[I-II.q.112.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that God alone is not the cause of grace. For it is written (John 1:17): \"Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.\" Now, by the name of Jesus Christ is understood not merely the Divine Nature assuming, but the created nature assumed. Therefore a creature may be the cause of grace.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non solus Deus sit causa gratiae. Dici-tur enim Joan., 1, 17: Gratia et veritas per Jesum Christum facta est. Sed in nomine Jesu Christi intelligitur non solum natura divina assumens, sed etiam natura creata assumpta. Ergo aliqua creatura potest esse causa gratiae.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.1.arg.2] Further, there is this difference between the sacraments of the New Law and those of the Old, that the sacraments of the New Law cause grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law merely signify it. Now the sacraments of the New Law are certain visible elements. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ista differentia ponitur inter sacramenta novæ legis et veteris, quod sacramenta novæ legis causant gratiam, quam sacramenta veteris legis solum significabant. Sed sacramenta novæ legis sunt quædam visibilia elementa. Ergo non solus Deus est causa gratiae.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.1.arg.3] Further, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iii, iv, vii, viii), \"Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect both lesser angels and men.\" Now the rational creature is cleansed, enlightened, and perfected by grace. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, secundum Dionysium, in lib. Cælest. hier., c. III et IV, col. 163, t. 4: « Angeli purgant et illuminant et perficiunt et angelos inferiores, et etiam homines. » Sed rationalis creatura purgatur, illuminatur et perficitur per gratiam. Ergo non solus Deus est causa gratiae.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.1.sc] It is written (Psalm 83:12): \"The Lord will give grace and glory.\"
\n[I-II.q.112.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod in psalm. LXXXIII, 12, dicitur: Gratia et gloriam dabit Dominus.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.1.co] Nothing can act beyond its species, since the cause must always be more powerful than its effect. Now the gift of grace surpasses every capability of created nature, since it is nothing short of a partaking of the Divine Nature, which exceeds every other nature. And thus it is impossible that any creature should cause grace. For it is as necessary that God alone should deify, bestowing a partaking of the Divine Nature by a participated likeness, as it is impossible that anything save fire should enkindle.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nulla res potest agere ultra suam speciem, quia semper oportet quod causa potior sit effectu. Donum autem gratiae excedit omnem facultatem naturæ creatæ, cum nihil aliud sit quam quædam participatio divinæ naturæ, quæ excedit omnem aliam naturam. Et ideo imposibile est quod aliqua creatura gratiam causet. Sic enim necesse est quod solus Deus deificet, communicando consortium divinæ naturæ per quamdam similitudinis participationem, sicut imposibile est quod aliquid igniat nisi solus ignis.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.1.ad.1] Christ's humanity is an \"organ of His Godhead,\" as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 19). Now an instrument does not bring forth the action of the principal agent by its own power, but in virtue of the principal agent. Hence Christ's humanity does not cause grace by its own power, but by virtue of the Divine Nature joined to it, whereby the actions of Christ's humanity are saving actions.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod humanitas Christi est sicut « quoddam organum divinitatis ejus, » ut Damascenus dicit in III lib. Orthod. fid., cap. xv, col. 1059, t. 4. Instrumentum autem non agit actionem agentis principalis propria virtute, sed virtute principalis agentis. Et ideo humanitas Christi non causat gratiam propria virtute, sed virtute divinitatis adjunctæ, ex qua actiones humanitatis Christi sunt salutares.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.1.ad.2] As in the person of Christ the humanity causes our salvation by grace, the Divine power being the principal agent, so likewise in the sacraments of the New Law, which are derived from Christ, grace is instrumentally caused by the sacraments, and principally by the power of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments, according to John 3:5: \"Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.\"
\n[I-II.q.112.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut in ipsa persona Christi humanitas causat salutem nostram per gratiam, virtute divina principaliter operante, ita etiam in sacramentis novæ legis, quæ derivantur a Christo, causatur gratia instrumentaliter quidem per ipsa sacramenta, sed principaliter per virtutem Spiritus sancti in sacramentis operantis, secundum illud Joan., III, 5: Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu sancto, non potest introire in regnum Dei. Albanenses dixerunt hominem ex se possi-dere Spiritum sanctum. Arnoldus dixit humanam naturam a Deo assumptam esse Deo æqualem in omnibus bonis suis.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.1.ad.3] Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect angels or men, by instruction, and not by justifying them through grace. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that \"this cleansing and enlightenment and perfecting is nothing else than the assumption of Divine knowledge.\"
\n[I-II.q.112.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod angelus pur-gat, illuminat et perficit angelum vel hominem, per modum instructionis cujusdam, non autem justificando per gratiam. Unde Dionysius dicit, vii cap. Cælest. hierar., § 3, col. 210, t. 1, quod hujusmodi « purgatio, et illuminatio, et perfectio nihil est aliud quam divinæ scientiae assumptio. »
\n[I-II.q.112.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that no preparation or disposition for grace is required on man's part, since, as the Apostle says (Romans 4:4), \"To him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt.\" Now a man's preparation by free-will can only be through some operation. Hence it would do away with the notion of grace.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non requiratur aliqua præparatio sive dispositio ad gratiam ex parte hominis. Quia, ut Apostolus dicit, Rom., iv, 4, ei qui operatur, merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum. Sed præparatio hominis per liberum arbitrium non est nisi per aliquam operationem. Ergo tollere-tur ratio gratiae.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.2.arg.2] Further, whoever is going on sinning, is not preparing himself to have grace. But to some who are going on sinning grace is given, as is clear in the case of Paul, who received grace whilst he was \"breathing our threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord\" (Acts 9:1). Hence no preparation for grace is required on man's part.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ille qui in peccato progreditur, non se præparat ad gratiam habendam. Sed aliquibus in peccato progreditibus data est gratia; sicut patet de Paulo, qui gratiam consecutus est, dum esset spirans minarum et cædis in discipulos Domini, ut dicitur Act., ix, 1. Ergo nulla præparatio ad gratiam requiritur ex parte hominis.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.2.arg.3] Further, an agent of infinite power needs no disposition in matter, since it does not even require matter, as appears in creation, to which grace is compared, which is called \"a new creature\" (Galatians 6:15). But only God, Who has infinite power, causes grace, as stated above (Article 1). Hence no preparation is required on man's part to obtain grace.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, agens infinitæ virtutis non requirit dispositionem in materia, cum nec ipsam materiam requirat; sicut in creatione apparet, cui collatio gratiae comparatur, quæ dicitur nova creatura, ad Galat., ult. Sed solus Deus, qui est infinitæ virtutis, gratiam causat, ut dictum est. Ergo nulla præparatio requiritur ex parte hominis ad gratiam consequendam.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.2.sc] It is written (Amos 4:12): \"Be prepared to meet thy God, O Israel,\" and (1 Samuel 7:3): \"Prepare your hearts unto the Lord.\"
\n[I-II.q.112.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Amos, iv, 42: Præparare in occursum Dei tui, Israel; et I Reg., vii, 3, dicitur: Præparate corda vestra Domino.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.2.co] As stated above (Question 111, Article 2), grace is taken in two ways: first, as a habitual gift of God. Secondly, as a help from God, Who moves the soul to good. Now taking grace in the first sense, a certain preparation of grace is required for it, since a form can only be in disposed matter. But if we speak of grace as it signifies a help from God to move us to good, no preparation is required on man's part, that, as it were, anticipates the Divine help, but rather, every preparation in man must be by the help of God moving the soul to good. And thus even the good movement of the free-will, whereby anyone is prepared for receiving the gift of grace is an act of the free-will moved by God. And thus man is said to prepare himself, according to Proverbs 16:1: \"It is the part of man to prepare the soul\"; yet it is principally from God, Who moves the free-will. Hence it is said that man's will is prepared by God, and that man's steps are guided by God.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, gratia dicitur dupliciter: quandoque quidem ipsum habituale donum Dei; quandoque autem auxilium Dei moventis animam ad bonum. Primo igitur modo accipiendo gratiam, præexigitur ad gratiam aliqua gratiae præparatio; quia nulla forma potest esse nisi in materia disposita. Sed si loquamur de gratia secundum quod significat auxilium Dei moventis ad bonum, sic nulla præparatio requiritur ex parte hominis, quasi præveniens divinum auxilium; sed potius quæcumque præparatio in homine esse potest, est ex auxilio Dei moventis animam ad bonum. Et secundum hoc ipse bonus motus liberi arbitrii, quo quis præparatur ad donum gratiae suscipiendum, est actus liberi arbitrii moti a Deo. Et quantum ad hoc dicitur homo se præparare, secundum illud Proverb., xvi, 1: Hominis est præparare animum*, et est principaliter a Deo movente liberum arbitrium. Et secundum hoc dicitur a Deo voluntas hominis præparari, et a Domino gressus hominis dirigi.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.2.ad.1] A certain preparation of man for grace is simultaneous with the infusion of grace; and this operation is meritorious, not indeed of grace, which is already possessed--but of glory which is not yet possessed. But there is another imperfect preparation, which sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace, and yet it is from God's motion. But it does not suffice for merit, since man is not yet justified by grace, and merit can only arise from grace, as will be seen further on (114, 2).
\n[I-II.q.112.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod præparatio hominis ad gratiam habendam quædam est simul cum ipsa infusione gratiae; et talis operatio est quidem meritoria, sed non gratiae, quæ jam habetur, sed gloriæ, quæ nondum habetur. Est autem alia præparatio gratiae imperfecta, quæ aliquando præcedit donum gratiae gratum facientis, quæ tamen est a Deo movente. Sed ista non sufficit ad meritum, nondum homine per gratiam justificato; quia nullum meritum potest esse nisi ex gratia, ut infra dicetur.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.2.ad.2] Since a man cannot prepare himself for grace unless God prevent and move him to good, it is of no account whether anyone arrive at perfect preparation instantaneously, or step by step. For it is written (Sirach 11:23): \"It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make the poor man rich.\" Now it sometimes happens that God moves a man to good, but not perfect good, and this preparation precedes grace. But He sometimes moves him suddenly and perfectly to good, and man receives grace suddenly, according to John 6:45: \"Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me.\" And thus it happened to Paul, since, suddenly when he was in the midst of sin, his heart was perfectly moved by God to hear, to learn, to come; and hence he received grace suddenly.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum homo ad gratiam se præparare non possit, nisi Deo eum præveniente et movente ad bonum, non refert utrum subito vel paulatim aliquis ad perfectam præparationem perveniat. Dicitur enim Eccli., xi, 23: Facile est in oculis Dei subito honestare pauperem. Contingit autem quandoque quod Deus movet hominem ad aliquod bonum non tamen perfectum; et talis præparatio præcedit gratiam. Sed quandoque statim perfecte movet ipsum ad bonum, et subito gratiam homo accipit, « Compendio denique non abs re dixerim, divinæ scientiae participationem esse purgationem, et illuminationem atque perfectionem. » Cord. Ita codd. et edit. passim; Conradus: « perfecte. » Juxta Lutherum, omnia quæ de præparatione liberi arbitrii dicuntur figmenta sunt, quia, facendo quod in se est, liberum arbitrium mortaliter peccat. Quidam vero theologi præparationem ad gratiam habitualem requirunt non physicam; physicam præparationem illam requiri Thomistæ do-cent. secundum illud Joan., vi, 45: Omnis qui audit* a Patre, et didicit, venit ad me. Et ita contingit Paulo, quia subito cum esset in progressu peccati, perfecte motum est cor ejus a Deo, audiendo, addiscendo et veniendo; et ideo subito est gratiam consecutus.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.2.ad.3] An agent of infinite power needs no matter or disposition of matter, brought about by the action of something else; and yet, looking to the condition of the thing caused, it must cause, in the thing caused, both the matter and the due disposition for the form. So likewise, when God infuses grace into a soul, no preparation is required which He Himself does not bring about.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod agens infinitae virtutis non exigit materiam vel dispositionem materiæ, quasi præsuppositam ex alterius causæ actione; sed tamen oportet quod secundum conditionem rei causandæ in ipsa re causet et materiam et dispositionem debitam ad formam; et similiter ad hoc quod Deus gratiam infundat animæ, nulla præparatio exigitur quam ipse non faciat.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for grace, or to whoever does what he can, because, on Romans 5:1, \"Being justified . . . by faith, let us have peace,\" etc. the gloss says: \"God welcomes whoever flies to Him, otherwise there would be injustice with Him.\" But it is impossible for injustice to be with God. Therefore it is impossible for God not to welcome whoever flies to Him. Hence he receives grace of necessity.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ex necessitate detur gratia se præparanti ad gratiam, vel facienti quod in se est. Quia super illud Rom., 11: Justitia Dei manifestata est, dicit Glossa ord., col. 480, t. 2: « Deus recipit eum qui ad se confugit; aliter esset in eo iniquitas. » Sed impossibile est in Deo iniquitatem esse. Ergo est impossibile quod Deus non recipiat eum qui ad se confugit. Ex necessitate igitur gratiam assequitur.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.3.arg.2] Further, Anselm says (De Casu Diaboli. iii) that the reason why God does not bestow grace on the devil, is that he did not wish, nor was he prepared, to receive it. But if the cause be removed, the effect must needs be removed also. Therefore, if anyone is willing to receive grace it is bestowed on them of necessity.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Anselmus dicit in lib. De casu diaboli, c. 11, col. 328, etc., t. 4, quod « ista est causa quare Deus non concedit diabolo gratiam, quia ipse non voluit accipere; nec paratus fuit. » Sed, remota causa, necesse est removeri effectum. Ergo si aliquis velit accipere gratiam, necesse est quod ei detur.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.3.arg.3] Further, good is diffusive of itself, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now the good of grace is better than the good of nature. Hence, since natural forms necessarily come to disposed matter, much more does it seem that grace is necessarily bestowed on whoever prepares himself for grace.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, « bonum est communicativum sui, » ut patet per Dionysium in iv cap. De divin. nomin., § 1, col. 694, t. 1. Sed bo-num gratiae est melius quam bonum naturæ. Cum igitur forma naturalis ex necessitate adveniat materiæ dispositæ, videtur quod multo magis gratia ex necessitate detur præparanti se ad gratiam.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.3.sc] Man is compared to God as clay to the potter, according to Jeremiah 18:6: \"As clay is in the hand of the potter, so are you in My hand.\" But however much the clay is prepared, it does not necessarily receive its shape from the potter. Hence, however much a man prepares himself, he does not necessarily receive grace from God.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.3.sc] Sed contra est, quod homo comparatur ad Deum sicut lutum ad figulum, secundum illud Jerem., xviii, 6: Sicut lutum in manu figuli, sic vos in manu mea. Sed lutum non ex necessitate accipit formam a figulo, quantumcumque sit præparatum. Ergo neque homo recipit ex necessitate gratiam a Deo, quantumcumque se præparet.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.3.co] As stated above (Article 2), man's preparation for grace is from God, as Mover, and from the free-will, as moved. Hence the preparation may be looked at in two ways: first, as it is from free-will, and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain grace, since the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But it may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the Mover, and thus it has a necessity--not indeed of coercion, but of infallibility--as regards what it is ordained to by God, since God's intention cannot fail, according to the saying of Augustine in his book on the Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xiv) that \"by God's good gifts whoever is liberated, is most certainly liberated.\" Hence if God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to it, according to John 6:45: \"Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me.\"
\n[I-II.q.112.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, præparatio hominis ad gratiam est a Deo sicut a movente, a libero autem arbitrio sicut a moto. Potest igitur præparatio dupliciter considerari: uno quidem modo, secundum quod est a libero arbitrio; et secundum hoc nullam necessitatem habet ad gratiae consecutem, quia donum gratiae excedit omnem præparationem virtutis humanæ. Alio modo potest considerari secundum quod est a Deo movente; et tunc habet necessitatem ad id ad quod ordinatur a Deo, non quidem coactionis, sed infallibilitatis; quia intentio Dei deficere non potest, secundum quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De dono persev., cap. xiv, § 35, col. 4014, t. 10, quod « per beneficia Dei certissime liberantur qui-cumque liberantur. » Unde si ex intentione Dei moventis est quod homo, cujus cor movet, gratiam consequatur; infallibiliter ipsam consequitur, secundum illud Joan., vi, 45: Omnis qui audivit a Patre, et didicit, venit ad me.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.3.ad.1] This gloss is speaking of such as fly to God by a meritorious act of their free-will, already \"informed\" with grace; for if they did not receive grace, it would be against the justice which He Himself established. Or if it refers to the movement of free-will before grace, it is speaking in the sense that man's flight to God is by a Divine motion, which ought not, in justice, to fail.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Glossa illa loquitur de illo qui confugit ad Deum per actum meritorium liberi arbitrii jam per gratiam informati; quem si non recipet, esset contra justitiam, quam ipse statuit. Vel si referatur ad motum liberi arbitrii ante gratiam, loquitur secundum quod ipsum confugium hominis ad Deum est per motionem divinam, quam justum est non deficere.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.3.ad.2] The first cause of the defect of grace is on our part; but the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on God's according to Hosea 13:9: \"Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me.\"
\n[I-II.q.112.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod defectus gratiae prima causa est ex nobis; sed collationis gratiae prima causa est a Deo, secundum illud Oseæ, xiii, 9: Perditio tua ex te, Israel, tantummodo in me auxilium tuum. Vulgat. non habet: ex te.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.3.ad.3] Even in natural things, the form does not necessarily ensue the disposition of the matter, except by the power of the agent that causes the disposition.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam in rebus naturalibus dispositio materiæ non ex necessitate consequitur formam, nisi per virtutem agentis, qui dispositionem causat.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that grace is not greater in one than in another. For grace is caused in us by the Divine love, as stated above (Question 110, Article 1). Now it is written (Wisdom 6:8): \"He made the little and the great and He hath equally care of all.\" Therefore all obtain grace from Him equally.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod gratia non sit major in uno quam in alio. Gratia enim causatur in nobis ex dilectione divina, ut dictum est. Sed Sap., vi, 8, dicitur: Pusillum et magnum ipse fecit, et aequaliter est illi cura* de omnibus. Ergo omnes aequaliter gratiam ab eo consequuntur.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.4.arg.2] Further, whatever is the greatest possible, cannot be more or less. But grace is the greatest possible, since it joins us with our last end. Therefore there is no greater or less in it. Hence it is not greater in one than in another.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ea quæ in summo dicuntur, non recipiunt magis et minus. Sed gratia in summo dicuntur, quia conjungit ultimo fini. Ergo non recipit magis et minus. Non est ergo major in uno quam in alio.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.4.arg.3] Further, grace is the soul's life, as stated above (110, 1, ad 2). But there is no greater or less in life. Hence, neither is there in grace.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, gratia est vita animæ, ut supra dictum est. Sed vivere non dicitur secundum magis et minus. Ergo etiam neque gratia.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.4.sc] It is written (Ephesians 4:7): \"But to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ.\" Now what is given in measure, is not given to all equally. Hence all have not an equal grace.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Ephes., iv, 7: Unicuique data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis Christi. Quod autem mensurate datur, non omnibus aequaliter datur. Ergo non omnes aequalem gratiam habent.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.4.co] As stated above (52, A1,2; 56, A1,2), habits can have a double magnitude: one, as regards the end or object, as when a virtue is said to be more noble through being ordained to a greater good; the other on the part of the subject, which more or less participates in the habit inhering to it.
\nNow as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace cannot be greater or less, since, of its nature, grace joins man to the Highest Good, which is God. But as regards the subject, grace can receive more or less, inasmuch as one may be more perfectly enlightened by grace than another. And a certain reason for this is on the part of him who prepares himself for grace; since he who is better prepared for grace, receives more grace. Yet it is not here that we must seek the first cause of this diversity, since man prepares himself, only inasmuch as his free-will is prepared by God. Hence the first cause of this diversity is to be sought on the part of the God, Who dispenses His gifts of grace variously, in order that the beauty and perfection of the Church may result from these various degree; even as He instituted the various conditions of things, that the universe might be perfect. Hence after the Apostle had said (Ephesians 4:7): \"To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ,\" having enumerated the various graces, he adds (Ephesians 4:12): \"For the perfecting of the saints . . . for the edifying of the body of Christ.\"
\n[I-II.q.112.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus duplicem magnitudinem habere potest: unam ex parte finis vel objecti, secundum quod dicitur una virtus alia nobilior inquantum ad majus bonum ordinatur; aliam vero ex parte subjecti; quod magis vel minus participat habitum inhærentem. Secundum igitur primam magnitudinem gratia gratum faciens non potest esse major et minor; quia gratia secundum sui rationem conjungit hominem summo bono, quod est Deus. Sed ex parte subjecti, gratia potest suscipere magis vel minus, prout scilicet unus perfectius illustratur a lumine gratiae quam alius. Cujus diversitatis ratio quidem est aliqua ex parte præparantis se ad gratiam; qui enim magis se ad gratiam præparat, pleniorem gratiam accipit. Sed ex hac parte potest non accipi prima ratio hujus diversitatis; quia præparatio ad gratiam non est hominis nisi inquantum liberum arbitrium ejus præparatur a Deo. Unde prima causa hujus diversitatis accipienda est ex parte ipsius Dei, qui diversimode suæ gratiae dona dispensat ad hoc quod ex diversis gradibus pulchritudo et perfectio Ecclesiæ consurgat; sicut etiam diversos gradus reum instituit ut esset universum perfectum. Unde Apostolus, ad Ephes., postquam dixerat: Unicuique data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis Christi, enumeratis diversis gratiiis subjungit: Ad consummationem sanctorum in ædificationem corporis Christi, iv, 42.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.4.ad.1] The Divine care may be looked at in two ways: first, as regards the Divine act, which is simple and uniform; and thus His care looks equally to all, since by one simple act He administers great things and little. But, \"secondly,\" it may be considered in those things which come to be considered by the Divine care; and thus, inequality is found, inasmuch as God by His care provides greater gifts to some, and lesser gifts for others.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cura divina dupliciter considerari potest: uno modo quantum ad ipsum divinum actum, qui est simplex et uniformis; et secundum hoc aequaliter se habet ejus cura ad omnes, quia scilicet uno actu simplici et majora et minora dispensat. Alio modo potest considerari ex parte eorum quæ in creaturis ex divina cura provenient; et secundum hoc inventur inæqualitas, inquantum scilicet Deus sua cura quibusdam majora, quibusdam minora providet dona.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.4.ad.2] This objection is based on the first kind of magnitude of grace; since grace cannot be greater by ordaining to a greater good, but inasmuch as it more or less ordains to a greater or less participation of the same good. For there may be diversity of intensity and remissness, both in grace and in final glory as regards the subjects' participation.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit secundum primum modum magnitudinis gratiae: non enim potest gratia secundum hoc major esse quod ad majus bonum ordinet, sed ex eo quod magis vel minus ordinat ad idem bonum magis vel minus participandum. Potest enim esse diversitas intensionis et remissionis, secundum participationem subjecti et in ipsa gratia et in finali gloria.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.4.ad.3] Natural life pertains to man's substance, and hence cannot be more or less; but man partakes of the life of grace accidentally, and hence man may possess it more or less.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod vita naturalis pertinet ad substantiam hominis et ideo non recipit magis et minus; sed vitam gratiae participat homo accidentaliter, et ideo eam potest homo magis vel minus habere.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that man can know that he has grace. For grace by its physical reality is in the soul. Now the soul has most certain knowledge of those things that are in it by their physical reality, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 31). Hence grace may be known most certainly by one who has grace.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo possit scire se habere gratiam. Gratia enim est in anima per sui esssentiam. Sed certissima cognitio animæ est eorum quæ sunt in anima per sui esssentiam, ut patet per Augustinum, XII Super Gen. ad litt., cap. xxxi, col. 479, t. 3. Ergo gratia certissime potest cognosci ab eo qui gratiam habet.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.arg.2] Further, as knowledge is a gift of God, so is grace. But whoever receives knowledge from God, knows that he has knowledge, according to Wisdom 7:17: The Lord \"hath given me the true knowledge of the things that are.\" Hence, with equal reason, whoever receives grace from God, knows that he has grace.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut scientia est donum Dei, ita et gratia. Sed qui a Deo scientiam accipit, scit se scientiam habere, secundum illud Sap., vii, 17: Dominus dedit mihi horum quæ sunt, scientiam veram. Ergo pari ratione qui accipit gratiam a Deo scit se gratiam habere.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.arg.3] Further, light is more knowable than darkness, since, according to the Apostle (Ephesians 5:13), \"all that is made manifest is light,\" Now sin, which is spiritual darkness, may be known with certainty by one that is in sin. Much more, therefore, may grace, which is spiritual light, be known.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, lumen est magis cognoscibile quam tenebra, quia secundum Apostolum ad Ephes., v, 13, omne quod manifestatur lumen est. Sed peccatum quod est spiritualis tenebra, per certitudinem potest sciri ab eo qui habet peccatum. Ergo multo magis gratia, quæ est spirituale lumen.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.arg.4] Further, the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 2:12): \"Now we have received not the Spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God; that we may know the things that are given us from God.\" Now grace is God's first gift. Hence, the man who receives grace by the Holy Spirit, by the same Holy Spirit knows the grace given to him.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.arg.4] 4. Præterea, Apostolus dicit, I ad Corinth., ii, 12: Nos autem non spiritum hujus mundi accipimus, sed spiritum qui ex Deo est, ut sciamus quæ a Deo donata sunt nobis. Sed gratia est primum donum Dei. Ergo homo qui accipit gratiam per Spiritum sanctum, per eumdem Spiritum scit gratiam esse sibi datam.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.arg.5] Further, it was said by the Lord to Abraham (Genesis 22:12): \"Now I know that thou fearest God,\" i.e. \"I have made thee know.\" Now He is speaking there of chaste fear, which is not apart from grace. Hence a man may know that he has grace.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.arg.5] 5. Præterea, Genes., xxii, 12, ex persona Domini dicitur ad Abraham: Nunc cognovi quod timeas Dominum, id est, cognoscere te feci. Loquitur autem ibi de timore casto, qui non est sine gratia. Ergo homo potest cognoscere se habere gratiam.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.sc] It is written (Ecclesiastes 9:1): \"Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred.\" Now sanctifying grace maketh a man worthy of God's love. Therefore no one can know whether he has sanctifying grace.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccles., ix, 1, quod nemo scit utrum sit dignus odio vel amore*. Sed gratia gratum faciens facit hominem dignum Dei amore. Ergo nullus potest scire utrum habeat gratiam gratum facientem.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.co] There are three ways of knowing a thing: first, by revelation, and thus anyone may know that he has grace, for God by a special privilege reveals this at times to some, in order that the joy of safety may begin in them even in this life, and that they may carry on toilsome works with greater trust and greater energy, and may bear the evils of this present life, as when it was said to Paul (2 Corinthians 12:9): \"My grace is sufficient for thee.\"
\nSecondly, a man may, of himself, know something, and with certainty; and in this way no one can know that he has grace. For certitude about a thing can only be had when we may judge of it by its proper principle. Thus it is by undemonstrable universal principles that certitude is obtained concerning demonstrative conclusions. Now no one can know he has the knowledge of a conclusion if he does not know its principle. But the principle of grace and its object is God, Who by reason of His very excellence is unknown to us, according to Job 36:26: \"Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge.\" And hence His presence in us and His absence cannot be known with certainty, according to Job 9:11: \"If He come to me, I shall not see Him; if He depart I shall not understand.\" And hence man cannot judge with certainty that he has grace, according to 1 Corinthians 4:3-4: \"But neither do I judge my own self . . . but He that judgeth me is the Lord.\"
\nThirdly, things are known conjecturally by signs; and thus anyone may know he has grace, when he is conscious of delighting in God, and of despising worldly things, and inasmuch as a man is not conscious of any mortal sin. And thus it is written (Apocalypse 2:17): \"To him that overcometh I will give the hidden manna . . . which no man knoweth, but he that receiveth it,\" because whoever receives it knows, by experiencing a certain sweetness, which he who does not receive it, does not experience. Yet this knowledge is imperfect; hence the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 4:4): \"I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justified,\" since, according to Psalm 18:13: \"Who can understand sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord, and from those of others spare Thy servant.\"
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod tripliciter aliquid cognosci potest: uno modo per revela-tionem: et hoc modo potest aliquis scire se habere gratiam; revelat enim Deus hoc aliquando aliquibus ex speciali privilegio, ut securitatis gaudium etiam in hac vita in eis incipiat, et ut confidentius et fortius magnifica opera prosequantur, et mala præsentis vitæ sustineant, sicut Paulo dictum est, II ad Corinth., xii, 9: Sufficit tibi gratia mea. Alio modo homo cognoscit aliquid per se-ipsum, et hoc certitudinaliter; et sic nullus potest scire se habere gratiam. Certitudo enim non potest haberi de aliquo, nisi possit dijudicari per proprium principium. Sic enim certitududo habetur de conclusionibus demonstrativis per indemonstrabilia universalia principia. Nullus autem posset scire se habere scientiam alicujus conclusionis, si principium ignoraret. Principium autem gratiae et objectum ejus est ipse Deus, qui propter sui excellentiam est nobis ignotus, secundum illud Job, xxxvi, 26: Ecce Deus magnus vincens scientiam nostram. Et ideo ejus præsentia in nobis et absentia per certitudinem cognosci non potest, secundum illud Job, ix, 14: Si venerit ad me, non videbo eum; si autem abierit, non intelligam. Et ideo homo non potest per certitudinem dijudicare, utrum ipse habeat gratiam; secundum illud I ad Corinth., iv, 3: Sed neque me ipsum judico... Qui autem judicat me, Dominus est. Tertio modo cognoscitur aliquid conjecturaliter per aliqua signa; et hoc modo aliquis cognoscere potest se habere gratiam, inquantum scilicet percipit se delectari in Deo et contemnere res mundanas, et inquantum homo non est conscius sibi aliquus peccati mortalis. Secundum quem modum potest intelligi quod habetur Apoc., ii, 17: Vincenti dabo manna absconditum..., quod nemo scit, nisi qui accipit; quia scilicet ille qui accipit, per quamdam experientiam dulcedinis novit, quam non experitur ille qui non accipit. Ista tamen cognitio imperfecta est; unde Apostolus dicit, I ad Corinth., iv, 3: Nihil mihi conscius sum, sed non in hoc justificatus sum: quia ut dicitur in psalm. xviii, 13, delicta quis intelligit? ab occultis meis munda me, et ab alienis parce servo tuo.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.ad.1] Those things which are in the soul by their physical reality, are known through experimental knowledge; in so far as through acts man has experience of their inward principles: thus when we wish, we perceive that we have a will; and when we exercise the functions of life, we observe that there is life in us.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa 1. Quod homo certa et indubitata fide scire potest se in gratiam esse; 2. Quod unusquisque, ut sit justus, id de se credere tenetur; quæ sunt per essentiam sui in anima, cognoscuntur experimentali cognitione, inquantum homo experitur per actus principia intrinseca; sicut voluntatem percipi mus volendo, et vitam in operibus vitæ.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.ad.2] It is an essential condition of knowledge that a man should have certitude of the objects of knowledge; and again, it is an essential condition of faith that a man should be certain of the things of faith, and this, because certitude belongs to the perfection of the intellect, wherein these gifts exist. Hence, whoever has knowledge or faith is certain that he has them. But it is otherwise with grace and charity and such like, which perfect the appetitive faculty.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod de ratione scientiae est quod homo certitudinem habeat de his quorum habet scientiam; et similiter de ratione fidei est quod homo sit certus de his quorum habet fidem; et hoc ideo, quia certitudo pertinet ad perfectionem intellectus, in quo prædicta dona existunt. Et ideo quicumque habet scientiam, vel fidem, certus est se habere. Non est autem similis ratio de gratia et charitate, et aliis hujusmodi, quæ perficiunt vim appetitivam.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.ad.3] Sin has for its principal object commutable good, which is known to us. But the object or end of grace is unknown to us on account of the greatness of its light, according to 1 Timothy 6:16: \"Who . . . inhabiteth light inaccessible.\"
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod peccatum habet pro principio et pro objecto bonum commutabile, quod nobis est notum. Objectum autem vel finis gratiae est nobis ignotum propter sui luminis immensitatem, secundum illud I ad Timoth., ult., 16: Lucem inhabitat inaccessibilem.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.ad.4] The Apostle is here speaking of the gifts of glory, which have been given to us in hope, and these we know most certainly by faith, although we do not know for certain that we have grace to enable us to merit them. Or it may be said that he is speaking of the privileged knowledge, which comes of revelation. Hence he adds (1 Corinthians 2:10): \"But to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit.\"
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod Apostolus ibi loquitur de donis gloriæ, quæ sunt nobis data in spe; quæ certissime cognoscimus per fidem, licet non cognoscamus per certitudinem nos habere gratiam, per quam nos possimus ea promereri. Vel potest dici quod loquitur de notitia privilegiata, quæ est per revelationem. Unde subdit: Nobis autem revelavit Deus per Spiritum sanctum.
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.ad.5] What was said to Abraham may refer to experimental knowledge which springs from deeds of which we are cognizant. For in the deed that Abraham had just wrought, he could know experimentally that he had the fear of God. Or it may refer to a revelation.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[I-II.q.112.a.5.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod illud verbum Abrahæ dictum potest referri ad notitiam experimentalem, quæ est per exhibitionem operis. In opere enim illo quod fecerat Abraham, cognoscere potuit, experimentaliter se Dei timorem habere. Vel potest hoc etiam ad revelationem referri.
\n