[I-II.q.16.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that use is not an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4) that \"to use is to refer that which is the object of use to the obtaining of something else.\" But \"to refer\" something to another is an act of the reason to which it belongs to compare and to direct. Therefore use is an act of the reason and not of the will.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod uti non sit actus voluntatis. Dicit enim Augustinus in I De doctr. christ., cap. iv, col. 20, t. 3, quod « uti est id quod in usum venit, ad aliud obtinendum referre. » Sed referre aliquid ad aliud est rationis, cujus est conferre et ordinare. Ergo uti est actus rationis; non ergo voluntatis.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.1.arg.2] Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that man \"goes forward to the operation, and this is called impulse; then he makes use (of the powers) and this is called use.\" But operation belongs to the executive power; and the act of the will does not follow the act of the executive power, on the contrary execution comes last. Therefore use is not an act of the will.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Damascenus dicit, lib. II Orthod. fid., cap. xxii, col. 946, t. 4, quod « homo impetum facit ad operationem, et dicitur impetus, deinde utitur, et dicitur usus. » Sed operatio pertinet ad potentiam executivam; actus autem voluntatis non sequitur actum executivæ potentiæ, sed executio est ultimum. Ergo usus non est actus voluntatis.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.1.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): \"All things that were made were made for man's use, because reason with which man is endowed uses all things by its judgment of them.\" But judgment of things created by God belongs to the speculative reason; which seems to be altogether distinct from the will, which is the principle of human acts. Therefore use is not an act of the will.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., q. xxx, col. 20, t. 6: « Omnia quæ facta sunt in usum hominis facta sunt; quia omnibus utitur judicando ratio quæ homini data est. » Sed judicare de rebus a Deo creatis pertinet ad rationem speculativam, quæ omnino separata videtur a voluntate, quæ est principium humano-rum actuum. Ergo uti non est actus voluntatis.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.1.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): \"To use is to apply to something to purpose of the will.\"
\n[I-II.q.16.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in X De Trinit., cap. xi, § 17, col. 982, t. 8: « Uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.1.co] The use of a thing implies the application of that thing to an operation: hence the operation to which we apply a thing is called its use; thus the use of a horse is to ride, and the use of a stick is to strike. Now we apply to an operation not only the interior principles of action, viz. the powers of the soul or the members of the body; as the intellect, to understand; and the eye, to see; but also external things, as a stick, to strike. But it is evident that we do not apply external things to an operation save through the interior principles which are either the powers of the soul, or the habits of those powers, or the organs which are parts of the body. Now it has been shown above (Question 9, Article 01) that it is the will which moves the soul's powers to their acts, and this is to apply them to operation. Hence it is evident that first and principally use belongs to the will as first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to the other powers as executing the operation, which powers are compared to the will which applies them to act, as the instruments are compared to the principal agent. Now action is properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as building is ascribed to the builder, not to his tools. Hence it is evident that use is, properly speaking, an act of the will.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod usus rei alicujus importat applicationem rei illius ad aliquam operationem; unde et operatio ad quam applicamus rem aliquam, dicitur usus ejus, sicut equitare est usus equi, et percutere est usus baculi. Ad operationem autem applicamus et principia interiora agendi, scilicet ipsas potentias animæ, vel membra corporis; ut intellectum ad intelligendum, et oculum ad videndum; et res exteriores, sicut baculum ad percutiendum. Sed manifestum est quod res exteriores non applicamus ad aliquam operationem nisi per principia intrinseca, quæ sunt potentiae animæ, aut habitus potentiarum, aut organa, quæ sunt corporis membra. Ostensum est autem supra, quod voluntas est quæ movet potentias animæ ad suos actus; et hoc est applicare eas ad operationem. Unde manifestum est, quod uti primo et principaliter est voluntatis tanquam primi moventis, rationis autem tanquam dirigentis, sed aliarum potentiarum tanquam exequentium, quæ comparantur ad voluntatem, a qua applicantur ad agendum, sicut instrumenta ad principale agens. Actio autem proprie non attribuitur instrumento, sed principali agenti, sicut ædificatio ædificatori, non autem instrumentis. Unde manifestum est, quod uti proprie est actus voluntatis.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.1.ad.1] Reason does indeed refer one thing to another; but the will tends to that which is referred by the reason to something else. And in this sense to use is to refer one thing to another.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio quidem in aliud refert, sed voluntas tendit in id quod est in aliud relatum per rationem; et secundum hoc dicitur, quod uti est referre aliquid in alterum.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.1.ad.2] Damascene is speaking of use in so far as it belongs to the executive powers.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Damascenus loquitur de usu, secundum quod pertinet ad executivas potentias.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.1.ad.3] Even the speculative reason is applied by the will to the act of understanding or judging. Consequently the speculative reason is said to use, in so far as it is moved by the will, in the same way as the other powers.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam ipsa ratio speculativa applicatur ad opus intelligendi, vel judicandi, a voluntate; et ideo intellectus speculativus uti dicitur, tanquam a voluntate motus, sicut aliæ executivæ potentiae.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that use is to be found in irrational animals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10): \"We use things by referring them to something else which we are to enjoy.\" But enjoyment is to be found in irrational animals, as stated above (Question 11, Article 2). Much more, therefore, is it possible for them to use.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod uti conveniat brutis animalibus. Frui enim est nobilius quam uti; quia, ut Augustinus dicit in X De Trin., c. x, § 13, col. 981, t. 8, « utimur eis quæ ad aliud referimus quo fruendum est. » Sed frui convenit brutis animalibus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo multo magis convenit eis uti.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.2.arg.2] Further, to apply the members to action is to use them. But irrational animals apply their members to action; for instance, their feet, to walk; their horns, to strike. Therefore it is possible for irrational animals to use.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, applicare membra ad agendum est uti membris. Sed bruta animalia applicant membra ad aliquid agendum, sicut pedes ad ambulandum, cornua ad percutiendum. Ergo brutis animalibus convenit uti.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.2.sc] Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): \"None but a rational animal can make use of a thing.\"
\n[I-II.q.16.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., q. xxx, col. 19, t. 6: « Uti aliqua re non potest nisi animal quod rationis est particeps. »
\n[I-II.q.16.a.2.co] as stated above (Article 1), to use is to apply an active principle to action: thus to consent is to apply the appetitive movement to the desire of something, as stated above (15, 1,2,3). Now he alone who has the disposal of a thing, can apply it to something else; and this belongs to him alone who knows how to refer it to something else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore none but a rational animal consents and uses.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, uti est applicare aliquod principium actionis ad actionem, sicut consentire est applicare motum appetitivum ad aliquid appetendum, ut dictum est. Applicare autem aliquid ad alterum non est nisi ejus quod habet super illud arbitrium; quod non est nisi ejus qui scit referre aliquid in alterum; quod ad rationem pertinet. Et ideo solum animal rationale et consentit et utitur.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.2.ad.1] To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the appetite to the appetible: whereas to use implies a movement of the appetite to something as directed to something else. If therefore we compare use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is better than use; because that which is appetible absolutely is better than that which is appetible only as directed to something else. But if we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that precedes them, greater excellence is required on the part of use: because to direct one thing to another is an act of reason; whereas to apprehend something absolutely is within the competency even of sense.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod frui importat absolutum motum appetitus in appetibile; sed uti importat motum appetitus ad aliquid in ordine ad alterum. Si ergo comparentur uti et frui quantum ad objecta, sic frui est nobilius quam uti; quia id quod est absolute appetibile, est melius quam id quod est appetibile solum in ordine ad aliud. Sed si comparentur quantum ad vim apprehensivam praæcedentem, major nobilitas requiritur ex parte usus: quia ordinare aliquid in alterum est rationis; absolute autem aliquid apprehendere potest etiam sensus.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.2.ad.2] Animals by means of their members do something from natural instinct; not through knowing the relation of their members to these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not apply their members to action, nor do they use them.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod animalia per sua membra aliquid agunt instinctu naturæ, non per hoc quod cognoscant ordinem membrorum ad illas operationes; unde non dicuntur proprio applicare membra ad agendum, nec uti membris.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that use can regard also the last end. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): \"Whoever enjoys, uses.\" But man enjoys the last end. Therefore he uses the last end.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod usus possit esse etiam ultimi finis. Dicit enim Augustinus in X De Trin., c. xi, § 17, col. 982, t. 8: « Omnis qui fruitur, utitur. » Sed ultimo fine fruitur aliquis. Ergo ultimo fine aliquis utitur.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.3.arg.2] Further, \"to use is to apply something to the purpose of the will\" (De Trin. x, 11). But the last end, more than anything else, is the object of the will's application. Therefore it can be the object of use.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, « uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis, » ut ibidem dicitur. Sed nihil magis assumitur a voluntate quam ultimus finis. Ergo usus potest esse ultimi finis.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.3.arg.3] Further, Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that \"Eternity is in the Father, Likeness in the Image,\" i.e. in the Son, \"Use in the Gift,\" i.e. in the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost, since He is God, is the last end. Therefore the last end can be the object of use.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Hilarius dicit in II De Trin., § 1, col. 51, t. 2, quod « æternitas est in Patre, species in imagine, » id est in Filio, « usus in munere, » id est, in Spiritu sancto. Sed Spiritus sanctus, cum sit Deus, est ultimus finis. Ergo usus potest esse ultimi finis.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.3.sc] Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): \"No one rightly uses God, but one enjoys Him.\" But God alone is the last end. Therefore we cannot use the last end.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., q. xxx, col. 20, t. 6: « Deo nullus recte utitur, sed fruitur. Sed solus Deus est ultimus finis. Ergo ultimo fine non est utendum.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.3.co] Use, as stated above (Article 1), implies the application of one thing to another. Now that which is applied to another is regarded in the light of means to an end; and consequently use always regards the means. For this reason things that are adapted to a certain end are said to be \"useful\"; in fact their very usefulness is sometimes called use.
\nIt must, however, be observed that the last end may be taken in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in respect of an individual. For since the end, as stated above (1, 8; 2, 7), signifies sometimes the thing itself, and sometimes the attainment or possession of that thing (thus the miser's end is either money or the possession of it); it is evident that, simply speaking, the last end is the thing itself; for the possession of money is good only inasmuch as there is some good in money. But in regard to the individual, the obtaining of money is the last end; for the miser would not seek for money, save that he might have it. Therefore, simply and properly speaking, a man enjoys money, because he places his last end therein; but in so far as he seeks to possess it, he is said to use it.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod uti, sicut dictum est, importat applicationem alicujus ad aliquid. Quod autem applicatur ad aliud, se habet in ratione ejus quod est ad finem; et ideo uti semper est ejus quod est ad finem; propter quod et ea quæ sunt ad finem accomoda, utilia dicuntur, et ipsa utilitas interdum usus nominatur. Sed considerandum est, quod ultimus finis dicitur dupliciter: uno modo simpliciter, et alio modo quoad aliquem. Cum enim finis, ut supra dictum est, dicatur quandoque quidem res, quandoque autem adeptio rei, vel possessio ejus, sicut avaro finis est vel pecunia, vel possessio pecuniæ, manifestum est, quod, simpliciter loquendo, ultimus finis est ipsa res; non enim possessio pecuniæ est bona, nisi propter bonum pecuniæ; sed quoad hunc adeptio pecuniæ est finis ultimus; non enim quæeret pecuniam avarus, nisi ut haberet eam. Ergo, simpliciter loquendo et proprie, pecunia homo aliquis fruitur, quia in ea ultimum finem constituit; sed inquantum refert eam ad possessionem, dicitur uti ea.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.3.ad.1] Augustine is speaking of use in general, in so far as it implies the relation of an end to the enjoyment which a man seeks in that end.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de usu communiter, secundum quod importat ordinem finis ad ipsam fruitionem quam aliquis quærit de fine.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.3.ad.2] The end is applied to the purpose of the will, that the will may find rest in it. Consequently this rest in the end, which is the enjoyment thereof, is in this sense called use of the end. But the means are applied to the will's purpose, not only in being used as means, but as ordained to something else in which the will finds rest.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod finis assumitur in facultatem voluntatis, ut voluntas in illo quiescat; unde ipsa requies in fine, quæ fruitio est, dicitur hoc modo usus finis. Sed id quod est ad finem assumitur in facultatem voluntatis, non solum in ordine ad usum ejus quod est ad finem, sed in ordine ad aliam rem, in qua voluntas quiescit.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.3.ad.3] The words of Hilary refer to use as applicable to rest in the last end; just as, speaking in a general sense, one may be said to use the end for the purpose of attaining it, as stated above. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10) that \"this love, delight, felicity, or happiness, is called use by him.\"
\n[I-II.q.16.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod usus accipitur in verbis Hilarii pro quiete in ultimo fine, eo modo quo aliquis, communiter loquendo, dicitur uti fine ad obtinendum ipsum, sicut dictum est. Unde Augustinus in VI De Trin., c. x, § 11, col. 932, t. 8, dicit quod « illa delectatio, felicitas, vel beatitudo, usus ab eo appellatur. » « Nec Deo utitur, sed fruitur. » Quod autem D. Thomas addit, scil.: « recte, » de textu elicitur.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that use precedes choice. For nothing follows after choice, except execution. But use, since it belongs to the will, precedes execution. Therefore it precedes choice also.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod usus præcedat electionem. Post electionem enim nihil sequitur nisi executio. Sed usus, cum pertineat ad voluntatem, præcedit executionem. Ergo præcedit etiam electionem.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.4.arg.2] Further, the absolute precedes the relative. Therefore the less relative precedes the more relative. But choice implies two relations: one, of the thing chosen, in relation to the end; the other, of the thing chosen, in respect of that to which it is preferred; whereas use implies relation to the end only. Therefore use precedes choice.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, absolutum est ante relatum. Ergo minus relatum est ante magis relatum. Sed electio importat duas relationes, unam ejus quod eligitur ad finem, aliam vero ad id cui præeligitur; usus autem importat solam relationem ad finem. Ergo usus est prior electione.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.4.arg.3] Further, the will uses the other powers in so far as it removes them. But the will moves itself, too, as stated above (Question 9, Article 3). Therefore it uses itself, by applying itself to act. But it does this when it consents. Therefore there is use in consent. But consent precedes choice as stated above (15, 3, ad 3). Therefore use does also.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, voluntas utitur aliis potentiis, inquantum movet eas. Sed voluntas movet etiam seipsam, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam utitur seipsa applicando se ad agendum. Sed hoc facit cum consentit. Ergo in ipso consensu est usus. Sed consensus præcedit electionem, ut dictum est. Ergo et usus.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.4.sc] Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that \"the will after choosing has an impulse to the operation, and afterwards it uses (the powers).\" Therefore use follows choice.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, lib. II Orth. fid., c. xxii, col. 946, t. 4, quod « voluntas post electionem impetum facit ad operationem, et postea utitur. » Ergo usus sequitur electionem.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.4.co] The will has a twofold relation to the thing willed. One, according as the thing willed is, in a way, in the willing subject, by a kind of proportion or order to the thing willed. Wherefore those things that are naturally proportionate to a certain end, are said to desire that end naturally. Yet to have an end thus is to have it imperfectly. Now every imperfect thing tends to perfection. And therefore both the natural and the voluntary appetite tend to have the end in reality; and this is to have it perfectly. This is the second relation of the will to the thing willed.
\nNow the thing willed is not only the end, but also the means. And the last act that belongs to the first relation of the will to the means, is choice; for there the will becomes fully proportionate, by willing the means fully. Use, on the other hand, belongs to the second relation of the will, in respect of which it tends to the realization of the thing willed. Wherefore it is evident that use follows choice; provided that by use we mean the will's use of the executive power in moving it. But since the will, in a way, moves the reason also, and uses it, we may take the use of the means, as consisting in the consideration of the reason, whereby it refers the means to the end. In this sense use precedes choice.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod voluntas duplicem habitudinem habet ad volitum. Unam quidem, secundum quod volitum est quodammodo in volente per quamdam proportionem vel ordinem ad volitum. Unde et res quæ naturaliter sunt proportionatæ ad aliquem finem, dicuntur appetere illum naturaliter. Sed sic habere finem est imperfecte habere ipsum. Omne autem imperfectum tendit in perfectionem; et ideo tam appetitus naturalis quam voluntarius tendit ut habeat ipsum finem realiter, quod est perfecte habere ipsum; et hæc est secunda habitudo voluntatis ad volitum. Volitum autem non solum est finis, sed id quod est ad finem. Ultimum autem quod pertinet ad primam habitudinem voluntatis, respectu ejus quod est ad finem, est electio; ibi enim completur proportion voluntatis, ut complete velit id quod est ad finem. Sed Plenius in textu D. Augustini. Volitum » in rem volitam. Unde manifestum est, quod usus sequitur electionem; si tamen accipiatur usus, secundum quod voluntas utitur executiva potentia, movendo ipsam. Sed quia voluntas etiam quodammodo rationem movet, et utitur ea; potest intelligi usus ejus quod est ad finem, secundum quod est in consideratione rationis referentis ipsum in finem. Et hoc modo usus præcedit electionem.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.4.ad.1] The motion of the will to the execution of the work, precedes execution, but follows choice. And so, since use belongs to that very motion of the will, it stands between choice and execution.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ipsam executionem operis præcedit motio qua voluntas movet ad exequendum; sequitur autem electionem: et sic cum usus pertineat ad prædictam motionem voluntatis, medium est inter electionem et executionem.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.4.ad.2] What is essentially relative is after the absolute; but the thing to which relation is referred need not come after. Indeed, the more a cause precedes, the more numerous the effects to which it has relation.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod id quod est per essentiam suam relatum, posterius est absoluto, sed id cui attribuuntur relationes, non oportet quod sit posterius; imo quanto causa est prior, tanto habet relationes ad plures effectus.
\n[I-II.q.16.a.4.ad.3] Choice precedes use, if they be referred to the same object. But nothing hinders the use of one thing preceding the choice of another. And since the acts of the will react on one another, in each act of the will we can find both consent and choice and use; so that we may say that the will consents to choose, and consents to consent, and uses itself in consenting and choosing. And such acts as are ordained to that which precedes, precede also.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.16.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod electio præcedit usum, si referantur ad idem. Nihil autem prohibet quod usus unius præcedat electionem alterius. Et quia actus voluntatis reflectuntur supra seipsos, in quolibet actu voluntatis potest accipi consensus, et electio, et usus; ut si dicatur quod voluntas consentit se eligere, et consentit se consentire, et utitur se ad consentiendum et eligendum; et semper isti actus ordinati ad id quod est prius, sunt priores.
\n