[I-II.q.45.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that \"daring is a vice.\" Now vice is contrary to virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a passion, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod audacia non contrarietur timori. Dicit enim Augustinus, in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., quæst. xxxi, § 2, col. 21, et quæst. xxxiv, col. 23, t. 6, quod « audacia vitium est. » Vitium autem virtuti contrariatur. Cum ergo timor non sit virtus, sed passio, vide-tur quod timori non contrarietur audacia.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.1.arg.2] Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, uni unum est contrarium. Sed timori contrariatur spes. Non ergo contrariatur ei audacia.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.1.arg.3] Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear excludes safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that \"fear takes forethought for safety.\" Therefore safety is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, unaquæque passio excludit passionem oppositam. Sed id quod excluditur per timorem, est securitas; dicit enim Augustinus, II Confess., cap. vi, § 13, col. 681, t. 1, quod « timor securitati præcavet. » Ergo securitas contrariatur timori. Non ergo audacia.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.1.sc] The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that \"daring is contrary to fear.\"
\n[I-II.q.45.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in II Rhet., cap. v, a med., quod « audacia est timori contraria.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.1.co] It is of the essence of contraries to be \"farthest removed from one another,\" as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Now that which is farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears it; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that same danger. Consequently it is evident that daring is contrary to fear.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod de ratione contrariorum est quod maxime a se distent, ut dicitur in X Metaph., text. 13. Illud autem quod maxime distat a timore est audacia. Timor enim refugit nocumentum futurum propter ejus victoriam super ipsum timentem; sed audacia aggreditur periculum imminens propter victoriam sui supra ipsum periculum. Unde manifeste timori contrariatur audacia.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.1.ad.1] Anger, daring and all the names of the passions can be taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of the sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus they are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides this movement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus they are names of vices. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of daring: but we are speaking of it in the first sense.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ira, audacia, et omnium passionum nomina dupliciter accipi possunt: uno modo, secundum quod important absolute motum appetitus sensitivi in aliquod objectum bonum vel malum; et sic sunt nomina passionum; alio modo, secundum quod simul cum hujus-modi motu important recessum ab ordine rationis; et sic sunt nomina vitiorum; et hoc modo loquitur Augustinus de audacia. Sed nos loquimur nunc de audacia secundum primum modum.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.1.ad.2] To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above (23, 2; 40, 4) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus fear is contrary to hope: the other, according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod uni secundum idem non sunt plura contraria; sed secundum diversa nihil prohibet uni plura contrariari; et sic dictum est supra, quod passiones irascibilis habent duplicem contrarietatem; unam secundum oppositionem boni et mali, et sic timor contrariatur spei; aliam secundum oppositionem accessus, et recessus, et sic timori contrariatur audacia, spei vero desperatio.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.1.ad.3] Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who fears not. Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while daring is opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety implies privation, so daring implies safety.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod securitas non significat aliquid contrarium timori, sed solam timoris exclusionem; ille enim dicitur esse securus qui non timet. Unde securitas opponitur timori sicut privatio, audacia autem sicut contrarium; et sicut contrarium includit in se privationem, ita audacia securitatem.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope. Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But hope regards good things, as stated above (Question 40, Article 1). Therefore they have different objects and are not in the same order. Therefore daring does not ensue from hope.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod audacia non consequatur spem. Audacia enim est respectu malorum et terribilium, ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. vii, circa med. Spes autem respicit bonum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo habent diversa objecta, et non sunt unius ordinis. Ergo audacia non consequitur spem.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.2.arg.2] Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact, despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore daring does not result from hope.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut audacia contrariatur timori, ita desperatio spei. Sed timor non sequitur desperationem; quinimo desperatio excludit timorem, ut Philosophus dicit in II Rhet., cap. v, a med. Ergo audacia non consequitur spem.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.2.arg.3] Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory. But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult. Therefore daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not result from it.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, audacia intendit quoddam bonum, scilicet victoriam. Sed tendere in bonum arduum pertinet ad spem. Ergo audacia est idem spei. Non ergo consequitur spem.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.2.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that \"those are hopeful are full of daring.\" Therefore it seems that daring ensues from hope.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., cap. vii, post med., quod « illi qui sunt bonæ spei, sunt audaces. » Videtur ergo audacia consequui spem.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.2.co] As we have often stated (22, 2; 35, 1; 41, 1), all these passions belong to the appetitive power. Now every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either of pursuit or of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something either by reason of itself or by reason of something else. By reason of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the object of avoidance: but by reason of something else, evil can be the object of pursuit, through some good attaching to it; and good can be the object of avoidance, through some evil attaching to it. Now that which is by reason of something else, follows that which is by reason of itself. Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil. Now these four things belong to four passions, since pursuit of good belongs to hope, avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, therefore, that daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. But despair results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope for.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut jam pluries dictum est, omnes hujusmodi passiones animæ ad appetitivam potentiam pertinent. Omnis autem motus appetitivæ potentiae reducitur ad prosecutionem vel ad fugam. Prosecutio autem vel fuga est alicujus et per se et per accidens; per se quidem est prosecutio boni, fuga vero mali; per accidens autem potest prosecutio esse mali propter aliquod bonum adjunctum, et fuga boni propter aliquod malum adjunctum. Quod autem est per accidens, sequitur ad id quod est per se; et ideo prosecutio mali sequitur prosecutionem boni, sicut et fuga boni sequitur fugam mali. Hæc autem qua-tuor pertinent ad quatuor passiones: nam prosecutio boni pertinet ad spem, fuga mali ad timorem, prosecutio mali terribilis pertinet ad audacia, fuga vero boni pertinet ad desperationem. Unde sequitur quod audacia consequitur ad spem; ex hoc enim quod aliquis sperat superare terribile imminens, ex hoc audacter insequitur ipsum. Ad timorem vero sequitur desperatio; ideo enim aliquis desperat, quia timet difficultatem quæ est circa bonum sperandum.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.2.ad.1] This argument would hold, if good and evil were not co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to good, since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit; consequently daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues good.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio sequeretur, si bonum et malum essent objecta non habentia ordinem ad invicem. Sed quia malum habet aliquem ordinem ad bonum, est enim posterius bono, sicut privatio habitu, ideo audacia, quæ insequitur malum, est post spem, quæ insequitur bonum.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.2.ad.2] Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to evil, yet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit of good precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope precedes daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear does not always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not always lead to daring, save only when it is strong.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod etsi bonum simpliciter sit prius quam malum, tamen fuga per prius debetur malo quam bono; sicut insecutio per prius debetur bono quam malo. Et ideo sicut spes est prior quam audacia, ita timor est prior quam desperatio; et sicut ex timore non semper sequitur desperatio, sed quando fuerit intensus, ita ex spe non semper sequitur audacia, sed quando fuerit vehemens.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.2.ad.3] Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined; yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In like manner despair regards directly the good which it turns away from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: just as despair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, daring cannot be a principal passion.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod audacia, licet sit circa malum, cui conjunctum est bonum victoriæ secundum æstimationem audacis, tamen respicit malum; bonum vero adjunctum respicit spes; et similiter desperatio respicit bonum directe, quod refugit; malum vero adjunctum respicit timor. Unde proprie loquendo audacia non est pars spei, sed ejus effectus; sicut nec desperatio est pars timoris, sed ejus effectus. Et propter hoc etiam audacia principalis passio esse non potest.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that \"lovers of wine are strong and daring.\" But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod defectus aliquis sit causa audaciæ. Dicit enim Philosophus in lib. De problematibus, sect. xxvii, probl. 4, quod « amatores vini sunt fortes et audaces. » Sed ex vino sequitur defectus ebrietatis. Ergo audacia causatur ex aliquo defectu.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.3.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that \"those who have no experience of danger are bold.\" But want of experience is a defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in II Rhet., cap. v, a med., quod « inexperti periculorum sunt audaces. » Sed inexperientia defectus quidam est. Ergo audacia ex defectu causatur.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.3.arg.3] Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be daring; \"like the beasts when beaten,\" as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. But the suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, injusta passi audaciores esse solent; sicut etiam bestiæ, cum percutiuntur, ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. viii, circa med. Sed injustum pati ad defectum pertinet. Ergo audacia ex aliquo defectu causatur.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.3.sc] The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of daring \"is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off.\" But anything pertaining to defect implies either the removal of the means of safety, or the proximity of something to be feared. Therefore nothing pertaining to defect is a cause of daring.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in II Rhetor., cap. v, a med., quod « causa audacia est cum in phantasia spes fuerit salutarium in prope existentium; timendorum autem aut non entium, aut longe entium. » Sed id quod pertinet ad defectum, vel pertinet ad salutarium remotionem vel ad terribilium propinquitatem. Ergo nihil quod ad defectum pertinet est causa audacia.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.3.co] As stated above (1,2) daring results from hope and is contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause hope or banish fear, is a cause of daring. Since, however, fear and hope, and also daring, being passions, consist in a movement of the appetite, and in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be considered as the cause of daring in two ways, whether by raising hope, or by banishing fear; in one way, in the part of the appetitive movement; in another way, on the part of the bodily transmutation.
\nOn the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension, hope that leads to daring is roused by those things that make us reckon victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power, as bodily strength, experience of dangers, abundance of wealth, and the like; or they regard the powers of others, such as having a great number of friends or any other means of help, especially if a man trust in the Divine assistance: wherefore \"those are more daring, with whom it is well in regard to godlike things,\" as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Fear is banished, in this way, by the removal of threatening causes of fear; for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies, through having harmed nobody, so that he is not aware of any imminent danger; since those especially appear to be threatened by danger, who have harmed others.
\nOn the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused through the incitement of hope and the banishment of fear, by those things which raise the temperature about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. iii, 4) that \"those whose heart is small in size, are more daring; while animals whose heart is large are timid; because the natural heat is unable to give the same degree of temperature to a large as to a small heart; just as a fire does not heat a large house as well as it does a small house.\" He says also (De Problem. xxvii, 4), that \"those whose lungs contain much blood, are more daring, through the heat in the heart that results therefrom.\" He says also in the same passage that \"lovers of wine are more daring, on account of the heat of the wine\": hence it has been said above (Question 40, Article 6) that drunkenness conduces to hope, since the heat in the heart banishes fear and raises hope, by reason of the dilatation and enlargement of the heart.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, audacia consequitur spem, et contrariatur timori. Unde quæcumque nata sunt causare spem, vel excludere timorem, sunt causa audacia. Quia vero timor, et spes, et etiam audacia, cum sint passiones quædam, consistunt in motu appetitus, et in quadam transmutatione corporali; dupliciter potest accipi causa audacia, sive quantum ad provocationem spei, sive quantum ad exclusionem timoris: uno modo quidem ex parte appetitivi motus; alio vero modo ex parte transmutationis corporalis. Ex parte quidem appetitivi motus, qui sequitur apprehensionem, provocatur spes causans audacia per ea quæ faciunt æstimare quod possibile sit adipisci victoriam vel secundum propriam potentiam, sicut fortitudo corporis, experientia in periculis, multitudo pecuniarum, et alia hujusmodi; sive per potentiam aliorum, sicut multitudo amicorum, vel quorumque auxiliantium; et præcipue si homo confidat de auxilio divino. Unde illi qui se bene habent ad divina, audaciores sunt, ut etiam Philosophus dicit in II Rhet., cap. v, sub fin. Timor autem excluditur secundum istum modum per remotionem terribilium appropinquantium, puta quia homo non habet inimicos, quia nulli nocuit, quia non videt aliquod periculum imminere; illis enim videntur maxime pericula immi-nere qui aliis nocuerunt. Ex parte vero transmutationis corporalis causatur audacia per provocationem spei et exclusionem timoris, ex his quæ faciunt caliditatem circa cor. Unde Philosophus dicit in lib. III De partibus animalium, cap. iv, circa fin, quod « illi qui habent parvum cor secundum quantitatem, sunt magis audaces; et animalia habentia magnum cor secundum quantitatem, sunt timida; » quia calor naturalis non tantum potest calefacere magnum cor, sicut parvum; sicut ignis non tantum potest calefacere magnam domum, sicut parvam. Et in lib. De probl., sect. xxvii, probl. 4, dicit quod « habentes magnum pulmonem sanguineum sunt audaciores propter caliditatem cordis exinde consequentem; » et ibidem dicit quod « vini amatores sunt magis audaces propter caliditatem vini. » Unde et supra dictum est, quod ebrietas facit ad bonitatem spei; caliditas enim cordis repellit timorem, et causat spem, propter cordis extensionem et amplificationem.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.3.ad.1] Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a defect, but through dilating the heart: and again through making a man think greatly of himself.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ebrietas causat audacia, non inquantum est defectus; sed inquantum facit cordis dilatationem et inquantum etiam facit æstimationem cujusdam magnitudinis.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.3.ad.2] Those who have no experience of dangers are more daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. in so far as through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor the dangers that threaten. Hence it is that the removal of the cause of fear gives rise to daring.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illi qui sunt inexperti periculorum, sunt audaciores, non propter defectum, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet propter inexperientiam neque debilitatem suam cognoscunt, neque præsentiam periculorum; et ita per subtractionem causæ timoris sequitur audacia. Ad tertium dieendum, quod sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhet., c. v, in fin., « injustum passi redduntur audaciores, quia æstimant quod Deus injustum passis auxilium ferat. » Et sic patet quod nullus defectus causat audacia nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet habet adjunctam aliquam excellentiam vel veram vel æstimatam, vel ex parte sui vel ex parte alterius.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.3.ad.3] As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) \"those who have been wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the assistance of those who suffer unjustly.\"
\nHence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally, i.e. in so far as some excellence attaches thereto, real or imaginary, either in oneself or in another.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the daring are not more eager at first than in the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by fear, which is contrary to daring, as stated above (1; 44, 3). But the daring sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3). Therefore they are not more eager at first than in the midst of danger.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod audaces non sint promptiores in principio quam in ipsis periculis. Tremor enim ex timore causatur, qui contrariatur audaciae, ut ex dictis patet. Sed audaces quandoque in principio tremunt, ut Philosophus dicit in lib. De problematibus, sect. xxvii, probl. 3, in fin. Ergo non sunt promptiores in principio quam in ipsis periculis existentes.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.4.arg.2] Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its object: thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more lovable. But the object of daring is something difficult. Therefore the greater the difficulty, the greater the daring. But danger is more arduous and difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is greatest.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, per augmentum objecti augetur passio; sicut si bonum est amabile, et magis bonum est magis amabile. Sed arduum est objectum audaciae. Augmentato ergo arduo, augmentatur audacia. Sed magis fit arduum et difficile periculum, quando est præsens. Ergo debet tunc magis crescere audacia.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.4.arg.3] Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds. But anger causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that \"anger makes man bold.\" Therefore when man is in the midst of danger and when he is being beaten, then is he most daring.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ex vulneribus inflictis provocatur ira. Sed ira causat audaciae; dicit enim Philosophus in II Rhetor., c. v, in fin., quod « ira est ausivum. » Ergo, quando jam sunt in ipsis periculis et percutiuntur, videur quod magis audaces reddantur.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.4.sc] It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that \"the daring are precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst of dangers they stand aloof.\"
\n[I-II.q.45.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in III Ethic., cap. vii, post med., quod « audaces prævolantes sunt, et volantes ante pericula; in ipsis autem discedunt. »
\n[I-II.q.45.a.4.co] Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite, follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive faculty cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances; its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens sometimes that it is impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises the movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he comes to experience the danger, he feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way.
\nOn the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet when they are in the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less than they anticipated; wherefore they are more persevering. Moreover, it may be because they face the danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will, however great the danger may prove: whereas men of daring face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing fear, as stated above (Article 3).
\n[I-II.q.45.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod audacia, cum sit quidam motus appetitus sensitivi, sequitur apprehensionem sensitivæ virtutis. Virtus autem sensitiva non est collativa, nec inquisitiva singulorum quæ circumstant rem, sed subitum habet judicium. Contingit autem quando quod secundum subitam apprehensionem, non possunt cognosci omnia quæ difficultatem in aliquo negotio afferunt. Unde surgit audaciae motus ad aggredientum periculum. Unde quando jam experiuntur ipsum periculum, sentiunt majorem difficultatem quam æstimaverunt; et ideo deficiunt. Sed ratio est discursiva omnium quæ afferunt difficultatem negotio. Et ideo fortes, qui ex judicio rationis aggrediuntur pericula, in principio videntur remissi, quia non passi, sed cum deliberatione debita aggrediuntur; quando autem sunt in ipsis periculis, non experiuntur aliquid improvisum, sed quandoque minora illis quæ præcogitaverunt; et ideo magis persistunt. Vel etiam quia propter bonum virtutis pericula aggrediuntur; cujus boni voluntas in eis perseverat, quantacumque sint pericula. Audaces autem propter solam æstimationem facientem spem et excludentem timorem, sicut dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.4.ad.1] Trembling does occur in men of daring, on account of the heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body, as occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of daring the heat withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, it withdraws to the inferior parts.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod etiam in audacibus accidit tremor propter revocationem caloris ab exterioribus ad interiora; sicut etiam in timentibus; sed in audacibus revocatur calor ad cor, in timentibus autem ad inferiora.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.4.ad.2] The object of love is good simply, wherefore if it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil presupposes the movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, so much difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if the movement of daring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the daring considered to be.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod objectum amoris est simpliciter bonum: unde augmentatum simpliciter augmentat amorem. Sed objectum audaciae est compositum ex bono et malo, et motus audaciae in malum præsupponit motum spei in bonum; et ideo si tantum addatur de arduitate ad periculum quod excedat spem, non sequetur motus audaciae, sed diminuetur; si tamen sit motus audaciae, quanto majus est periculum, tanto major audacia reputatur.
\n[I-II.q.45.a.4.ad.3] Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be some kind of hope, as we shall see later on (46, 1). Consequently if the danger be so great as to banish all hope of victory, anger does not ensue. It is true, however, that if anger does ensue, there will be greater daring.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.45.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ex læsione non causatur ira, nisi supposita aliqua spe, ut infra dicetur, et ideo si fuerit tantum periculum quod excedat spem victoriæ non sequetur ira; sed verum est quod si ira sequatur, audacia augebitur.
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