[I-II.q.24.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since \"morals are properly predicated of man,\" as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog.). But passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nulla passio animæ sit bona vel mala moraliter. Bonum enim et malum morale est proprium hominis; « mores » enim « proprie dicuntur humani, » ut Ambrosius dicit Super Lucam, prolog., § 8, col. 1612, t. 2. Sed passiones non sunt propriæ hominum, sed sunt etiam aliis animalibus communes. Ergo nulla passio animæ est bona vel mala moraliter.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.1.arg.2] Further, the good or evil of man consists in \"being in accord, or in disaccord with reason,\" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Question 22, Article 3). Therefore they have no connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, « bonum vel malum hominis est secundum rationem esse, vel præter rationem esse, » ut Dionysius dicit, cap. iv De div. nom., § 32, col. 734, t. 1. Sed passiones animæ non sunt in ratione, sed in appetitu sensitivo, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non pertinent ad bonum vel malum hominis, quod est bonum morale.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.1.arg.3] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that \"we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions.\" But we are praised and blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally good or evil.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in II Ethic., cap. v, quod « passionibus neque laudamur neque vituperamur. » Sed secundum bona et mala moralia laudamur et vituperamur. Ergo passiones non sunt bonæ vel malæ moraliter.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.1.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the passions of the soul: \"They are evil if our love is evil; good if our love is good.\"
\n[I-II.q.24.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in XIV De civ. Dei, cap. vii, § 2, col. 440, t. 7, de passionibus animæ loquens: « Mala sunt ista, si malus est amor; bona, si bonus. »
\n[I-II.q.24.a.1.co] We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above (18, 05). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod passiones animæ dupliciter possunt considerari: uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum quod subjacent imperio rationis et voluntatis. Si igitur secundum se considerentur, prout scilicet sunt motus quidam irrationalis appetitus; sic non est in eis bonum vel malum morale, quod dependet a ratione, ut supra dictum est. Si autem considerentur secundum quod subjacent imperio rationis et voluntatis, sic est in eis bonum vel malum morale. Propinquior enim est appetitus sensitivus ipsi rationi et voluntati, quam membra exteriora; quorum tamen motus et actus sunt boni vel mali moraliter, secundum quod sunt voluntarii; unde multo magis et ipsæ passiones, 1 Sic apud Migne, ex versione Mich. Lequien: « Actio motus est naturæ consentaneus; passio, motus præter naturam. » Dicuntur autem voluntariæ, vel ex eo quod a voluntate imperantur, vel ex eo quod a voluntate non prohibentur.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.1.ad.1] These passions, considered in themselves, are common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they are proper to man.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod istæ passiones secundum se consideratæ sunt communes hominibus et animalibus aliis; sed secundum quod a ratione imperantur, sunt propriæ hominibus.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.1.ad.2] Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational, in so far as \"they partake of reason in some sort\" (Ethic. i, 13).
\n[I-II.q.24.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod etiam inferiores vires appetitivæ dicuntur rationales secundum quod participant aliqualiter rationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic., cap. xiii.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.1.ad.3] The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: \"For the man who fears or is angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against reason.\"
\n[I-II.q.24.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Philosophus dicit quod non laudamur aut vituperamur secundum passiones absolute consideratas; sed non removet quin possint fieri laudabiles vel vituperabiles, secundum quod a ratione ordinatur; unde subdit: « Non enim laudatur aut vituperatur qui timet aut irascitur, sed qui aliqualiter; » id est, secundum rationem vel præter rationem.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, on which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders the judgment of reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): \"All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from hatred, anger, friendship and pity.\" Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a moral act.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod passio quæcumque semper diminuat de bonitate actus moralis. Omne enim quod impedit judicium rationis, ex quo dependet bonitas actus moralis, diminuit per consequens bonitatem actus moralis. Sed omnis passio impedit judicium rationis; dicit enim Sallustius in Catilinario, in princ. orat. Cæsaris: « Omnes homines qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, ira, et amicitia atque misericordia vacuos esse decet. » Ergo omnis passio diminuit bonitatem moralis actus.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.3.arg.2] Further, the more a man's action is like to God, the better it is: hence the Apostle says (Ephesians 5:1): \"Be ye followers of God, as most dear children.\" But \"God and the holy angels feel no anger when they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve the unhappy,\" as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is better to do such like deeds without than with a passion of the soul.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, actus hominis quanto est Deo similior, tanto est melior; unde dicit Apostolus, Eph., v, 4: Estote imitatores Dei, sicut filii charissimi. Sed Deus et sancti angeli « puniunt sine ira, sine miseriæ compassione subveniunt, » ut Augustinus dicit in X De civitate Dei, cap. v, col. 261, t. 7. Ergo est melius hujusmodi opera agere sine passione animæ quam cum passione.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.3.arg.3] Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by passion: for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins deliberately. Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without passion, than he who does with passion.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut malum morale attenditur per ordinem ad rationem, ita et bonum 1 Plenius et paulo aliter in textu D. Augustini. Stoici omnes passiones morbos animæ vocabant, quia illas solas passiones, quæ præter ordinem rationis erant, passionis nomine donabant; cæteras nomine voluntatis indicebant. Sic a Peripateticis passionum mediocritatem approbantibus voce tenus discrepabant. Systole est constrictio quædam, et diastole quædam dilatatio. Cor, arteriae, pulmo, pectus et cerebrum systolem et diastolem habent. Quando cor systolem habet, habent arteriae diastolem, et vice versa. morale. Sed malum morale diminuitur per passionem; minus enim peccat qui peccat ex passione quam qui peccat ex industria. Ergo minus bonum operatur qui operatur cum passione, quam qui operatur sine passione.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.3.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that \"the passion of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven.\" But nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral good. Therefore a passion of the soul does not lessen moral good.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, IX De civit. Dei, cap. v, col. 261, t. 7, quod « passio misericordiae rationi deservit quando ita præbetur misericordia, ut justitia conservetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur pœnitenti. » Sed nihil quod deservit rationi, diminuit bonum morale. Ergo passio animæ non diminuit bonum moris.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.3.co] As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his passions be moderated by reason. For since man's good is founded on reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according as it extends to more things pertaining to man. Wherefore no one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good, that the actions of the outward members be controlled by the law of reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated above (Question 17, Article 7), it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves also should be controlled by reason.
\nAccordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite; according to Psalm 83:3: \"My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God\": where by \"heart\" we are to understand the intellectual appetite, and by \"flesh\" the sensitive appetite.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Stoici sicut ponebant omnem passionem animæ esse malam, ita ponebant consequenter omnem passionem animæ diminuere actus bonitatem; omne enim bonum ex permixtione mali vel totaliter tollitur, vel fit minus bonum. Et hoc quidem verum est, si dicamus passiones animæ solum inordinatos motus sensitivi appetitus, prout sunt perturbationes seu ægritudines. Sed si passiones simpliciter nominemus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsæ passiones sint moderatæ per rationem. Cum enim bonum hominis consistat in ratione sicut in radice, tanto istud bonum erit perfectius, quanto ad plura, quæ homini conveniunt, derivari po-test. Unde nullus dubitat quin ad perfectionem moralis boni pertineat quod actus exteriorum membrorum per rationis regulam dirigantur. Unde cum appetitus sensitivus possit obedire rationi, ut supra dictum est, ad perfectionem moralis sive humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsæ passiones animæ sint regulatæ per rationem. Sicut igitur melius est quod homo et velit bonum, et faciat exteriori actu, ita etiam ad perfectionem boni moralis pertinet quod homo ad bonum moveatur non solum secundum voluntatem, sed etiam secundum appetitum sensitivum, secundum illud quod in psalm. Lxxxiii, 3, dicitur: Cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum, ut cor accipiamus pro appetitu intellectivo, carnem autem pro appetitu sensitivo.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.3.ad.1] The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus, since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere passion of pity. In the second place, consequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: because, to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that movement: and thus the passion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral goodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a passion of the soul increases the goodness of an action.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod passiones animæ dupliciter se possunt habere ad judicium rationis; uno modo antecedenter; et sic, cum obnubilent judicium rationis, ex quo dependet bonitas moralis actus, diminunt actus bonitatem; laudabilius enim est quod ex judicio rationis aliquis faciat opus charitatis, quam ex sola passione misericordiae. Alio modo se habent consequenter, et hoc dupliciter: uno modo per modum redundantiæ, quia scilicet cum superior pars animæ intense movetur in aliquid, sequitur motum ejus etiam pars inferior; et sic passio existens consequenter in appetitu sensitivo est signum intensionis voluntatis; et sic indicat bonitatem moralem majorem. Alio modo per modum electionis, quando scilicet homo ex judicio rationis eligit affici aliqua passione, ut promptius operetur, cooperante appetitu sensitivo; et sic passio animæ addit ad bonitatem actionis.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.3.ad.2] In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in Deo et in angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, neque etiam membra corporea; et ideo bonum in eis non attenditur secundum ordinationem passionum aut corporeorum actuum, sicut in nobis.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.3.ad.3] A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either of the ways mentioned above (Reply to Objection 1), it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of its being more grievous.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod passio tendens in malum præcedens judicium rationis diminuit peccatum, sed consequens aliquo prædictorum modorum auget ipsum, vel significat augmentum ejus.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend on reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, nothing accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is good or evil according to its species.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nulla passio animæ secundum speciem suam sit bona vel mala moraliter. Bonum enim et malum morale attenditur secundum rationem. Sed passiones sunt in appetitu sensitivo: et ita id quod est secundum rationem, accidit eis. Cum ergo nihil quod est per accidens pertineat ad speciem rei, videur quod nulla passio secundum suam speciem sit bona vel mala.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.4.arg.2] Further, acts and passions take their species from their object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according to its species, it would follow that those passions the object of which is good, are specifically good, such as love, desire and joy: and that those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as hatred, fear and sadness. But this is clearly false. Therefore no passion is good or evil according to its species.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, actus et passiones habent speciem ex objecto. Si ergo aliqua passio secundum aliquam suam speciem esset bona Ita codd.; in edit.: « intensioris. » vel mala, oporteret quod passiones quarum objectum est bonum, bonæ essent secundum suam speciem, ut amor, desiderium et gaudium; et passiones quarum objectum est malum, essent malæ secundum suam speciem, ut odium, timor et tristitia. Sed hoc patet esse falsum. Non ergo aliqua passio est bona vel mala ex sua specie.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.4.arg.3] Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore no passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nulla species passionum est quæ non inveniatur in aliquibus animalibus. Sed bonum morale non invenitur nisi in homine. Ergo nulla passio animæ bona est vel mala ex sua specie.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.4.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that \"pity is a kind of virtue.\" Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or evil according to their species.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, IX De civ. Dei, cap. v, col. 261, t. 7, quod misericordia pertinet ad virtutem; Philosophus etiam dicit in II Ethic., cap. vii, prope fin., quod « verecundia est passio laudabilis. » Ergo aliquæ passiones sunt bonæ vel malæ secundum suam speciem.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.4.co] We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been said in regard to acts (18, 5,6; 20, 1)--viz. that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is clear in the case of \"shame\" which is base fear; and of \"envy\" which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to the same species as the external act.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut de actibus dictum est, ita et de passionibus dicendum videtur, quod scilicet species actus vel passionis dupliciter considerari potest uno modo, secundum quod est in genere naturæ; et sic bonum vel malum morale non pertinet ad speciem actus vel passionis; alio modo, secundum quod pertinent ad genus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et de judicio rationis; et hoc modo bonum et malum morale possunt pertinere ad speciem passionis, secundum quod accipitur ut objectum passionis, aliquid de se conveniens rationi, vel dissonum a ratione; sicut patet de verecundia, quæ est « timor turpis; » et de invidia, quæ est « tristitia de bono alterius; » sic enim pertinent ad speciem exterioris actus.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.4.ad.1] This argument considers the passions in their natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in itself. But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite, but essentially.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de passionibus, secundum quod pertinent ad speciem naturæ, prout scilicet appetitus sensitivus in se consideratur; secundum vero quod appetitus sensitivus obedit rationi, jam bonum et malum rationis non est in 1 passionibus ejus per accidens, sed per se.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.4.ad.2] Passions having a tendency to good, are themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner, if they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a tendency to evil, are themselves evil.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod passiones quæ in bonum tendunt, si sit verum bonum, sunt bonæ; et similiter quæ a vero malo recedunt; e contrario vero passiones quæ sunt per recessum a bono, et per accessum ad malum, sunt malæ.
\n[I-II.q.24.a.4.ad.3] In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the soul's passions.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.24.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in brutis ani-malibus appetitus sensitivus non obedit ra-tioni; et tamen inquantum ducitur quadam aestimativa naturali, quæ subjicitur rationi superiori, scilicet divinæ, est in eis quædam similitudo moralis boni quantum ad animæ passiones.
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