[I-II.q.79.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the Apostle says of certain ones (Romans 1:28): \"God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not right [Douay: 'convenient'],\" and a gloss comments on this by saying that \"God works in men's hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good or to evil.\" Now sin consists in doing what is not right, and in having a will inclined to evil. Therefore God is to man a cause of sin.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Deus sit causa peccati. Dicit enim Apostolus, Rom., 1, 28, de quibusdam: Tradidit eos* Deus in reprobum sensum, ut faciant ea quæ non conveniunt; et Glossa, ibid., dicit quod « Deus operatur in cordibus hominum, inclinando voluntates eorum in quodcumque voluerit, sive in bonum, sive in malum. » Sed facere quæ non conveniunt, et inclinari secundum voluntatem ad malum, est peccatum. Ergo Deus hominibus est causa peccati.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.arg.2] Further, it is written (Wisdom 14:11): \"The creatures of God are turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men.\" But a temptation usually denotes a provocation to sin. Since therefore creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the I, 44, 1, it seems that God is a cause of sin, by provoking man to sin.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Sap., xiv, 11, dicitur: Creaturæ Dei in odium factæ sunt, et in tentationem animabus hominum. Sed tentatio solet dici provocatio ad peccandum. Cum ergo creaturæ non sint factæ nisi a Deo, ut in I habitum est, videtur quod Deus sit causa peccati provocans hominem ad peccandum.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.arg.3] Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect. Now God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the cause of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quidquid est causa causæ est causa effectus. Sed Deus est causa liberi arbitrii, quod est causa peccati. Ergo Deus est causa peccati.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.arg.4] Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not contrary to God's goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment; since of this evil it is written (Isaiah 45:7) that God creates evil, and (Amos 3:6): \"Shall there be evil in the city which God [Vulgate: 'the Lord'] hath not done?\" Therefore it is not incompatible with God's goodness that He should cause the evil of fault.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, omne malum opponitur bono. Sed non repugnat divinæ bonitati quod ipse sit causa mali pœnæ; de isto enim malo dicitur Isa., xLV, 7, quod Deus est creans malum; et Amos., III, 6: Si est malum in civitate, quod Deus* non fecerit. Ergo *Sierit... etiam divinæ bonitati non repugnat quod Deus sit causa culpæ.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.sc] It is written (Wisdom 11:25): \"Thou . . . hatest none of the things which Thou hast made.\" Now God hates sin, according to Wisdom 14:9: \"To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful.\" Therefore God is not a cause of sin.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.sc] Sed contra, Sap., xi, 25, dicitur: Nihil odisti eorum quæ fecisti. Odit autem Deus peccatum, secundum illud Sap., xiv, 9: Odio est* Deo impius et impietas ejus. Ergo Deus non est causa peccati.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.co] Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of another's sin. First, directly, namely by inclining his or another's will to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely by not preventing someone from sinning. Hence (Ezekiel 3:18) it is said to the watchman: \"If thou say not to the wicked: 'Thou shalt surely die' [Vulgate: \"If, when I say to the wicked, 'Thou shalt surely die,' thou declare it not to him.\"] . . . I will require his blood at thy hand.\" Now God cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every sin is a departure from the order which is to God as the end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their last end, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i): so that it is impossible that He should be either to Himself or to another the cause of departing from the order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the cause of sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He to give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom and Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is not said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer while able and bound to steer. It is therefore evident that God is nowise a cause of sin.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod homo dupli-citer est causa peccati vel sui vel alterius: uno modo directe, inclinando scilicet voluntatem suam vel alterius ad peccandum; alio modo indirecte, dum scilicet non retrahit aliquos a peccato. Unde Ezech., 111, 48, speculatori dicitur: Si non dixeris impio: Morte morieris..., sanguinem ejus de manu tua requiram*. Deus autem non potest esse directe causa peccati vel sui vel alterius; quia omne peccatum est per recessum ab ordine, qui est in ipsum$^1$ sicut in finem. Deus autem omnia inclinat et convertit in seipsum sicut in ultimum finem, sicut Dionysius dicit, cap. 1 De div. nom., § 7, col. 596, t. 4; unde imposibile est quod sit sibi vel aliis causa discedendi ab ordine, qui est in ipsum. Unde non potest directe esse causa peccati. Similiter etiam neque indirecte. Contingit enim quod Deus aliquibus non præbet auxilium ad evitandum peccata; quod si præberet, non peccarent. Sed hoc totum facit secundum ordinem suæ sapientiæ et justitiæ, cum ipse sit sapientia et justitia: unde non imputatur ei quod alius peccet, sicut causæ peccati; sicut gubernator non dicitur causa submersionis navis ex hoc quod non gubernat navem, nisi quando subtrahit gubernationem potens et debens gubernare. Et sic patet quod Deus nullo modo est causa peccati.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.ad.1] As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is clear from the text. For if God delivered some up to a reprobate sense, it follows that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was not right. Accordingly He is said to deliver them up to a reprobate sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from following that reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose a person to danger if we do not protect him. The saying of Augustine (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xxi, whence the gloss quoted is taken) to the effect that \"God inclines men's wills to good and evil,\" is to be understood as meaning that He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so far as He does not hinder it, as stated above. And yet even this is due as being deserved through a previous sin.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quantum ad verba Apostoli, ex ipso textu patet solutio. Si enim Deus tradit aliquos in reprobum sensum, jam ergo reprobum sensum habent ad faciendum ea quæ non conveniunt. Dicitur ergo tradere eos in reprobum sensum, in quantum non prohibet eos quin suum sensum reprobum sequantur, sicut dicimur exponere illos quos non tuemur. Quod autem Augustinus dicit in lib. De grat. et lib. arb., c. xx1, § 43, col. 909, t. 10, unde sumpta est Glossa, quod « Deus inclinat voluntates hominum in bonum et malum, » sic intelligendum est, quod in bonum qui dem directe inclinat voluntatem; in malum autem, inquantum non prohibet, sicut dictum est. Et tamen hoc etiam contingit ex merito præcedentis peccati.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.ad.2] When it is said the \"creatures of God are turned 'to' an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men,\" the preposition \"to\" does not denote causality but sequel [This is made clear by the Douay Version: the Latin \"factae sunt in abominationem\" admits of the translation \"were made to be an abomination,\" which might imply causality.]; for God did not make the creatures that they might be an evil to man; this was the result of man's folly, wherefore the text goes on to say, \"and a snare to the feet of the unwise,\" who, to wit, in their folly, use creatures for a purpose other than that for which they were made.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, cum dicitur: Creaturæ Dei factæ sunt in odium et in tentationem animabus hominum, hæc præpositio « in » non ponitur causaliter, sed consecutive; non enim Deus fecit creaturas ad malum hominum, sed hoc consecutum est propter insipientiam hominum; unde subditur: Et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium, qui scilicet per suam insipientiam utuntur creaturis ad aliud quam ad quod factæ sunt.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.ad.3] The effect which proceeds from the middle cause, according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that first cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced to that first cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his master's orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though he were the cause thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will commits against the commandment of God, is not attributed to God as being its cause.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod effectus causæ mediæ procedens ab ea, secundum quod subditur ordini causæ primæ, reducitur etiam in causam primam; sed si procedat a causa media, secundum quod exit ordinem causæ primæ, non reducitur in Dominum, ut$^2$ in causam primam; sicut si minister faciat aliquid contra mandatum domini, hoc non reducitur in dominum sicut in causam. Et similiter peccatum, quod liberum arbitrium committit contra præceptum Dei, non reducitur in Deum sicut in causam.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.ad.4] Punishment is opposed to the good of the person punished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is opposed to the good of subordination to God; and so it is directly opposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison between fault and punishment.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod pœna oppositur bono ejus qui punitur, qui privatur quocumque bono; sed culpa oppositur bono ordinis, qui est in Deum, unde directe oppositur bonitati divinæ; et propter hoc non est similis ratio de culpa et pœna.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that \"the act of sin is not a thing.\" Now whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin is not from God.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod actus peccati non sit a Deo. Dicit enim Augustinus in lib. De perfect. justitia, cap. 11, col. 294, t. 10, quod « actus peccati non est res aliqua. » Omne autem quod est a Deo, est res aliqua. Ergo actus peccati non est a Deo.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.2.arg.2] Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except because he is the cause of the sinful act: for \"no one works, intending evil,\" as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is not a cause of sin, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, homo non dicitur esse causa peccati, nisi quia homo est causa actus peccati; « nullus » enim « intendens ad malum operatur, » ut Dionysius dicit, iv cap. De div. nom., § 31, col. 731, t. 1. Sed Deus non est causa peccati, ut dictum est. Ergo Deus non est causa actus peccati.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.2.arg.3] Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their species, as was shown above (18, A2,8). Now whatever is the cause of a thing, causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If therefore God caused the act of sin, He would be the cause of sin, which is false, as was proved above (Article 1). Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, aliqui actus secundum suam speciem sunt mali et peccata, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed quidquid est causa alicujus, est causa ejus quod convenit ei secundum suam speciem. Si ergo Deus esset causa actus peccati, sequeretur quod esset causa peccati. Sed hoc non est verum, ut ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est causa actus peccati.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.2.sc] The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now \"the will of God is the cause of every movement,\" as Augustine declares (De Trin. iii, 4,9). Therefore God's will is the cause of the act of sin.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.2.sc] Sed contra, actus peccati est quidam motus liberi arbitrii. Sed « voluntas Dei est causa omnium motionum, » ut Augustinus dicit in III De Trinit., c. iv et ix, col. 873, t. 8. Ergo voluntas Dei est causa actus peccati.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.2.co] The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the First Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God is the cause of every action, in so far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect is from the created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod actus peccati et est ens et est actus; et ex utroque habet quod sit a Dec. Omne enim ens, quocumque modo sit, oportet quod derivetur a primo Ente, ut patet per Dionysium, v cap. De div. nom., § 4, col. 818, t. 1. Omnis autem actio causatur ab aliquo existente in actu; quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu. Omne autem ens actu reducitur in primum actum, scilicet Deum, sicut in causam, qui est per suam essentiam actus. Unde relinquitur quod Deus sit causa omnis actionis, inquantum est actio. Sed peccatum nominat ens et actionem cum quodam defectu. Defectus autem ille est ex causa creata, scilicet libero arbitrio, inquantum deficit ab ordine primi agentis, scilicet Dei. Unde defectus iste non reducitur in Deum sicut in causam, sed in liberum arbitrium; sicut defectus claudicationis reducitur in tibiam curvam sicut in causam, non autem in virtutem motivam, a qua tamen causatur quidquid est motionis in claudicatione. Et secundum hoc Deus est causa actus peccati; non tamen est causa peccati, quia non est causa hujus quod actus sit cum defectu.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.2.ad.1] In this passage Augustine calls by the name of \"thing,\" that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this sense the act of sin is not a thing.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus nominat ibi rem id quod est res simpliciter, scilicet substantiam; sic enim actus peccati non est res.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.2.ad.2] Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced to man as its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to Whom he ought to be, although he does not intend this principally. Wherefore man is the cause of the sin: while God is the cause of the act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause of the sin.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in hominem sicut in causam reducitur non solum actus, sed etiam ipse defectus; quia scilicet non subditur ei cui debet subdi, licet hoc ipse non intendat principaliter, et ideo homo est causa peccati; sed Deus sic est causa actus, quod nullo modo est causa defectus concomitantis actum; et ideo non est causa peccati.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.2.ad.3] As stated above (Question 72, Article 1), acts and habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein consists the nature of evil, but from some object, to which that privation is united: and so this defect which consists in not being from God, belongs to the species of the act consequently, and not as a specific difference.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est supra, actus et habitus non recipiunt speciem ex ipsa privatione, in qua consistit ratio mali, sed ex aliquo objecto, cui conjungitur talis privatio. Et sic ipse defectus, qui dicitur non esse a Deo, pertinet ad speciem actus consequenter, et non quasi differentia specifica.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 3) that God is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man is made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Deus non sit causa excæcationis et indurationis. Dicit enim Augustinus in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., quæst. 11, col. 14, t. 6, quod Deus non est causa ejus quo homo fit deteriori. Sed per excæcationem et obdurationem homo fit deterior. Ergo Deus non est causa excæcationis et obdurationis.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.3.arg.2] Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. Praedest. i, 19): \"God does not punish what He causes.\" Now God punishes the hardened heart, according to Sirach 3:27: \"A hard heart shall fear evil at the last.\" Therefore God is not the cause of hardness of heart.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Fulgentius dicit lib. I De dupl. prædest. ad Monimum, cap. xix, col. 167, quod « Deus non est ultor illius rei cujus est auctor. » Sed Deus est ultor cordis obdurati, secundum illud Eccli., 11, 27: Cor durum male habebit in die novissimo*. Ergo Deus non est causa obdurationis.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.3.arg.3] Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice of man, according to Wisdom 2:21: \"For their own malice blinded them,\" and again, according to 2 Corinthians 4:4: \"The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers\": which causes seem to be opposed to God. Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, idem effectus non attribuitur causis contrariis. Sed causa excæcationis Edit. Rom. et Patav.: « quod homo sit deterior. » dicitur esse malitia hominis, secundum illud Sapientiæ, ii, 21: Excæcavit enim eos* malitia eorum; et etiam diabolus, secundum illud II ad Cor., iv, 4: Deus hujus sæculi excæcavit mentes infidelium; quæ quidem causæ videntur esse contrariæ Deo. Ergo Deus non est causa excæcationis et obdurationis.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.3.sc] It is written (Isaiah 6:10): \"Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy,\" and Romans 9:18: \"He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth.\"
\n[I-II.q.79.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Isa., vi, 10: Excæca cor populi hujus, et aures ejus aggrava; et Rom., ix, 18, dicitur: Cujus vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.3.co] Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, and turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, just as He is not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the result of which is that the mind is not enlightened by God to see aright, and man's heart is not softened to live aright; and as regards this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
\nNow we must consider that God is the universal cause of the enlightening of souls, according to John 1:9: \"That was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world,\" even as the sun is the universal cause of the enlightening of bodies, though not in the same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature, whereas God works freely, through the order of His wisdom. Now although the sun, so far as it is concerned, enlightens all bodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as happens to a house whose window-shutters are closed, although the sun is in no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it does not act of its own accord in failing to light up the interior of the house; and the cause of this is the person who closed the shutters. On the other hand, God, of His own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being withheld is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace. In this way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness of ear, and hardness of heart.
\nThese differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, which both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, and softens the affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses excel in rendering service to the intellect, viz. sight and hearing, of which the former assists \"discovery,\" and the latter, \"teaching,\" hence it is that spiritual \"blindness\" corresponds to sight, \"heaviness of the ears\" to hearing, and \"hardness of heart\" to the affections.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod excæcatio et obduratio duo important. Quorum unum est motus animi humani inhærentis malo, et aversi a divino lumine; et quantum ad hoc Deus non est causa excæcationis et obdurationis, sicut non est causa peccati. Aliud autem est subtractio gratiae, ex qua sequitur quod mens divinitus non illumine-tur ad recte videndum, et cor hominis non emolliatur ad recte vivendum; et quantum ad hoc Deus est causa excæcationis et obdurationis. Est autem considerandum quod Deus est causa universalis illuminationis animarum, secundum illud Joan., i, 9: Erat lux vera, quæ illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum; sicut sol est universalis causa illuminationis corporum: aliter tamen et aliter; nam sol agit illuminando per necessitatem naturæ, Deus autem agit voluntarie per ordinem suæ sapientiae. Sol autem, licet quantum est de se, omnia corpora illuminet, si quod tamen impedimentum inveniat in aliquo corpore, relinquit illud tenebrosum; sicut patet de domo cujus fenestræ sunt clausæ; sed tamen illius obs-curationis nullo modo causa est sol; non enim suo judicio agit ut lumen interius non immittat; sed causa ejus est solum ille qui claudit fenestram. Deus autem proprio judicio lumen gratiae non immittit illis in quibus obstaculum invenit. Unde causa subtractionis gratiae est non solum ille qui ponit obstaculum gratiae, sed etiam Deus, qui suo judicio gratiam non apponit. Et per hunc modum Deus est causa excæcationis, et aggravationis aurium, et obdurationis cordis; quæ quidem distinguuntur secundum effectus gratiae, quæ et perficit intellectum dono sapientiae, et affectum emollit igne charitatis. Et quia ad cognitionem intellectus maxime deserviunt duo sensus, scilicet visus et auditus, quorum unus deservit inventioni, scilicet visus, alius disciplinæ, scilicet auditus; ideo quantum ad visum ponitur excæcatio; quantum ad auditum, aurium aggravatio; quantum ad affectum, obduration.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.3.ad.1] Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the withholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this respect, they make man no worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he incurs them, even as other punishments.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum excæcatio et induratio ex parte subtractionis gratiae sint quædam pœnæ, ex hac parte eis homo non fit deterior; sed deterior factus per culpam hæc incurrit, sicut et cæteras pœnas.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.3.ad.2] This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it is a sin.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod objectio illa procedit de obduratione secundum quod est culpa.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.3.ad.3] Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as sin is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil is said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin.
\n[I-II.q.79.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod malitia est causa excæcationis meritoria, sicut culpa est causa pœnæ; et hoc etiam modo diabolus excæcare dicitur, inquantum inducit ad culpam.
\n