[I-II.q.48.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. Because sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, since, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6, \"everyone that acts from anger, acts with pain.\" Therefore anger does not cause pleasure.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ira non causet delectationem. Tristitia enim delectationem excludit. Sed ira est semper cum tristitia; quia, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., cap. vi, parum a med., « omnis qui facit aliquid propter iram, facit tristatus. » Ergo ira non causat delectationem.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.1.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that \"vengeance makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for pain\": whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the advent of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an effect united with pleasure.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. v, circa med., quod « punitio quietat impetum iræ, delectationem pro tristitia faciens; » ex quo potest accipi quod delectatio irato provenit ex punitione. Punitio autem excludit iram. Ergo, adveniente delectatione, ira tollitur. Non est ergo effectus delectationi conjunctus.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.1.arg.3] Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in Rhet. ii, 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus effectus impedit caus-sam suam, cum sit suæ causæ conformis. Sed delectationes impediunt iram, ut dicitur in II Rhet., cap. iii, circa med. Ergo delectatio non est effectus iræ.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.1.sc] The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that anger is \"Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste\" (Iliad, xviii, 109 [trl. Pope]).
\n[I-II.q.48.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus, in eodem libro, cap. ii, parum a princ., inducit pro-verbium, quod « ira multo dulcior melle distillante in pectoribus virorum crescit. »
\n[I-II.q.48.a.1.co] As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow: and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we to the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in the case of thirst which increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what has been said (47, A1,3), that the movement of anger arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so much the greater according as the sorrow was greater. Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure ensues, entirely excluding sorrow, so that the movement of anger ceases. But before vengeance is really present, it becomes present to the angry man in two ways: in one way, by hope; because none is angry except he hopes for vengeance, as stated above (Question 46, Article 1); in another way, by thinking of it continually, for to everyone that desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought of what he desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant. Accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much about vengeance. This pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish sorrow and consequently anger.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., cap. xiv, delectationes, maxime sensibles et corporales sunt medicinæ quædam contra tristitiam; et ideo quanto per delectationem contra majorem tristitiam vel anxietatem remedium præstatur, tanto delectatio magis percipitur; sicut patet quod quando aliquis sitit, delectabilior fit ei potus. Manifestum est autem ex prædic-tis, quod motus iræ insurgit ex aliqua illata injuria contristante, cui quidem tristitiae remedium adhibetur per vindictam. Et ideo ad præsentiam vindictæ delectatio sequitur, et tanto major quanto major fuit tristitia. Si igitur vindicta fuerit præsens realiter, fit perfecta delectatio, quæ totaliter excludit tristitiam; et per hoc quietat motum iræ. Sed antequam vindicta sit præsens realiter, fit irascenti præsens dupliciter: uno modo per spem, quia nullus irascitur nisi sperans vindictam, ut supra dictum est; alio modo secundum continuam cogitationem: unicui-que enim concupiscenti est delectabile immorari in cogitatione eorum quæ concupiscit; propter quod etiam imaginationes somnio-rum sunt delectabiles. Et ideo, cum iratus multum in animo suo cogitet de vindicta, ex hoc delectatur; tamen delectatio non est perfecta, quæ tollat tristitiam, et per consequens iram.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.1.ad.1] The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as its beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non de eodem iratus tristatur et gaudet; sed tristatur de illata injuria, delectatur autem de vindicta cogitata et sperata. Unde tristitia se habet ad iram sicut principium, sed delectatio sicut effectus vel terminus.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.1.ad.2] This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused by the real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod objectio illa procedit de delectatione quæ causatur ex reali præsentia vindictæ, quæ totaliter tollit iram.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.1.ad.3] Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from ensuing, and consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in taking vengeance follows from anger.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod delectationes præcedentes impediunt ne sequatur tristitia, et per consequens impediunt iram; sed delectatio de vindicta consequitur ipsam iram.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that heat is not above all the effect of anger. For fervor, as stated above (28, 5; 37, 2), belongs to love. But love, as above stated, is the beginning and cause of all the passions. Since then the cause is more powerful than its effect, it seems that anger is not the chief cause of fervor.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod fervor non sit maxime effectus iræ. Fervor enim, sicut supra dictum est, pertinet ad amorem. Sed amor, sicut supra dictum est, principium est et causa omnium passionum. Cum ergo causa sit potior effectu, videtur quod ira non faciat maxime fervorem.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.2.arg.2] Further, those things which, of themselves, arouse fervor, increase as time goes on; thus love grows stronger the longer it lasts. But in course of time anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that \"time puts an end to anger.\" Therefore fervor is not the proper effect of anger.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illa quæ de se excitant fervorem, per temporis assiduitatem magis augentur, sicut amor diuturnitate convalescit. Sed ira per tractum temporis debilitatur; dicit enim Philosophus in II Rhet., cap. III, post med., quod « tempus quietat iram. » Ergo ira non proprie causat fervorem.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.2.arg.3] Further, fervor added to fervor produces greater fervor. But \"the addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger,\" as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause fervor.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, fervor additus fervori augmentat fervorem. Sed « major ira superveniens facit iram mitescere, » ut Philosophus dicit in II Rhetor., ibid. Ergo ira non causat fervorem.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.2.sc] Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that \"anger is fervor of the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation of the bile.\"
\n[I-II.q.48.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit lib. II Orthod. fid., cap. xvI, col. 934, t. 1, quod « ira est fervor ejus qui circa cor est sanguinis, ex evaporatione fellis fiens. »
\n[I-II.q.48.a.2.co] As stated above (Question 44, Article 1), the bodily transmutation that occurs in the passions of the soul is proportionate to the movement of the appetite. Now it is evident that every appetite, even the natural appetite, tends with greater force to repel that which is contrary to it, if it be present: hence we see that hot water freezes harder, as though the cold acted with greater force on the hot object. Since then the appetitive movement of anger is caused by some injury inflicted, as by a contrary that is present; it follows that the appetite tends with great force to repel the injury by the desire of vengeance; and hence ensues great vehemence and impetuosity in the movement of anger. And because the movement of anger is not one of recoil, which corresponds to the action of cold, but one of prosecution, which corresponds to the action of heat, the result is that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and vital spirits around the heart, which is the instrument of the soul's passions. And hence it is that, on account of the heart being so disturbed by anger, those chiefly who are angry betray signs thereof in their outer members. For, as Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) \"the heart that is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick, the body trembles, the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce, they that are well known are not recognized. With the mouth indeed he shapes a sound, but the understanding knows not what it says.\"
\n[I-II.q.48.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, corporalis transmutatio quæ est in passionibus animæ, proportionatur motui appetitus. Manifestum est autem, quod quilibet appetitus, etiam naturalis, fortius tendit in id quod est sibi contrarium, si fuerit præsens; unde videmus quod aqua calefacta magis congelatur, quasi frigido vehementius in calidum agente. Motus autem appetitivus iræ causatur ex aliqua injuria illata, sicut ex quodam contrario injacente; et ideo appetitus potissime tendit ad repellendam injuriam per appetitum vindictæ; et ex hoc sequitur magna vehementia et impetuositas in motu iræ. Et quia motus iræ non est per modum retractionis, cui proportionatur frigus, sed magis per modum insecutionis, cui proportionatur calor; consequenter fit motus iræ causativus cujusdam fervoris sanguinis et spirituum circa cor, quod est instrumentum passionis animæ. Et exinde est quod propter magnam perturbationem cordis, quæ est in ira, maxime apparent in iratis indicia quædam in exterioribus membris. Unde Gregorius dicit in V Moral., cap. xlv, § 79, col. 724, t. 1: « Iræ stimulis accensum cor palpitat, corpus tremit, lingua se præpedit, facies ignescit, exasperantur oculi, et nequaquam recognoscuntur noti; ore quidem clamorem format, sed sensus quid loquatur ignorat. »
\n[I-II.q.48.a.2.ad.1] \"Love itself is not felt so keenly as in the absence of the beloved,\" as Augustine observes (De Trin. x, 12). Consequently when a man suffers from a hurt done to the excellence that he loves, he feels his love thereof the more: the result being that his heart is moved with greater heat to remove the hindrance to the object of his love; so that anger increases the fervor of love and makes it to be felt more.
\nNevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs according as it is to be referred to love or to anger. Because the fervor of love has a certain sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one loves: whence it is likened to the warmth of the air and of the blood. For this reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love; and hence the saying that \"love springs from the liver,\" because of the blood being formed there. On the other hand, the fervor of anger has a certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy, for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil: whence it is likened to the heat of fire and of the bile, and for this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that it \"results from an exhalation of the bile whence it takes its name chole.\"
\n[I-II.q.48.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod « amor ipse non ita sentitur, nisi cum eum prodit indigentia, » ut Augustinus dicit in X De Trinit., cap. xii, § 19, col. 984, t. 8. Et ideo quando homo patitur detrimentum amatæ excellentiæ propter injuriam illatam, magis sentitur amor; et ideo ferventius cor mutatur ad removendum impedimentum rei amatæ, ut sic fervor ipse amoris per iram crescat, et magis sentiatur. Et tamen fervor qui consequitur calorem, alia ratione pertinet ad amorem et ad iram. Nam fervor amoris est cum quadam dulcedine et lenitate; est enim in bonum amatum; et ideo assimilatur calori aeris et sanguinis; propter quod sanguinei sunt magis amativi; et dicitur quod « cogit amare jecur, » in quo fit quæ-dam generatio sanguinis. Fervor autem iræ est cum amaritudine ad consumendum, quia tendit ad punitionem contrarii; unde assimilatur calori ignis et choleræ. Et propter hoc Damascenus dicit, lib. II Orthod. fid., cap. xvI, col. 934, t. 1, quod « procedit ex evaporatione fellis et fellea nominatur. »
\n[I-II.q.48.a.2.ad.2] Time, of necessity, weakens all those things, the causes of which are impaired by time. Now it is evident that memory is weakened by time; for things which happened long ago easily slip from our memory. But anger is caused by the memory of a wrong done. Consequently the cause of anger is impaired little by little as time goes on, until at length it vanishes altogether. Moreover a wrong seems greater when it is first felt; and our estimate thereof is gradually lessened the further the sense of present wrong recedes into the past. The same applies to love, so long as the cause of love is in the memory alone; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that \"if a friend's absence lasts long, it seems to make men forget their friendship.\" But in the presence of a friend, the cause of friendship is continually being multiplied by time: wherefore the friendship increases: and the same would apply to anger, were its cause continually multiplied.
\nNevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself proves the strength of its fervor: for as a great fire is soon spent having burnt up all the fuel; so too anger, by reason of its vehemence, soon dies away.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod omne illud cujus causa per tempus diminuitur, necesse est quod tempore debilitetur. Manifestum est autem, quod memoria tempore diminuitur: quæ enim antiqua sunt, a memoria de facili excidunt. Ira autem causatur ex memoria injuriæ illatæ; et ideo causa iræ per tempus diminuitur paulatim, quousque tollatur. Major etiam videtur injuria, quando primo sentitur; et paulatim diminuitur ejus aestimatio, secundum quod magis receditur a præsenti sensu injuriæ. Et similiter etiam est de amore, si amoris causa remaneat in « Ira est sanguinis qui cordi affusus est, ebullitio, ex exhalatione bilis proveniens, » ex vers. sola memoria. Unde Philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic., cap. v, non procul a princ., quod « si diuturna fiat amici absentia, videtur amicitiæ oblivionem facere; » sed in præsentia amici semper per tempus multiplicatur causa amicitiæ, et ideo amicitia crescit. Et similiter esset de ira, si continue multiplicaretur causa ipsius. Tamen hoc ipsum quod ira cito consumitur, attestatur vehementi fervori ipsius. Sicut enim ignis magnus cito extinguitur, consumpta materia, ita etiam ira propter suam vehementiam cito deficit.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.2.ad.3] Every power that is divided in itself is weakened. Consequently if a man being already angry with one, becomes angry with another, by this very fact his anger with the former is weakened. Especially is this so if his anger in the second case be greater: because the wrong done which aroused his former anger, will, in comparison with the second wrong, which is reckoned greater, seem to be of little or no account.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnis virtus divisa in plures partes diminuitur; et ideo quando aliquis iratus alicui, irascitur postmodum alteri, ex hoc ipso diminuitur ira ad primum; et præcipue si ad secundum fuerit major ira. Nam injuria quæ excitavit iram ad primum, videbitur comparatione secundæ injuriæ, quæ aestimatur major, esse parva vel nulla.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that anger does not hinder the use of reason. Because that which presupposes an act of reason, does not seem to hinder the use of reason. But \"anger listens to reason,\" as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore anger does not hinder reason.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ira non impediat rationem. Illud enim quod est cum ratione, non videtur esse rationis impedimentum. Sed ira est cum ratione, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., cap. vi, circa princ. Ergo ira non impedit rationem.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.3.arg.2] Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less does a man show his thoughts. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that \"an angry man is not cunning but is open.\" Therefore anger does not seem to hinder the use of reason, as desire does; for desire is cunning, as he also states (Ethic. vii, 6.).
\n[I-II.q.48.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quanto magis impeditur ratio, tanto diminuitur manifestatio. Sed Philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., loc. cit., quod « iracundus non est insidiator sed manifestus. » Ergo ira non videtur impedire usum rationis, sicut concupiscentia, quæ est insidiosa, ut ibidem dicitur.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.3.arg.3] Further, the judgment of reason becomes more evident by juxtaposition of the contrary: because contraries stand out more clearly when placed beside one another. But this also increases anger: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that \"men are more angry if they receive unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable men, if they be dishonored\": and so forth. Therefore the same cause increases anger, and facilitates the judgment of reason. Therefore anger does not hinder the judgment of reason.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, judicium rationis evidentius fit ex adjunctione contrarii, quia « contraria juxta se posita magis elucescunt. » Sed ex hoc etiam crescit ira; dicit enim Philosophus in II Rhet., c. 11, post med., quod « magis homines irascuntur, si contraria præxistunt, sicut honorati, si dehonorentur, » et sic de aliis. Ergo ex eodem ira crescit, et judicium rationis adjuvatur. Non ergo ira impedit judicium rationis.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.3.sc] Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that anger \"withdraws the light of understanding, while by agitating it troubles the mind.\"
\n[I-II.q.48.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit in V II. Moral., cap. xlv, § 78, col. 724, t. 1, quod « ira intelligentiæ lucem subtrahit cum mentem permovendo confundit. »
\n[I-II.q.48.a.3.co] Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that any disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep. Now it has been stated (2) that anger, above all, causes a bodily disturbance in the region of the heart, so much as to effect even the outward members. Consequently, of all the passions, anger is the most manifest obstacle to the judgment of reason, according to Psalm 30:10: \"My eye is troubled with wrath.\"
\n[I-II.q.48.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod mens vel ratio, quamvis non utatur organo corporali in suo proprio actu, tamen, quia indiget ad sui actum quibusdam viribus sensitivis, quarum actus impediuntur corpore perturbato, necesse est quod perturbationes corporales etiam judicium rationis impediant, sicut patet in ebrietate et somno. Dictum est autem, quod ira maxime facit perturbationem corporalem circa cor, ita ut etiam usque ad exteriora membra derivetur. Unde ira inter cæteras passiones manifestius impedit judicium rationis, secundum illud psal. xxx, 10: Conturbatus est in ira oculus meus.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.3.ad.1] The beginning of anger is in the reason, as regards the appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger. But the passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though it listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of the commotion of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the material element of anger. In this respect it hinders the judgment of reason.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod a ratione est principium irae quantum ad motum appetitivum, qui est formalis in ira; sed perfectum judicium rationis passio irae præoccupat, quasi non perfecte rationem audiens, propter commotionem caloris velociter impellentis, quæ est materialis in ira; et quantum ad hoc, impedit judicium rationis.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.3.ad.2] An angry man is said to be open, not because it is clear to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and what done openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity which is an effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv, 3) that \"he is open in his hatreds and his friendships . . . and speaks and acts openly.\" Desire, on the other hand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame and voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those things that savor of manliness and excellence, such as matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod iracundus dicitur esse manifestus, non quia manifestum fit sibi quid facere debeat, sed quia manifeste operatur, non quærens aliquam occultationem. Quod partim contingit propter impedimentum rationis, quæ non potest discernere quid sit occultandum et quid manifestandum, nec etiam excogitare occultandi vias; partim vero est ex ampliatione cordis, quæ pertinet ad magnanimitatem, quam facit ira. Unde et de magnanimo Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. 11, a med., quod est « manifestus oditor et amator, et manifeste dicit et operatur. » Concupiscentia autem dicitur esse « latens et insidiosa, » quia ut plurimum delectabilia quæ concupiscuntur habent turpitudinem quamdam et mollitiem, in quibus homo vult latere. In his autem quæ sunt virilitatis et excellentiæ, cujusmodi sunt vindictæ, quærit homo manifestus esse.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.3.ad.3] As stated above (ad 1), the movement of anger begins in the reason, wherefore the juxtaposition of one contrary with another facilitates the judgment of reason, on the same grounds as it increases anger. For when a man who is possessed of honor or wealth, suffers a loss therein, the loss seems all the greater, both on account of the contrast, and because it was unforeseen. Consequently it causes greater grief: just as a great good, through being received unexpectedly, causes greater delight. And in proportion to the increase of the grief that precedes, anger is increased also.
\n[I-II.q.48.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, motus iræ a ratione incipit; et ideo secundum idem appositio contrarii ad contrarium adjuvat judicium rationis, et auget iram. Cum enim aliquis habet honorem vel divitias, et postea incurrit alicujus detrimentum, illud detrimentum apparet majus, tum propter vicinitatem contrarii, tum quia erat inopinatum, et ideo causat majorem tristitiam; sicut etiam magna bona ex inopinato venientia causant majorem delectationem; et secundum augmentum tristitiæ praecedentis consequenter augetur et ira.
\n