[I.q.116.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that fate is not in created things. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the \"Divine will or power is called fate.\" But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.
\n[I.q.116.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod fatum non sit in rebus creatis. Dicit enim Augustinus, V De civit. Dei, cap. 1, col. 141, et cap. viii, col. 148, t. 7, quod « ipsa Dei voluntas vel potestas fati nomine appellatur. » Sed voluntas et potestas Dei non est in creaturis, sed in Deo. Ergo fatum non est in rebus creatis, sed in Deo.
\n[I.q.116.a.2.arg.2] Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God alone, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures.
\n[I.q.116.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, fatum comparatur ad ea quæ fato aguntur, ut causa, sicut ipse modus loquendi ostendit. Sed causa universalis per se eorum quæ hic per accidents aguntur, est solus Deus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo fatum est in Deo, et non in rebus creatis.
\n[I.q.116.a.2.arg.3] Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.
\n[I.q.116.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si fatum est in creaturis, aut est substantia, aut accidents; et quod-cumque horum detur, oportet quod multiplicetur secundum creaturarum multitudi-nem. Cum ergo fatum videatur esse unum tantum, videtur quod fatum non sit in creaturis, sed in Deo.
\n[I.q.116.a.2.sc] Boethius says (De Consol. iv): \"Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things.\"
\n[I.q.116.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit in IV De cons., prosa vi, col. 815, t. 1, quod « fatum est dispositio rebus mobilibus inhærens. »
\n[I.q.116.a.2.co] As is clear from what has been stated above (22, 3; 103, 6), Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two ways.
\nFirstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): \"Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain of fate is forged.\" Of each of these things we have spoken above (1; 104, 2; 110, 1; 113; 114). It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects.
\n[I.q.116.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex prædictis patet, divina Providentia per causas medias suos effectus exequitur. Potest ergo ipsa ordinatio effectuum dupliciter considerari. Uno modo secundum quod est in ipso Deo: et sic ipsa ordinatio effectuum vocatur Providentia. Secundum vero quod prædicta ordinatio consideratur in mediis causis a Deo ordinatis ad aliquos effectus producendos, sic habet rationem fati; et hoc est quod Boetius dicit IV De cons., loc. sup. cit.: « Sive famulantibus quibusdam Providentiae divinis spiritibus fatum exercetur, seu anima, seu tota inserviente natura, seu cælestibus siderum motibus, seu angelica virtute, seu dæmonum varia solertia, seu aliquibus horum, seu omnibus, fatalis series texitur; » de quibus omnibus per singula in præcedentibus dictum est. Sic ergo est manifestum, quod fatum est in ipsis causis creatis, in quantum sunt ordinatæ a Deo ad aliquos effectus producendos.
\n[I.q.116.a.2.ad.1] The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the \"series of causes,\" has not the nature of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially fate is the very disposition or \"series,\" i.e. order, of second causes.
\n[I.q.116.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ipsa ordinatio causarum secundarum, quam Augustinus, loc. cit. in arg. 1, « seriem causarum » nominat non habet rationem fati, nisi secundum quod dependet a Deo: et ideo causaliter Dei potestas vel voluntas dici potest fatum; essentialiter vero fatum est ipsa dispositio seu series, id est ordo causarum secundarum.
\n[I.q.116.a.2.ad.2] Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.
\n[I.q.116.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod intantum fatum habet rationem causæ, inquantum et ipsæ causæ secundæ, quarum ordinatio fatum vocatur.
\n[I.q.116.a.2.ad.3] Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote: \"Thy fate draws thee.\"
\n[I.q.116.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod fatum dicitur dispositio, non quæ est in genere qualitatis, sed secundum quod dispositio designat ordinem, qui non est substantia, sed relatio. Qui quidem ordo si consideretur per comparationem ad suum principium, est unus; et sic dicitur unum fatum; si autem consideretur per relationem ad effectus, vel ad ipsas causas medias, sic multiplicatur; per quem modum poeta dixit: « Te tua fata trahunt. »
\n[I.q.116.a.3.arg.1] It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): \"As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of Providence.\"
\n[I.q.116.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod fatum non sit immobile. Dicit enim Boetius in IV De consolat., prosa vi, col. 817, t. 1: « Uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio; ad id quod est, id quod gignitur; ad aternitatem tempus; ad punctum medium circulus; ita est fati series mobilis ad Providentiæ stabilem simplicitatem. »
\n[I.q.116.a.3.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): \"If we be moved, what is in us is moved.\" But fate is a \"disposition inherent to changeable things,\" as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is changeable.
\n[I.q.116.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut Philosophus dicit in II Topic., cap. 111, in declarat. loci 24: « Motis nobis, moventur ea quæ in nobis sunt. » Sed fatum est « dispositio inhærens rebus mobilibus, » ut Boetius dicit, IV De consolat., prosa vi, col. 815, t. 1. Ergo fatum est immobile.
\n[I.q.116.a.3.arg.3] Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.
\n[I.q.116.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si fatum est immobile, ea quæ subduntur fato, immobiliter et ex necessitate eveniunt. Sed talia maxime videntur esse contingentia, quæ fato attribuuntur. Ergo nihil erit contingens in rebus, sed omnia ex necessitate evenient.
\n[I.q.116.a.3.sc] Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an unchangeable disposition.
\n[I.q.116.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, loc. cit., quod « fatum est immobilis dispositio. »
\n[I.q.116.a.3.co] The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes, which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, therefore, have held that the series itself or dispositions of causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen of necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a cause the effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as proved above (Question 115, Article 6).
\nOthers, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says (Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved above for the reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.
\nWe must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary: \"If God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen.\" Wherefore Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds--\"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable Providence must also itself be unchangeable.\"
\nFrom this the answers to the objections are clear.
\n[I.q.116.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod dispositio secundarum causarum, quam fatum dicimus, potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo secundum ipsas causas secundas, quæ sic disponuntur seu ordinantur; alio modo per relationem ad primum principium a quo ordinantur, scilicet Deum. Quidam ergo posuerunt ipsam seriem seu dispositionem causarum esse secundum se necessariam, ita quod omnia ex necessitate contingerent, propter hoc quod quilibet effectus habet causam, et causa posita, necesse est effectum poni. Sed hoc patet esse falsum per ea quæ supra dicta sunt. Alii vero e contrario posuerunt fatum esse mutabile etiam secundum quod a divina Providentia dependet. Unde AEgyptii dicebant, quibusdam sacrificiis fatum posse mutari, ut Gregorius Nyss. dicit lib. De anima. Sed hoc supra exclusum est, quia immobilitati divinæ Providentiæ repugnat. Et ideo dicendum est, quod fatum, secundum considerationem secundarum causarum mobile est; sed secundum quod subest divinæ Providentiæ, immobilitatem sortitur, non quidem absolutæ necessitatis, sed conditionatæ; secundum quod dicimus hanc conditionalem esse veram, vel necessariam: Si Deus præscivit hoc, futurum erit. Unde cum Boetius dixisset, fati seriem esse mobilem, post pauca subdit, De cons., lib. IV, prosa vi, col. 817, t. 1: « Quæ cum ab » immobilis « Providentiæ proficiscatur exordiis, ipsam quoque immutabilem esse necesse est. » Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.
\n[I.q.116.a.4.arg.1] It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): \"The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed.\" Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.
\n[I.q.116.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod omnia fato subdantur. Dicit enim Boetius, IV De consol., prosa vi, col. 817, t. 1: «Series fati cælum et sidera movet, elementa in se invicem temperat et alterna commutatione transformat; eadem nascentia occidentiaque omnia per similes fætuum seminumque renovat progressus; hæc actus, fortunasque hominum indissolubili causarum connexione constringit. » Nihil ergo excipi videtur quod sub fati serie non contineatur.
\n[I.q.116.a.4.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.
\n[I.q.116.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in V De civit. Dei, cap. 1, col. 141, cap. 1x, col. 150, t. 7, quod « fatum aliquid est, secundum quod ad voluntatem et potestatem Dei referitur. » Sed voluntas Dei est causa omnium quæ fiunt, ut Augustinus dicit, De Trinit., lib. III, cap. III, col. 872, et cap. 1x, col. 877, t. 8. Ergo omnia subduntur fato.
\n[I.q.116.a.4.arg.3] Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate \"is a disposition inherent to changeable things.\" But all creatures are changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above (Question 9, Article 2). Therefore fate is in all things.
\n[I.q.116.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, fatum, secundum Boetium, loc. cit., « est dispositio rebus mobilibus inhærens. » Sed omnes creaturæ sunt mutabiles, et solus Deus vere immutabilis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo in omnibus creaturis est fatum.
\n[I.q.116.a.4.sc] Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that \"some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate.\"
\n[I.q.116.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit in IV De consol., loc. cit., col. 816, quod « quædam quæ sub Providentia locata sunt, fati seriem superant. »
\n[I.q.116.a.4.co] As stated above (Article 2), fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): viz. that \"those things which are nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate.\" Hence it is clear that \"the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate\"; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes.
\n[I.q.116.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, fatum est ordinatio secundarum causarum ad effectus divinitus provisos. Quæcumque igitur causis secundis subduntur, ea subduntur et fato. Si qua vero sunt quæ immediate a Deo fiunt, cum non subdantur secundis causis, non subduntur fato; sicut creatio rerum, glorificatio spiritualium substantiarum, et alia hujusmodi. Et hoc est quod Boetius dicit, loc. sup. cit., quod « ea quæ sunt primæ propinqua divinitati, stabiliter fixa, fatalis ordinem mobilitis excedunt. » Ex quo etiam patet, quod « quanto aliquid longius a prima mente discedit, majoribus fati nexibus implicatur; » quia magis subjicitur necessitati secundarum causarum.
\n[I.q.116.a.4.ad.1] All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above.
\n[I.q.116.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod omnia illa quæ ibi tanguntur, fiunt a Deo medianibus causis secundis; et ideo sub fati serie continentur. Sed non est eadem ratio de omnibus aliis, ut supra dictum est.
\n[I.q.116.a.4.ad.2] Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated.
\n[I.q.116.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod fatum refertur ad voluntatem et potestatem Dei sicut ad primum principium. Unde non oportet quod quidquid subjicitur voluntati divinæ vel potestati, subjiciatur fato, ut dictum est.
\n[I.q.116.a.4.ad.3] Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I.q.116.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis omnes creaturæ sint aliquo modo mutabiles, tamen aliquæ earum non procedunt a causis creatis mutabilibus, et ideo non subjiciuntur fato, ut dictum est.
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