[I-II.q.63.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself, save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), \"it is God's rule to bring about extremes through the mean.\" Now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our acts, as stated above (Article 2). Therefore it is not reasonable that they should be caused in us by infusion.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod præter virtutes theologicas non sint aliæ vir Juxta Scotum infantes vel acquirunt virtutes morales in usu rationis, vel, si post baptismum ante usum rationis moriantur, eas accipiunt a Deo infusas in instanti mortis, aut acquirunt in cœlo. Præter virtutes morales acquisitas, aliæ sunt virtutes a Deo per se nobis infusæ. Hæc propositio communis est contra Scotum, cujus sententiam quidam theologi post definitionem concilii Viennensis censura notant. Concilium istud resolvendo quæstionem ab Innocentio III ad archiepiscopum Arela-tutes nobis infusæ a Deo. Ea enim quæ possunt fieri a causis secundis, non fiunt immediate a Deo, nisi forte aliquando miraculose: quia, ut Dionysius dicit, cap. v Eccl. hier., § 4, col. 503, t. 1, « lex divinitatis est ultima per media adducere. » Sed virtutes intellectuales et morales possunt in nobis causari per nostros actus, ut dictum est. Non ergo convenienter causantur in nobis per infusionem.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.3.arg.2] Further, much less superfluity is found in God's works than in the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to direct us to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing to be caused in us by God.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in operibus Dei multo minus est aliquid superfluum quam in operibus naturæ. Sed ad ordinandum nos in bonum supernaturale sufficiunt virtutes theologicæ. Ergo non sunt aliæ virtutes supernaturales, quas oporteat in nobis causari a Deo.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.3.arg.3] Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices: much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our souls, according to a gloss on Hebrews 1 [Cf. Jerome on Galatians 1:15-16]. Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, natura non facit per duo quod potest per unum, et multo minus Deus. Sed « Deus inseruit animæ nostræ semina virtutum, » ut dicit Glossa, Hebr., 1. Ergo non oportet quod alias virtutes in nobis per infusionem causet.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.3.sc] It is written (Wisdom 8:7): \"She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude.\"
\n[I-II.q.63.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap., viii, 7: Sobrietatem et justitiam docet, prudentiam et virtutem*.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.3.co] Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as above stated (1; 51, 1): instead of which natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to a supernatural end, as stated (62, 1). Wherefore we need to receive from God other habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod oportet effectus esse suis causis et principiis proportionatos. Omnes autem virtutes tam intellectuales quam morales, quæ ex nostris actibus acquiruntur, procedunt ex quibusdam naturalibus principiis in nobis præexistentibus, ut supra dictum est. Loco quorum naturalium principiorum conferuntur nobis a Deo virtutes theologicæ quibus ordinamur ad finem supernaturalem, sicut supra dictum est. Unde oportet quod etiam his virtutibus theologicis proportionaliter respondeant alii habitus divinitus causati in nobis, qui sic se habent ad virtutes theologicas, sicut se habent virtutes morales et intellectuales ad principia naturalia virtutum.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.3.ad.1] Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliquæ quidem virtutes morales et intellectuales possunt causari in nobis ex nostris actibus; tamen illæ non sunt proportionatæ virtutibus theologicis: et ideo oportet alias eis tensem rescribente in dubio relictam, utrum scilicet fides, spes, charitas, aliæque virtutes (intellige virtutes morales) parvulis in baptismo infundantur, ita definit: Opinionem quæ dicit tam parvulis quam adultis conferri in baptismo informantem grai-tiam et virtutes, sacro approbante concilio, duxi-mus eligendam; addit tamen concilium: tanquam probabiliorem et dictis sanctorum et doctorum modernorum theologiae magis consonam et concordem. proportionatas immediate a Deo causari.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.3.ad.2] The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to God Himself immediately. But the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod virtutes theologicæ sufficienter nos ordinant in finem supernaturalem, secundum quamdam inclinationem, quantum scilicet ad ipsum Deum immediate; sed oportet quod per alias virtutes infusas perficiatur anima circa alias res, in ordine tamen ad Deum.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.3.ad.3] The power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod virtus illorum principiorum naturaliter inditorum non se extendit ultra proportionem naturæ; et ideo in ordine ad finem supernaturalem indiget homo perfici per alia principia superaddita.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues, according to what has been said (3), do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last, but by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod virtutes infusæ non sint alterius speciei a virtutibus acquisitis. Virtus enim acquisita et virtus infusa secundum prædicta non videntur differre nisi secundum ordinem ad ultimum finem. Sed habitus et actus humani non recipiunt speciem ab ultimo fine, sed a proximo. Non ergo virtutes morales vel intellectuales infusæ differunt specie ab acquisitis.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.4.arg.2] Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, habitus per actus cognoscuntur. Sed idem est actus temperantiæ infusæ et acquisitæ, scilicet moderari concupiscentias tactus. Ergo non differunt specie.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.4.arg.3] Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a creature. But the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind, as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to the same species.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, virtus acquisita et virtus infusa differunt secundum illud quod est immediate a Deo factum et a creatura. Sed idem est specie homo quem Deus formavit et quem generat natura, et oculus quem cæco nato dedit et quem virtus formativa causat. Ergo videtur quod est eadem specie virtus acquisita et infusa.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.4.sc] Any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition of infused virtue contains the words, \"which God works in us without us,\" as stated above (Question 55, Article 4). Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.4.sc] Sed contra, quælibet differentia in definitione posita, mutata diversificat speciem. Sed in definitione virtutis infusæ ponitur: « Quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur, » ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtus acquisita, cui hoc non convenit, non est ejusdem speciei cum infusa.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.4.co] There is a twofold specific difference among habits. The first, as stated above (54, 2; 56, 2; 60, 1), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue's proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material element is something on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to \"chastise his body, and bring it into subjection\" (1 Corinthians 9:27), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species; and the same applies to the other virtues.
\nThe other specific differences among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed: for a man's health and a horse's are not of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures to which their respective healths are directed. In the same sense, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are well directed to diverse forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby men behave well in respect of their being \"fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household [Douay: 'domestics'] of God\" (Ephesians 2:19), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod dupliciter habitus distinguentur specie: uno modo, sicut prædictum est, secundum speciales et formales rationes objectorum. Objectum autem virtutis cujuslibet est bonum consideratum in materia propria; sicut temperantiæ objectum est bonum delectabilium in concupiscentiis tactus; cujus quidem objecti formalis ratio est a ratione, quæ instituit modum in his concupiscentiis; materiale autem est id quod est ex parte concupiscentiarum. Manifestum est autem, quod alterius rationis est motus impositus in hujusmodi concupiscentiis secundum regulam rationis humanæ, et secundum regulam divinam: puta in sumptione ciborum ratione humana modus statuitur ut non noceat valetudini corporis, nec impediat rationis actum; secundum autem regulam legis divinæ requiritur quod homo castiget corpus suum et in servitutem redigat, I Cor., 1x, 27, per abstinentiam cibi et potus, et aliorum hujusmodi. Unde manifestum est quod temperantia infusa et acquisita differunt specie; et eadem ratio est de aliis virtutibus. Alio modo habitus distinguentur specie secundum ea ad quæ ordinantur. Non enim est eadem specie sanitas hominis et equi, propter diversas naturas ad quas ordinantur. Et eodem modo dicit Philosophus in III Polit., cap. 111, a princ., quod « diversæ sunt virtutes civium, secundum quod bene se habent ad diversas politias. » Et per hunc etiam modum differunt specie virtutes morales infusæ, per quas homines bene se habent in ordine ad hoc quod sint cives sanctorum et domestici Dei, Ephes., 11, 19, et aliæ virtutes acquisita, secundum quas homo se bene habet in ordine ad res humanas.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.4.ad.1] Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, as stated.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtus infusa et acquisita non solum differunt secundum ordinem ad ultimum finem, sed etiam secundum ordinem ad propria objecta, ut dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.4.ad.2] Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: wherefore their respective acts are not identical.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod alia ratione modificat concupiscentias delectabilium tactus temperantia acquisita et temperantia infusa, ut dictum est, unde non habent eumdem actum.
\n[I-II.q.63.a.4.ad.3] God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired by acts. But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.63.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod oculum cæci nati Deus fecit ad eumdem actum ad quem formantur alii oculi secundum naturam, et ideo fuit ejusdem speciei: et eadem ratio esset, si Deus vellet miraculose causare in homine virtutes, quales acquiruntur ex actibus. Sed ita non est in proposito, ut dictum est.
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