[I-II.q.19.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the object. For the will cannot be directed otherwise than to what is good: since \"evil is outside the scope of the will,\" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). If therefore the goodness of the will depended on the object, it would follow that every act of the will is good, and none bad.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis non dependeat ex objecto. Voluntas enim non potest esse nisi boni, quia « malum est præter voluntatem, » ut Dionysius dicit, iv cap. De div. nom., § 32, col. 731, t. 1. Si igitur bonitas voluntatis judicaretur ex objecto, sequeretur quod omnis voluntas esset bona, et nulla esset mala.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.1.arg.2] Further, good is first of all in the end: wherefore the goodness of the end, as such, does not depend on any other. But, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), \"goodness of action is the end, but goodness of making is never the end\": because the latter is always ordained to the thing made, as to its end. Therefore the goodness of the act of the will does not depend on any object.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, bonum per prius invenitur in fine; unde bonitas finis, inquantum hu-jusmodi, non dependet ab aliquo alio. Sed secundum Philosophum in VI Ethic., cap. v, a princ., « bona actio est finis, licet factio nunquam sit finis: » ordinatur enim semper sicut ad finem ad aliquid factum. Ergo bonitas actus voluntatis non dependet ex aliquo objecto.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.1.arg.3] Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a thing to be. But the object of the will is good, by reason of the goodness of nature. Therefore it cannot give moral goodness to the will. Therefore the moral goodness of the will does not depend on the object.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, unumquodque quale est, tale alterum facit. Sed objectum voluntatis est bonum bonitate naturæ. Non ergo potest præstare voluntati bonitatem moralem. Moralis ergo bonitas voluntatis non dependet ex objecto.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.1.sc] the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is that habit \"from which men wish for just things\": and accordingly, virtue is a habit from which men wish for good things. But a good will is one which is in accordance with virtue. Therefore the goodness of the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is good.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., cap. 1, in princ., quod « justitia est secundum quam aliqui volunt justa; » et eadem ratione virtus est secundum quam aliqui volunt bona. Sed bona voluntas est quæ est secundum virtutem. Ergo bonitas voluntatis est ex hoc quod aliquis vult bonum.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.1.co] Good and evil are essential differences of the act of the will. Because good and evil of themselves regard the will; just as truth and falsehood regard reason; the act of which is divided essentially by the difference of truth and falsehood, for as much as an opinion is said to be true or false. Consequently good and evil will are acts differing in species. Now the specific difference in acts is according to objects, as stated above (Question 18, Article 5). Therefore good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly from the objects.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod bonum et malum sunt per se differentiæ actus voluntatis. Nam bonum et malum per se ad voluntatem pertinent, sicut verum et falsum ad rationem, cujus actus per se distinguitur differentia veri et falsi, prout dicimus opinionem esse veram vel falsam. Unde voluntas bona et mala sunt actus differentes secundum speciem. Differentia autem speciei in actibus est secundum objecta, ut dictum est; et ideo bonum et malum in actibus voluntatis proprie attenditur secundum objecta.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.1.ad.1] The will is not always directed to what is truly good, but sometimes to the apparent good; which has indeed some measure of good, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence it is that the act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod voluntas non semper est veri boni, sed quandoque est apparentis boni; quod quidem habet rationem aliquam boni, non tamen simpliciter convenientis ad appetendum; et propter hoc actus voluntatis non est bonus, sed malus.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.1.ad.2] Although an action can, in a certain way, be man's last end; nevertheless such action is not an act of the will, as stated above (1, 1, ad 2).
\n[I-II.q.19.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis aliquis actus possit esse ultimus finis hominis secundum aliquem modum, non tamen talis actus est actus voluntatis, ut supra dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.1.ad.3] Good is presented to the will as its object by the reason: and in so far as it is in accord with reason, it enters the moral order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will: because the reason is the principle of human and moral acts, as stated above (Question 18, Article 5).
\n[I-II.q.19.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod bonum per rationem repræsentatur voluntati ut objectum: et inquantum cadit sub ordine rationis, pertinet ad genus moris, et causat bonitatem moralem in actu voluntatis. Ratio enim principium est humanorum et moralium actuum, ut supra dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the object alone. For the end has a closer relationship to the will than to any other power. But the acts of the other powers derive goodness not only from the object but also from the end, as we have shown above (18, 04). Therefore the act also of the will derives goodness not only from the object but also from the end.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis non dependeat solum ex objecto. Finis enim affinior est voluntati quam alteri potentiae. Sed actus alia-rum potentiarum recipiunt bonitatem non solum ex objecto, sed etiam ex fine, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo etiam actus voluntatis recipit bonitatem non solum ex objecto, sed etiam ex fine.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.2.arg.2] Further, the goodness of an action is derived not only from the object but also from the circumstances, as stated above (Question 18, Article 3). But according to the diversity of circumstances there may be diversity of goodness and malice in the act of the will: for instance, if a man will, when he ought, where he ought, as much as he ought, and how he ought, or if he will as he ought not. Therefore the goodness of the will depends not only on the object, but also on the circumstances.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, bonitas actus non solum est ex objecto, sed etiam ex circumstantiis, ut supra dictum est. Sed secundum diversitatem circumstantiarum contingit esse diversitatem bonitatis et malitiæ in actu voluntatis; puta quod aliquis velit quandoque debet, et ubi debet, et quantum debet, et quomodo debet, vel prout non debet. Ergo bonitas voluntatis non solum dependet ex objecto, sed etiam ex circumstantiis.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.2.arg.3] Further, ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will, as stated above (Question 6, Article 8). But it would not be so, unless the goodness or malice of the will depended on the circumstances. Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend on the circumstances, and not only on the object.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ignorantia circumstantiarum excusat malitiam voluntatis, ut supra habitum est. Sed hoc non esset, nisi bonitas et malitia voluntatis a circumstantiis dependent. Ergo bonitas et malitia voluntatis de- Ita codd.; in Parm. et in edit.: « bonus sem-per, sed aliquando malus. » Ita omnes codd.; in pendent ex circumstantiis, et non e solo objecto.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.2.sc] An action does not take its species from the circumstances as such, as stated above (18, 10, ad 2). But good and evil are specific differences of the act of the will, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend, not on the circumstances, but on the object alone.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.2.sc] Sed contra, ex circumstantiis, inquantum hujusmodi, actus non habet speciem, ut supra dictum est. Sed bonum et malum sunt specificæ differentiæ actus voluntatis, ut dictum est. Ergo bonitas et malitia voluntatis non dependent ex circumstantiis, sed ex solo objecto.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.2.co] In every genus, the more a thing is first, the more simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which it consists: thus primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to be observed that the first things in every genus, are, in some way, simple and consist of one principle. Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human actions is taken from the act of the will. Consequently the goodness and malice of the act of the will depend on some one thing; while the goodness and malice of other acts may depend on several things.
\nNow that one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not something accidental to that genus, but something essential thereto: because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as to its principle. Therefore the goodness of the will's act depends on that one thing alone, which of itself causes goodness in the act; and that one thing is the object, and not the circumstances, which are accidents, as it were, of the act.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in quolibet genere, quanto aliquid est prius, tanto est simplicius, et in paucioribus consistens, sicut prima corpora sunt simplicia; et ideo invenimus quod ea quæ sunt prima in quolibet genere, sunt aliquo modo simplicia, et in uno consistunt. Principium autem bonitatis et malitiæ humanorum actuum est ex actu voluntatis; et ideo bonitas et malitia voluntatis secundum aliquid unum attenduntur; aliorum vero actuum bonitas et malitia possunt secundum diversa attendi. Illud autem unum quod est principium in quolibet genere, non est per accidens, sed per se; quia omne quod est per accidens, reducitur ad id quod est per se sicut ad principium. Et ideo bonitas voluntatis ex solo uno illo dependet quod per se facit bonitatem in actu, scilicet ex objecto, et non ex circumstantiis, quæ sunt quædam accidentia actus.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.2.ad.1] The end is the object of the will, but not of the other powers. Hence, in regard to the act of the will, the goodness derived from the object, does not differ from that which is derived from the end, as they differ in the acts of the other powers; except perhaps accidentally, in so far as one end depends on another, and one act of the will on another.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod finis est objectum voluntatis, non autem aliarum virium. Unde quantum ad actum voluntatis non differt bonitas quæ est ex objecto, a bonitate quæ est ex fine, sicut in actibus aliarum virium; nisi forte per accidens, prout finis dependet ex fine, et voluntas ex voluntate.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.2.ad.2] Given that the act of the will is fixed on some good, no circumstances can make that act bad. Consequently when it is said that a man wills a good when he ought not, or where he ought not, this can be understood in two ways. First, so that this circumstance is referred to the thing willed. And thus the act of the will is not fixed on something good: since to will to do something when it ought not to be done, is not to will something good. Secondly, so that the circumstance is referred to the act of willing. And thus, it is impossible to will something good when one ought not to, because one ought always to will what is good: except, perhaps, accidentally, in so far as a man by willing some particular good, is prevented from willing at the same time another good which he ought to will at that time. And then evil results, not from his willing that particular good, but from his not willing the other. The same applies to the other circumstances.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod supposito quod voluntas sit boni, nulla circumstantia potest eam facere malam. Quod ergo dicitur quod aliquis vult aliquod bonum quando non debet, potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo ita quod ista circumstantia referatur ad volitum, et sic voluntas non est boni, quia velle facere aliquid, quando non debet fieri, non est velle bonum. Alio modo ita quod referatur ad actum volendi, et sic imposibile est quod aliquis velit bonum quando non debet, quia semper homo debet velle bonum; nisi forte per accidens, inquantum aliquis volendo hoc bonum, impeditur ne tunc velit aliquod bonum debitum, et tunc non incidit malum ex eo quod aliquis vult illud bonum, sed ex eo quod non vult aliud bonum. Et similiter dicendum est de aliis circumstantiis.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.2.ad.3] Ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will, in so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed: that is to say, in so far as a man ignores the circumstances of the act which he wills.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod circumstantiarum ignorantia excusat malitiam voluntatis, secundum quod circumstantiæ se tenent ex parte voliti, inquantum scilicet ignorat circumstantias actus quem vult.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on reason. For what comes first does not depend on what follows. But the good belongs to the will before it belongs to reason, as is clear from what has been said above (Question 9, Article 1). Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis non dependeat a ratione. Prius enim non dependet a posteriori. Sed bonum per prius pertinet ad voluntatem quam ad rationem, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo bonum voluntatis non dependet a ratione.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.3.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that the goodness of the practical intellect is \"a truth that is in conformity with right desire.\" But right desire is a good will. Therefore the goodness of the practical reason depends on the goodness of the will, rather than conversely.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. II, quod « bonitas intellectus practici est verum conforme appetitui recto. » Appetitus autem rectus est voluntas bona. Ergo bonitas rationis practicæ magis dependet a bonitate voluntatis quam e converso.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.3.arg.3] Further, the mover does not depend on that which is moved, but vice versa. But the will moves the reason and the other powers, as stated above (Question 9, Article 1). Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, movens non dependet ab eo quod movetur, sed e converso. Voluntas autem movet rationem et alias vires, ut supra dictum est. Ergo bonitas voluntatis non dependet a ratione.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.3.sc] Hilary says (De Trin. x): \"It is an unruly will that persists in its desires in opposition to reason.\" But the goodness of the will consists in not being unruly. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its being subject to reason.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Hilarius dicit in X De Trinit., § 1, col. 344, t. 2: « Immoderata est omnis susceptarum voluntatum pertinacia; ubi non rationi voluntas subjicitur. » Sed bonitas voluntatis consistit in hoc quod non sit immoderata. Ergo bonitas voluntatis dependet ex hoc quod sit subjecta rationi.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.3.co] As stated above (1,2), the goodness of the will depends properly on the object. Now the will's object is proposed to it by reason. Because the good understood is the proportionate object of the will; while sensitive or imaginary good is proportionate not to the will but to the sensitive appetite: since the will can tend to the universal good, which reason apprehends; whereas the sensitive appetite tends only to the particular good, apprehended by the sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on reason, in the same way as it depends on the object.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, bonitas voluntatis proprie ex objecto dependet. Objectum autem voluntatis proponiur ei per rationem; nam bonum intellectus est objectum voluntatis proportionatum ei. Bonum autem sensibile vel imaginarium Bonitas essentialis ex objecto, accessoria ex objecti circumstantiis: sic quidam. Voluntas pro objecto circumstantias habet: sic alli. Voluntas non est proportionatum voluntati, sed appetitui sensitivo: quia voluntas potest tendere in bonum universale, quod ratio apprehendit; appetitus autem sensitivus non tendit nisi in bonum particulare, quod apprehendit vis sensitiva. Et ideo bonitas voluntatis dependet a ratione eo modo quo dependet ab objecto.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.3.ad.1] The good considered as such, i.e. as appetible, pertains to the will before pertaining to the reason. But considered as true it pertains to the reason, before, under the aspect of goodness, pertaining to the will: because the will cannot desire a good that is not previously apprehended by reason.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod bonum sub ratione boni, id est, appetibilis, per prius pertinet ad voluntatem quam ad rationem: sed tamen per prius pertinet ad rationem sub ratione veri, quam ad voluntatem sub ratione appetibilis; quia appetitus voluntatis non potest esse de bono, nisi prius a ratione apprehendatur.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.3.ad.2] The Philosopher speaks here of the practical intellect, in so far as it counsels and reasons about the means: for in this respect it is perfected by prudence. Now in regard to the means, the rectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with the desire of a due end: nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes on the part of reason a right apprehension of the end.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod philosophus ibi loquitur de intellectu practico, secundum quod est consiliativus et ratiocinativus eorum quæ sunt ad finem; sic enim perficitur per prudentiam. In his autem quæ sunt ad finem, rectitudo rationis consistit in conformitate ad appetitum finis debiti; sed tamen et ipse appetitus finis debiti præsupponit rectam apprehensionem de fine, quæ est per rationem.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.3.ad.3] The will moves the reason in one way: the reason moves the will in another, viz. on the part of the object, as stated above (Question 9, Article 01).
\n[I-II.q.19.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntas quodam modo movet rationem, et ratio alio modo movet voluntatem, ex parte scilicet objecti, ut supra dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not depend on the eternal law. Because to one thing there is one rule and one measure. But the rule of the human will, on which its goodness depends, is right reason. Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on the eternal law.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis humanæ non dependat a lege æterna. Unius enim una est regula et mensura. Sed regula humanæ voluntatis, ex qua ejus bonitas dependet, est ratio recta. Ergo non dependet bonitas voluntatis a lege æterna.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.4.arg.2] Further, \"a measure is homogeneous with the thing measured\" (Metaph. x, 1). But the eternal law is not homogeneous with the human will. Therefore the eternal law cannot be the measure on which the goodness of the human will depends.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, « mensura est homogenea mensurato, » ut dicitur in X Met., text. 4. Sed lex æterna non est homogenea voluntati humanæ. Ergo lex æterna non potest esse mensura voluntatis humanæ, ut ab ea bonitas ejus dependat.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.4.arg.3] Further, a measure should be most certain. But the eternal law is unknown to us. Therefore it cannot be the measure on which the goodness of our will depends.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, mensura debet esse certissima. Sed lex æterna est nobis ignota. Ergo non potest esse nostræ voluntatis mensura, ut ab ea bonitas voluntatis nostræ dependat.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.4.sc] Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that \"sin is a deed, word or desire against the eternal law.\" But malice of the will is the root of sin. Therefore, since malice is contrary to goodness, the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit XXII Contra Faustum, cap. xxvii, col. 418, t. 8, quod « peccatum est dictum, factum vel concupitum aliquid contra æternam legem. » Sed malitia voluntatis est radix peccati. Ergo cum malitia bonitati opponatur, bonitas voluntatis dependet a lege æterna.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.4.co] Wherever a number of causes are subordinate to one another, the effect depends more on the first than on the second cause: since the second cause acts only in virtue of the first. Now it is from the eternal law, which is the Divine Reason, that human reason is the rule of the human will, from which the human derives its goodness. Hence it is written (Psalm 4:6-7): \"Many say: Who showeth us good things? The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us\": as though to say: \"The light of our reason is able to show us good things, and guide our will, in so far as it is the light (i.e. derived from) Thy countenance.\" It is therefore evident that the goodness of the human will depends on the eternal law much more than on human reason: and when human reason fails we must have recourse to the Eternal Reason.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in omnibus causis ordinatis effectus plus dependet a causa prima quam a causa secunda, quia causa secunda non agit nisi in virtute primæ causæ. Quod autem ratio humana sit regula voluntatis humanæ, ex qua ejus bonitas mensuretur, habet ex lege æterna, quæ est ratio divina; unde in psal. iv, 6 et 7, dicitur: Multi dicunt: Quis ostendit nobis bona? Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine; quasi diceret: Lumen rationis, quod in nobis est, intantum potest nobis ostendere bona, et nostram voluntatem regulare, inquantum est lumen vultus tui, id est, a vultu tuo derivatum. Unde manifestum est, quod multo magis dependet bonitas voluntatis humanæ a lege æterna quam a ratione humana; et ubi deficit humana ratio, oportet ad rationem æternam recurrere.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.4.ad.1] To one thing there are not several proximate measures; but there can be several measures if one is subordinate to the other.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod unius rei non sunt plures mensuræ proximæ, possunt tamen esse plures mensuræ, quarum una sub alia ordinetur.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.4.ad.2] A proximate measure is homogeneous with the thing measured; a remote measure is not.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod mensura proxima est homogenea mensurato: non autem mensura remota.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.4.ad.3] Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in the Divine Mind: nevertheless, it becomes known to us somewhat, either by natural reason which is derived therefrom as its proper image; or by some sort of additional revelation.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet lex æterna sit nobis ignota, secundum quod est in mente divina, innotescit tamen nobis aliquiditer vel per rationem naturalem, quæ ab ea derivatur ut propria ejus imago, vel per aliqualem revelationem superadditam.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that the will is not evil when it is at variance with erring reason. Because the reason is the rule of the human will, in so far as it is derived from the eternal law, as stated above (Article 4). But erring reason is not derived from the eternal law. Therefore erring reason is not the rule of the human will. Therefore the will is not evil, if it be at variance with erring reason.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod voluntas discordans a ratione errante non sit mala. Ratio enim est regula voluntatis humanæ, inquantum derivatur a lege æterna, ut dictum est. Sed ratio errans non derivatur a lege æterna. Ergo ratio errans non est regula voluntatis humanæ: non est ergo voluntas mala, si discordat a ratione errante.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.5.arg.2] Further, according to Augustine, the command of a lower authority does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority: for instance, if a provincial governor command something that is forbidden by the emperor. But erring reason sometimes proposes what is against the command of a higher power, namely, God Whose power is supreme. Therefore the decision of an erring reason does not bind. Consequently the will is not evil if it be at variance with erring reason.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, secundum Augustinum, Serm. lxii de Verb. Dom., cap. viii, § 13, col. 420, t. 5, « inferioris potestatis præceptum non obligat, si contrarietur præcepto potestatis superioris; sicut si proconsul jubat aliquid [quod imperator prohibet. » Sed ratio errans quandoque proponit aliquid quod est contra præceptum superioris, scilicet Dei, cujus est summa potestas. Ergo dictamen rationis errantis non obligat; non est ergo voluntas mala, si discordet a ratione errante.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.5.arg.3] Further, every evil will is reducible to some species of malice. But the will that is at variance with erring reason is not reducible to some species of malice. For instance, if a man's reason err in telling him to commit fornication, his will in not willing to do so, cannot be reduced to any species of malice. Therefore the will is not evil when it is at variance with erring reason.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnis voluntas mala reduciur ad aliquam speciem malitiæ. Sed voluntas discordans a ratione errante non potest reduci ad aliquam speciem malitiæ: puta si ratio errans errat in hoc quod dicat esse fornicandum, voluntas ejus qui fornicari non vult, ad nullam malitiam reduci potest. Ergo voluntas discordans a ratione errante non est mala.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.5.sc] As stated in the I, 79, 13, conscience is nothing else than the application of knowledge to some action. Now knowledge is in the reason. Therefore when the will is at variance with erring reason, it is against conscience. But every such will is evil; for it is written (Romans 14:23): \"All that is not of faith\"--i.e. all that is against conscience--\"is sin.\" Therefore the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.5.sc] Sed contra, sicut in primo dictum est, conscientia nihil aliud est quam applicatio scientiæ ad aliquem actum. Scientia autem in ratione est. Voluntas ergo discordans a ratione errante est contra conscientiam. Sed omnis talis voluntas est mala; dicitur enim Rom., xiv, 23: Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est, id est, omne quod est contra conscientiam. Ergo voluntas discordans a ratione errante est mala.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.5.co] Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason (for it is an application of knowledge to action, as was stated in the I, 19, 13), to inquire whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason, is the same as to inquire \"whether an erring conscience binds.\" On this matter, some distinguished three kinds of actions: for some are good generically; some are indifferent; some are evil generically. And they say that if reason or conscience tell us to do something which is good generically, there is no error: and in like manner if it tell us not to do something which is evil generically; since it is the same reason that prescribes what is good and forbids what is evil. On the other hand if a man's reason or conscience tells him that he is bound by precept to do what is evil in itself; or that what is good in itself, is forbidden, then his reason or conscience errs. In like manner if a man's reason or conscience tell him, that what is indifferent in itself, for instance to raise a straw from the ground, is forbidden or commanded, his reason or conscience errs. They say, therefore, that reason or conscience when erring in matters of indifference, either by commanding or by forbidding them, binds: so that the will which is at variance with that erring reason is evil and sinful. But they say that when reason or conscience errs in commanding what is evil in itself, or in forbidding what is good in itself and necessary for salvation, it does not bind; wherefore in such cases the will which is at variance with erring reason or conscience is not evil.
\nBut this is unreasonable. For in matters of indifference, the will that is at variance with erring reason or conscience, is evil in some way on account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of the will depends; not indeed on account of the object according as it is in its own nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by reason as something evil to do or to avoid. And since the object of the will is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above (Article 3), from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as being evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil. And this is the case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good or evil in themselves. For not only indifferent matters can received the character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also that which is good, can receive the character of evil, or that which is evil, can receive the character of goodness, on account of the reason apprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain from fornication is good: yet the will does not tend to this good except in so far as it is proposed by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose it as an evil, the will tends to it as to something evil. Consequently the will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that which is evil in itself, but that which is evil accidentally, through being apprehended as such by the reason. In like manner, to believe in Christ is good in itself, and necessary for salvation: but the will does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason. Consequently if it be proposed by the reason as something evil, the will tends to it as to something evil: not as if it were evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the apprehension of the reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 9) that \"properly speaking the incontinent man is one who does not follow right reason; but accidentally, he is also one who does not follow false reason.\" We must therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at variance with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum conscientia sit quodammodo dictamen rationis, est enim quædam applicatio scientiæ ad actum, ut in primo dictum est, idem est quærere « utrum voluntas discordans a ratione errante sit mala, » quod quærere « utrum conscientia errans obliget. » Circa quod aliqui distinxerunt tria genera actuum. Quidam enim sunt boni ex genere: quidam sunt indifferentes; quidam sunt mali ex genere. Dicunt ergo, quod si ratio vel conscientia dicat] aliquid esse faciendum quod sit bonum ex suo genere, non est ibi error; similiter si dicat aliquid non esse faciendum quod est malum ex suo genere; eadem enim ratione præcipiuntur bona, qua prohibentur mala. Sed si ratio vel conscientia dicat aliqui quod illa quæ sunt secundum se mala, homo teneatur facere ex præcepto, vel quod illa quæ sunt secundum se bona, sint prohibita, erit ratio vel conscientia errans; et similiter si ratio vel conscientia dicat aliqui quod id quod est secundum se indifferens, ut levare festucam de terra, sit prohibitum vel præceptum, erit ratio vel conscientia errans. Dicunt ergo quod ratio vel conscientia errans circa indifferentia, sive præcipiendo sive prohibendo, obligat; ita quod voluntas discordans a tali ratione errante erit mala, et peccatum. Sed ratio vel conscientia errans præcipiendo ea quæ sunt per se mala, vel prohibendo ea quæ sunt per se bona et necessaria ad salutem, non obligat; unde in talibus voluntas discordans a ratione vel conscientia errante non est mala. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur. In indifferentibus enim voluntas discordans a ratione vel conscientia errante est mala aliquo modo propter objectum, a quo bonitas vel malitia voluntatis dependet; non autem propter objectum secundum sui naturam, sed secundum quod per accidens a ratione apprehenditur ut bonum vel malum, ad faciendum vel ad vitandum. Et quia objectum voluntatis est id quod proponitur a ratione, ut dictum est, ex quo aliquid proponitur a ratione ut malum, voluntas, dum in illud fertur, accipit rationem mali. Hoc autem contingit non solum in indifferentibus, sed etiam in per se bonis vel malis. Non solum enim id quod est indifferens, potest accipere rationem boni vel mali per accidens, sed etiam id quod est bonum potest accipere rationem mali, vel illud quod est malum, rationem boni, propter apprehensionem rationis: puta abstinere a fornicatione, bonum quoddam est; tamen in hoc bonum non fertur voluntas, nisi secundum quod a ratione proponitur. Si ergo proponatur ut malum a ratione errante, fertur in hoc sub ratione mali. Unde voluntas erit mala, quia vult malum, non quidem id quod est malum per se, sed id quod est malum per accidens, propter apprehensionem rationis. Et similiter credere in Christum est per se bonum et necessaria ad salutem; sed voluntas non fertur in hoc, nisi secundum quod a ratione proponitur. Unde si a ratione proponatur ut malum voluntas feretur in hoc ut malum, non quia illud sit malum secundum se, sed quia est malum per accidens ex apprehensione rationis. Et ideo Philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., cap. i et ii, quod per se loquendo incontinens est qui non sequitur rationem rectam, per accidens autem qui non sequitur rationem falsam. Unde dicendum, quod simpliciter omnis voluntas discordans a ratione, sive recta sive errante, semper est mala.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.5.ad.1] Although the judgment of an erring reason is not derived from God, yet the erring reason puts forward its judgment as being true, and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom is all truth.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod judicium rationis errantis, licet non derivetur a Deo, tamen ratio errans judicium suum proponit ut verum, et per consequens ut a Deo derivatum, a quo est omnis veritas.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.5.ad.2] The saying of Augustine holds good when it is known that the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to the command of the higher authority. But if a man were to believe the command of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in scorning the command of the proconsul he would scorn the command of the emperor. In like manner if a man were to know that human reason was dictating something contrary to God's commandment, he would not be bound to abide by reason: but then reason would not be entirely erroneous. But when erring reason proposes something as being commanded by God, then to scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn the commandment of God.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum Augustini habet locum quando cognoscitur quod inferior potestas præcipit aliquid contra præceptum superioris potestatis. Sed si aliquis crederet quod præceptum proconsulis esset præceptum imperatoris, contemnendo præceptum proconsulis, contemneret præceptum imperatoris. Et similiter, si aliquis homo cognosceret quod ratio humana dictaret aliquid contra præceptum Dei, non teneretur rationem sequi; sed tunc ratio non totaliter esset errans. Sed quando ratio errans proponit aliquid ut præceptum Dei, tunc idem est contemnere dictamen rationis, et Dei præceptum.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.5.ad.3] Whenever reason apprehends something as evil, it apprehends it under some species of evil; for instance, as being something contrary to a divine precept, or as giving scandal, or for some such like reason. And then that evil is reduced to that species of malice.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio, quando apprehendit aliquid ut malum, semper apprehendit illud sub aliqua ratione mali, puta quia contrariatur divino præcepto, vel quia est scandalum, vel propter aliquod hujusmodi; et tunc ad talem speciem malitiæ reducitur talis mala voluntas.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that the will is good when it abides by erring reason. For just as the will, when at variance with the reason, tends to that which reason judges to be evil; so, when in accord with reason, it tends to what reason judges to be good. But the will is evil when it is at variance with reason, even when erring. Therefore even when it abides by erring reason, the will is good.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod voluntas concordans rationi erranti sit bona. Sicut enim voluntas discordans a ratione tendit in id quod ratio judicat malum, ita voluntas concordans rationi tendit in id quod ratio judicat bonum. Sed voluntas discordans a ratione etiam errante est mala. Ergo voluntas concordans rationi etiam erranti est bona.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.6.arg.2] Further, the will is always good, when it abides by the commandment of God and the eternal law. But the eternal law and God's commandment are proposed to us by the apprehension of the reason, even when it errs. Therefore the will is good, even when it abides by erring reason.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, voluntas concordans præcepto Dei et legi æternæ semper est bona. Sed lex æterna, et præceptum Dei proponitur nobis per apprehensionem rationis etiam errantis. Ergo voluntas concordans etiam rationi erranti est bona.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.6.arg.3] Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason. If, therefore, the will is evil also when it abides by erring reason, it seems that the will is always evil when in conjunction with erring reason: so that in such a case a man would be in a dilemma, and, of necessity, would sin: which is unreasonable. Therefore the will is good when it abides by erring reason.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, voluntas discordans a ratione errante est mala. Si ergo voluntas concordans rationi erranti sit etiam mala, videtur quod omnis voluntas habentis rationem errantem sit mala; et sic talis homo erit perplexus, et ex necessitate peccabit; quod est inconveniens. Ergo voluntas concordans rationi erranti est bona.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.6.sc] The will of those who slew the apostles was evil. And yet it was in accord with the erring reason, according to John 16:2: \"The hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a service to God.\" Therefore the will can be evil, when it abides by erring reason.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.6.sc] Sed contra, voluntas occidentium apostolos erat mala; sed tamen concordabat rationi erranti ipsorum, secundum illud Joan., xvi, 2: Venit hora ut omnis qui interficit vos arbitretur obsequium se præstare Deo. Ergo voluntas concordans rationi erranti potest esse mala.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.6.co] Whereas the previous question is the same as inquiring \"whether an erring conscience binds\"; so this question is the same as inquiring \"whether an erring conscience excuses.\" Now this question depends on what has been said above about ignorance. For it was said (6, 8) that ignorance sometimes causes an act to be involuntary, and sometimes not. And since moral good and evil consist in action in so far as it is voluntary, as was stated above (Article 2); it is evident that when ignorance causes an act to be involuntary, it takes away the character of moral good and evil; but not, when it does not cause the act to be involuntary. Again, it has been stated above (Question 6, Article 8) that when ignorance is in any way willed, either directly or indirectly, it does not cause the act to be involuntary. And I call that ignorance \"directly\" voluntary, to which the act of the will tends: and that, \"indirectly\" voluntary, which is due to negligence, by reason of a man not wishing to know what he ought to know, as stated above (Question 6, Article 8).
\nIf then reason or conscience err with an error that is voluntary, either directly, or through negligence, so that one errs about what one ought to know; then such an error of reason or conscience does not excuse the will, that abides by that erring reason or conscience, from being evil. But if the error arise from ignorance of some circumstance, and without any negligence, so that it cause the act to be involuntary, then that error of reason or conscience excuses the will, that abides by that erring reason, from being evil. For instance, if erring reason tell a man that he should go to another man's wife, the will that abides by that erring reason is evil; since this error arises from ignorance of the Divine Law, which he is bound to know. But if a man's reason, errs in mistaking another for his wife, and if he wish to give her her right when she asks for it, his will is excused from being evil: because this error arises from ignorance of a circumstance, which ignorance excuses, and causes the act to be involuntary.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut præmissa quæstio eadem est cum questione qua quæritur « utrum conscientia erronea liget, » ita ista quæstio eadem est cum illa qua quæritur « utrum conscientia erronea excuset. » Hæc autem quæstio dependet ab eo quod supra de ignorantia dictum est. Dictum est enim supra, quod ignorantia quandoque causat involuntarium, quandoque autem non. Et quia bonum et malum morale consistit in actu, inquantum est voluntarius, ut ex præmissis patet, manifestum est, quod illa ignorantia quæ causat involuntarium, tollit rationem boni et mali moralis; non autem illa quæ involuntarium non causat. Dictum est etiam supra, quod ignorantia quæ est aliquo modo volita, sive directe sive indirecte, non causat involuntarium. Et dico ignorantiam directe voluntariam, in quam actus voluntatis fertur; indirecte autem propter negligentiam, ex eo quod aliquis non vult illud scire quod scire tenetur, ut supra dictum est. Si igitur ratio vel conscientia erret errore voluntario vel directe vel indirecte propter negligentiam, quia est error circa id quod quis scire tenetur, tunc talis error rationis vel conscientiae non excusat quin voluntas concordans rationi vel conscientiae sic erranti sit mala. Si autem sit error qui causet involuntarium, proveniens ex ignorantia alicujus circumstantiæ absque omni negligentia, tunc talis error rationis vel conscientiae excusat, ut voluntas concordans rationi erranti non sit mala: puta si ratio errans dicat quod homo teneatur ad uxorem alterius accedere, voluntas concordans huic rationi erranti est mala, eo quod error iste provenit ex ignorantia legis Dei quam scire tenetur; si autem ratio erret in hoc quod credat aliquam mulierem submissam esse suam uxorem, et ea petente debitum, velit eam cognoscere, excusatur voluntas ejus ut non sit mala, quia error iste ex ignorantia circumstantiæ provenit, quæ excusat et involuntarium causat.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.6.ad.1] As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), \"good results from the entire cause, evil from each particular defect.\" Consequently in order that the thing to which the will tends be called evil, it suffices, either that it be evil in itself, or that it be apprehended as evil. But in order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Dionysius dicit in iv cap. De divin. nom., § 31, col. 730, t. 1, « bonum causatur ex integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus defectibus. » Et ideo ad hoc quod dicatur malum id in quod fertur voluntas, sufficit sive quod secundum suam naturam sit malum, sive quod apprehendatur ut malum. Sed ad hoc quod sit bonum, requiritur quod utroque modo sit bonum.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.6.ad.2] The eternal law cannot err, but human reason can. Consequently the will that abides by human reason, is not always right, nor is it always in accord with the eternal law.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod lex æterna errare non potest, sed ratio humana potest errare: et ideo voluntas concordans rationi humanæ non semper est recta, nec semper est concordans legi æternæ.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.6.ad.3] Just as in syllogistic arguments, granted one absurdity, others must needs follow; so in moral matters, given one absurdity, others must follow too. Thus suppose a man to seek vainglory, he will sin, whether he does his duty for vainglory or whether he omit to do it. Nor is he in a dilemma about the matter: because he can put aside his evil intention. In like manner, suppose a man's reason or conscience to err through inexcusable ignorance, then evil must needs result in the will. Nor is this man in a dilemma: because he can lay aside his error, since his ignorance is vincible and voluntary.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut in syllogisticis, uno inconvenienti dato, necesse est alia sequi, ita in moralibus, uno inconvenienti posito, ex necessitate alia sequuntur; sicut supposito quod aliquis quærat inanem gloriam; sive propter inanem gloriam faciat quod facere tenetur, sive dimittat, semper peccabit: nec tamen est perplexus, quia potest intentionem malam dimittere. Et similiter supposito errore rationis vel conscientiæ, qui procedit ex ignorantia non excusante, necesse est quod sequatur malum in voluntate; nec tamen est homo perplexus, quia potest ab errore recedere, cum ignorantia sit vincibilis et voluntaria.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end. For it has been stated above (Article 2) that the goodness of the will depends on the object alone. But as regards the means, the object of the will is one thing, and the end intended is another. Therefore in such matters the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis non dependeat ex intentione finis. Dictum est enim supra, quod bonitas voluntatis dependet ex solo objecto. Sed in his quæ sunt ad finem, aliud est objectum voluntatis, et aliud finis inten-tus. Ergo in talibus bonitas voluntatis non dependet ab intentione finis.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.7.arg.2] Further, to wish to keep God's commandment, belongs to a good will. But this can be referred to an evil end, for instance, to vainglory or covetousness, by willing to obey God for the sake of temporal gain. Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, velle servare mandatum Dei pertinet ad voluntatem bonam. Sed hoc potest referri ad malum finem, scilicet ad finem inanis gloriæ vel cupiditatis, dum ali-quis vult obedire Deo propter temporalia consequenda. Ergo bonitas voluntatis non dependet ab intentione finis.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.7.arg.3] Further, just as good and evil diversify the will, so do they diversify the end. But malice of the will does not depend on the malice of the end intended; since a man who wills to steal in order to give alms, has an evil will, although he intends a good end. Therefore neither does the goodness of the will depend on the goodness of the end intended.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, bonum et malum, sicut diversificant voluntatem, ita diversificant finem. Sed malitia voluntatis non dependet a malitia finis intenti; qui enim vult furari, ut det eleemosynam, voluntatem malam habet, licet intendat finem bonum. Ergo etiam bonitas voluntatis non dependet a bonitate finis intenti.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.7.sc] Augustine says (Confess. ix, 3) that God rewards the intention. But God rewards a thing because it is good. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit IX Confessionum, cap. III, col. 765, t. 1, quod « intentio remuneratur a Deo. » Sed ex eo aliquid remuneratur a Deo, quia est bonum. Ergo bonitas voluntatis ex intentione finis dependet.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.7.co] The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the act of the will; first, as preceding it, secondly as following [Leonine edn.: 'accompanying'] it. The intention precedes the act of the will causally, when we will something because we intend a certain end. And then the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of the thing willed: for instance, when a man wills to fast for God's sake; because the act of fasting is specifically good from the very fact that it is done for God's sake. Wherefore, since the goodness of the will depends on the goodness of the thing willed, as stated above (1,2), it must, of necessity, depend on the intention of the end.
\nOn the other hand, intention follows the act of the will, when it is added to a preceding act of the will; for instance, a man may will to do something, and may afterwards refer it to God. And then the goodness of the previous act of the will does not depend on the subsequent intention, except in so far as that act is repeated with the subsequent intention.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod intentio dupliciter se potest habere ad voluntatem: uno modo ut pracedens; alio modo ut consequens 1. Præcedit quidem causaliter intentio voluntatem, quando aliquid volumus propter intentionem alicujus finis; et tunc ordo ad finem consideratur ut ratio quædam bonitatis ipsius voliti, puta cum aliquis vult jejunare propter Deum; habet enim jejunium rationem boni ex hoc ipso quod fit propter Deum. Unde cum bonitas voluntatis dependeat a bonitate voliti, ut supra dictum est, necesse est quod dependeat ex intentione finis. Consequitur autem intentio voluntatem, quando accedit voluntati præexistenti, puta si aliquis velit aliquid facere, et postea referat illud in Deum; et tunc primæ voluntatis bonitas non dependet ex intentione sequenti, nisi quatenus reiteratur actus voluntatis cum sequenti intentione.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.7.ad.1] When the intention is the cause of the act of willing, the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of the object, as stated above.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quando intentio est causa volendi, ordo ad finem accipitur ut quædam ratio bonitatis in objecto, ut dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.7.ad.2] The act of the will cannot be said to be good, if an evil intention is the cause of willing. For when a man wills to give an alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in itself, under a species of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it is evil. Wherefore his will is evil. If, however, the intention is subsequent to the act of the will, then the latter may be good: and the intention does not spoil that act of the will which preceded, but that which is repeated.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod voluntas non potest dici bona, si sit intentio mala causa volendi; qui enim vult dare eleemo-comitans, » et hæc vox in multis etiam codicibus inventur. synam propter inanem gloriam consequendam, vult id quod de se est bonum sub ratione mali; et ideo prout est volitum ab ipso, est malum; unde voluntas ejus est mala. Sed si intentio sit consequens, tunc voluntas potuit esse bona; et per intentionem sequentem non depravatur ille actus voluntatis, qui præcessit, sed actus voluntatis qui iteratur.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.7.ad.3] As we have already stated (06, ad 1), \"evil results from each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire cause.\" Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even under the species of good; or to the good under the species of evil, it will be evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good, it must tend to the good under the species of good; in other words, it must will the good for the sake of the good.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut jam dictum est, malum contingit ex singularibus defectibus, bonum autem ex tota et integra causa. Unde, sive voluntas sit ejus quod est secundum se malum sub ratione boni, sive sit boni sub ratione mali, semper voluntas erit mala; sed ad hoc quod sit voluntas bona, requiritur quod sit boni sub ratione boni, id est, quod velit bonum, et propter bonum.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will depends on the degree of good in the intention. Because on Matthew 12:35, \"A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good,\" a gloss says: \"A man does as much good as he intends.\" But the intention gives goodness not only to the external action, but also to the act of the will, as stated above (Article 7). Therefore the goodness of a man's will is according to the goodness of his intention.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod quantitas bonitatis in voluntate dependat ex quantitate bonitatis in intentione. Quia super illud Matth., xii, 35: Bonus homo de thesauro bono cordis sui profert bona*, dicit Glossa 1: «Tantum boni quis facit, quantum intendit.» Sed intentio non solum dat bonitatem actui exteriori, sed etiam voluntati, ut dictum est. Ergo tantum aliquis habet bonam voluntatem, quantum intendit.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.8.arg.2] Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the effect. But the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good will. Therefore a man's will is good, according as his intention is good.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, augmentata causa, augmentatur effectus. Sed intentionis bonitas est quædam 2 causa bonæ voluntatis. Ergo quantum quis intendit de bono, tantum voluntas est bona.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.8.arg.3] Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion to his intention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous intention, he would be guilty of murder. Therefore, for the same reason, in good actions, the will is good in proportion to the good intended.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in malis quantum aliquis intendit, tantum peccat; si enim aliquis projiciens lapidem intenderet facere homicidium, reus esset homicidii. Ergo pari ratione in bonis tantum est bona voluntas, quantum aliquis bonum intendit.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.8.sc] The intention can be good, while the will is evil. Therefore, for the same reason, the intention can be better, and the will less good.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.8.sc] Sed contra, potest esse intentio bona, et voluntas mala. Ergo pari ratione potest esse intentio magis bona, et voluntas minus bona.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.8.co] In regard to both the act, and the intention of the end, we may consider a twofold quantity: one, on the part of the object, by reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater; the other, taken from the intensity of the act, according as a man wills or acts intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.
\nIf then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of view of the object, it is evident that the quantity in the act does not depend on the quantity in the intention. With regard to the external act this may happen in two ways. First, through the object that is ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that end; for instance, if a man were to give ten pounds, he could not realize his intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds. Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may supervene in regard to the exterior action, which obstacles we are unable to remove: for instance, a man intends to go to Rome, and encounters obstacles, which prevent him from going. On the other hand, with regard to the interior act of the will, this happens in only one way: because the interior acts of the will are in our power, whereas the external actions are not. But the will can will an object that is not proportionate to the intended end: and thus the will that tends to that object considered absolutely, is not so good as the intention. Yet because the intention also belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, inasmuch, to wit, as it is the reason thereof; it comes to pass that the quantity of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act of the will; that is to say, in so far as the will wills some great good for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great a good, is not proportionate to that good.
\nBut if we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act, according to their respective intensity, then the intensity of the intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the will: since the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of form, as is clear from what has been said above (12, 4; 18, 6). And yet considered materially, while the intention is intense, the interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much intensity to take medicine as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless the very fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal principle, upon the intense volition of medicine.
\nWe must observe, however, that the intensity of the interior or exterior act, may be referred to the intention as its object: as when a man intends to will intensely, or to do something intensely. And yet it does not follow that he wills or acts intensely; because the quantity of goodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend on the quantity of the good intended, as is shown above. And hence it is that a man does not merit as much as he intends to merit: because the quantity of merit is measured by the intensity of the act, as we shall show later on (20, 04; 114, 4).
\n[I-II.q.19.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa actum et intentionem finis duplex quantitas potest considerari: una ex parte objecti, quia vult majus bonum, vel agit; alia ex intentione actus, quia intense vult vel agit; quod est majus ex parte agentis. Si igitur loquamur de quantitate utriusque quantum ad objectum, manifestum est quod quantitas actus non sequitur quantitatem intentionis. Quod quidem ex parte actus exterioris contingere potest dupliciter: uno modo, quia objectum quod ordinatur ad finem intentum, non est proportionatum fini illi; sicut si quis daret decem libras, non posset consequi suam intentionem, si intenderet emere rem valentem centum libras; alio modo propter impedimenta quæ supervenire possunt circa exteriorem actum, quæ non est in potestate nostra removere, puta aliquis intendit ire usque Romam, et occurrunt ei impedimenta, quod non potest hoc facere. Sed ex parte interioris actus voluntatis non est nisi uno modo, quia interiores actus voluntatis sunt in potestate nostra, non autem exteriores actus. Sed voluntas potest velle aliquod objectum non proportionatum fini intento; et sic voluntas, quæ fertur in illud objectum absolute consideratum, non est tantum bona, quantum est intentio. Sed quia etiam ipsa intentio quodammodo pertinet ad actum voluntatis, inquantum scilicet est ratio ejus, propter hoc redundat quantitas bonæ intentionis in voluntatem, inquantum scilicet voluntas vult aliquod bonum magnum ut finem, licet illud per quod vult consequi tantum bonum, non sit dignum illo bono. Si vero consideretur quantitas intentionis et actus secundum intentionem utriusque, sic intensio intentionis redundat in actum interiorem et exteriorem voluntatis, quia ipsa intentio quodammodo se habet formaliter ad utrumque, ut ex supra dictis patet, licet materialiter intentione 3 existente intensa, possit esse actus interior vel exterior non ita intensus, materialiter loquendo: puta cum aliquis non ita intense vult medicinam sumere, sicut vult sanitatem; tamen hoc ipsum quod est intense intendere sanitatem, redundat formaliter in hoc quod est 2 Ita codic.; vox tamen illa: «quædam» in Parm. et in edit. deest.; in intense velle medicinam. Sed tamen hoc est considerandum, quod intensio actus interioris vel exterioris potest referri ad intentionem ut objectum, puta cum aliquis intendit intense velle, vel aliquid intense operari, et tamen non propter hoc intense vult vel operatur; quia quantitatem intenti boni non sequitur bonitas actus interioris, vel exterioris, ut dictum est. Et inde est quod non quantum aliquis intendit mereri, meretur; quia quantitas meriti consistit in intensione actus, ut infra dicetur.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.8.ad.1] This gloss speaks of good as in the estimation of God, Who considers principally the intention of the end. Wherefore another gloss says on the same passage that \"the treasure of the heart is the intention, according to which God judges our works.\" For the goodness of the intention, as stated above, redounds, so to speak, upon the goodness of the will, which makes even the external act to be meritorious in God's sight.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Glossa illa loquitur quantum ad reputationem Dei, qui praecipue considerat intentionem finis. Unde alia Glossa, dicit ibidem, quod « thesaurus cordis intentio est, ex qua Deus judicat opera. » Bonitas enim intentionis, ut dictum est, redundat quodammodo in bonitatem voluntatis, quæ facit etiam exteriorem actum apud Deum meritorium.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.8.ad.2] The goodness of the intention is not the whole cause of a good will. Hence the argument does not prove.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonitas intentionis non est tota causa bonæ voluntatis; unde ratio non sequitur.
\n[I-II.q.19.a.8.ad.3] The mere malice of the intention suffices to make the will evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as the intention is evil. But the same reasoning does not apply to goodness, as stated above (ad 2).
\n[I-II.q.19.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sola malitia intentionis sufficit ad malitiam voluntatis; et ideo etiam quantum mala est intentio, tantum etiam mala est voluntas. Sed non est eadem ratio de bonitate, ut dictum est.
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