[I-II.q.20.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that good and evil are in the external action prior to being in the act of the will. For the will derives goodness from its object, as stated above (19, 1,2). But the external action is the object of the interior act of the will: for a man is said to will to commit a theft, or to will to give an alms. Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod bonum et malum per prius consistat in actu exteriori quam in actu voluntatis. Voluntas enim habet bonitatem ex objecto, ut supra dictum est. Sed actus exterior est objectum interioris actus voluntatis; dicimur enim velle furtum, vel velle dare eleemosynam. Ergo bonum et malum per prius est in actu exteriori, quam in actu voluntatis.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.1.arg.2] Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end: since what is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from its relation to the end. Now whereas the act of the will cannot be an end, as stated above (1, 1, ad 2), the act of another power can be an end. Therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to being in the act of the will.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, bonum per prius convenit fini; quia ea quæ sunt ad finem, habent rationem boni ex or dine ad finem. Actus autem voluntatis non potest esse finis, ut supra dictum est; actus autem alicujus potentiæ potest esse finis. Ergo per prius consistit bonum in actu potentiæ alterius quam in actu voluntatis.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.1.arg.3] Further, the act of the will stands in a formal relation to the external action, as stated above (Question 18, Article 6). But that which is formal is subsequent; since form is something added to matter. Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, actus voluntatis formaliter se habet ad actum exteriorem, ut supra dictum est. Sed id quod est formale, est posterius; nam forma advenit materiæ. Ergo per prius est bonum et malum in actu exteriori quam in actu voluntatis.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.1.sc] Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that \"it is by the will that we sin, and that we behave aright.\" Therefore moral good and evil are first in the will.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. I Retract., cap. Ⅺ, § 4, col. 596, t. 1, quod « voluntas est qua peccatur, et recte vivitur. » Ergo bonum et malum morale per prius consistit in voluntate.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.1.co] External actions may be said to be good or bad in two ways. First, in regard to their genus, and the circumstances connected with them: thus the giving of alms, if the required conditions be observed, is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, from its relation to the end: thus the giving of alms for vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the end is the will's proper object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil, which the external action derives from its relation to the end, is to be found first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes to the external action. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the external action has of itself, on account of its being about due matter and its being attended by due circumstances, is not derived from the will, but rather from the reason. Consequently, if we consider the goodness of the external action, in so far as it comes from reason's ordination and apprehension, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will: but if we consider it in so far as it is in the execution of the action done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its principle.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod aliqui actus exteriores possunt dici boni vel mali dupli-citer. Uno modo secundum genus suum, et secundum circumstantias in ipsis consideratas; sicut dare eleemosynam, servatis debitis circumstantiis, dicitur esse bonum. Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse bonum vel malum ex ordine ad finem; sicut dare eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam dicitur esse malum. Cum autem finis sit proprium objectum voluntatis, manifestum est quod ista ratio boni vel mali, quam habet actus exterior ex ordine ad finem, per prius invenitur in actu voluntatis, et ex eo derivatur ad actum exteriorem. Bonitas autem vel malitia quam habet actus exterior secundum se propter debitam materiam et debitas circumstantias, non derivatur a voluntate, sed magis a ratione. Unde, si consideretur bonitas exterioris actus, secundum quod est in ordinatione et apprehensione rationis, prior est quam bonitas actus voluntatis. Sed si consideretur, secundum quod est in executione operis, sequitur bonitatem voluntatis, quæ est principium ejus.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.1.ad.1] The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good apprehended and ordained by the reason: and thus it is prior to the good in the act of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the execution of the action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod actus exterior est objectum voluntatis, inquantum proponitur voluntati a ratione ut quoddam bonum apprehensum et ordinatum per rationem; et sic est prius bonum quam actus voluntatis; inquantum vero consistit in executione operis, est effectus voluntatis, et sequitur voluntatem.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.1.ad.2] The end precedes in the order of intention, but follows in the order of execution.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod finis est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in executione.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.1.ad.3] A form as received into matter, is subsequent to matter in the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order of nature: but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in every way. Now the will is compared to the exterior action, as its efficient cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as existing in the active cause, is the form of the exterior action.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod forma secundum quod est recepta in materia, est posterior in via generationis quam materia, licet sit prior natura; sed secundum quod est in causa agente, est omnibus modis prior. Voluntas autem comparatur ad actum exteriorem sicut causa efficiens. Unde bonitas actus voluntatis est forma exterioris actus, sicut in causa agente existens.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the external action depend on the goodness of the will. For it is written (Matthew 7:18): \"A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit.\" But, according to the gloss, the tree signifies the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it is impossible for the interior act of the will to be good, and the external action evil, or vice versa.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod tota bonitas et malitia actus exterioris dependeat ex voluntate. Dicitur enim Matth., VII, 18: Non potest arbor bona malos fructus facere, nec arbor mala facere fructus bonos*. Per arborem autem intelligitur voluntas, et per fructum intelligitur opus, secundum Glossam ord., col. 111, t. 2. Ergo non potest esse quod voluntas interior sit bona, et actus exterior sit malus, aut e converso.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.2.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that there is no sin without the will. If therefore there is no sin in the will, there will be none in the external action. And so the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the will.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in lib. I Retract., cap. Ⅺ, § 4, col. 596, t. 1, quod non In — In » deest in Parm. Glossa ord. Strabi. nisi voluntate peccatur. Si ergo non sit pecatum in voluntate, non erit peccatum in exteriori actu, et ita tota bonitas vel malitia exterioris actus ex voluntate dependet.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.2.arg.3] Further, the good and evil of which we are speaking now are differences of the moral act. Now differences make an essential division in a genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 12). Since therefore an act is moral from being voluntary, it seems that goodness and malice in an act are derived from the will alone.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, bonum et malum, de quo nunc loquimur, sunt differentiæ moralis actus. Differentiæ autem per se dividunt genus secundum Philosophum, in VII Metaph., text. 43. Cum igitur actus sit moralis ex eo quod est voluntarius, videtur quod bonum et malum accipitur in actu solum ex parte voluntatis.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.2.sc] Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that \"there are some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good.\"
\n[I-II.q.20.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. Contra mendacium, cap. vii, § 18, col. 528, t. 6, quod « quædam sunt quæ nullo quasi bono fine, aut bona voluntate possunt bene fieri. »
\n[I-II.q.20.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), we may consider a twofold goodness or malice in the external action: one in respect of due matter and circumstances; the other in respect of the order to the end. And that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on the will: while that which is in respect of due matter or circumstances, depends on the reason: and on this goodness depends the goodness of the will, in so far as the will tends towards it.
\nNow it must be observed, as was noted above (19, 6, ad 1), that for a thing to be evil, one single defect suffices, whereas, for it to be good simply, it is not enough for it to be good in one point only, it must be good in every respect. If therefore the will be good, both from its proper object and from its end, if follows that the external action is good. But if the will be good from its intention of the end, this is not enough to make the external action good: and if the will be evil either by reason of its intention of the end, or by reason of the act willed, it follows that the external action is evil.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut jam dictum est, in exteriori actu potest considerari duplex bonitas vel malitia; una secundum debitam materiam et circumstantias; alia secundum ordinem ad finem. Et illa quidem quæ est secundum ordinem ad finem, tota dependet ex voluntate; illa autem quæ est ex debita materia vel circumstantiis, dependet ex ratione; et ex hac dependet bonitas voluntatis, secundum quod in ipsam fertur. Est autem considerandum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad hoc quod aliquid sit malum, sufficit unus singularis defectus; ad hoc autem quod sit simplicitur bonum, non sufficit unum singulare bonum, sed requiritur integritas bonitatis. Si igitur voluntas sit bona et ex objecto proprio, et ex fine, consequens est actum exteriorem esse bonum. Sed non sufficit ad hoc quod actus exterior sit bonus bonitas voluntatis, quæ est ex intentione finis. Sed si voluntas sit mala sive ex intentione finis, sive ex actu volito, consequens est actum exteriorem esse malum.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.2.ad.1] If the good tree be taken to signify the good will, it must be in so far as the will derives goodness from the act willed and from the end intended.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod voluntas bona, prout significatur per arborem bonam, est accipienda secundum quod habet bonitatem et ex actu volito et ex fine intento.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.2.ad.2] A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end; but also when he wills an evil act.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non solum aliquis voluntate peccat, quando vult malum finem, sed etiam quando vult malum actum.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.2.ad.3] Voluntariness applies not only to the interior act of the will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they proceed from the will and the reason. Consequently the difference of good and evil is applicable to both the interior and external act.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntarium dicitur non solum actus interior voluntatis, sed etiam actus exteriores, prout a volun-tate procedunt et ratione; et ideo circa utrosque actus potest esse differentia boni et mali.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the goodness and malice of the interior act of the will are not the same as those of the external action. For the principle of the interior act is the interior apprehensive or appetitive power of the soul; whereas the principle of the external action is the power that accomplishes the movement. Now where the principles of action are different, the actions themselves are different. Moreover, it is the action which is the subject of goodness or malice: and the same accident cannot be in different subjects. Therefore the goodness of the interior act cannot be the same as that of the external action.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non eadem sit bonitas vel malitia actus interioris voluntatis et exterioris actus. Actus enim interioris principium est vis animæ interior apprehensiva vel appetitiva; actus autem exterioris principium est potentia exequens motum. Ubi autem sunt diversa principia actionis, ibi sunt diversi actus; actus autem est subjectum bonitatis vel malitiæ; non potest autem esse idem accidens in diversis subjectis. Ergo non potest esse eadem bonitas interioris et exterioris actus.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.3.arg.2] Further, \"A virtue makes that, which has it, good, and renders its action good also\" (Ethic. ii, 6). But the intellective virtue in the commanding power is distinct from the moral virtue in the power commanded, as is declared in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the goodness of the interior act, which belongs to the commanding power, is distinct from the goodness of the external action, which belongs to the power commanded.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtus est « quæ bonum facit habentem, et opus ejus bonum reddit, » ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. vi, in princ. Sed alia est virtus intellectualis in potentia imperante, et alia virtus moralis imperata, ut patet in princ. II Ethic., cap. 1. Ergo alia est bonitas actus interioris, quæ est potentiæ imperantis, et alia est bonitas actus exterioris, quæ est potentiæ imperatæ.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.3.arg.3] Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect; since nothing is its own cause. But the goodness of the interior act is the cause of the goodness of the external action, or vice versa, as stated above (1,2). Therefore it is not the same goodness in each.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, causa et effectus idem esse non possunt; nihil enim est causa sui ipsius. Sed bonitas actus interioris est causa bonitatis actus exterioris, aut e converso, ut dictum est. Ergo non potest esse eadem bonitas utriusque.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.3.sc] It was shown above (Question 18, Article 6) that the act of the will is the form, as it were, of the external action. Now that which results from the material and formal element is one thing. Therefore there is but one goodness of the internal and external act.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod supra ostensum est, quod actus voluntatis se habet ut formale ad actum exteriorem. Ex formali autem et materiali fit unum. Ergo est una bonitas actus interioris et exterioris.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.3.co] As stated above (Question 17, Article 4), the interior act of the will, and the external action, considered morally, are one act. Now it happens sometimes that one and the same individual act has several aspects of goodness or malice, and sometimes that it has but one. Hence we must say that sometimes the goodness or malice of the interior act is the same as that of the external action, and sometimes not. For as we have already said (1,2), these two goodnesses or malices, of the internal and external acts, are ordained to one another. Now it may happen, in things that are subordinate to something else, that a thing is good merely from being subordinate; thus a bitter draught is good merely because it procures health. Wherefore there are not two goodnesses, one the goodness of health, and the other the goodness of the draught; but one and the same. On the other hand it happens sometimes that that which is subordinate to something else, has some aspect of goodness in itself, besides the fact of its being subordinate to some other good: thus a palatable medicine can be considered in the light of a pleasurable good, besides being conducive to health.
\nWe must therefore say that when the external action derives goodness or malice from its relation to the end only, then there is but one and the same goodness of the act of the will which of itself regards the end, and of the external action, which regards the end through the medium of the act of the will. But when the external action has goodness or malice of itself, i.e. in regard to its matter and circumstances, then the goodness of the external action is distinct from the goodness of the will in regarding the end; yet so that the goodness of the end passes into the external action, and the goodness of the matter and circumstances passes into the act of the will, as stated above (1,2).
\n[I-II.q.20.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, actus interior voluntatis et actus exterior, prout considerantur in genere moris, sunt unus actus. Contingit autem quandoque, actum qui est unus subjecto, habere plures rationes bonitatis vel causæ obtentu, nullo quasi bono fine, nulla velut bona intentione facienda sunt. » malitiae, et quando unam tantum. Sic ergo dicendum, quod quando est eadem bonitas vel malitia interioris actus et exterioris, quando alia et alia. Sicut enim dictum est, prædictæ duæ bonitates vel malitiae, scilicet interioris et exterioris actus, ad invicem ordinantur. Contingit autem in his quæ ad aliud ordinantur, quod aliquid est bonum ex hoc solum quod ad aliud ordinatur, sicut potio amara ex hoc solo est bona quod est sanativa; unde non est alia bonitas sanitatis et potionis, sed una et eadem. Quandoque vero illud quod ad aliud ordinatur, habet in se aliquam rationem boni, etiam præter ordinem ad aliud bonum; sicut medicina saporosa habet rationem boni delectabilis præter hoc quod est sanativa. Sic ergo dicendum, quod quando actus exterior est bonus vel malus solum ex ordine ad finem, tunc est omnino eadem bonitas et malitia actus voluntatis, quæ per se respicit finem, et actus exterioris qui respicit finem mediante actu voluntatis. Cum autem actus exterior habet bonitatem vel malitiam secundum se, scilicet secundum materiam vel circumstantias 1, tunc bonitas exterioris actus est una, et bonitas voluntatis, quæ est ex fine, est alia; ita tamen quod bonitas finis ex voluntate redundat in actum exteriorem, et bonitas materiae et circumstantiarum redundat in actum voluntatis, sicut jam dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.3.ad.1] This argument proves that the internal and external actions are different in the physical order: yet distinct as they are in that respect, they combine to form one thing in the moral order, as stated above (Question 17, Article 4).
\n[I-II.q.20.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa probat quod actus interior et exterior sunt diversi secundum genus naturæ; sed tamen ex eis sic diversis constituitur unum in genere moris, ut supra dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.3.ad.2] As stated in Ethic. vi, 12, a moral virtue is ordained to the act of that virtue, which act is the end, as it were, of that virtue; whereas prudence, which is in the reason, is ordained to things directed to the end. For this reason various virtues are necessary. But right reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has no other goodness than the goodness of that virtue, in so far as the goodness of the reason is participated in each virtue.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut dictur in VI Ethic., cap. xii, parum a princ., virtutes morales ordinantur ad ipsos actus virtutum, qui sunt quasi fines; prudentia autem, quæ est in ratione, ad ea quæ sunt ad finem; et propter hoc requiruntur diversæ virtutes. Sed ratio recta de ipso fine virtutum non habet aliam bonitatem quam bonitatem virtutis, secundum quod bonitas rationis participatur in qualibet virtute.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.3.ad.3] When a thing is derived by one thing from another, as from a univocal efficient cause, then it is not the same in both: thus when a hot thing heats, the heat of the heater is distinct from the heat of the thing heated, although it be the same specifically. But when a thing is derived from one thing from another, according to analogy or proportion, then it is one and the same in both: thus the healthiness which is in medicine or urine is derived from the healthiness of the animal's body; nor is health as applied to urine and medicine, distinct from health as applied to the body of an animal, of which health medicine is the cause, and urine the sign. It is in this way that the goodness of the external action is derived from the goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz. according to the order of one to the other.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quando aliquid ex uno derivatur in alterum sicut ex causa agente univoca, tunc aliud est quod est in utroque; sicut cum calidum calefacit, alius numero est calor calefacientis, et calor calefacti, licet idem sit in specie. Sed quando aliquid derivatur ab uno in alterum secundum analogiam vel proportionem, tunc est tantum unum numero; sicut a sano quod est in corpore animalis, derivatur sanum ad medicinam et urinam; nec alia sanitas est medicinæ et urinæ quam sanitas animalis, quam medicina facit, et urina significat. Et hoc modo a bonitate voluntatis derivatur bonitas actus exterioris, et e converso, sciicet secundum ordinem unius ad alterum.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice. For the effect pre-exists virtually in its cause. But the consequences result from the action as an effect from its cause. Therefore they pre-exist virtually in actions. Now a thing is judged to be good or bad according to its virtue, since a virtue \"makes that which has it to be good\" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an action.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod eventus sequens addat ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus. Effectus enim virtute præxistit in causa. Sed eventus consequuntur actus, sicut effectus causas. Ergo virtute præxistunt in actibus. Sed unum-quodque secundum suam virtutem judicatur bonum vel malum; nam virtus est quæ « bonum facit habentem, » ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. vi, in princ. Ergo eventus ad-dunt aliquid ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.arg.2] Further, the good actions of his hearers are consequences resulting from the words of a preacher. But such goods as these redound to the merit of the preacher, as is evident from Philippians 4:1: \"My dearly beloved brethren, my joy and my crown.\" Therefore the consequences of an action increase its goodness or malice.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, bona quæ faciunt auditores, sunt effectus quidam consequentes ex prædicatione doctoris. Sed hujusmodi bona redundant ad meritum prædicatoris, ut patet per id quod dicitur Philipp., iv, 1: Fratres mei carissimi et desideratissimi, gaudium præmium vel pœnam accidentalem non confert. Thomistæ docent quod actui interiori in ordine ad præmium vel pœnam accidentalem actus exterior addit secundum quid; negant actus exterioris bonitatem vel malitiam esse formalem intrinsece. meum et corona mea. Ergo eventus sequens addit aliquid ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.arg.3] Further, punishment is not increased, unless the fault increases: wherefore it is written (Deuteronomy 25:2): \"According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.\" But the punishment is increased on account of the consequences; for it is written (Exodus 21:29): \"But if the ox was wont to push with his horn yesterday and the day before, and they warned his master, and he did not shut him up, and he shall kill a man or a woman, then the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death.\" But he would not have been put to death, if the ox, although he had not been shut up, had not killed a man. Therefore the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an action.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, pœna non additur nisi crescente culpa; unde dicitur Deuter., xxv, 2: Pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus. Sed ex eventu sequente additur ad pœnam; dicitur enim Exod., xxi, 29, quod si bos fuerit cornupeta* ab heri et nudius tertius, et contestati sunt dominum ejus, nec recluserit eum, occideritque virum aut mulierem; et bos lapidibus obruetur, et dominum illius occident. Non autem occideretur, si bos non occidisset hominem etiam non reclusus. Ergo eventus sequens addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.arg.4] Further, if a man do something which may cause death, by striking, or by sentencing, and if death does not ensue, he does not contract irregularity: but he would if death were to ensue. Therefore the consequence of an action increase its goodness or malice.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.arg.4] 4. Præterea, si aliquis ingerat causam mortis percutiendo vel sententiam dando, et mors non sequatur, non contrahitur irregularitas. Contraheretur autem si mors sequetur. Ergo eventus sequens addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.sc] The consequences do not make an action that was evil, to be good; nor one that was good, to be evil. For instance, if a man give an alms to a poor man who makes bad use of the alms by committing a sin, this does not undo the good done by the giver; and, in like manner, if a man bear patiently a wrong done to him, the wrongdoer is not thereby excused. Therefore the consequences of an action doe not increase its goodness or malice.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.sc] Sed contra, eventus sequens non facit actum malum qui erat bonus, nec bonum qui erat malus; puta si aliquis det eleemosynam pauperi, qua ille abutatur ad peccatum, nihil deperit ei qui eleemosynam facit; et similiter, si aliquis patienter ferat injuriam sibi factam, non propter hoc excusatur ille qui fecit. Ergo eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.co] The consequences of an action are either foreseen or not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that they increase the goodness or malice. For when a man foresees that many evils may follow from his action, and yet does not therefore desist therefrom, this shows his will to be all the more inordinate.
\nBut if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make a distinction. Because if they follow from the nature of the action and in the majority of cases, in this respect, the consequences increase the goodness or malice of that action: for it is evident that an action is specifically better, if better results can follow from it; and specifically worse, if it is of a nature to produce worse results. On the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom, then they do not increase the goodness or malice of the action: because we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of itself.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod eventus sequens aut est præcogitatus, aut non. Si est præcogitatus, manifestum est quod addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus: cum enim aliquis cogitat quod ex opere suo multa mala possunt sequi, nec propter hoc dimittit, ex hoc apparet voluntas ejus esse magis inordinata. Si autem eventus sequens non sit præcogitatus, tunc distinguendum est: quia si per se sequitur ex tali actu, et ut in pluribus, secundum hoc eventus sequens addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus. Manifestum est enim meliorem actum esse ex suo genere, ex quo possunt plura bona sequi, et pejorem ex quo nata sunt plura mala sequi. Si vero per accidens, et ut in paucioribus, tunc eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel ad malitiam actus. Non enim datur judicium de re aliqua secundum illud quod est per accidens, sed solum secundum illud quod est per se.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.ad.1] The virtue of a cause is measured by the effect that flows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by accident.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtus causæ existimatur secundum effectus per se, non autem secundum effectus per accidens.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.ad.2] The good actions done by the hearers, result from the preacher's words, as an effect that flows from their very nature. Hence they redound to the merit of the preacher: especially when such is his intention.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bona quæ auditores faciunt, consequuntur ex prædicaione doctoris sicut effectus per se; unde redundat ad præmium prædicatoris, et præcipe quando sunt præintenta.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.ad.3] The consequences for which that man is ordered to be punished, both follow from the nature of the cause, and are supposed to be foreseen. For this reason they are reckoned as punishable.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod eventus ille pro quo illi pœna infligenda mandatur, et per se sequitur ex tali causa, et iterum punitur ut præcogitatus, et ideo imputatur ad pœnam.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.ad.4] This argument would prove if irregularity were the result of the fault. But it is not the result of the fault, but of the fact, and of the obstacle to the reception of a sacrament.
\n[I-II.q.20.a.5.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet si irregularitas sequeretur culpam; non autem sequitur culpam, sed factum, propter aliquem defectum sacramenti.
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