[I-II.q.59.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is a mean between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod virtus moralis sit passio. Medium enim est ejusdem generis cum extremis. Sed virtus moralis est medium inter passiones. Ergo virtus moralis est passio.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.1.arg.2] Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, such as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtus et vitium, cum sint contraria, sunt in eodem genere. Sed quædam passiones vitia esse dicuntur, ut invi dia et ira. Ergo etiam quædam passiones sunt virtutes.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.1.arg.3] Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for another's ills, as stated above (Question 35, Article 8). Now \"Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue,\" as Augustine states in De Civ. Dei ix, 5. Therefore a passion may be a moral virtue.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, misericordia quædam passio est; est enim tristitia de alienis malis, ut supra dictum est. Hanc autem « Cicero, locutor egregius, non dubitavit appellare virtutem, » ut Augustinus dicit in IX De civitate Dei, cap. v, col. 261, t. 7. Ergo passio potest esse virtus moralis.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.1.sc] It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that \"passions are neither virtues nor vices.\"
\n[I-II.q.59.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in II Ethic., cap. v, a princ., quod « passiones neque virtutes sunt, neque malitiæ. »
\n[I-II.q.59.a.1.co] Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for three reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Question 22, Article 3): whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit. Secondly, because passions are not in themselves good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to reason: wherefore the passions, considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with reason. Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above (Question 55, Article 3). Thirdly, because, granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only; even then the movement of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appetite, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is \"a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it.\"
\n[I-II.q.59.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod virtus moralis non potest esse passio. Et hoc patet triplici ratione: primo quidem, quia passio est motus quidam appetitus sensitivi, ut supra dictum est. Virtus autem moralis non est motus aliquis, sed magis principium appetitivi motus, habitus quidam existens. Secundo, quia passiones ex seipsis non habent rationem boni vel mali. Bonum enim vel malum hominis est secundum rationem: unde passiones secundum se consideratæ se habent et ad bonum et ad malum secundum quod possunt convenire rationi vel non convenire. Nihil autem tale potest esse virtus, cum virtus solum ad bonum se habeat, ut supra dictum est. Tertio, quia, dato quod aliqua passio se habeat ad bonum solum vel ad malum solum, secundum aliquem modum, tamen motus passionis, inquantum passio est, principium habet in ipso appetitu, et terminum in ratione, in cujus conformatem appetitus tendit. Motus autem virtutis est e converso principium habens in ratione, et terminum in appetitu, secundum quod a ratione movetur. Unde in definitione virtutis moralis dicitur in II Ethic., cap. vi, a med., quod « est habitus electivus in medietate consistens determinata ratione, prout sapiens determinabit. »
\n[I-II.q.59.a.1.ad.1] Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it establishes the mean between passions.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtus secundum suam essentiam non est medium inter passiones; sed secundum suum effectum, quia scilicet inter passiones medium constituit.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.1.ad.2] If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds, it is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to mean sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act of virtue; in so far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with reason.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod si vitium dicatur habitus secundum quem quis male operatur, manifestum est quod nulla passio est vitium. Si vero dicatur vitium peccatum, quod est actus vitiosus, sic nihil prohibet passionem esse vitium, et e contrario con-currere ad actum virtutis, secundum quod passio vel contrariatur rationi, vel sequitur actum rationis.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.1.ad.3] Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act of virtue, in so far as \"that movement of the soul is obedient to reason\"; viz. \"when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven,\" as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders pity, in this sense, from being a virtue. The same applies to similar passions.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod misericordia dicitur esse virtus, id est, virtutis actus, secundum quod « motus ille animi rationi servit, quando ita præbetur misericordia, ut justitia conservetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur sive cum ignoscitur pœnitenti, » ut Augustinus dicit ibidem. Si tamen misericordia dicatur aliquis habitus quo homo perficitur ad rationabiliter miserendum, nihil prohibet misericordiam sic dictam esse virtutem; et eadem est ratio de similibus passionibus.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion. For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that \"a gentle man is one who is not passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not give way.\" The same applies to all the moral virtues. Therefore all moral virtues are without passion.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod virtus moralis cum passione esse possit. Dicit enim Philosophus in IV Topic., c. v, loc. 54, quod « mitis est qui non patitur; patiens autem qui patitur, et non deduci-tur; » et eadem ratio est de omnibus virtutibus moralibus. Ergo omnis virtus moralis est sine passione.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.2.arg.2] Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as health is to the body, as stated Phys. vii, text. 17: wherefore \"virtue is a kind of health of the soul,\" as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv). But the soul's passions are \"the soul's diseases,\" as he says in the same book. Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is passion compatible with virtue.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.2.arg.3] Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even in particular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that \"pleasures destroy the judgment of prudence\": and Sallust says (Catilin.) that \"when they,\" i.e. the soul's passions, \"interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp the truth.\" Therefore passion is incompatible with moral virtue.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, virtus moralis requirit perfectum usum rationis etiam in particularibus. Sed hoc impeditur per passiones. Dicit enim Philosophus in VI Ethic., cap. v, circa med., quod « delectationes corrumpunt existimationem prudentiæ; » et Sallustius dicit in Catilinario, in princ. Orat. Cæsaris, quod « non facile verum perspicit animus, ubi illæ officiunt, » scilicet animi passiones. Virtus ergo moralis non potest esse cum passione.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): \"If the will is perverse, these movements,\" viz. the passions, \"are perverse also: but if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy.\" But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral virtue. Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with them.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in XIV De civitate Dei, cap. vi, col. 409, t. 7: « Si perversa est voluntas, perversos habebit hos motus, » scilicet passionum, « si autem recta est, non solum inculpables, verum etiam laudabiles erunt. » Sed nullum laudabile excluditur per virtutem moralem. Virtus ergo moralis non excludit passiones, sed potest esse cum ipsis.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.2.co] The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be reduced to the mean.
\nThis difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other affections of the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions being, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason. These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus Gellius [Noct. Attic. xix, 1, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), \"it is not in our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow,\" in so far as \"these passions forestall the use of reason without his approving of such things or consenting thereto.\"
\nAccordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately; as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that \"some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should be qualified\": they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions \"that are not as they should be as to manner and time.\"
\n[I-II.q.59.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hoc fuit discordia inter Stoicos et Peripateticos, sicut Augustinus dicit in IX De civ. Dei, cap. iv, col. 258, t. 7. Stoici enim posuerunt quod passiones animæ non possunt esse in sapiente sive virtuoso; Peripatetici vero, quorum sectam Aristoteles instituit, ut Augustinus dicit in IX De civit. Dei, ibidem, posuerunt quod passiones simul cum virtute morali esse possunt, sed ad medium reductæ. Hæc autem diversitas, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, magis erat secundum verba quam secundum rerum sententias. Quia enim Stoici non distinguebant inter appetitum intellectivum, qui est voluntas, et inter appetitum sensitivum, qui per irascibilem et concupiscibilem dividitur, non distinguebant in hoc passiones ab aliis affectionibus humanis, quod passiones sint motus appetitus sensitivi; aliæ vero affectiones, quæ non sunt passiones animæ, sint motus appetitus intellectivi, qui dicitur voluntas, sicut Peripatetici distinxerunt; sed solum quantum ad hoc quod passiones esse dicebant quascumque affectiones rationi repugnantes; quæ si ex deliberatione oriantur, in sapiente, seu in virtuoso esse non possunt; si autem subito oriantur, hoc in virtuoso potest accidere, eo quod « animi visa, quas appellant phantasias, non est in potestate nostra utrum et quando incidant animo; et cum veniunt ex terribilibus rebus, necesse est etiam sapientis animum moveant; ita ut paulisper vel pavescat metu, vel tristitia contrahatur, tanquam his passionibus prævenientibus rationis officium; nec tamen approbat ista, eisque consentit, » ut Augustinus narrat in IX De civ. Dei, ubi supra, ab Aulo Gellio dictum. Si igitur passiones dicantur inordinatæ affectiones, non possunt esse in virtuoso, ita quod post deliberationem eis consentiatur, ut Stoici posuerunt. Si vero passiones dicantur quicumque motus appetitus sensitivi, sic possunt esse in virtuoso, secundum quod sunt a ratione ordinati. Unde Aristoteles dicit in II Ethic., cap. Ⅲ, parum ante med., quod « non bene quidam determinant virtutes impassibilitates quasdam et quietes, quoniam simpliciter dicunt; sed deberent etiam dicere quod sunt quietes a passionibus, quæ sunt ut non oportet, et quando non oportet. »
\n[I-II.q.59.a.2.ad.1] The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his own mind, but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the Philosopher rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not freedom from passion. It may be said, however, that when he says \"a gentle man is not passionate,\" we are to understand this of inordinate passion.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Philosophus exemplum illud inducit, sicut et multa alia in libris logicalibus non secundum opinionem propriam, sed secundum opinionem aliorum. Hæc autem fuit opinio Stoicorum, quod virtutes essent sine passionibus animæ, quam Philosophus excludit in II Ethic., loc. cit., dicens « virtutes non esse impassibilitates. » Potest tamen dici, quod cum dicitur quod « mitis non patitur, » intelligendum est secundum passionem inordinatam.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.2.ad.2] This and all similar arguments which Tully brings forward in De Tusc. Quaest. iv take the passions in the execution of reason's command.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa et omnes similes quas Tullius ad hoc inducit in lib. IV De tuscul. quæstion., procedunt de passionibus, secundum quod significant inordinatas affectiones.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.2.ad.3] When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason's command.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod passio præveniens judicium rationis, si in animo prævaleat, ut ei consentiatur, impedit consilium et judicium rationis; si vero sequatur quasi ex ratione imperata, adjuvat ad exquendum imperium rationis.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue. Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to Wisdom 8:7: \"She,\" i.e. Divine wisdom, \"teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude.\" Now the \"conversation\" of wisdom \"hath no bitterness,\" as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue also.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod virtus cum tristitia esse non possit. Virtutes enim sunt sapientiae effectus, secundum illud Sap., viii, 7: Sobrietatem* et justitiam docet, scilicet divina sapientia, prudentiam et virtutem. Sed *sapientiae convictus non habet amaritudinem, ut postea subditur. Ergo nec virtutes cum tristitia esse possunt.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.3.arg.2] Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, tristitia est impedimentum operationis, ut patet per Philosophum in VII Ethic., cap. xiii, et in X, cap. v. Sed impe- In — Ita codd.; in edit.: « ordinatæ. » dimentum bonæ operationis repugnat virtuti. Ergo tristitia repugnat virtuti.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.3.arg.3] Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De Tusc. Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue, which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is incompatible with it.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, tristitia est quædam animi ægritudo, ut Tullius eam vocat in IV De tuscul. quæstion., parum ante med. Sed ægritudo animæ contrariatur virtuti, quæ est bona animæ habitudo. Ergo tristitia contrariatur virtuti, nec potest simul esse cum ea.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.3.sc] Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in Him, for He said (Matthew 26:38): \"My soul is sorrowful even unto death.\" Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Christus fuit perfectus virtute. Sed in eo fuit tristitia; dicit enim, ut habetur Matth., xxvi, 38: Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem. Ergo tristitia potest esse cum virtute.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.3.co] As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are three eupatheiai, i.e. \"three good passions,\" in place of the three disturbances: viz. instead of covetousness, \"desire\"; instead of mirth, \"joy\"; instead of fear, \"caution.\" But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man, for two reasons.
\nFirst, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they thought that, just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so man's only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous man. But this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever conduces to preserve the life of the body, is some good to man; yet not his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to 1 John 1:8: \"If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.\" A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to 2 Corinthians 7:10: \"The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto salvation.\" Fourthly, because he may praiseworthily sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions are when moderated by reason.
\nTheir second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even as pleasure is about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire to have good that one possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the mind resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is altogether contrary to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected by reason. Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according as reason dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be conformed to reason, as stated above (1, ad 2). Wherefore moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6,7). Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.
\nAccordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut dicit Augustinus, XIV De civit. Dei, cap. viii, col. 414, t. 7. Stoici voluerunt pro tribus perturbationibus, in animo sapientis esse tres eupathias, id est, « tres bonas passiones; » pro cupiditate scilicet « voluptatem, » pro lætitia « gaudium, » pro metu « cautionem. » Pro tristitia vero negaverunt posse aliquid esse in animo sapientis, duplici ratione: primo quidem, quia tristitia est de malo quod jam accidit. Nullum autem malum existimant posse accidere sapienti. Crediderunt enim, quod, sicut solum hominis bonum est virtus, bona autem corporalia nulla bona hominis sunt, ita solum inhonestum est hominis malum, quod in virtuoso esse non potest. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur: cum enim homo sit ex anima et corpore compositus, id quod confert ad vitam corporis conservandam, aliquod bonum hominis est; non tamen maximum, quia eo potest homo male uti: unde et malum huic bono contrarium in sapiente esse potest; et tristitiam moderatam inducere. Præterea, etsi virtuosus sine gravi peccato esse possit, nullus tamen inventur qui absque levibus peccatis vitam ducat, secundum illud I Joan., i, 8: Si dixerimus quia* peccatum non habemus, ipsi nos seducimus. Tertio, quia virtuosus, etsi peccatum non habeat, forte quandoque habuit; et de hoc laudabiliter dolet, secundum illud II Cor., vii, 10: Quæ secundum Deum est tristitia*, pænitentiam in salutem stabilem operatur. Quarto, quia potest etiam dolere laudabiliter de peccato alterius. Unde eo modo quo virtus moralis compatitur alias passiones ratione moderatas, compatitur etiam tristitiam. Secundo movebantur ex hoc quod tristitia est de præsenti malo, timor autem de malo futuro; sicut delectatio de bono præsenti, desiderium vero de bono futuro. Potest autem hoc ad virtutem pertinere quod aliquis bono habito fruatur, vel non habitum habere desideret, vel quod etiam malum futurum caveat. Sed quod malo præsenti animus hominis substernatur, quod fit per tristitiam, omnino videtur contrarium rationi; unde cum virtute esse non potest. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur. Est enim aliquod malum quod potest esse virtuoso præsens, ut dictum est, quod quidem malum ratio detestatur. Unde appetitus sensitivus in hoc sequitur detestationem rationis, quod de hujusmodi malo tristatur, moderate ta-men secundum rationis judicium. Hoc autem pertinet ad virtutem, ut appetitus sensitivus rationi conformetur, ut dictum est. Unde ad virtutem pertinet quod tristetur moderate in quibus tristandum est, sicut etiam Philosophus dicit in II Ethic., cap. vi et vii. Et hoc etiam utile est ad fugiendum mala. Sicut enim bona propter delectationem promptius quæruntur, ita mala propter tristitiam fortius fugiuntur. Sic igitur dicendum est, quod tristitia de his quæ conveniunt virtuti, non potest simul esse cum virtute, quia virtus in propriis delectatur; sed de his quæ quocumque modo repugnant virtuti, virtus moderate tristatur.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.3.ad.1] The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom. Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ex illa auctoritate habetur quod de sapientia sapiens non tristetur, tristatur tamen de his quæ sunt impeditiva sapientiae. Et ideo in beatis, in quibus nullum impedimentum sapientiae esse potest, tristitia locum non habet.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.3.ad.2] Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod tristitia impedit operationem de qua tristamur; sed adjuvat ad ea promptius exequenda per quæ tristitia fugitur.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.3.ad.3] Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to the present state of life.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod tristitia im-moderata est animæ ægritudo; tristitia autem moderata ad bonam habitudinem animæ pertinet secundum statum præsentis vitæ.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that \"moral virtue is about objects of pleasure and sorrow.\" But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (23, 4; 31, 1; 35, A1, 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod omnis virtus moralis sit circa passiones. Dicit enim Philosophus in II Ethic., cap. III, quod « circa voluptates et tristitias est moralis virtus. » Sed delectatio et tristitia sunt passiones, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnis virtus moralis est circa passiones.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.4.arg.2] Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above (Question 22, Article 3). Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, rationale per participationem est subjectum moralium virtutum, ut dicitur in I Ethic., cap. ult.; sed hujusmodi pars animæ est in qua sunt passiones, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnis virtus moralis est circa passiones.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.4.arg.3] Further, some passion is to be found in every moral virtue: and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in omni virtute morali est invenire aliquam passionem. Aut ergo omnes sunt circa passiones, aut nulla. Sed aliquæ sunt circa passiones, ut fortitudo et temperantia, ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. VI et X. Ergo omnes virtutes morales sunt circa passiones.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.4.sc] Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.4.sc] Sed contra est, quod justitia, quæ est virtus moralis, non est circa passiones, ut dicitur in V Ethic., cap. I, II, III et IV.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.4.co] Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason. Consequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as stated above (Question 22, Article 3). Therefore not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod virtus moralis perficit appetitivam partem animæ, ordinando ipsam in bonum rationis. Est autem rationis bonum id quod est secundum rationem moderatum seu ordinatum. Unde circa omne id quod contingit ratione ordinari et moderari, contingit esse virtutem moralem. Ratio autem ordinat non solum passiones appetitus sensitivi, sed etiam ordinat operationes appetitivus intellectivi, qui est voluntas, quæ non est subjectum passionum, ut supra dictum est, imperanter. Et ideo non omnis virtus moralis est circa passiones, sed quædam circa passiones, quædam circa operationes.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.4.ad.1] The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, after the words quoted, adds, \"if virtues are about actions and passions; now every action and passion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows,\" viz. as about something that results from virtue.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non omnis virtus moralis est circa delectationes et tristitias, sicut circa propriam materiale, sed sicut circa aliquid consequens ad proprium actum. Omnis enim virtuosus delectatur in actu virtutis, et tristatur in contrario. Unde Philosophus, post præmissa verba, loc. cit. in arg., subdit quod « si virtutes sunt circa actus, et passiones; omnem autem passionem et omnem actum sequitur delectatio et tristitia; etiam propter hoc virtus erit circa delectationes et tristitias, » scilicet sicut circa aliquid consequens.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.4.ad.2] Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where there are no passions, as stated above.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod rationale per participationem non solum est appetitus sensitivus, qui est subjectum passionum, sed etiam voluntas, in qua non sunt passiones, ut dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.4.ad.3] Some virtues have passions as their proper matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in quibusdam virtutibus sunt passiones, sicut propria materia, in quibusdam autem non. Unde non est eadem ratio de omnibus, ut infra ostendetur.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion. For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without passion.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod virtus moralis possit esse absque passione. Quanto enim virtus moralis est perfectior, tanto magis superat passiones. Ergo in suo perfectissimo esse est omnino absque passionibus.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.5.arg.2] Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (Romans 7:5) they are called \"passions of sins.\" Therefore perfect virtue is altogether without passion.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, tunc unumquodque est perfectum quando est remotum a suo contrario, et ab his quæ ad contrarium inclinant. Sed passiones inclinant ad peccatum, quod virtuti contrariatur; unde Rom., VII, 5, nominantur passiones peccatorum. Ergo perfecta virtus est omnino absque passione.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.5.arg.3] Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does all things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is without any passion.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, secundum virtutem Deo conformamur, ut patet per Augustinum in lib. De morib. Eccles., c. VI et XI, col. 1314, t. 1. Sed Deus omnia operatur sine passione. Ergo virtus perfectissima est absque omni passione.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.5.sc] \"No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds,\" as stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod « nullus justus est qui non gaudet justa operatione, » ut dicitur in I Ethic., cap. VIII, circa med. Sed gaudium est passio. Ergo justitia non potest esse sine passione, et multo minus aliæ virtutes.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.5.co] If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions. The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements.
\nThose moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue is justice: because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion. Nevertheless, joy results from the act of justice; at least in the will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher, as stated above (17, 7; 24, 3). Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod si passiones dicamus « inordinatas affectiones, » sicut Stoici posuerunt, sic manifestum est quod virtus perfecta est sine passionibus. Si vero passiones dicamus « omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, » sic planum est quod virtutes morales, quæ sunt circa passiones sicut circa propriam materiam, sine passionibus esse non possunt. Cujus ratio est, quia secundum hoc sequeretur quod virtus moralis faceret appetitum sensitivum omnino otiosum. Non autem ad virtutem pertinet quod ea quæ sunt subjecta rationi, a propriis actibus vacent; sed quod exequantur imperium rationis, proprios actus agendo. Unde sicut virtus membra corporis ordinat ad actus exteriores debitos, ita appetitum sensitivum ad motus proprios ordinatos. Virtutes autem morales quæ non sunt circa passiones, sed circa operationes, possunt esse sine passionibus; et hujusmodi virtus est justitia, quia per eam applicatur voluntas ad proprium actum, qui non est passio. Sed tamen ad actum justitiæ sequitur gaudium, ad minus in voluntate, quod non est passio; et si hoc gaudium multiplicetur per justitiæ perfectionem, fiet gaudii redundantia usque ad appetitum sensitivum, secundum quod vires inferiores sequuntur motum superiorum, ut supra dictum est. Et sic per redundantiam hujusmodi, quanto magis fuerit perfecta, tanto magis passionem causat.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.5.ad.1] Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtus passiones inordinatas superat, moderatas autem producit.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.5.ad.2] It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod passiones inordinatæ inducunt ad peccandum, non autem si sint moderatæ.
\n[I-II.q.59.a.5.ad.3] The good of anything depends on the condition of its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, as there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels is altogether without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the body's help.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.59.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod bonum in unoquoque consideratur secundum conditionem suæ naturæ. In Deo autem et angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, sicut in homine; et ideo bona operatio Dei et angeli est omnino sine passione, sicut et sine corpore; hominis est cum passione, sicut et cum corporis ministerio.
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