[I-II.q.41.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that fear is not a passion of the soul. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that \"fear is a power, by way of systole\"--i.e. of contraction--\"desirous of vindicating nature.\" But no virtue is a passion, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 5. Therefore fear is not a passion.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod timor non sit passio animæ. Dicit enim Damascenus in lib. III Orth. fid., cap. xxiii, col. 1087, t. 1, quod « timor est virtus secundum systole, » id est contractionem, « essentiæ desiderativa. » Sed nulla virtus est passio, ut probatur in II Ethic., cap. v. Ergo timor non est passio.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.1.arg.2] Further, every passion is an effect due to the presence of an agent. But fear is not of something present, but of something future, as Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is not a passion.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnis passio est effectus ex præsentia agentis proveniens. Sed timor non est de aliquo præsenti, sed de futuro, ut Damascenus dicit in II lib. Orth. fid., cap. xii, col. 930, t. 1. Ergo timor non est passio.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.1.arg.3] Further, every passion of the soul is a movement of the sensitive appetite, in consequence of an apprehension of the senses. But sense apprehends, not the future but the present. Since, then, fear is of future evil, it seems that it is not a passion of the soul.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnis passio animæ est motus appetitus sensitivi, qui sequitur apprehensionem sensus. Sensus autem non est apprehensivus futuri, sed præsentis. Cum ergo timor sit de malo futuro, videtur quod non sit passio animæ.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.1.sc] Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq.) reckons fear among the other passions of the soul.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus in XIV De civ. Dei, cap. vii et ix, col. 410, etc., t. 7, enumerat timorem inter alias animæ passiones.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.1.co] Among the other passions of the soul, after sorrow, fear chiefly has the character of passion. For as we have stated above (Article 22), the notion of passion implies first of all a movement of a passive power--i.e. of a power whose object is compared to it as its active principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In this way, both \"to feel\" and \"to understand\" are passions. Secondly, more properly speaking, passion is a movement of the appetitive power; and more properly still, it is a movement of an appetitive power that has a bodily organ, such movement being accompanied by a bodily transmutation. And, again, most properly those movements are called passions, which imply some deterioration. Now it is evident that fear, since it regards evil, belongs to the appetitive power, which of itself regards good and evil. Moreover, it belongs to the sensitive appetite: for it is accompanied by a certain transmutation--i.e. contraction--as Damascene says (Cf. Objection 1). Again, it implies relation to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some particular good. Wherefore it has most properly the character of passion; less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil: because fear regards future evil, which is not so strong a motive as present evil.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod inter cæteros animæ motus post tristitiam timor magis rationem obtinet passionis. Ut enim supra dictum est, ad rationem passionis primo quidem pertinet quod sit motus passivæ virtutis, ad quam scilicet comparetur suum objectum per modum activi moventis, eo quod passio est effectus agentis; et per hunc modum etiam sentire et intelligere discuntur pati. Secundo magis proprie dicitur passio motus appetitivæ virtutis; et adhuc magis proprie motus appetitivæ virtutis habentis organum corporale, qui fit cum aliqua transmutatione corporali; et adhuc propriissime illi motus passiones dicuntur qui important aliquod nocumentum. Manifestum est autem quod timor, cum sit de malo, ad appetitivam potentiam pertinet, quæ per se respicit bonum et malum; pertinet autem ad appetitum sensitivum; fit enim cum quadam transmutatione, scilicet « Timor naturalis est vis sibi esse vindicandi cum contractione. » Ex vers. Mich. Lequien. Ita ex cod. Tarrac., Garcia et edit Patav. ann. 1712. Cod. Alcan.: « Et adhuc etiam magis dicitur proprie, » etc.; etc., intermediis omissis; edit. Patav. ann. 1698: « Secundo proprie dicitur passio motus appetitivæ magis virtutis habentis organum, » etc., aliis pariter omissis. cum contractione, ut Damascenus dicit, et importat etiam habitudinem ad malum secundum quod malum habet quodammodo victoriam super aliquem. Unde verissime ipsi competit ratio passionis; tamen post tristitiam, quæ est de præsenti malo; nam timor est de malo futuro, quod non ita movet sicut præsens.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.1.ad.1] Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore, in so far as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are principles of external action, they are called virtues. But the Philosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtus nominat quoddam principium actionis; et ideo inquantum interiores motus appetitivæ virtutis sunt principia exteriorum actuum, dicuntur virtutes. Philosophus autem negat passionem esse virtutem, quæ est habitus.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.1.ad.2] Just as the passion of a natural body is due to the bodily presence of an agent, so is the passion of the soul due to the agent being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor really present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which is really future, is present in the apprehension of the soul.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut passio corporis naturalis provenit ex corporali præsentia agentis; ita passio animæ provenit ex animali præsentia corporali vel reali, inquantum scilicet malum, quod est futurum realiter, est præsens secundum apprehensionem animæ.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.1.ad.3] The senses do not apprehend the future: but from apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to hope for a future good, or to fear a future evil.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sensus non apprehendit futurum; sed ex eo quod apprehendit præsens, animal naturali instinctu movetur ad sperandum futurum bonum, vel timendum futurum malum.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that fear is not a special passion. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that \"the man who is not distraught by fear, is neither harassed by desire, nor wounded by sickness\"--i.e. sorrow--\"nor tossed about in transports of empty joys.\" Wherefore it seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other passions are removed. Therefore fear is not a special but a general passion.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod timor non sit specialis passio. Dicit enim Augustinus in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., quæst. xxxiii, col. 23, t. 6, quod « quem non exanimat metus, nec cupiditas eum vastat, nec ægritudo, » id est, tristitia, « macerat, nec ventilat gestiens et vana lætitia. » Ex quo videtur quod remoto timore, omnes aliæ passiones removentur. Non ergo est passio specialis sed generalis.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.2.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that \"pursuit and avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and denial are in the intellect.\" But denial is nothing special in the intellect, as neither is affirmation, but something common to many. Therefore neither is avoidance anything special in the appetite. But fear is nothing but a kind of avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not a special passion.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. ii, circa princ., quod « ita se habet in appetitu prosecutio et fuga, sicut in intellectu affirmatio et negatio. » Sed negatio non est aliquid speciale in intellectu, sicut nec affirmatio, sed aliquid commune ad multa. Ergo nec fuga in appetitu. Sed nihil est aliud timor quam fuga quædam mali. Ergo timor non est passio specialis.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.2.arg.3] Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible: since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that \"fear is a kind of sorrow\"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that fear is \"a power of desire\": and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Question 23, Article 4). Therefore fear is not a special passion, since it belongs to different powers.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si timor esset passio specialis, præcipue in irascibili esset. Est autem timor etiam in concupiscibili; dicit enim Philosophus in II Rhetor., cap. v, quod « timor est tristitia quædam; » et Damascenus dicit, lib. III Orthod. fid., cap. xxiii, col. 1087, t. 1, quod « timor est virtus desiderativa. » Tristitia autem et desiderium sunt in concupiscibili, ut supra dictum est. Non est ergo passio specialis, cum pertineat ad diversas potentias.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.2.sc] Fear is condivided with the other passions of the soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12,15).
\n[I-II.q.41.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod timor condividitur aliis passionibus animæ, ut patet per Damascenum in II Orth. fid., c. xii, col. 930, t. 1.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.2.co] The passions of the soul derive their species from their objects: hence that is a special passion, which has a special object. Now fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; so the object of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible. Consequently fear is a special passion of the soul.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod passiones animæ recipiunt speciem ex objectis; unde specialis passio est quæ habet speciale objectum. Timor autem habet speciale objectum, sicut et spes; sicut enim objectum spei est bonum futurum arduum possibile adipisci, ita objectum timoris est malum futurum difficile, cui resisti non potest. Unde timor est specialis passio animæ.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.2.ad.1] All the passions of the soul arise from one source, viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By reason of this connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions of the soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general passion.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod omnes passiones animæ derivantur ex uno principio, scilicet ex amore, in quo habent ad invicem connexionem; et ratione hujus connexionis, remoto timore, removentur aliæ passiones animæ, non ideo quia sit passio generalis.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.2.ad.2] Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear, but avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance be something common, yet fear is a special passion.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non omnis fuga appetitus est timor, sed fuga ab aliquo speciali objecto, ut dictum est. Et ideo licet fuga sit quoddam generale, tamen timor est passio specialis.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.2.ad.3] Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated above (Question 25, Article 01); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far as the object of fear causes sorrow when present: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises \"from the representation of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful.\" In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as hope arises from the desire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is evident from what has been said above (25, 2; 29, 02; 36, 2).
\n[I-II.q.41.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod timor nullo modo est in concupiscibili; non enim respicit malum absolute, sed cum quadam difficultate vel arduitate, ut ei resisti vix possit. Sed quia passiones irascibilis derivantur a passionibus concupiscibilis, et ad eas terminatur, ut supra dictum est, ideo timori attribuntur ea quæ sunt concupiscibilis. Dicitur enim timor esse tristitia, inquantum objectum timoris est contristans, si præsens fuerit; unde et Philosophus dicit, ibid., quod « timor procedit ex phantasia futuri mali corruptivi vel contristativi. » Similiter et desiderium attribuitur a Damasceno timori, quia sicut spes causatur vel oritur a desiderio boni, ita timor est ex fuga mali; fuga autem mali oritur ex desiderio boni, ut ex supra dictis patet.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that there is a natural fear. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that \"there is a natural fear, through the soul refusing to be severed from the body.\"
\n[I-II.q.41.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod timor aliquis sit naturalis. Dicit enim Damascenus in III lib. Orthod. fid., cap. xxiii, col. 1087, t. 1, quod « est quidam timor naturalis, nolente anima dividi a corpore. »
\n[I-II.q.41.a.3.arg.2] Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (02, ad 1). But there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is also a natural fear.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, timor ex amore oritur, ut dictum est. Sed est aliquis amor naturalis, ut Dionysius dicit cap. iv De div. nom., § 15, col. 714, t. 1. Ergo etiam est aliquis timor naturalis.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.3.arg.3] Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above (40, 4, ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident from Romans 4:18, where it is said of Abraham that \"against hope\" of nature, \"he believed in hope\" of grace. Therefore there is also a fear of nature.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, timor opponitur spei, ut supra dictum est. Sed est aliqua spes naturæ, ut patet per id quod dicitur Rom., iv, 18, de Abraham, quod contra spem naturæ in spem gratiae credidit. Ergo etiam est aliquis timor naturæ.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.3.sc] That which is natural is common to things animate and inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there is no natural fear.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.3.sc] Sed contra, ea quæ sunt naturalia, communiter inveniuntur in rebus animatis et inanimatis. Sed timor non invenitur in rebus inanimatis. Ergo timor non est naturalis.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.3.co] A movement is said to be natural, because nature inclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is entirely accomplished by nature, without any operation of the apprehensive faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to fire, and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants. Secondly, a movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines thereto, though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone: since, as stated above (Question 10, Article 1), the movements of the cognitive and appetitive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first principle. In this way, even the acts of the apprehensive power, such as understanding, feeling, and remembering, as well as the movements of the animal appetite, are sometimes said to be natural.
\nAnd in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the diversity of its object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a fear of \"corruptive evil,\" which nature shrinks from on account of its natural desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural. Again, there is a fear of \"painful evil,\" which is repugnant not to nature, but to the desire of the appetite; and such fear is not natural. In this sense we have stated above (26, 1; 30, 3; 31, 7) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into natural and non-natural.
\nBut in the first sense of the word \"natural,\" we must observe that certain passions of the soul are sometimes said to be natural, as love, desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural. The reason of this is because love and hatred, desire and avoidance, imply a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what is evil; which inclination is to be found in the natural appetite also. Consequently there is a natural love; while we may also speak of desire and hope as being even in natural things devoid of knowledge. On the other hand the other passions of the soul denote certain movements, whereto the natural inclination is nowise sufficient. This is due either to the fact that perception or knowledge is essential to these passions (thus we have said, 31, 1,3; 35, 1, that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure and sorrow), wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is because such like movements are contrary to the very nature of natural inclination: for instance, despair flies from good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary evil; both of which are contrary to the inclination of nature. Wherefore such like passions are in no way ascribed to inanimate beings.
\nThus the Replies to the Objections are evident.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod aliquis motus dicitur naturalis, quia ad ipsum inclinat natura. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter: uno modo quod totum perficitur a natura absque aliqua operatione apprehensivæ virtutis, sicut moveri sursum est motus naturalis ignis, et augeri est motus naturalis animalium et plantarum. Alio modo dicitur motus naturalis ad quem natura inclinat, licet non perficiatur nisi per apprehensionem, quia, sicut supra dictum est, motus cognitivæ et appetitivæ virtutis reducuntur in naturam sicut in principium primum. Et per hunc modum etiam ipsi actus apprehensivæ virtutis, ut intelligere, sentire et memorari, et etiam motus appetitus animalis quando dicuntur naturales. Et per hunc modum potest dici timor naturalis; et distinguitur a timore non naturali secundum diversitatem objecti. Est enim, ut Philosophus dicit in II Rhetor., cap. v, timor de malo corruptivo; quod natura refugit propter naturale desiderium essendi; et talis timor dicitur esse naturalis: et iterum de malo contristativo, quod non repugnat naturæ, sed desiderio appetitus; et talis timor non est naturalis; sicut etiam supra, amor, concupiscentia et delectatio distincta sunt per « naturale » et « non naturale. » Sed secundum primam acceptionem « naturalis, » sciendum est quod quædam de passionibus animæ quando dicuntur naturales, ut amor, desiderium et spes; aliæ vero naturales dici non possunt; et hoc ideo quia amor et odium, desiderium et fuga important inclinationem quamdam ad prosequendum bonum et fugiendum malum; quæ quidem inclination pertinet etiam ad appetitum naturalem; et ideo est amor quidam naturalis; et desiderium vel spes potest quodammodo dici etiam in rebus naturalibus cognitione carentibus. Sed aliæ passiones animæ important quosdam motus, ad quos nullo modo sufficit inclination naturalis; vel quia de ratione harum passionum est sensus seu cognitio, sicut dictum est, quod apprehensio requiritur ad rationem delectationis et doloris; unde qui carent cognitione non possunt dici delectari vel dolere; aut quia hujusmodi motus sunt contra rationem inclinationis naturalis, puta quod desperatio refugit bonum propter aliquam difficultatem, et timor refugit impugnationem mali contrarii, ad quod est inclination naturalis. Et ideo hujusmodi passiones nullo modo attribuuntur rebus inanimatis. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, \"laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety.\" Because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), \"fear regards a saddening evil.\" Therefore the species of fear should correspond to the species of sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above (Question 35, Article 8). Therefore there should only be four species of fear corresponding to them.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inconvenienter Damascenus, lib. II Orthod. fid., cap. xv, col. 934, t. 1, assignet sex species timoris, scilicet « segnitiem, erubescentiam, verecundiam, admirationem, stuporem, agoniam. » Ut enim Philosophus dicit in II Rhetor., c. v, « timor est de malo contristativo. » Ergo species timoris debent respondere speciebus tristitiæ. Sunt autem quatuor species tristitiæ, ut supra dictum est. Ergo solum debent esse quatuor species timoris eis correspondentes. Ita codd.; addit « Segnities, pudor, verecundia, stupor, terror,
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.arg.2] Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in our power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, as stated above (Article 2). Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame, which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of fear.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud quod in actu nostro consistit, nostræ potestati subjicitur. Sed timor est de malo quod excedit potestatem nostram, ut dictum est. Non ergo segnities, et erubescentia, et verecundia, quæ respiciunt operationem nostram, debent poni species timoris.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.arg.3] Further, fear is of the future, as stated above (Question 1, Article 2). But \"shame regards a disgraceful deed already done,\" as Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx.] says. Therefore shame is not a species of fear.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, timor est de futuro, ut dictum est. Sed verecundia est de turpi actu jam commisso, ut Gregorius Nyss. dicit, lib. De nat. hom. Ergo verecundia non est species timoris.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.arg.4] Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore amazement and stupor are not species of fear.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, timor non est nisi de malo. Sed admiratio et stupor sunt de magno et insolito, sive bono, sive malo. Ergo admiratio et stupor non sunt species timoris.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.arg.5] Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaphysics. But fear leads to flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of fear.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.arg.5] 5. Præterea, philosophi ex admiratione sunt moti ad inquirendum veritatem, ut dictur in principio Metaph., cap. 11, a princ. Timor autem non movet ad inquirendum, sed magis ad fugiendum. Ergo admiratio non est species timoris. Sed in contrarium sufficit auctoritas Damasceni et Gregorii Nyss..
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.sc] suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius] (Cf. Objection 1,3).
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.co] As stated above (Article 2), fear regards a future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now man's evil, like his good, may be considered either in his action or in external things. In his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, there is the toil that burdens his nature: and hence arises \"laziness,\" as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much toil. Secondly, there is the disgrace which damages him in the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is \"shamefacedness\"; if, however, it be a deed already done, there is \"shame.\"
\nOn the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may surpass man's faculty of resistance in three ways. First by reason of its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: and then there is \"amazement.\" Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; because, to wit, some unwonted evil arises before us, and on that account is great in our estimation: and then there is \"stupor,\" which is caused by the representation of something unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of its being unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of this kind is called \"anxiety.\"
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, timor est de futuro malo quod excedit potestatem timentis, ut scilicet ei resisti non possit. Sicut autem bonum hominis, ita et malum potest considerari vel in operatione ipsius, vel in exterioribus rebus. In operatione autem ipsius hominis potest duplex malum timeri: primo quidem labor gravans naturam; et sic causatur segnities, cum scilicet aliquis refugit operari propter timorem exceedentis laboris. Secundo turpitudo laedens opinionem; et sic si turpitudo timeatur in actu committendo, est erubescentia; si autem sit de turpi jam facto, est verecundia. Malum autem quod in exterioribus rebus consistit, tripliciter potest exceedere hominis facultatem ad resistendum. Primo quidem ratione suæ magnitudinis, cum aliquis scilicet considerat aliquod magnum malum cujus exitum considerare non sufficit; et sic est admiratio. Secundo ratione dissuetudinis, quia scilicet aliquod malum inconsuetum nostræ considerationi offertur, et sic est magnum nostra reputatione; et hoc modo est stupor, qui causatur ex insolita imaginatione. Tertio modo ratione improvisionis, quia scilicet provideri non potest, sicut futura infortunia timentur; et talis timor dicitur agonia. « Verecundia, metus ob turpitudinem susceptam. » Migne. — Nemesius, cui liber De nat. hom.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.ad.1] Those species of sorrow given above are not derived from the diversity of objects, but from the diversity of effects, and for certain special reasons. Consequently there is no need for those species of sorrow to correspond with these species of fear, which are derived from the proper division of the object of fear itself.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illæ species tristitiæ quæ supra positæ sunt, non accipiuntur secundum diversitatem objecti, sed secundum effectus, et secundum quasdam speciales rationes; et ideo non oportet quod illæ species tristitiæ respondant istis speciebus timoris, quæ accipiuntur secundum divisionem propriam objecti ipsius timoris.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.ad.2] A deed considered as being actually done, is in the power of the doer. But it is possible to take into consideration something connected with the deed, and surpassing the faculty of the doer, for which reason he shrinks from the deed. It is in this sense that laziness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species of fear.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod operatio, secundum quod jam fit, subditur potestati operantis. Sed aliquid circa operationem considerari potest, facultatem operantis excedens, propter quod aliquis refugit actionem. Et secundum hoc segnities, erubescentia et verecundia ponuntur species timoris.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.ad.3] The past deed may be the occasion of fear of future reproach or disgrace: and in this sense shame is a species of fear.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod de actu præterito potest timeri convicium vel opprobrium futurum; et secundum hoc verecundia est species timoris.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.ad.4] Not every amazement and stupor are species of fear, but that amazement which is caused by a great evil, and that stupor which arises from an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that, just as laziness shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement and stupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and unwonted thing, whether good or evil: so that amazement and stupor stand in relation to the act of the intellect, as laziness does to external work.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod non quælibet admiratio et stupor sunt species timoris, sed admiratio quæ est de magno malo, et stupor qui est de malo insolito. Vel potest dici quod sicut segnities refugit laborem exterioris operationis, ita admiratio et stupor refugiunt difficultatem considerationis rei magnæ et insolitæ, sive sit bona, sive mala; ut hoc modo se habeant admiratio et stupor ad actum intellectus, sicut segnities ad exteriorem actum.
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.ad.5] He who is amazed shrinks at present from forming a judgment of that which amazes him, fearing to fall short of the truth, but inquires afterwards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor fears both to judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Wherefore amazement is a beginning of philosophical research: whereas stupor is a hindrance thereto.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.41.a.4.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod admirans refugit in præsenti dare judicium de eo quod miratur timens defectum; sed in futurum inquirit. Stupens autem timet et in præsenti judicare, et in futuro inquirere. Unde admiratio est principium philosophandi; sed stupor est philosophicæ considerationis impedimentum.
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