmia et poenæ. Ad hujus autem evidentiam considerandum est quod quædam agunt absque judicio, sicut lapis movetur deorsum, et similiter omnia cognitione carentia. Quædam autem agunt judicio, sed non libero, sicut animalia bruta; judicat enim ovis videns lupum, eum esse fugiendum, naturali judicio, et non libero: quia non ex collatione, sed ex naturali instinctu hoc judicat, et simile est de quolibet judicio brutorum animalium. Sed homo agit judicio, quia per vim cognosciti-vam judicat aliquid esse fugiendum vel prosequendum. Sed quia judicium istud non est ex naturali instinctu in particulari operabili, sed ex collatione quadam rationis; ideo agit libero judicio, potens in diversa ferri. Ratio enim circa contingentia habet viam ad opposita, ut patet in dialecticis syllogismis, et rhetoricis persuasionibus. Particularia autem operabilia sunt quædam contingentia; et ideo circa ea judicium rationis ad diversa se habet, et non est determinatum ad unum. Et pro tanto necesse est quod homo sit liberi arbitrii ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.ad.1] As we have said above (81, 3, ad 2), the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes--namely, \"not to desire against reason,\" as Augustine says.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, appetitus sensitivus, etsi obediat rationi, tamen potest in aliquo repugnare, concupiscendo contra illud quod ratio dictat. Hoc ergo est bonum quod homo non facit cum vult, scilicet non concupiscere contra rationem, ut Glossa Augustini ibidem dicit, Contra Jul., lib. III, cap. xxvi, § 62, col. 733, t. 10.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.ad.2] Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but because the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by God.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum illud Apostoli non sic est intelligendum quasi homo non velit et non currat libero arbitrio, sed quia liberum arbitrium ad hoc non est sufficiens, nisi moveatur et juvetur a Deo.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.ad.3] Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus, quia homo per liberum arbitrium seipsum movet ad agendum. Non tamen hoc est de necessitate libertatis quod sit prima causa sui id quod liberum est; sicut nec ad hoc quod aliquid sit causa alterius, requiritur quod sit prima causa ejus. Deus igitur est prima causa movens et naturales causas et voluntarias. Et sicut naturalibus causis, movendo eas, non aufert quin actus earum sint naturales, ita movendo causas voluntarias, non aufert quin actiones earum sint voluntariæ, sed potius hoc in eis facit; operatur enim in unoquoque secundum ejus proprietatem.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.ad.4] \"Man's way\" is said \"not to be his\" in the execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod dicitur non esse in homine via ejus, quantum ad executiones electionum, in quibus homo impediri potest, velit, nolit; electiones autem ipsæ sunt in nobis, supposito tamen divino auxilio.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.ad.5] Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above (82, 1,2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said (81, 3). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will.
\nThe adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will.
\n[I.q.83.a.1.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod qualitas hominis est duplex, una naturalis, et alia superveniens. Naturalis autem qualitas accipi potest vel circa partem intellectivam, vel circa corpus et virtutes corpori annexas. Ex eo igitur quod homo est aliqualis qualitate naturali, quæ attenditur secundum intellectivam partem, naturaliter homo appetit ultimum finem, scilicet beatitudinem. Qui quidem appetitus naturalis est, et non subjacet libero arbitrio, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ex parte vero corporis et virtutum corpori annexarum potest esse homo aliqualis naturali qualitate, secundum quod est talis complexionis, vel talis dispositionis, ex quacumque impressione corporearum causarum, quæ non possunt in intellectivam partem imprimere, eo quod non est alicujus corporis actus. Sic igitur qualis unusquisque est secundum corpoream qualitatem, talis finis videtur ei; quia ex hujusmodi dispositione homo inclinatur ad eligendum aliquid, vel repudiandum. Sed istæ inclinationes subjacent judicio rationis, cui obedit inferior appetitus, ut dictum est. Unde per hæc libertati arbitrii non præjudicatur. Qualitates autem supervenientes sunt sicut habitus et passiones, secundum quas aliquis magis inclinatur in unum quam in alterum. Tamen istæ etiam inclinationes subjacent judicio rationis; et hujusmodi etiam qualitates ei subjacent, inquantum in nobis est tales qualitates acquirere vel causaliter vel dispositive, vel a nobis excludere. Et sic nihil est quod libertati arbitrii repugnet.
\n[I.q.83.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that free-will is not a power. For free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, not a power. Therefore free-will is not a power.
\n[I.q.83.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium non sit potentia. Arbitrium enim liberum nihil est aliud quam liberum judicium. Judicium autem non nominat potentiam, sed actum. Ergo liberum arbitrium non est potentia.
\n[I.q.83.a.2.arg.2] Further, free-will is defined as \"the faculty of the will and reason.\" But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is \"the soul's habit of disposing of itself.\" Therefore it is not a power.
\n[I.q.83.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, liberum arbitrium dicitur esse facultas voluntatis et rationis. Facultas autem nominat facilitatem potestatis, quæ quidem est per habitum. Ergo liberum arbitrium est habitus. Bernardus etiam dicit, Tract. de gratia et lib. arbitr., cap. 1, § 2, col. 402, t. 2 edit. Vivès, quod « liberum arbitrium est habitus animi liber sui. » Non ergo est potentia.
\n[I.q.83.a.2.arg.3] Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that \"man, by abusing free-will, loses both it and himself.\" Therefore free-will is not a power.
\n[I.q.83.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nulla potentia naturalis tollitur per peccatum. Sed liberum arbitrium tollitur per peccatum. Augustinus enim dicit in Enchir., cap. xxx, col. 246, t. 6, quod « libero arbitrio male utens homo et se perdidit, et ipsum. » Ergo liberum arbitrium non est potentia.
\n[I.q.83.a.2.sc] Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which it chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power.
\n[I.q.83.a.2.sc] Sed contra est, quod nihil est subjectum habitus, ut videtur, nisi potentia. Sed liberum arbitrium est subjectum gratia, qua sibi assistente bonum eligit. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia.
\n[I.q.83.a.2.co] Although free-will [Liberum arbitrium--i.e. free judgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge and by the intellectual power. Therefore free-will must be either a power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways.
\nFirst of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit; for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not natural habit in us with respect to those things which come under free-will: for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural habits--for instance, to assent to first principles: while those things which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will, as we have said of the desire of happiness (82, 1,2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.
\nSecondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that \"by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and passions\" (Ethic. ii, 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed: and by knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the free-will is indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it is impossible for free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a power.
\n[I.q.83.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quamvis liberum arbitrium nominet quemdam actum secundum propriam significationem vocabuli, secundum tamen communem usum loquendi liberum arbitrium dicimus id quod est hujus actus principium, scilicet quo homo libere judicat. Guillermus, Richardus, Bonaventura, cum D. Thoma, liberum arbitrium in bruto non agnoscunt, quamvis Aristoteles animalia dicat voluntate Principium autem actus in nobis est et potentia et habitus. Dicimur enim aliquid cognoscere et per scientiam et per intellectivam potentiam. Oportet ergo quod liberum arbitrium vel sit potentia, vel sit habitus, vel sit potentia cum aliquo habitu. Quod autem non sit habitus, neque potentia cum habitu, manifeste apparet ex duobus. Primo quidem, quia si est habitus, oportet quod sit habitus naturalis; hoc enim est naturale homini quod sit liberi arbitrii. Nullus autem habitus naturalis adest nobis ad ea quæ subsunt libero arbitrio; quia ad ea respectu quorum habemus habitus naturales, naturaliter inclinamur, sicut ad assentiendum primis principiis. Ea autem ad quæ naturaliter inclinamur, non subsunt libero arbitrio, sicut dictum est de appetitu beatitudinis. Unde contra propriam rationem liberi arbitrii est quod sit habitus naturalis. Contra naturalitatem autem ejus est quod sit habitus non naturalis. Et sic relinquitur quod nullo modo sit habitus. Secundo hoc apparet, quia habitus dicuntur secundum quod nos habemus ad passiones, vel ad actus, bene vel male, ut dicitur in II Ethic., c. v. Nam per temperantiam bene nos habemus ad concupiscentias, per intemperantiam autem male. Per scientiam etiam bene nos habemus ad actum intellectus, dum verum cognoscimus; per habitum autem contrarium, male. Liberum autem arbitrium indifferenter se habet ad bene eligendum vel male. Unde impossibile est quod liberum arbitrium sit habitus. Relinquitur ergo quod sit potentia.
\n[I.q.83.a.2.ad.1] It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act. And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free-will denominated an act, it would not always remain in man.
\n[I.q.83.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod consuetum est potentiam significari nomine actus. Et sic per hunc actum, qui est liberum judicium, nominatur potentia quæ est hujus actus principium; alioquin si liberum arbitrium nominaret actum, non semper maneret in homine.
\n[I.q.83.a.2.ad.2] Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for operation, and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of free-will. But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit: for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or ill.
\n[I.q.83.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod facultas nominat quandoque potestatem expeditam ad operandum, et sic facultas ponitur in definitione liberi arbitrii. Bernardus autem accipit habitum, non secundum quod dividitur contra potentiam, sed secundum quod significat habitudinem quamdam, qua aliquo modo se aliquis habet ad actum; quod quidem est tam per potentiam, quam operari. Sed hic voluntas largo modo accipitur, prout ad operari per naturalem appetitum extenditur, et contra violentum dividitur. per habitum; nam per potentiam homo se habet ut potens operari, per habitum autem ut aptus ad operandum bene vel male.
\n[I.q.83.a.2.ad.3] Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as regards freedom from fault and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this work (I-II, 85, seqq.; 109).
\n[I.q.83.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod homo pecando liberum arbitrium dicitur perdidisse, non quantum ad libertatem naturalem, quæ est a coactione, sed quantum ad libertatem quæ est a culpa et a miseria; de qua infra in Tractatu moralium dicetur.
\n[I.q.83.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that free-will is not an appetitive, but a cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) says that \"free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature.\" But reason is a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
\n[I.q.83.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium non sit potentia appetitiva, sed cognitiva. Dicit enim Damascenus, lib. II Orth. fidei, c. xxvii, col. 959, t. 4, quod « cum rationali confestim comitatur liberum arbitrium. » Sed ratio est potentia cognitiva. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia cognitiva.
\n[I.q.83.a.3.arg.2] Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
\n[I.q.83.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, liberum arbitrium dicitur quasi liberum judicium. Sed judicare est actus cognitivæ virtutis. Ergo liberum arbitrium est cognitiva potentia.
\n[I.q.83.a.3.arg.3] Further, the principal function of free-will is to choose. But choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a certain comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
\n[I.q.83.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ad liberum arbitrium præcipe pertinet electio. Sed electio videtur ad cognitionem pertinere; quia electio importat quamdam comparisonem unius ad alterum, quod est proprium cognitivæ virtutis. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia cognitiva.
\n[I.q.83.a.3.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is \"the desire of those things which are in us.\" But desire is an act of the appetitive power: therefore choice is also. But free-will is that by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive power.
\n[I.q.83.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., c. 11, circa med., quod « electio est desiderium eorum quæ sunt in nobis. » Sed desiderium est actus appetitivæ virtutis. Ergo et electio. Liberum autem arbitrium est, secundum quod eligimus. Ergo liberum arbitrium est virtus appetitiva.
\n[I.q.83.a.3.co] The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel. Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since he says that choice is either \"an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite.\" But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as \"a desire proceeding from counsel.\" And the reason of this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive power.
\n[I.q.83.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod proprium liberi arbitrii est electio. Ex hoc enim liberi arbitrii esse dicimur, quod possumus unum recipere, alio recusato, quod est eligere; et ideo naturam liberi arbitrii ex electione considerare oportet. Ad electionem autem con-currit aliquid ex parte cognitivæ virtutis, et aliquid ex parte appetitivæ. Ex parte qui-dem cognitivæ requiritur consilium, per quod dijudicatur quid sit alteri præferendum. Ex parte autem appetitivæ requiritur quod appetendo acceptetur quod per consilium dijudicatur; et ideo Aristoteles in V1 Ethic., cap. 11, sub dubio relinquit, utrum principalius pertineat electio ad vim appetitivam, vel ad vim cognitivam. Dicit enim quod electio vel est « intellectus appetitivus, vel appetitus intellectivus. » Sed in III Ethic., cap. 11, in hoc magis declinat quod sit appetitus intellectivus, nominans electionem « desiderium consiliabile. » Et hujus ratio est, quia proprium objectum electionis est illud quod est ad finem. Hoc autem, in-quantum hujusmodi, habet rationem boni quod dicitur utile. Unde cum bonum, in-quantum hujusmodi, sit objectum appetitus, sequitur quod electio sit principaliter actus appetitivæ virtutis. Et sic liberum arbitrium est appetitiva potentia.
\n[I.q.83.a.3.ad.1] The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies the rational power.
\n[I.q.83.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod potentiæ appetitivæ concomitantur apprehensivas; et secundum hoc dicit Damascenus, quod « cum rationali confestim concomitatur liberum arbitrium. »
\n[I.q.83.a.3.ad.2] Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3) says that, \"having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel.\" And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name.
\n[I.q.83.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod judicium est quasi conclusio et determinatio consilii. Determinatur autem consilium primo qui-dem per sententiam rationis, et secundo per acceptanceem appetitus. Unde Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., loco nunc cit., quod « ex consiliari judicantes desideramus secundum consilium. » Et hoc modo ipsa electio dicitur quoddam judicium, a quo nominatur liberum arbitrium.
\n[I.q.83.a.3.ad.3] This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another.
\n[I.q.83.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ista collatio quæ importatur in nomine electionis, pertinet ad consilium præcedens, quod est rationis. Appetitus enim, quamvis non sit collativus, tamen inquantum a vi cognitiva conferente movetur, habet quamdam collationis similitudinem, dum unum alteri præ-optat.
\n[I.q.83.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that thelesis is one thing and boulesis another. But thelesis is the will, while boulesis seems to be the free-will, because boulesis, according to him, is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the will.
\n[I.q.83.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit alia potentia a voluntate. Dicit enim Damascenus in lib. II Orth. fid., c. xxii, col. 943, t. 1, quod aliud est thelesis aliud vero boulesis; thelesis autem est voluntas, boulesis autem videtur arbitrium liberum: quia boulesis secundum ipsum est voluntas quæ est circa aliquid, quasi unius per comparisonem ad aliorum. Ergo videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit alia potentia a voluntate.
\n[I.q.83.a.4.arg.2] Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, because \"the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end\" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.
\n[I.q.83.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, potentiæ cognoscuntur per actus. Sed electio, quæ est actus liberi arbitrii, est aliud a voluntate, ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. 11: quia « voluntas est de fine, electio autem de iis quæ sunt ad finem. » Ergo liberum arbitrium est alia potentia a voluntate.
\n[I.q.83.a.4.arg.3] Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the intellect there are two powers--the active and the passive. Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be free-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.
\n[I.q.83.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, voluntas est appetitus intellectivus. Sed ex parte intellectus sunt duæ potentiæ, scilicet agens et possibilis. Ergo etiam ex parte appetitus intellectivi debet esse aliqua potentia præter voluntatem; et hæc non videtur esse nisi liberum arbitrium. Ergo liberum arbitrium est alia potentia præter voluntatem.
\n[I.q.83.a.4.sc] Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will is nothing else than the will.
\n[I.q.83.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit in III lib. Orth. fid., c. xiv, col. 1038, t. 1, quod « liberum arbitrium nihil aliud est quam voluntas. »
\n[I.q.83.a.4.co] The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above (Question 64, Article 2). Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of \"understanding\" implies the simple acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. But to \"reason,\" properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appetite to \"will\" implies the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to \"choose\" is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above (Question 79, Article 8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one.
\n[I.q.83.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod potentias appetitivas oportet esse proportionatas potentiis apprehensivis, ut supra dictum est. Sicut autem ex parte apprehensionis intellectivæ se habent intellectus et ratio; ita ex parte appetitus intellectivi se habent voluntas et liberum arbitrium, quod nihil aliud est quam vis electiva. Et hoc patet ex habitudine et objectorum et actuum. Nam intelligere importat simplicem acceptionem alicujus rei; unde intelligi dicuntur proprie principia quæ sine collatione per seipsa cognoscuntur. Ratiocinari autem proprie est devenire ex uno in cognitionem alterius. Unde proprie de conclusionibus ratiocina-mur, quæ ex principiis innotescunt. Similiiter ex parte appetitus velle importat simplicem appetitum alicujus rei; unde voluntas dicitur esse de fine, qui propter se appetitur. Eligere autem est appetere aliquid propter alterum consequendum; unde proprie est eorum quæ sunt ad finem. Sicut autem se habet in cognitivis principium ad conclusionem, cui propter principia assentimur; ita in appetitivis se habet finis ad ea quæ sunt ad finem, quæ propter finem appetuntur. Unde manifestum est quod sicut se habet intellectus ad rationem, ita se habet voluntas ad vim electivam, id est ad liberum arbitrium. Ostensum est autem supra, quod ejusdem potentiæ est intelligere et ratiocinari, sicut ejusdem virtutis est quiescere et moveri: unde etiam ejusdem potentiæ est velle et eligere. Et propter hoc voluntas et liberum arbitrium non sunt duæ potentiæ, sed una.
\n[I.q.83.a.4.ad.1] Boulesis is distinct from thelesis on account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts.
\n[I.q.83.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod boulesis distinguitur a thelesis non propter diversitatem potentiarum, sed propter differentiam actuum.
\n[I.q.83.a.4.ad.2] Choice and will--that is, the act of willing --are different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to understand and to reason, as we have said.
\n[I.q.83.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod electio et voluntas, id est ipsum velle, sunt diversi actus, sed tamen pertinent ad unam potentiam; sicut etiam intelligere et ratiocinari, ut dictum est.
\n[I.q.83.a.4.ad.3] The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a passive will.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I.q.83.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod intellectus comparatur ad voluntatem ut movens; et ideo non oportet in voluntate distinguere agens et possibile.
\n