[I-II.q.81.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written (Ezekiel 18:20): \"The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father.\" But he would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore no one contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod primum peccatum primi parentis non traducatur ad alios per originem. Dicitur enim Ezech., xviii, 20: Filius non portabit iniquitatem patris. Portaret autem, si ab eo iniquitatem traheret. Ergo nullus trahit ab aliquo parentum per originem aliquod peccatum.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.arg.2] Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin, unless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not pass from one subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the subject of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin, as was shown in the I, 118, 2. Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, accidens non traducitur per originem, nisi traducto subjecto; eo quod accidens non transit de subjecto in subjectum. Sed anima rationalis, quæ est subjectum culpæ, non traducitur per originem, ut in I ostensum est. Ergo neque aliqua culpa per originem traduci potest.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.arg.3] Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin, is caused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin, because it lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne illud quod traducitur per originem humanam, causatur ex semine. Sed semen non potest causare peccatum, eo quod caret rationali parte animæ, quæ sola potest esse causa peccati. Ergo nullum peccatum potest trahi per originem.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.arg.4] Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more powerful in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united to it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long as it is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can the semen infect the soul.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, quod est perfectius in natura, virtuosius est ad agendum. Sed caro perfecta non potest inficere animam sibi unitam; alioquin anima non posset emundari a culpa originali, dum est carni unita. Ergo multo minus semen potest inficere animam.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.arg.5] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): \"No one finds fault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who are so through want of exercise and through carelessness.\" Now those are said to be \"naturally ugly,\" who are so from their origin. Therefore nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.arg.5] 5. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., cap. v, a med., quod « propter naturam turpes nullus increpat, sed eos qui propter desidiam et negligentiam. » Dicuntur autem « natura turpes, » qui habent turpitudinem ex sua origine. Ergo nihil quod est per originem est increpabile, neque peccatum.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.sc] The Apostle says (Romans 5:12): \"By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.\" Nor can this be understood as denoting imitation or suggestion, since it is written (Wisdom 2:24): \"By the envy of the devil, death came into this world.\" It follows therefore that through origin from the first man sin entered into the world.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit Rom., v, 12: Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit; quod non potest intelligi per modum imitationis, propter hoc quod dicitur Sap., ii, 24: Invidia diaboli mors intravit* in orbem terrarum. Restat ergo quod per originem a primo homine peccatum in mundum intravit.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.co] According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants, by way of origin. For this reason children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, to show that they have to be washed from some uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear from Augustine in many of his books [For instance, Retract. i, 9; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. ix; Contra Julian. iii, 1; De Dono Persev. xi, xii.]
\nIn endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be transmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various writers have gone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject of sin is the rational soul, maintained that the rational soul is transmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to produce other infected souls. Others, rejecting this as erroneous, endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent's soul can be transmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted, from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted from parent to child--thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the father of a gouty son, on account of some seminal corruption, although this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body is proportionate to the soul, and since the soul's defects redound into the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable defect of the soul is passed on to the child, through the transmission of the semen, albeit the semen itself is not the subject of the guilt.
\nBut all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from parent to child, and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in consequence, on account of a defect in the bodily habit, as in the case of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a defect by the way of origin seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the rational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child's soul is not in its will, it would cease to be a guilty stain binding its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5), \"no one reproaches a man born blind; one rather takes pity on him.\"
\nTherefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch as they have one common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil matters, all who are members of one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that \"by sharing the same species, many men are one man.\" Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which the hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging to man and moved by man's first moving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate from him, even as the soul's will moves all the members to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first parent to his descendants is called \"original,\" just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called \"actual.\" And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of that member, except inasmuch as that member is a part of the man, for which reason it is called a \"human sin\"; so original sin is not the sin of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is called the \"sin of nature,\" according to Ephesians 2:3: \"We . . . were by nature children of wrath.\"
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum fidem catholicam est tenendum, quod primum peccatum primi hominis originaliter transit in posteros. Propter quod etiam pueri mox nati deferuntur ad baptismum, tanquam ab aliqua infectione culpæ abluendi. Contra-rium autem est hæresis pelagianæ, ut patet per Augustinum in plurimis suis libris, ut lib. I Retract., cap. ix, t. 4, et lib. De peccat. merit. et remiss., cap. ix, et lib. I Cont. Jul., cap. iii, et lib. III, cap. i, t. 0, et lib. De dono persever., cap. xi et xii, t. 10. Ad investigandum autem qualiter peccatum primi parentis originaliter possit transire in posteros, diversi diversis viis processerunt. Quidam enim considerantes quod peccati subjectum est anima rationalis, posuerunt quod cum semine rationalis anima traducatur, ut sic ex infecta anima infectæ animæ derivari videantur. Alii vero hoc repudiantes tanquam erroneum, conati sunt ostendere quomodo culpa animæ parentis traducitur in prolem, etiamsi anima non traducatur, per hoc quod corporis defectus traducuntur a parente in prolem sicut leprosus generat leprosum, et podagricus podagricum, propter aliquam corruptionem seminis, licet talis corruptio non dicatur lepra vel podagra. Cum autem corpus sit proportionatum animæ, et defectus animæ redundent in corpus, et e converso, simili modo dicunt quod culpabilis defectus animæ per traductionem seminis in prolem derivatur, quamvis semen actualiter non sit culpæ subjectum. Sed omnes hujusmodi viæ insufficientes sunt: quia dato quod aliqui defectus corporales a parente transeant in prolem per originem, et etiam aliqui defectus animæ ex consequenti propter corporis indispositionem, sicut interdum ex fatuis fatui generantur; tamen hoc ipsum quod est ex origine aliquem defectum habere videtur excludere rationem culpæ, de cujus ratione est quod sit voluntaria. Unde etiam posito quod anima rationalis traduceretur, ex hoc ipso quod infectio animæ prolis non esset in ejus voluntate, amitteret rationem culpæ obligantis ad pœnam: quia, ut Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., cap. v, a med., nullus improperabit cæco nato, sed magis miserebitur. Et ideo alia via procedendum est, dicendo quod omnes homines qui nascuntur ex Adam possunt considerari ut unus homo, in quantum conveniunt in natura, quam a primo parente accipiunt; secundum quod in civilibus omnes homines qui sunt unius communitatis, reputantur quasi unum corpus, et tota communitas quasi unus homo; sicut etiam Porphyrius dicit, cap. « De specie, » circa med., quod « participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo. » Sic igitur multi homines ex Adam derivati sunt tanquam multa membra unius corporis. Actus autem unius membri corporalis, puta manus, non est voluntarius voluntate ipsius manus, sed voluntate animæ, quæ primo movet membra. Unde homicidium quod manus committit, non imputaretur manui ad peccatum, si consideraretur manus secundum se, ut divisa a corpore; sed imputatur ei inquantum est aliquid hominis, quod movetur a primo principio motivo hominis. Sic igitur inordinatio quæ est inisto homine ex Adam generato, non est voluntaria voluntate ipsius, sed voluntate primi parentis, qui movet motione generationis omnes qui ex ejus origine derivantur, sicut voluntas animæ movet omnia membra corporis ad actum. Unde peccatum quod sic a primo parente in posteros derivatur, dicitur Codd. non habent, ut edit.: « vel incitationis.» originale, sicut peccatum quod ab anima derivatur ad membra corporis, dicitur actuale; et sicut peccatum actuale quod per membrum aliquod committitur, non est peccatum illius membri, nisi inquantum illud membrum est aliquid ipsius hominis propter quod vocatur peccatum humanum, ita peccatum originale non est peccatum hujus personæ, nisi inquantum hæc persona recipit naturam a primo parente, unde et vocatur peccatum naturæ, secundum illud Ephes., ii, 3: Eramus natura filii iræ..
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.ad.1] The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father, because he is not punished for his father's sin, unless he share in his guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even as actual sin is transmitted through being imitated.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod filius dicitur non portare peccatum patris, quia non punitur pro peccato patris, nisi sit particeps culpæ. Et sic est in proposito: derivatur enim per originem culpa a patre in filium, sicut et peccatum actuale per imitationem.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.ad.2] Although the soul is not transmitted, because the power in the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless the motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul: so that the semen by its own power transmits the human nature from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which infects it: for he that is born is associated with his first parent in his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his nature from him by a kind of movement which is that of generation.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod etsi anima non traducatur, quia virtus seminis non potest causare animam rationalem, movet tamen ad ipsam dispositive; unde per virtutem seminis traducitur humana natura a parente in prolem, et simul cum natura naturæ infectio. Ex hoc enim fit iste qui nascitur, consors culpæ primi parentis, quod naturam ab eo sortitur per quamdam generativam motionem.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.ad.3] Although the guilt is not actually in the semen, yet human nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etsi culpa non sit actu in semine, est tamen ibi virtute humana natura, quam concomitatur talis culpa.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.ad.4] The semen is the principle of generation, which is an act proper to nature, by helping it to propagate itself. Hence the soul is more infected by the semen, than by the flesh which is already perfect, and already affixed to a certain person.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod semen est principium generationis, quæ est proprius actus naturæ, ejus propagationi deserviens; et ideo magis inficitur anima per semen quam per carnem jam perfectam quæ jam determinata est ad personam.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.ad.5] A man is not blamed for that which he has from his origin, if we consider the man born, in himself. But it we consider him as referred to a principle, then he may be reproached for it: thus a man may from his birth be under a family disgrace, on account of a crime committed by one of his forbears.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.1.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod illud quod est per originem, non est increpabile, si consideretur iste qui nascitur secundum se; sed si consideretur prout refertur ad aliquod principium, sic potest esse ei increpabile; sicut aliquis qui nascitur, patitur ignominiam generis ex culpa alicujus progenito-rum causatam.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that also other sins, whether of the first parent or of nearer ancestors, are transmitted to their descendants. For punishment is never due unless for fault. Now some are punished by the judgment of God for the sin of their immediate parents, according to Exodus 20:5: \"I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation.\" Furthermore, according to human law, the children of those who are guilty of high treason are disinherited. Therefore the guilt of nearer ancestors is also transmitted to their descendants.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod etiam alia peccata vel ipsius primi parentis, vel proximorum parentum traducantur in posteros. Pœena enim nunquam debetur nisi culpæ. Sed aliqui puniuntur judicio divino pro peccato proximorum parentum, secundum illud Exod., xx, 5: Ego sum Deus zelotes, visitans iniquitatem patrum in filios in tertiam et quartam generationem. Judicio etiam humano in crimine læsæ majestatis filii exheredantur pro peccato parentum. Ergo etiam culpa proximorum parentum transit ad posteros.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.2.arg.2] Further, a man can better transmit to another, that which he has of himself, than that which he has received from another: thus fire heats better than hot water does. Now a man transmits to his children, by the way, of origin, the sin which he has from Adam. Much more therefore should he transmit the sin which he has contracted of himself.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, magis potest transferre in alterum id quod habet aliquis a seipso, quam id quod habet ex alio; sicut ignis magis potest calefacere quam aqua calefacta. Sed homo transfert in prolem per originem peccatum quod habet ab Adam. Ergo multo magis peccatum quod ipse commisit.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.2.arg.3] Further, the reason why we contract original sin from our first parent is because we were in him as in the principle of our nature, which he corrupted. But we were likewise in our nearer ancestors, as in principles of our nature, which however it be corrupt, can be corrupted yet more by sin, according to Apocalypse 22:11: \"He that is filthy, let him be filthier still.\" Therefore children contract, by the way of origin, the sins of their nearer ancestors, even as they contract the sin of their first parent.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ideo contrahimus a primo parente peccatum originale, quia in eo fui-mus sicut in principio naturæ, quam ipse corrupit. Sed similiter fuimus in proximis parentibus sicut in quibusdam naturæ principiis, quæ, etsi sit corrupta, potest adhuc magis corrumpi per peccatum, secundum illud Apoc., ult., 11: Qui in sordibus est, sordescat adhuc. Ergo filii contrahunt peccata proximorum parentum per originem, sicut et primi parentis.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.2.sc] Good is more self-diffusive than evil. But the merits of the nearer ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants. Much less therefore are their sins.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.2.sc] Sed contra, bonum est magis diffusivum sui quam malum. Sed merita proximorum parentum non traducuntur ad posteros. Ergo multo minus peccata.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.2.co] Augustine puts this question in the Enchiridion xlvi, xlvii, and leaves it unsolved. Yet if we look into the matter carefully we shall see that it is impossible for the sins of the nearer ancestors, or even any other but the first sin of our first parent to be transmitted by way of origin. The reason is that a man begets his like in species but not in individual. Consequently those things that pertain directly to the individual, such as personal actions and matters affecting them, are not transmitted by parents to their children: for a grammarian does not transmit to his son the knowledge of grammar that he has acquired by his own studies. On the other hand, those things that concern the nature of the species, are transmitted by parents to their children, unless there be a defect of nature: thus a man with eyes begets a son having eyes, unless nature fails. And if nature be strong, even certain accidents of the individual pertaining to natural disposition, are transmitted to the children, e.g. fleetness of body, acuteness of intellect, and so forth; but nowise those that are purely personal, as stated above.
\nNow just as something may belong to the person as such, and also something through the gift of grace, so may something belong to the nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature, and something too through the gift of grace. In this way original justice, as stated in the I, 100, 1, was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as that original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Augustinus naturæ temporalium necessitatem contraxisse Pelagiani concesserunt. Priorem Pelagii errorem innovarunt Armeni, Albigenses, Albanenses et Anabaptistæ. Volebant ideo Anabaptistæ pueros non esse baptizandos. Posteriorem Pelagii sententiam Zwinglius, Faber et Erasmus admiserunt. quæstionem movet in Enchir., cap. xlvii et xlvii, col. 254, t. 6, et insolutam relinquit. Sed si aliquis diligenter attendat, impossibile est quod aliqua peccata proximorum parentum, vel etiam primi parentis, præter primum, per originem traducantur. Cujus ratio est, quia homo generat sibi idem in specie, non autem secundum individuum; et ideo ea quæ directe pertinent ad individuum, sicut personales actus, et quæ ad eos pertinent, non traducuntur a parentibus in filios: non enim grammaticus traducit in filium scientiam grammaticæ, quam proprio studio acquisivit; sed ea quæ pertinent ad naturam speciei, traducuntur a parentibus in filios, nisi sit defectus naturæ, sicut oculatus generat oculatum, nisi natura deficiat; et si natura sit fortis, etiam aliqua accidentia individualia propagantur in filios, pertinentia ad dispositionem naturæ, sicut velocitas corporis, bonitas ingenii, et alia hujusmodi; nullo autem modo ea quæ sunt pure personalia, ut dictum est. Sicut autem ad personam pertinet aliquid secundum seipsam, et aliquid ex dono gratia, ita etiam ad naturam potest aliquid pertinere secundum seipsam, scilicet quod causatur ex principiis ejus, et aliquid ex dono gratia. Et hoc modo justitia originalis, sicut in I dictum est, erat quoddam donum gratia toti humanæ naturæ divinitus collatum in primo parente, quod quidem primus homo amisit per primum peccatum. Unde sicut illa originalis justitia traducta fuisset in posteros simul cum natura, ita etiam inordinatio opposita. Sed alia peccata actualia vel primi parentis vel aliorum non corrumpunt naturam quantum ad id quod naturæ est, sed solum quantum ad id quod personæ est, id est, secundum pronitatem ad actum. Unde alia peccata non traducuntur.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.2.ad.1] According to Augustine in his letter to Avitus [Ep. ad Auxilium ccl.], children are never inflicted with spiritual punishment on account of their parents, unless they share in their guilt, either in their origin, or by imitation, because every soul is God's immediate property, as stated in Ezekiel 18:4. Sometimes, however, by Divine or human judgment, children receive bodily punishment on their parents' account, inasmuch as the child, as to its body, is part of its father.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod pœna spirituali, sicut Augustinus dicit in Epistola ccl ad Auxilium, col. 1066, t. 2, nunquam puniuntur filii pro parentibus, nisi communicent in culpa vel per originem, vel per imitationem; quia omnes animæ immediate sunt Dei, ut dicitur Ezech., xviii. Sed pœna corporali interdum judicio divino vel humano puniuntur filii pro parentibus, inquantum filius est aliquid patris secundum corpus.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.2.ad.2] A man can more easily transmit that which he has of himself, provided it be transmissible. But the actual sins of our nearer ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely personal, as stated above.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illud quod habet aliquis ex se, magis potest traducere, dummodo sit traducibile: sed peccata actualia proximorum parentum non sunt traducibilia, quia sunt pure personalia, ut dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.2.ad.3] The first sin infects nature with a human corruption pertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a corruption pertaining only to the person.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod primum peccatum corrumpit naturam humanam corruptione ad naturam pertinente; alia vero peccata corrumpunt eam corruptione pertinente ad solam personam.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh. For a gloss on Genesis 4:1 says that \"Adam's entire posterity was corrupted in his loins, because they were not severed from him in the place of life, before he sinned, but in the place of exile after he had sinned.\" But if a man were to be formed in the aforesaid manner, his flesh would be severed in the place of exile. Therefore it would contract original sin.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod si aliquis formaretur ex carne humana miraculose, contraheret originale peccatum. Dicit enim quædam Glossa, Genes., iv, quod « in lumbis Adæ fuit tota posteritas corrupta, quia non est separata prius in loco vitæ, sed postea in loco exilii. » Sed si aliquis homo sic formaretur, sicut dictum est, caro ejus separaretur in loco exilii. Ergo contraheret originale peccatum.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.4.arg.2] Further, original sin is caused in us by the soul being infected through the flesh. But man's flesh is entirely corrupted. Therefore a man's soul would contract the infection of original sin, from whatever part of the flesh it was formed.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, peccatum originale causatur in nobis, inquantum anima inficitur ex carne. Sed caro tota hominis est infecta. Ergo ex quacumque parte carnis homo formaretur, anima ejus inficeretur infectione originalis peccati.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.4.arg.3] Further, original sin comes upon all from our first parent, in so far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who might be formed out of human flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore they would contract original sin.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, peccatum originale a primo parente pervenit inquantum omnes in eo peccante fuerunt. Sed illi qui ex carne humana formaretur, in Adam fuissent. Ergo peccatum originale contraherent.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.4.sc] They would not have been in Adam \"according to seminal virtue,\" which alone is the cause of the transmission of original sin, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. x, 18, seqq.).
\n[I-II.q.81.a.4.sc] Sed contra est, quia non fuissent in Adam secundum « seminalem rationem » quod solum causat traductionem peccati originalis, ut Augustinus dicit, X Super Gen. ad litt., cap. xviii, xix et xx, col. 424, t. 3.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.4.co] As stated above (1,3), original sin is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inasmuch as they are moved by him through generation, even as the members are moved by the soul to actual sin. Now there is no movement to generation except by the active power of generation: so that those alone contract original sin, who are descended from Adam through the active power of generation originally derived from Adam, i.e. who are descended from him through seminal power; for the seminal power is nothing else than the active power of generation. But if anyone were to be formed by God out of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would not be derived from Adam. Consequently he would not contract original sin: even as a hand would have no part in a human sin, if it were moved, not by the man's will, but by some external power.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut jam dictum est, peccatum originale a primo parente traducitur in posteros, inquantum moventur ab ipso per generationem, sicut membra moventur ab anima ad peccatum actuale. Non autem est motio ad generationem nisi per virtutem activam in generatione. Unde illi soli peccatum originale contrahunt, qui ab Adam descendunt per virtutem activam in generatione originaliter ab Adam derivatam, quod est secundum « seminalem rationem » ab eo descendere; nam ratio seminalis nihil aliud est quam vis activa in generatione. Si autem aliquis formaretur virtute divina ex carne humana, manifestum est logicis, tract. xv, affirmat, et ex coætaneis monumentis utcumque probat, et probatum pariter a famoso Georgio Colvenerio refert, addens quod puer baptizatus est, ut gratiae particeps esset, etsi peccatum originale non contraxisset. Ipse P. Henno quod vis activa non derivaretur ab Adam. Unde non contraheret peccatum originale; sicut nec actus manus pertineret ad peccatum humanum, si manus non moveretur a voluntate hominis, sed ab aliquo extrinseco movente.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.4.ad.1] Adam was not in the place of exile until after his sin. Consequently it is not on account of the place of exile, but on account of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to whom his active generation extends.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Adam non fuit in loco exilii nisi post peccatum. Unde non propter locum exilii, sed propter peccatum traducitur originalis culpa ad eos, ad quos activa ejus generatio venit.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.4.ad.2] The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so far as it is the active principle in generation, as we have stated.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod caro non inficit animam, nisi inquantum est principium activum in generatione, ut dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.4.ad.3] If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he would have been in Adam, \"by way of bodily substance\" [The expression is St. Augustine's (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica TP, 31, 6, Reply to Objection 1, but not according to seminal virtue, as stated above. Therefore he would not contract original sin.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui formaretur ex carne humana, fuisset in Adam secundum « corpulentam substantiam, » sed non secundum « seminalem rationem, » ut dictum est, et ideo non contraheret originale peccatum.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin. Because we contract original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in them, according to the word of the Apostle (Romans 5:12): \"In whom all have sinned.\" Now a man pre-exist in his mother as well as in his father. Therefore a man would have contracted original sin from his mother's sin as well as from his father's.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod si Adam non peccasset, Eva peccante, filii originale peccatum contraherent. Peccatum enim originale a parentibus contrahimus, inquantum in eis fuimus, secundum illud Apostoli Rom., v, 12: In quo omnes peccaverunt. Sed sicut homo præexistit in patre suo, ita in matre. Ergo ex peccato matris homo peccatum originale contraheret, sicut et ex peccato patris.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.5.arg.2] Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is \"the mother\" that \"provides the matter in generation\" as the Philosopher states (De Gener. Animal. ii, 1,4), when death and liability to suffering are the necessary results of matter. Now liability to suffering and the necessity of dying are punishments of original sin. Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would contract original sin.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si Eva peccasset, Adam non peccante, filii passibles et mortales nasce-de illa fabula late disserit. Dicit puerum formatum fuisse in fœmorem viri, prope Dixmudam in Flandria, ut ex incolarum traditione, sepulcro patris, et registro parochiae constat, et addit: debuit baptizari ut fieret capax aliorum sacramentorum, et gratiam justificantem ac habitus supernaturales recipet. Si talis, inquit, mortuus fuisset ante baptismum, non tamen defuisset ei locus; Deus enim de loco proportionato sapientissime providisset. — Voluit, ut arbitror, P. Henno discipulos erudire ridendo; sed melius hic tacuisset. Posito casu quod dæmon susceptum semen viri rentur; mater enim dat materiam in generatione, ut dicit Philosophus in II De genetione animalium, cap. 1, parum a princ., et cap. 1v. Mors autem et omnis passibilitas provenit ex necessitate materiæ. Sed passibilitas et necessitas moriendi sunt pœna peccati originalis; ergo si Eva peccasset, Adam non peccante, filii contraherent originale peccatum.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.5.arg.3] Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3) that \"the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin,\" (of whom Christ was to be born without original sin) \"purifying her.\" But this purification would not have been necessary, if the infection of original sin were not contracted from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is contracted from the mother: so that if Eve had sinned, her children would have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Damascenus dicit in lib. III Orthod. fid., cap. 11, col. 986, t. 4, quod « Spiritus sanctus prævenit in Virginem » de qua Christus erat absque peccato originali nasciturus, purgans eam. Sed illa purgatio non fuisset necessaria, si infectio originalis peccati non contraheretur ex matre. Ergo infectio originalis peccati ex matre trahitur; et sic, Eva peccante, ejus filii peccatum originale contraherent, etiamsi Adam non peccasset.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.5.sc] The Apostle says (Romans 5:12): \"By one man sin entered into this world.\" Now if the woman would have transmitted original sin to her children, he should have said that it entered by two, since both of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she sinned first. Therefore original sin is transmitted to the children, not by the mother, but by the father.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit Rom., v, 12: Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit. Magis autem fuisset dicendum quod per duos intrasset, cum ambo peccaverint, vel potius per mulierem, quæ primo peccavit, si femina peccatum originale in prolem transmitteret. Non ergo peccatum originale derivatur in filios a matre, sed a patre.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.5.co] The solution of this question is made clear by what has been said. For it has been stated (1) that original sin is transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the begetting of his children: wherefore it has been said (4) that if anyone were begotten materially only, of human flesh, they would not contract original sin. Now it is evident that in the opinion of philosophers, the active principle of generation is from the father, while the mother provides the matter. Therefore original sin, is contracted, not from the mother, but from the father: so that, accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would not contract original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they would contract it.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hujus dubitationis solutio ex præmissis patet. Dictum est enim supra, quod peccatum originale a primo parente traducitur, inquantum ipse movet ad generationem natorum. Unde dictum est, quod si materialiter tantum aliquis ex carne humana generaretur, originale peccatum non contraheret. Manifestum est autem secundum doctrinam philosophorum, quod principium activum in generatione est a patre, materiam autem mater ministrat. Unde peccatum originale non contrahitur a matre, sed a patre. Et secundum hoc, si, Adam non peccante, Eva peccasset, filii originale peccatum non contraherent; e converso autem esset, si Adam peccasset, et Eva non peccasset.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.5.ad.1] The child pre-exists in its father as in its active principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive principle. Consequently the comparison fails.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in patre præexistit filius sicut in principio activo, sed in matre sicut in principio materiali et passivo. Unde non est similis ratio.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.5.ad.2] Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would be immune from the sin, but would have been subject to the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that are a necessary result of the matter which is provided by the mother, not as punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems unreasonable. Because, as stated in the I, 97, A1, 2, ad 4, immortality and impassibility, in the original state, were a result, not of the condition of matter, but of original justice, whereby the body was subjected to the soul, so long as the soul remained subject to God. Now privation of original justice is original sin. If, therefore, supposing Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been transmitted to posterity on account of Eve's sin; it is evident that the children would not have been deprived of original justice: and consequently they would not have been liable to suffer and subject to the necessity of dying.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quibusdam videtur quod, Eva peccante, si Adam non peccasset, filii essent immunes a culpa; paterentur tamen necessitatem moriendi, et alias passibilitates provenientes ex necessitate materiæ, quam mater ministrat, non sub ratione pœnæ, sed sicut quosdam naturales defectus. Sed hoc non videtur conveniens. Immortalitas enim et impassibilitas primi status non erat ex conditione materiæ, ut in primo dictum est, sed ex originali justitia, per quam corpus subdebatur animæ, quamdiu anima esset subjecta Deo. Defectus autem originalis justitia est peccatum originale. Si igitur, Adam non peccante, peccatum originale non transfunderetur in posteros propter peccatum Evæ, manifestum est quod in filiis non esset defectus originalis justitia; unde non esset in 'eis passibilitas vel necessitas moriendi.
\n[I-II.q.81.a.5.ad.3] This prevenient purification in the Blessed Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but because it behooved the Mother of God \"to shine with the greatest purity\" [Cf. Anselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii.]. For nothing is worthy to receive God unless it be pure, according to Psalm 92:5: \"Holiness becometh Thy House, O Lord.\"
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.81.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illa purgatio præveniens in beata Virgine, non requirebatur ad auferendam transfusionem originalis peccati; sed quia oportebat ut Mater Dei maxima puritate niteret, non enim est aliquid digne receptaculum Dei nisi sit mundum, secundum illud psal. xcii, 5: Domum tuam, Domine, decet sanctitudo*.
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