[I-II.q.7.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of a human act. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhetor. i) that a circumstance is that from \"which an orator adds authority and strength to his argument.\" But oratorical arguments are derived principally from things pertaining to the essence of a thing, such as the definition, the genus, the species, and the like, from which also Tully declares that an orator should draw his arguments. Therefore a circumstance is not an accident of a human act.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod circumstantia non sit accidens actus humani; dicit enim Tullius in Rhetoricis$^4$, quod « circumstantia est per quam argumenti auctoritatem et firmamentum adjungit oratio. » Sed oratio dat firmamentum argumentationi præcipue ab his quæ sunt de substantia rei$^2$, ut definitio, genus, species, et alia hujusmodi, a quibus etiam Tullius in Topicis ad Trebat., oratorem argumentari docet. Ergo circumstantia non est accidens humani actus.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.1.arg.2] Further, \"to be in\" is proper to an accident. But that which surrounds [circumstat] is rather out than in. Therefore the circumstances are not accidents of human acts.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, accidentis proprium est inesse. Quod autem circumstat, non inest, sed magis est extra. Ergo circumstantia non sunt accidentia humanorum actuum.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.1.arg.3] Further, an accident has no accident. But human acts themselves are accidents. Therefore the circumstances are not accidents of acts.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, accidentis non est accidens. $^1$ Quid simile Tullius I De inventione habet. $^2$ Ita cod. Alcan. Garcia, Nicolaï, et edit. Pat.; Sed ipsi humani actus sunt quædam accidentia. Non ergo circumstantiæ sunt accidentia actuum.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.1.sc] The particular conditions of any singular thing are called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) calls the circumstances particular things [ta kath' ekasta], i.e. the particular conditions of each act. Therefore the circumstances are individual accidents of human acts.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.1.sc] Sed contra, particulares conditiones cujuslibet rei singularis dicuntur accidentia individuantia ipsam. Sed Philosophus, in III Ethic., cap. 1, ante med., circumstantias nominat « particularia, » id est, particulares singulorum actuum conditiones. Ergo circumstantiæ sunt accidentia individualia humanorum actuum.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.1.co] Since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), \"words are the signs of what we understand,\" it must needs be that in naming things we follow the process of intellectual knowledge. Now our intellectual knowledge proceeds from the better known to the less known. Accordingly with us, names of more obvious things are transferred so as to signify things less obvious: and hence it is that, as stated in Metaph. x, 4, \"the notion of distance has been transferred from things that are apart locally, to all kinds of opposition\": and in like manner words that signify local movement are employed to designate all other movements, because bodies which are circumscribed by place, are best known to us. And hence it is that the word \"circumstance\" has passed from located things to human acts.
\nNow in things located, that is said to surround something, which is outside it, but touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly, whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances. Now what is outside a thing's substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called its accident. Wherefore the circumstances of human acts should be called their accidents.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quia « nomina, » secundum Philosophum, lib. I Perih., cap. 1, « sunt signa intellectuum, » necesse est quod secundum processum intellectivæ cognitionis sit etiam nominationis processus Procedit autem nostra cognitio intellectualis a notioribus ad minus nota: et ideo apud nos a notioribus nomina tranferuntur ad significandum res minus notas. Et inde est quod, sicut dicitur in X Metaphys., text. 13 et 14, ab his quæ sunt secundum locum, processit nomen distantiæ ad omnia contra-ria; et similiter nominibus pertinentibus ad motum localem utimur ad significandum alios motus, eo quod corpora, quæ loco circumscribuntur, sunt maxime nobis nota. Et inde est quod nomen circumstantiæ ab his quæ in loco sunt, derivatur ad actus humanos. Dicitur autem in localibus aliquid circumstare, quod est quidem extrinsecum a re, tamen attingit ipsam, vel appropriquat ei secundum locum. Et ideo quæcumque conditiones sunt extra substantiam actus, et tamen attingunt aliquo modo actum humanum, circumstantæ dicuntur. Quod autem est extra substantiam rei, ad rem ipsam pertinens, accidens ejus dicitur. Unde circumstantiæ actuum humanorum accidentia eorum dicendæ sunt.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.1.ad.1] The orator gives strength to his argument, in the first place, from the substance of the act; and secondly, from the circumstances of the act. Thus a man becomes indictable, first, through being guilty of murder; secondly, through having done it fraudulently, or from motives of greed or at a holy time or place, and so forth. And so in the passage quoted, it is said pointedly that the orator \"adds strength to his argument,\" as though this were something secondary.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod oratio quidem dat firmamentum argumentationi primo ex substantia actus, secundario vero ex his quæ circumstant actum; sicut primo accusabilis redditur aliquis ex hoc quod homicidium fecit, secundario vero ex hoc quod dolo fecit, vel propter lucrum, vel in tempore aut in loco sacro, aut aliquid aliud hujusmodi. Et ideo signanter dicit quod per circumstantiam oratio argumentationi firmamentum adjungit, quasi secundario.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.1.ad.2] A thing is said to be an accident of something in two ways. First, from being in that thing: thus, whiteness is said to be an accident of Socrates. Secondly, because it is together with that thing in the same subject: thus, whiteness is an accident of the art of music, inasmuch as they meet in the same subject, so as to touch one another, as it were. And in this sense circumstances are said to be the accidents of human acts.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur accidens alicujus dupliciter, ut patet edit. Rom.: « quæ sunt subjecta rei. » V Metaph., text. 16: uno modo quia inest ei, sicut album dicitur accidens Socratis; alio modo quia est simul cum eo in eodem subjecto, sicut dicitur quod album accidit musico, inquantum conveniunt et quodammodo se contingunt in uno subjecto. Et per hunc modum dicuntur circumstantiæ accidentia actuum.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.1.ad.3] As stated above (ad 2), an accident is said to be the accident of an accident, from the fact that they meet in the same subject. But this happens in two ways. First, in so far as two accidents are both related to the same subject, without any relation to one another; as whiteness and the art of music in Socrates. Secondly, when such accidents are related to one another; as when the subject receives one accident by means of the other; for instance, a body receives color by means of its surface. And thus also is one accident said to be in another; for we speak of color as being in the surface.
\nAccordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both these ways. For some circumstances that have a relation to acts, belong to the agent otherwise than through the act; as place and condition of person; whereas others belong to the agent by reason of the act, as the manner in which the act is done.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, accidens dicitur accidenti accidere propter convenientiam in subjecto. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter: uno modo secundum quod duo accidentia comparantur ad unum subjectum absque aliquo ordine, sicut album et musicum, ad Socratem; alio modo cum aliquo ordine, puta quia subjectum recipit unum accidens alio mediante, sicut corpus recipit colorem mediante superficie; et sic unum accidens dicitur etiam alteri inesse; dicimus enim colorem esse in superficie. Utroque autem modo circumstantiæ se habent ad actus; nam aliquæ circumstantiæ ordinatæ ad actum pertinent ad agentem non mediante actu, puta locus et conditio personæ: aliquæ vero mediante ipso actu, sicut modus agendi.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that theologians should not take note of the circumstances of human acts. Because theologians do not consider human acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil. But it seems that circumstances cannot give quality to human acts; for a thing is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which is outside it; but by that which is in it. Therefore theologians should not take note of the circumstances of acts.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod circumstantiæ humanorum actuum non sint considerandæ a theologo. Non enim considerantur a theologo actus humani, nisi secundum quod sunt aliquales, id est, boni vel mali. Sed circumstantiæ non videntur posse facere actus aliquales: quia nihil qualificatur, formaliter loquendo, ab eo quod est extra ipsum, sed ab eo quod in ipso est. Ergo circumstantiæ actuum non sunt a theologo considerandæ.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.2.arg.2] Further, circumstances are the accidents of acts. But one thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents; hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 2) that \"no art or science considers accidental being, except only the art of sophistry.\" Therefore the theologian has not to consider circumstances.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, circumstantiæ sunt accidentia actuum. Sed uni infinita accidunt; et ideo, ut dicitur in VI Metaph., text. 4, «nulla ars vel scientia est circa ens per accidens, nisi sola sophistica.» Ergo theologus non habet considerare circumstantias humanorum actuum.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.2.arg.3] Further, the consideration of circumstances belongs to the orator. But oratory is not a part of theology. Therefore it is not a theologian's business to consider circumstances.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, circumstantiarum consideratio pertinet ad rhetorem. Rhetorica autem non est pars theologiæ. Ergo consideratio circumstantiarum non pertinet ad theologum.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.2.sc] Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.]. But involuntariness excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the theologian. Therefore circumstances also should be considered by the theologian.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.2.sc] Sed contra, ignorantia circumstantiarum causat involuntarium, ut Damascenus, lib. II Orthod. fid., cap. xxiv, col. 954, t. 1, et Gregorius Nyss. 4, lib. De natura hom., c. xxxi, dicunt. Sed involuntarium excusat a culpa, cujus consideratio pertinet ad theologum. Ergo et consideratio circumstantiarum ad theologum pertinet.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.2.co] Circumstances come under the consideration of the theologian, for a threefold reason. First, because the theologian considers human acts, inasmuch as man is thereby directed to Happiness. Now, everything that is directed to an end should be proportionate to that end. But acts are made proportionate to an end by means of a certain commensurateness, which results from the due circumstances. Hence the theologian has to consider the circumstances. Secondly, because the theologian considers human acts according as they are found to be good or evil, better or worse: and this diversity depends on circumstances, as we shall see further on (18, A10,11; 73, 7). Thirdly, because the theologian considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be voluntary or involuntary, according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances, as stated above (Question 6, Article 8). Therefore the theologian has to consider circumstances.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circumstantiæ pertinent ad considerationem theologi triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia theologus considerat actus humanos secundum quod per eos homo ad beatitudinem ordinatur; omne autem quod ordinatur ad finem, cportet esse proportionatum fini; actus autem proportionantur fini secundum commensurationem quamdam, quæ fit per debitas circumstantias. Unde consideratio circumstantiarum ad theologum pertinet. Secundo, quia theologus considerat actus humanos secundum quod in eis invenitur bonum et malum, melius et pejus; et hoc diversificatur secundum circumstantias, ut infra patebit. Tertio, quia theologus considerat actus humanos secundum quod sunt meritorii vel demeritorii, quod convenit actibus humanis; ad quod requiritur quod sint voluntarii. Actus autem humanus judicatur voluntarius vel involuntarius secundum cognitionem vel ignorantiam circumstantiarum, ut dictum est. Et ideo consideratio circumstantiarum pertinet ad theologum.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.2.ad.1] Good directed to the end is said to be useful; and this implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that \"the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful.\" Now, in the genus \"relation\" a thing is denominated not only according to that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the expressions \"right\" and \"left,\" \"equal\" and \"unequal,\" and such like. Accordingly, since the goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders their being called good or bad according to their proportion to extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod bonum ordinatum ad finem dicitur utile, quod importat relationem quamdam. Unde Philosophus dicit in I Ethic., cap. vi, circa princ., quod in «ad aliquid» bonum est utile. In his autem quæ «ad aliquid» dicuntur, denominatur aliquid non solum ab eo quod inest, sed etiam ab eo quod extrinsecus adjacet, ut patet in dextro et sinistro, æquali et inæquali, et similibus. Et ideo cum bonitas actuum sit, inquantum sunt utiles ad finem, nihil prohibet eos bonos vel malos dici secundum proportionem ad aliqua quæ exterius adjacent.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.2.ad.2] Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such like accidents are not what we call circumstances; because circumstances although, as stated above (Article 1), they are extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the consideration of art.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod accidentia quæ omnino per accidens se habent, relinquuntur ab omni arte propter eorum incertitudinem et infinitatem. Sed talia accidentia non habent rationem circumstantiæ; quia ut dictum est, sic circumstantiæ sunt extra actum, quod tamen actum aliquo modo contingunt, ordinatæ ad ipsum. Accidentia autem per se cadunt sub arte.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.2.ad.3] The consideration of circumstances belongs to the moralist, the politician, and the orator. To the moralist, in so far as with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue in human acts and passions. To the politician and to the orator, in so far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of excuse or indictment. In different ways, however: because where the orator persuades, the politician judges. To the theologian this consideration belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since to him all the other arts are subservient: for he has to consider virtuous and vicious acts, just as the moralist does; and with the orator and politician he considers acts according as they are deserving of reward or punishment.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod consideratio circumstantiarum pertinet ad moralem et politicum, et ad rhetorem. Ad moralem qui dem, prout secundum eas inventur vel prætermittitur medium virtutis in humanis actibus et passionibus: ad politicum autem et rhetorem, secundum quod ex circumstantiis actus redduntur laudabiles vel vituperabiles, excusabiles vel accusabiles. Diversimode tamen; nam quod rhetor persuadet, politicus dijudicat; ad theologum autem, cui omnes aliæ artes deserviunt, pertinet omnibus modis prædictis. Nam ipse habet considerationes de actibus virtuosis et vitiosis cum morali: et considerat actus secundum quod merentur poenam vel præmium cum rhetore et politico.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the circumstances are not properly set forth in Ethic. iii, 1. For a circumstance of an act is described as something outside the act. Now time and place answer to this description. Therefore there are only two circumstances, to wit, \"when\" and \"where.\"
\n[I-II.q.7.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inconvenienter circumstantiæ enumerentur in III Ethic., cap. 1, a med. Circumstantia enim actus dicitur quod exterius se habet ad actum. Hujusmodi autem sunt tempus et locus. Ergo solæ duæ sunt circumstantiæ, scilicet quando et ubi.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.3.arg.2] Further, we judge from the circumstances whether a thing is well or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore all the circumstances are included under one, which is the \"mode of acting.\"
\n[I-II.q.7.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ex circumstantiis accipitur quid bene vel male fiat. Sed hoc pertinet ad modum actus. Ergo omnes circumstantiæ includuntur sub una, quæ est modus agendi.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.3.arg.3] Further, circumstances are not part of the substance of an act. But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance. Therefore no circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act itself. Accordingly, neither \"who,\" nor \"why,\" nor \"about what,\" are circumstances: since \"who\" refers to the efficient cause, \"why\" to the final cause, and \"about what\" to the material cause.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, circumstantiæ non sunt de substantia actus. Sed ad substantiam actus pertinere videntur causæ ipsius actus. Ergo nulla circumstantia debet sumi ex causa ipsius actus. Sic ergo neque quis, neque propter quid, neque circa quid, sunt circumstantiæ; nam quis pertinet ad causam efficientem, propter quid ad finalem, circa quid ad materialem.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.3.sc] is the authority of the Philosopher in Ethic. iii, 1.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.3.sc] Sed contra est auctoritas Philosophi in III Ethic., loc. sup. cit.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.3.co] Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse: \"Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando--
\nWho, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when.\" For in acts we must take note of \"who\" did it, \"by what aids\" or \"instruments\" he did it, \"what\" he did, \"where\" he did it, \"why\" he did it, \"how\" and \"when\" he did it. But Aristotle in Ethic. iii, 1 adds yet another, to wit, \"about what,\" which Tully includes in the circumstance \"what.\"
\nThe reason of this enumeration may be set down as follows. For a circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the act, and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways: first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as it touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the effect. It touches the act itself, either by way of measure, as \"time\" and \"place\"; or by qualifying the act as the \"mode of acting.\" It touches the effect when we consider \"what\" is done. It touches the cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance \"why\"; as to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance \"about what\"; as to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance \"who\"; and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the circumstance \"by what aids.\"
\n[I-II.q.7.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Tullius, in sua Rhetorica, assignat septem circumstantias, quæ hoc versu continentur: « Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, [quando. » Considerandum est enim in actibus, « quis » fecit, « quibus auxiliis », vel instrumentis fecerit, « quid » fecerit, « ubi » fecerit, « cur » fecerit, « quomodo » fecerit, et « quando » fecerit. Sed Aristoteles in III Ethic., loc. cit., addit aliam, scilicet « circa quid, » quae a Tullio comprehenditur sub « quid. » Et ratio hujus annumerationis sic accipi potest: nam circumstantia dicitur quasi extra substantiam actus existens, ita tamen quod aliquo modo attingit ipsum. Contingit autem hoc fieri tripliciter: uno modo, in quantum attingit ipsum actum; alio modo, in quantum attingit causam actus; tertio modo, in quantum attingit effectum. Ipsum autem actum attingit vel per modum mensuræ, sicut tempus et locus; vel per modum qualitatis actus, sicut modus agendi. Ex parte autem effectus, ut cum consideratur « quid » aliquis fecerit. Ex parte vero causæ actus, quantum ad causam finalem, accipitur « propter quid; » ex parte autem causæ materialis, sive objecti accipitur « circa quid; » ex parte vero causæ agentis principalis accipitur « quis » egerit; ex parte vero causæ agentis instrumentalis accipitur « quibus auxiliis. »
\n[I-II.q.7.a.3.ad.1] Time and place surround [circumstant] the act by way of measure; but the others surround the act by touching it in any other way, while they are extrinsic to the substance of the act.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod tempus et locus circumstant actum per modum mensuræ; sed alia circumstant actum, inquantum attingunt ipsum quocumque alio modo extra substantiam ejus existentia.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.3.ad.2] This mode \"well\" or \"ill\" is not a circumstance, but results from all the circumstances. But the mode which refers to a quality of the act is a special circumstance; for instance, that a man walk fast or slowly; that he strike hard or gently, and so forth.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod iste modus qui est « bene » vel « male, » non ponitur circumstantia, sed consequens ad omnes circumstantias. Sed specialis circumstantia ponitur modus qui pertinet ad qualitatem actus; puta quod aliquis ambulet velociter vel tarde; et quod aliquis percutiat fortiter vel remisse; et sic de aliis. Ita emendat Garcia ex Conrado, quem sequuntur editi passim. Cod. Alcan. et edit. Rom.: « ex substantia. »
\n[I-II.q.7.a.3.ad.3] A condition of the cause, on which the substance of the act depends, is not a circumstance; it must be an additional condition. Thus, in regard to the object, it is not a circumstance of theft that the object is another's property, for this belongs to the substance of the act; but that it be great or small. And the same applies to the other circumstances which are considered in reference to the other causes. For the end that specifies the act is not a circumstance, but some additional end. Thus, that a valiant man act \"valiantly for the sake of\" the good of the virtue or fortitude, is not a circumstance; but if he act valiantly for the sake of the delivery of the state, or of Christendom, or some such purpose. The same is to be said with regard to the circumstance \"what\"; for that a man by pouring water on someone should happen to wash him, is not a circumstance of the washing; but that in doing so he give him a chill, or scald him; heal him or harm him, these are circumstances.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illa conditio causæ, ex qua substantia actus dependet, non dicitur circumstantia, sed aliqua conditio adjuncta; sicut in objecto non dicitur circumstantia furti quod sit alienum; hoc enim pertinet ad substantiam furti; sed quod sit magnum vel parvum; et similiter est de aliis circumstantiis, quæ accipiuntur ex parte aliarum causarum. Non enim finis, qui dat speciem actus, est circumstantia, sed aliquis finis adjunctus; sicut quod fortis fortiter agat propter bonum fortitudinis, non est circumstantia; sed si fortiter agat propter liberationem civitatis, vel populi christiani vel aliquid hujusmodi. Similiter etiam ex parte ejus quod est quid; nam quod aliquis perfundens aliquem aqua, abluat ipsum, non est circumstantia ablutionis; sed quod abluendo infrigidet, vel calefaciat, et sanet, vel noceat, hoc est circumstantia.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that these are not the most important circumstances, namely, \"why\" and those \"in which the act is, [hen ois e praxis]\" as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. For those in which the act is seem to be place and time: and these do not seem to be the most important of the circumstances, since, of them all, they are the most extrinsic to the act. Therefore those things in which the act is are not the most important circumstances.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sint principales circumstantiæ « propter quid » et « ea in quibus est operatio, » ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. 1, a med. Ea enim in quibus est operatio, videntur esse locus et tempus; quæ non videntur esse principalia inter circumstantias, cum sint maxime extrinseca ab actu. Ea ergo in quibus est operatio, non sunt principalis simæ circumstantiarum.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.4.arg.2] Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to it. Therefore it is not the most important circumstance.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, finis est extrinsecus rei. Non ergo videtur esse principalissima circumstantiarum.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.4.arg.3] Further, that which holds the foremost place in regard to each thing, is its cause and its form. But the cause of an act is the person that does it; while the form of an act is the manner in which it is done. Therefore these two circumstances seem to be of the greatest importance.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, principalissimum in unoquoque est causa ejus, et forma ipsius. Sed causa ipsius actus est persona agens; forma autem actus est modus ipsius. Ergo istæ duæ circumstantiæ videntur esse principalissima.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.4.sc] Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.] says that \"the most important circumstances\" are \"why it is done\" and \"what is done.\"
\n[I-II.q.7.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyss., lib. De nat. hom., cap. xxxi, dicit quod princi- In Parm. et Patav.: « propter Christum. » Sed cod., edit. Rom. et Nic.: « populi christiani. » Ita cod. Alcan. et Tarrac. cum editis passim; edit. Rom. cum aliis: « intelligitur etiam. »
\n[I-II.q.7.a.4.co] As stated above (Question 1, Article 1), acts are properly called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Now, the motive and object of the will is the end. Therefore that circumstance is the most important of all which touches the act on the part of the end, viz. the circumstance \"why\": and the second in importance, is that which touches the very substance of the act, viz. the circumstance \"what he did.\" As to the other circumstances, they are more or less important, according as they more or less approach to these.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod actus proprie dicuntur humani, sicut supra dictum est, prout sunt voluntarii. Voluntatis autem motivum et objectum est finis. Et ideo principalissima est omnium circumstantiarum illa quæ attingit actum ex parte finis; scilicet « cujus gratia; » secundaria vero quæ attingit ipsam substantiam actus; id est, « quid fecit. » Aliæ vero circumstantiæ sunt magis vel minus principales, secundum quod magis vel minus ad has appropriant.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.4.ad.1] By those things \"in which the act is\" the Philosopher does not mean time and place, but those circumstances that are affixed to the act itself. Wherefore Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.], as though he were explaining the dictum of the Philosopher, instead of the latter's term--\"in which the act is\"--said, \"what is done.\"
\n[I-II.q.7.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod per ea in quibus est operatio, Philosophus non intelligit tempus et locum, sed ea quæ adjunguntur ipsi actui. Unde Gregorius Nyss., loc. sup. cit., quasi exponens dictum Philosophi, loco ejus quod Philosophus dixit, « in quibus est operatio, » dicit, « quid agitur. » Ad secundum dicendum, quod finis, etsi non sit de substantia actus, est tamen causa actus principalissima, inquantum movet agentem ad agendum. Unde et maxime actus moralis speciem habet ex fine.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.4.ad.2] Although the end is not part of the substance of the act, yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it moves the agent to act. Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by the end.
\n[I-II.q.7.a.4.ad.3] The person that does the act is the cause of that act, inasmuch as he is moved thereto by the end; and it is chiefly in this respect that he is directed to the act; while other conditions of the person have not such an important relation to the act. As to the mode, it is not the substantial form of the act, for in an act the substantial form depends on the object and term or end; but it is, as it were, a certain accidental quality of the act.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.7.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod persona agens causa est actus, secundum quod movetur a fine; et secundum hoc principaliter ordinatur ad actum; aliæ vero conditiones personæ non ita principaliter ordinantur ad actum. Modus etiam non est substantialis forma actus, hæc enim attenditur in actu secundum objectum, vel terminum et finem, sed est quasi quædam qualitas accidentalis.
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