[I-II.q.65.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity. For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Prosperi vii, that \"every virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad.\" But \"charity can be in none except the good,\" as stated in the same book. Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod virtutes morales possint esse sine charitate. Dicitur enim in lib. Sent. Prosperi, cap. vii, col. 1859, t. 10, quod omnis virtus præter charitatem potest esse communis bonis et malis. Sed charitas non potest esse nisi in bonis, ut dicitur ibid. Ergo aliæ virtutes possunt haberi sine charitate.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.2.arg.2] Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, whereas charity cannot be had otherwise than by infusion, according to Romans 5:5: \"The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us.\" Therefore it is possible to have the other virtues without charity.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtutes morales possunt acquiri ex actibus humanis, ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. i et ii. Sed charitas non habetur nisi ex infusione, secundum illud Rom., v, 5: Charitas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Ergo aliæ virtutes possunt haberi sine charitate.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.2.arg.3] Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; indeed, it surpasses prudence, according to Ephesians 3:19: \"The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge.\" Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with charity, and can be without it.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, virtutes morales connectuntur ad invicem, inquantum dependent a prudentia. Sed charitas non dependet a prudentia, imo prudentiam excedit, secundum illud Ephes., 19: Supereminentem scientiæ charitatem Christi. Ergo virtutes mo- 1 Oper. August. Quæstio est de virtutibus moralibus, non de virtutibus intellectualibus. Certum est enim virtutes intellectuales non esse inter se connexas; nam, quamvis veritas una sit, licetque mirabili quodam vinculo scientiæ jungantur omnes, non omnes tamen scientias habet qui habet unam. Quod autem ad virtutes theologicas attinet, certum est fidem et spem, amissa charitate, remanere posse, et hoc est dogma definitum in concilio tridentino, sess. vi, can. 28: « Si quis dixerit, amissa per peccatum gratia, simul et fidem semper amitti, aut fidem quæ remanet, non esse veram fidem, anathema sit.» Sed de virtutibus moralibus omnibus et indistincte agi non potest. Sunt enim, juxta theologos et Ecclesiæ doctrinam, quædam virtutes morales infusæ; illæ autem cum gratia et infunduntur et pereunt, et ideo connexionem habent ad invicem. Quæstio est igitur solummodo de virtutibus moralibus acquisitis. S. Thomas docet has virtutes in statu perfecto ita esse inter se connexas, ut qui una caret nullam perfecte habeat.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.2.sc] It is written (1 John 3:14): \"He that loveth not, abideth in death.\" Now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues, since it is \"by them\" that \"we lead a good life,\" as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19). Therefore they cannot be without the love of charity.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur I Joan., III, 14: Qui non diligit, manet in morte. Sed per virtutes perficitur vita spiritualis; ipsæ enim sunt « quibus recte vivitur, » ut Augustinus dicit in II De lib. arbitr., cap. xviii et xix, col. 1267, t. 1. Ergo non possunt esse sine dilectione charitatis.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.2.co] As stated above (Question 63, Article 2), it is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can be without charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and cannot be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated above (1; 58, A4,5) that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence. Now for prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be well disposed towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which is the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle, that \"contradictories cannot both be true at the same time.\" It is therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence.
\nIt is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues simply: since they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense, but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last end simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine [Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] on the words, \"All that is not of faith is sin\" (Romans 14:23), says: \"He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct be good.\"
\n[I-II.q.65.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales, prout sunt operativæ boni in ordine ad finem qui non excedit facultatem naturalem hominis, possunt per opera humana acquiri; et sic acquisitæ sine charitate esse possunt, sicut fuerunt in multis gentilibus. Secundum autem quod sunt operativæ boni in ordine ad ultimum finem supernaturalem, sic perfecte et vere habent rationem virtutis; et non possunt humanis actibus acquiri, sed infunduntur a Deo; et hujusmodi virtutes morales sine charitate esse non possunt. Dictum est enim supra, quod aliæ virtutes morales non possunt esse sine prudentia. Prudentia autem non potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus, inquantum virtutes morales faciunt bene se habere ad quosdam fines, ex quibus procedit ratio prudentia. Ad rectam autem rationem prudentia multo magis requiritur quod homo bene se habeat circa ultimum finem, quod fit per charitatem, quam circa alios fines, quod fit per virtutes morales; sicut ratio recta in speculativis maxime indiget primo principio indemonstrabili, quod est contradictoria non simul esse vera. Unde manifestum fit quod nec prudentia infusa potest esse sine charitate, nec aliæ virtutes morales consequenter, quæ sine prudentia esse non possunt. Patet igitur ex dictis, quod solæ virtutes infusæ sunt perfectæ, et simpliciter dicendæ virtutes, quia bene ordinant hominem ad finem ultimum simpliciter; aliæ vero virtutes, scilicet acquisitæ, sunt secundum quid virtutes, non autem simpliciter; ordinant enim hominem bene respectu finis ultimi in aliquo genere, non autem respectu finis ultimi simpliciter. Unde Rom., xiv, 23, super illud: Omne quod non est ex fide peccatum est, dicit Glossa Aug., col. 516, t. 2: « Ubi deest agnitio veritatis, falsa est virtus etiam in optimis moribus. »
\n[I-II.q.65.a.2.ad.1] Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, \"it makes its possessor good,\" and consequently cannot be in the wicked.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtutes ibi accipiuntur secundum imperfectam rationem virtutis; alioquin, si virtus moralis secundum perfectam rationem virtutis accipiatur, bonum facit habentem; et per consequens in malis esse non potest.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.2.ad.2] This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of acquired virtue.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de virtutibus moralibus acquisitis.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.2.ad.3] Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet prudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all the infused moral virtues.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, etsi charitas excedat scientiam et prudentiam, tamen prudentia dependet a charitate, ut dictum est, et per consequens omnes virtutes morales infusæ.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.3.arg.1] It would seem possible to have charity without the moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 13:4, seqq.: \"Charity is patient, is kind,\" etc. Therefore it seems that if one has charity, other virtues are superfluous.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod charitas sine aliis virtutibus moralibus haberi possit. Ad id enim ad quod sufficit unum, indebitum est quod plura ordinentur. Sed sola charitas sufficit ad omnia opera virtutis implenda, ut patet per id quod dicitur I ad Cor., xiii, 4: Charitas patiens est, benigna Habetur in Gloss. ordin. ex lib. Sentent. Prosperi, sent. Cvi, col. 1868, t. 10, Oper. Aug. Scotus negat prudentiam connexam esse aliis virtutibus cardinalibus, tum quia per prudentiam in intellectu recte dictantem voluntas potest non eligere, tum quia ex articulo Parisiensi error est dicere voluntatem non posse deficere, stante recto judicio intellectus. Cum igitur per bonas electiones generentur virtutes, relinquitur quod prudentia erit in intellectu absque virtute in affectu.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.3.arg.2] Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for their own sake: hence \"pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit\" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now many have charity, being free from mortal sin, and yet they find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing to them for their own sake, but only for the sake of charity. Therefore many have charity without the other virtues.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, qui habet habitum virtutis, de facili operatur ea quæ sunt virtutis, et ei secundum se placent; unde et « signum habitus est delectatio quæ fit in opere, » ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. 111, in princ. Sed multi habent charitatem absque peccato mortali existentes, qui tamen difficultatem in operibus virtutum patiuntur, neque eis secundum se placent, sed solum secundum quod referuntur ad charitatem. Ergo multi habent charitatem qui non habent alias virtutes.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.3.arg.3] Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet there are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says (on Luke 17:10) that the saints are more humbled on account of their not having certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have. Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that he has all the moral virtues.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, charitas in omnibus sanctis inventur. Sed quidam sunt sancti qui tamen aliquibus virtutibus carent; dicit enim Beda, quod « sancti magis humiliantur de virtutibus quas non habent, quam de virtutibus quas habent, glorientur. » Ergo non est necessarium quod qui habet charitatem, omnes virtutes morales habeat.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.3.sc] The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is written (Romans 13:8): \"He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the Law.\" Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without having all the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about all acts of virtue, as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2. Therefore he that has charity, has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter (Epis. clxvii) [Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi de Temp.] that charity contains all the cardinal virtues.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod per charitatem tota lex impletur; dicitur enim Rom., xiii, 8, quod qui diligit proximum, legem implevit. Sed tota lex impleri non potest nisi per omnes virtutes morales, quia lex præcipit de omnibus actibus virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic., cap. 1 et 11, post med. Ergo qui habet charitatem, habet omnes virtutes morales. Augustinus etiam dicit in quadam epist., quod « charitas includit in se omnes virtutes cardinales. »
\n[I-II.q.65.a.3.co] All the moral virtues are infused together with charity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in works of grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain works, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the actions that their souls empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through them that man performs each different kind of good work.
\nIt is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence, but also on account of charity: and, again, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral virtues.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum charitate simul infunduntur omnes virtutes morales. Cujus ratio est, quia Deus non minus perfecta operatur in operibus gratiae quam in operibus naturæ. Sic autem videmus in operibus naturæ, quod non invenitur principium aliquorum operum in aliqua re, quin inveniantur in ea quæ sunt necessaria ad hujusmodi opera perficienda; sicut in animalibus inveniuntur organa, quibus perfici possunt opera ad quæ peragenda anima habet potestatem. Manifestum est autem, quod charitas, inquantum ordinat hominem ad finem ultimum, est principium omnium bonorum operum, quæ in finem ultimum ordinari possunt. Unde oportet quod cum charitate simul infundantur omnes virtutes morales, quibus homo perficit singula genera bonorum operum. Et sic patet quod virtutes morales infusæ non solum habent connexionem propter prudentiam, sed etiam propter charitatem; et quod qui amittit cha-ritatem per peccatum mortale, amittit omnes virtutes morales infusas.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.3.ad.1] In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower power: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well disposed. Consequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is referred to the end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect of those things that are referred to the end. Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ad hoc quod actus inferioris potentiæ sit perfectus, requiritur quod non solum adsit perfectio in superiori potentia, sed etiam in inferiori. Si enim principale agens debito modo se haberet, non sequeretur actio perfecta, si instrumentum non esset bene dispositum. Unde oportet ad hoc quod homo bene operetur in his quæ sunt ad finem, quod non solum habeat virtutem qua bene se habeat circa finem, sed etiam virtutes quibus bene se habeat circa ea quæ sunt ad finem. Nam virtus quæ est circa finem, se habet ut principalis et motiva, respectu earum quæ sunt ad finem. Et ideo cum charitate necesse est etiam habere alias virtutes morales.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.3.ad.2] It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of moral virtue experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary dispositions remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue: because the repeated acts by which they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quandoque contingit quod aliquis habens habitum patiunt difficultatem in operando; et per consequens non sentit delectationem et complacen-tiam in actu propter aliquod impedimentum extrinsecus superveniens; sicut ille qui habet habitum scientiæ, patitur difficultatem in intelligendo propter somnolentiam vel aliquam infirmitatem. Et similiter habitus moralium virtutum infusarum patiuntur interdum difficultatem in operando propter aliquas dispositiones contrarias ex præcedentibus actibus relictas; quæ quidem difficultas non ita accidit in virtutibus moralibus acquisitis, quia per exercitium actuum, quo acquiruntur, tolluntur etiam contrariæ dispositiones.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.3.ad.3] Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all the virtues.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliqui sancti dicuntur aliquas virtutes non habere, inquantum patiuntur difficultatem in actibus earum, ratione jam dicta, quamvis habitus omnium virtutum habeant.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that faith and hope are never without charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore can faith and hope be without charity.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod fides et spes nunquam sint sine charitate. Cum enim sint virtutes theologicae, digniores esse videntur virtutibus moralibus etiam infusis. Sed virtutes morales infusæ non possunt esse sine charitate. Ergo neque fides et spes.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.4.arg.2] Further, \"no man believes unwillingly\" as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection thereof, as stated above (Question 62, Article 3). Therefore faith cannot be without charity.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, « nullus credit nisi volens, » ut Augustinus dicit Super Joan., tract. xxvi, § 2, col. 1607, t. 3. Sed charitas est in voluntate sicut perfectio ejus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo fides non potest esse sine charitate.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.4.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that \"there can be no hope without love.\" But love is charity: for it is of this love that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in Enchir., cap. viii, col. 235, t. 6, quod « spes esse sine amore non potest. » Amor autem est charitas; de hoc enim amore ibi loquitur. Ergo spes non potest esse sine charitate.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.4.sc] A gloss on Matthew 1:2 says that \"faith begets hope, and hope, charity.\" Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be without it. Therefore faith can be without hope; and hope, without charity.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Matth., i, dicitur in Glossa interl., in princ., quod « fides generat spem, spes vero charitatem. » Sed generans est prius generato, et potest esse sine eo. Ergo fides potest esse sine spe, et spes sine charitate.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.4.co] Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as complete virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing a perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done is good, but not well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the habit that is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence.
\nAccordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue without charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since to believe is to assent to someone of one's own free will: to will not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in looking to God for future bliss. This act is perfect, if it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to expect future bliss through merits which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6).
\n[I-II.q.65.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod fides et spes, sicut et virtutes morales, dupliciter considerari possunt: uno modo secundum inchoa-tionem quamdam; alio modo secundum perfectum esse virtutis. Cum enim virtus ordinetur ad bonum opus agendum, virtus quædam perfecta dicitur ex hoc quod potest in opus perfecte bonum: quod quidem est dum non solum bonum est quod fit, sed etiam bene fit; alioquin, si bonum sit quod fit, non autem bene fiat, non erit perfecte bonum; unde nec habitus, qui est talis operis principium, habebit perfecte rationem virtutis; sicut si aliquis operetur justa, bonum quidem facit; sed non erit opus perfectæ virtutis, nisi hoc bene faciat, id est, secundum electionem rectam, quod est per prudentiam. Et ideo justitia sine prudentia non potest esse virtus perfecta. Sic igitur fides et spes sine charitate possunt quidem aliqualiter esse; perfectæ autem virtutis rationem sine charitate non habent. Cum enim fidei opus sit credere Deo, credere autem sit aliquem propria voluntate assentire, si non debito modo velit, non erit fidei opus perfectum: quod autem debito modo velit hoc est per charitatem, quæ perficit voluntatem. Omnis enim rectus motus voluntatis ex recto amore procedit, ut Augus-tinus dicit in XIV De civitate Dei, cap. ix, col. 413, t. 7. Sic igitur fides est quidem sine charitate, sed non perfecta virtus; sicut temperantia vel fortitudo sine prudentia. Et similiter dicendum est de spe; nam actus spei est expectare futuram beatitudinem a Deo: qui quidem actus perfectus est, si fiat ex meritis quæ quis habet, quod non potest esse sine charitate; si autem hoc expectet ex meritis quæ nondum habet, sed proponit in futurum acquirere, erit actus imperfectus: et hoc potest esse sine charitate. Et ideo fides et spes possunt esse sine charitate; sed sine charitate, proprie loquendo, virtutes non sunt. Nam ad rationem virtutis pertinet ut non solum secundum ipsam aliquod bonum operemur, sed etiam bene, ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. vi, in princ.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.4.ad.1] Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this involves the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity, although they are not virtues without charity, as stated.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtutes morales dependent a prudentia. Prudentia autem infusa nec rationem prudentiae habere potest absque charitate, utpote deficiente debita habitudine ad primum principium, quod est ultimus finis. Fides autem et spes secundum proprias rationes nec a prudentia nec a charitate dependent; et ideo sine charitate esse possunt, licet non sint virtutes sine charitate, ut dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.4.ad.2] This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect virtue.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de fide quæ habet perfectam rationem virtutis.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.4.ad.3] Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this is not without charity.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de spe, secundum quod aliquis expectat futuram beatitudinem per merita quæ jam habet; quod non est sine charitate.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love God naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod charitas possit esse sine fide et spe. Charitas enim est amor Dei. Sed Deus potest a nobis amari naturaliter, etiam non præsupposita 1 Ita codd.; in edit.: « alicui. » Ly « propriie loquendo » salvat probabiliter D. Thomam a censura cujusdam Scotistæ dicentis: « In hoc defecit S. Thomas qui dicit quod fides et spes sine charitate non est virtus. » Quamvis enim S. Bonaventura et Guillermus teneant quod fides et spes possint esse sine charitate, addunt tamen: fide vel spe futuræ beatitudinis. Ergo charitas potest esse sine fide et spe.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.5.arg.2] Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Ephesians 3:17: \"Rooted and founded in charity.\" Now the root is sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without faith and hope, and the other virtues.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, charitas est radix omnium virtutum, secundum illud Ephes., 17: In charitate radicati et fundati. Sed radix aliquando est sine ramis. Ergo charitas potest esse aliquando sine fide, et spe, et aliis virtutibus.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.5.arg.3] Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, as we shall explain further on (TP, 7, A3,4). Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in Christo fuit perfecta charitas: et ipse tamen non habuit fidem et spem, quia fuit perfectus comprehensor, ut infra dicetur. Ergo charitas potest esse sine fide et spe.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.5.sc] The Apostle says (Hebrews 11:6): \"Without faith it is impossible to please God\"; and this evidently belongs most to charity, according to Proverbs 8:17: \"I love them that love me.\" Again, it is by hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above (Question 62, Article 4). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit Hebr., xi, 6: Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo; quod maxime pertinet ad charitatem, ut patet secundum illud Proverb., viii, 17: Ego diligentes me diligo. Spes etiam est quæ introducit ad charitatem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo charitas non potest haberi sine fide et spe.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.5.co] Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident from 1 John 4:16: \"He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him,\" and from 1 Corinthians 1:9, where it is written: \"God is faithful, by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son.\" Now this fellowship of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility of their fellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite impossible without faith and hope.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod charitas non solum significat amorem Dei, sed etiam amicitiam quamdam ad ipsum; quæ quidem super amorem addit « mutuam redamationem cum quadam communicatione mutua, » ut dicitur in VIII Ethic., cap. ii. Et quod hoc ad charitatem pertineat, patet per id quod dicitur I Joan., iv, 16: Qui manet in charitate in Deo manet, et Deus in eo, et I ad Cor., i, 9, dicitur: Fidelis Deus, per quem vocati estis in societatem Filii ejus. Hæc autem societas hominis ad Deum, quæ est quædam familiaris conversatio cum ipso, inchoatur quidem hic in præsenti per gratiam; perficietur autem in futuro in gloria; quorum utrumque fide et spe tenetur. Unde sicut aliquis non posset cum aliquo amicitiam habere, si discrederet vel desperaret se posse habere aliquam societatem vel familiarem conversationem cum ipso, ita aliquis non potest habere amicitiam ad Deum, quæ est charitas, nisi fidem habeat, per quam credat hujusmodi societatem et conversationem hominis cum Deo, et speret se ad hanc societatem pertinere. Et sic charitas sine fide et spe nullo modo esse potest.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.5.ad.1] Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object we are directed by faith and hope.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod charitas non est qualiscumque amor Dei, sed amor Dei quo diligitur ut beatitudinis objectum, ad quod ordinamur per fidem et spem.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.5.ad.2] Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are the precursors of charity, as stated above (Question 62, Article 4), and so charity is impossible without them.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod charitas est radix fidei et spei, inquantum dat eis perfectionem virtutis; sed fides et spes secundum rationem propriam præsupponuntur ad charitatem, ut supra dictum est, et sic charitas sine eis esse non potest.
\n[I-II.q.65.a.5.ad.3] In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had manifest vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [See above, 4, 3]: so that in Him was perfect charity.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.65.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Christo defuit fides et spes, propter id quod est imperfectionis in eis: sed loco fidei habuit apertam visionem; et loco spei plenam comprehensionem; et sic fuit perfecta charitas in eo.
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