[I-II.q.71.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one thing has one contrary, as proved in Metaph. x, text. 17. Now sin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it: since vice applies also to undue disposition of bodily members or of any things whatever.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod vitium non contrarietur virtuti; uni enim unum est contrarium, ut probatur in X Metaph., text. 17. Sed virtuti contrariantur peccatum et malitia. Non ergo contrariatur ei vitium; quia vitium dicitur etiamsi sit indebita dispositio membrorum corporalium, vel quarumcumque rerum.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.1.arg.2] Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtus nominat quamdam perfectionem potentiæ. Sed vitium nihil nominat ad potentiam pertinens. Ergo vitium non contrariatur virtuti.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.1.arg.3] Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that \"virtue is the soul's health.\" Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, is opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Tullius dicit in IV De tuscul. quæst., parum ante med., quod « virtus est quædam sanitas animæ. » Sanitati autem opponitur ægritudo vel morbus magis quam vitium. Ergo virtuti non contrariatur vitium.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.1.sc] Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that \"vice is a quality in respect of which the soul is evil.\" But \"virtue is a quality which makes its subject good,\" as was shown above (55, A3,4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus in libro De perfectione justitiæ, c. 11, col. 294, t. 10, quod « vitium est qualitas secundum quam malus est animus; » virtus autem est qualitas quæ « facit bonum habentem, » ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo vitium contraria-tur virtuti.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.1.co] Two things may be considered in virtue--the essence of virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue we may consider something directly, and we may consider something consequently. Virtue implies \"directly\" a disposition whereby the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that \"virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed according to its nature.\" That which virtue implies \"consequently\" is that it is a kind of goodness: because the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its nature. That to which virtue is directed is a good act, as was shown above (Question 56, Article 3).
\nAccordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of these is \"sin,\" which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to which virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act; even as an act of virtue is an ordinate and due act: in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of goodness, the contrary of virtue is \"malice\": while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary is \"vice\": because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): \"Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural perfection may be called a vice.\"
\n[I-II.q.71.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa virtu-tem duo possumus considerare, scilicet ipsam essentiam virtutis, et id ad quod est virtus. In essentia quidem virtutis aliquid considerari potest directe, et aliquid ex consequenti. Directe quidem virtus importat dispositionem quamdam alicujus convenienter se habentis secundum modum suæ naturæ. Unde Philosophus dicit in VII Physic., text. 17, quod « virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. » Ex consequenti autem sequitur quod virtus sit bonitas quædam. In hoc enim consistit uniuscujusque rei bonitas, quod convenienter se habet secundum modum suæ naturæ. Id autem ad quod virtus ordinatur, est actus bonus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Secundum hoc igitur tria inveniuntur opponi virtuti: quorum unum est peccatum, quod opponitur sibi ex parte ejus ad quod virtus ordinatur; nam peccatum proprie nominat actum inordinatum, sicut actus virtutis est actus ordinatus et debitus. Secundum autem quod ad rationem virtutis consequitur quod sit bonitas quædam, opponitur virtuti malitia. Sed secundum id quod directe est de ratione virtutis, opponitur virtuti vitium; vitium enim uniuscujusque rei esse videtur quod non sit disposita secundum quod convenit suæ naturæ. Unde Augustinus dicit in III De lib. arb., cap. xiv, § 41, col. 1291, t. 1: « Quod perfectioni naturæ deesse perspexeris, id voca vitium. »
\n[I-II.q.71.a.1.ad.1] These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the latter is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly as such.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa tria non contrariantur virtuti secundum idem; sed peccatum quidem contrariatur, secundum quod virtus est operativa boni; malitia autem, secundum quod est bonitas quædam; vitium autem proprie, secundum quod est virtus.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.1.ad.2] Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The reason for this is because a thing operates according as it is in act: so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a good work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod virtus non solum importat perfectionem potentiæ, quæ est principium agendi; sed etiam importat debitam dispositionem ejus cujus est virtus; et hoc ideo quia unumquodque operatur secundum quod actu est. Requiritur ergo quod aliquid sit in se bene dispositionum, quod debet esse boni operativum. Et secundum hoc virtuti vitium opponitur. D. Thomæ Aquinatis pars prima quam plurimum allegatur, quia nullibi doctrina moralis clariori ac sapientiori facundia exprimitur.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.1.ad.3] As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), \"disease and sickness are vicious qualities,\" for in speaking of the body \"he calls it\" disease \"when the whole body is infected,\" for instance, with fever or the like; he calls it sickness \"when the disease is attended with weakness\"; and vice \"when the parts of the body are not well compacted together.\" And although at times there may be disease in the body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden complaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; \"yet, in the soul,\" as he says, \"these two things are indistinguishable, except in thought.\" For whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since \"a tree is known by its fruit,\" i.e. man by his works, according to Matthew 12:33. But \"vice of the soul,\" as Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), \"is a habit or affection of the soul discordant and inconsistent with itself through life\": and this is to be found even without disease and sickness, e.g. when a man sins from weakness or passion. Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even as virtue extends to more things than health; for health itself is reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice is reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or disease.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Tullius dicit in IV De tuscul. quæstion., parum ante med., « morbi et ægrotationes partes sunt vitiositatis. » In corporibus enim morbum appellat « totius corporis corruptionem », puta febrem vel aliquid hujusmodi; ægrotationem vero « morbum cum imbecillitate; » vitium autem, « cum partes corporis inter se dissident. » Et quamvis in corpore quandoque sit morbus sine ægrotatione, puta cum aliquis est interius male dispositus, non tamen exterius præpeditur a solitis operationibus; in animo tamen, ut ipse dicit, « hæc duo non possunt nisi cogitatione secerni. » Necesse est enim quod quando-cumque aliquis interius est male dispositus habens inordinatum affectum, ex hoc imbecillis reddatur ad debitas operationes exercendas; quia unaquæque ex suo fructu arbor cognoscitur, id est, homo ex opere, ut dicitur Matth., xii, 33. Sed vitium animi, ut Tullius ibidem dicit, « est habitus aut affectio animi in tota vita inconstans et a seipsa dissentiens: » quod quidem inventur etiam absque morbo vel ægrotatione, Vitium directe contrariatur virtuti acquisitæ, sed virtuti infusæ nullum vitium neque naturale, neque supernaturale contrariatur. Quod sic patet. Contraria sunt directe quæ sub eodem genere maxime distant et eidem subjecto insunt, a quo mutuo se expellunt. Sed vitium et virtus acquisita sub eodem genere, id est habitu morali insunt, et maxime inter se distant, quia constituuntur per differentias oppositas boni et mali, et etiam quia virtus inclinat ad actum consonum rationi, vitium ad actum rationi dissonum; eidem que subjecto insunt, scilicet eidem potentiæ voluntatis aut appetitus, seque ab eo mutuo expellunt; ergo directe contrariantur. Quoad autem virtutem infusam habet pro objecto formali rationem quamdam supernaturalem cui non contrariatur vitium naturale cujus objectum formale ratio quædam est supernaturalis. Sed et subjectum vitii naturalis et etiam vitii contra-supernaturalis non est idem cum objecto virtutis infusæ; nam subjectum vitiorum est potentia naturalis, subjectum vero virtutis infusæ est obedientialis potentia. Contrariantur nihilominus indirecte, quidquid e contra sentiant Salmanticenses, et Gonet, et alli, virtutibus infusis vitia sive naturalia, sive contra-supernaturalia. Nec omittendum aliquando vitia virtutum speciem prætendere. Unde Quintilianus, De orat. inst., lib. II: « Est quædam virtutum vitiorumque vicinia, qua temerarius pro forti, effusus pro copioso accipitur; » et Seneca, Ad Lucil., ep. xLV: « Vitia nobis sub virtutum nomine irrepunt. Temeritas sub titulo fortitudinis latet, moderatio vocatur ignavia, pro cauto timidus accipitur: in his magno periculo erramus; » et in ep. LVI: « Omnia vitia ad utpote cum aliquis ex infirmitate vel ex passione peccat. Unde in plus se habet vitium quam ægrotatio vel morbus, sicut etiam virtus in plus se habet quam sanitas; nam sanitas etiam quædam virtus ponitur in VII Physic., text. 17; et ideo virtuti convenientius opponitur vitium quam ægrotatio vel morbus.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above (Article 1). Now virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above (63, A1,2,3). Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod vitium non sit contra naturam. Vitium enim contrariatur virtuti, ut dictum est. Sed virtutes non sunt in nobis a natura, sed causantur in nobis per infusionem, aut ab assuetudine, ut dictum est. Ergo vitia non sunt contra naturam. modum morbi in aperto leviora sunt, tunc autem perniciosissima, cum simulata sanitate subsidunt; » et Sallustius, In Catil.: « Habuit ille permulta maximarum non expressa signa sed adumbrata virtutum; utebatur hominibus improbis, et quidem optimis viris se debitum aliis deditum esse simulabat. Nunquam tale monstrum in terris ullum fuisse puto tam contrariiis diversisque et inter se pugnantibus naturæ studiis cupiditatibus conflatum. Quis enim clarioribus viris quandoque jucundior, quis turpioribus conjunctior, quis civis aliquando melior, quis hostis civitati tetrior, quis in voluptatibus inquinatior, quis in laboribus patientior, quis in rapacitate avarior, quis in largitione effusior. Illud quoque in eo erat mirabile naturam suam versare et regere ad tempus, atque huc et illuc torquere, flere cum tristibus, sævire cum remissis jocunde, cum senibus graviter, cum juvenibus comiter, cum facinorosis audacter, cum luxuriosis luxuriose vivere; » et Sydonius, in Ep. lib. III, de quodam: « Est hic ipse loquax nec dicax, ridiculus nec lœtus, arrogans nec constans, curiosus nec perspicax; » et Lactantius, in lib. De vero cultu: « Etiam ea quæ bona sunt fines suos habent quos si excesserint in vitia labuntur. Nam constantia, nisi pro veritate suscepta sit impudentia fit, et fortitudo, si nulla necessitate cogente aut non pro causa honesta certum periculum subierit, in temeritatem convertitur, et severitas nisi se intra congruentes nocentium cœdes coerceat, fit sæva crudelitas; » et Ovidius in lib. De remed.: « Et mala sunt vicina bonis errore sub ipso, Pro vitio virtus crimina sæpe tulit. » Et Juvenalis, lib.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.arg.2] Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which is contrary to nature: thus \"a stone never becomes habituated to upward movement\" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ea quæ sunt contra naturam, non possunt assuefieri; sicut lapis nunquam assuescit ferri sursum, ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. 1, in princ. Sed aliqui assuefiunt ad vitia. Ergo vitia non sunt contra naturam.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.arg.3] Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice is found in the greater number of men; for it is written (Matthew 7:13): \"Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat.\" Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nihil quod est contra naturam, inventur in habentibus illam naturam, ut in pluribus. Sed vitia inveniuntur in hominibus, ut in pluribus; quia, sicut dicitur Matth., vii, 13, lata est via quæ ducit ad perditionem, et multi vadunt per eam*. Ergo vitium non est contra naturam.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.arg.4] Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as stated above (Article 1). Now sin is defined as \"a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the Law of God,\" as Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, peccatum comparatur ad vitium sicut actus ad habitum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed peccatum definitur esse « dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum contra legem Dei, » ut patet per Augustinum, XXII Contra Faustum, cap. xxvii, col. 418, t. 8; lex autem Dei est supra naturam. Magis ergo dicendum est quod vitium sit contra legem, quam quod sit contra naturam.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): \"Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature.\"
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in III De lib. arb., cap. xiii, § 38, col. 1290, t. 1: « Omne vitium, eo ipso quod vitium est, contra naturam est. »
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), vice is contrary to virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its nature, as stated above (Article 1). Hence the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and for this reason is that thing \"vituperated,\" which word is derived from \"vice\" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14).
\nBut it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man. Now \"man's good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against reason,\" as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man's nature, for as much as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man's nature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, vitium virtuti contrariatur. Virtus autem uniuscujusque rei consistit in hoc quod sit bene disposita secundum convenientiam suæ naturæ, ut supra dictum est. Unde oportet quod in qualibet re vitium dicatur ex hoc quod est disposita contra id quod convenit suæ naturæ; unde et de hoc unaquæque res vituperatur; a vitio autem no men vituperationis detractum creditur, ut Augustinus dicit in III De lib. arb., cap. xiv, § 40, col. 1291, t. 1. Sed considerandum est quod natura uniuscujusque rei potissime est forma, secundum quam res speciem sortitur. Homo autem in specie constituitur per animam rationalem. Et ideo id quod est contra ordinem rationis, proprie est contra naturam hominis, inquantum est homo; quod autem est secundum rationem, est secundum naturam hominis, inquantum est homo. « Bonum autem hominis est secundum rationem esse, et malum hominis est præter rationem esse, » ut Dionysius dicit, iv cap. De div. nom., § 32, col. 734, t. 1. Unde virtus humana, quæ hominem facit bonum, et opus ipsius bonum reddit, intantum est secundum naturam hominis, inquantum convenit rationi; vitium autem intantum est contra naturam hominis, inquantum est contra ordinem rationis.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.ad.1] Although the virtues are not caused by nature as regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which accords with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that \"virtue is a habit in accord with reason, like a second nature\": and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is contrary to nature.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtutes, etsi non causentur a natura secundum suum esse perfectum, tamen inclinant ad id quod est secundum naturam, id est, secundum ordinem rationis. Dicit enim Tullius in Rhetor. sua, lib. II De invent., aliquant. ante fin., quod « virtus est habitus in modum naturæ rationi consentaneus. » Et hoc modo virtus dicitur esse secundum naturam; et per contrarium intelligitur quod vitium sit contra naturam.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.ad.2] The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing being against nature, in so far as \"being against nature\" is contrary to \"being from nature\": and not in so far as \"being against nature\" is contrary to \"being in accord with nature,\" in which latter sense virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they incline us to that which is suitable to nature.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Philosophus ibi loquitur de his quæ sunt contra naturam, secundum quod esse contra naturam opponitur ei quod est esse a natura; non autem secundum quod esse contra naturam opponitur ei quod est esse secundum naturam; eo modo quo virtutes dicuntur esse secundum naturam, inquantum inclinant ad id quod naturæ convenit.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.ad.3] There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than who follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than achieve its completion. Now the presence of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of his reason.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in homine est duplex natura, scilicet rationalis et sensitiva. Et quia per operationem sensus homo pervenit ad actus rationis, ideo plures sequuntur inclinationes naturæ sensitivæ quam ordinem rationis. Plures enim sunt qui assequuntur principium rei, quam qui ad consummationem perveniunt. Ex hoc autem vitia et peccata in hominibus provenient, quod sequuntur inclinationem naturæ sensitivæ contra ordinem rationis.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.ad.4] Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is unnatural to the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared to the order of human reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that \"every nature, as such, is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the Divine art whereby it was made.\"
\n[I-II.q.71.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod quidquid est contra rationem artificiati, est etiam contra naturam artis, qua artificiatum producitur. Lex autem æterna comparatur ad ordinem rationis humanæ, sicut ars ad artificiatum. Unde ejusdem rationis est quod vitium et peccatum sit contra ordinem rationis humanæ, et quod sit contra legem æternam. Unde Augustinus dicit in III De lib. arb., cap. xv, col. 1291, t. 1, quod « a Deo habent omnes naturæ quod naturæ sunt; et intantum vitiosæ sunt, inquantum ab ejus, qua factæ sunt, arte discedunt. »
\n[I-II.q.71.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit, is worse than a sin, i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better it is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious habit is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith. Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod vitium, id est, habitus malus, sit pejus quam peccatum, id est, actus malus. Sicut enim bonum quod est diuturnius, est melius, ita malum quod est diuturnius, est pejus. Sed habitus vitiosus est diuturnior quam actus vitiosi, qui statim transeunt. Ergo habitus vitiosus est pejor quam actus vitiosus.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.3.arg.2] Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one. But a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, plura mala sunt magis fugienda quam unum malum. Sed habitus malus virtualiter est causa multorum malorum actuum. Ergo habitus vitiosus est pejor quam actus vitiosus.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.3.arg.3] Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a habit produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their badness. Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in goodness and in badness.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, causa est potior quam effectus. Sed habitus perficit actum tam in bonitate quam in malitia. Ergo habitus est potior actu et in bonitate et in malitia.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.3.sc] A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but not for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious action is worse than a vicious habit.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.3.sc] Sed contra, pro actu vitioso aliquis juste punitur; non autem pro habitu vitioso, si non procedat ad actum. Ergo actus vitiosus est pejor quam habitus vitiosus.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.3.co] A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as stated in Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be able to do well, and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do evil, than to be able to do evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in badness, habit stands midway between power and act, so that, to wit, even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding power in goodness or in badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act. This is also made clear from the fact that a habit is not called good or bad, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a habit is called good or bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its act: so that an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since \"the cause of a thing being such, is yet more so.\"
\n[I-II.q.71.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod habitus medio modo se habet inter potentiam et actum. Manifestum est autem quod actus in bono et malo præeminet potentiæ, ut dicitur in IX Metaph., text. 19; melius est enim bene agere, quam posse bene agere; et similiter vituperabilius est male agere, quam posse male agere. Unde etiam sequitur quod habitus in bonitate et in malitia medium gradum obtineat inter potentiam et actum, ut scilicet sicut habitus bonus vel malus præeminet in bonitate vel malitia potentiæ, ita etiam subdatur actui. Quod etiam ex hoc apparet, quod habitus non dicitur bonus vel malus, nisi ex hoc quod inclinat ad actum bonum vel malum. Unde propter bonitatem vel malitiam actus dicitur habitus bonus vel malus. Et sic potior est actus in bonitate vel malitia quam habitus, quia propter quod unum-quodque tale, et illud magis est.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.3.ad.1] Nothing hinders one thing from standing above another simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed above another simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both; while it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses it in something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from the very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness. Whereas the fact that habit is more lasting than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are both found in a nature such that it cannot always be in action, and whose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act simply excels in goodness and badness, but habit excels in a certain respect.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse simpliciter altero potius, quod tamen secundum quid ab eo deficit. Simpliciter enim potius judicatur quod præeminet quantum ad id quod per se consideratur in utroque; secundum quid autem, quod præeminet secundum id quod per accidens se habet ad utrumque. Ostensum est autem, ex ipsa ratione actus et habitus, quod actus est potior in bonitate et malitia quam habitus. Quod autem habitus sit diuturnior quam actus, accidit ex eo quod utrumque invenitur in tali natura, quae non potest semper agere, et cujus actio est in motu transeunte. Unde simpliciter actus est potior tam in bonitate quam in malitia; sed habitus est potior secundum quid.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.3.ad.2] A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a certain respect, i.e. virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that habit precedes act simply, both in goodness and in badness.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod habitus non est simpliciter plures actus, sed secundum quid, id est, virtute. Unde ex hoc non potest concludi quod habitus sit simpliciter potior in bonitate vel malitia quam actus.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.3.ad.3] Habit causes act by way of efficient causality: but act causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we consider the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod habitus est causa actus in genere causæ efficientis; sed actus est causa habitus in genere causæ finalis, secundum quam consideratur ratio boni et mali; et ideo in bonitate et malitia actus præeminet habitui.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. sin, is incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same subject. Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod actus vitiosus, sive peccatum, non possit simul esse cum virtute. Contraria enim non possunt esse simul in eodem. Sed peccatum quodammodo contrariatur virtuti, ut dictum est. Ergo peccatum non potest simul esse cum virtute.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.4.arg.2] Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither, therefore, can sin.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, peccatum est pejus quam vitium, id est, actus malus quam habitus tialibus hominis, sed secundum quamdam repugnantiam et dissonantiam ad rationem; et ideo homines assuefiunt ad vitia, quod esset impossibile, si vitia principiis essentialibus naturæ repugnant. Quoad vitia quæ specialiter dicuntur contra naturam, ut bestialitas et sodomia, sic discuntur quia sunt contra naturalem ordinem ad generationem præscriptum ab ipso auctore naturæ, suntque contra naturam hominis non solum ut homo est, sed etiam ut est animal. Actus vitiosus est simpliciter pejor vitio; sed vitium secundum quid pejus est actu vitioso. Pejus enim est actu peccare quam inclinari ad peccan-dum; sed vitium diutius durat quam actus vitiosus, pluriumque actuum vitiosorum causa est. malus. Sed vitium non potest simul esse in eodem cum virtute. Ergo nec peccatum.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.4.arg.3] Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in voluntary matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now sin never happens in natural things, except through some corruption of the natural power; thus monsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in the seed, as stated in Phys. ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary matters, except through the corruption of some virtue in the soul: so that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut peccatum accidit in rebus voluntariis, ita et in rebus naturalibus, ut dicitur in II Physic., text. 82. Sed nunquam in rebus naturalibus accidit peccatum nisi per aliquam corruptionem virtutis naturalis, sicut monstra accidunt corrupto aliquo principio in semine, ut dicitur in II Physic., ibid. Ergo etiam in rebus voluntariis non accidit peccatum nisi corrupta aliqua virtute animæ; et sic peccatum et virtus non possunt esse in eodem.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.4.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2,3) that \"virtue is engendered and corrupted by contrary causes.\" Now one virtuous act does not cause a virtue, as stated above (Question 51, Article 3): and, consequently, one sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they can be together in the same subject.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in II Ethic., cap. 11 et 13, in fine, quod « per contraria virtus generatur et corrumpitur.» Sed unus actus virtuosus non causat virtutem, ut supra habitum est. Ergo neque unus actus peccati tollit virtutem. Possunt ergo simul in eodem esse.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.4.co] Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit. Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of a form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore a natural form is incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompatible with the act of cooling, and lightness with downward movement (except perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover): whereas the habit that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, produce its operation, but is used by man when he wills. Consequently man, while possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a contrary act; and so a man having a virtue may produce an act of sin. And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, cannot corrupt virtue, if we compare the act to the virtue itself as a habit: since, just as habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it destroyed by one act as stated above (63, 2, ad 2). But if we compare the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for some virtues to be destroyed by one sinful act. For every mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues, as virtues; and consequently, charity being banished by one act of mortal sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled \"as virtues.\" And I say on account of faith and hope, whose habits remain unquickened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues. On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary to charity, nor banishes it, as a consequence, neither does it expel the other virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they are not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin.
\nAccordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but is consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin is compatible with virtues, whether infused or acquired.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod peccatum comparatur ad virtutem, sicut actus malus ad habitum bonum. Aliter autem se habet habitus in anima, et forma in re naturali. Forma enim naturalis ex necessitate producit operationem sibi convenientem; unde non potest esse simul cum forma naturali actus formæ contrariæ; sicut non potest esse cum calore actus infrigidationis, neque simul cum levitate motus descensionis, nisi forte ex violentia exterioris moventis. Sed habitus in anima non ex necessitate producit suam operationem, sed homo utitur eo cum voluerit; unde simul habitu in homine existente, potest non uti habitu, aut agere contrarium actum; et sic potest habens virtutem procedere ad actum peccati. Actus vero peccati si comparetur ad ipsam virtutem, prout est habitus quidam, non potest ipsam corrumpere, si sit unus tantum. Sicut enim non generatur habitus per unum actum, ita nec per unum actum corrumpitur, ut supra dictum est. Sed si comparetur actus peccati ad causam virtutum, sic possibile est quod per unum actum peccati aliquæ virtutes corrumpantur. Quodlibet enim peccatum mortale contrariatur charitati, quæ est radix omnium virtutum infusarum, inquantum sunt virtutes; et ideo per unum actum peccati mortalis exclusa charitate, excluduntur per consequens omnes virtutes infusæ, quantum ad hoc quod sunt virtutes. Et hoc dico propter fidem et spem, quarum habitus remanent informes post peccatum mortale; et sic non sunt virtutes. Sed peccatum veniale, quod non contrariatur charitati, nec excludit ipsam, per consequens etiam non excludit alias virtutes. Virtutes vero acquisitæ non tolluntur per unum actum cujuscumque peccati. Sic igitur peccatum mortale non potest simul esse cum virtutibus infusis; potest tamen simul esse cum virtutibus acquisitis; peccatum vero veniale potest simul esse et cum virtutibus infusis et cum acquisitis.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.4.ad.1] Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the act, but not with the habit, of virtue.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod peccatum non contrariatur virtuti secundum se, sed secundum suum actum. Et ideo peccatum non potest simul esse cum actu virtutis; potest tamen simul esse cum habitu.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.4.ad.2] Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin to virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts of virtue.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod vitium directe contrariatur virtuti, sicut et peccatum actui virtuoso; et ideo vitium excludit virtutem, sicut peccatum excludit actum virtutis.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.4.ad.3] The natural powers act of necessity, and hence so long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On the other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity; hence the comparison fails.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod virtutes naturales agunt ex necessitate; et ideo, integra existente virtute, nunquam peccatum potest in actu inveniri. Sed virtutes animæ non producunt actus ex necessitate; unde non est similis ratio.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice. Now there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can there be sin without action.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in quolibet peccato sit aliquis actus. Sicut enim meritum comparatur ad virtutem, ita peccatum ad vitium comparatur. Sed meritum non potest esse absque aliquo actu. Ergo nec peccatum potest esse absque aliquo actu.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.5.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.]: So \"true is it that every sin is voluntary, that, unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all.\" Now nothing can be voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every sin implies an act.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in lib. III De libero arbitrio, quod « omne peccatum adeo est voluntarium, quod si non sit voluntarium non est peccatum. » Sed non potest esse aliquod voluntarium nisi per actum voluntatis. Ergo omne peccatum habet aliquem actum.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.5.arg.3] Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who never does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and this is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si peccatum esset absque aliquo actu, sequeretur quod ex hoc ipso Ita codd.; — Expresquod aliquis cessat ab actu debito, peccaret. Sed continue aliquis cessat ab hoc 1 actu debito, ille scilicet qui nunquam actum debitum operatur. Ergo sequeretur quod continue peccaret, quod est falsum. Non ergo est aliquod peccatum absque actu.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.5.sc] It is written (James 4:17): \"To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin.\" Now \"not to do\" does not imply an act. Therefore sin can be without act.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Jac., iv, 17: Scienti bonum facere, et non facienti, pecatum est illi. Sed non facere non importat aliquem actum. Ergo peccatum potest esse absque actu.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.5.co] The reason for urging this question has reference to the sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. For some say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either interior or exterior--interior, as when a man wills \"not to go to church,\" when he is bound to go--exterior, as when a man, at the very hour that he is bound to go to church (or even before), occupies himself in such a way that he is hindered from going. This seems, in a way, to amount to the same as the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible with this other, wills, consequently, to go without this other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him, that what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that which he is bound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin of omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of not doing what one is bound to do is a sin.
\nNow each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of omission we look merely at that in which the essence of the sin consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act, as when a man wills \"not to go to church\": while sometimes it will be without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at the time that he is bound to go to church, does not think of going or not going to church.
\nIf, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission must of necessity include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit what we can do or not do: and that we turn aside so as not to do what we can do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, either united with the omission or preceding it. Now if this cause be not in man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone omits going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be subject to the will, the omission is sinful; and such cause, in so far as it is voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least the interior act of the will: which act sometimes bears directly on the omission, as when a man wills \"not to go to church,\" because it is too much trouble; and in this case this act, of its very nature, belongs to the omission, because the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin. Sometimes, however, the act of the will bears directly on something else which hinders man from doing what he ought, whether this something else be united with the omission, as when a man wills to play at the time he ought to go to church--or, precede the omission, as when a man wills to sit up late at night, the result being that he does not go to church in the morning. In this case the act, interior or exterior, is accidental to the omission, since the omission follows outside the intention, and that which is outside the intention is said to be accidental (Phys. ii, text. 49,50). Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission has indeed an act united with, or preceding the omission, but that this act is accidental to the sin of omission.
\nNow in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is proper to them, and not by that which is accidental: and consequently it is truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the circumstantial acts and occasions would be essential to other actual sins.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quæstio ista principaliter movetur propter peccatum omissionis, de quo aliqui diversimode opinantur. Quidam enim dicunt quod in omni peccato omissionis est aliquis actus vel interior vel exterior: interior quidem, sicut cum aliquis vult non ire ad ecclesiam, quando ire tenetur; exterior autem, sicut cum aliquis illa hora qua ad ecclesiam ire tenetur, vel etiam ante, occupat se talibus quibus ab eundo ad ecclesiam impeditur; et hoc quodammodo videtur in primum redire; qui enim vult aliquid cum quo aliud simul esse non potest, ex consequenti vult illo carere; nisi forte non perpendat quod per hoc quod vult facere impeditur ab eo quod facere tenetur; in quo casu posset per negligentiam culpabilis judicari. Alii vero dicunt quod in peccato omissionis non requiritur aliquis actus; ipsum enim non facere quod quis facere tenetur, peccatum est. Utraque autem opinio secundum aliquid veritatem habet. Si enim intelligatur in peccato omissionis illud solum quod per se pertinet ad rationem peccati, sic quando omissionis peccatum est cum actu interiori, ut cum aliquis vult non ire ad ecclesiam; quando vero absque omni actu vel interiori vel exteriori, sicut cum aliquis hora qua tenetur ire ad ecclesiam, nihil cogitat de eundo vel non eundo ad ecclesiam. Si vero in peccato omissionis intelligantur etiam causæ vel occasiones omittendi, sic necesse est in peccato omissionis aliquem actum esse. Non enim est peccatum omissioin edit. deest. S. Thomas dicit: « Si intelligatur in peccato omissionis illud solum quod per se pertinet ad rationem peccati, peccatum est quando absque omni actu, vel interiori, vel exteriori; » et infra: « Verius dici potest quod aliquod peccatum possit esse absque omni actu. » — Lege S. Ligorium, et invenies: « Notandum cum S. Thoma ad quodlibet peccatum omissionis requiri actum positivum voluntatis. » — Secundum Guillermum et S.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.5.ad.1] More things are required for good than for evil, since \"good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results from each single defect,\" as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or by his not doing what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly what he ought to do: wherefore there can be no merit without act, whereas there can be sin without act.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod plura requiruntur ad bonum quam ad malum, eo quod « bonum contingit ex tota integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus defectibus, » ut Dionysius dicit, cap. iv De div. nom., § 30, col. 730, t. 4. Et ideo peccatum potest contingere, sive aliquis faciat quod non debet, sive non faciendo quod debet; sed meritum non potest esse, nisi aliquis faciat voluntarie quod debet. Et ideo meritum non potest esse sine actu; sed peccatum potest esse sine actu.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.5.ad.2] The term \"voluntary\" is applied not only to that on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far as man has it in his power to will, and not to will.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur voluntarium, non solum quia cadit super ipsum actus voluntatis, sed quia in potestate nostra est ut fiat vel non fiat, ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. v. Unde etiam ipsum non velle potest dici voluntarium, inquantum in potestate hominis est velle et non velle.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.5.ad.3] The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to act, a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod peccatum omissionis contrariatur præcepto affirmativo quod obligat semper, sed non ad semper; et ideo solum pro tempore illo aliquis cessando ab actu peccat, pro quo præceptum affirmativum obligat.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying: \"Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law.\" Because \"Word,\" \"deed,\" and \"desire\" imply an act; whereas not every sin implies an act, as stated above (Article 5). Therefore this definition does not include every sin.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inconvenienter definiatur peccatum, cum dicitur: « Peccatum est dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum contra legem æternam. » Dictum enim, vel factum, vel concupitum importat aliquem actum. Sed non omne peccatum importat aliquem actum, ut dictum est. Ergo hæc definitio non includit omne peccatum.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): \"Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids.\" Now will is comprised under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite. Therefore it was enough to say: \"Sin is a desire contrary to the eternal law,\" nor was there need to add \"word\" or \"deed.\"
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in libro De duabus animabus, cap. xi, col. 105, t. 8: « Peccatum est voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod justitia vetat. » Sed voluntas sub concupiscentia comprehenditur, secun-dum quod concupiscentia largo modo sumitur pro omni appetitu. Ergo suffecisset dicere: « Peccatum est concupitum contra legem æternam; » nec oportuit addere dictum, vel factum.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.arg.3] Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard to the end as explained above (1, 3; k1 18, A4,6; 20, A2,3): wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference to the end, by saying that \"sin is nothing else than to neglect eternal things, and seek after temporal things\": and again he says (Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that \"all human wickedness consists in using what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should use.\" Now the definition is question contains no mention of aversion from our due end: therefore it is an insufficient definition of sin.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, peccatum proprie consistere videtur in aversione a fine; nam bonum et malum principaliter considerantur secundum finem, ut ex supra dictis patet; unde et Augustinus in lib. I De libero arbitr., cap. xvi, col. 1240, t. 1, per comparationem ad finem definit peccatum, dicens quod « peccare nihil est aliud quam neglectis æternis, temporalia sectari; » et lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., q. xxx, col. 19, t. 6, dicit quod « omnis humana perversitas est uti fruendis, et frui utendis. » Sed in præmissa definitione nulla fit mentio de aversione a debito fine. Ergo insufficienter definitur peccatum.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.arg.4] Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden, but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general should not be defined as being against the law of God.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.arg.4] 4. Præterea, ex hoc dicitur aliquid esse prohibitum, quia legi contrariatur. Sed non omnia peccata sunt mala, quia prohibita; sed quædam sunt prohibita, quia mala. Non ergo in communi definitione peccati debuit poni quod sit « contra legem Dei. »
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.arg.5] Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained above (Article 1). Now man's evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to say that sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.arg.5] 5. Præterea, peccatum significat malum hominis actum, ut ex dictis patet. Sed « malum hominis est contra rationem esse, » ut Dionysius dicit, iv cap. De div. nom., § 32, col. 734, t. 1. Ergo potius debuit dici quod peccatum sit contra rationem, quam quod peccatum sit contra legem æternam. In contrarium sufficit auctoritas Augustini, lib. XXII Contra Faust., cap. xxvii, col. 418, t. 8.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.sc] the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust. xxii, 27).
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.co] As was shown above (Article 1), sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary, as stated above (Question 1, Article 1), whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being commanded by the will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God's reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the definition of sin; one, pertaining to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says \"word,\" \"deed,\" or \"desire\"; the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, \"contrary to the eternal law.\"
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex dictis patet, peccatum nihil aliud est quam actus humanus malus. Quod autem aliquis actus sit humanus, habet ex hoc quod est voluntarius, sicut ex supra dictis patet; sive sit voluntarius, quasi a voluntate elicitus, ut ipsum velle vel eligere; sive quasi a voluntate imperatus, ut exteriores actus vel locutionis vel operationis. Habet autem actus humanus quod sit malus ex eo quod caret debita commensuratio cujuscumque rei attenditur per comparisonem ad aliquam regulam; a qua si divertat, incommensurata erit. Regula autem voluntatis humanæ est duplex: una propinqua et homogenea, scilicet ipsa humana ratio; alia vero est prima regula, scilicet lex æterna, quæ est quasi ratio Dei. sed a S. Thoma, illum exponendo, Scotista ille II. Et ideo Augustinus in definitione peccati posuit duo: unum quod pertinet ad substantiam actus humani, quod est quasi materiale in peccato, cum dixit, dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum; aliud autem quod pertinet ad rationem mali, quod est quasi formale in peccato, cum dixit, « contra legem aternam. »
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.ad.1] Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same genus: e.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the genus \"relation,\" as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6,7): and so \"word\" and \"deed\" denote equally what is said and what is not said, what is done and what is not done.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod affirmatio et negatio reducuntur ad idem genus, sicut in divinis genitum et ingenitum ad relationem, ut Augustinus dicit in V De Trinit., cap. vi et vii, col. 914, t. 8. Et ideo pro eodem est accipiendum dictum et non dictum, factum et non factum.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.ad.2] The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and hence it is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance of sin, through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in defining sin to include something referring to external action.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod prima causa peccati est in voluntate, quæ imperat omnes actus voluntarios, in quibus solis inventur peccatum. Et ideo Augustinus quando per solam voluntatem definit peccatum. Sed quia etiam ipsi exteriores actus pertinent ad substantiam peccati, cum sint secundum se mali, ut dictum est, necesse fuit quod in definitione peccati poneretur etiam aliquid pertinens ad exteriores actus.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.ad.3] The eternal law first and foremost directs man to his end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to things which are directed to the end: hence when he says, \"contrary to the eternal law,\" he includes aversion from the end and all other forms of inordinateness.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod lex aterna primo et principaliter ordinat hominem ad finem; consequenter autem facit hominem bene se habere circa ea quæ sunt ad finem; Multipliciter definitur peccatum: 1. Secundum causam efficientem: « Peccatum est voluntas consequendi vel retinendi quod justitia vetat. » Augustin., lib. De duabus naturis. 2. Secundum causam formalem: « Peccatum est praevaricatio legis divinæ et cælestium inobedientia mandatorum; » Ambrosius. Vel secundum Augustin.: « Peccatum est privatio speciei, modi et ordinis. » 3. Secundum causam finalem: « Peccatum est spreto incommutabili bono rebus mutabilibus ad hærere. » Augustin., seu: Peccatum est aversio a Deo et conversio ad creaturam. 4. Secundum causam materialem, ex Augustino, XII Contra Faustum: « Peccatum est dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum contra legem aternam. » Et de hac ultima definitione hic agitur. Si dicas illam non comprehendere nec veniale peccatum, quia praeter legem est, non contra legem in doctrina D. Thomæ, nec originale peccatum quod non est in parvulo dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum, nec peccata omissionis quæ sunt negationes et privationes: de peccato veniali respondemus illud esse praeter finem legis, non contra, quia charitatem quæ finis est legis non destruit, esse tamen contra legem prohibentem; — de peccato originali allegata concedimus; — de peccatis omissionis notamus ad idem genus reduci affirmationes et negationes, dictum et non dictum, factum et non fac-tum, concupitum et non concupitum. Alii definiunt peccatum: actio vel omissio voluntaria contra legem divinam. Hic moveri potest quæstio subtilis de formali constitutivo peccati, utrum sit in positivo, vel in privativo. Clarum est esse in privativo formale constitutivum peccati omissionis; et hæc est communis sententia theologorum. Sed de peccato commissionis maxime controvertitur: pro privativo, citantur ex Thomistis, Sylvius, Ferre, Carasco, Contenson, Bancel, etc.; pro positivo, Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Cajetanus, Joannes a Sancto Thoma, Salmanticenses, Serra, Massolieus, Gonet, etc. — Circa eamdem quæstionem scinduntur pariter aliæ scholæ.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.ad.4] When it is said that not every sin is evil through being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by positive law. If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily in the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural law, precisely because it is inordinate.
\n[I-II.q.71.a.6.ad.5] The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason. Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being \"contrary to the eternal law,\" more fittingly than with reference to its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. in matters of faith.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
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