[I-II.q.14.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that counsel is not an inquiry. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is \"an act of the appetite.\" But inquiry is not an act of the appetite. Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod consilium non sit inquisitio. Dicit enim Damascenus, lib. II Orth. fid., c. xxii, col. 946, t. 1, quod « consilium est appetitus. » Sed ad appetitum non pertinet inquirere. Ergo consilium non est inquisitio.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.1.arg.2] Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect: for which reason it is not found in God, Whose knowledge is not discursive, as we have shown in the I, 14, 7. But counsel is ascribed to God: for it is written (Ephesians 1:11) that \"He worketh all things according to the counsel of His will.\" Therefore counsel is not inquiry.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, inquirere intellectus discurrentis est, et sic Deo non convenit, cujus cognitio non est discursiva, ut in primo habitum est. Sed consilium Deo attribuitur; dicitur enim ad Eph., i, 11, quod operatur Id est, non ad id faciendum necessitatur quod ex electione facit, ut et alibi passim docet S. Thomas, et præsertim q. vi, De malo, art. unico, qui inscribitur « De humana electione. » Quo mire convicitur hæresis janseniana. Parm.; in margine tamen unius leguntur addita verba quæ Parm habet: « Quod autem possibile sit non eligere, vel eligere. » — In omnibus cod. legitur infra hæc verba quæ in Parm. et in edit. desunt: « et agere hoc aut illud. » Theologi in hac quæstione scinduntur: omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suæ. Ergo consilium non est inquisitio.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.1.arg.3] Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters. But counsel is given in matters that are certainly good; thus the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 7:25): \"Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel.\" Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, inquisitio est de rebus dubiis. Sed consilium datur de his quæ sunt bona certa, secundum illud Apostoli, I ad Cor., vii, 25: De virginibus autem præceptum Domini non habeo, consilium autem do. Ergo consilium non est inquisitio.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.1.sc] Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says: \"Every counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a counsel.\"
\n[I-II.q.14.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyss., lib. De nat. hom., cap. xxxiv, dicit: « Omne quidem consilium quæstio est, non autem omnis quæstio consilium. »
\n[I-II.q.14.a.1.co] Choice, as stated above (13, 1, ad 2; 3), follows the judgment of the reason about what is to be done. Now there is much uncertainty in things that have to be done; because actions are concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of their vicissitude, are uncertain. Now in things doubtful and uncertain the reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous inquiry: wherefore the reason must of necessity institute an inquiry before deciding on the objects of choice; and this inquiry is called counsel. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is the \"desire of what has been already counselled.\"
\n[I-II.q.14.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod electio, sicut dictum est, consequitur judicium rationis de rebus agendis. In rebus autem agendis multa incertitudo inventur, quia actiones sunt circa singularia contingentia, quæ propter sui variabilitatem incerta sunt. In rebus autem dubiis et incertis ratio non profert judicium absque inquisitione præcedente: et ideo necessaria est inquisitio rationis ante judicium de eligendis. Et hæc inquisitio « consilium » vocatur; propter quod Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., cap. iii, circa fin., quod « electio est appetitus præ-consiliati. »
\n[I-II.q.14.a.1.ad.1] When the acts of two powers are ordained to one another, in each of them there is something belonging to the other power: consequently each act can be denominated from either power. Now it is evident that the act of the reason giving direction as to the means, and the act of the will tending to these means according to the reason's direction, are ordained to one another. Consequently there is to be found something of the reason, viz. order, in that act of the will, which is choice: and in counsel, which is an act of reason, something of the will--both as matter (since counsel is of what man wills to do)--and as motive (because it is from willing the end, that man is moved to take counsel in regard to the means). And therefore, just as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice \"is intellect influenced by appetite,\" thus pointing out that both concur in the act of choosing; so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is \"appetite based on inquiry,\" so as to show that counsel belongs, in a way, both to the will, on whose behalf and by whose impulsion the inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes the inquiry.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quando actus duarum potentiarum ad invicem ordinantur, in utroque est aliquid quod est alterius potentiæ; et ideo uterque actus ab utraque potentia denominari potest. Manifestum est autem, quod actus rationis diligentis in his quæ sunt ad finem, et actus voluntatis secundum regimen rationis in ea tendentis, ad se invicem ordinantur. Unde et in actu voluntatis, qui est electio, apparet aliquid rationis, scilicet ordo; et in consilio, quod est actus rationis, apparet aliquid voluntatis, sicut materia, quia consilium est de his quæ homo vult facere, et etiam sicut motivum: quia ex hoc quod homo vult finem, movetur ad consilium de his quæ sunt ad finem. Et ideo Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. ii, quod « electio est intellectus appetitivus, » ut ad electionem utrumque concurrere ostendat; ita Damascenus dicit, loc. sup. cit., « consilium est appetitus inquisitivus, » ut consilium aliquo modo pertinere ostendat et ad voluntatem, circa quam et ex qua fit inquisitio, et ad rationem inquirentem.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.1.ad.2] The things that we say of God must be understood without any of the defects which are to be found in us: thus in us science is of conclusions derived by reasoning from causes to effects: but science when said of God means sure knowledge of all effects in the First Cause, without any reasoning process. In like manner we ascribe counsel to God, as to the certainty of His knowledge or judgment, which certainty in us arises from the inquiry of counsel. But such inquiry has no place in God; wherefore in this respect it is not ascribed to God: in which sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22): \"God takes not counsel: those only take counsel who lack knowledge.\"
\n[I-II.q.14.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ea quæ dicuntur de Deo, accipienda sunt absque omni defectu qui invenitur in nobis, sicut in nobis scientia est conclusionum per discursum a causis in effectus; sed scientia dicta de Deo significat certitudinem de omnibus effectibus in prima causa absque omni discursu. Et similiter consilium attribuitur Deo quantum ad certitudinem sententiæ vel judicii, quæ in nobis provenit ex inquisitione consilii; sed hujusmodi inquisitio in Deo locum non habet; et ideo consilium secundum hoc Deo non attribuitur. Et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit, lib. II Orth. fid., cap. xxii, col. 946, t. 1, quod « Deus non consiliatur; ignorantis enim est consiliari. »
\n[I-II.q.14.a.1.ad.3] It may happen that things which are most certainly good in the opinion of wise and spiritual men are not certainly good in the opinion of many, or at least of carnal-minded men. Consequently in such things counsel may be given.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod nihil prohibet aliqua esse certissima bona secundum sententiam sapientum et spiritualium virorum, quæ tamen non sunt certa bona secundum sententiam plurium vel carnalium hominum; et ideo de talibus consilia dantur.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that counsel is not only of the means but also of the end. For whatever is doubtful, can be the subject of inquiry. Now in things to be done by man there happens sometimes a doubt as to the end and not only as to the means. Since therefore inquiry as to what is to be done is counsel, it seems that counsel can be of the end.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod consilium non solum sit de his quæ sunt ad finem, sed etiam de fine. Quæcumque enim dubitationem habent, de his potest inquiri. Sed circa operabilia humana continit esse dubitationem de fine, et non solum de his quæ sunt ad finem. Cum igitur inquisitio circa operabilia sit consilium, videtur quod consilium possit esse de fine.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.2.arg.2] Further, the matter of counsel is human actions. But some human actions are ends, as stated in Ethic. i, 1. Therefore counsel can be of the end.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, materia consilii sunt operationes humanæ. Sed quædam operationes humanæ sunt fines, ut dicitur in I Ethic., in princ. cap. 1. Ergo consilium potest esse de fine.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.2.sc] Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says that \"counsel is not of the end, but of the means.\"
\n[I-II.q.14.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyss., lib. De nat. hom., cap. xxxiv, dicit, quod « non de fine sed de his quæ sunt ad finem est consilium. »
\n[I-II.q.14.a.2.co] The end is the principle in practical matters: because the reason of the means is to be found in the end. Now the principle cannot be called in question, but must be presupposed in every inquiry. Since therefore counsel is an inquiry, it is not of the end, but only of the means. Nevertheless it may happen that what is the end in regard to some things, is ordained to something else; just as also what is the principle of one demonstration, is the conclusion of another: and consequently that which is looked upon as the end in one inquiry, may be looked upon as the means in another; and thus it will become an object of counsel.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod finis in operabilibus habet rationem principii, eo quod rationes eorum quæ sunt ad finem ex fine sumuntur. Principium autem non cadit sub quæstione; sed principia oportet supponere in omni inquisitione. Unde cum consilium Seu potius Nemesius, col. 735. Ms. quod citat Nicolaïi habet planiori constructione quam in impressis: « quæ est electio. » Parm. sit quæstio, de fine non est consilium, sed solum de his quæ sunt ad finem. Tamen contingit, id quod est finis, respectu quorumdam, ordinari ad alium finem; sicut etiam id quod est principium unius demonstrationis, est conclusio alterius. Et ideo id quod accipitur ut « finis » in una inquisitione, potest accipi ut « ad finem » in alia inquisitione; et sic de eo erit consilium.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.2.ad.1] That which is looked upon as an end, is already fixed: consequently as long as there is any doubt about it, it is not looked upon as an end. Wherefore if counsel is taken about it, it will be counsel not about the end, but about the means.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod id quod accipitur ut finis est jam determinatum. Unde quamdiu habetur ut dubium, non habetur ut finis; et ideo si de eo consilium habetur, non erit consilium de fine, sed de eo quod est ad finem.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.2.ad.2] Counsel is about operations, in so far as they are ordained to some end. Consequently if any human act be an end, it will not, as such, be the matter of counsel.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod de operationibus est consilium, inquantum ordinantur ad aliquem finem. Unde si aliqua operatio humana sit finis, de ea, inquantum hujusmodi, non est consilium.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that counsel is not only of things that we do. For counsel implies some kind of conference. But it is possible for many to confer about things that are not subject to movement, and are not the result of our actions, such as the nature of various things. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod consilium non sit solum de his quæ aguntur a nobis. Consilium enim collationem quamdam importat. Sed collatio inter multos potest fieri etiam de rebus immobilibus, quæ non fiunt a nobis, puta de naturis rerum. Ergo consilium non solum est de his quæ aguntur a nobis.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.arg.2] Further, men sometimes seek counsel about things that are laid down by law; hence we speak of counsel at law. And yet those who seek counsel thus, have nothing to do in making the laws. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, homines interdum consilia quærunt de his quæ sunt lege statuta, unde et jurisconsulti dicuntur; et tamen eorum qui quærunt hujusmodi consilium, non est leges facere. Ergo consilium non solum est de his quæ a nobis aguntur,
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.arg.3] Further, some are said to take consultation about future events; which, however, are not in our power. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, dicuntur etiam quidam consultiones facere de futuris eventibus, qui tamen non sunt in potestate nostra. Ergo consilium non solum est de his quæ a nobis fiunt.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.arg.4] Further, if counsel were only of things that we do, no would take counsel about what another does. But this is clearly untrue. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, si consilium esset solum de his quæ a nobis fiunt, nullus consiliaretur de his quæ sunt per alium agenda. Sed hoc patet esse falsum. Ergo consilium non solum est de his quæ a nobis fiunt.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.sc] Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says: \"We take counsel of things that are within our competency and that we are able to do.\"
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyss. 4, 1 Potius Nemesius, col. 738: nam liber De nat. Lib. De nat. hom., cap. xxxiv, dicit: « Consiliamur de his quæ sunt in nobis et per nos fieri possunt. »
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.co] Counsel properly implies a conference held between several; the very word [consilium] denotes this, for it means a sitting together [considium], from the fact that many sit together in order to confer with one another. Now we must take note that in contingent particular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it is necessary to take several conditions or circumstances into consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes note of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary and universal things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more absolute and simple, so that one man by himself may be sufficient to consider these things. Wherefore the inquiry of counsel is concerned, properly speaking, with contingent singulars. Now the knowledge of the truth in such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is the knowledge of things universal and necessary; but it is desired as being useful towards action, because actions bear on things singular and contingent. Consequently, properly speaking, counsel is about things done by us.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod consilium proprie importat collationem inter plures habitam; quod et ipsum nomen designat. Dicitur enim consilium, quasi « considium, » eo quod multi consider ad simul conferendum. Est autem considerandum, quod in particularibus contingentibus, ad hoc quod aliquid certum cognoscatur, plures conditiones seu circumstantias considerare oportet, quas ab uno non facile est considerari, sed a pluribus certius percipiuntur, dum quod unus considerat, alii non occurrit. In necessariis autem et universalibus est absolutior et simplicior consideratio, ita quod magis ad hujusmodi considerationem unus per se sufficere potest; et ideo inquisitio consiliii proprie pertinet ad contingentia singularia. Cognitio autem veritatis in talibus non habet aliquid magnum, ut per se sit appetibilis, sicut cognitio universalium et necessariorum; sed appetitur secundum quod est utilis ad operationem, quia actiones sunt circa contingentia singularia. Et ideo dicendum est quod proprie consilium est circa ea quæ aguntur a nobis.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.ad.1] Counsel implies conference, not of any kind, but about what is to be done, for the reason given above.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod consilium importat collationem, non quamcumque, sed collationem de rebus agendis, razione jam dicta.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.ad.2] Although that which is laid down by the law is not due to the action of him who seeks counsel, nevertheless it directs him in his action: since the mandate of the law is one reason for doing something.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod id quod est lege positum, quamvis non sit ex operatione quærentis consilium, tamen est directivum ejus ad operandum; quia ista est una ratio aliquid operandi, scilicet mandatum legis.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.ad.3] Counsel is not only about what is done, but also about whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we speak of consulting about future events, in so far as man is induced to do or omit something, through the knowledge of future events.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod consilium non solum est de his quæ aguntur, sed de his quæ ordinantur ad operationes; et propter hoc consultatio dicitur fieri de futuris eventibus, inquantum homo per futuros eventus cognitos dirigitur ad aliquid faciendum, vel vitandum.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.ad.4] We seek counsel about the actions of others, in so far as they are, in some way, one with us; either by union of affection--thus a man is solicitous about what concerns his friend, as though it concerned himself; or after the manner of an instrument, for the principal agent and the instrument are, in a way, one cause, since one acts through the other; thus the master takes counsel about what he would do through his servant.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod de aliorum factis consilium quærimus, inquantum sunt quodammodo unum nobiscum; vel per unionem affectus, sicut amicus sollicitus est de his quæ ad amicum spectant, sicut de suis, vel per modum instrumenti; nam agens principale et instrumentale, sunt quasi una causa, cum unum agat per alterum; et sic dominus consiliatur de his quæ sunt agenda per servum. hom. Gregorio Nyss. jam abjudicatur. QUÆST. XIV, ART. IV ET V.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that counsel is about all things that we have to do. For choice is the \"desire of what is counselled\" as stated above (Article 1). But choice is about all things that we do. Therefore counsel is too.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod consilium sit de omnibus quæ sunt per nos agenda. Electio enim est « appetitus præconsiliati, » ut dictum est. » Sed electio est de omnibus quæ per nos aguntur. Ergo et consilium.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.4.arg.2] Further, counsel implies the reason's inquiry. But, whenever we do not act through the impulse of passion, we act in virtue of the reason's inquiry. Therefore there is counsel about everything that we do.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, consilium importat inquisitionem rationis. Sed in omnibus quæ non per impetum passionis agimus, procedimus ex inquisitione rationis. Ergo de omnibus quæ aguntur a nobis, est consilium.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.4.arg.3] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that \"if it appears that something can be done by more means than one, we take counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best; but if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be done by this.\" But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several. Therefore counsel takes place in all things that we do.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., cap. Ⅲ, in med., quod « si per plura aliquid fieri potest, consilio inquiritur, per quod facillime et optime fiat; si autem per unum, qualiter per illud fiat. » Sed omne quod fit, fit per unum vel per multa. Ergo de omnibus quæ fiunt a nobis est consilium.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.4.sc] Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says that \"counsel has no place in things that are done according to science or art.\"
\n[I-II.q.14.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyss., lib. De nat. hom., cap. xxxiv, dicit, quod « de his quæ secundum disciplinam vel artem sunt operibus, non est consilium. »
\n[I-II.q.14.a.4.co] Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above (Article 1). But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument, \"is a reason that attests something that admitted of doubt\" [Cicero, Topic. ad Trebat.]. Now, that something in relation to human acts admits of no doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because certain determinate ends are gained by certain determinate means: as happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of action; thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his letters, for this is determined by art. Secondly, from the fact that it little matters whether it is done this or that way; this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed at; and reason looks upon small things as mere nothings. Consequently there are two things of which we do not take counsel, although they conduce to the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3): namely, minute things, and those which have a fixed way of being done, as in works produced by art, with the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture such as medicine, commerce, and the like, as Gregory of Nyssa says [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxiv.].
\n[I-II.q.14.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod consilium est inquisitio quædam, ut dictum est. De illis autem inquirere solemus quæ in dubium veniunt. Unde et ratio inquisitiva, quæ dicitur « argumentum, » est « rei dubiæ faciens fidem. » Quod autem aliquid in operabilibus humanis non sit dubitabile, ex duobus contingit. Uno modo, quia per determinatas vias proceditur ad determinatos fines, sicut contingit in artibus quæ habent certas vias operandi; sicut scriptor non consiliatur quomodo debeat trahere litteras, hoc enim determinatum est per artem. Alio modo quia non multum refert utrum sic vel sic fiat; et ista sunt minima, quæ parum adjuvant vel impediunt respectu finis consequendi; quod autem parum est, quasi nihil accipit ratio. Et ideo de duobus non consiliamur, quamvis ordinentur ad finem, ut Philosophus dicit, lib. III Ethic., cap. Ⅲ, scilicet de rebus parvis, et de his quæ sunt determinata qualiter fieri debent, sicut est in operationibus artium, præter quasdam con- 1 Seu potius Nemesius, col. 738. — Nemesius.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.4.ad.1] Choice presupposes counsel by reason of its judgment or decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is evident without inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.4.ad.2] In matters that are evident, the reason makes no inquiry, but judges at once. Consequently there is no need of counsel in all that is done by reason.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.4.ad.3] When a thing can be accomplished by one means, but in different ways, doubt may arise, just as when it can be accomplished by several means: hence the need of counsel. But when not only the means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed, then there is no need of counsel.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that the process of counsel is not one of analysis. For counsel is about things that we do. But the process of our actions is not one of analysis, but rather one of synthesis, viz. from the simple to the composite. Therefore counsel does not always proceed by way of analysis.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod consilium non procedat modo resolutorio. Consilium enim est de his quæ a nobis aguntur. Sed operationes nostræ non procedunt modo resolutorio, sed magis modo compositivo, scilicet de simplicibus ad composita. Ergo consilium non semper procedit modo resolutorio.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.5.arg.2] Further, counsel is an inquiry of the reason. But reason proceeds from things that precede to things that follow, according to the more appropriate order. Since then, the past precedes the present, and the present precedes the future, it seems that in taking counsel one should proceed from the past and present to the future: which is not an analytical process. Therefore the process of counsel is not one of analysis.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, consilium est inquisitio rationis. Sed ratio a prioribus incipit, et ad posteriora devenit, secundum convenientorem ordinem. Cum igitur præterita sint priora præsentibus et præsentia priora futuris, in consiliando videtur esse procedendum a præsentibus et præteritis in futura; quod non pertinet ad ordinem resolutorium. Ergo in consiliis non servatur ordo resolutorius.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.5.arg.3] Further, counsel is only of such things as are possible to us, according to Ethic. iii, 3. But the question as to whether a certain thing is possible to us, depends on what we are able or unable to do, in order to gain such and such an end. Therefore the inquiry of counsel should begin from things present.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, consilium non est nisi de his quæ sunt nobis possibilia, ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. Ⅲ, paulo post princ. Sed an sit nobis aliquid possibile, perpenditur ex eo quod possumus facere, vel non possumus, ut perveniamus in illud. Ergo in inquisitione consilii a præsentibus incipere oportet.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.5.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that \"he who takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze.\"
\n[I-II.q.14.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., c. Ⅲ, post med., quod « ille qui consiliatur, videtur quærere et resolvere. »
\n[I-II.q.14.a.5.co] In every inquiry one must begin from some principle. And if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the process is not analytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause to effect is to proceed synthetically, since causes are more simple than effects. But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the order of being, the process is one of analysis, as when our judgment deals with effects, which by analysis we trace to their simple causes. Now the principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which precedes indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into execution. Hence the inquiry of counsel must needs be one of analysis, beginning that is to say, from that which is intended in the future, and continuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in omni inquisitione oportet incipere ab aliquo principio; quod quidem si sicut est prius in cognitione, ita etiam sit prius in esse, non est processus resolutorius, sed magis compositivus. Procedere enim a causis in effectus, est processus compositivus; nam causæ sunt simpliciores effectibus. Si autem id quod est prius in cognitione, sit posterius in esse, est processus resolutorius, utpote cum de effectibus manifestis judicamus, resolvendo in causas simplices. Principium autem in inquisitione consilii est finis, qui quidem est prior in intentione, posterior tamen in esse. Et secundum hoc oportet quod inquisitio consilii sit resolutoria, incipiendo scilicet ab eo quod in futuro intenditur, quousque perveniatur ad id quod statim agendum est.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.5.ad.1] Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take their reason from the end; and consequently the order of reasoning about actions is contrary to the order of actions.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod consiliium est de operationibus; sed ratio operationum accipitur ex fine; et ideo ordo ratiocinandi de operationibus est contrarius ordini operandi.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.5.ad.2] Reason begins with that which is first according to reason; but not always with that which is first in point of time.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio incipit ab eo quod est prius secundum rationem, non autem semper ab eo quod est prius tempore.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.5.ad.3] We should not want to know whether something to be done for an end be possible, if it were not suitable for gaining that end. Hence we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the end, before considering whether it be possible.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod de eo quod est agendum propter finem, non quæeremus scire an sit possibile, si non esset congruum fini; et ideo prius oportet inquirere, an conveniat ad ducendum in finem, quam consideretur an sit possibile.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that the process of counsel is indefinite. For counsel is an inquiry about the particular things with which action is concerned. But singulars are infinite. Therefore the process of counsel is indefinite.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inquisitio consilii procedat in infinitum. Consilium enim inquisitio est de particularibus, in quibus est operatio. Sed singularia sunt infinita. Ergo inquisitio consilii est infinita.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.6.arg.2] Further, the inquiry of counsel has to consider not only what is to be done, but how to avoid obstacles. But every human action can be hindered, and an obstacle can be removed by some human reason. Therefore the inquiry about removing obstacles can go on indefinitely.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sub inquisitione consilii cadit considerare non solum quid agendum sit, sed etiam quomodo impedimenta tollantur. Sed quælibet humana actio potest infinite impediri; et impedimentum tolli potest per aliquam rationem humanam. Ergo in infinitum remanet quærere de impedimentis tollendis.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.6.arg.3] Further, the inquiry of demonstrative science does not go on indefinitely, because one can come to principles that are self-evident, which are absolutely certain. But such like certainty is not to be had in contingent singulars, which are variable and uncertain. Therefore the inquiry of counsel goes on indefinitely.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, inquisitio scientiæ demonstrativæ non procedit in infinitum, quia est devenire in aliqua principia per se nota, quæ omnimodam certitudinem habent. Sed talis certitudo non potest inveniri in singularibus contingentibus, quæ sunt variabilia et incerta. Ergo inquisitio consilii procedit in infinitum.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.6.sc] \"No one is moved to that which he cannot possibly reach\" (De Coelo i, 7). But it is impossible to pass through the infinite. If therefore the inquiry of counsel is infinite, no one would begin to take counsel. Which is clearly untrue.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.6.sc] Sed contra, nullus movetur ad id ad quod impossibile est quod perveniat, ut dicitur in I De cælo, text. 58. Sed infinitum impossibile est transire. Si igitur inquisitio consilii sit infinita, nullus consiliari inciperet, quod patet esse falsum.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.6.co] The inquiry of counsel is actually finite on both sides, on that of its principle and on that of its term. For a twofold principle is available in the inquiry of counsel. One is proper to it, and belongs to the very genus of things pertaining to operation: this is the end which is not the matter of counsel, but is taken for granted as its principle, as stated above (Article 2). The other principle is taken from another genus, so to speak; thus in demonstrative sciences one science postulates certain things from another, without inquiring into them. Now these principles which are taken for granted in the inquiry of counsel are any facts received through the senses--for instance, that this is bread or iron: and also any general statements known either through speculative or through practical science; for instance, that adultery is forbidden by God, or that man cannot live without suitable nourishment. Of such things counsel makes no inquiry. But the term of inquiry is that which we are able to do at once. For just as the end is considered in the light of a principle, so the means are considered in the light of a conclusion. Wherefore that which presents itself as to be done first, holds the position of an ultimate conclusion whereat the inquiry comes to an end. Nothing however prevents counsel from being infinite potentially, for as much as an infinite number of things may present themselves to be inquired into by means of counsel.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod inquisitio consilii est finita in actu ex duplici parte, scilicet ex parte principii et ex parte termini. Accipitur enim in inquisitione consilii duplex principium: unum proprium ex ipso genere operabilium, et hoc est finis, de quo non est consilium, sed supponitur in consilio, ut principium, ut dictum est; aliud quasi ex alio genere assumptum; sicut et in scientiis demonstrativis una scientia supponit aliqua ab alia, de quibus non inquirit. Hujusmodi autem principia, quæ in inquisitione consilii supponuntur, sunt quæcumque sunt per sensum accepta; utpote quod hoc sit panis vel ferrum, et quæcumque sunt per aliquam scientiam speculativam vel practicam in universali cognita, sicut quod moechari est a Deo prohibitum, et quod homo non potest vivere, nisi nutriatur nutrimento convenienti; et de istis non inquirit consiliator. Terminus autem inquisitionis est id quod statim est in potestate nostra ut faciamus. Sicut enim finis habet rationem principii, ita id quod agitur propter finem, habet rationem conclusionis. Unde id quod primo agendum occurrit, habet rationem ultimæ conclusionis, ad quam inquisitio terminatur. Nihil autem prohibet consilium potentia infinitum esse, secundum quod in infinitum possunt aliqua occurrere consilio inquirenda.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.6.ad.1] Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only potentially.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod singularia non sunt infinita actu, sed in potentia.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.6.ad.2] Although human action can be hindered, the hindrance is not always at hand. Consequently it is not always necessary to take counsel about removing the obstacle.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, licet humana actio possit impediri, non tamen semper habet impedimentum paratum; et ideo non semper oportet consiliari de impedimento tollendo.
\n[I-II.q.14.a.6.ad.3] In contingent singulars, something may be taken for certain, not simply, indeed, but for the time being, and as far as it concerns the work to be done. Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a necessary statement; but that he is sitting, as long as he continues to sit, is necessary; and this can be taken for a certain fact.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.14.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in singularibus contingentibus potest aliquid accipi certum, etsi non simpliciter, tamen ut nunc, prout assumitur in operatione. Socratem enim sedere non est necessarium: sed eum sedere dum sedet, est necessarium; et hoc per certitudinem accipi potest.
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