[I-II.q.2.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth. For since happiness is man's last end, it must consist in that which has the greatest hold on man's affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written (Ecclesiastes 10:19): \"All things obey money.\" Therefore man's happiness consists in wealth.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in divitiis consistat. Cum enim beatitudo sit ultimus finis hominis, in eo consistit quod maxime in hominis affectu dominatur; hujusmodi autem sunt 3 divitiæ; dicitur enim Eccl., x, 19: Pecuniæ obediunt omnia. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo hominis consistit.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.1.arg.2] Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is \"a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.\" Now money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented, that it might be a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, secundum Boetium in III De consol., prosa 11, col. 724, t. 4, « beatitudo est status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus. » Sed in pecuniis omnia possideri videntur; quia, ut Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., cap. v, et I Polit., cap. vi, « ad hoc nummus est inventus, ut sit quasi fidejussor habendi pro eo quodcumque homo voluerit. » Ergo in divitiis beatitudo consistit.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.1.arg.3] Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more than anything else; since \"a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches\" (Ecclesiastes 5:9). Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, desiderium summi boni, cum nunquam deficiat, videtur esse infinitum. Sed hoc maxime in divitiis inventur; quia avarus non implebitur pecunia, ut dicitur Eccle., v, 9. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo consistit.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.1.sc] Man's good consists in retaining happiness rather than in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), \"wealth shines in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous man is applauded.\" Therefore man's happiness does not consist in wealth.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.1.sc] Sed contra, bonum hominis in retinendo beatitudinem magis consistit quam in amittendo ipsam. Sed, sicut Boetius, in II De consol., prosa v, col. 689, t. 4, dicit, « divitiæ effundendo magis quam coacervando nitent; siquidem avaritia semper odiosos, claros facit largitas. » Ergo in divitiis beatitudo non consistit 4.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.1.co] It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3), viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, cars, dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature, as money, but is invented by the art of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things salable.
\nNow it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of something else, viz. as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be man's last end, rather is it ordained to man as to its end. Wherefore in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to Psalm 8:8: \"Thou hast subjected all things under his feet.\"
\nAnd as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because, by its means, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently much less can it be considered in the light of the last end. Therefore it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in wealth.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod imposibile est 1 Nescio an recte hunc textum et Nicolaï et Parm. intellexerint. Nam in omnibus codicibus quos vidimus habetur: « in II Physic.; » et Parm., post Nicolaï, dicit quod neutro in loco, id est nec in II Physic., nec in V Metaphysic., talis distinctio inventur. — Ego tamen in II Physic., cap. 11, sequentia lego: « quorum enim, motus cum sit continuus, est finis illius motus, hic finis est extremum et id cujus causa. » Quid clarius? finis motus est ipsa res cujus causa motus fit, et etiam adeptio hujus rei, seu extremum. — Sic etiam Deus est finis cujus causa omnia existunt, « omnia propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus, » et finis quo, fruendo, creaturæ rationales perveniunt, seu extremum quo perveniunt. 2 Quod hic D.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.1.ad.1] All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod omnia corporalia obediunt pecuniæ quantum ad multitudinem stultorum, qui sola corporalia bona cognoscunt, quæ pecunia acquiri possunt. Judicium autem de bonis humanis non debet sumi a stultis, sed a sapientibus; sicut et judicium de saporibus ab his qui habent gustum bene dispositum.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.1.ad.2] All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written (Proverbs 17:16): \"What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom.\"
\n[I-II.q.2.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod pro pecuniæ possunt haberi omnia venalia, non autem spiritualia, quæ vendi non possunt. Unde dicitur, Prov., xvii, 16: Quid prodest stulto divitias habere, cum sapientiam emere non possit?
\n[I-II.q.2.a.1.ad.3] The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear (Polit. i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things despised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written (Sirach 24:29): \"They that eat me shall yet hunger.\" Whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is the case: for when we already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord's words (John 4:13): \"Whosoever drinketh of this water,\" by which temporal goods are signified, \"shall thirst again.\" The reason of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact shows that they are imperfect, and the sovereign good does not consist therein.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod appetitus naturalium divitiarum non est infinitus, quia secundum certam mensuram sufficiunt na-indigentiam removendam; et ita firmum ac stabile, ut nec auferri possit, nec amitti. Sed, sicut rursum Boetius dicit, in III De consol., prosa iii, inter abundantissimas opes aliqua semper animum confundit anxietas, et quod absens est desideratur; qui desiderat autem, eget; qui vero eget, non usquequaque sibi sufficiens est; ac proinde nihilo indigentem sufficientemque sibi facere nequeunt opes; possuntque ipsæ vel invitis auferri, vel turæ; sed appetitus divitiarum artificialium est infinitus, quia deservit concupiscentia inordinatæ, quæ non modificatur, ut patet per Philosophum in I Polit., cap. vi, a med. Aliter tamen est infinitum desiderium divitiarum, et desiderium summi boni. Nam summum bonum quanto perfectius possidetur, tanto ipsum magis amatur, et alia contemnuntur; quia quanto magis habetur magis cognoscitur; et ideo dicitur Eccli., xxiv, 29: Qui edunt me, adhuc esurient. Sed in appetitu divitiarum et quorumcumque temporalium bonorum est e contrario. Nam quando jam habentur, ipsa contemnuntur, et alia appetuntur, secundum quod significatur Joan., iv, 13, cum Dominus dicit: Qui bibit ex hac aqua*, per quam temporalia significantur, sitiet iterum; et hoc ideo, quia eorum insufficientia magis cognoscitur cum habentur. Et ideo hoc ipsum ostendit eorum imperfectionem, et quod in eis summum bonum non consistit.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors. For happiness or bliss is \"the reward of virtue,\" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore happiness consists especially in honor.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in honoribus consistat. Beatitudo enim, sive felicitas, est « præmium virtutis, » ut Philosophus dicit in I Ethic., cap. ix, in princ. Sed honor maxime videtur esse id quod est « virtutis præmium, » ut Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. iii. Ergo in honore maxime consistit beatitudo.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.2.arg.2] Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover, the Apostle says (1 Timothy 1:17): \"To . . . the only God be honor and glory.\" Therefore happiness consists in honor.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud quod convenit Deo, et excellentissimis, maxime videtur esse beatitudo, quæ est bonum perfectum. Sed hujusmodi est honor, ut Philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic., cap. xiv; et I Tim., i, 17, dicit Apostolus: Soli Deo honor et gloria. Ergo in honore consistit beatitudo. amitti; ac propterea præsidio indigent ut serventur. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo consistere dici non potest.; in edit.: « facilitatem. » — In —; edit. non habent: « propter aliquid, scilicet. » — Ita cod. Venetus SS. Joannis et Pauli; — — deest in Parm. — — In Edit.: « e converso. » —
\n[I-II.q.2.a.2.arg.3] Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore happiness consists in honor.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illud quod est maxime desideratum ab hominibus est beatitudo. Sed nihil videtur esse magis desiderabile ab hominibus quam honor; quia homines patiuntur jacturam in omnibus aliis rebus, ne patiantur aliquod detrimentum sui honoris. Ergo in honore beatitudo consistit.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.2.sc] Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore happiness does not consist in honor.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.2.sc] Sed contra, beatitudo est in beato. Honor autem « non est in eo qui honoratur, sed magis in honorante, qui reverantiam exhibet honorato, » ut Philosophus dicit in I Ethic., cap. v. Ergo in honore beatitudo non consistit.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.2.co] It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion, especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist therein.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod impossibile est beatitudinem consistere in honore. Honor enim exhibetur alicui propter aliquam ejus excellentiam; et ita est signum et testimonium quoddam illius excellentiæ, quæ est in honorato. Excellentia autem hominis maxime attenditur secundum beatitudinem, quæ est hominis bonum perfectum; et secundum partes ejus, id est secundum illa bona quibus aliquid beatitudinis participatur. Et ideo honor potest quidem consequi beatitudinem; sed principaliter in eo beatitudo consistere non potest.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.2.ad.1] As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive honor from men by way of reward, \"as from those who have nothing greater to offer.\" But virtue's true reward is happiness itself, for which the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be a virtue, but ambition.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus ibidem dicit 1, honor non est præmium virtutis, propter quod virtuosi operantur, sed accipiunt honorem ab hominibus loco præmii, quasi a non habentibus ad dandum majus. Verum autem præmium virtutis est ipsa beatitudo, propter quam virtuosi operantur. Si autem propter honorem operarentur, jam non esset virtus, sed magis ambitio.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.2.ad.2] Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that honor makes them excellent.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod honor debetur Deo et excellentissimis, in signum vel testimonium excellentiæ præxistentis, non quod ipse honor faciat eos excellentes.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.2.ad.3] That man desires honor above all else, arises from his natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ex naturali desiderio beatitudinis, quam consequitur honor, ut dictum est, contingit quod homines maxime honorem desiderant; unde quærunt homines maxime honorari a sapientibus, quorum judicio credunt se esse excellentes, vel felices.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory. For happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints for the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says (Romans 8:18): \"The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us.\" Therefore happiness consists in glory.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in gloria. In eo enim videtur beatitudo consistere, quod redditur sanctis pro tribulationibus quas in mundo patiuntur. Hujusmodi autem est gloria; dicit enim Apostolus, Rom., viii, 18: Non sunt condignæ passiones hujus temporis ad futuram gloriaam, quæ revelabitur in nobis. Ergo beatitudo consistit in gloria.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.3.arg.2] Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the knowledge of others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose [Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13, glory consists \"in being well known and praised.\" Therefore man's happiness consists in glory.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, « bonum est diffusivum, » ut patet per Dionysium, iv cap. De div. nom., § 1, col. 694, t. 1. Sed per gloriam bonum hominis maxime diffunditur in noti-tiam aliorum; quia gloria, ut Augustinus dicit lib. III Cont. Maxim., cap. xiii, col. 770, t. 8, nihil aliud est quam « clara cum laude notitia. » Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in gloria.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.3.arg.3] Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity after a fashion. Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): \"You seem to beget unto yourselves eternity, when you think of your fame in future time.\" Therefore man's happiness consists in fame or glory.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, beatitudo est stabilissimum bonorum. Hoc autem esse videtur fama, vel gloria, quia per hanc quodammodo homines æternitatem sortiuntur; unde Boetius dicit in lib. II De consolat., prosa vii, col. 711, t. 1: « Vos immortalitatem vobis propagare videmini, cum futuri famam temporis cogitatis. » Ergo beatitudo consistit in fama seu gloria.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.3.sc] Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that fame or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), \"many owe their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything be more shameful? For those who receive false fame, must needs blush at their own praise.\" Therefore man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.3.sc] Sed contra, beatitudo est verum hominis bonum. Sed famam, seu gloria contingit esse falsam; ut enim dicit Boetius in lib. III De consolat., prosa vii, col. 745, t. 1: « Plures magnum sæpe nomen falsis vulgi opinionibus abstulerunt: quo quid turpius excogitari potest? Nam qui falso prædicantur, suis ipsi necesse est laudibus erubescant. » Non ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in fama seu gloria.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.3.co] Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory. For glory consists \"in being well known and praised,\" as Ambrose [Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13 says. Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge: for human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man's good depends on God's knowledge as its cause. And therefore man's beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God; according to Psalm 90:15-16: \"I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation.\"
\nFurthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; hence it is written (2 Corinthians 10:18): \"He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth.\"
\n[I-II.q.2.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in fama, seu gloria humana consistere. Nam gloria nihil aliud est quam « clara notitia cum laude, » ut Augustinus dicit. Res autem cognita aliter comparatur ad cognitionem humanam, et aliter ad cognitionem divinam. Humana enim cognitio a rebus cognitis causatur; sed divina cognitio est causa rerum cognitarum. Unde perfectio humani boni, quæ beatitudo dicitur, non potest causari a notitia humana; sed magis notitia humana de beatitudine alicujus procedit, et quodammodo causatur ab ipsa humana beatitudine vel inchoata, vel perfecta. Et ideo in fama vel in gloria non potest consistere hominis beatitudo. Sed bonum hominis dependet, sicut ex causa, ex cognitione Dei; et ideo ex gloria quæ est apud Deum, dependet beatitudino hominis sicut ex causa sua, secundum illud psalm. xc, 15: Eripiam eum, et glorificabo eum; longitudine dierum replebo eum, et ostendam illi salutare meum. Est etiam aliud considerandum, quod humana notitia sæpe fallitur, et præcipue in singularibus contingentibus, cujusmodi sunt actus humani; et ideo frequenter humana gloria fallax est. Sed quia Deus falli non potest, ejus gloria semper vera est; propter quod dicitur II ad Cor., x, 18: Ille probatus est quem Deus commendat.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.3.ad.1] The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence it is written (Mark 8:38): \"The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His angels\" [St. Thomas joins Mark 8:38 with Luke 12:8 owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was quoting from memory].
\n[I-II.q.2.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Apostolus non loquitur ibi de gloria quæ est ab hominibus, sed de gloria quæ est a Deo coram angelis ejus. Unde dicitur Luc., xii, 8: Filius hominis confitebitur eum in gloria Patris sui coram angelis ejus*.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.3.ad.2] A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, it does not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man happy.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum alicujus hominis, quod per famam vel gloriam est in cognitione multorum, si cognitio qui dem vera sit, oportet quod derivetur a bono existente in ipso homine; et sic præsupponit perfectam beatitudinem, vel inchoatam. Si autem cognitio falsa sit, non concordat rei; et sic bonum non invenitur in eo cujus fama celebris habetur. Unde patet quod fama nullo modo potest facere hominem beatum.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.3.ad.3] Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But happiness endures of itself, and for ever.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod fama non habet stabilitatem, imo falso rumore de facili perditur; et si stabilis aliquando perseveret, hoc est per accidentes. Sed beatitudo habet per se stabilitatem et semper.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all things desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be most like to God: hence also in Scripture they are called \"gods\" (Exodus 22:28), \"Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods.\" Therefore happiness consists in power.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in potestate. Omnia enim appetunt assimilari Deo tanquam ultimo fini et primo principio. Sed homines qui in potestatibus sunt, propter similitudinem potestatis maxime videntur esse Deo conformes; unde in Scriptura dii vocantur, ut patet Exod., xxii, 28: Diis non detrahes. Ergo in potestate beatitudo consistit.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.4.arg.2] Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to those who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, beatitudo est bonum perfectum. Sed perfectissimum est quod homo etiam alios congrue possit regere, quod convenit his qui in potestate sunt constituti. Ergo beatitudo consistit in potestate.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.4.arg.3] Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, beatitudo, cum sit maxime appetibilis, opponitur ei quod maxime est fugiendum. Sed homines maxime fugiunt servitutem, cui contraponitur potestas. Ergo in potestate beatitudo consistit.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.4.sc] Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), \"the power of man cannot relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety\": and further on: \"Think you a man is powerful who is surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still more?\"
\n[I-II.q.2.a.4.sc] Sed contra, beatitudo est perfectum bonum. Sed potestas est maxime imperfecta; ut enim dicit Boetius, lib. III De consolat., prosa v, col. 741, t. 4, « potestas humana sollicitudinum morsus expellere, formidinum aculeos vitare nequit; » et postea: « Potentem censes, qui satellite latus ambit; qui quos terret, ipse plus metuit? » Non igitur beatitudo consistit in potestate.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.4.co] It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle, as is stated in Metaph. v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last end. Secondly, because power has relation to good and evil: whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness might consist in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.
\nNow four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because, since happiness is man's supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the foregoing can be found both in good and in evil men. Secondly, because, since it is the nature of happiness to \"satisfy of itself,\" as stated in Ethic. i, 7, having gained happiness, man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may still lack many goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and such like. Thirdly, because, since happiness is the perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is written (Ecclesiastes 5:12) that \"riches\" are sometimes \"kept to the hurt of the owner\"; and the same may be said of the other three. Fourthly, because man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in him; since he is ordained thereto naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod impossibile est beatitudinem in potestate consistere, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia potestas habet rationem principii, ut patet in V Metaph., text. 17; beatitudo autem habet rationem ultimi finis. Secundo quia potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum; beatitudo autem est proprium et perfectum hominis bonum: unde magis posset consistere beatitudo aliqua in bono usu potestatis, qui est per virtutem, quam in ipsa potestate. Possunt autem quatuor generales rationes induci ad ostendendum quod in nullo præmissorum exteriorum bonorum beatitudo consistit. Quarum prima est, quod cum beatitudo sit summum hominis bonum, non compatitur secum aliquod malum; omnia autem In — Sed apud Marcum nil ibi simile invenitur nisi: in gloria Patris sui, et agitur non de confessione sed de confusione: Filius hominis confundetur eum, cum venerit in gloria Patris sui cum angelis sanctis. Ita cod. Tarrac. cum editis plurimis; edit. Rom.: « bonum. » prædicta possunt inveniri et in bonis, et in malis. Secunda ratio est, quia cum de ratione beatitudinis sit quod sit per se sufficiens, ut patet in I Ethic., cap. vii, 1 necesse est quod beatitudine adepta, nullum bonum necessarium homini desit; adeptis autem singulis præmissorum, possunt adhuc multa bona homini necessaria deesse, puta sapientia, sanitas corporis, et hujusmodi. Tertia, quia cum beatitudo sit bonum perfectum, ex beatitudine non potest aliquod malum alicui provenire: quod non convenit præmissis; dicitur enim Eccle., v, 12, quod divitiæ interdum conservantur in malum domini sui; et simile patet in aliis tribus. Quarta ratio est, quia ad beatitudinem homo ordinatur per principia interiora, cum ad ipsam naturaliter ordinetur; præmissa autem quatuor bona magis sunt a causis exterioribus, et ut plurimum a fortuna; unde et bona fortunæ dicuntur. Unde patet quod in præmissis nullo modo beatitudo consistit.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.4.ad.1] God's power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod divina potestas est sua bonitas; unde uti sua potestate non potest nisi bene. Sed hoc in hominibus non invenitur. Unde non sufficit ad beatitudinem quod homo assimiletur Deo quantum ad potestatem, nisi etiam 2 assimiletur ei quantum ad bonitatem.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.4.ad.2] Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut optimum est quod aliquis utatur bene potestate in regimine multorum, ita pessimum est, si male utatur; et ita potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.4.ad.3] Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's supreme good consists in power.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod servitus est impedimentum boni usus potestatis; et ideo naturaliter homines eam fugiunt, non quasi in potestate hominis sit summum bonum.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily goods. For it is written (Sirach 30:16): \"There is no riches above the riches of the health of the body.\" But happiness consists in that which is best. Therefore it consists in the health of the body.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in bonis corporis. Dicitur enim Eccli., xxx, 16: Non est census super censum salutis corporis. — 2 In — — 4 Parm.: « in Sed in eo quod est optimum, consistit beatitudo. Ergo consistit in corporis salute.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.5.arg.2] Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that \"to be\" is better than \"to live,\" and \"to live\" is better than all that follows. But for man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary. Since, therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it seems that health of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Dionysius dicit, v cap. De divin. nomin., § 1, col. 815, t. 4, quod « esse est melius quam vivere, et vivere melius quam alia quæ consequuntur. » Sed ad esse vel vivere hominis requiritur salus corporis. Cum ergo beatitudo sit summum bonum hominis, videtur quod salus corporis maxime pertineat ad beatitudinem.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.5.arg.3] Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so the causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause is that which flows into all things, so the last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that which is most desired by all. Therefore man's happiness consists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the health of the body.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quanto aliquid est communius, tanto ab altiori principio dependet; quia quanto est causa superior, tanto ejus virtus ad plura se extendit. Sed sicut causalitas causæ efficientis consideratur secundum influentiam, ita causalitas finis attenditur secundum appetitum. Ergo, sicut prima causa efficiens est quæ in omnia influit, ita ultimus finis est quod ab omnibus desideratur. Sed ipsum esse est quod maxime desideratur ab omnibus. Ergo in his quæ pertinent ad esse hominis, sicut est salus corporis, maxime consistit beatitudo.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.5.sc] Man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for instance, by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness. Therefore man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.5.sc] Sed contra est, quod secundum beatitudinem homo excellit omnia alia animalia. Sed secundum bona corporis a multis animalibus superatur, sicut ab elephante in diuturnitate vitæ, a leone in fortitudine, a cervo in cursu. Ergo beatitudo hominis non consistit in bonis corporis.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.5.co] It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in the goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a thing be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its being. Hence a captain does not intend as a last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is ordained to something else as its end, viz. to navigation. Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may steer its course, so man is given over to his will and reason; according to Sirach 15:14: \"God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel.\" Now it is evident that man is ordained to something as his end: since man is not the supreme good. Therefore the last end of man's reason and will cannot be the preservation of man's being.
\nSecondly, because, granted that the end of man's will and reason be the preservation of man's being, it could not be said that the end of man is some good of the body. For man's being consists in soul and body; and though the being of the body depends on the soul, yet the being of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (I, 75, 2); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that puts them into motion, that by their means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in bonis corporis consistere propter duo. Primo quidem, quia impossibile est quod illius rei quæ ordinatur ad aliud sicut ad finem ultimum, finis sit 3 ejusdem conservatio in esse. Unde gubernator non intendit, sicut ultimum finem, conservationem navis sibi commissæ, eo quod navis ad aliud ordinatur sicut 4 ad finem, scilicet ad navigandum. Sicut autem navis committitur gubernatori ad dirigendum, ita homo est suæ voluntati et rationi commissus, secundum illud quod dicitur Eccli., xv, 14: Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum* in manu consilii sui. Manifestum est autem, quod homo ordinatur ad aliquid sicut ad finem; non enim homo est summum bonum. Unde impossibile est quod ultimus finis rationis et voluntatis humanæ sit conservatio humani esse. Secundo, quia dato quod finis rationis et voluntatis humanæ esset conservatio humani esse, non tamen posset dici, quod finis homi-finem. » nis esset aliquod corporis bonum. Esse enim hominis consistit in anima et corpore; et quamvis esse corporis dependeat ab anima, esse tamen humanæ animæ non dependet a corpore, ut supra ostensum est, ipsumque corpus est propter animam, sicut materia propter formam, et instrumenta propter motorem, ut per ea suas actiones exercat; unde omnia bona corporis ordinantur ad bona animæ sicut ad finem. Unde impossibile est quod in bonis corporis beatitudo consistat; quæ est ultimus finis.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.5.ad.1] Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which are signified by \"riches,\" just as the good of the soul is preferred to all bodily goods.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut corpus ordinatur ad animam sicut ad finem, ita bona exteriora ad ipsum corpus; et ideo rationabiliter bonum corporis praefertur bonis exterioribus, quæ per censum significantur, sicut et bonum animæ praefertur omnibus bonis corporis.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.5.ad.2] Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident that being itself together with an additional perfection is more excellent. Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than living things.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod esse simpli-citer acceptum, secundum quod includit in se omnem perfectionem essendi, praeeminet vitæ et omnibus subsequentibus. Sic enim ipsum esse praæhabet in se omnia subsequentia, et hoc modo Dionysius loquitur. Sed si consideretur ipsum esse, prout participatur in hac re vel in illa, quæ non capiunt totam perfectionem essendi, sed habent esse imperfectum, sicut est esse cujuslibet creaturæ; sic manifestum est quod ipsum esse cum perfectione superaddita est eminentius. Unde et Dionysius ibidem, § 3, dicit, quod « viventia sunt meliora existentibus, et intelligentia viventibus. »
\n[I-II.q.2.a.5.ad.3] Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living being, some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quia finis respondet principio, ex illa ratione probatur quod ultimus finis est primum principium essendi, in quo est omnis essendi perfectio: cujus similitudinem appetunt, secundum suam perfectionem, quædam quidem secundum esse tantum, quædam secundum esse vivens, quædam secundum esse vivens et intelligens, et beatum; et hoc paucorum est.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: \"for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in wishing to be pleased\" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in voluptate consistat. Beatitudo enim cum sit ultimus finis, non appetitur propter aliud, sed alia propter ipsam. Sed hoc maxime convenit delectationi; ridiculum est enim ab aliquo quærere, propter quid velit delectari, ut dicitur in X Ethic., cap. Ⅱ. Ergo beatitudo maxime in voluptate et delectatione consistit.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.6.arg.2] Further, \"the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause\" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the end consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end. Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man's will and reason, that it causes him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man's last end, which is happiness, consists principally in pleasure.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, causa prima vehementius imprimit quam secunda, ut dicitur in lib. De causis, prop. Ⅰ. Influentia autem finis attenditur secundum ejus appetitum. Illud ergo videtur habere rationem finis ultimi quod maxime movet appetitum. Hoc autem est voluptas; cujus signum est quod delectatio in tantum absorbet hominis voluptatem et rationem, quod alia bona contemnere facit. Ergo videtur quod ultimus finis hominis, qui est beatitudo, maxime in voluptate consistat.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.6.arg.3] Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, cum appetitus sit boni, illud quod omnia appetunt, videtur esse bonum optimum. Sed delectationem omnia appetunt et sapientes, et insipientes, et etiam ratione carentia. Ergo delectatio est optimum; consistit ergo in voluptate beatitudo, quæ est summum bonum.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.6.sc] Boethius says (De Consol. iii): \"Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy too.\"
\n[I-II.q.2.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit in III De consol., prosa vii, col. 749, t. 4: « Tristes esse voluptatum exitus, quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum volet, intelliget; quæ si beatos efficere possent, nihil causæ est quin pecudes quoque beatæ esse dicantur. »
\n[I-II.q.2.a.6.co] Because bodily delights are more generally known, \"the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them\" (Ethic. vii, 13), although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, is precisely man's happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.
\nBut bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man's perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a form is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect, which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence it is written (Wisdom 7:9) that \"all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand.\" And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor a proper accident of happiness.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quia delectationes corporales pluribus notæ sunt, assumperunt sibi nomen voluptatum, ut dicitur VII Ethic., cap. xiii, ad fin., cum tamen sint aliæ delectationes potiores. In quibus tamen beatitudo principaliter non consistit; quia in unaquaque re aliud est quod pertinet ad In — In Corporeæ voluptates vel illicitæ sunt, vel licitæ. Si illicitæ, et desideriis antecedentibus, et doloribus consequentibus ita circumfundi solent, ut plus amari, quam jucundi admistum habeant. Unde Chrysostomus, Hom. Lxix in Matth., aiebat: « Si saltetricis alicujus amoribus captus quispiam fuerit, omni malitia durius, omni peregrinatione molestius, omni obsessa civitate miserius tormentum sustinebit. » Si vero sunt licitæ voluptates corporis, nimirum conjugii hujus fructus liberi parentibus saepe adeo sunt infensi, ut probanda videatur sententia Euripidis in Andromacha, qui « carentem liberis infortunio » dixit « esse felicem. »; in edit. deest: « cum tamen sint aliæ delectationes potiores. » essentiam ejus, aliud est proprium accidens ipsius; sicut in homine aliud est quod est animal rationale mortale, aliud quod est risibile. Est igitur considerandum, quod omnis delectatio est quoddam proprium accidens, quod consequitur beatitudinem, vel aliquam beatitudinis partem. Ex hoc enim aliquis delectatur, quod habet bonum aliquod sibi conveniens vel in re, vel in spe, vel saltem in memoria. Bonum autem conveniens, siquidem sit perfectum, est ipsa hominis beatitudo; si autem sit imperfectum, est quædam beatitudinis participatio vel propinqua, vel remota, vel saltem apparens. Unde manifestum est, quod nec ipsa delectatio, quæ consequitur bonum perfectum, est ipsa essentia beatitudinis, sed quoddam consequens ad ipsam, sicut per se accidens. Voluptas autem corporalis non potest etiam modo prædicto sequi bonum perfectum: nam sequitur bonum quod apprehendit sensus, qui est virtus animæ corpore utens; bonum autem quod pertinet ad corpus quod apprehenditur secundum sensum, non potest esse perfectum hominis bonum. Cum enim anima rationalis excedat proportionem materiæ corporalis, pars animæ quæ est ab organo corporeo absoluta, quamdam habet infinitatem respectu ipsius corporis, et partium animæ corpori concreatarum, sicut invisibilia sunt quodammodo infinita respectu materialium, eo quod forma per materiam quodammodo contrahitur, et finitur; unde forma a materia absoluta, est quodammodo infinita. Et ideo sensus, qui est vis corporalis, cognoscit singulare, quod est determina-tum per materiam: intellectus vero, qui est vis a materia absoluta, cognoscit universale, quod est abstractum a materia et continet sub se infinita singularia. Unde patet quod bonum conveniens corpori, quod per apprehensionem sensus delectationem corporalem causat, non est perfectum bonum hominis, sed est minimum quiddam in comparatione ad bonum animæ. Unde Sapientiæ, vii, 9, dicitur quod omne aurum in comparatione sapientiæ, arena est exigua. Sic igitur neque voluptas corporalis est ipsa beatitudo, nec est per se accidens beatitudinis. In « Quod » deest in edit. Cerinthiani beatitudinem in carnis delitiis reponunt. Paradisum voluptatum carnalium Judæi, Sarracenique expectant. Post secundum Christi
\n[I-II.q.2.a.6.ad.1] It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good: thus it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the preposition \"for\" denote the final cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight is desirable for something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently is its principle, and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ejusdem rationis est quod appetatur bonum, et quod appetatur delectatio, quæ nihil est aliud quam quietatio appetitus in bono; sicut ex eadem virtute naturæ est quod grave feratur deorsum, et quod ibi quiescat. Unde sicut bonum propter seipsum appetitur, ita et delectatio propter se, et non propter aliud appetitur, si ly propter dicat causam finalem; si vero dicat causam formalem, vel potius motivam, sic delectatio est appetibilis propter aliud, id est propter bonum quod est delectationis objectum, et per consequens est principium ejus et dat ei formam. Ex hoc enim delectatio habet quod appetatur, quia est quies in bono desiderato.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.6.ad.2] The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod vehemens appetitus delectationis sensibilis contingit ex hoc quod operationes sensuum, quia sunt principia nostræ cognitionis, sunt magis perceptibiles; unde etiam a pluribus delectationes sensibiles appetuntur.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.6.ad.3] All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod eo modo omnes appetunt delectationes, sicut et appetunt bonum; et tamen delectationem appetunt ratione boni, et non e converso, ut dictum est. Unde non sequitur quod delectatio sit maximum et per se bonum; sed quod unaquæque delectation consequatur aliquod bonum et quod aliqua delectatio consequatur id quod est per se et maximum bonum.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold: external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown above (4,5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in aliquo bono animæ. Beatitudo enim est quoddam hominis bonum; hoc autem per tria dividitur, quæ sunt bona exteriora, bona corporis, et bona animæ. Sed beatitudo non consistit in bonis exterioribus, neque in bonis corporis, sicut supra ostensum est. Ergo consistit in bonis animæ. adventum mille annos generationis ac ventris delectationibus Millenarii quidam concedebant. Non-nulli philosophi summum bonum esse voluptatem diversimode docuerunt.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.7.arg.2] Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from the fact that for its sake all else is loved and desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: not, however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud cui appetimus aliquod bonum magis amamus quam bonum quod ei appetimus; sicut magis amamus amicum, cui appetimus pecuniam, quam pecuniam. Sed unusquisque quodcumque bonum sibi appetit. Ergo seipsum amat magis quam omnia alia bona. Sed beatitudo est quod maxime amatur: quod patet ex hoc quod propter ipsam omnia amantur et desiderantur. Ergo beatitudo consistit in aliquo bono ipsius hominis. Sed non in bonis corporis. Ergo in bonis animæ.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.7.arg.3] Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the body, as shown above (Article 5). Therefore it is something belonging to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, perfectio est aliquid ejus quod perficitur. Sed beatitudo est quædam perfectio hominis. Ergo beatitudo est aliquid hominis. Sed non est aliquid corporis, ut ostensum est. Ergo beatitudo est aliquid animæ, et ita consistit in bonis animæ.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.7.sc] As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), \"that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake.\" But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists in no good of the soul.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. I De doctrina christiana, c. xxii, § 20, col. 26, t. 3, « id in quo constituitur beata vita, propter se diligendum est. » Sed homo non est propter seipsum diligendus; sed quidquid est in homine est diligendum propter Deum. Ergo in nullo bono animæ beatitudo consistit.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.7.co] As stated above (Question 1, Article 8), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul itself or something belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end.
\nIn like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's last end.
\nBut if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis dupliciter dicitur; scilicet ipsa res, quam adipisci desideramus, et usus, seu adeptio, vel possessio illius rei. Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam rem quam appetimus sicut ultimum finem, impossibile est quod ultimus finis hominis sit ipsa anima, vel aliquid ejus. Ipsa enim anima in se considerata est ut in potentia existens; fit enim de potentia sciente actu sciens, et de potentia virtuosa actu virtuosa. Cum autem potentia sit propter actum sicut propter complementum, impossibile est quod id quod est secundum se in potentia existens, habeat rationem ultimi finis. Unde impossibile est quod ipsa anima sit ultimus finis sui ipsius; similiter etiam neque aliquid ejus, sive sit potentia, sive actus, sive habitus. Bonum enim, quod est ultimus finis, est bonum perfectum complens appetitum. Appetitus autem humanus, qui est voluntas, est boni universalis: quodlibet autem bonum inhærens ipsi animæ est bonum participatum, et per consequens particulatum. Unde impossibile est quod aliquid eorum sit ultimus finis hominis. Ita cod. Alcan., aliique cum editis plurimis; theologi omittunt « amat. » Ita cod Alcan. et Camer., cum Nicolaï; edit. Sed si loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam adeptionem, vel possessionem, seu quemcumque usum ipsius rei quæ appetitur ut finis; sic ad ultimum finem pertinet aliquid hominis ex parte animæ; quia homo per animam beatitudinem consequitur. Res ergo ipsa quæ appetitur ut finis, est id in quo beatitudo consistit, et quod beatum facit; sed hujus rei adeptio vocatur beatitudo. Unde dicendum est, quod beatitudo est aliquid animæ; sed id in quo consistit beatitudo est aliquid extra animam. Ad primum ergo dicendem, quod secundum quod sub illa divisione comprehenduntur omnia bona quæ homini sunt appetibilia, sic bonum animæ dicitur non solum potentia, aut habitus, aut actus, sed et objectum quod est extrinsecum; et hoc modo nihil prohibet dicere, id in quo beatitudo consistit, esse quoddam bonum animæ.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.7.ad.1] Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes happiness is a good of the soul.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.7.ad.2] As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both cases. As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quantum ad propositum pertinet, quod beatitudo maxime amatur tanquam bonum concupitum; amicus autem amatur tanquam id cui concupiscitur bonum; et sic etiam homo amat seipsum. Unde non est eadem ratio amoris utrobique. Utrum autem amore amicitiæ aliquid homo supra se amet, erit locus considerandi cum de charitate agetur.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.7.ad.3] Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness, viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod beatitudo ipsa, cum sit perfectio animæ, est quoddam animæ bonum inhærens: sed id in quo beatitudo consistit, quod scilicet beatum facit, est aliquid extra animam, ut dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that some created good constitutes man's happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom \"unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things,\" from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches the base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness. Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature, as stated in I, 111, 1, it seems that man's happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in aliquo bono creato. Dicit enim Dionysius vii cap. De divin. nomin., § 3, col. 871, t. 4, quod « divina sapientia conjungit fines primorum principiis secundorum; » ex quo potest accipi, quod summum inferioris naturæ sit Rom. et Pat.: « complens boni appetitum. Corderius: « Deus semper fines pracedentium cum principiis sequentium connectit. » attingere infimum naturæ superioris. Sed summum hominis bonum est beatitudo. Cum ergo angelus naturæ ordine sit supra hominem, ut in primo habitum est, videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in hoc quod aliquo modo attingit ad angelum.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.8.arg.2] Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ultimus finis cujuslibet rei est in suo perfecto; unde pars est propter totum, sicut propter finem. Sed tota universitas creaturarum, quæ dicitur major mundus, comparatur ad hominem, qui in VIII Phys., text. 17, dicitur minor mundus, sicut perfectum ad imperfectum. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in tota universitate creaturarum.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.8.arg.3] Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good surpassing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include that good which surpasses the limits of all creation, it seems that man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good constitutes man's happiness.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, per hoc homo efficitur beatus, per quod ejus naturale desiderium quietatur. Sed desiderium hominis non extenditur ad majus bonum quam quod ipse capere potest, Cum ergo homo non sit capax boni, quod excedit limites totius creaturæ, videtur quod per aliquod bonum creatum homo beatus fieri possit; et ita beatitudo hominis in aliquo bono creato consistit.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.8.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): \"As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom it is written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' (Psalm 143:15).\"
\n[I-II.q.2.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX De civit. Dei, cap. xxvi, col. 656, t. 7: « Ut vita carnis anima est, ita beata vita hominis Deus est; » de quo dicitur ps. cxliii, 15: Beatus populus cujus Dominus Deus ejus est.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.8.co] It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man's appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Psalm 102:5: \"Who satisfieth thy desire with good things.\" Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis esse in aliquo bono creato. Beatitudo enim est bonum perfectum, quod totaliter quietat appetitum; alioquin non esset ultimus finis, si adhuc restaret aliquid appetendum. Objectum autem voluntatis, quæ est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum, sicut objectum intellectus est universale verum. Ex quo patet, quod nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis nisi bonum universale; quod non invenitur in aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo; quia omnis creatura habet bonitatem participatam. Unde solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere potest, secundum quod dicitur in psal. cii, 5: Qui replet in bonis desiderium tuum. In solo igitur Deo beatitudo hominis consistit.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.8.ad.1] The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod superius hominis contingit quidem infimum ange-licæ naturæ per quamdam similitudinem; non tamen ibi sistit sicut in ultimo fine, sed procedit usque ad ipsum universalem fon-tem boni, qui est universale objectum beatitinis omnium beatorum, tanquam infinitum et perfectum bonum existens.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.8.ad.2] If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself, but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but God himself.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod si totum aliquod non sit ultimus finis, sed ordinetur ad finem ulteriorem, ultimus finis partis non est ipsum totum, sed aliquid aliud. Universitas autem creaturarum, ad quam comparatur homo ut pars ad totum, non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur in Deum sicut in ultimum finem. Unde bonum universi non est ultimus finis hominis, sed ipse Deus.
\n[I-II.q.2.a.8.ad.3] Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.2.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod bonum creatum non est minus quam bonum cujus est homo capax ut rei intrinsecæ et inhærentis; est tamen minus quam bonum cujus est capax ut objecti, quod est infinitum. Bonum autem participatum ab angelo, et a toto universo, est bonum finitum, et contractum.
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