[I-II.q.28.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with absence; for the Apostle says (Galatians 4:18): \"Be zealous for that which is good in a good thing always\" (speaking of himself, according to a gloss), \"and not only when I am present with you.\" Therefore union is not an effect of love.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod unio non sit effectus amoris. Absentia enim unioni repugnat. Sed amor compatitur secum absentiam; dicit enim Apostolus ad Galat., IV, 18: Bonum æmulamini in bono semper, loquens de seipso, ut Glossa dicit, et non tantum cum præsens sum apud vos. Ergo unio non est effectus amoris.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.1.arg.2] Further, every union is either according to essence, thus form is united to matter, accident to subject, and a part to the whole, or to another part in order to make up the whole: or according to likeness, in genus, species, or accident. But love does not cause union of essence; else love could not be between things essentially distinct. On the other hand, love does not cause union of likeness, but rather is caused by it, as stated above (Question 27, Article 3). Therefore union is not an effect of love.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnis unio aut est per essentiam, sicut forma unitur materiæ, et accidens subjecto, et pars toti, vel alteri parti ad constitutionem totius; aut est per similitudinem vel generis, vel speciei, vel accidentis. Sed amor non causat unionem essentiæ; alioquin nunquam haberetur amor ad ea quæ sunt per essentiam divisa; unionem autem quæ est per similitudinem amor non causat, sed magis ab ea causatur, ut dictum est. Ergo unio non est effectus amoris.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.1.arg.3] Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and the intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the lover in act is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect of knowledge rather than of love.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sensus in actu fit sensibile in actu, et intellectus in actu fit intellectum in actu. Non autem amans in actu fit amatum in actu. Ergo unio magis est effectus cognitionis quam amoris.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.1.sc] Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every love is a \"unitive love.\"
\n[I-II.q.28.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit, Dionysius IV cap. De divin. nomin., § 15, col. 714, t. 1, quod « amor quilibet est virtus unitiva. »
\n[I-II.q.28.a.1.co] The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being. In like manner when a man loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's \"other self\" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), \"Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul.\"
\nThe first of these unions is caused \"effectively\" by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused \"formally\" by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that \"love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved.\" For in describing it as \"uniting\" he refers to the union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that \"it seeks to unite,\" he refers to real union.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex est unio amantis ad amatum: una quidem secundum rem, puta cum amatum præsentialiter adest amanti; alia vero secundum affectum; quæ quidem unio consideranda est ex apprehensione præcedente, nam motus appetitivus sequitur apprehensionem. Cum autem sit duplex amor, scilicet concupiscentiæ et amicitiæ; uterque procedit ex quadam apprehensione unitatis amati ad amantem; cum enim aliquis amat aliquid, quasi concupiscens illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse. Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiæ, vult ei bonum, sicut et sibi vult bonum; unde ap- His causis amoris, adde sympathiam, familiaritatem, communicationem in bonis aut secretis. prehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum, sicut et sibi ipsi; et inde est quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse; et Augustinus dicit in IV Confess., cap. vi, § 11, col. 697, t. 1: « Bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animæ suæ. » Primam ergo unionem amor facit effective, quia movet ad desiderandum et quærendum præsentiam amati quasi sibi convenientis et ad se pertinentis. Secundam autem unionem facit formaliter quia ipse amor est talis unio vel nexus. Unde Augustinus dicit in VIII De Trinitate, cap. x, § 14, col. 960, t. 8, quod « amor est quasi junctura quædam duo aliqua copulans vel copulare appetens, » amantem scilicet, et quod amatur. Quod enim dicit « copulans, » refertur ad unionem affectus, sine qua non est amor; quod vero dicit « copulare intendens, » pertinet ad unionem realem.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.1.ad.1] This argument is true of real union. That is necessary to pleasure as being its cause; desire implies the real absence of the beloved: but love remains whether the beloved be absent or present.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod objectio illa procedit de unione reali, quam quidem requirit delectatio sicut causam; desiderium vero est in reali absentia amati; amor vero et in absentia, et in præsentia.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.1.ad.2] Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above (Question 27, Article 3). There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened to substantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence. Again there is a union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. ii, 1), \"Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one,\" but since \"this would result in either one or both being destroyed,\" they seek a suitable and becoming union--to live together, speak together, and be united together in other like things.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod unio tripli-citer se habet ad amorem: quædam enim unio est causa amoris; et hæc quidem est unio substantialis quantum ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum; quantum vero ad amorem quo quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, ut dictum est. Quædam vero unio est essentialiter ipse amor; et hæc est unio secundum coaptationem affectus; quæ quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali, inquantum amans se habet ad amatum in amore quidem amicitiæ, ut ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscentiæ ut ad aliquid sui. Quædam vero unio est effectus amoris; et hæc est unio realis, quam amans quærit de amata: et hæc quidem unio est secundum convenientiam amoris. Ut enim Philosophus dicit II Polit., c. 11, post med.: « Aristophanes dixit quod amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri unum. Sed quia ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi, quæunt unionem quæ convenit et decet, ut scilicet simul conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis hujusmodi conjungantur. »
\n[I-II.q.28.a.1.ad.3] Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being united, through its likeness, to the knower. But the effect of love is that the thing itself which is loved, is, in a way, united to the lover, as stated above. Consequently the union caused by love is closer than that which is caused by knowledge.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod cognitio per ficitur per hoc quod cognitum unitur cognoscenti secundum suam similitudinem; sed amor facit quod ipsa res quæ amatur amanti aliquo modo uniatur, ut dictum est. Unde amor est magis unitivus quam cognitio.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that love does not cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. For that which is in another is contained in it. But the same cannot be container and contents. Therefore love cannot cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod amor non causet mutuam inhæsionem, scilicet ut amans sit in amato, et e converso. Quod enim est in altero, continetur in eo. Sed non potest idem esse continens, et contentum. Ergo per amorem non potest causari mutua inhæsio, ut amatum sit in amante, et e converso.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.2.arg.2] Further, nothing can penetrate within a whole, except by means of a division of the whole. But it is the function of the reason, not of the appetite where love resides, to divide things that are really united. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nihil potest penetrare in interiora alicujus integri nisi per aliquam divisionem. Sed dividere quæ sunt secundum rem conjuncta, non pertinet ad appetitum, in quo est amor, sed ad rationem. Ergo mutua inhæsio non est effectus amoris.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.2.arg.3] Further, if love involves the lover being in the beloved and vice versa, it follows that the beloved is united to the lover, in the same way as the lover is united to the beloved. But the union itself is love, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore it follows that the lover is always loved by the object of his love; which is evidently false. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si per amorem amans est in amato, et e converso, sequitur quod hoc modo amatum uniatur amanti, sicut amans amato. Sed ipsa unio est amor, ut dictum est. Ergo sequitur quod semper amans ametur ab amato; quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo mutua inhæsio est effectus amoris.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.2.sc] It is written (1 John 4:16): \"He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him.\" Now charity is the love of God. Therefore, for the same reason, every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur I Joan., iv, 16: Qui manet in charitate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Charitas autem est amor Dei. Ergo eadem ratione quilibet amor facit amatum esse in amante.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.2.co] This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. Because, as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover, according to Philippians 1:7, \"For that I have you in my heart\": while the lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus it is written concerning the Holy Ghost, Who is God's Love, that He \"searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God\" (1 Corinthians 2:10).
\nAs the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or wish good to another on account of something else), but because the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. For this reason we speak of love as being \"intimate\"; and \"of the bowels of charity.\" On the other hand, the lover is in the beloved, by the love of concupiscence and by the love of friendship, but not in the same way. For the love of concupiscence is not satisfied with any external or superficial possession or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess the beloved perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it were. Whereas, in the love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch as he reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his friend's will as his own, so that it seems as though he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is proper to friends \"to desire the same things, and to grieve and rejoice at the same,\" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4). Consequently in so far as he reckons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he were become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking on his friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the lover.
\nIn yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch as friends return love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod iste effectus mutuæ inhæsionis potest intelligi et quantum ad vim apprehensivam, et quantum ad vim appetitivam. Nam quantum ad vim apprehensivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, inquantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis, secundum illud Philipp., i, 7: Eo quod habeam vos in corde. Amans vero dicitur esse in amato secundum apprehensionem, inquantum amans non est contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula quæ ad amatum pertinent, intrinsecus disquirere; et sic ad interiora ejus ingrediur; sicut de Spiritu sancto, qui est amor Dei, dicitur I ad Corinth., ii, 40, quod scrutatur etiam profunda Dei. Sed quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, prout est per quamdam complacentiam in ejus affectu, ut vel delectetur in eo aut in bonis ejus apud præsentiam, vel in absentia per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem concupiscentiæ, vel in bona quæ vult amato, per amorem amicitiæ; non quidem ex aliqua extrinseca causa, sicut cum aliquis desiderat aliquid propter alterum, vel cum aliquis vult bonum alteri propter aliquid aliud; sed propter complacentiam amati interius radicatam; unde et amor dicitur intimus, et dicuntur viscera charitatis. E converso autem amans est in amato aliter quidem per amorem concupiscentiæ, aliter per amorem amicitiæ. Amor namque concupiscentiæ non requiescit in quacumque extrinseca aut superficiali adeptione vel fruitione amati, sed quærit amatum perfecte habere, quasi ad intima illius perveniens. In amore vero amicitiæ amans est in amato, inquantum reputat bona vel mala amici sicut sua, et voluntatem amici sicut suam; ut quasi ipse in suo amico videatur bona vel mala pati et affici. Et propter hoc proprium est amicorum « eadem velle, et in eodem tristari et gaudere, » secundum Philosophum in IX Ethic., cap. iii, a med., et in II Rhetor., cap. iv, in princ., ut sic, inquantum quæ sunt amici, æstimat sua, amans videatur esse in amato, quasi idem factus amato; inquantum autem e converso vult et agit propter amicum sicut propter seipsum, quasi reputans amicum idem sibi, sic amatum est in amante. Potest autem et tertio modo mutua inhæsio intelligi in amore amicitiæ secundum viam redamationis, inquantum mutuo se amant amici, et sibi invicem bona volunt et operantur.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.2.ad.1] The beloved is contained in the lover, by being impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his complacency. On the other hand, the lover is contained in the beloved, inasmuch as the lover penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved. For nothing hinders a thing from being both container and contents in different ways: just as a genus is contained in its species, and vice versa.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod amatum continetur in amante, inquantum est impressum in affectu ejus per quamdam complacentiam; e converso vero amans continetur in amato, inquantum amans sequitur aliquo modo illud quod est intimum amati; nihil enim prohibet diverso modo esse aliquid continens et contentum, sicut genus continetur in specie, et e converso.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.2.ad.2] The apprehension of the reason precedes the movement of love. Consequently, just as the reason divides, so does the movement of love penetrate into the beloved, as was explained above.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod rationis apprehensio præcedit affectum amoris; et ideo sicut ratio disquirit, ita affectus amoris subintrat in amatum, ut ex dictis patet.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.2.ad.3] This argument is true of the third kind of mutual indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illa ratio cedit de tertio modo mutuæ inhæsionis, qui non invenitur in quolibet amore.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love. For ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always result in loss of reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at times. Therefore love does not cause ecstasy.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod extasis non sit effectus amoris. Extasis enim quamdam alienationem importare videtur. Sed amor non semper facit alienationem, sunt enim amantes interdum sui compotes. Ergo amor non facit extasim.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.3.arg.2] Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to him. Therefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes himself into the beloved, going forth out from himself as it were.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, amans desiderat amatum sibi uniri. Magis ergo amatum trahit ad se quam etiam pergat in amatum, extra se exiens.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.3.arg.3] Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as stated above (Article 1). If, therefore, the lover goes out from himself, in order to betake himself into the beloved, it follows that the lover always loves the beloved more than himself: which is evidently false. Therefore ecstasy is not an effect of love.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, amor unit amatum amanti, sicut dictum est. Si ergo amans extra se tendit, ut in amatum pergat, sequitur quod semper plus diligat amatum quam seipsum; quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo extasis est effectus amoris.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.3.sc] Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"the Divine love produces ecstasy,\" and that \"God Himself suffered ecstasy through love.\" Since therefore according to the same author (Div. Nom. iv), every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love, it seems that every love causes ecstasy.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit iv cap. De div. nom., col. 714, quod « divinus amor extasim facit, » et quod « ipse Deus propter amorem est extasim passus. » Cum ergo quilibet amor sit quædam similitudo participata divini amoris, ut ibidem dicitur, videur quod quilibet amor causet extasim.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.3.co] To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside oneself. This happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the appetitive power. As to the apprehensive power, a man is said to be placed outside himself, when he is placed outside the knowledge proper to him. This may be due to his being raised to a higher knowledge; thus, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, inasmuch as he is placed outside the connatural apprehension of his sense and reason, when he is raised up so as to comprehend things that surpass sense and reason: or it may be due to his being cast down into a state of debasement; thus a man may be said to suffer ecstasy, when he is overcome by violent passion or madness. As to the appetitive power, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out from itself, as it were.
\nThe first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so far, namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved, as stated above (Article 2), and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from other things. The second ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love of friendship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in a restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the lover is carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. But since he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this movement remains finally within him. On the other hand, in the love of friendship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply; because he wishes and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for him, for his sake.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod extasim pati aliquis dicitur, cum extra se ponitur; quod quidem contingit et secundum vim apprehensivam, et secundum vim appetitivam. Secundum quidem vim apprehensivam aliquis dicitur extra se poni, quando ponitur extra cognitionem sibi propriam; vel quia ad superiore sublimatur, sicut homo, dum elevatur ad comprehendenda aliqua quæ sunt supra sensum et rationem, dicitur extasim pati, inquantum ponitur extra conna-turalem apprehensionem rationis et sensus; vel quia ad inferiora deprimitur, puta cum aliquis in furiam vel amentiam cadit, dicitur extasim passus. Secundum appetitivam vero partem dicitur aliquis extasim pati, quando appetitus alicujus in alterum fertur, exiens quodammodo extra seipsum. Primam quidem extasim facit amor dispositive, inquantum scilicet facit meditari de amato, ut dictum est; intensa autem meditatio unius abstrahit ab aliis. Sed secundam extasim facit amor directe, simpliciter quidem amor amicitiæ, amor autem concupiscentiæ non simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Nam in amore concupiscentiæ quodamodo fertur amans extra seipsum, inquantum scilicet non contentus gaudere de bono quod habet, quærit frui aliquo extra se. Sed quia illud extrinsecum bonum quærit sibi habere, non exit simpliciter extra se, sed talis affectio in fine intra ipsum concluditur. Sed in amore amicitiæ affectus alicujus simpliciter exit extra se; quia vult amico bonum, et operatur bonum, quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius propter ipsum amicum.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.3.ad.1] This argument is true of the first kind of ecstasy.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa ratio procedit de prima extasi.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.3.ad.2] This argument applies to love of concupiscence, which, as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illa ratio procedit de amore concupiscentiæ, qui non facit simpliciter extasim, ut dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.3.ad.3] He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as he wills the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will the good of his friend more than his own good: and so it does not follow that he loves another more than himself.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui amat, in tantum extra se exit, inquantum vult bona amici et operatur; non tamen vult bona amici magis quam sua; unde non sequitur quod alterum plus quam se diligat.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For zeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written (1 Corinthians 3:3): \"Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention,\" etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod zelus non sit effectus amoris. Zelus enim est contentionis principium: unde dicitur I ad Corinth., III, 3: Cum sit inter vos zelus et contentio, etc. Sed contentio repugnat amori. Ergo zelus non est effectus amoris.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.4.arg.2] Further, the object of love is the good, which communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication; since it seems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the object of his love with another: thus husbands are said to be jealous of [zelare] their wives, because they will not share them with others. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, objectum amoris est bonum quod est communicativum sui. Sed zelus repugnat communicationi; ad zelum enim pertinere videtur quod aliquis non patiatur consortium in amato; sicut viri dicuntur zelare uxores, quas nolunt habere communes cum cæteris. Ergo zelus non est effectus amoris.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.4.arg.3] Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is there without love: for it is written (Psalm 72:3): \"I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked.\" Therefore it should not be set down as an effect of love any more than of hatred.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, zelus non est sine odio, sicut nec sine amore; dicitur enim in psal. LXXII, 3: Zelavi super iniquos. Non ergo debet dici magis effectus amoris quam odii.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.4.sc] Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): \"God is said to be a zealot, on account of his great love for all things.\"
\n[I-II.q.28.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, iv cap. De div. nom., § 13, col. 714, t. 1, quod « Deus appellatur zelotes propter multum amorem quem habet ad existentia. »
\n[I-II.q.28.a.4.co] Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power tends to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance. Since therefore love is \"a movement towards the object loved,\" as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove everything that opposes it.
\nBut this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence, and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence he who desires something intensely, is moved against all that hinders his gaining or quietly enjoying the object of his love. It is thus that husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a hindrance to their exclusive individual rights. In like manner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who seem to excel, as though these were a hindrance to their excelling. And this is the zeal of envy, of which it is written (Psalm 36:1): \"Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy [zelaveris] them that work iniquity.\"
\nOn the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's good: wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved against everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when he makes a point of repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In this way, too, a man is said to be zealous on God's behalf, when he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to the honor or will of God; according to 1 Kings 19:14: \"With zeal I have been zealous for the Lord of hosts.\" Again on the words of John 2:17: \"The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up,\" a gloss says that \"a man is eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy whatever evil he perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and laments it.\"
\n[I-II.q.28.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod zelus, quocumque modo sumatur, ex intensione amoris provenit. Manifestum est enim, quod quanto aliqua virtus intensius tendit in aliquid, fortius etiam repellit omne contrarium vel repugnans. Cum igitur amor sit quidam motus in amatum, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., q. xxxv, col. 23, t. 6, intensus amor quærit excludere omne id quod sibi repugnat. Aliter tamen hoc contingit in amore concupiscentiæ, et aliter in amore amicitiæ. Nam in amore concupiscentiæ, qui intense aliquid concupiscit, movetur contra omne illud quod repugnat consecutioni vel fruitioni qui quietæ ejus quod amatur; et hoc modo viri dicuntur zelare uxores, ne per consortium aliorum impediatur singularitas quam in uxore quærunt; similiter etiam qui quærunt excellentiam, moventur contra eos qui excelse 1 videntur, quasi impedientes excellentiam eorum; et iste est zelus invidiæ, de quo dicitur in psalm. xxxvi, 4: Noli æmulari in malignantibus, neque 2 zelaveris facientes iniquitatem. Amor autem amicitiæ quærit bonum amici; unde quando est intensus, facit hominem moveri contra omne illud quod repugnat bonis amici. Et secundum hoc aliquis dicitur zelare pro amico, quando, si quæ dicuntur, vel fiunt contra bonum amici, homo repellere studet; et per hunc etiam modum aliquis dicitur zelare pro Deo, quando ea quæ sunt contra honorem vel voluntatem Dei, repellere secundum posse conatur, secundum illud III Reg., xix, 14: Zelatus sum pro Domino exercituum; et Joan., II, super illud: Zelus domus tuæ comedit me, dicit Glossa ordin., col. 365, t. 2, quod « bono zelo comeditur qui quæliet prava quæ viderit, corrigere satagit; si nequit, tolerat et gemit. »
\n[I-II.q.28.a.4.ad.1] The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the object of love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Apostolus sibi loquitur de zelo invidiæ, qui quidem est causa contentionis, non contra rem amatam, sed pro re amata contra impedimenta ipsius.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.4.ad.2] Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this communication, becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot, in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and from the love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it does not arise, properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in their entirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the knowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by many; except perhaps one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum amatur, inquantum est communicabile amanti, unde omne illud quod perfectionem hujus communicationis impedit, efficitur odiosum; et sic ex amore boni zelus causatur. Ex defectu autem bonitatis contingit quod quædam parva bona non possunt integre simul possideri a multis, et ex amore talium causatur zelus invidiæ; non autem proprie ex his quæ integre possunt a multis possideri; nullus enim invidet alteri de cognitione veritatis, quæ a multis integre cognosci potest, sed forte de excellentia circa cognitionem hujus.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.4.ad.3] The very fact that a man hates whatever is opposed to the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is set down as an effect of love rather than of hatred.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod hoc ipsum quod aliquis odio habet ea quæ repugnant amato, ex amore procedit; unde zelus proprie ponitur effectus amoris magis quam odii.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that the lover does not do everything from love. For love is a passion, as stated above (Question 26, Article 2). But man does not do everything from passion: but some things he does from choice, and some things from ignorance, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Therefore not everything that a man does, is done from love.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod amans non agat omnia ex amore. Amor enim quædam passio est, ut supra dictum est. Sed non omnia quæ agit homo, agit ex passione; sed quædam agit ex electione, et quædam ex ignorantia, ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. v. Ergo non omnia quæ homo agit, agit ex amore.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.6.arg.2] Further, the appetite is a principle of movement and action in all animals, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. If, therefore, whatever a man does is done from love, the other passions of the appetitive faculty are superfluous.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, appetitus est principium motus et actionis in omnibus animalibus, ut patet in III De anima, text. 48 et seq. Si igitur omnia quæ quis agit, agit ex amore, aliæ passiones appetitivæ partis erunt superfluæ.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.6.arg.3] Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time by contrary causes. But some things are done from hatred. Therefore all things are not done from love.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nihil causatur simul a contrariis causis. Sed quædam fiunt ex odio. Non ergo omnia sunt ex amore.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.6.sc] Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"all things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good.\"
\n[I-II.q.28.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit iv cap. De div. nom., § 10, col. 707, quod « propter amorem boni omnia agunt quæcumque agunt. »
\n[I-II.q.28.a.6.co] Every agent acts for an end, as stated above (Question 1, Article 2). Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of some kind.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod omne agens agit propter finem aliquem, ut supra dictum est. Finis autem est bonum desideratum et amatum unicuique. Unde manifestum est quod omne agens, quodcumque sit, agit quamcumque actionem ex aliquo amore.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.6.ad.1] This objection takes love as a passion existing in the sensitive appetite. But here we are speaking of love in a general sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks of love in chapter iv of De Divinis Nominibus.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod objectio illa procedit de amore qui est passio in appetitu sensitivo existens; nos autem loquimur nunc de amore communiter accepto, prout comprehendit sub se amorem « intellectualem, rationalem, animalem, naturalem. » Sic enim Dionysius loquitur de amore in iv cap. De divin. nom., § 15, col. 714, t. 4.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.6.ad.2] As stated above (05; 27, 4) desire, sadness and pleasure, and consequently all the other passions of the soul, result from love. Wherefore every act proceeds from any passion, proceeds also from love as from a first cause: and so the other passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex amore, sicut jam dictum est, causatur et desiderium, et tristitia, et delectatio, et per consequens omnes aliæ passiones: unde omnis actio quæ procedit ex quacumque passione, procedit etiam ex amore sicut ex prima causa; unde non superfluunt aliæ passiones, quæ sunt causæ proximæ.
\n[I-II.q.28.a.6.ad.3] Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall state further on (29, 2).
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.28.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod odium etiam ex amore causatur, sicut infra dicetur.
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