[I.q.119.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that none of the food is changed into true human nature. For it is written (Matthew 15:17): \"Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy.\" But what is cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature. Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nihil de alimento transeat in veritatem Priscillianistæ dixerunt animas humanas, propter peccatum ante infusionem commissum, in humanæ naturæ. Dicitur enim Matth., xv, 17: Omne quod in os intrat, in ventrem vadit, et per* secessum emittitur. Sed quod emittitur, non transit in veritatem humanæ naturæ. Ergo nihil de alimento in veritatem humanæ naturæ transit.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh belonging to the \"species\" from flesh belonging to \"matter\"; and says that the latter \"comes and goes.\" Now what is formed from food comes and goes. Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus in I De gener., text. 35, 36 et 37, distinguit carnem « secundum speciem » et « secundum materiam; » et dicit quod « caro secundum materiam advenit et recedit. » Quod autem ex alimento generatur, advenit et recedit. Ergo id in quod alimentum convertitur, est caro « secundum materiam, » et non caro « secundum speciem. » Sed hoc pertinet ad veritatem humanæ naturæ quod pertinet ad speciem ejus. Ergo alimentum non transit in veritatem humanæ naturæ.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.arg.3] Further, the \"radical humor\" seems to belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true human nature.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ad veritatem humanæ naturæ pertinere videtur humidum radicale; quod si deperdatur, restitui non potest, ut medici dicunt. Posset autem restitui, si alimentum converteretur in ipsum humidum. Ergo nutrimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanæ naturæ.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.arg.4] Further, if the food were changed into true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, si alimentum transiret in veritatem humanæ naturæ, quidquid in homine deperditur, restaurari posset. Sed mors hominis non accidit, nisi per deperditionem alicujus. Posset igitur homo per sumptionem alimenti in perpetuum se contra mortem tueri.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.arg.5] Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same, identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.arg.5] 5. Præterea, si alimentum in veritatem humanæ naturæ transiret, nihil esset in homine quod non posset recedere et reparari; quia id quod in homine generatur ex alimento, et recedere et reparari potest. Si ergo homo diu viveret, sequeretur quod nihil quod in eo fuit materialiter in principio suæ generationis finaliter remaneret in ipso; et sic non esset idem homo numero per totam vitam suam; cum ad hoc quod sit idem numero, requiratur identitas materiae. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Non ergo alimentum transit in veritatem humanæ naturæ.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.sc] Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): \"The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture of the members.\" But the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality of human nature.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.sc] Sed contra est, quod dicit Augustinus in lib. De vera relig., cap. xL, col. 155, t. 3: « Alimenta carnis corrupta, id est amittentia formam suam, in membrorum istorum fabricam migrant. » Sed fabrica membrorum pertinet ad veritatem humanæ naturæ. Ergo alimenta transeunt in veritatem humanæ naturæ. * Impii autem... accersierunt illam. manæ naturæ. Ut et VII Confess., cap. x, col. 742, t. 4: « Nec tu me in te mutabis, sicut cibum carnis tuæ, sed, etc. »
\n[I.q.119.a.1.co] According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), \"The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being.\" Therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in two ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.
\nNow there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which, they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. So that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature.
\nBut, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and prevent the consumption of the \"radical humor\"; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed by fire.
\nBut this is unreasonable in many ways.
\nFirstly, because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject: else the human body would not be corruptible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be changed into true human nature.
\nSecondly, because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would only be one individual of the human species.
\nThirdly, because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from division. Therefore some other substance must be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some other things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of flesh matter: for, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): \"All things were created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific form.\" Consequently the multiplication of the human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature.
\nFourthly, because, since man does not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. Which multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does anything increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of generation and nourishment, which are called \"natural forces,\" would be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible.
\nWherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter, on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through the change of food into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase required. And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not required for the primary existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food, this does not belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible.
\nFirst, because this opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in species, there is not the power of generating their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing, therefore, would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true nature.
\nSecondly, because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above (Question 118, Article 1). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true form of human nature on the food which is assimilated.
\nThirdly, because food is needed not only for growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action of natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food.
\nTherefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): \"Food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh.\"
\n[I.q.119.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, secundum Philosophum, II Metaph., text. 4, « hoc modo se habet unumquodque ad veritatem, sicut se habet ad esse. » Illud ergo pertinet ad veritatem naturæ alicujus, quod est de constitutione naturæ ipsius. Sed natura dupliciter considerari potest: uno modo in communi secundum naturam speciei, alio modo secundum quod est in hoc individuo. Ad veritatem igitur naturæ alicujus in communi consideratæ pertinet forma et materia ejus in communi accepta; ad veritatem autem naturæ in hoc particulari consideratæ pertinet materia individualis signata, et forma per hujusmodi materiam individuata; sicut de veritate humanæ naturæ in communi est anima humana et corpus; sed de veritate humanæ naturæ in Petro et Martino est hæc anima et hoc corpus. Sunt autem quædam, quorum formæ non possunt salvari nisi in una materia signata, sicut forma solis non potest salvari in materia quæ actu sub ea continetur. Et secundum hunc modum aliqui posuerunt, quod forma humana non potest salvari nisi in materia quadam signata, quæ scilicet a principio fuit tali forma formata in primo homine; ita quod quidquid aliud præter illud quod ex primo parente in posteros derivatur, additum fuerit, non pertinet ad veritatem humanæ naturæ, quasi non vere accipiat formam humanæ naturæ; sed illa materia quæ in primo homine formæ humanæ fuit subjecta, in seipsa multiplicatur. Et hoc modo multitudo humanorum corporum a corpore primi hominis derivatur. Et secundum hoc alimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanæ naturæ; sed dicunt quod alimentum accipitur ut quoddam foentum naturæ, id est ut resistat actioni caloris naturalis, ne consumat humidum radicale; sicut plumbum vel stannum adjungitur argento, ne consumatur per ignem. Sed hæc positio est multipliciter irrationabilis. Primo quidem, quia ejusdem rationis est quod aliqua forma possit fieri in alia materia, et quod possit propriam materiam deserere; et ideo omnia generabilia sunt corruptibilia, et e converso. Manifestum est autem, quod forma humana potest deficere ab hac materia quæ ei subjicitur: alioquin corpus humanum corruptibile non esset. Unde relinquitur quod et alii materiæ advenire possit, aliquo alio in veritatem humanæ naturæ transeunte. Secundo, quia in omnibus quorum materia invenitur tota sub uno individuo, non est nisi unum individuum in una specie, sicut patet in sole et luna, et hujusmodi. Sic igitur non esset nisi unum individuum humanæ speciei. Tertio, quia non est possibile quod multiplicatio materiæ attendatur, nisi vel secundum quantitatem tantum, sicut accidit in rarefactis, quorum materia suscipit majores dimensions, vel etiam secundum substantiam materiæ. Sola autem eadem substantia materiæ manente, non potest dici quod sit multiplicata; quia idem ad seipsum non constituit multitudinem, cum necesse sit omnem multitudinem ex aliqua divisione causari. Unde oportet quod aliqua alia substantia materiæ adveniat vel per creationem, vel per conversionem alterius rei in ipsam. Unde relinquitur, quod non potest aliqua materia multiplicari nisi per rarefactionem, sicut cum ex aqua fit aer; vel per additionem alterius rei, sicut multiplicatur ignis per additionem lignorum; vel per creationem materiæ. Sed manifestum est, multiplicationem materiæ in humanis corporibus non accidere per rarefactionem; quia sic corpora hominum perfectæ aetatis essent imperfectiora quam corpora puerorum; nec iterum per creationem novæ materiæ: quia, secundum Gregorium, lib. XXXII Moral., cap. xii, col. 644, t. 2, omnia sunt simul creata secundum substantiam materiæ, licet non secundum speciem formæ. Unde relinquitur, quod multiplicatio corporis humani non fit nisi per hoc quod alimentum convertitur in veritatem humani corporis. Quarto, quia, cum homo non differat ab animalibus et plantis secundum animam vegetabilem, sequeretur quod etiam corpora animalium et plantarum non multiplicentur per conversionem alimenti in corpus nutritum, sed per quamdam multiplicationem, quae non potest esse naturalis; cum materia secundum naturam non extendatur nisi usque ad certam quantitatem, ne iterum inveniatur aliquid naturaliter crescere nisi per rarefactionem vel conversionem alterius in ipsum. Et sic totum opus generativæ et nutritivæ, quae dicuntur vires naturales, esset miraculosum; quod est omnino inconveniens. Unde ali dixerunt quod forma humana potest quidem fieri de novo in aliqua alia materia, si consideretur natura humana in communi, non autem si accipiatur prout est in hoc individuo, in quo forma humana fixa manet in quadam materia determinata, cui primo imprimitur in generatione hujus individui: ita quod illam materiam nunquam deserit usque ad ultimam individui corruptionem. Et hanc materiam dicunt principaliter pertinere ad veritatem humanæ naturæ. Sed quia hujusmodi materia non sufficit ad quantitatem debitam, requiritur ut adveniat alia materia per conversionem alimenti in substantiam nutriti, quantum sufficiat ad debitum augmentum. Et hanc materiam dicunt secundario pertinere ad veritatem humanæ naturæ; quia non requiritur ad primum esse individui, sed ad quantitatem ejus. Jam vero, si quid aliud veniat ex alimento, non pertinet ad veritatem humanæ naturæ, proprie loquendo. Sed hoc etiam est inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia hæc opinio judicat de materia corporum viventium ad modum corporum inanimatorum; in quibus, etsi sit virtus ad generandum simile in specie, non tamen est virtus in eis ad generandum aliquid sibi simile secundum individuum: quæ quidem virtus in corporibus viventibus est virtus nutritiva. Nihil ergo per virtutem nutritivam adderetur corporibus viventibus, et alimentum in veritatem naturæ ipsorum non converteretur. Secundo quia virtus activa quæ est in semine, est quædam impressio derivata ab anima generantis, sicut supra dictum est. Unde non potest esse majoris virtutis in agendo quam ipsa anima, a qua derivatur. Si ergo ex virtute seminis vere assumit aliqua materia formam naturæ humanæ, multo magis anima in nutrimentum conjunctum poterit veram formam naturæ humanæ imprimere per potentiam nutritivam. Tertio, quia nutrimento indi-getur non solum ad augmentum, alioquin terminato augmento necessarium non esset, sed etiam ad restaurandum illud quod deperditur per actionem caloris naturalis. Non autem esset restauratio, nisi id quod ex alimento generatur, succederet in locum deperditi. Unde sicut id quod primo inerat, est de veritate humanæ naturæ, ita id quod ex alimento generatur. Et ideo secundum alios dicendum est, quod alimentum vere convertitur in verita-tem humanæ naturæ, inquantum vere accipit speciem carnis et ossis, et hujusmodi partium. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus in lib. II De anima, text. 46, et I De gen., text. 39, quod « alimentum nutrit, inquantum est potentia caro. »
\n[I.q.119.a.1.ad.1] Our Lord does not say that the \"whole\" of what enters into the mouth, but \"all\"--because something from every kind of food is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Dominus non dicit, quod totum quod in os intrat, per secessum emittatur; sed oportet quod de quolibet cibo aliquid impurum per secessum emittatur. Vel potest dici, quod quidquid ex alimento generatur, potest etiam per calorem naturalem resolvi, et per poros quosdam occultos emitti, ut Hieronymus exponit super illud Matth., xv: Non intelligitis, quod, etc., Comment., lib. II, col. 108, t. 7.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.ad.2] By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood that which first receives the human species, which is derived from the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that \"just as in things which have their species in matter\"--for instance, wood or stone--\"so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and something belonging to matter.\" Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, or nourished. Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is added, cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains.
\nIt must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, according to that which is formed therein, thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is substituted in its place.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliqui per carnem « secundum speciem » intellexerunt id quod primo accipit speciem humanam, quod sumitur a generante; et hoc dicunt semper manere, quousque individuum durat; carnem vero « secundum materiam » dicunt esse quæ generatur ex alimento; et hanc dicunt non semper permanere, sed quod sicut advenit, ita abscedit. Sed hoc est contra intentionem Aristotelis. Dicit enim ibi, quod « sicut in unoquoque habentium speciem in materia, » puta in ligno et lapide, « ita et in carne, hoc est secundum speciem, et illud secundum materiam. » Manifestum est autem, quod prædicta distinctio locum non habet in rebus inanimatis, quæ non generantur ex semine, nec nutriuntur. Et iterum cum id quod ex alimento generatur, adjungatur corpori nutrito per modum mixtionis, sicut si aqua miscetur vino, ut ponit exemplum ibidem Philosophus, lib. I De gener., text. 39 et 88, non potest alia esse natura ejus quod advenit, et ejus cui advenit; cum jam sit factum unum per veram mixtionem. Unde nulla ratio est quod unum consumatur per calorem naturalem, et alterum maneat. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod hæc distinctio Philosophi non est secundum diversas carnes, sed est ejusdem carnis secundum diversam considerationem. Si enim consideretur caro « secundum speciem, » id est secundum id quod est formale in ipsa, sic semper manet, quia semper manet natura carnis, et dispositio naturalis ipsius. Sed si consideretur caro « secundum materiam, » sic non manet, sed paulatim consumitur et restauratur; sicut patet inigne fornacis, cujus forma manet, sed materia paulatim consumitur, et alia in locum ejus substituitur.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.ad.3] The \"radical humor\" is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the \"nutritive humor\" is that which has not yet received perfectly the specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ad humidum radicale intelligitur pertinere totum id in quo fundatur virtus speciei; quod si subtrahatur, restitui non potest; sicut si amputetur manus, aut pes, vel aliquid hujusmodi. Sed humidum nutrimentale est quod nondum pervenit ad suscipiendum perfectæ naturam speciei, sed est in via ad hoc, sicut est sanguis et alia hujusmodi. Unde si talia subtrahantur, remanet adhuc virtus speciei in radice, quæ non tollitur.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.ad.4] Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).
\n[I.q.119.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod omnis virtus in corpore passibili per continuam actionem debilitatur, quia hujusmodi agentia etiam patiuntur. Et ideo virtus conversiva in principio quidem tam fortis est, ut possit convertere non solum quod sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, sed etiam ad augmentum; postea vero non potest convertere nisi quantum sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, et tunc cessat augmentum: demum nec hoc potest, et tunc fit diminutio; deinde, deficiente hujusmodi virtute totaliter, animal moritur; sicut virtus vini convertentis aquam admixtam paulatim per admixtionem aquæ debilitatur, ut tandem totum fiat aquosum, ut Philosophus exemplificat in I De gener., text. 39 et 88.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.ad.5] As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to be generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if, while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time: because that which is added passes into what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed by natural heat.
\n[I.q.119.a.1.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in I De gener., text. 39, quando aliqua materia per se convertitur in ignem, tunc dicitur ignis de novo generari; quando vero aliqua materia convertitur in ignem præexistentem, dicitur nutriri; unde si tota materia simul amittat speciem ignis, et alia materia convertatur in ignem, erit alius ignis numero; si vero paulatim combusto uno ligno aliud substituatur, et sic deinceps quousque omnia prima consumantur, semper remanet idem ignis numero; quia semper quod additur transit in præexistens. Et similiter est intelligendum in corporibus viventibus, in quibus ex nutrimento restauratur id quod per calorem naturalem consumitur.
\n