[I-II.q.97.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that human law should not be changed in any way at all. Because human law is derived from the natural law, as stated above (Question 95, Article 2). But the natural law endures unchangeably. Therefore human law should also remain without any change.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod lex humana nullo modo debeat mutari. Lex enim humana derivatur a lege naturali, ut supra dictum est. Sed lex naturalis immobilis permanet. Ergo et lex humana debet immobilis permanere.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.1.arg.2] Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), a measure should be absolutely stable. But human law is the measure of human acts, as stated above (90, A1,2). Therefore it should remain without change.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., cap. v, a med., « mensura maxime debet esse permanens. » Sed lex humana est mensura humanorum actuum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo debet immobiliter permanere.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.1.arg.3] Further, it is of the essence of law to be just and right, as stated above (Question 95, Article 2). But that which is right once is right always. Therefore that which is law once, should be always law.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, de ratione legis est quod sit justa et recta, ut supra dictum est. Sed illud quod semel est rectum, semper est rectum. Ergo illud quod est semel lex, semper debet esse lex.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.1.sc] Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): \"A temporal law, however just, may be justly changed in course of time.\"
\n[I-II.q.97.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in I De lib. arbitr., cap. vi, § 14, col. 1229, t. 1: « Lex temporalis, quamvis justa sit, commutari tamen per tempora juste potest. »
\n[I-II.q.97.a.1.co] As stated above (Question 91, Article 3), human law is a dictate of reason, whereby human acts are directed. Thus there may be two causes for the just change of human law: one on the part of reason; the other on the part of man whose acts are regulated by law. The cause on the part of reason is that it seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence, in speculative sciences, we see that the teaching of the early philosophers was imperfect, and that it was afterwards perfected by those who succeeded them. So also in practical matters: for those who first endeavored to discover something useful for the human community, not being able by themselves to take everything into consideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient in many ways; and these were changed by subsequent lawgivers who made institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in respect of the common weal.
\nOn the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be rightly changed on account of the changed condition of man, to whom different things are expedient according to the difference of his condition. An example is proposed by Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): \"If the people have a sense of moderation and responsibility, and are most careful guardians of the common weal, it is right to enact a law allowing such a people to choose their own magistrates for the government of the commonwealth. But if, as time goes on, the same people become so corrupt as to sell their votes, and entrust the government to scoundrels and criminals; then the right of appointing their public officials is rightly forfeit to such a people, and the choice devolves to a few good men.\"
\n[I-II.q.97.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex humana est quoddam dictamen rationis, quo diriguntur humani actus: et secundum hoc duplex causa potest esse quod lex humana juste mutetur: una qui dem ex parte rationis; alia vero ex parte hominum, quorum actus lege regulantur. Ex parte quidem rationis, quia humanæ rationi naturale esse videtur ut gradatim ab imperfecto ad perfectum perveniat. Unde videmus in scientiis speculativis, quod qui primo philosophati sunt, quædam imperfecta tradiderunt, quæ postmodum per posteriores sunt tradita magis perfecte. Ita etiam et in operabilibus; nam primi qui intenderunt invenire aliquid utile communitati hominum, non valentes omnia ex se ipsis considerare, instituerunt quædam imperfecta in multis deficientia, quæ posteriores mutaverunt, instituentes aliqua quæ in paucioribus deficere possunt a communi utilitate. Ex parte vero hominum, quorum actus lege regulantur, lex recte mutari potest propter mutationem conditionum hominum, quibus secundum diversas eorum conditiones diversa expediunt; sicut Augustinus ponit exemplum in I De lib. arb., cap. vi, § 14, col. 1229, t. 1, quod « si populus sit bene moderatus et gravis, communisque utilitatis diligentissimus custos, recte lex fertur, qua tali populo liceat creare sibi magistratus, per quos respublica administreur. Porro, si paulatim depravatus idem populus habeat venale suffragium, et regimen flagitiosis sceleratisque committat, recte adimitur populo talis potestas dandi honores, et ad paucorum bonorum redit arbitrium. »
\n[I-II.q.97.a.1.ad.1] The natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above (Question 91, Article 2), and therefore endures without change, owing to the unchangeableness and perfection of the Divine Reason, the Author of nature. But the reason of man is changeable and imperfect: wherefore his law is subject to change. Moreover the natural law contains certain universal precepts, which are everlasting: whereas human law contains certain particular precepts, according to various emergencies.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod naturalis lex est participatio quædam legis ατεπηε, ut supra dictum est, et ideo immobilis perseverat; quod habet ex immobilitate et perfectione divinæ rationis instituentis naturam. Sed ratio humana mutabilis est et imperfecta; et ideo ejus lex mutabilis est. Et præterea lex naturalis continet quædam universalia præcepta, quæ semper manent; lex vero posita ab homine continet præcepta quædam particularia secundum diversos causus qui emergunt.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.1.ad.2] A measure should be as enduring as possible. But nothing can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject to change. And therefore human law cannot be altogether unchangeable.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod mensura debet esse permanens, quantum est possibile. Sed in rebus mutabilibus non potest esse aliquid omnino immutabiliter permanens; et ideo lex humana non potest esse omnino immutabilis.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.1.ad.3] In corporal things, right is predicated absolutely: and therefore, as far as itself is concerned, always remains right. But right is predicated of law with reference to the common weal, to which one and the same thing is not always adapted, as stated above: wherefore rectitude of this kind is subject to change.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod rectum in rebus corporalibus dicitur absolute; et ideo semper quantum est de se, manet rectum. Sed rectitudo legis dicitur in ordine ad utilitatem communem, cui non semper proportionatur una eadem res, sicut supra dictum est, et ideo talis rectitudo mutatur.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that custom cannot obtain force of law, nor abolish a law. Because human law is derived from the natural law and from the Divine law, as stated above (93, 3; 95, 2). But human custom cannot change either the law of nature or the Divine law. Therefore neither can it change human law.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod consuetudo non possit obtinere vim legis, nec legem amovere. Lex enim humana derivatur a lege naturæ, et a lege divina, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed consuetudo hominum non potest mutare legem naturæ, nec legem divinam. Ergo etiam nec legem humanam immutare potest.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.3.arg.2] Further, many evils cannot make one good. But he who first acted against the law, did evil. Therefore by multiplying such acts, nothing good is the result. Now a law is something good; since it is a rule of human acts. Therefore law is not abolished by custom, so that the mere custom should obtain force of law.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ex multis malis non potest fieri unum bonum. Sed ille qui incipit primo contra legem agere, male facit. Ergo multiplicatis similibus actibus non efficietur aliquod bonum. Lex autem est quoddam bonum, cum sit regula humanorum actuum. Ergo per consuetudinem non potest removeri lex, ut ipsa consuetudo legis vim obtineat.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.3.arg.3] Further, the framing of laws belongs to those public men whose business it is to govern the community; wherefore private individuals cannot make laws. But custom grows by the acts of private individuals. Therefore custom cannot obtain force of law, so as to abolish the law.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ferre leges pertinet ad publicas personas, ad quas pertinet regere communitatem; unde privatæ personæ legem facere non possunt. Sed consuetudo invalescit per actus privatarum personarum. Ergo principum, lege ii. consuetudo non potest obtinere vim legis, per quam lex removeatur.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.3.sc] Augustine says (Ep. ad Casulan. xxxvi): \"The customs of God's people and the institutions of our ancestors are to be considered as laws. And those who throw contempt on the customs of the Church ought to be punished as those who disobey the law of God.\"
\n[I-II.q.97.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in Epist. xxxvi ad Casulanum, col. 136, t. 2: «Mos populi Dei, et instituta majorum pro lege sunt tenenda; et 1 sicut prævaricatores legum divinarum, ita et contemptores consuetudinum ecclesiasticarum coercendi sunt.»
\n[I-II.q.97.a.3.co] All law proceeds from the reason and will of the lawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of God; the human law from the will of man, regulated by reason. Now just as human reason and will, in practical matters, may be made manifest by speech, so may they be made known by deeds: since seemingly a man chooses as good that which he carries into execution. But it is evident that by human speech, law can be both changed and expounded, in so far as it manifests the interior movement and thought of human reason. Wherefore by actions also, especially if they be repeated, so as to make a custom, law can be changed and expounded; and also something can be established which obtains force of law, in so far as by repeated external actions, the inward movement of the will, and concepts of reason are most effectually declared; for when a thing is done again and again, it seems to proceed from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly, custom has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod omnis lex proficiscitur a ratione et voluntate legislatoris; lex quidem divina et naturalis a rationabili Dei voluntate; lex autem humana a voluntate hominis ratione regulata. Sicut autem ratio et voluntas hominis manifestantur verbo in rebus agendis, ita etiam manifestantur facto; hoc enim unusquisque eligere videtur ut bonum, quod opere implet. Manifestum est autem quod verbo humano potest et mutari lex, et etiam exponi, inquantum manifestat interiorem motum et conceptum rationis humanæ; unde etiam et per actus maxime multiplicatos, qui consuetudinem efficiunt, mutari potest lex, et exponi, et etiam aliquid causari quod legis virtutem obtineat; inquantum scilicet per exteriores actus multiplicatos interior voluntatis motus, et rationis conceptus efficacissime declaratur. Cum enim aliquid multoties fit, videtur ex deliberato rationis judicio provenire. Et secundum hoc consuetudo et habet vim legis, et legem abolet, et est legum interpretatrix.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.3.ad.1] The natural and Divine laws proceed from the Divine will, as stated above. Wherefore they cannot be changed by a custom proceeding from the will of man, but only by Divine authority. Hence it is that no custom can prevail over the Divine or natural laws: for Isidore says (Synon. ii, 16): \"Let custom yield to authority: evil customs should be eradicated by law and reason.\"
\n[I-II.q.97.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod lex naturalis et divina procedit a voluntate divina, ut dictum est; unde non potest mutari per consuetudinem procedentem a voluntate hominis, sed solum per auctoritatem divinam mutari posset; et inde est quod nulla consuetudo vim legis obtinere potest contra legem divinam vel legem naturalem. Dicit enim Isidorus in Synonym., lib. II, § 80, 1 Quæ sequuntur Decretum habet, dist. XI, cap. VII, col. 60. Quale tempus requiritur ut consuetudo legem abroget, vimque legis obtineat? Arbitrio prudentium juxta repetitionem actuum, et negotiorum qualitatem relinquitur: Vasquez, Tap., etc. Decennium: Salmantic., Laym., Suarez. Et hoc decennium etiam contra leges canonicas sufficit: Less., Sa, Azor. Sed hæc doctrina non probatur Salmanticensibus, Bonacinæ, Suarezio. Quadraginta anni contra leges canonicas requiruntur: Bonacina, Layman, Diana; et habetur ex cap. «De quarta, » et cap. «Adamus» de præscriptione. Non de legibus, sed de juribus et bonis imcol. 863, t. 6: «Usus auctoritati cedat; pra-vum usum lex et ratio vincat. »
\n[I-II.q.97.a.3.ad.2] As stated above (Question 96, Article 6), human laws fail in some cases: wherefore it is possible sometimes to act beside the law; namely, in a case where the law fails; yet the act will not be evil. And when such cases are multiplied, by reason of some change in man, then custom shows that the law is no longer useful: just as it might be declared by the verbal promulgation of a law to the contrary. If, however, the same reason remains, for which the law was useful hitherto, then it is not the custom that prevails against the law, but the law that overcomes the custom: unless perhaps the sole reason for the law seeming useless, be that it is not \"possible according to the custom of the country\" [95, 3], which has been stated to be one of the conditions of law. For it is not easy to set aside the custom of a whole people.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, leges humanæ in aliquibus ca-sibus deficiunt. Unde possibile est quandoque præter legem agere, in casu scilicet in quo deficit lex; et tamen actus non erit malus; et cum tales casus multiplicantur propter aliquam mutationem hominum, tunc manifestatur per consuetudinem quod lex ulterius non est utilis; sicut etiam manifestaretur si lex contraria verbo promulgaretur. Si autem adhuc manet ratio eadem, propter quam prima lex utilis erat, non consuetudo legem, sed lex consuetudinem vincit; nisi forte propter hoc solum inutilis lex videatur, quoniam non est possibilis secundum consuetudinem patriæ, quæ erat una de conditionibus legis. Difficile enim est consuetudinem multitudinis removere.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.3.ad.3] The people among whom a custom is introduced may be of two conditions. For if they are free, and able to make their own laws, the consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts far more in favor of a particular observance, that does the authority of the sovereign, who has not the power to frame laws, except as representing the people. Wherefore although each individual cannot make laws, yet the whole people can. If however the people have not the free power to make their own laws, or to abolish a law made by a higher authority; nevertheless with such a people a prevailing custom obtains force of law, in so far as it is tolerated by those to whom it belongs to make laws for that people: because by the very fact that they tolerate it they seem to approve of that which is introduced by custom.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod multitudo, in qua consuetudo introducitur, duplicis conditionis esse potest. Si enim sit libera multitudo, quæ possit sibi legem facere, plus est consensus totius multitudinis ad aliquid observandum, quod consuetudo manifestat, quam auctoritas principis, qui non habet potestatem condendi legem, nisi inquantum gerit personam multitudinis; unde licet singulæ personæ non possint condere legem, tamen totus populus condere legem potest. Si vero multitudo non habeat liberam potestatem condendi sibi legem vel legem a superiori potestate positam removendi, tamen ipsa consuetudo in tali multitudine prævalens obtinet vim legis, inquantum per eos toleratur ad quos pertinet multitudini legem imponere; ex hoc enim ipso videntur approbare quod consuetudo introduxit.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the rulers of the people cannot dispense from human laws. For the law is established for the \"common weal,\" as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But the common good should not be set aside for the private convenience of an individual: because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2), \"the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of one man.\" Therefore it seems that a man should not be dispensed from acting in compliance with the general law.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod rectores multitudinis non possint in legibus humanis dispensare. Lex enim statuta est pro communi utilitate, ut Isidorus dicit, lib. V Etym., cap. xxI, col. 203, t. 3. Sed commune bonum non debet intermitti pro privato commodo alicujus personæ; quia, ut dicit Philosophus in I Ethic., cap. II, « bonum gentis divinius est quam bonum unius hominis. » Ergo videtur quod non debeat dispensari cum aliquo, ut contra legem communem agat.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.4.arg.2] Further, those who are placed over others are commanded as follows (Deuteronomy 1:17): \"You shall hear the little as well as the great; neither shall you respect any man's person, because it is the judgment of God.\" But to allow one man to do that which is equally forbidden to all, seems to be respect of persons. Therefore the rulers of a community cannot grant such dispensations, since this is against a precept of the Divine law.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illis qui super alios constituentur præcipitur Deuter., I, 17: Ita parvum audietis ut magnum; nec accipietis cujusquam personam, quia Dei judicium est. Sed concedere alicui quod communiter denegatur omnibus, videtur esse acceptio personarum. Ergo hujusmodi dispensationes facere rectores multitudinis non possunt, cum hoc sit contra præceptum legis divinæ.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.4.arg.3] Further, human law, in order to be just, should accord with the natural and Divine laws: else it would not \"foster religion,\" nor be \"helpful to discipline,\" which is requisite to the nature of law, as laid down by Isidore (Etym. v, 3). But no man can dispense from the Divine and natural laws. Neither, therefore, can he dispense from the human law.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, lex humana, si sit recta, oportet quod consonet legi naturali et legi divinæ; aliter enim non congrueret religioni, nec conveniret disciplinæ; quod requiritur ad legem, ut Isidorus dicit, lib. V Etym., cap. III, col. 199, t. 3. Sed in lege naturali et divina nullus homo potest dispensare. Ergo nec etiam in lege humana.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.4.sc] The Apostle says (1 Corinthians 9:17): \"A dispensation is committed to me.\"
\n[I-II.q.97.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Apostolus, I ad Cor., IX, 17: Dispensatio mihi credita est.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.4.co] Dispensation, properly speaking, denotes a measuring out to individuals of some common goods: thus the head of a household is called a dispenser, because to each member of the household he distributes work and necessaries of life in due weight and measure. Accordingly in every community a man is said to dispense, from the very fact that he directs how some general precept is to be fulfilled by each individual. Now it happens at times that a precept, which is conducive to the common weal as a general rule, is not good for a particular individual, or in some particular case, either because it would hinder some greater good, or because it would be the occasion of some evil, as explained above (Question 96, Article 6). But it would be dangerous to leave this to the discretion of each individual, except perhaps by reason of an evident and sudden emergency, as stated above (Question 96, Article 6). Consequently he who is placed over a community is empowered to dispense in a human law that rests upon his authority, so that, when the law fails in its application to persons or circumstances, he may allow the precept of the law not to be observed. If however he grant this permission without any such reason, and of his mere will, he will be an unfaithful or an imprudent dispenser: unfaithful, if he has not the common good in view; imprudent, if he ignores the reasons for granting dispensations. Hence Our Lord says (Luke 12:42): \"Who, thinkest thou, is the faithful and wise dispenser [Douay: steward], whom his lord setteth over his family?\"
\n[I-II.q.97.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod dispensatio proprie importat commensurationem alicujus communis ad singula. Unde etiam gubernator familiæ dicitur dispensator, inquantum unicuique de familia cum ponere et mensura distribuit et operationes, et necessaria vitæ. Sic igitur et in quacumque multitudine ex eo dicitur aliquis dispensare, qui ordinat qualiter aliquod commune præceptum sit a singulis adimplendum. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquod præceptum quod est ad commodum multitudinis ut in pluribus, non est conveniens; in edit.: « quia. » —; in edit.: « rationabiliter ut. » huic personæ vel in hoc casu; quia vel per hoc impediretur aliquid melius, vel etiam induceretur aliquod malum, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Periculosum autem esset ut hoc judicio cujuslibet committeretur, nisi forte propter evidens et subitum periculum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo ille qui habet regere multitudinem, habet potestatem dispensandi in lege humana, quæ suæ auctoritati innititur, ut scilicet in personis vel in casibus in quibus lex deficit, licentiam tribuat ut præceptum legis non servetur. Si autem absque hac ratione pro sola voluntate licentiam tribuat, non erit fidelis in dispensatione, aut erit imprudens; infidelis quidem, si non habet intentionem ad bonum commune; imprudens autem, si rationem dispensandi ignoret; propter quod Dominus dicit, Luc., xII, 42: Quis, putas, est fidelis dispensator et prudens, quem constituit dominus supra familiam suam?
\n[I-II.q.97.a.4.ad.1] When a person is dispensed from observing the general law, this should not be done to the prejudice of, but with the intention of benefiting, the common good.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quando cum aliquo dispensatur ut legem communem non servet, non debet fieri in præjudicium boni communis; sed ea intentione ut ad bonum commune proficiat.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.4.ad.2] It is not respect of persons if unequal measures are served out to those who are themselves unequal. Wherefore when the condition of any person requires that he should reasonably receive special treatment, it is not respect of persons if he be the object of special favor.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non est acceptio personarum, si non serventur aequalia in personis inæqualibus. Unde quando conditio alicujus personæ requirit ut rationabiliter in ea aliquid specialiter observetur, non est personarum acceptio, si ei aliqua specialis gratia fit.
\n[I-II.q.97.a.4.ad.3] Natural law, so far as it contains general precepts, which never fail, does not allow of dispensations. In other precepts, however, which are as conclusions of the general precepts, man sometimes grants a dispensation: for instance, that a loan should not be paid back to the betrayer of his country, or something similar. But to the Divine law each man stands as a private person to the public law to which he is subject. Wherefore just as none can dispense from public human law, except the man from whom the law derives its authority, or his delegate; so, in the precepts of the Divine law, which are from God, none can dispense but God, or the man to whom He may give special power for that purpose.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.97.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod lex naturalis, inquantum continet præcepta communia, quæ nunquam fallunt, dispensationem recipere non potest. In aliis vero præceptis, quæ sunt quasi conclusiones præceptorum communium, quando per hominem dispensatur; puta quod mutuum non reddatur proditori patriæ, vel aliquid hujusmodi. Ad legem autem divinam ita se habet quilibet homo, sicut persona privata ad legem publicam, cui subjicitur. Unde, sicut in lege humana publica non potest dispensare nisi ille a quo lex auctoritatem habet, vel is cui ipse commiserit, ita in præceptis juris divini, quæ sunt a Deo, nullus potest dispensare nisi Deus, vel is cui ipse specialiter committeret.
\n