[I-II.q.6.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human acts. For that is voluntary \"which has its principle within itself.\" as Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii.], Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare. But the principle of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him: since man's appetite is moved to act, by the appetible object which is outside him, and is as a \"mover unmoved\" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in humanis actibus non inveniatur voluntarium. Voluntarium enim est cujus principium est in ipso, ut patet per Gregorium Nyss., lib. De nat. hom., c. xxxii, et Damascenum, lib. II Orthod. fid., cap. xxiv, col. 954, t. 1, et Aristotelem, III Ethic., c. 1. Sed principium humanorum actuum non est in ipso homine, sed est extra; nam appetitus hominis movetur ad agendum ab appetibili, quod est extra, quod est sicut movens non motum, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 54. Ergo in humanis actibus non invenitur voluntarium.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.1.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2) proves that in animals no new movement arises that is not preceded by a motion from without. But all human acts are new, since none is eternal. Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from without: and therefore there is nothing voluntary in them.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus, in VIII Physic., text. 28, probat quod non invenitur in animalibus aliquis actus novus, qui non præveniatur ab alio motu exteriori. Sed omnes actus hominis sunt novi; nullus enim actus hominis æternus est. Ergo principium omnium humanorum actuum est ab extra. Non igitur in eis invenitur voluntarium.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.1.arg.3] Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act of himself. But this is not true of man; for it is written (John 15:5): \"Without Me you can do nothing.\" Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, qui voluntarie agit, per se agere potest. Sed hoc homini non convenit: dicitur enim Joan., xv, 5: Sine me nihil potestis facere. Ergo voluntarium in humanis actibus non invenitur.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.1.sc] Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that \"the voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation.\" Now such are human acts. Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Damascenus in II lib. Orthod. fid., cap. xxiv, col. 954, t. 1, 1 Seu potius Nemesium, col. 727. 2 Ita cod. Alcan. cum edit. Rom. Theologi ex cod. Camer. et aliæ editiones posteriores habent « motus. » — 3 Forte: « ab aliquo. » — 4 In edit. Rom. deest « seu motuum. » Scotistæ quidam definitioni huic addunt: « cum cognitione singularium in quibus operatio quod « voluntarium est actus qui est operatio rationalis. » Tales autem sunt actus humani. Ergo in actibus humanis invenitur voluntarium.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.1.co] There must needs be something voluntary in human acts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle of some acts or movements is within the agent, or that which is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the stone: whereas when it is moved downwards, the principle of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some not. For since every agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end, as stated above (Question 1, Article 2); those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of movement for an end. Now in order for a thing to be done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of action or movement, nevertheless the principle of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is imprinted on it. Wherefore such like things are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have a knowledge of the end are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an end. And consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, to wit, that they act and that they act for an end, the movements of such things are said to be voluntary: for the word \"voluntary\" implies that their movements and acts are from their own inclination. Hence it is that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene [See Objection 1, the voluntary is defined not only as having \"a principle within\" the agent, but also as implying \"knowledge.\" Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod oportet in actibus humanis voluntarium esse. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est, quod quorumdam actuum, seu motuum4 principium est in agente, seu in eo quod movetur; quorumdam autem motuum vel actuum principium est extra. Cum enim lapis movetur sursum, principium hujus motionis est extra lapidem; sed cum movetur deorsum, principium hujus motionis est in ipso lapide. Eorum autem quæ a principio intrinseco moventur, quædam movent seipsa, quædam autem non. Cum enim omne agens, seu motum agat, seu moveatur propter finem, ut supra habitum est, illa perfecte moventur a principio intrinseco in quibus est aliquod intrinsecum principium, non solum ut moveantur, sed ut moveantur in finem. Ad hoc autem quod fiat aliquid propter finem, requiritur cognitio finis aliqualis. Quodcumque igitur sic agit vel movetur a principio intrinseco, quod habet aliquam notitiam finis, habet in seipso principium sui actus, non solum ut agat, sed etiam ut agat propter finem; quod autem nullam notitiam finis habet, etsi in eo sit principium actionis vel motus, non tamen ejus quod est agere vel moveri propter finem, est principium in ipso, sed in alio a quo ei imprimitur principium suæ motionis in finem. Unde hujusmodi non dicuntur movere seipsa, sed ab aliis moveri; quæ vero habent notitiam finis, dicuntur seipsa movere, quia in eis est principium non solum ut agant, sed etiam ut agant propter finem. Et ideo cum utrumque sit ab intrinseco principio, scilicet quod agunt, et quod propter finem agunt, eorum motus et actus dicuntur voluntarii. Hoc autem importat nomen voluntarii, quod motus et actus sit a propria inclinatione; et inde est quod voluntarium dicitur esse, secundum definitionem Aristotelis, et Gregorii Nysseni, et Damasceni, non solum « cujus principium est consistit, id est, circumstantiarum pertinentium ad substantiam actionis. » Ne confundas voluntarium cum spontaneo, vel cum libero. Omne voluntarium est spontaneum, non omne spontaneum est voluntarium; omne liberum est voluntarium, non omne voluntarium est liberum. intra, » sed cum additione « scientiæ. » Unde cum homo maxime cognoscat finem sui operis, et moveat seipsum, in ejus actibus maxime voluntarium invenitur.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.1.ad.1] Not every principle is a first principle. Therefore, although it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, nevertheless it is not contrary to the nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or moved by an extrinsic principle: because it is not essential to the voluntary act that its intrinsic principle be a first principle. Yet again it must be observed that a principle of movement may happen to be first in a genus, but not first simply: thus in the genus of things subject to alteration, the first principle of alteration is a heavenly body, which is nevertheless, is not the first mover simply, but is moved locally by a higher mover. And so the intrinsic principle of the voluntary act, i.e. the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first principle in the genus of appetitive movement, although it is moved by an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non omne principium est principium primum. Licet ergo de ratione voluntarii sit quod principium ejus sit intus, non tamen est contra rationem voluntarii quod principium intrinsecum causetur vel moveatur ab exteriori principio; quia non est de ratione voluntarii quod principium intrinsecum sit principium primum. Sed tamen sciendum, quod contingit aliquod principium motus esse primum in genere, quod tamen non est primum simpliciter; sicut in genere alterabilium primum alterans est corpus cæleste, quod tamen non est primum movens simpliciter, sed movetur motu locali a superiori movente. Sic igitur principium intrinsecum voluntarii actus, quod est vis cognoscitiva et appetitiva, est primum principium in genere appetitivi motus, quamvis moveatur ab aliquo exteriori secundum alias species motus.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.1.ad.2] New movements in animals are indeed preceded by a motion from without; and this in two respects. First, in so far as by means of an extrinsic motion an animal's senses are confronted with something sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite. Thus a lion, on seeing a stag in movement and coming towards him, begins to be moved towards the stag. Secondly, in so far as some extrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animal's body, as in the case of cold or heat; and through the body being affected by the motion of an outward body, the sensitive appetite which is the power of a bodily organ, is also moved indirectly; thus it happens that through some alteration in the body the appetite is roused to the desire of something. But this is not contrary to the nature of voluntariness, as stated above (ad 1), for such movements caused by an extrinsic principle are of another genus of movement.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod motus animalis novus prævenitur quidem ab aliquo exteriori motu quantum ad duo: uno modo inquantum per motum exteriorem præsentatur sensui animalis aliquod sensibile, quod apprehensum movet appetitum; sicut leo videns cervum per ejus motum appropinquantem, incipit moveri ad ipsum. Alio modo inquantum per exteriorem motum incipit aliqualiter immutari naturali immutatione corpus animalis, puta per frigus vel calorem; corpore autem immuṭato per motum exterioris corporis, immutatur etiam per accidens appetitus sensitivus, qui est virtus organi corporei, sicut cum ex aliqua alteratione corporis commovetur appetitus ad concupiscentiam alicujus rei. Sed hoc non est contra rationem voluntarii, ut dictum est, hujusmodi enim motiones ab exteriori principio sunt alterius generis.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.1.ad.3] God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as it is not incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from God as the First Mover, inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God moving it: so it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary act, that it proceed from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless both natural and voluntary movements have this in common, that it is essential that they should proceed from a principle within the agent.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus movet hominem ad agendum, non solum sicut proponens sensui appetibile, vel sicut immutans corpus, sed etiam sicut movens ipsam voluntatem; quia omnis motus, tam voluntatis, quam naturæ, ab eo procedit sicut a primo movente. Et sicut non est contra rationem naturæ quod motus naturæ sit a Deo sicut a primo movente, inquantum natura est quoddam instrumentum Dei moventis, ita non est contra rationem actus voluntarii quod sit a Deo, inquantum voluntas a Deo movetur. Est tamen communiter de ratione naturalis et voluntarii motus quod sint a principio intrinseco.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in irrational animals. For a thing is called \"voluntary\" from \"voluntas\" [will]. Now since the will is in the reason (De Anima iii, 9), it cannot be in irrational animals. Therefore neither is there anything voluntary in them.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod voluntarium non sit in brutis animalibus. Voluntarium enim a voluntate dicitur. Voluntas autem, cum sit in ratione, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 42, non potest esse in brutis animalibus. Ergo neque voluntarium in eis invenitur.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.2.arg.2] Further, according as human acts are voluntary, man is said to be master of his actions. But irrational animals are not masters of their actions; for \"they act not; rather are they acted upon,\" as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 27). Therefore there is no such thing as a voluntary act in irrational animals.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, secundum hoc quod actus humani sunt voluntarii, homo dicitur esse dominus suorum actuum. Sed bruta animalia non habent dominium sui actus; non enim agunt, sed magis aguntur, ut Damascenus dicit lib. II Orthod. fid., cap. xxvii, col. 962, t. 4. Ergo in brutis animalibus non est voluntarium.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.2.arg.3] Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 24) that \"voluntary acts lead to praise and blame.\" But neither praise nor blame is due to the acts of irrational minds. Therefore such acts are not voluntary.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Damascenus dicit, ibidem, cap. xxiv, col. 954, t. 4, quod « actus voluntarios sequitur laus, vel vituperium. » Sed actibus brutorum animalium non debetur neque laus, neque vituperium. Ergo in eis non est voluntarium.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.2.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that \"both children and irrational animals participate in the voluntary.\" The same is said by Damascene (De Fide Orth. 24) and Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxii.].
\n[I-II.q.6.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Philosophus in III Ethic., cap. 1, prope fin., quod « pueri et bruta animalia communicant voluntario, » et idem dicunt Gregorius Nyss. 1, De nat. hom., cap. xxxii, et Damascenus, ubi supra, col. 955.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, together with some knowledge of the end. Now knowledge of the end is twofold; perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And such knowledge belongs to none but the rational nature. But imperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals, through their senses and their natural estimative power.
\nConsequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man can, from deliberating about the end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, to gain that end. But imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the imperfect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. Wherefore the voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature: whereas the imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even irrational animals.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, ad rationem voluntarii requiritur quod principium actus sit intra cum aliqua cognitione finis. Est autem duplex cognitio finis, perfecta scilicet et imperfecta. Perfecta qui dem finis cognitio est, quando non solum apprehenditur res quæ est finis, sed etiam cognoscitur ratio finis, et proportio ejus quod ordinatur in finem ad ipsum; et talis cognitio finis competit soli rationali naturæ. 1 Seu potius Nemesius, col. 730. — 2 In Edit. mi Imperfecta autem cognitio finis est quæ in sola finis apprehensione consistit, sine hoc quod cognoscatur ratio finis et proportio actus ad finem; et talis cognitio finis reperitur in brutis animalibus per sensum et aestimationem naturalem. Perfectam igitur cognitionem finis sequitur voluntarium secundum rationem perfectam, prout scilicet apprehenso fine aliquis potest deliberans de fine et de his quæ sunt ad finem, moveri in finem vel non moveri; imperfectam autem cognitionem finis sequitur voluntarium secundum rationem imperfectam, prout scilicet apprehendens finem non deliberat, sed subito movetur in ipsum. Unde soli rationali naturæ competit voluntarium secundum rationem perfectam; sed secundum rationem imperfectam competit etiam brutis.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.2.ad.1] The will is the name of the rational appetite; and consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word \"voluntary\" is derived from \"voluntas\" [will], and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through some kind of knowledge.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod voluntas nominat rationalem appetitum; et ideo non potest esse in his quæ ratione carent; voluntarium autem denominative dicitur a voluntate, et potest trahi ad ea in quibus est aliqua participatio voluntatis secundum aliquam convenientiam ad voluntatem; et hoc modo voluntarium attribuitur animalibus brutis, inquantum scilicet per cognitionem aliquam moventur in finem.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.2.ad.2] The fact that man is master of his actions, is due to his being able to deliberate about them: for since the deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things, the will can be inclined to either. But it is not thus that voluntariness is in irrational animals, as stated above.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex hoc contingit quod homo est dominus sui actus, quod habet deliberationem de suis actibus. Ex hoc enim quod ratio deliberans se habet ad opposita, voluntas in utrumque potest. Sed secundum hoc voluntarium non est in brutis animalibus, ut dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.2.ad.3] Praise and blame are the result of the voluntary act, wherein is the perfect voluntary; such as is not to be found in irrational animals.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod laus et vituperium consequuntur actum voluntarium secundum perfectam voluntarii rationem, qualis non invenitur in brutis.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act of the will. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.3.arg.2] Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of the will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to wish. But not to wish implies involuntariness, which is contrary to voluntariness. Therefore there can be nothing voluntary when the act of the will ceases.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.3.arg.3] Further, knowledge is essential to the voluntary, as stated above (1,2). But knowledge involves an act. Therefore voluntariness cannot be without some act.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.3.sc] The word \"voluntary\" is applied to that of which we are masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to act, to will and not to will. Therefore just as to act and to will are voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.3.co] Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one thing proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly; in which sense something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts; for instance, heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly; in which sense something proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus the sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman, from his having ceased to steer. But we must take note that the cause of what follows from want of action is not always the agent as not acting; but only then when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman were unable to steer the ship or if the ship's helm be not entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship would not be set down to him, although it might be due to his absence from the helm.
\nSince, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing and not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will. And thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an act; sometimes without outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills not to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one does not will to act.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.3.ad.1] We apply the word \"voluntary\" not only to that which proceeds from the will directly, as from its action; but also to that which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.3.ad.2] \"Not to wish\" is said in two senses. First, as though it were one word, and the infinitive of \"I-do-not-wish.\" Consequently just as when I say \"I do not wish to read,\" the sense is, \"I wish not to read\"; so \"not to wish to read\" is the same as \"to wish not to read,\" and in this sense \"not to wish\" implies involuntariness. Secondly it is taken as a sentence: and then no act of the will is affirmed. And in this sense \"not to wish\" does not imply involuntariness.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.3.ad.3] Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in one's power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to wish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to act, is voluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But there is something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will. Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod voluntati possit violentia inferri. Unum-quodque enim potest cogi a potentiori. Sed positioni sic intellectæ contradicere audeant! Concedunt Scotistæ Thomistis contra Ariagam, Amicum, et alios, requiri obligationem impediendi effectum per accidens solummodo ex omissione consequentem, ut effectus ille sit voluntarius. Quomodo autem effectus ille, etiam absque obligatione impediendi illum, non esset voluntarius in sensu Scotistarum, si præcognosci potuerit aut debuerit, et si insuper impediri potuerit? Id me latet. Sed obligationem impediendi Scotistæ exigunt, terrore ducti conclusionis quæ ex non obligatione impediendi sequeretur: tunc enim peccata hominum essent Deo voluntaria. — Cæterum, inter Thoaliquid est humana voluntate potentius, scilicet Deus. Ergo saltem ab eo cogi potest.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.4.arg.2] Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active principle, when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive force: for it is a \"mover moved\" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is sometimes moved by its active principle, it seems that sometimes it is compelled.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne passivum cogitur a suo activo quando immutatur ab eo. Sed voluntas est vis passiva; est enim movens motum, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 54. Cum ergo aliquando moveatur a suo activo, videtur quod aliquando cogatur.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.4.arg.3] Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature; as is clear of the will's movement to sin, which is contrary to nature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore the movement of the will can be compelled.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, motus violentus est qui est contra naturam. Sed motus voluntatis aliquando est contra naturam, ut patet de motu voluntatis ad peccandum, qui est contra naturam, ut Damascenus dicit IV Orth. fid., cap. xx, col. 1495, t. 1. Ergo motus voluntatis potest esse coactus.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.4.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that what is done by the will is not done of necessity. Now, whatever is done under compulsion is done of necessity: consequently what is done by the will, cannot be compelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to act.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in V De civit. Dei, cap. x, col. 152, t. 7, quod si aliquid fit voluntarie, non fit ex necessitate. Omne autem coactum fit ex necessitate. Ergo quod fit ex voluntate non potest esse coactum. Ergo voluntas non potest cogi ad agendum.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.4.co] The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, \"to wish\"; the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other power, such as \"to walk\" and \"to speak,\" which are commanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power.
\nAs regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be done to the will.
\nThe reason of this is that the act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge: just as the natural appetite is an inclination proceeding from an interior principle without knowledge. Now what is compelled or violent is from an exterior principle. Consequently it is contrary to the nature of the will's own act, that it should be subject to compulsion and violence: just as it is also contrary to the nature of a natural inclination or movement. For a stone may have an upward movement from violence, but that this violent movement be from its natural inclination is impossible. In like manner a man may be dragged by force: but it is contrary to the very notion of violence, that he be dragged of his own will.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex est actus voluntatis: unus quidem qui est ejus immediate, velut ab ipsa elicitus, scilicet velle; alius autem est actus voluntatis a voluntate imperatus, et mediante alia potentia exercitus, ut ambulare et loqui; qui a voluntate imperantur, exercentur autem mediante potentia motiva. Quantum igitur ad actus a voluntate imperatos, voluntas violentiam pati potest, in quantum per violentiam exteriora membra impediri possunt ne imperium voluntatis exequantur. Sed quantum ad ipsum proprium actum voluntatis, non potest ei violentia inferri. Et hujus est ratio, quia actus voluntatis nihil est aliud quam inclinatio quædam procedens ab interiori principio cognoscente, sicut appetitus naturalis est quædam inclinatio ab interiori principio et sine cognizione; quod autem est coactum vel violentum, est mistas, omissionem ab effectu distinguendo, et voluntarium ab imputabilitate, Cajetanus, Serra, Gonet et alii ad voluntarium, etiam absque imputabilitate, tam pro omissione quam pro effectu obligationem ponendi actum requiri tenent; Joannes vero a S.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.4.ad.1] God Who is more powerful than the human will, can move the will of man, according to Proverbs 21:1: \"The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it.\" But if this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against the will.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus, qui est potentior quam voluntas humana, potest voluntatem humanam movere, secundum illud Prov., xxi, 1: Cor regis in manu Dei est*, et quocumque voluerit, inclinabit illud. Sed si hoc esset per violentiam, jam non esset cum actu voluntatis, nec ipsa voluntas moveretur, sed aliquid contra voluntatem.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.4.ad.2] It is not always a violent movement, when a passive subject is moved by its active principle; but only when this is done against the interior inclination of the passive subject. Otherwise every alteration and generation of simply bodies would be unnatural and violent: whereas they are natural by reason of the natural interior aptitude of the matter or subject to such a disposition. In like manner when the will is moved, according to its own inclination, by the appetible object, this movement is not violent but voluntary.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non semper est motus violentus quando passivum immutatur a suo activo, sed quando hoc fit contra interiorem inclinationem passivi; alioquin omnes alterationes et generationes simplicium corporum essent innaturales et violentæ; sunt autem naturales propter naturalem aptitudinem interiorem materiæ vel subjecti ad talem dispositionem. Et similiter, quando voluntas movetur ab appetibili secundum propriam inclinationem, non est motus violentus, sed voluntarius.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.4.ad.3] That to which the will tends by sinning, although in reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, nevertheless is apprehended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some vicious habit.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod id in quod voluntas tendit peccando, etsi sit malum et contra rationalem naturam secundum rei veritatem, apprehenditur tamen ut bonum et conveniens naturæ, inquantum est conveniens homini secundum aliquam delectationem sensus, vel secundum aliquem habitum corruptum.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that violence does not cause involuntariness. For we speak of voluntariness and involuntariness in respect of the will. But violence cannot be done to the will, as shown above (Article 4). Therefore violence cannot cause involuntariness.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod violentia non causet involuntarium. Voluntarium enim et involuntarium secundum voluntatem dicuntur. Sed voluntati violentia inferri non potest, ut ostensum est. Ergo violentia involuntarium causare non potest.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.5.arg.2] Further, that which is done involuntarily is done with grief, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 5) say. But sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being grieved thereby. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, id quod est involuntarium, est cum tristitia, ut Damascenus, lib. II Orth. fid., cap. xxiv, col. 954, t. 1, et Philosophus, III Ethic., cap. 1, dicunt. Sed aliquando patitur aliquis violentiam, nec tamen inde tristatur. Ergo violentia non causat involuntarium.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.5.arg.3] Further, what is from the will cannot be involuntary. But some violent actions proceed from the will: for instance, when a man with a heavy body goes upwards; or when a man contorts his limbs in a way contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, id quod est a voluntate, non potest esse involuntarium. Sed aliqua violenta sunt a voluntate, sicut cum aliquis cum corpore gravi sursum ascendit, et sicut cum aliquis inflectit membra contra naturalem eorum flexibilitatem. Ergo violentia non causat involuntarium.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.5.sc] The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) say that \"things done under compulsion are involuntary.\"
\n[I-II.q.6.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus et Damascenus dicunt, quod « aliquid est involuntarium per violentiam.»
\n[I-II.q.6.a.5.co] Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and the natural have this in common, that both are from an intrinsic principle; whereas violence is from an extrinsic principle. And for this reason, just as in things devoid of knowledge, violence effects something against nature: so in things endowed with knowledge, it effects something against the will. Now that which is against nature is said to be \"unnatural\"; and in like manner that which is against the will is said to be \"involuntary.\" Therefore violence causes involuntariness.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod violentia directe opponitur voluntario, sicut etiam et naturali. Commune est enim voluntario et naturali quod utrumque sit a principio intrinseco; violentum autem est a principio extrinseco. Et propter hoc, sicut in rebus quæ cognitione carent, violentia aliquid facit esse contra naturam, ita in rebus cognoscentibus violentia facit aliquid esse contra voluntatem; quod autem est contra naturam dicitur esse innaturale; et similiter quod est contra voluntatem dicitur esse involuntarium. Unde violentia involuntarium causat.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.5.ad.1] The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Now it has been said (04) that not only the act, which proceeds immediately from the will, is called voluntary, but also the act commanded by the will. Consequently, as to the act which proceeds immediately from the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as stated above (Article 4): wherefore violence cannot make that act involuntary. But as to the commanded act, the will can suffer violence: and consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod involuntarium voluntario opponitur. Dictum est autem supra, quod voluntarium dicitur non solum actus qui est immediate ipsius voluntatis, sed etiam actus a voluntate imperatus. Quantum igitur ad actum qui est immediate ipsius voluntatis, ut supra dictum est, violentia voluntati inferri non potest; unde Violentia absoluta, juxta theologos communiter, causat involuntarium simpliciter in actibus voluntatis imperatis, et etiam, juxta Scotum, Scotistas et alios, in cessatione voluntatis ab actibus propriis. talem actum violentia involuntarium facere non potest; sed quantum ad actum imperatum voluntas potest pati violentiam, et quantum ad hunc actum violentia involuntarium facit.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.5.ad.2] As that is said to be natural, which is according to the inclination of nature; so that is said to be voluntary, which is according to the inclination of the will. Now a thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, because it is from nature as from an active principle: thus it is natural for fire to produce heat. Secondly, according to a passive principle; because, to wit, there is in nature an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic principle: thus the movement of the heavens is said to be natural, by reason of the natural aptitude in a heavenly body to receive such movement; although the cause of that movement is a voluntary agent. In like manner an act is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, in regard to action, for instance, when one wishes to be passive to another. Hence when action is brought to bear on something, by an extrinsic agent, as long as the will to suffer that action remains in the passive subject, there is not violence simply: for although the patient does nothing by way of action, he does something by being willing to suffer. Consequently this cannot be called involuntary.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut naturale dicitur quod est secundum inclinationem naturæ, ita voluntarium dicitur quod est secundum inclinationem voluntatis. Dicitur autem aliquid naturale dupliciter: uno modo quia est a natura sicut a principio activo, sicut calefacere est naturale igni; alio modo secundum principium passivum, quia scilicet est innata inclinatio ad recipiendum actionem ab extrinseco; sicut motus cæli dicitur esse naturalis propter aptitudinem naturalem cælestis corporis ad talem motum, licet movens sit voluntarium. Et similiter voluntarium potest aliquid dici dupliciter: uno modo secundum actionem, puta cum aliquis vult aliquid agere; alio modo secundum passionem, scilicet cum aliquis vult pati ab alio. Unde cum actio infertur ab aliquo exteriori, manente in eo qui patitur voluntate patiendi, non est simpliciter violentum; quia licet ille qui patitur non conferat agendo, confert tamen volendo pati: unde non potest dici involuntarium.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.5.ad.3] As the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4) the movement of an animal, whereby at times an animal is moved against the natural inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, is nevertheless somewhat natural to the animal, to which it is natural to be moved according to its appetite. Accordingly this is violent, not simply but in a certain respect. The same remark applies in the case of one who contorts his limbs in a way that is contrary to their natural disposition. For this is violent in a certain respect, i.e. as to that particular limb; but not simply, i.e. as to the man himself.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in VIII Physic., text. 27, motus animalis, quo interdum movetur animal contra naturalem inclinationem corporis, etsi non sit naturalis corpori, est tamen quodammodo naturalis animali, cui naturale est quod secundum appetitum moveatur; et ideo hoc non est violentum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et similiter est dicendum, cum aliquis inflectit membra contra naturalem dispositionem: hoc enim est violentum secundum quid, scilicet quantum ad membrum particulare, non tamen simpliciter quantum ad ipsum hominem.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that fear causes involuntariness simply. For just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will at the time, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will. But violence causes involuntariness simply. Therefore fear too causes involuntariness simply.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod metus causet involuntarium simpliciter. Sicut enim violentia est respectu ejus quod contrariatur præsentialiter voluntati, ita metus est respectu futuri mali, quod repugnat voluntati. Sed violentia causat involuntarium simpliciter. Ergo et metus involuntarium simpliciter causat.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.6.arg.2] Further, that which is such of itself, remains such, whatever be added to it: thus what is hot of itself, as long as it remains, is still hot, whatever be added to it. But that which is done through fear, is involuntary in itself. Therefore, even with the addition of fear, it is involuntary.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quod est secundum se tale, quolibet addito remanet tale; sicut quod secundum se est calidum, cuicumque conjungatur, nihilominus est calidum ipso manente. Sed illud quod per metum agitur, secundum se est involuntarium. Ergo etiam adveniente metu est involuntarium.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.6.arg.3] Further, that which is such, subject to a condition, is such in a certain respect; whereas what is such, without any condition, is such simply: thus what is necessary, subject to a condition, is necessary in some respect: but what is necessary absolutely, is necessary simply. But that which is done through fear, is absolutely involuntary; and is not voluntary, save under a condition, namely, in order that the evil feared may be avoided. Therefore that which is done through fear, is involuntary simply.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quod sub conditione tale est, secundum quid est tale; quod autem absque conditione est tale, simpliciter est tale; sicut quod est necessarium ex conditione, est necessarium secundum quid; quod autem est necessarium absolute, est necessarium simpliciter. Sed id quod per metum agitur, est involuntarium absolute; non est autem voluntarium, nisi sub conditione, scilicet ut vitetur malum quod timetur. Ergo quod per metum agitur est simpliciter involuntarium.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.6.sc] Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that such things as are done through fear are \"voluntary rather than involuntary.\"
\n[I-II.q.6.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyss., dicit lib. De nat. hom., c. xxx, et etiam Philosophus, lib. III Eth., c. 1, non procul a princ., quod « hujusmodi quæ per metum aguntur, sunt magis voluntaria quam involuntaria. »
\n[I-II.q.6.a.6.co] As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such things are done through fear \"are of a mixed character,\" being partly voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear, considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared.
\nBut if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply, according as it is in act; but according as it is only in apprehension, it is not simply, but in a certain respect. Now that which is done through fear, is in act in so far as it is done. For, since acts are concerned with singulars; and the singular, as such, is here and now; that which is done is in act, in so far as it is here and now and under other individuating circumstances. And that which is done through fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and now, that is to say, in so far as, under the circumstances, it hinders a greater evil which was feared; thus the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm, through fear of the danger: wherefore it is clear that it is voluntary simply. And hence it is that what is done out of fear is essentially voluntary, because its principle is within. But if we consider what is done through fear, as outside this particular case, and inasmuch as it is repugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration of the mind. And consequently what is done through fear is involuntary, considered in that respect, that is to say, outside the actual circumstances of the case.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in III Eth., ibid., et idem dicit Gregorius Nyss. in lib. suo De hom., ibid.: « Hujusmodi quæ per metum aguntur, mixta sunt ex voluntario et involuntario. » Id enim quod per metum agitur, in se consideratum non est voluntarium, sed fit voluntarium in casu, scilicet ad vitandum malum quod timetur. Sed si quis recte consideret, magis sunt hujusmodi voluntaria quam involuntaria; sunt enim voluntaria simpliciter, involuntaria autem secundum quid. Unumquodque In Parm. et in edit. supprimitur: « unde talem actum violentia involuntarium facere non potest. » In Seu potius Nemesius, col. 719. Nemesius, ut supra. enim simpliciter esse dicitur, secundum quod est in actu; secundum autem quod est in sola apprehensione, non est simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Hoc autem quod per metum agitur secundum hoc est in actu, secundum quod fit. Cum enim actus in singularibus sint, singulare autem, inquantum hujusmodi, est hic et nunc; secundum hoc id quod fit est in actu, secundum quod est hic et nunc, et sub aliis conditionibus individualibus. Sic autem hoc quod fit per metum est voluntarium, inquantum scilicet est hic et nunc, prout scilicet in hoc casu est impedimentum majoris mali quod timebatur; sicut projectio mercium in mare fit voluntarium tempore tempestatis propter timorem periculi; unde manifestum est quod simpliciter voluntarium est, unde et competit ei ratio voluntarii, quia principium ejus est intra. Sed quod accipiatur id quod per metum fit, ut extra hunc casum existens, prout repugnat voluntati, hoc non est nisi secundum considerationem tantum; et ideo est involuntarium secundum quid, id est prout consideratur extra hunc casum existens.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.6.ad.1] Things done through fear and compulsion differ not only according to present and future time, but also in this, that the will does not consent, but is moved entirely counter to that which is done through compulsion: whereas what is done through fear, becomes voluntary, because the will is moved towards it, albeit not for its own sake, but on account of something else, that is, in order to avoid an evil which is feared. For the conditions of a voluntary act are satisfied, if it be done on account of something else voluntary: since the voluntary is not only what we wish, for its own sake, as an end, but also what we wish for the sake of something else, as an end. It is clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion, the will does nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done through fear, the will does something. Accordingly, as Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] says, in order to exclude things done through fear, a violent action is defined as not only one, \"the principal whereof is from without,\" but with the addition, \"in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all\"; because the will of him that is in fear, does concur somewhat in that which he does through fear.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ea quæ aguntur per metum et per vim, non solum differunt secundum præsens et futurum, sed etiam secundum hoc quod in eo quod agitur per vim voluntas non consentit, sed omnino est contra motum voluntatis; sed id quod per metum agitur, fit voluntarium, ideo quia motus voluntatis fertur in id, licet non propter seipsum, sed propter aliud, scilicet ad repellendum malum quod timetur. Sufficit enim ad rationem voluntarii quod sit propter aliud voluntarium; voluntarium enim est non solum quod propter seipsum volumus ut finem, sed etiam quod propter aliud volumus ut propter finem. Patet ergo, quod in eo quod per vim agitur, voluntas interior nihil agit; sed in eo quod per metum agitur, voluntas aliquid agit. Et ideo, ut Gregorius Nyss. dicit, loc. sup. cit., ad excludendum ea quæ per metum aguntur, in definitione violenti non solum dicitur quod «violentum est cujus principium est extra,» sed additur, « nihil conferente vim passo; » quia ad id quod agitur per metum, voluntas timentis aliquid confert.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.6.ad.2] Things that are such absolutely, remain such, whatever be added to them; for instance, a cold thing, or a white thing: but things that are such relatively, vary according as they are compared with different things. For what is big in comparison with one thing, is small in comparison with another. Now a thing is said to be voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it were absolutely; but also for the sake of something else, as it were relatively. Accordingly, nothing prevents a thing which was not voluntary in comparison with one thing, from becoming voluntary when compared with another.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ea quæ absolute dicuntur, quolibet addito, remanent talia, sicut calidum et album; sed ea quæ relative dicuntur, variantur secundum comparationem ad diversa; quod enim est magnum comparatum huic, est parvum comparatum alteri. Voluntarium autem dicitur aliquid, non solum propter se quasi absolute, sed etiam propter aliud quasi relative. Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquid quod de se non esset voluntarium, alteri comparatum fieri voluntarium per comparationem ad aliud.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.6.ad.3] That which is done through fear, is voluntary without any condition, that is to say, according as it is actually done: but it is involuntary, under a certain condition, that is to say, if such a fear were not threatening. Consequently, this argument proves rather the opposite.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illud quod per metum agitur, absque conditione est voluntarium, id est, secundum quod actu agitur; sed involuntarium est sub conditione, id est, si talis metus non immineret. Unde secundum illam rationem magis potest concludi oppositum.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that concupiscence causes involuntariness. For just as fear is a passion, so is concupiscence. But fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so too.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod concupiscentia causet involuntarium. Sicut enim metus est quædam passio, ita et concupiscentia. Sed metus causat quodam modo involuntarium. Ergo etiam concupiscentia.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.7.arg.2] Further, just as the timid man through fear acts counter to that which he proposed, so does the incontinent, through concupiscence. But fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so also.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut per timorem timidus agit contra id quod proponebat, ita incontinens propter concupiscentiam. Sed timor aliquo modo causat involuntarium. Ergo et concupiscentia.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.7.arg.3] Further, knowledge is necessary for voluntariness. But concupiscence impairs knowledge; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that \"delight,\" or the lust of pleasure, \"destroys the judgment of prudence.\" Therefore concupiscence causes involuntariness.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ad voluntarium requiritur cognitio. Sed concupiscentia corrumpit cognitionem; dicit enim Philosophus in VI Ethicor., cap. v, quod delectatio, sive concupiscentia delectationis corrumpit aestimationem prudentiæ. Ergo concupiscentia causat involuntarium.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.7.sc] Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24): \"The involuntary act deserves mercy or indulgence, and is done with regret.\" But neither of these can be said of that which is done out of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence does not cause involuntariness.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, lib. II Fid. orth., cap. xxiv, col. 954, t. 1: « Involuntarium est misericordia vel indulgentia dignum et cum tristitia agitur. » Sed neutrum horum competit ei quod per concupiscentiam agitur. Ergo concupiscentia non causat involuntarium.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.7.co] Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but on the contrary makes something to be voluntary. For a thing is said to be voluntary, from the fact that the will is moved to it. Now concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence. Therefore the effect of concupiscence is to make something to be voluntary rather than involuntary.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod concupiscentia non causat involuntarium, sed magis facit aliquid voluntarium. Dicitur enim aliquid voluntarium ex eo quod voluntas in illud fertur; per concupiscentiam autem voluntas inclinatur ad volendum id quod concupisci-tur, et ideo concupiscentia magis facit ad hoc quod aliquid sit voluntarium, quam quod sit involuntarium.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.7.ad.1] Fear regards evil, but concupiscence regards good. Now evil of itself is counter to the will, whereas good harmonizes with the will. Therefore fear has a greater tendency than concupiscence to cause involuntariness.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod timor est de malo, concupiscentia autem respicit bonum; malum autem secundum se coninvoluntarius involuntario opposito voluntario lubenti: ita Scotus, Tartaretus, Lichetus et alii. Sed nihil aliud dicunt nisi quod actus ille est voluntarius simpliciter voluntario libero, et involuntarius secundum quid involuntario quod opponitur voluntario libero. — Similiter Scotistæ, de voluntario lubenti et de involuntario ipsimet opposito semper loquentes, docent quod ea quæ fiunt ex metu non sunt semper involuntaria simpliciter, imo nec secundum quid, quia, ut addunt, possunt aliqua quæ ex metu fiunt esse secundum se bona, et consequenter esse bona secundum inclinationem voluntatis. Scotistæ nihilominus concedunt quod, per se loquendo, quæ fiunt ex metu sunt simpliciter voluntaria in ratione liberi. Dicunt « per se loquendo, » quia, juxta illos, si malum imminens trariatur voluntati, sed bonum est voluntati consonum. Unde magis se habet timor ad causandum involuntarium quam concupiscentia.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.7.ad.2] He who acts from fear retains the repugnance of the will to that which he does, considered in itself. But he that acts from concupiscence, e.g. an incontinent man, does not retain his former will whereby he repudiated the object of his concupiscence; for his will is changed so that he desires that which previously he repudiated. Accordingly, that which is done out of fear is involuntary, to a certain extent, but that which is done from concupiscence is nowise involuntary. For the man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but not counter to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires now.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in eo qui per metum aliquid agit, manet repugnantia voluntatis ad id quod agitur secundum quod in se consideratur; sed in eo qui agit aliquid per concupiscentiam, sicut est incontinens, non manet prior voluntas, qua repudiabat illud quod concupiscitur; sed mutatur ad volendum id quod prius repudiabat. Et ideo quod per metum agitur, quodammodo est involuntarium; sed quod per concupiscentiam agitur, nullo modo. Nam incontinens concupiscentia agit contra id quod prius proponebat, non autem contra id quod nunc vult; sed timidus agit contra id quod etiam nunc secundum se vult.
\n[I-II.q.6.a.7.ad.3] If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether, as happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad, it would follow that concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And yet properly speaking it would not result in the act being involuntary, because in things bereft of reason, there is neither voluntary nor involuntary. But sometimes in those actions which are done from concupiscence, knowledge is not completely destroyed, because the power of knowing is not taken away entirely, but only the actual consideration in some particular possible act. Nevertheless, this itself is voluntary, according as by voluntary we mean that which is in the power of the will, for example \"not to act\" or \"not to will,\" and in like manner \"not to consider\"; for the will can resist the passion, as we shall state later on (10, 3; 77, 7).
\n[I-II.q.6.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod si concupiscentia totaliter cognitionem auferret, sicut contingit in illis qui propter concupiscentiam fiunt amentes, sequeretur quod concupiscentia voluntarium tolleret; nec tamen proprie esset ibi involuntarium, quia in his quæ usum rationis non habent, neque voluntarium est, neque involuntarium. Sed quandoque in his quæ per concupiscentiam aguntur, non totaliter tollitur cognitio, quia non tollitur potestas cognoscendi, sed solum consideratio actualis in particulari agibili; et tamen hoc ipsum est voluntarium, secundum quod voluntarium dicitur quod est in potestate voluntatis, ut non agere et non velle; similiter autem et non considerare: potest enim voluntas passioni resistere, ut infra dicetur.
\n