[I-II.q.29.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore evil be the object of hatred, it follows that nothing but the lack of something can be the object of hatred: which is clearly untrue.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod objectum et causa odii non sit malum. Omne enim quod est, inquantum hujusmodi, bonum est. Si igitur objectum odii sit malum, sequitur quod nulla res odio habeatur, sed solum defectus alicujus rei; quod patet esse falsum.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.1.arg.2] Further, hatred of evil is praise-worthy; hence (2 Maccabees 3:1) some are praised for that \"the laws were very well kept, because of the godliness of Onias the high-priest, and the hatred of their souls [Douay: 'his soul'] had no evil.\" If, therefore, nothing but evil be the object of hatred, it would follow that all hatred is commendable: and this is clearly false.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, odire malum est laudabile: unde in laudem quorumdam dicitur II Mach., III, 1, quod leges optime custodiebantur propter Oniæ pontificis pietatem, et animos odio habentes mala. Si igitur nihil oditur nisi malum, sequitur quod omne odium sit laudabile; quod patet esse falsum.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.1.arg.3] Further, the same thing is not at the same time both good and evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different subjects. Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, idem non est simul bonum et malum. Sed idem diversis est odibile et amabile. Ergo odium non solum est mali, sed etiam boni.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.1.sc] Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of love is good, as stated above (26, 1; 27, 1). Therefore the object of hatred is evil.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.1.sc] Sed contra, odium contrariatur amori. Sed objectum amoris est bonum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo objectum odii est malum. Corderius: « Omnia, pulchrum et bonum expetendo, faciunt et volunt, quæcumque faciunt et volunt. » Corderius: « Amorem sive angelicum, sive spiritualem, sive animalem, sive naturalem. »
\n[I-II.q.29.a.1.co] Since the natural appetite is the result of apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the same subject as the natural appetite), it seems that what applies to the inclination of the natural appetite, applies also to the animal appetite, which does result from an apprehension in the same subject, as stated above (Question 26, Article 1). Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has it a natural dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it; and this is natural hatred. So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as suitable; while hatred is dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such, bears the aspect of good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum appetitus naturalis derivetur ab aliqua apprehensione, licet non conjuncta, eadem ratio videtur esse de inclinatione appetitus naturalis et appetitus animalis, qui sequitur apprehensionem conjunctam, sicut supra dictum est. In appetitu autem naturali hoc manifeste apparet, quod sicut unumquodque habet naturalem consonantiam vel aptitudinem ad id quod sibi convenit, quæ est amor naturalis. ita ad id quod est repugnans et corruptivum habet dissonantiam naturalem, quæ est odium naturale. Sic igitur et in appetitu animali seu intellectivo amor est consonantia quædam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut conveniens, odium vero est dissonantia quædam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut repugnans et nocivum. Sicut autem omne conveniens, inquantum hujusmodi, habet rationem boni; ita omne repugnans, inquantum hujusmodi, habet rationem mali; et ideo sicut bonum est objectum amoris, ita malum est objectum odii.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.1.ad.1] Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance but only of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But being, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being is hateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by comparison with something else.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ens, inquantum ens, non habet rationem repugnantis, sed magis convenientis, quia omnia communia conveniunt in ente; sed ens, inquantum est hoc ens determinatum, habet rationem repugnantis ad aliquod ens determinatum; et secundum hoc, unum ens est odibile alteri, et est malum, etsi non in se, tamen per comparisonem ad alterum.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.1.ad.2] Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love of good is good.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut aliquid apprehenditur ut bonum, quod non est vere bonum, ita aliquid apprehenditur ut malum, quod non est vere malum; unde contingit quando nec odium mali nec amorem boni esse bonum.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.1.ad.3] To different things the same thing may be lovable or hateful: in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the same thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally unsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming to water: and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and the same thing being apprehended by one as good, by another as bad.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod contingit idem esse amabile et odibile diversis, secundum appetitum quidem naturalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem est conveniens uni secundum suam naturam, et repugnans alteri, sicut calor convenit igni, et repugnat aquæ, secundum appetitum vero animalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem apprehenditur ab uno sub ratione boni, et ab alio sub ratione mali.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For \"the opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous\" (Praedic. x). But love and hatred are opposite members of a division, since they are contrary to one another. Therefore they are naturally simultaneous. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.2.arg.2] Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, unum contrariorum non est causa alterius. Sed amor et odium sunt contraria. Ergo, etc.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.2.arg.3] Further, that which follows is not the cause of that which precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred implies a turning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning towards good. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, posterius non est causa prioris. Sed odium est prius amore, ut videtur; nam odium importat recessum a malo, amor vero accessum ad bonum. Ergo amor non est causa odii.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all emotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is an emotion of the soul, is caused by love.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus XIV De civitate Dei, cap. vii, col. 410, t. 7, quod « omnes affectiones causantur ex amore. » Ergo et odium, cum sit quædam affectio animæ.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), love consists in a certain agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists in a certain disagreement or dissonance. Now we should consider in each thing, what agrees with it, before that which disagrees: since a thing disagrees with another, through destroying or hindering that which agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred; and nothing is hated, save through being contrary to a suitable thing which is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is caused by love.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, amor consistit in quadam convenientia amantis ad amatum; odium vero consistit in quadam repugnantia vel dissonantia. Oportet autem in quolibet prius considerare quid ei conveniat quam quid ei repugnet; per hoc enim aliquid est repugnans alteri, quia est corruptivum vel impeditivum ejus quod est conveniens. Unde necesse est quod amor sit prior odio, et quod nihil odio habeatur, nisi hoc quod contrariatur convenienti quod amatur. Et secundum hoc omne odium ex amore causatur.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.2.ad.1] The opposite members of a division are sometimes naturally simultaneous, both really and logically; e.g. two species of animal, or two species of color. Sometimes they are simultaneous logically, while, in reality, one precedes, and causes the other; e.g. the species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes they are not simultaneous either really or logically; e.g. substance and accident; for substance is in reality the cause of accident; and being is predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident, by a priority of reason, because it is not predicated of accident except inasmuch as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous, logically but not really. Wherefore nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in iis quæ ex opposito dividuntur, quædam inventur quæ sunt naturaliter simul et secundum rem et secundum rationem, sicut duæ species animalis, vel duæ species coloris; quædam vero sunt simul secundum rationem, sed unum realiter est prius altero et causa ejus, sicut patet in speciebus numerorum, figurarum et motuum; quædam vero non sunt simul nec secundum rem, nec secundum rationem, sicut substantia et accidens; nam substantia realiter est causa accidentis, et ens secundum rationem prius attribuitur substantiae quam accidenti, quia « Communia, » deest in Parm. — Addunt edit.: « causatur ex amore. » accidenti non attributur nisi inquantum est in substantia. Amor autem et odium naturaliter quidem sunt simul secundum rationem sed non realiter. Unde nihil prohibet amorem esse causam odii.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.2.ad.2] Love and hatred are contraries if considered in respect of the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries, they are not themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for it amounts to the same that one love a certain thing, or that one hate its contrary. Thus love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its contrary.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod amor et odium sunt contraria, quando accipiuntur circa idem; sed quando sunt de contrariis, non sunt contraria, sed se invicem consequentia; ejusdem enim rationis est quod ametur aliquid, et odiatur ejus contrarium; et sic amor unius rei est causa quod ejus contrarium odiatur.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.2.ad.3] In the order of execution, the turning away from one term precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse is the case in the order of intention: since approach to one term is the reason for turning away from the other. Now the appetitive movement belongs rather to the order of intention than to that of execution. Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each is an appetitive movement.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in executione prius est recedere ab uno termino quam accedere ad alterum terminum; sed in intentione est e converso; propter hoc enim receditur ab uno termino, ut accedatur ad alterum. Motus autem appetivus magis pertinet ad intentionem quam ad executionem; et ideo amor est prior odio, cum utrumque sit motus appetitivus.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive appetite, which is moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the senses cannot apprehend the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod odium non possit esse alicujus in uni-versali. Odium enim est passio appetitus sensitivi, qui movetur ex sensibilis apprehensione. Sed sensus non potest apprehendere universale. Ergo odium non potest esse alicujus in universali.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.6.arg.2] Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there is disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of universality implies something in common. Therefore nothing can be the object of universal hatred.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, odium causatur ex aliqua dissonantia, quæ communitati repugnat. Sed communitas est de ratione universalis. Ergo odium non potest esse alicujus in universali.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.6.arg.3] Further, the object of hatred is evil. But \"evil is in things, and not in the mind\" (Metaph. vi, 4). Since therefore the universal is in the mind only, which abstracts the universal from the particular, it would seem that hatred cannot have a universal object.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, objectum odii est malum. Malum autem est in rebus, et non in mente, ut dicitur in VI Metaph., text. 8. Cum ergo universale sit solum in mente, quæ abstrahit universale a particulari, videtur quod odium non possit esse alicujus universalis.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.6.sc] The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that \"anger is directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed to a thing in general; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter.\"
\n[I-II.q.29.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetor., cap. iv, prope fin., quod « ira semper fit inter singularia, odium autem etiam ad genera: furem enim odit et calumniatorem unusquisque. »
\n[I-II.q.29.a.6.co] There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first, as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as considered in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing to consider the universal man, and another to consider a man as man. If, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive power, whether of apprehension or of appetite, can attain the universal: because the universal is obtained by abstraction from individual matter, on which every sensitive power is based.
\nNevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that the object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight is cognizant of universal color, but because the fact that color is cognizant by the sight, is attributed to color, not as being this particular color, but simply because it is color. Accordingly hatred in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because this thing, by reason of its common nature, and not merely as an individual, is hostile to the animal--for instance, a wolf in regard to a sheep. Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally. On the other hand, anger is always caused by something in particular: because it is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from individuals. For this reason the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that \"anger is always directed to something singular, whereas hatred can be directed to a thing in general.\"
\nBut according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises from the universal apprehension of the intellect, it can regard the universal in both ways.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod de universali dupliciter contingit loqui: uno modo secundum quod subest intentioni universalitatis; alio autem modo dicitur de natura cui talis intentio attribuitur; alia est enim consideratio hominis universalis, et alia hominis in eo quod est homo. Si igitur universale accipiatur primo modo, sic nulla potentia sensitivæ partis, neque apprehensiva, neque appetitiva, ferri potest in universale; quia universale fit per abstractionem a materia individuali, in qua radicatur omnis virtus sensitiva. Potest tamen aliqua potentia sensitiva et apprehensiva et appetitiva, ferri in aliquid universaliter; sicut dicimus quod objectum visus est color secundum genus, non quia visus cognoscat colorem universalem, sed quia, quod color sit cognoscibilis a visu, non convenit colori, in quantum est hic color, sed inquantum est color simpliciter. Sic ergo odium etiam sensitivæ partis potest respicere aliquid in universali, quia ex natura communi aliquid adversatur animali, et non solum ex eo quod est particularis; sicut lupus ovi, unde ovis odit lupum generaliter. Sed ira semper causatur ex aliquo particulari, quia ex aliquo actu laedentis; actus autem particularium sunt; et propter hoc Philosophus dicit, lib. II Rhet., cap. iv, prope fin.: « Ira semper est ad aliquid 'particulare, odium vero potest esse ad aliquid in genere. » Sed odium secundum quod est in parte intellectiva, cum consequatur apprehensionem universalem intellectus, potest utroque modo esse respectu universalis.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.6.ad.1] The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such: but they apprehend something to which the character of universality is given by abstraction.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sensus non apprehendit universale prout est universale; apprehendit tamen aliquid cui per abstractionem accidit universalitas.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.6.ad.2] That which is common to all cannot be a reason of hatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at variance with others, so as to be hateful to them.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod id quod commune est omnibus, non potest esse ratio odii; sed nihil prohibet aliquid esse commune multis, quod tamen dissonat ab aliis; et sic est eis odiosum.
\n[I-II.q.29.a.6.ad.3] This argument considers the universal under the aspect of universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive apprehension or appetite.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.29.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illa objectio procedit de universali secundum quod substat intentioni universalitatis; sic enim non cadit sub apprehensione vel appetitu sensitivo.
\n