[I.q.107.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that one angel does not speak to another. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection \"each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows.\" Much less, therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. But speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not necessary that one angel should speak to another.
\n[I.q.107.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod unus angelus alteri non loquatur. Dicit enim Gregorius, Mor., lib. XVIII, cap. xlviii, § 78, col. 84, t. 2, quod in statu resurrectionis « uniuscujusque mentem ab alterius oculis membrorum corpulentia non abscondet. » Multo igitur minus mens unius angeli absconditur ab altero. Sed locutio est ad manifestandum alteri quod latet in mente. Non igitur oportet quod unus angelus alteri loquatur.
\n[I.q.107.a.1.arg.2] Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.
\n[I.q.107.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, duplex est locutio: interior, per quam aliquis sibi ipsi loquitur, et exterior, per quam aliquis loquitur alteri. Exterior autem locutio fit per aliquod sensibile signum, puta voce, vel nutu, vel aliquo corporis membro, puta lingua vel digito, quæ angelis competere non possunt. Ergo unus angelus alteri non loquitur.
\n[I.q.107.a.1.arg.3] Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another to listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.
\n[I.q.107.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, loquens excitat audientem ut attendat suæ locutioni. Sed non videtur per quid 1 unus angelus excitet alium ad attendendum; hoc enim fit apud nos aliquo sensibili signo. Ergo unus angelus non loquitur alteri.
\n[I.q.107.a.1.sc] The Apostle says (1 Corinthians 13:1): \"If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels.\"
\n[I.q.107.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur I Cor., xiii, 1: Si linguis hominum loquar et angelorum.
\n[I.q.107.a.1.co] The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory says (Moral. ii): \"It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech.\"
\nTo understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that, as we explained above (Question 82, Article 4), when treating of the actions and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation. Now an intelligible object is present to the intellect in three ways; first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6,7); secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as related to something else. And it is clear that the intelligible object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will, and hence in the definition of habit these words occur, \"which anyone uses when he wills.\" So likewise the intelligible object passes from the second to the third stage by the will; for by the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for instance, either to the performing of an action, or to being made known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called \"the interior word.\" And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel speaks to another; for to speak to another only means to make known the mental concept to another.
\n[I.q.107.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in angelis est aliqua locutio. Sed, sicut dicit Gregorius, II Moral., c. viii, § 8, col. 559, t. 4: « Dignum est ut mens nostra qualitatem corporeæ locutionis exceedens, ad sublimes atque incognitos modos locutionis intimæ suspendatur. » Ad intelligendum igitur qualiter unus angelus alii loquatur, considerandum est, quod, sicut supra diximus, cum de actibus et potentiis animæ ageretur, voluntas movet intellectum ad suam operationem. Intelligibile autem est in intellectu tripliciter. Primo quidem habitualiter vel secundum memoriam, ut Augustinus dicit, X De Trinit., c. viii, col. 979, t. 8; secundo autem ut in actu consideratum vel conceptum; tertio ut ad aliud relatum. Manifestum est autem, quod de primo gradu in secundum transferur intelligibile per imperium voluntatis: unde in definitione habitus dicitur: « Quo quis utitur, cum voluerit. » Similiter autem de secundo gradu transfertur in tertium per voluntatem; nam per voluntatem conceptus mentis ordinatur ad alterum, puta vel ad agendum aliquid, vel ad manifestandum alteri. Quando autem mens convertit se ad actu considerandum quod habet in habitu, loquitur aliquis sibi ipsi; nam ipse conceptus mentis « interius verbum » vocatur. Ex hoc vero quod conceptus mentis angelicæ ordinatur ad manifestandum alteri per voluntatem ipsius angeli, conceptus mentis unius angeli innotescit alteri, et sic loquitur unus angelus alteri; nihil est enim aliud loqui ad alterum, quam conceptum mentis alteri manifestare.
\n[I.q.107.a.1.ad.1] Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, or can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another, according to 1 Corinthians 2:11: \"What man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?\" The other obstacle whereby the mental concept is excluded from another one's knowledge, comes from the body; and so it happens that even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once make known to another; but some sensible sign must be used. Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): \"To other eyes we seem to stand aloof as it were behind the wall of the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the door of the tongue to show what we really are.\" But an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another at once.
\n[I.q.107.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in nobis interior mentis conceptus quasi duplici obstaculo clauditur. Primo quidem ipsa voluntate, quæ conceptum intellectus potest retinere interius vel ad extra ordinare; et quantum ad hoc mentem unius nullus alius potest videre, nisi solus Deus, secundum illud I Cor., II, 11: Quæ sunt hominis, nemo novit, nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est. Secundo autem clauditur mens hominis ab alio homine per grossitiem corporis: unde cum etiam voluntas ordinat conceptum mentis ad manifestandum alteri, non statim cognosci-tur ab alio; sed oportet aliquod signum sensibile adhibere. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, Mor., lib. II, c. VII, § 8, col. 559, t. 1: « Alienis oculis intra secretum mentis quasi post parietem corporis stamus; sed cum manifestare nosmetipsos cupimus, quasi per linguæ januam egredimur, ut quales sumus intrinsecus, ostendamus. » Hoc autem obstaculum non habet angelus; et ideo quam cito vult manifestare suum conceptum, statim alius cognoscit.
\n[I.q.107.a.1.ad.2] External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also its being ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel's power, whereby he manifests his mental concept.
\n[I.q.107.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod locutio exterior, quæ fit per vocem, est nobis necessaria propter obstaculum corporis, unde non convenit angelo; sed sola locutio interior, ad quam pertinet non solum quod loquatur sibi interius concipiendo, sed etiam quod ordinet per voluntatem ad alterius manifestationem. Et sic lingua angelorum metaphorice dicitur ipsa virtus angeli, qua conceptum suum prædicto modo manifestat.
\n[I.q.107.a.1.ad.3] There is no need to draw the attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as one ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself. But because by their very nature they can speak to each other, and even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as sense is affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by the sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power.
\n[I.q.107.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quantum ad angelos bonos, qui semper se invicem vident in verbo, non esset necessarium ponere aliquid excitativum; quia sicut unus semper videt alium, ita semper videt in eo quidquid est ad se ordinatum. Sed quia etiam in statu naturæ conditæ sibi invicem loqui poterant, et mali etiam angeli nunc sibi invicem loquuntur, dicendum est, quod sicut sensus movetur a sensibili, ita intellectus movetur ab intelligibili. Sicut ergo per signum sensibile excitatur sensus, ita per aliquam virtu-tem intelligibilem potest excitari mens angeli ad attendendum.
\n[I.q.107.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make known anything to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not speak to God.
\n[I.q.107.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod angelus Deo non loquatur. Locutio enim est ad manifestandum aliquid alteri. Sed angelus nihil potest manifestare Deo, qui omnia novit. Ergo angelus non loquitur Deo.
\n[I.q.107.a.3.arg.2] Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference to another, as was shown above (Article 1). But an angel ever orders his mental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks to God; which in some ways appears to be unreasonable, since an angel sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel never speaks to God.
\n[I.q.107.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, loqui est ordinare conceptum intellectus ad alterum, ut dictum est. Sed angelus semper conceptum suæ mentis ordi-nat ad Deum. Si ergo aliquando Deo loquitur, semper Deo loquitur; quod potest videri aliquibus inconveniens, cum aliquando angelus angelo loquatur. Videtur ergo quod angelus nunquam loquatur Deo.
\n[I.q.107.a.3.sc] It is written (Zechariah 1:12): \"The angel of the Lord answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy on Jerusalem.\" Therefore an angel speaks to God.
\n[I.q.107.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Zachar., 1, 12: Respondit angelus Deo * et dixit: Domine exercituum, usquequo non misereberis Jerusalem? Loquitur ergo angelus Deo.
\n[I.q.107.a.3.co] As was said above (1,2), the angel speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner. In one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and in human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of what concerns the truth, or of whatever depends on the created will; because God is the principle and source of all truth and of all will. In another way one thing is ordered to another to receive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech the disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will of what ought to be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that \"the angels speak to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration.\"
\n[I.q.107.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, locutio angeli est per hoc, quod conceptio mentis ordinatur ad alterum. Sed aliquid ordinatur ad alterum dupliciter. Uno modo ad hoc quod communicet aliquid alteri, sicut in rebus nauralibus agens ordinatur ad patiens et in locutione humana doctor ordinatur ad discipulum, et quantum ad hoc nullo modo angelus loquitur Deo neque de his quæ ad rerum veritatem pertinent, neque de his quæ dependent a voluntate creata; quia Deus est omnis veritatis et omnis voluntatis principium et conditor. Alio modo ordinatur aliquid ad alterum, ut ab eo aliquid accipiat, sicut in rebus naturalibus passivum ad agens, et in locutione humana discipulus ad magistrum: et hoc modo angelus loquitur Deo, vel consulendo divinam voluntatem de agendis, vel ejus excellentiam quam nunquam comprehendit admirando, sicut Gregorius dicit, II Moral., cap. VII, § 10, col. 560, t. 4, quod « angeli loquuntur Domino, cum per hoc quod super semetipsos respiciunt, in motum admirationis surgunt. »
\n[I.q.107.a.3.ad.1] Speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples ask instruction from the master.
\n[I.q.107.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod locutio non semper est ad manifestandum alteri; sed quandoque ad hoc ordinatur finaliter, ut loquenti aliquid manifestetur, sicut cum discipulus quærit aliquid a magistro.
\n[I.q.107.a.3.ad.2] The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by consulting Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.
\n[I.q.107.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod locutione qua angeli loquuntur Deo laudantes ipsum et admirantes, semper angeli Deo loquuntur; sed locutione qua ejus sapientiam consulunt super agendis, tunc ei loquuntur, quando aliquod novum per eos agendum occurrit, super quo desiderant illuminari.
\n[I.q.107.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that local distance affects the angelic speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): \"An angel works where he is.\" But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's speech is limited by the bounds of that place.
\n[I.q.107.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod localis distantia operetur aliquid in locutione angelica. Sicut enim dicit Damascenus, libro II Orth. fid., c. iii, col. 870, t. 4: « Angelus, ubi est, ibi operatur. » Locutio autem est quædam operatio angeli. Cum ergo angelus sit in determinato loco, videtur quod usque ad determinatam loci distantiam angelus loqui possit.
\n[I.q.107.a.4.arg.2] Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that \"they cried one to another\" (Isaiah 6:3). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance has some effect.
\n[I.q.107.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, clamor loquentis fit propter distantiam audientis. Sed Isa., vi, 3, dicitur de Seraphim, quod clamabant alter ad alterum. Ergo videtur quod in locutione angelorum aliquid operetur localis distantia.
\n[I.q.107.a.4.sc] It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance (Luke 16:24). Much less therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another.
\n[I.q.107.a.4.sc] Sed contra est, quod sicut dicitur Luc., xvI, dives in inferno positus loquebatur Abrahæ, non impediente locali distantia. Multo igitur minus localis distantia potest impedire locutionem unius angeli ad alterum.
\n[I.q.107.a.4.co] The angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation, as explained above (1,2,3). And the intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the \"here and now.\" For even our own intellectual operation takes place by abstraction from the \"here and now,\" except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist at all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted from \"here and now,\" neither difference of time nor local distance has any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is no impediment.
\n[I.q.107.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod locutio angeli in intellectualis operatione consistit, ut ex dictis patet. Intellectualis autem operatio angeli omnino abstracta est a loco et tempore. Nam etiam nostra intellectualis operatione est per abstractionem ab hic et nunc, nisi per accidens ex parte phantasmatum, quæ in angelis nulla sunt. In eo autem quod est omnino abstractum a loco et tempore, nihil operatur neque temporis diversitas, neque loci distantia. Unde in locutione angeli nullum impedimentum facit distantia loci.
\n[I.q.107.a.4.ad.1] The angelic speech, as above explained (1, ad 2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it exists in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel seeing another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered to him on the part of another; and this is to perceive his speech.
\n[I.q.107.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod locutio angeli, sicut dictum est, est locutio interior; quæ tamen ab alio percipitur; et ideo est in angelo loquente et per consequens ubi est angelus loquens. Sed sicut distantia localis non impedit quin unus angelus alium videre possit; ita etiam non impedit quin percipiat quod in eo est ad se ordinatum: quod est ejus locutionem percipere.
\n[I.q.107.a.4.ad.2] The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what Gregory says (Moral. ii): \"The less one desires, the less one cries out.\"
\n[I.q.107.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod clamor ille non est vocis corporeæ, quæ fit propter distantiam loci; sed significat magnitudinem rei quæ dicebatur, vel magnitudinem effectus, secundum quod dicit Gregorius, Mor., lib. II, cap. vii, § 11, col. 560, t. 4: « Tanto quisque minus clamat, quanto minus desiderat. »
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