[I-II.q.104.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. For judicial precepts take their name from \"judgment.\" But there are many things that direct man as to his neighbor, which are not subordinate to judgment. Therefore the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ratio præceptorum judicialium non consistat in hoc quod sunt ordinantia ad proximum. Judicialia enim præcepta a judicio dicuntur. Sed multa sunt alia quibus homo ad proximum ordinatur, quæ non pertinent ad ordinationem judiciorum. Non ergo præcepta judicialia dicuntur quibus homo ordinatur ad proximum.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.1.arg.2] Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts, as stated above (Question 99, Article 4). But there are many moral precepts which direct man as to his neighbor: as is evidently the case with the seven precepts of the second table. Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, præcepta judicialia a moralibus distinguuntur, ut supra dictum est. Sed multa præcepta moralia sunt quibus homo ordinatur ad proximum, sicut patet in septem præceptis secundæ tabulæ. Non ergo præcepta judicialia dicuntur ex hoc quod ad proximum ordinant.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.1.arg.3] Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to God, so do the judicial precepts relate to one's neighbor, as stated above (99, 4; 101, 1). But among the ceremonial precepts there are some which concern man himself, such as observances in matter of food and apparel, of which we have already spoken (102, 6, ad 1,6). Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut se habent præcepta cæremonialia ad Deum, ita se habent judicialia præcepta ad proximum, ut supra dictum est. Sed inter præcepta cæremonialia sunt quædam quæ pertinent ad seipsum, sicut observantia ciborum et vestimentorum, de quibus supra dictum est. Ergo præcepta judicialia non ex hoc dicuntur quod ordinent hominem ad proximum.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.1.sc] It is reckoned (Ezekiel 18:8) among other works of a good and just man, that \"he hath executed true judgment between man and man.\" But judicial precepts are so called from \"judgment.\" Therefore it seems that the judicial precepts were those which directed the relations between man and man.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Ezech., xviii, 8, inter cætera bona opera viri justi: Si judicium verum fecerit inter virum et virum. Sed judicialia præcepta a judicio dicuntur. Ergo præcepta judicialia videntur dici illa quæ pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.1.co] As is evident from what we have stated above (95, 2; 99, 4), in every law, some precepts derive their binding force from the dictate of reason itself, because natural reason dictates that something ought to be done or to be avoided. These are called \"moral\" precepts: since human morals are based on reason. At the same time there are other precepts which derive their binding force, not from the very dictate of reason (because, considered in themselves, they do not imply an obligation of something due or undue); but from some institution, Divine or human: and such are certain determinations of the moral precepts. When therefore the moral precepts are fixed by Divine institution in matters relating to man's subordination to God, they are called \"ceremonial\" precepts: but when they refer to man's relations to other men, they are called \"judicial\" precepts. Hence there are two conditions attached to the judicial precepts: viz. first, that they refer to man's relations to other men; secondly, that they derive their binding force not from reason alone, but in virtue of their institution.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, præceptorum cujuscumque legis quædam habent vim obligandi ex ipso dictamine rationis, quia naturalis ratio dictat hoc esse debitum fieri, vel vitari; et hujusmodi præcepta dicuntur moralia, eo quod a ratione dicuntur mores humani. Alia vero præcepta sunt quæ non habent vim obligandi ex ipso dictamine rationis; quia scilicet in se considerata non habent absolute rationem debiti vel indebiti; sed habent vim obligandi ex aliqua institutione divina vel humana; et hujusmodi sunt determinations quædam moralium præceptorum. Si igitur determinentur moralia præcepta per institutionem divinam in his per quæ ordinatur homo ad Deum, talia dicentur præcepta cæremonialia; si autem in his quæ pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem, talia dicentur præcepta judicialia. In duobus ergo consistit ratio judicialium præceptum: scilicet ut pertineant ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem, et ut non habeant vim obligandi ex sola ratione, sed ex institutione.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.1.ad.1] Judgments emanate through the official pronouncement of certain men who are at the head of affairs, and in whom the judicial power is vested. Now it belongs to those who are at the head of affairs to regulate not only litigious matters, but also voluntary contracts which are concluded between man and man, and whatever matters concern the community at large and the government thereof. Consequently the judicial precepts are not only those which concern actions at law; but also all those that are directed to the ordering of one man in relation to another, which ordering is subject to the direction of the sovereign as supreme judge.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod judicia exercentur officio aliquorum principum, qui habent potestatem judicandi. Ad principem autem pertinet non solum ordinare de his quæ veniunt in litigium, sed etiam de voluntariis contractibus, qui inter homines fiunt, et de omnibus pertinentibus ad populi communitatem et regimen. Unde præcepta judicialia non solum sunt illa quæ pertinent ad lites judiciorum, sed etiam quæcumque pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem, quæ subest ordinationi principis tanquam supremi judicis.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.1.ad.2] This argument holds in respect of those precepts which direct man in his relations to his neighbor, and derive their binding force from the mere dictate of reason.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de præceptis ordinantibus ad proximum, quæ habent vim obligandi ex solo dictamine rationis.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.1.ad.3] Even in those precepts which direct us to God, some are moral precepts, which the reason itself dictates when it is quickened by faith; such as that God is to be loved and worshipped. There are also ceremonial precepts, which have no binding force except in virtue of their Divine institution. Now God is concerned not only with the sacrifices that are offered to Him, but also with whatever relates to the fitness of those who offer sacrifices to Him and worship Him. Because men are ordained to God as to their end; wherefore it concerns God and, consequently, is a matter of ceremonial precept, that man should show some fitness for the divine worship. On the other hand, man is not ordained to his neighbor as to his end, so as to need to be disposed in himself with regard to his neighbor, for such is the relationship of a slave to his master, since a slave \"is his master's in all that he is,\" as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Hence there are no judicial precepts ordaining man in himself; all such precepts are moral: because the reason, which is the principal in moral matters, holds the same position, in man, with regard to things that concern him, as a prince or judge holds in the state. Nevertheless we must take note that, since the relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason than the relations of man to God, there are more precepts whereby man is directed in his relations to his neighbor, than whereby he is directed to God. For the same reason there had to be more ceremonial than judicial precepts in the Law.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam in his quæ ordinant ad Deum, quædam sunt moralia, quæ ipsa ratio fide informata dictat, sicut Deum esse amandum et colendum; quædam vero sunt cæremonialia, quæ non habent vim obligationis nisi ex institutione divina. Ad Deum autem pertinent non solum sacrificia oblata Deo, sed etiam quæcumque pertinent ad idoneitatem offerentium et Deum colentium; homines enim ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem. Et ideo ad cultum Dei pertinet, et per consequens ad cæremonialia præcepta, quod homo habet quamdam idoneitatem respectu cultus divini. Sed homo non ordinatur ad proximum sicut in finem, ut oporteat eum disponi in seipso in ordine ad proximum; hæc enim est comparatio servorum ad dominos, qui id quod sunt, dominorum sunt, secundum Philosophum in I Polit., cap. 11, ante med. Et ideo non sunt aliqua præcepta judicialia ordinantia hominem in seipso; sed omnia talia sunt moralia; quia ratio, quæ est principium moralium, se habet in homine respectu eorum quæ ad ipsum pertinent, sicut princeps vel judex in civitate. Sciendum tamen, quod quia ordo hominis ad proximum magis subjacet rationi quam ordo hominis ad Deum, plura præcepta moralia inveniuntur per quæ ordinatur homo ad proximum, quam per quæ ordinatur homo ad Deum; et propter hoc etiam oportuit plura esse cæremonialia in lege quam judicialia.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the judicial precepts were not figurative. Because it seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be instituted as figures of something else. Therefore, if the judicial precepts are figurative, there will be no difference between the judicial and ceremonial precepts.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod præcepta judicialia non figurent aliquid. Hoc enim videtur esse proprium cæremonialium præceptorum, quod sint in figuram alicujus rei instituta. Si igitur etiam præcepta judicialia aliquid figurent, non erit differentia inter judicialia et cæremonialia præcepta.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.2.arg.2] Further, just as certain judicial precepts were given to the Jewish people, so also were some given to other heathen peoples. But the judicial precepts given to other peoples were not figurative, but stated what had to be done. Therefore it seems that neither were the judicial precepts of the Old Law figures of anything.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut populo Judæorum data sunt quædam judicialia præcepta, ita etiam aliis populis gentilium. Sed judicialia præcepta aliorum populorum non figurant aliquid, sed ordinant quid fieri debeat. Ergo videtur quod neque præcepta judicialia veteris legis aliquid figurent.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.2.arg.3] Further, those things which relate to the divine worship had to be taught under certain figures, because the things of God are above our reason, as stated above (101, 2, ad 2). But things concerning our neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the judicial precepts which direct us in relation to our neighbor should not have been figurative.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ea quæ ad cultum divinum pertinent, figuris quibusdam tradi oportuit; quia ea quæ Dei sunt, supra nostram rationem sunt, ut supra dictum est. Sed ea quæ sunt proximorum, non excedunt rationem nostram. Ergo per judicialia, quæ ad proximum nos ordinant, non oportuit aliquid figurari.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.2.sc] The judicial precepts are expounded both in the allegorical and in the moral sense (Exodus 21).
\n[I-II.q.104.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Exod., xx1, judicialia præcepta allegorice et moraliter exponuntur.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.2.co] A precept may be figurative in two ways. First, primarily and in itself: because, to wit, it is instituted principally that it may be the figure of something. In this way the ceremonial precepts are figurative; since they were instituted for the very purpose that they might foreshadow something relating to the worship of God and the mystery of Christ. But some precepts are figurative, not primarily and in themselves, but consequently. In this way the judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For they were not instituted for the purpose of being figurative, but in order that they might regulate the state of that people according to justice and equity. Nevertheless they did foreshadow something consequently: since, to wit, the entire state of that people, who were directed by these precepts, was figurative, according to 1 Corinthians 10:11: \"All . . . things happened to them in figure.\"
\n[I-II.q.104.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod dupliciter contingit aliquod præceptum esse figurale; uno modo primo et per se, quia scilicet principaliter est institutum ad aliquid figurandum; et hoc modo præcepta cæremonialia sunt figuralia; ad hoc enim sunt instituta, ut aliquid figurent pertinens ad cultum Dei et ad mysterium Christi. Quædam vero præcepta sunt figuralia non primo et per se, sed ex consequenti; et hoc modo præcepta judicialia veteris legis sunt figuralia; non enim sunt instituta ad aliquid figurandum, sed ad ordinandum statum illius populi secundum justitiam et aequitatem; sed ex consequenti aliquid figurant, inquantum scilicet totus status illius populi, qui per hujusmodi præcepta disponebatur, figuralis erat, secundum illud I ad Cor., x, 41: Omnia in figura contingebant illis.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.2.ad.1] The ceremonial precepts are not figurative in the same way as the judicial precepts, as explained above.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod præcepta cæremonialia alio modo sunt figuralia quam judicialia, ut dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.2.ad.2] The Jewish people were chosen by God that Christ might be born of them. Consequently the entire state of that people had to be prophetic and figurative, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xxii, 24). For this reason even the judicial precepts that were given to this people were more figurative that those which were given to other nations. Thus, too, the wars and deeds of this people are expounded in the mystical sense: but not the wars and deeds of the Assyrians or Romans, although the latter are more famous in the eyes of men.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod populus Judæorum ad hoc electus erat a Deo quod ex eo Christus nasceretur; et ideo oportuit totum illius populi statum esse propheticum et figurale, ut Augustinus dicit Contra Faustum, lib. XXII, cap. xxiv, col. 417, t. 8. Et propter hoc etiam judicialia illi populo tradita magis sunt figuralia quam judicialia aliis populus tradita; sicut etiam bella et gesta illius populi exponuntur mystice, non autem bella vel gesta Assyriorum vel Romanorum, quam vis longe clariora secundum homines.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.2.ad.3] In this people the direction of man in regard to his neighbor, considered in itself, was subject to reason. But in so far as it was referred to the worship of God, it was above reason: and in this respect it was figurative.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ordo ad proximum in populo illo secundum se consideratus pervius erat rationi; sed secundum quod referebatur ad cultum Dei, superabat rationem; et ex hac parte erat figuralis.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever. Because the judicial precepts relate to the virtue of justice: since a judgment is an execution of the virtue of justice. Now \"justice is perpetual and immortal\" (Wisdom 1:15). Therefore the judicial precepts bind for ever.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod praecepta judicialia veteris legis perpetuam obligationem habeant. Praecepta enim judicialia pertinent ad virtutem justitiae; nam judicium dicitur justitiae executio. Justitia autem est perpetua et immortalis, ut dicitur Sap., 1. Ergo obligatio praeceptorum judicialium est perpetua. 2. Praeterea, institutio divina est stabilior quam institutio humana. Sed praecepta judicialia humanarum legum habent perpetuam obligationem. Ergo multo magis praecepta judicialia legis divinæ. 3. Praeterea, Apostolus dicit ad Hebr., VII, 18, quod reprobatio fit praecedentis mandati propter infirmitatem ejus et inutilitatem; quod quidem verum est de mandato cæremoniali, quod non poterat facere perfectum juxta conscientiam* servientem solummodo in cibis et in potibus, et variis baptismatibus, et justitiis carnis, ut Apostolus dicit ad Hebr., IX, 9. Sed praecepta judicialia erant utilia et efficacia ad id ad quod ordinabantur, scilicet ad justitiam et aequitatem inter homines constituentam. Ergo praecepta judicialia veteris legis non reprobantur, sed ad huc efficaciam habent.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.3.arg.2] Further, Divine institutions are more enduring than human institutions. But the judicial precepts of human laws bind for ever. Therefore much more do the judicial precepts of the Divine Law.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.3.arg.3] Further, the Apostle says (Hebrews 7:18) that \"there is a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof.\" Now this is true of the ceremonial precept, which \"could [Vulgate: 'can'] not, as to the conscience, make him perfect that serveth only in meats and in drinks, and divers washings and justices of the flesh,\" as the Apostle declares (Hebrews 9:9-10). On the other hand, the judicial precepts were useful and efficacious in respect of the purpose for which they were instituted, viz. to establish justice and equity among men. Therefore the judicial precepts of the Old Law are not set aside, but still retain their efficacy.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.3.sc] The Apostle says (Hebrews 7:12) that \"the priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law.\" But the priesthood was transferred from Aaron to Christ. Therefore the entire Law was also transferred. Therefore the judicial precepts are no longer in force.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit ad Hebr., VII, 12, quod, translato sacerdotio, necesse est ut legis translatio fiat. Sed sacerdotium est translatum ab Aaron ad Christum. Ergo etiam et tota lex est translata. Non ergo judicialia praecepta adhuc obligationem habent.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.3.co] The judicial precepts did not bind for ever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the ceremonial precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only \"dead,\" but also deadly to those who observe them since the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts are dead indeed, because they have no binding force: but they are not deadly. For if a sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would not sin: unless perchance they were observed, or ordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force through being institutions of the Old Law: for it would be a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus.
\nThe reason for this difference may be gathered from what has been said above (Article 2). For it has been stated that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and in themselves, as being instituted chiefly for the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. On the other hand, the judicial precepts were not instituted that they might be figures, but that they might shape the state of that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently, when the state of that people changed with the coming of Christ, the judicial precepts lost their binding force: for the Law was a pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated in Galatians 3:24. Since, however, these judicial precepts are instituted, not for the purpose of being figures, but for the performance of certain deeds, the observance thereof is not prejudicial to the truth of faith. But the intention of observing them, as though one were bound by the Law, is prejudicial to the truth of faith: because it would follow that the former state of the people still lasts, and that Christ has not yet come.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod judicialia praecepta non habuerunt perpetuam obligationem, sed sunt evacuata per adventum Christi; aliter tamen quam cæremonialia: nam cæremonialia adeo sunt evacuata, ut non solum sint mortua, sed etiam mortifera observantibus post Christum, maxime post Evangelium divulgatum. Praecepta autem judicialia sunt quidem mortua, quia non habent vim obligandi, non tamen sunt mortifera: quia si quis princeps ordinaret in regno suo illa judicialia observari, non peccaret, nisi forte hoc modo observarentur, vel observari mandarentur, tanquam habentia vim obligandi ex veteris legis institutione; talis enim intentio observandi esset mortifera. Et hujus differentiæ ratio potest accipi ex praemissis. Dictum est enim, quod praecepta cæremonialia sunt figuralia primo et per se, tanquam instituta principaliter ad figuranda Christi mysteria ut futura; et ideo ipsa observatio eorum praejudicat fidei veritati, secundum quam confitemur illa mysteria jam esse completa. Praecepta autem judicialia non sunt instituta ad figurandum, sed ad disponendum statum illius populi, qui ordinabatur ad Christum; et ideo, mutato statu illius populi, Christo jam veniente, judicialia praecepta obligationem amiserunt; lex enim fuit pædagogus ducens ad Christum, ut dicitur ad Gal., III. Quia tamen hujusmodi judicialia praecepta non ordinantur ad figurandum, sed ad aliquid faciendum, ipsa eorum observatio absolute non praejudicat fidei veritati; sed intentio observandi tanquam ex obligatione legis praejudicat veritati fidei; quia per hoc haberetur quod status prioris populi adhuc duraret, et quod Christus nondum venisset.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.3.ad.1] The obligation of observing justice is indeed perpetual. But the determination of those things that are just, according to human or Divine institution, must needs be different, according to the different states of mankind.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod justitia quidem perpetuo est observanda; sed determinatio eorum quae sunt justa, secundum institutionem humanam vel divinam, oportet quod varietur secundum diversum hominum statum.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.3.ad.2] The judicial precepts established by men retain their binding force for ever, so long as the state of government remains the same. But if the state or nation pass to another form of government, the laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which is government by the people, demands different laws from those of oligarchy, which is government by the rich, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. iv, 1). Consequently when the state of that people changed, the judicial precepts had to be changed also.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod praecepta judicialia ab hominibus instituta habent perpetuam obligationem, manente illo statu regiminis; sed si civitas, vel gens ad aliud regimen deveniat, oportet leges mutari; non enim eædem leges conveniunt in democratia, quae est potestas populi, et in oligarchia, quae est potestas divitum, ut patet per Philosophum in sua Polit., lib. III, cap. v, VI et IX. Et ideo, etiam mutato statu illius populi, oportuit praecepta judicialia mutari.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.3.ad.3] Those judicial precepts directed the people to justice and equity, in keeping with the demands of that state. But after the coming of Christ, there had to be a change in the state of that people, so that in Christ there was no distinction between Gentile and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial precepts needed to be changed also.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illa praecepta judicialia disponebant populum ad justitiam et aequitatem, secundum quod conveniebat illi statui. Sed post Christum statum illius populi oportuit mutari, ut jam in Christo non esset discretio gentilis et Judæi, sicut antea erat; et propter hoc oportuit etiam præcepta judicialia mutari.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that it is impossible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. Because the judicial precepts direct men in their relations to one another. But those things which need to be directed, as pertaining to the relationship between man and man, and which are made use of by men, are not subject to division, since they are infinite in number. Therefore it is not possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod præcepta judicialia non possint habere aliquam certam divisionem. Præcepta enim judicialia ordinant homines ad invicem. Sed ea quæ inter homines ordinari oportet, in usum eorum venientia, non cadunt sub certa distinctione, cum sint infinita. Ergo præcepta judicialia non possunt habere certam distinctionem.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.4.arg.2] Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on moral matters. But moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division, except in so far as they are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore there is no distinct division of the judicial precepts.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, præcepta judicialia sunt determinationes moralium. Sed moralia præcepta non videntur habere aliquam distinctionem, nisi secundum quod reducuntur ad præcepta decalogi. Ergo præcepta judicialia non habent aliquam certam distinctionem.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.4.arg.3] Further, because there is a distinct division of the ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this division, by describing some as \"sacrifices,\" others as \"observances.\" But the Law contains no allusion to a division of the judicial precepts. Therefore it seems that they have no distinct division.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, præcepta cæremonialia, quia certam distinctionem habent, eorum distinctio in lege innuitur, dum quædam vocantur sacrificia, quædam observantiæ. Sed nulla distinctio innuitur in lege præceptorum judicialium. Ergo videtur quod non habeant certam distinctionem.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.4.sc] Wherever there is order there must needs be division. But the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the judicial precepts, since thereby that people was ordained. Therefore it is most necessary that they should have a distinct division.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.4.sc] Sed contra, ubi est ordo, oportet quod sit distinctio. Sed ratio ordinis maxime pertinet ad præcepta judicialia, per quæ populus ille ordinabatur. Ergo maxime debent habere distinctionem certam.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.4.co] Since law is the art, as it were, of directing or ordering the life of man, as in every art there is a distinct division in the rules of art, so, in every law, there must be a distinct division of precepts: else the law would be rendered useless by confusion. We must therefore say that the judicial precepts of the Old Law, whereby men were directed in their relations to one another, are subject to division according to the divers ways in which man is directed.
\nNow in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the people's sovereign to his subjects; a second of the subjects among themselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth, of members of the same household, such as the order of the father to his son; of the wife to her husband; of the master to his servant: and according to these four orders we may distinguish different kinds of judicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are laid down concerning the institution of the sovereign and relating to his office, and about the respect due to him: this is one part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are given in respect of a man to his fellow citizens: for instance, about buying and selling, judgments and penalties: this is the second part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are enjoined with regard to foreigners: for instance, about wars waged against their foes, and about the way to receive travelers and strangers: this is the third part of the judicial precepts. Lastly, certain precepts are given relating to home life: for instance, about servants, wives and children: this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum lex sit quasi quædam ars humanæ vitæ instituendæ vel ordinandæ, sicut in unaquaque arte est certa distinctio regularum artis, ita oportet in qualibet lege esse certam distinctionem præceptorum; aliter enim ipsa confusio utilitatem legis auferret. Et ideo dicendum est quod præcepta judicialia veteris legis, per quæ homines ad invicem ordinabantur, distinctionem habent secundum distinctionem ordinationis humanæ. Quadruplex autem ordo in aliquo populo inveniri potest: unus quidem principum populi ad subditos; alius autem subditorum ad invicem; tertius autem eorum qui sunt de populo, ad extraneos; quartus autem ad domesticos, sicut patris ad filium, uxoris ad virum, et domini ad servum; et secundum istos quatuor ordines distinguui possunt præcepta judicialia veteris legis. Dantur autem quædam præcepta de institutione principum et officio eorum, et de reverentia eis exhibenda; et hæc est una pars judicialium præceptorum. Dantur etiam quædam pertinentia ad concives ad invicem, puta circa emptiones, et venditiones, et judicia, et pœnas; et hæc est secunda pars judicialium præceptorum. Dantur etiam quædam præcepta pertinentia ad extraneos, puta de bellis contra hostes, et de suscep-tione peregrinorum et advenarum: et hæc est tertia pars judicialium præceptorum. Dantur etiam in lege quædam præcepta pertinentia ad domesticam conversationem, sicut de servis, et uxoribus, et filiis: et hæc est quarta pars judicialium præceptorum.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.4.ad.1] Things pertaining to the ordering of relations between one man and another are indeed infinite in number: yet they are reducible to certain distinct heads, according to the different relations in which one man stands to another, as stated above.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ea quæ pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem, sunt quidem numero infinita, sed tamen reduci possunt ad aliqua certa secundum differentiam ordinationis humanæ, ut dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.4.ad.2] The precepts of the decalogue held the first place in the moral order, as stated above (Question 100, Article 3): and consequently it is fitting that other moral precepts should be distinguished in relation to them. But the judicial and ceremonial precepts have a different binding force, derived, not from natural reason, but from their institution alone. Hence there is a distinct reason for distinguishing them.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod præcepta decalogi sunt prima in genere moralium, ut supra dictum est; et ideo convenienter alia præcepta moralia secundum ea distinguuntur. Sed præcepta judicialia et cæremonialia habent aliam rationem obligationis, non quidem ex ratione naturali, sed ex sola institutione; et ideo distinctionis eorum alia est ratio.
\n[I-II.q.104.a.4.ad.3] The Law alludes to the division of the judicial precepts in the very things themselves which are prescribed by the judicial precepts of the Law.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.104.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ex ipsis rebus quæ per præcepta judicialia ordinantur in lege, innuit lex distinctionem judicialium præceptorum.
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