[I-II.q.60.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence. Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod sit una tantum moralis virtus. Sicut enim in actibus moralibus directio pertinet ad rationem, quæ est subjectum intellectualium virtutum; ita inclinatio pertinet ad vim appetitivam, quæ est subjectum moralium virtutum. Sed una est intellectualis virtus dirigens in omnibus moralibus actibus, scilicet prudentia. Ergo etiam una tantum est moralis virtus inclinans in omnibus moralibus actibus.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.1.arg.2] Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there is but one moral virtue.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, habitus non distinguuntur secundum materialia objecta, sed secundum formales rationes objectorum. Formalis autem ratio boni, ad quod ordinatur virtus moralis, est una, scilicet modus rationis. Ergo videtur quod sit una tantum moralis virtus.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.1.arg.3] Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their end, as stated above (Question 1, Article 3). Now there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, moralia recipiunt speciem a fine, ut supra dictum est. Sed finis omnium virtutum moralium communis est unus, scilicet felicitas: proprii autem et propinqui sunt infiniti; non sunt autem infinitæ virtutes morales. Ergo videtur quod sit una tantum.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.1.sc] One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above (Question 56, Article 2). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in the I, 80, 2; I, 81, 2. Therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod unus habitus non potest esse in diversis potentiis, ut supra dictum est. Sed subjectum virtutum moralium est pars appetitiva animæ, quæ per diversas potentias distinguitur, ut in I dictum est. Ergo non potest esse una tantum virtus moralis.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.1.co] As stated above (58, A1,2,3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above (Question 54, Article 2). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent. But we must observe that the matter of the passive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive a form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received into matter are not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various adaptability of matter.
\nNow it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species, according to their various relations to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species and are not one only.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales sunt habitus quidam appetitivæ partis. Habitus autem specie differunt secundum speciales differentias objectorum, ut supra dictum est. Species autem objecti appetibilis, sicut et cujuslibet rei, attenditur secundum formam specificam, quæ est ab agente. Est autem considerandum, quod materia patientis se habet ad agens dupliciter: quando enim recipit formam agentis secundum eamdem rationem, prout est in agente, sicut est in omnibus agentibus univocis; et sic necesse est quod si agens est unum specie, materia recipiat formam unius speciei; sicut ab igne non generatur univoce nisi aliquod existens in specie ignis. Aliquando vero materia recipit formam ab agente non secundum eamdem rationem, prout est in agente, sicut patet in generantibus non univocis, ut animal generatur a sole; et tunc formæ receptæ in materia ab eodem agente non sunt unius speciei, sed diversificantur secundum diversam proportionem materiæ ad recipiendum influxum agentis; sicut videmus quod ab una actione solis generantur per putrefactionem animalia diversarum specierum, secundum diversam proportionem materiæ. Manifestum est autem, quod in moralibus ratio est sicut imperans et movens; vis autem appetitiva sicut imperata et mota. Non autem appetitus respicit impressionem rationis quasi univoce; quia non fit rationale per essentiam, sed per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic., cap. ult. Unde appetibilia secundum motionem rationis constituuntur in diversis speciebus secundum quod diversimode se habent ad rationem: et ita sequitur quod virtutes morales sint diversæ secundum speciem, et non una tantum.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.1.ad.1] The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing power.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod objectum rationis est verum; est autem eadem ratio veri in omnibus moralibus, quæ sunt contingentia agibilia: unde est una sola virtus in eis dirigens, scilicet prudentia. Objectum autem appetitivæ virtutis est bonum appetibile, cujus est diversa ratio secundum diversam habitudinem ad rationem dirigenem.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.1.ad.2] This formal element is one generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illud female est unum genere propter unitatem agentis, sed diversificatur specie propter diversas habitudines recipientium, ut supra dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.1.ad.3] Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod moralia non habent speciem a fine ultimo, sed a finibus proximis; qui quidem etsi infiniti sint numero, non tamen infiniti sunt specie.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems to belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is but one virtue about operations.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod sit una tantum virtus moralis circa operationes. Rectitudo enim omnium opera-tionum exteriorum videtur ad justitiam pertinere. Sed justitia est una virtus. Ergo una sola virtus est circa operationes.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.3.arg.2] Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which directs a man's actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does not cause a diversity of moral virtues.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, operationes maxime differentes esse videntur quæ ordinantur ad bonum unius, et quæ ordinantur ad bonum multitudinis. Sed ista diversitas non diversificat virtutes morales; dicit enim Philosophus in V Ethic., cap. 1, circa fin., quod « justitia legalis, quæ ordinat actus hominum ad commune bonum, non est aliud a virtute, quæ ordinat actus hominis ad unum tantum, nisi secundum rationem. » Ergo diversitas operationum non causat diversitatem virtutum moralium.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.3.arg.3] Further, if there are various moral virtues about various operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity of operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and again in distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2. Therefore there are not different virtues about different operations.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si sunt diversæ virtutes morales circa diversas operationes, oporteret quod secundum diversitatem operationum esset diversitas virtutum moralium. Sed hoc patet esse falsum; nam ad justitiam pertinet in diversis generibus commutationum rectitudinem statuere, et etiam in distributionibus, ut patet in V Ethic., cap. 11, a med. Non ergo diversæ virtutes sunt diversarum operationum.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.3.sc] Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both of which are about operations.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod religio est alia virtus a pietate; quarum tamen utraque est circa operationes quasdam.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.3.co] All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something due to another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The reason for this is that in external operations, the order of reason is established, as we have stated (2), not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness of the thing itself; from which becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of justice. But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various virtues: e.g. \"Religion\" whereby we pay our debt to God; \"Piety,\" whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; \"Gratitude,\" whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod omnes virtutes morales quæ sunt circa operationes, conveniunt in quadam generali ratione justitiae, quæ attenditur secundum debitum ad alterum; distinguuntur autem secundum diversas speciales rationes. Cujus ratio est, quia in operationibus exterioribus ordo rationis instituitur, sicut dictum est, non secundum proportionem ad affectionem hominis, sed secundum ipsam convenientiam rei in seipsa, secundum quam convenientiam accipitur ratio debiti, ex quo constituitur ratio justitiae. Ad justitiam enim pertinere videtur ut quis debitum reddat. Unde omnes hujusmodi virtutes quæ sunt circa operationes, habent aliquo modo rationem justitiae. Sed debitum non est unius rationis in omnibus: aliter enim debetur aliquid æquali, aliter superiori, aliter minori; et aliter ex pacto, vel ex promisso, vel ex beneficio suscepto. Et secundum has diversas rationes debiti sumuntur diversæ virtutes: puta religio est per quam redditur debitum Deo; pietas est per quam redditur debitum parentibus vel patriæ; gratia est per quam redditur debitum benefactoribus, et sic de aliis.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.3.ad.1] Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent. But the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special virtue.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod justitia proprie dicta est una specialis virtus, quæ attendit perfectam rationem debiti, quod secundum æquivalentiam potest restitui; dicitur tamen et ampliato nomine justitia secundum quamcumque debiti redditionem; et sic non est una specialis virtus.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.3.ad.2] That justice which seeks the common good is another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an individual: wherefore common right differs from private right; and Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs man to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the common good is a general virtue through its act of command: since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the common good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue does not differ, save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical difference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue that is active through the command of another virtue.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod justitia quæ intendit bonum commune, est alia virtus a justitia quæ ordinatur ad bonum privatum alicujus; unde et jus commune distinguitur a jure privato; et Tullius ponit, lib II De invent., aliquant. ante fin., unam specialem virtutem « pietatem, » quæ ordinat ad bonum patriæ. Sed justitia ordinans hominem ad bonum commune, est generalis per imperium, quia omnes actus virtutum ordinat ad finem suum, scilicet ad bonum commune. Virtus autem, secundum quod a tali justitia imperatur, etiam justitia nomen accipit. Et sic virtus a justitia legali non differt nisi ratione, sicut sola ratione differt virtus operans secundum seipsam, et virtus operans ad imperium alterius.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.3.ad.3] There is the same kind of due in all the operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative justice; but about this we shall inquire later on (II-II, 61, 1).
\n[I-II.q.60.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in omnibus operationibus ad justitiam specialem pertinentibus est eadem ratio debiti; et ideo est eadem virtus justitiae, praecipue quantum ad commutationes; forte enim distributiva est alterius speciei a commutativa. Sed de hoc infra quæretur.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that there are not different moral virtues about different passions. For there is but one habit about things that concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of sciences. But the passions all concur in one source, viz. love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated above (25, A1,2,4; 27, 4). Therefore there is but one moral virtue about all the passions.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod circa diversas passiones non sint diversæ virtutes morales. Eorum enim quæ conveniunt in principio et fine, unus est habitus, sicut patet maxime in scientiis. Sed omnium passionum unum est principium, scilicet amor; et omnes ad eumdem finem terminantur, scilicet delectationem vel tristitiam, ut supra habitum est. Ergo circa omnes passiones est una tantum moralis virtus.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.4.arg.2] Further, if there were different moral virtues about different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral virtues as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, about fear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is no need for different moral virtues about different passions.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si circa diversas passiones essent diversæ virtutes morales, sequeretur quod tot essent virtutes morales quot passiones. Sed hoc patet esse falsum, quia circa oppositas passiones est una et eadem virtus moralis; sicut fortitudo circa timores et audacias, temperantia circa delectationes et tristitias. Non ergo oportet ut circa diversas passiones sint diversæ virtutes morales.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.4.arg.3] Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of different species, as stated above (Question 23, Article 4). Now there is but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there are not different moral virtues about different passions.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, amor, concupiscentia et delectatio sunt passiones specie differentes, ut supra habitum est. Sed circa omnes has est una virtus, scilicet temperantia. Ergo virtutes morales non sunt diversæ circa diversas passiones.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.4.sc] Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.4.sc] Sed contra est, quod fortitudo est circa timores et audacias, temperantia circa concupiscentias, mansuetudo circa iras, ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. vi et x, et in IV, c. v.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.4.co] It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Question 23, Article 1).
\nOn the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, because some passions are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear and daring, and so on. About such passions as are thus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral virtue consists in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural order there is but one mean between contraries, e.g. between black and white. Secondly, because there are different passions contradicting reason in the same manner, e.g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing from that which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral virtues, because their movements follow one another in a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure; and it is the same with the opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this leads to sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible passions are not all of one order, but are directed to different things: for daring and fear are about some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary which has wrought harm. Consequently there are different virtues about such like passions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, about hope and despair; meekness, about anger.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod non potest dici quod circa omnes passiones sit una sola virtus moralis. Sunt enim quædam passiones ad diversas potentias pertinentes; aliæ namque pertinent ad irascibilem, aliæ ad concupiscibilem, ut supra dictum est. Nec tamen oportet quod omnis diversitas passionum sufficiat ad virtutes morales diversificandas: primo quidem, quia quædam passiones sunt quæ sibi opponuntur secundum contrarietatem; sicut gaudium et tristitia, timor et audacia, et alia hujusmodi. Et circa hujusmodi passiones sic oppositas oportet esse unam et eamdem virtutem. Cum enim virtus moralis in quadam mediate consistat, medium in contrariis passionibus secundum eamdem rationem instituitur; sicut et in naturalibus idem est medium inter contraria, ut inter album et nigrum. Secundo, quia diversæ passiones inveniuntur secundum eumdem modum rationi repugnantes, puta secundum impulsum ad id quod est contra rationem, vel secundum retractionem ab eo quod est secundum rationem. Et ideo diversæ passiones concupiscibilis non pertinent ad diversas virtutes morales, quia earum motus secundum quemdam ordinem se invicem consequuntur, utpote ad idem ordinati, scilicet ad consequendum bonum, vel ad fugiendum malum; sicut ex amore procedit concupiscentia, et ex concupiscentia pervenitur ad delectationem. Et eadem ratio est de oppositis; quia ex odio sequitur fuga vel abominatio, quae perducit ad tristitiam. Sed passiones irascibilis non sunt unius ordinis, sed ad diversa ordinantur. Nam « audacia » et « timor » ordinantur ad aliquod magnum periculum; « spes » et « desperatio » ad aliquod bonum arduum; ira autem ad superandum aliquod contrarium, quod nocumentum intulit. Et ideo circa has passiones diversæ virtutes ordinantur, utpote « temperantia » circa passiones concupiscibilis, « fortitudo » circa timores et audacias, « magnanimitas » circa spem et desperationem, « mansuetudo » circa iras.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.4.ad.1] All the passions concur in one common principle and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not suffice for the unity of moral virtue.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod omnes passiones conveniunt in uno principio et fine communi, non autem in uno proprio principio, seu fine; unde hoc non sufficit ad unitatem virtutis moralis.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.4.ad.2] Just as in the natural order the same principle causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as in the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like a second nature, consents to reason's dictates.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut in naturalibus idem est principium quo receditur ab uno principio, et acceditur ad aliud, et in rationalibus est eadem ratio contrario-rum, ita etiam virtus moralis, quæ in modum naturæ rationi consentit, est eadem contrariarum passionum.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.4.ad.3] Those three passions are directed to the same object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the same virtue.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illæ tres passiones ad idem objectum ordinantur secundum quemdam ordinem, ut dictum est, et ideo ad eamdem virtutem moralem pertinent.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according to the objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice. Therefore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ according to the objects of those passions.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod virtutes morales non distinguantur secundum objecta passionum. Sicut enim sunt objecta passionum, ita sunt objecta operationum. Sed virtutes morales quæ sunt circa operationes, non distinguuntur secundum objecta operationum; ad eamdem enim virtutem justitiæ pertinet emere vel vendere domum et equum. Ergo etiam nec virtutes morales quæ sunt circa passiones, diversificantur per objecta passionum.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.arg.2] Further, the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue: so that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the same applies to the other passions.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, passiones sunt quidam actus vel motus appetitus sensitivi. Sed major diversitas requiritur ad diversitatem habituum quam ad diversitatem actuum. Diversa igitur objecta, quæ non diversificant speciem passionis, non diversificabunt speciem virtutis moralis; ita scilicet quod de omnibus delectationibus erit una virtus moralis, et similiter est de aliis.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.arg.3] Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the same applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according to the objects of the passions.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Sed diversa delectabilia non differunt nisi secundum magis et minus. Ergo omnia delectabilia pertinent ad unam speciem virtutis, et eadem ratione omnia terribilia, et similiter de aliis. Non ergo virtus moralis distinguitur secundum objecta passionum.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.arg.4] Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good. But there are various virtues about the desires for good things: thus temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and \"eutrapelia\" [eutrapelia] about pleasures in games. Therefore there should be different virtues about fears of evils.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.arg.4] 4. Præterea, sicut virtus est operativa boni, ita est impeditiva mali. Sed circa concupiscentias bonorum sunt diversæ virtutes; sicut « temperantia » circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus, « cutrapelia » circa delectationes ludi. Ergo etiam circa timores malorum debent esse diversæ virtutes.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.sc] Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about pleasures of the table, and \"eutrapelia\" about pleasures in games.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod « castitas » est circa delectabilia venereorum, « abstinentia » vero est circa delectabilia ciborum, et « eutrapelia » circa delectabilia ludorum.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.co] The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite. Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason, they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions, without causing diversity of virtues, as when one virtue is about several passions, as stated above (Article 4); and again, a difference of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference of passions, since several virtues are directed about one passion, e.g. pleasure.
\nAnd because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong to diverse virtues, as stated above (Article 4); therefore a difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always causes a specific difference of virtues--for instance the difference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good and difficult to obtain. Moreover since the reason rules man's lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to outward things; hence, one single object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason, and again, according as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason, and consequently is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues. Consequently man's good which is the object of love, desire and pleasure, may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed to man's good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man's good in relation to other men. And every such difference, being differently related to reason, differentiates virtues.
\nAccordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of \"temperance.\" As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are not intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason: hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, \"like art, is about difficult things\" (Ethic. ii, 3).
\nOn the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honor; the former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body, while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind. These goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern the concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction, however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far as he has something in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money considered as a good absolutely, as an object of desire, pleasure, or love, there is \"liberality\": but if we consider this good as difficult to get, and as being the object of our hope, there is \"magnificence\" [megaloprepeia]. With regard to that good which we call honor, taken absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called \"philotimia\" [philotimia], i.e. \"love of honor\": while if we consider it as hard to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have \"magnanimity.\" Wherefore liberality and \"philotimia\" seem to be in the concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible.
\nAs regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his behavior towards another either in some serious matter, in actions, to wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions, viz. that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand in the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls \"friendship\" [philia], and may be rendered \"affability.\" Secondly, one man behaves towards another by being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to another virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he calls \"truthfulness\" [aletheia]. For frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters than play. Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher \"eutrapelia\" [eutrapelia] (Ethic. iv, 8).
\nIt is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, \"philotimia,\" gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and \"eutrapelia,\" all of which differ in respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add \"justice,\" which is about operations, there will be eleven in all.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod perfectio virtutis ex ratione dependet; perfectio autem passionis ex ipso appetitu sensitivo. Unde oportet quod virtutes diversificentur secundum ordinem ad rationem, passiones autem secundum ordinem ad appetitum. Objecta igitur passionum, secundum quod diversi-mode ordinantur ad appetitum sensitivum, causant diversas passionum species; secundum vero quod comparantur ad rationem, causant diversas species virtutum. Non est autem idem motus rationis et appetitus sensitivi. Unde nihil prohibet aliquam differentiam objectorum causare diversitatem passionum, quæ non causat diversitatem virtutum, sicut quando una virtus est circa multas passiones, ut dictum est, et aliquam etiam differentiam objectorum causare diversitatem virtutum, quæ non causat diversitatem passionum, cum circa unam passionem, puta delectationem, diversæ virtutes ordinentur. Et quia diversæ passiones ad diversas potentias pertinentes semper pertinent ad diversas virtutes, ut dictum est, ideo diversitas objectorum, quæ respicit diversitatem potentiarum, semper diversificat species virtutum, puta quod aliquid sit bonum absolute, et aliquid sit bonum cum aliqua arduitate. Et quia ordine quodam ratio inferiores hominis partes regit, et etiam se ad exteriora extendit; ideo etiam secundum quod unum objectum passionis apprehenditur sensu vel imaginatione, aut etiam ratione, et secundum etiam quod pertinet ad animam, corpus vel exteriores res, diversam habitudinem habet ad rationem, et per consequens natum est diversificare virtutes. Bonum igitur hominis, quod est objectum amoris, concupiscentiæ et delectationis, potest accipi vel ad sensum corporis pertinens, vel ad interiorem animæ apprehensionem; et hoc sive ordinetur ad bonum hominis in seipso, vel quantum ad corpus, vel quantum ad animam, sive ordinetur ad bonum hominis in ordine ad alios. Et omnis talis diversitas propter diversum ordinem ad rationem diversificat virtutem. Sic igitur si consideretur aliquod bonum, si quidem sit per sensum tactus apprehensum, et ad consistentiam humanæ vitæ pertinens in individuo vel in specie, sicut sunt delectabilia ciborum et venereorum, erit pertinens ad virtutem « temperantiæ. » Delectationes autem aliorum sensuum, cum non sint vehementes, non præstant aliquam difficultatem rationi; et ideo circa eas non ponitur aliqua virtus, quæ est circa difficile, sicut et ars, ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. III, ad fin. Bonum autem non sensu, sed interiori virtute apprehensum, ad ipsum hominem pertinens secundum seipsum, est sicut pecunia et honor; quorum pecunia ordinabilis est de se ad bonum corporis, honor autem consistit in apprehensione animæ. Et hæc quidem bona considerari possunt vel absolute, secundum quod pertinent ad concupiscibilem, vel cum arduitate quadam, secundum quod pertinent ad irascibilem. Quæ quidem distinctio non habet locum in bonis quæ delectant tactum, quia hujusmodi sunt quædam infima, et competunt homini secundum quod convenit cum brutis. Circa bonum igitur pecuniæ absolute sumptum, secundum quod est objectum concupiscentiæ, vel delectationis aut amoris, est « liberalitas; » circa bonum autem hujusmodi cum arduitate sumptum, secundum quod est objectum spei, est « magnificentia; » circa bonum vero quod est honor, si quidem sit absolute sumptum, secundum quod est objectum amoris, sic est quædam virtus, quæ vocatur « philotimia, » id est, amor honoris; si vero cum arduitate consideretur, secundum quod est objectum spei, sic est « magnanimitas. » Unde « liberalitas » et « philotimia » videntur esse in concupiscibili; « magnificentia » vero et « magnanimitas » in irascibili. Bonum vero hominis in ordine ad alium non videtur arduitatem habere; sed accipitur ut absolute sumptum, prout est objectum passionum concupiscibilis. Quod quidem bonum potest esse alicui delectabile, secundum quod præbet se alteri, vel in his quæ serio fiunt, id est, in actionibus per rationem ordinatis ad debitum finem, vel in his quæ fiunt ludo, id est, in actionibus ordinatis ad delectationem tantum, quæ non eodem modo se habent ad rationem, sicut prima. In seriis autem se exhibet aliquis alteri dupliciter: uno modo ut delectabilem decentibus verbis et factis; et hoc pertinet ad quamdam virtutem, quam Aristoteles, lib. II, cap. VII, circa med., nominat « amicitiam, » et potest dici « affabilitas. » Alio modo præbet se aliquis alteri ut manifestum per dicta et facta; et hoc pertinet ad aliam virtutem, quam nominat « veritatem, » lib. IV Ethic., cap. VII. Manifestatio enim propinquius accedit ad rationem quam delectatio, et seria quam jocosa. Unde et circa delectationes ludorum est alia virtus, quam Philosophus, lib. IV Ethic., cap. 8, « eutrapeliam » nominat. Sic igitur patet, quod secundum Aristotelem sunt undecim virtutes morales circa passiones, scilicet « fortitudo, temperantia, liberalitas, magnificentia, magnanimitas, philotimia, mansuetudo, amicitia, veritas, eutrapelia et justitia, » et distinguuntur secundum diversas materias, vel secundum diversas passiones, vel secundum diversa objecta. Si igitur addatur « justitia, » quæ est circa operationes, erunt omnes duodecim.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.ad.1] All objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod omnia objecta ejusdem operationis secundum speciem, eamdem habitudinem habent ad rationem; non autem omnia objecta ejusdem passionis secundum speciem; quia operationes non repugnant rationi, sicut passiones.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.ad.2] Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as virtues are, as stated above.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod alia ratione Ita codd. septem quos vidimus. Sed in edit.: « sunt decem, eutrapelia..., et distinguuntur... erunt omnes undecim. » Certum est plures Scholasticos duodecim virtutes morales numerasse, quia prudentiam inter morales ponebant. S. Thomas vero dicit prudentiam esse virtutem intellectivam. Et ideo libenter, nisi sequentia contraria essent, propter codices admitteremus ipsum moralibus virtutibus adnexuisse justitiam quam vocant « justitiam circa passiones. » Hanc « justitiam » non omnino rejicit Richardus de Mediavilla. Cæterum in uno codice legitur: « abstinentia. » diversificantur passiones, et alia virtutes, sicut dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.ad.3] More and less do not cause a difference of species, unless they bear different relations to reason.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod magis et minus non diversificant speciem nisi propter diversam habitudinem ad rationem.
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.ad.4] Good is a more potent mover than evil: because evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there being, seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion. Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the other hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be not a great good in that particular kind of passion. Consequently there are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.60.a.5.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod bonum fortius est ad movendum quam malum, quia « malum non agit nisi virtute boni, » ut Dionysius dicit iv cap. De divin. nomin., § 32, col. 731, t. 1. Unde malum non facit difficultatem rationi, quæ requirat virtutem, nisi sit excellens, quod videtur esse unum in uno genere passionis. Unde circa iras non ponitur nisi una virtus, scilicet « mansuetudo; » et similiter circa audacias una sola, scilicet « fortitudo. » Sed bonum ingerit difficultatem, quæ requirit virtutem, etiamsi non sit excellens in genere talis passionis. Et ideo circa concupiscentias ponuntur diversæ virtutes morales, ut dictum est.
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