[I.q.117.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord says (Matthew 22:8): \"Be not you called Rabbi\": on which the gloss of Jerome says, \"Lest you give to men the honor due to God.\" Therefore to be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper to God.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod unus homo non possit alium docere. Dicit enim Dominus, Matth., xxiii, 8: Nolite vocari Rabbi; ubi dicit Glossa Hieron. 3: « Ne divinum honorem hominibus tribuatis. » Esse ergo magistrum pertinet proprie ad divinum honorem. Sed docere est proprium magistri. Homo ergo non potest docere, sed hoc est proprium Dei. 1 Colligitur æquivalenter ex locis citatis. 2
\n[I.q.117.a.1.arg.2] Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si homo alium docet, hoc non est nisi inquantum agit per scientiam suam ad causandum scientiam in alio. Sed qualitas per quam aliquis agit ad faciendum sibi simile, est qualitas activa. Ergo sequitur quod scientia sit qualitas activa, sicut et calor.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.arg.3] Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either of these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ad scientiam requiritur lumen intelligibile et species rei intellectæ. Sed neutrum istorum potest causare unus homo in alio. Ergo unus homo non potest docendo causare scientiam in alio.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.arg.4] Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. For these are signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, doctor nihil agit ad discipulum, nisi quod proponit ei quædam signa, vel vocibus aliquid significando, vel nutibus. Sed proponendo signa non potest aliquis alium docere, causando in eo scientiam; quia aut proponit signa rerum notarum, aut rerum ignotarum; si rerum notarum, ille ergo cui signa proponuntur, jam habet scientiam, et eam non acquirit a magistro; si autem rerum ignotarum, per hujusmodi signa nihil addiscit, sicut si aliquis proponeret alicui latino verba græca quorum significationem ignoraret, per hoc eum docere non posset. Nullo ergo modo unus homo potest alium docendo, scientiam in eo causare.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.sc] The Apostle says (1 Timothy 2:7): \"Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth.\"
\n[I.q.117.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit I ad Tim., ii, 7: In quo positus sum ego prædicator et apostolus, doctor gentium in fide et veritate.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.co] On this question there have been various opinions. For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have one passive intellect in common, as stated above (Question 76, Article 2). From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the identity of the thing known: for the same objective truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect, and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above (Question 76, Article 2).
\nBesides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through the participation of separate forms, as stated above (84, 3,4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we have proved above (79, 2; 84, 3) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4).
\nWe must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art, sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed.
\nFirst, that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art.
\nSecondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended end.
\nNow knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by his own research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): \"All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge.\"
\nNow the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner.
\nFirstly, by proposing to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown.
\nSecondly, by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above (106, 1; 111, 1) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that \"a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge.\" In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer to know.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hoc diversæ fuerunt opiniones. Averroes enim, in comment. III De anima, posuit unum intellectum possibile esse omnium hominum, ut supra dictum est; et ex hoc sequebatur quod eædem species intelligibles sint omnium hominum. Et secundum hoc ponit, quod unus homo per doctrinam non causat scientiam in altero aliam ab ea quam ipse habet; sed communicat ei eamdem scientiam quam ipse habet, per hoc quod movet eum ad ordinandum phantasmata in anima sua, ad hoc quod sint disposita convenienter ad intelligibilem apprehensionem. Quæ quidem opinio quantum ad hoc vera est, quod est eadem scientia in discipulo et magistro, si consideretur identitas secundum unitatem rei scitæ; eadem rei veritas est quam cognoscit et discipulus et magister. Sed quantum ad hoc quod ponit esse unum intellectum possibile omnium hominum et easdem species intelligibiles, differentes solum secundum diversa phantasmata, falsa est ejus opinio, ut supra habitum est. Alia est opinio Platonicorum, qui posuerunt, quod scientia inest a principio animabus nostris per participationem formarum separatarum, sicut supra habitum est; sed anima ex unione corporis impeditur ne possit considerare libere ea quorum scientiam habet; et secundum hoc discipulus a magistro non acquirit scientiam de novo, sed ab eo exercetur ad considerandum ea quorum scientiam habet, ut sic addiscere nihil aliud sit quam reminisci. Sic etiam ponebant, quod agentia naturalia solummodo disponunt ad susceptionem formarum, quas acquirit materia corporalis per participationem specierum separatarum. Sed contra hoc supra ostensum est, quod intellectus possibilis animæ humanæ est in potentia pura ad intelligibilia, secundum quod etiam Aristoteles dicit in III De anima, text. 14. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod docens causat scientiam in addiscente, reducendo ipsum de potentia in actum, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic., text. 32. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est, quod effectuum qui sunt ab exteriori principio, aliquis est ab exteriori principio tantum, sicut forma domus causatur in materia solum ab arte; aliquis autem effectus est quandoque quidem ab exteriori principio, quandoque autem ab interiori; sicut sanitas causatur in infirmo quandoque ab exteriori principio, scilicet ab arte medicinæ, quandoque autem ab interiori principio, ut cum aliquis sanatur per virtutem naturæ. Et in talibus effectibus sunt duo attendenda: primo quidem quod ars imitatur naturam in sua operatione; sicut enim natura sanat infirmum, alterando dirigendo et expellendo materiam quæ causat morbum, ita et ars. Secundo attendendum est quod principium exterius, scilicet ars, non operatur sicut principale agens, sed sicut coadjuvans agens principale, quod est principium interius, confortando ipsum et ministrando ei instrumenta et auxilia, quibus natura utatur ad effectum producendum; sicut medicus comfortat naturam et adhibet ei cibos et medicinas, quibus natura utatur ad finem intentum. Scientia autem acquiritur in homine et ab interiori principio, ut patet in eo qui per inventionem propriam scientiam acquirit; et a principio exteriori, ut patet in eo qui addiscit. Inest enim unicuique homini quoddam principium scientiæ, scilicet lumen intellectus agentis, per quod cognoscuntur statim a principio naturaliter quædam universalia principia omnium scientiarum. Cum autem aliquis hujusmodi universalia principia applicat ad aliqua particularia, quorum memoriam et experimentum per sensum accipit, per inventionem propriam acquirit scientiam eorum quæ nesciebat, ex notis ad ignota procedens. Unde et quilibet docens, ex his quæ discipulus novit, ducit eum in cognitionem eorum quæ ignorabat, secundum quod dicitur in I Poster., in princ., quod « omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina ex præexistenti fit cognitione. » Ducit autem magister discipulum ex præcognitis in cognitionem ignotorum dupliciter. Primo quidem proponendo ei aliqua auxilia vel instrumenta quibus intellectus ejus utatur ad scientiam acquirendam; puta cum proponit ei aliquas propositiones minus universales, quas tamen ex præcognitis discipulus dijudicare potest; vel cum proponit ei aliqua sensibilia exempla vel similia vel opposita vel aliqua hujusmodi, ex quibus intellectus addiscentis manuducitur in cognitionem veritatis ignotæ. Alio modo cum comfortat intellectum addiscentis, non quidem aliqua virtute activa, quasi superioris naturæ, sicut supra dictum est de angelis illuminantibus, quia omnes humani intellectus sunt unius gradus in ordine naturæ; sed inquantum proponit discipulo ordinem principiorum ad conclusiones, qui forte per seipsum non haberet tantam virtutem collativam, ut ex principiis posset conclusiones deducere. Et ideo dicitur in I Post., text. 5, quod « demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire. » Et per hunc modum ille qui demonstrat auditorem scientem facit.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.ad.1] As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these are from God. Therefore as of God is it written: \"Who healeth all thy diseases\" (Psalm 102:3); so of Him is it written: \"He that teacheth man knowledge\" (Psalm 93:10), inasmuch as \"the light of His countenance is signed upon us\" (Psalm 4:7), through which light all things are shown to us.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut jam dictum est, homo docens solummodo exterius ministerium adhibet, sicut medicus sanans; sed sicut natura interior est principalis causa sanationis, ita et interius lumen intellectus est principalis causa scientiæ. Utrumque autem horum est a Deo; et ideo sicut de Deo dicitur, psal. cii, 3: Qui sanat omnes infirmitates tuas; ita de eo dicitur, psal. xciii, 40: Qui docet hominem scientiam, inquantum lumen vultus ejus super nos signatur, per quod nobis omnia ostenduntur.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.ad.2] As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause. Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by which one is directed in working.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod doctor non causat scientiam in discipulo per modum agentis naturalis, ut Averroes objicit, lib. III De anima, comment. v, versus finem. Unde non oportet quod scientia sit qualitas activa, sed est principium per quod aliquis dirigitur in operando.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.ad.3] The master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are proposed to him from without.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod magister non causat lumen intelligibile in discipulo, nec directe species intelligibles; sed movet discipulum per suam doctrinam ad hoc quod ipse per virtutem sui intellectus formet intelligibiles conceptiones, quarum sibi signa proponit exterius.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.ad.4] The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master.
\n[I.q.117.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod signa quæ magister discipulo proponit, sunt rerum notarum in universali et sub quadam confusione, sed ignotarum in particulari et sub quadam diffusione; et ideo cum quisque per seipsum scientiam acquirit, non potest dici docere seipsum vel esse sui ipsius magister, quia non præexistit in eo scientia completa, qualis requiritur in magistro.
\n[I.q.117.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): \"Saints work miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof delivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira.\" But in the working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal matter. Therefore men, by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter.
\n[I.q.117.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo per virtutem animæ possit corporalem materiam immutare. Dicit enim Gregorius, Dialog., II, c. xxx, quod « sancti miracula aliquando ex prece faciunt, aliquando ex potestate; sicut Petrus, qui Tabitham mortuam orando suscitavit, Ananiam et Saphiram mentientes morti increpando tradidit 5. » Sed in operatione miraculorum fit aliqua immutatio materiae corporalis. Ergo homines virtute suæ animæ possunt materiae corporalem immutare. 4 Nicolaï: « eis. » 5 Liber II Dialogi, quo narratur vita S. Benedicti, non habetur inter opera S. Gregorii in editione Migne, sed in praeviis ad opera S. Benedicti.
\n[I.q.117.a.3.arg.2] Further, on these words (Galatians 3:1): \"Who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth?\" the gloss says that \"some have blazing eyes, who by a single look bewitch others, especially children.\" But this would not be unless the power of the soul could change corporeal matter. Therefore man can change corporeal matter by the power of his soul.
\n[I.q.117.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, super illud ad Galat., m.: Qui vos fascinavit veritati non obedire? dicit Glossa ordin., col. 574, t. 2, quod « quidam habent oculos urentes, qui solo aspectu inficiunt alios, et maxime pueros. » Sed hoc non esset, nisi virtus animæ posset materiam corporalem immutare. Ergo homo per virtutem suæ animæ potest materiam corporalem immutare.
\n[I.q.117.a.3.arg.3] Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies. But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death. Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal matter.
\n[I.q.117.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, corpus humanum est nobilius quam alia inferiora corpora. Sed per apprehensionem animæ humanæ immutatur corpus humanum ad calorem et frigus, ut patet in irascentibus et timentibus; et quandoque etiam hæc immutatio pervenit usque ad ægritudinem et mortem. Ergo multo magis anima hominis potest sua virtute materiam corporalem immutare.
\n[I.q.117.a.3.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): \"Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will.\"
\n[I.q.117.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus in III De Trin., c. viii, col. 875, t. 8, quod « materia corporalis soli Deo obedit ad nutum. »
\n[I.q.117.a.3.co] As stated above (Question 110, Article 2), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore of the angels also we have stated (110, 2) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter, except by means of bodies.
\n[I.q.117.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, materia corporalis non immutatur ad formam, nisi vel ab agente aliquo composito ex materia et forma, vel ab ipso Deo, in quo virtualiter et materia et forma præxistit sicut in primordiali causa utriusque. Unde et de angelis supra dictum est, quod materiam corporalem immutare non possunt naturali virtute, nisi applicando corporalia agentia ad effectus aliquos producendos. Multo igitur minus anima sua virtute naturali potest immutare materiam corporalem, nisi mediantibus aliquibus corporibus.
\n[I.q.117.a.3.ad.1] The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the same place: \"Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says--what wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?\"
\n[I.q.117.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sancti dicuntur miracula facere ex potestate gratiae, non naturæ; quod patet per illud quod Gregorius ibidem dicit: « Qui filii Dei ex potestate sunt, ut dicit Joannes, quid mirum, si signa facere ex potestate valeant? »
\n[I.q.117.a.3.ad.2] Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual substance rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This he says is the cause of the \"evil eye.\"
\nBut it has been shown above (Question 110, Article 2) that corporeal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone. Therefore it is better to say, that by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which change in the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in contact with them to a certain distance: in the same way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a \"menstruata,\" as Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.; [De Insomniis ii).
\nHence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.
\n[I.q.117.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod fascinationis causam assignavit Avicenna ex hoc quod materia corporalis nata est obedire spirituali substantiæ magis quam contrariis agentibus in natura. Et ideo quando anima fuerit fortis in sua imaginatione, corporalis materia immutatur secundum eam; et hanc dicit esse causam oculi fascinantis. Sed supra ostensum est, quod materia corporalis non obedit substantiæ spirituali ad nutum, nisi soli Creatori. Et ideo melius dicendum est, quod ex forti imaginatione animæ immutantur spiritus corpori conjuncti; quæ quidem immutatio spirituum maxime fit in oculis, ad quos subtiliores spiritus perveniunt; oculi autem inficiunt aerem continuum usque ad determinatum spatium; per quem modum specula, si fuerint nova et pura, contrahunt quamdam impuritatem ex aspectu mulieris menstruatæ, ut Aristoteles dicit in lib. De somn. et vig. Sic igitur cum aliqua anima fuerit vehementer commota ad malitiam, sicut maxime in vetulis contingit, efficitur secundum modum prædictum aspectus ejus venenosus et noxius, maxime pueris, qui habent corpus tenerum et de facili receptivum impressionis. Possibile est etiam, quod ex Dei permissione, vel etiam ex aliquo facto occulto cooperetur ad hoc malignitas dæmonum, cum quibus vetulæ sortilegæ aliquod fædus habent.
\n[I.q.117.a.3.ad.3] The soul is united to the body as its form; and the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as stated above (Question 81, Article 3), it is the act of a corporeal organ. Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of a change in the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2).
\n[I.q.117.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod anima corpori humano unitur ut forma; et appetitus sensitivus, qui obedit aliqualiter rationi, ut supra dictum est, est actus alicujus organi corporalis; et ideo oportet quod ad apprehensionem animæ humanæ commoveatur appetitus sensitivus cum aliqua operatione corporali: ad exteriora vero corpora immutanda apprehensio animæ humanæ non sufficit nisi mediante immutatione proprii corporis, ut dictum est.
\n[I.q.117.a.4.arg.1] It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to local motion, as stated above (Question 110, Article 5). But the separate soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its command.
\n[I.q.117.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod anima hominis separata possit corpora saltem localiter movere. Substantiæ enim spirituali naturaliter obedit corpus ad motum localem, ut supra dictum est. Sed anima separata est subtantia spiritualis. Ergo suo imperio potest exteriora corpora movere, saltem scilicet localiter.
\n[I.q.117.a.4.arg.2] Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not have been without some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate soul has the power to move bodies locally.
\n[I.q.117.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in Itinerario Clementis dici- « Dicitur etiam fascinus vulgo qui nocet infantibus. Dicuntur enim quorumdam oculi visu urentes, dum et hic eorum actus fascinatio dicitur. » Seu lib. De insomniis, c. ii.; in Deest in tur, narrante Niceta ad Petrum, quod Simon Magus per magicas artes pueri a se interfecti animam retinebat, per quam magicas operationes efficiebat. Sed hoc esse non potuisset sine aliqua corporum transmutatione, ad minus locali. Ergo anima separata habet virtutem localiter movendi corpora.
\n[I.q.117.a.4.sc] the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.
\n[I.q.117.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit I De anima, text. 52 et 53, quod « anima non potest movere quodcumque corpus, sed solummodo proprium. »
\n[I.q.117.a.4.co] The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as to local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the separate soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, by the power of God, it can exceed those limits.
\n[I.q.117.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod anima separata sua naturali virtute non potest movere aliquod corpus. Manifestum est enim, quod cum anima est corpori unita, non movet corpus nisi vivificatum; unde si aliquod membrum corporis mortificetur, non obedit animæ ad motum localem. Manifestum est autem quod ab anima separata nullum corpus vivificatur; unde nullum corpus obedit ei ad motum localem quantum est de virtute suæ naturæ, supra quam potest aliquid ei conferri virtute divina.
\n[I.q.117.a.4.ad.1] There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are naturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only one of lower degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body.
\n[I.q.117.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod substantiae quædam spirituales sunt quarum virtutes non determinantur ad aliqua corpora, sicut sunt angeli, qui sunt naturaliter a corporibus absoluti; et ideo diversa corpora eis possunt obedire ad motum. Si tamen alicujus substantiae separatæ virtus motiva determinetur naturaliter ad movendum aliquod corpus, non poterit illa substantia movere aliquod corpus majus, sed minus; sicut secundum philosophos motor inferioris cæli non posset movere cælum superius. Unde cum anima secundum suam naturam determinetur ad movendum corpus cujus est forma, nullum aliud corpus sua naturali virtute movere potest.
\n[I.q.117.a.4.ad.2] As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I.q.117.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, De civ. Dei, lib. X, cap. xi, col. 290, t. 7, et Chrysostomus, Super Matth., hom. xxix, t. 12, frequenter dæmones simulant se esse animas mortuorum ad confirmandum gentilium errorem, qui hoc credebant. Et ideo credibile est quod Simon Magus illudebatur ab aliquo dæmone qui simulabat se esse animam pueri quem ipse occiderat.
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