[I.q.96.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had no mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14), that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of the angels, to receive their names from him. But the angels need not have intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals. Therefore in the state of innocence man had no mastership of the animals.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.arg.2] Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another should be brought under the mastership of one. But many animals are hostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all animals were not brought under the mastership of man.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ea quæ ab invicem discordant, non recte sub uno dominio congregantur. Sed multa animalia naturaliter ab invicem discordant, sicut ovis et lupus. Ergo omnia animalia sub hominis dominio non continebantur.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.arg.3] Further, Jerome says [The words quoted are not in St. Jerome's works. St. Thomas may have had in mind Bede, Hexaem., as quoted in the Glossa ordinaria on Genesis 1:26: \"God gave man mastership over the animals, although before sin he had no need of them: for God foresaw that after sin animals would become useful to man.\" Therefore, at least before sin, it was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Hieronymus dicit quod « homini ante peccatum non indigenti Deus animalium dominationem dedit; præsciebat enim hominem adminiculo animalium adjuvandum fore post lapsum. » Ergo ad minus usus dominii super animalia non competebat homini ante peccatum.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.arg.4] Further, it is proper to a master to command. But a command is not given rightly save to a rational being. Therefore man had no mastership over the irrational animals.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, proprium domini esse videtur præcipere. Sed præceptum non recte fertur nisi ad habentem rationem. Ergo homo non habebat dominium super animalia irrationalia.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.sc] It is written (Genesis 1:26): \"Let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts of the earth\" [Vulg.\"and the whole earth\"].
\n[I.q.96.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen., 1, 26, de homine: Præsit piscibus maris, et volatilibus cæli, et bestiis.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.co] As above stated (95, 1) for his disobedience to God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which should be subject to him. Therefore in the state of innocence, before man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him. Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be proved in three ways.
\nFirst, from the order observed by nature; for just as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of procession of the perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the sake of form; and the imperfect form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there order in the use of natural things; thus the imperfect are for the use of the perfect; as the plants make use of the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes use of both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises a natural right.
\nSecondly, this is proved by the order of Divine Providence which always governs inferior things by the superior. Wherefore, as man, being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these are rightly subject to his government.
\nThirdly, this is proved from a property of man and of other animals. For we see in the latter a certain participated prudence of natural instinct, in regard to certain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence as regards all practical matters. Now whatever is participated is subject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the subjection of other animals to man is proved to be natural.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, inobedientia ad hominem eorum quæ ei debent esse subjecta, subsecuta est in poenam ejus eo quod ipse fuit inobediens Deo. Et ideo in statu innocentiæ ante inobedientiam prædictam nihil ei repugnabat quod naturaliter deberet ei esse subjectum. Omnia autem animalia sunt homini naturaliter subjecta, quod apparet ex tribus. Primo, ex ipso naturæ processu. Sicut enim in generatione rerum intelligitur quidam ordo quo proceditur de imperfecto ad perfectum, nam materia est propter formam, et forma imperfectior propter perfectiorem, ita etiam est in usu rerum naturalium. Nam imperfectiora cedunt in usum perfectiorum; plantæ enim utuntur terra ad sui nutrimentum, animalia vero plantis, et homines plantis et animalibus. Unde naturaliter homo dominatur animalibus, et propter hoc Philosophus dicit in I Polit., cap. v, quod « venatio sylvestrium animalium est justa et naturalis, quia per eam homo vindicat sibi quod est naturaliter suum. » Secundo, apparet hoc ex ordine divinæ providentiæ, quæ semper inferiora per superiora gubernat. Unde cum homo sit supra cætera animalia, utpote ad imaginem Dei factus, convenienter ejus gubernationi alia animalia subduntur. Tertio, apparet idem ex proprietate hominis, et aliorum animalium. In aliis enim animalibus inventur secundum aestimationem naturalem quædam participatio prudentiæ ad aliquos particulares actus; in homine autem universalis prudentia, quæ est ratio omnium agibilium. Omne autem quod est per participationem subditur ei quod est per essentiam et universaliter. Unde patet quod naturalis est subjectio aliorum animalium ad hominem.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.ad.1] A higher power can do many things that an inferior power cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an angel is naturally higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard to animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in subjectos multa potest facere superior potestas quæ non potest facere inferior. Angelus autem est naturaliter superior homine. Unde aliquis effectus poterat fieri circa animalia virtute angelica qui non poterat fieri potestate humana, scilicet quod statim omnia animalia congregarentur.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.ad.2] In the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not only in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed by man's sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. Nor does Bede's gloss on Genesis 1:30, say that trees and herbs were given as food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy between some animals. They would not, however, on this account have been excepted from the mastership of man: as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from the mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all this. Of this Providence man would have been the executor, as appears even now in regard to domestic animals, since fowls are given by men as food to the trained falcon.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quidam dicunt, quod animalia quæ nunc sunt ferocia et occidunt alia animalia, in statu illo fuissent mansueta, non solum circa hominem, sed etiam circa alia animalia. Sed hoc est omnino irrationabile. Non enim per peccatum hominis natura animalium est mutata; ut quibus nunc naturale est comedere aliorum carnes, tunc vixissent de herbis, sicut leones et falcones. Nec Glossa Bedæ dicit Gen., 1, quod « ligna et herbæ data sunt omnibus animalibus et avibus in cibum, » sed « quibusdam. » Fuisset ergo naturalis discordia inter quædam animalia. Nec tamen propter hoc subtraherentur dominio hominis; sicut nec nunc propter hoc subtrahuntur dominio Dei, cujus providentia hoc totum dispensatur. Et hujus providentiæ homo executor fuisset, ut etiam nunc apparet in animalibus domesticis; ministrantur enim falconibus domesticis per homines gallinæ in cibum.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.ad.3] In the state of innocence man would not have had any bodily need of animals--neither for clothing, since then they were naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence--nor for food, since they fed on the trees of paradise--nor to carry him about, his body being strong enough for that purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God led the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod homines in statu innocentiæ non indigebant animalibus ad necessitatem corporalem, neque ad tegumentum, quia nudi erant et non erubescebant, nullo incitante inordinatæ concupis- Oppositum legitur apud Bedam: unde conjicit Nicolai D. Thomam quoddam corruptum exemplar prae manibus habuisse. centiæ motu; neque ad cibum, quia lignis paradisi vescebantur; neque ad vehiculum, propter corporis robur; indigebant tamen eis ad experimentalem cognitionem sumendam de naturis eorum. Quod significatum est per hoc quod Deus ad eum animalia adduxit, ut eis nomina imponeret quæ eorum naturas designant.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.ad.4] All animals by their natural instinct have a certain participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact that cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present state some domestic animals obey him.
\n[I.q.96.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod omnia animalia habent quamdam participationem prudentiæ et rationis secundum æstimationem naturalem: ex qua contingit quod grues sequuntur ducem, et apes obediunt regi. Et sic tunc omnia animalia per seipsa homini obedivissent, sicut nunc quædam domestica ei obediunt.
\n[I.q.96.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel naturally has a greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8), \"corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy angels.\" Much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state of innocence.
\n[I.q.96.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo non habuisset dominium super omnes alias creaturas. Angelus enim naturaliter est majoris potestatis quam homo. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus, De Trinit., lib. III, c. vIII, col. 876, t. 8, materia corporalis non obedivisset ad nutum etiam sanctis angelis. Ergo multo minus homini in statu innocentiæ.
\n[I.q.96.a.2.arg.2] Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these doe not naturally obey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. Therefore, since it is by his reason that man is competent to have mastership, it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over plants.
\n[I.q.96.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in plantis non sunt de viribus animæ, nisi nutritiva et augmentativa et generativa. Hæc autem non sunt natæ obedire rationi, ut in uno et eodem homine apparet. Ergo cum dominium competat homini secundum rationem, videtur quod homo in statu innocentiæ non dominaretur plantis.
\n[I.q.96.a.2.arg.3] Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; for this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii). Therefore man had no dominion over them.
\n[I.q.96.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quicumque dominatur alicui rei potest illam rem mutare. Sed homo non potuisset mutare cursum cælestium corporum; hoc enim solius Dei est, ut dicit Dionysius in Epist. ad Polycarp., vii, col. 1082, t. 1. Ergo non dominabatur eis.
\n[I.q.96.a.2.sc] It is written (Genesis 1:26): \"That he may have dominion over . . . every creature.\"
\n[I.q.96.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Genes., 1, 26, de homine: Præsit universæ creaturæ*.
\n[I.q.96.a.2.co] Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four things in man: his \"reason,\" which makes him like to the angels'; his \"sensitive powers,\" whereby he is like the animals; his \"natural forces,\" which liken him to the plants; and \"the body itself,\" wherein he is like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of a master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over the angels in the primitive state; so when we read \"all creatures,\" we must understand the creatures which are not made to God's image. Over the sensitive powers, as the irascible and concupiscible, which obey reason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in the state of innocence man had mastership over the animals by commanding them. But of the natural powers and the body itself man is master not by commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of innocence man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted not in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without hindrance.
\nThe answers to the objections appear from the above.
\n[I.q.96.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in homine quodammodo sunt omnia; et ideo secundum modum quo dominatur his quæ in seipso sunt, secundum hunc modum competit ei dominari aliis. Est autem in homine quatuor considerare, scilicet rationem, secundum quam convenit cum angelis, vires sensitivas, secundum quas convenit cum animalibus; vires naturales, secundum quas convenit cum plantis, et ipsum corpus, secundum quod convenit cum rebus inanimatis. Ratio autem in homine habet locum dominantis, et non subjecti dominio. Unde homo angelis non dominabatur in primo statu. Et quod dicitur, omni creaturæ, intelligitur, quæ non est ad imaginem Dei. Viribus autem sensitivis, sicut irascibili et concupiscibili, quæ aliqualiter obediunt rationi, dominatur anima imperando. Unde in statu innocentiæ animalibus aliis per imperium dominabatur; viribus autem naturalibus et ipsi corpori homo dominatur, non quidem imperando, sed utendo. Et sic etiam homo in statu innocentiæ dominabatur plantis et rebus inanimatis, non per imperium vel immutationem, sed absque impedimento utendo eorum auxilio. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.
\n[I.q.96.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that in the state of innocence all would have been equal. For Gregory says (Moral. xxi): \"Where there is no sin, there is no inequality.\" But in the state of innocence there was no sin. Therefore all were equal.
\n[I.q.96.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homines in statu innocentiæ omnes fuissent æquales. Dicit enim Gregorius XXI Moral., cap. xv, § 22, col. 203, t. 2, quod «ubi non deliquimus, omnes pares sumus.» Sed in statu innocentiæ non erat delictum. Ergo omnes erant pares.
\n[I.q.96.a.3.arg.2] Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love, according to Sirach 13:19, \"Every beast loveth its like; so also every man him that is nearest to himself.\" Now in that state there was among men an abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore all were equal in the state of innocence.
\n[I.q.96.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, similitudo et æqualitas est ratio mutuæ dilectionis, secundum illud Eccli., xiii, 19: Omne animal diligit sibi simile*; sic et omnis homo proximum sibi. * * Colligitur æquivalenter, non quidem expressis verbis. Deus animalia adduxit ad Adam non carnaliter ad sensum, sed ad intellectum secundum intelligentiæ conspectum; et Ambrosius dicere videtur quod hoc fuit ante formationem Evæ. Tunc animalia homini utilia erant ad quatuor: ad manifestandum suum imperium, ad contemplandum, ad diligendum, ad solatium. Poterat homo saltem ad nutum commoditatiibus ex creaturis provenientibus uti. In illo autem statu inter homines abundasset dilectio $^1$, quæ est vinculum pacis. Ergo omnes fuissent pares in statu innocentiæ.
\n[I.q.96.a.3.arg.3] Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part of God, from the fact that He rewards some and punishes others; and on the part of nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which would not have been the case in the primitive state. Therefore, etc.
\n[I.q.96.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, cessante causa, cessat effectus. Sed causa inæqualitatis inter homines videtur non esse ex parte quidem Dei, quod quosdam pro meritis præmiat, quosdam vero punit; ex parte vero naturæ, quia propter naturæ defectum quidam nascuntur debiles et orbati, quidam autem fortes et perfecti; quæ in primo statu non fuissent. Ergo, etc.
\n[I.q.96.a.3.sc] It is written (Romans 13:1): \"The things which are of God, are well ordered\" [Vulg.\"Those that are, are ordained of God\"]. But order chiefly consists in inequality; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): \"Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place.\" Therefore in the primitive state, which was most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed.
\n[I.q.96.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom., xiii, 4: Quæ a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt*. Ordo autem maxime videtur in disparitate consistere: dicit enim Augustinus, De civ. Dei, lib. XIX, cap. xiii, col. 640, t. 7: « Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio. » Ergo in primo statu, qui decentissimus fuisset, disparitas inveniretur.
\n[I.q.96.a.3.co] We must needs admit that in the primitive state there would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because generation depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age; for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have been sterile.
\nMoreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or less, to action, desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others.
\nThere might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from exterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was dependent on food wherewith to sustain life.
\nSo we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the stars, some would have been born more robust in body than others, and also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so that, however, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been no defect or fault either in soul or body.
\n[I.q.96.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est dicere aliquam disparitatem in primo statu $^2$ fuisse, ad minus quantum ad sexum; quia sine diversitate sexus generatio non fuisset; similiter etiam quantum ad ætatem; sic $^3$ quidam ex aliis nascebantur, nec illi qui miscebantur $^4$, steriles erant. Sed et secundum animam diversitas fuisset et quantum ad justitiam et quantum ad scientiam. Non enim ex necessitate homo operabatur, sed per liberum arbitrium, ex quo homo habet quod possit $^5$ magis et minus animum applicare ad aliquid faciendum vel volendum vel cognoscendum; unde quidam magis profecissent in justitia et scientia, quam alii. Ex parte etiam corporis poterat esse disparitas. Non enim erat exemptum corpus humanum totaliter a legibus naturæ, quin ex exterioribus agentibus aliquod commodum aut auxilium recipet magis vel minus, cum etiam cibis eorum vita sustentaretur. Et sic nihil prohibet dicere quin secundum diversam dispositionem aeris, et diversum situm stellarum, aliqui robustiores corpore generarentur quam alii, et majores et pulchriores, et melius complexionati; ita tamen quod in illis qui exceedentur, nullus esset defectus vel peccatum, sive circa animam, sive circa corpus.
\n[I.q.96.a.3.ad.1] By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some are placed in subjection to others as a penalty.
\n[I.q.96.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Gregorius per verba illa intendit excludere disparitatem quæ est secundum differentiam justitiae et peccati; ex qua contingit quod aliqui pœnaliter sunt sub aliis coercendi.
\n[I.q.96.a.3.ad.2] Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother; although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him.
\n[I.q.96.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod æqualitas est causa quod dilectio mutua sit æqualis. Sed tamen inter inæquales potest esse major dilectio quam inter æquales, licet non æqualiter utrinque respondeat; pater enim plus diligit filium naturaliter quam frater fratrem; licet filius non tantumdem diligat patrem, sicut ab eo diligitur.
\n[I.q.96.a.3.ad.3] The cause of inequality could be on the part of God; not indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that He would exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the more shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise on the part of nature as above described, without any defect of nature.
\n[I.q.96.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod causa disparitis poterat esse ex parte Dei; non quidem ut puniret quosdam et quosdam præmiaret, sed ut quosdam plus quosdam minus sublimaret; et pulchritudo ordinis magis in hominibus relucteret. Et etiam ex parte naturæ poterat disparitas causari secundum prædicum modum absque aliquo defectu naturæ.
\n[I.q.96.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have been master over man. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): \"God willed that man, who was endowed with reason and made to His image, should rule over none but irrational creatures; not over men, but over cattle.\"
\n[I.q.96.a.4.arg.2] Further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin would not have existed in the state of innocence. But man was made subject to man as a penalty; for after sin it was said to the woman (Genesis 3:16): \"Thou shalt be under thy husband's power.\" Therefore in the state of innocence man would not have been subject to man.
\n[I.q.96.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud quod est introductum in pœnam peccati, non fuisset in statu innocentiæ. Sed hominem subesse homini, introductum est in pœnam peccati; dictum $^1$ Ita Lovan. et Duaceni theologi ex cod. Camer. Thomas Madalena, in suo Alcan. cod. legendum putat: « Hujusmodi dabatur dilectio; » edit. Rom. et Patav., 1698: « abundat. » In editione Nicolaï typographorum errore omissum fuit hoc secundum argumentum. $^2$ $^3$ $^4$ Ita editi omnes quos vidimus, et cod. Alcan. prima manu, sed in « nascebantur » mutatum apest enim mulieri post peccatum: Sub postestate viri eris, ut dicitur Gen., iii, 16. Ergo in statu innocentiæ non erat homo homini subjectus.
\n[I.q.96.a.4.arg.3] Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But liberty is one of the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking in the state of innocence, \"where nothing was wanting that man's good-will could desire,\" as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore man would not have been master over man in the state of innocence.
\n[I.q.96.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, subjectio libertati opponitur. Sed libertas est unum de præcipuis bonis, quod in statu innocentiæ non defuisset, quando « nihil aberat quod bona voluntas cupere posset $^1$, » ut Augustinus dicit, De civ. Dei, lib. XIV, cap. x, col. 417, t. 7. Ergo homo homini in statu innocentiæ non dominabatur.
\n[I.q.96.a.4.sc] The condition of man in the state of innocence was not more exalted than the condition of the angels. But among the angels some rule over others; and so one order is called that of \"Dominations.\" Therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state of innocence that one man should be subject to another.
\n[I.q.96.a.4.sc] Sed contra, conditione hominum in statu innocentiæ non erat dignior quam conditione angelorum. Sed inter angelos quidam aliis dominantur; unde et unus ordo dominatio-num vocatur. Ergo non est contra dignitatem status innocentiæ quod homo homini dominaretur.
\n[I.q.96.a.4.co] Mastership has a twofold meaning.
\nFirst, as opposed to slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is subject as a slave. In another sense mastership is referred in a general sense to any kind of subject; and in this sense even he who has the office of governing and directing free men, can be called a master. In the state of innocence man could have been a master of men, not in the former but in the latter sense. This distinction is founded on the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that the latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics, whereas a slave is ordered to another. So that one man is master of another as his slave when he refers the one whose master he is, to his own--namely the master's use. And since every man's proper good is desirable to himself, and consequently it is a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be one's own, therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain inflicted on the subject; and consequently in the state of innocence such a mastership could not have existed between man and man.
\nBut a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man and man, for two reasons.
\nFirst, because man is naturally a social being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many, as such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the Politics, that wherever many things are directed to one, we shall always find one at the head directing them.
\nSecondly, if one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 Peter 4:10, \"As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another.\" Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 14): \"Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of counsel\": and (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): \"The natural order of things requires this; and thus did God make man.\"
\nFrom this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on the first-mentioned mode of mastership.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I.q.96.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod dominium accipitur dupliciter: uno modo secundum quod opponitur servituti; et sic dominus dicitur cui aliquis subditur ut servus. Alio modo accipitur dominium, secundum quod communiter refertur ad subjectum qualiter-cumque; et sic etiam ille qui habet officium gubernandi et dirigendi liberos, dominus dici potest. Primo ergo modo accepto dominio, in statu innocentiæ homo homini non dominaretur; sed secundo modo accepto dominio, in statu innocentiæ homo homini dominari potuisset. Cujus ratio est, quia servus in hoc differt a libero, quod « liber est causa sui, servus autem ordinatur ad alium. » Tunc ergo aliquis dominatur alicui ut servo, quando eum cui dominatur ad propriam utilitatem sui, scilicet dominantis, refert. Et quia unicuique est appetibile proprium bonum, et per consequens contristabile est unicuique quod illud bonum quod deberet esse suum, cedat alteri tantum; ideo tale dominium non potest esse sine pœna subjectorum; propter quod in statu innocentiæ non fuisset tale dominium hominis ad hominem. Tunc vero dominatur aliquis alteri ut libero, quando dirigit ipsum ad proprium bonum ejus qui dirigitur, vel ad bonum commune; et tale dominium hominis ad hominem in statu innocentiæ fuisset propter duo; primo quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale. Unde homines in statu innocentiæ socialiter vixissent. Socialis autem vita multorum esse non posset, nisi aliquis præsideret, qui ad bonum commune intenderet. Multi enim per se intendunt ad multa, unus vero ad unum. Et ideo Philosophus dicit in princ. Politic., quod quandocumque multa ordinantur ad unum, semper invenitur unum ut principale et dirigens. Secundo, quia si unus homo habuisset super alios supereminentiam scientiæ et justitiæ, inconveniens fuisset, nisi hoc exequeretur in utilitatem aliorum, secundum quod dici-tur, Petr., iv, 10: Unusquisque gratiam quam acceptit in alterutrum illam administrantes. Unde Augustinus dicit, De civ. Dei, lib. XIX, cap. xiv, col. 643, t. 7, quod « justi non dominandi cupiditate imperant, sed officio consulendi; » et cap. xv: « Hoc naturalis ordo præscribit; ita Deus hominem conditit. » Et per hoc patet responsio ad omnia objecta, quæ procedunt de primo modo dominii.
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