[I-II.q.114.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that a man can merit nothing from God. For no one, it would seem, merits by giving another his due. But by all the good we do, we cannot make sufficient return to God, since yet more is His due, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14). Hence it is written (Luke 17:10): \"When you have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do.\" Therefore a man can merit nothing from God.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo non possit aliquid mereri a Deo. Nullus enim videtur mercedem mereri ex hoc quod reddit alteri quod debet. Sed per omnia bona quæ facimus, non possumus sufficienter recompensare Deo quod debemus, quin semper amplius debeamus, ut etiam Philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic., cap. ult., post med. Unde et Luc., xvii, 10, dicitur: Cum omnia quæ præcepta sunt vobis feceritis*, dicite: Servi inutiles sumus; quod debuimus facere, fecimus. Ergo homo non potest aliquid mereri a Deo.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.1.arg.2] Further, it would seem that a man merits nothing from God, by what profits himself only, and profits God nothing. Now by acting well, a man profits himself or another man, but not God, for it is written (Job 35:7): \"If thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him, or what shall He receive of thy hand.\" Hence a man can merit nothing from God.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ex eo quod aliquis sibi proficit, nihil videtur mereri apud Deum cui nihil proficit. Sed homo bene operando sibi proficit, vel alteri homini, non autem Deo; dicitur enim Job., xxxv, 7: Si juste egeris, quid donabis ei; quid de manu tua accipiet? Ergo homo non potest aliquid a Deo mereri.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.1.arg.3] Further, whoever merits anything from another makes him his debtor; for a man's wage is a debt due to him. Now God is no one's debtor; hence it is written (Romans 11:35): \"Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to him?\" Hence no one can merit anything from God.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quicumque apud aliquem aliquid meretur, constituit eum sibi debitorem; debitum enim est ut aliquis merenti mercedem rependat. Sed Deus nulli est debitor; unde dicitur Rom., xi, 35: Quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? Ergo nullus a Deo potest aliquid mereri.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.1.sc] It is written (Jeremiah 31:16): \"There is a reward for thy work.\" Now a reward means something bestowed by reason of merit. Hence it would seem that a man may merit from God.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Jerem., xxxi, 16: Est merces operi tuo. Sed merces dicitur quod merito redditur. Ergo videtur quod homo possit a Deo mereri.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.1.co] Merit and reward refer to the same, for a reward means something given anyone in return for work or toil, as a price for it. Hence, as it is an act of justice to give a just price for anything received from another, so also is it an act of justice to make a return for work or toil. Now justice is a kind of equality, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3), and hence justice is simply between those that are simply equal; but where there is no absolute equality between them, neither is there absolute justice, but there may be a certain manner of justice, as when we speak of a father's or a master's right (Ethic. v, 6), as the Philosopher says. And hence where there is justice simply, there is the character of merit and reward simply. But where there is no simple right, but only relative, there is no character of merit simply, but only relatively, in so far as the character of justice is found there, since the child merits something from his father and the slave from his lord.
\nNow it is clear that between God and man there is the greatest inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all man's good is from God. Hence there can be no justice of absolute equality between man and God, but only of a certain proportion, inasmuch as both operate after their own manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue is in man from God. Hence man's merit with God only exists on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, so that man obtains from God, as a reward of his operation, what God gave him the power of operation for, even as natural things by their proper movements and operations obtain that to which they were ordained by God; differently, indeed, since the rational creature moves itself to act by its free-will, hence its action has the character of merit, which is not so in other creatures.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod meritum et merces ad idem referuntur. Id enim merces dicitur, quod alicui recompensatur pro retributione operis vel laboris, quasi quoddam pretium ipsius. Unde, sicut reddere justum pretium pro re accepta ab aliquo est actus justitiae, ita etiam recompensare mercedem operis vel laboris est actus justitiae. Justitia autem aqualitas quædam est, ut patet per Philosophum, in V Ethic., cap. iv, in princ., et ideo simpliciter est justitia inter eos quorum est simpliciter aqualitas; eorum vero quorum non est simpliciter aqualitas, non est simpliciter justitia, sed quidam justitiae modus potest esse; sicut dicitur quoddam jus paternum sive dominativum, ut in eodem libro, cap. vi, Philosophus dicit. Et propter hoc in his in quibus est simpliciter justum, est etiam simpliciter ratio meriti et mercedis; in quibus autem est secundum quid justum, et non simpliciter, in his etiam non simpliciter est ratio meriti, sed secundum quid, inquantum salvatur ibi justitiae ratio; sic enim et filius meretur aliquid a patre, et servus a Domino. Manifestum est autem quod inter Deum et hominem est maxima inæqualitas; in infinitum enim distant, et totum quod est hominis bonum, est a Deo. Unde non potest hominis ad Deum esse justitia secundum absolutam aæqualitatem, sed secundum proportionem quamdam, inquantum scilicet uterque operatur secundum modum suum. Modus autem et mensura humanæ virtutis homini est a Deo. Et ideo meritum hominis apud Deum esse non potest nisi secundum præsuppositionem divinæ ordinationis; ita scilicet ut id homo consequatur a Deo per suam operationem, quasi mercedem, ad quod Deus ei virtutem operandi deputavit; sicut etiam res naturales hoc consequuntur per proprios motus et operationes, ad quod a Deo sunt ordinatæ: differenter tamen; quia creatura rationalis seipsam movet ad agendum per liberum arbitrium, unde sua actio habet rationem meriti; quod non est in aliis creaturis.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.1.ad.1] Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he ought, by his free-will; otherwise the act of justice whereby anyone discharges a debt would not be meritorious.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod homo, inquantum propria voluntate facit illud quod debet, meretur; alioquin actus justitiae, quo quis reddit debitum, non esset meritorius.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.1.ad.2] God seeks from our goods not profit, but glory, i.e. the manifestation of His goodness; even as He seeks it also in His own works. Now nothing accrues to Him, but only to ourselves, by our worship of Him. Hence we merit from God, not that by our works anything accrues to Him, but inasmuch as we work for His glory.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deus ex bonis nostris non quærit utilitatem, sed gloriam, id est manifestationem suæ bonitatis, quod etiam ex suis operibus quærit. Ex hoc autem quod eum colimus, nihil ei accrescit, sed nobis; et ideo meremur aliquid a Deo, non quasi ex nostris operibus aliquid ei accrescat, sed inquantum propter ejus gloriam operamur.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.1.ad.3] Since our action has the character of merit, only on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, it does not follow that God is made our debtor simply, but His own, inasmuch as it is right that His will should be carried out.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quia actio nostra non habet rationem meriti nisi ex præsuppositione divinæ ordinationis, non sequitur quod Deus efficiatur simpliciter debitor nobis, sed sibi ipsi, inquantum debitum est ut sua ordinatio impleatur.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that without grace anyone can merit eternal life. For man merits from God what he is divinely ordained to, as stated above (Article 1). Now man by his nature is ordained to beatitude as his end; hence, too, he naturally wishes to be blessed. Hence man by his natural endowments and without grace can merit beatitude which is eternal life.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod aliquis sine gratia possit mereri vitam æternam. Illud enim homo a Deo meretur, ad quod divinitus ordinatur, sicut dictum est. Sed homo secundum suam naturam ordinatur ad beatitudinem sicut ad finem; unde etiam naturaliter appetit esse beatus. Ergo homo per sua naturalia absque gratia mereri potest beatitudinem, quæ est vita æterna.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.2.arg.2] Further, the less a work is due, the more meritorious it is. Now, less due is that work which is done by one who has received fewer benefits. Hence, since he who has only natural endowments has received fewer gifts from God, than he who has gratuitous gifts as well as nature, it would seem that his works are more meritorious with God. And thus if he who has grace can merit eternal life to some extent, much more may he who has no grace.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, idem opus quanto est minus debitum, tanto est magis meritorium. Sed minus debitum est bonum quod fit ab eo qui minoribus beneficiis est præventus. Cum igitur ille qui habet solum bona naturalia, minora beneficia sit consecutus a Deo quam ille qui cum naturalibus habet gratuita, videtur quod ejus opera sint apud Deum magis meritoria; et ita si ille qui habet gratiam potest mereri aliquo modo vitam æternam, multo magis ille qui non habet.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.2.arg.3] Further, God's mercy and liberality infinitely surpass human mercy and liberality. Now a man may merit from another, even though he has not hitherto had his grace. Much more, therefore, would it seem that a man without grace may merit eternal life.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, misericordia et liberalitas Dei in infinitum excedit misericordiam et liberalitatem humanam. Sed unus homo potest apud alium mereri, etiamsi nunquam ejus gratiam ante habuerit. Ergo videtur quod multo magis homo absque gratia vitam æternam possit a Deo mereri.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.2.sc] The Apostle says (Romans 6:23): \"The grace of God, life everlasting.\"
\n[I-II.q.114.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit, Rom., vi, 23: Gratia Dei vita æterna.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.2.co] Man without grace may be looked at in two states, as was said above (Question 109, Article 2): the first, a state of perfect nature, in which Adam was before his sin; the second, a state of corrupt nature, in which we are before being restored by grace. Therefore, if we speak of man in the first state, there is only one reason why man cannot merit eternal life without grace, by his purely natural endowments, viz. because man's merit depends on the Divine pre-ordination. Now no act of anything whatsoever is divinely ordained to anything exceeding the proportion of the powers which are the principles of its act; for it is a law of Divine providence that nothing shall act beyond its powers. Now everlasting life is a good exceeding the proportion of created nature; since it exceeds its knowledge and desire, according to 1 Corinthians 2:9: \"Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man.\" And hence it is that no created nature is a sufficient principle of an act meritorious of eternal life, unless there is added a supernatural gift, which we call grace. But if we speak of man as existing in sin, a second reason is added to this, viz. the impediment of sin. For since sin is an offense against God, excluding us from eternal life, as is clear from what has been said above (71, 6; 113, 2), no one existing in a state of mortal sin can merit eternal life unless first he be reconciled to God, through his sin being forgiven, which is brought about by grace. For the sinner deserves not life, but death, according to Romans 6:23: \"The wages of sin is death.\"
\n[I-II.q.114.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hominis sine gratia duplex status considerari potest, sicut supra dictum est: unus quidem naturæ integræ, qualis fuit in Adam ante peccatum; alius autem naturæ corruptæ, sicut est in nobis ante reparationem gratiae. Si ergo loquamur de homine quoad primum statum, sic una ratione non potest homo mereri absque gratia vitam æternam per pura naturalia; quia scilicet meritum hominis dependet ex præordinatione divina. Actus autem cujuscumque rei non ordinatur divinitus ad aliquid excedens proportionem virtutis quæ est principium actus; hoc enim est ex institutione divinæ providentiæ ut nihil agat ultra suam virtutem. Vita autem æterna est quoddam bonum excedens proportionem naturæ creatæ; quia etiam excedit cognitionem et desiderium ejus, secundum illud I ad Corinth., ii, 9: Oculus non vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit. Et inde est quod nulla natura creata est sufficiens principium actus meritorii vitæ æternæ, nisi superaddatur aliquod supernaturale donum, quod gratia dicitur. Si vero loquamur de homine sub peccato existente, additur cum hoc secunda ratio propter impedimentum peccati. Cum enim peccatum sit quædam Dei offensa excludens a vita æterna, ut patet per supra dicta, nullus in statu peccati existens potest vitam æternam mereri, nisi prius Deo reconcilietur dimisso peccato, quod fit per gratiam. Peccatori enim non debetur vita, sed mors, secundum illud Rom., vi, 23: Stipendia peccati mors.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.2.ad.1] God ordained human nature to attain the end of eternal life, not by its own strength, but by the help of grace; and in this way its act can be meritorious of eternal life.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus ordinavit humanam naturam ad finem vitæ æternæ consequendum non propria virtute, sed per auxilium gratiae; et hoc modo ejus actus potest esse meritorius vitæ æternæ.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.2.ad.2] Without grace a man cannot have a work equal to a work proceeding from grace, since the more perfect the principle, the more perfect the action. But the objection would hold good, if we supposed the operations equal in both cases.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod homo sine gratia non potest habere æquale opus operi quod ex gratia procedit; quia quanto est perfectius principium actionis, tanto est perfectior actio. Sequeretur autem ratio, supposita æqualitate operationis utrobique.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.2.ad.3] With regard to the first reason adduced, the case is different in God and in man. For a man receives all his power of well-doing from God, and not from man. Hence a man can merit nothing from God except by His gift, which the Apostle expresses aptly saying (Romans 11:35): \"Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to him?\" But man may merit from man, before he has received anything from him, by what he has received from God.
\nBut as regards the second proof taken from the impediment of sin, the case is similar with man and God, since one man cannot merit from another whom he has offended, unless he makes satisfaction to him and is reconciled.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, quantum ad primam rationem inductam, dissimiliter se habet in Deo et in homine: nam homo omnem virtutem benefaciendi habet a Deo, non autem ab homine; et ideo a Deo non potest homo aliquid mereri nisi per donum ejus; quod Apostolus signanter exprimit, dicens: Quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? Rom., xi, 35. Sed ab homine potest quis mereri, antequam ab eo acceperit, per id quod acceptit a Deo. Sed quantum ad secundam rationem sumptam ex impedimento peccati, simile est de homine et de Deo: quia etiam homo ab alio mereri non potest, quem offendit prius, nisi ei satisfaciens reconcilietur. Ita cum codd. Alcan. aliisque edit. Patav. 1798; Garcia, theologi, Nicolaï et edit. Patav. 1712: « quem QUÆST. CXIV, ART. II ET III.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that a man in grace cannot merit eternal life condignly, for the Apostle says (Romans 8:18): \"The sufferings of this time are not worthy [condignae] to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us.\" But of all meritorious works, the sufferings of the saints would seem the most meritorious. Therefore no works of men are meritorious of eternal life condignly.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod homo in gratia constitutus non possit mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno. Dicit enim Apostolus, ad Rom., vIII, 18: Non sunt condignæ passiones hujus temporis ad futuram gloriam quæ revelabitur in nobis. Sed inter alia opera meritoria maxime videntur esse meritoriae sanctorum passiones. Ergo nulla opera hominum sunt meritoria vitæ aeternæ ex condigno.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.3.arg.2] Further, on Romans 6:23, \"The grace of God, life everlasting,\" a gloss says: \"He might have truly said: 'The wages of justice, life everlasting'; but He preferred to say 'The grace of God, life everlasting,' that we may know that God leads us to life everlasting of His own mercy and not by our merits.\" Now when anyone merits something condignly he receives it not from mercy, but from merit. Hence it would seem that a man with grace cannot merit life everlasting condignly.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, super illud Rom., vi, 23: Gratia Dei vita aeterna, dicit Glossa: « Posset recte dicere: Stipendium justitiae vita aeterna; sed maluit dicere: Gratia Dei vita aeterna; ut intelligeremus, Deum ad aeternam vitam pro sua miseratione nos perducere, non meritis nostris. » Sed id quod ex condigno quis meretur, non ex miseratione, sed ex merito accipit. Ergo videtur quod homo non possit per gratiam mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.3.arg.3] Further, merit that equals the reward, would seem to be condign. Now no act of the present life can equal everlasting life, which surpasses our knowledge and our desire, and moreover, surpasses the charity or love of the wayfarer, even as it exceeds nature. Therefore with grace a man cannot merit eternal life condignly.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illud meritum videtur esse condignum, quod aquatur mercedi. Sed nullus actus præsentis vitæ potest aquari vitæ aeternæ, quæ cognitionem et desiderium nostrum excedit; excedit etiam charitatem vel dilectionem viæ, sicut et excedit naturam. Ergo homo non potest per gratiam mereri vitæ aeternam ex condigno.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.3.sc] What is granted in accordance with a fair judgment, would seem a condign reward. But life everlasting is granted by God, in accordance with the judgment of justice, according to 2 Timothy 4:8: \"As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day.\" Therefore man merits everlasting life condignly.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.3.sc] Sed contra, id quod redditur secundum justum judicium, videtur esse merces condigna. Sed vita aeterna redditur a Deo secundum judicium justitiae, secundum illud II ad Tim., iv, 8: In reliquo reposita est mihi corona justitiae, quam reddet mihi Dominus in illa die justus judex. Ergo homo meretur vitam aeternam ex condigno.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.3.co] Man's meritorious work may be considered in two ways: first, as it proceeds from free-will; secondly, as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost. If it is considered as regards the substance of the work, and inasmuch as it springs from the free-will, there can be no condignity because of the very great inequality. But there is congruity, on account of an equality of proportion: for it would seem congruous that, if a man does what he can, God should reward him according to the excellence of his power.
\nIf, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting, it is meritorious of life everlasting condignly. For thus the value of its merit depends upon the power of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting according to John 4:14: \"Shall become in him a fount of water springing up into life everlasting.\" And the worth of the work depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man, being made a partaker of the Divine Nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the inheritance is due by right of adoption, according to Romans 8:17: \"If sons, heirs also.\"
\n[I-II.q.114.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod opus meritorium hominis dupliciter considerari potest: uno modo, secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio; alio modo, secundum quod procedit ex gratia Spiritus sancti. Si consideretur secundum substantiam operis, et secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio, sic non potest ibi esse condignitas propter maximam inæqualitatem; sed est ibi congruitas propter quamdam aæqualitatem proportionis. Videtur enim congruum ut homini operanti secundum suam virtutem, Deus recompenset secundum excellentiam suæ virtutis. Si autem loquamur de opere meritorio, secundum quod procedit ex gratia Spiritus sancti, sic est meritorum vitæ aeternæ ex condigno. Sic enim valor meriti attenditur secundum virtutem Spiritus sancti moventis nos in vitam aeternam, secundum illud Joan., iv, 14: Fiet in eo fons aquæ salientis in vitam aeternam. Attenditur etiam pretium operis secundum dignitatem gratiae, per quam homo consors factus divinæ naturæ adoptatur in filium Dei, cui debetur hereditas ex ipso jure adoptionis, secundum illud Rom., viii, 17: Si filii et heredes.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.3.ad.1] The Apostle is speaking of the substance of these sufferings.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Apostolus loquitur de passionibus sanctorum secundum eorum substantiam.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.3.ad.2] This saying is to be understood of the first cause of our reaching everlasting life, viz. God's mercy. But our merit is a subsequent cause.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum illius Glossæ intelligendum est quantum ad primam causam perveniendi ad vitam aeternam, quæ est miseratio Dei. Meritum autem nostrum est causa subsequens.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.3.ad.3] The grace of the Holy Ghost which we have at present, although unequal to glory in act, is equal to it virtually as the seed of a tree, wherein the whole tree is virtually. So likewise by grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man; and He is a sufficient cause of life everlasting; hence, 2 Corinthians 1:22, He is called the \"pledge\" of our inheritance.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod gratia Spiritus sancti, quam in præsenti habemus, etsi non sit aæqualis gloriæ in actu, est tamen aæqualis in virtute, sicut semen arboris, in quo est virtus ad totam arborem. Et simi- Meritum de condigno illud est quod, accedente Dei promissione, aestimabilitatem habet præmio proportionatam, ita ut, quasi ex justitia, merces illi debeatur; — meritum de congruo illud est cui præmium non debetur ex justitia, aut ex fidelitate, sed ex decentia, et ex præmiantis liberalitate, quamvis non sine intuitu operis. D. Thomas, q. cix, a. 4 et 6, expresse docuit hominem non posse per solas naturæ vires se ad gratiam præpaire, nec a fortiori illam mereri de congruo; quomodo ergo nunc dicit quod opera justorum, secundum substantiam, et ut sunt a libero arbitrio, mereantur de congruo gloria? Sylvius respondet: liter per gratiam inhabitat hominem Spiritus sanctus, qui est sufficiens causa vitæ æternæ; unde et dicitur esse pignus hereditatis nostræ, II ad Corinth., 1.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that grace is not the principle of merit through charity rather than the other virtues. For wages are due to work, according to Matthew 20:8: \"Call the laborers and pay them their hire.\" Now every virtue is a principle of some operation, since virtue is an operative habit, as stated above (Question 55, Article 2). Hence every virtue is equally a principle of merit.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod gratia non sit principium meriti principalius per charitatem quam per alias virtutes. Merces enim operi debetur, secundum illud Matth., xx, 8: Voca operarios, et redde illis mercedem. Sed quælibet virtus est principium alicujus operis; est enim virtus habitus operativus, ut supra habitum est. Ergo quælibet virtus est æqualiter principium merendi.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.4.arg.2] Further, the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 3:8): \"Every man shall receive his own reward according to his labor.\" Now charity lessens rather than increases the labor, because as Augustine says (De Verbis Dom., Serm. lxx), \"love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and next to nothing.\" Hence charity is no greater principle of merit than any other virtue.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Apostolus dicit I ad Corinth., Ⅲ, 8: Unusquisque propriam mercedem accipiet secundum proprium * laborem. Sed charitas magis diminuit laborem quam augeat; quia, sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. De verb. Dom., serm. Lxx, cap. Ⅲ, col. 444, t. 5: « Omnia sæva et immania, facilia et prope nulla efficit amor. » Ergo charitas non est principalius principium merendi quam alia virtus.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.4.arg.3] Further, the greatest principle of merit would seem to be the one whose acts are most meritorious. But the acts of faith and patience or fortitude would seem to be the most meritorious, as appears in the martyrs, who strove for the faith patiently and bravely even till death. Hence other virtues are a greater principle of merit than charity.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illa virtus videtur principalius esse principium merendi, cujus actus sunt maxime meritorii. Sed maxime meritorii videntur esse actus fidei et patientiæ, sive fortitudinis, sicut patet in martyribus, qui pro fide patienter et fortiter usque ad mortem certaverunt. Ergo aliæ virtutes principalius sunt principium merendi quam charitas.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.4.sc] Our Lord said (John 14:21): \"He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father; and I will love him and will manifest Myself to him.\" Now everlasting life consists in the manifest knowledge of God, according to John 17:3: \"This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true\" and living \"God.\" Hence the merit of eternal life rests chiefly with charity.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Dominus, Joan., xiv, 21, dicit: Si quis* diligit me, diligetur a Patre meo, et ego diligam eum, et manifestabo ei me ipsum. Sed in manifesta Dei cognitione consistit vita æterna, secundum illud Joan., xvii, 3: Hæc est vita æterna, ut cognoscant te solum Deum verum, et vivum. Ergo meritum vitæ æternæ maxime residet penes charitatem.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.4.co] As we may gather from what has been stated above (Article 1), human acts have the nature of merit from two causes: first and chiefly from the Divine ordination, inasmuch as acts are said to merit that good to which man is divinely ordained. Secondly, on the part of free-will, inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has the power of voluntary acts by acting by himself. And in both these ways does merit chiefly rest with charity. For we must bear in mind that everlasting life consists in the enjoyment of God. Now the human mind's movement to the fruition of the Divine good is the proper act of charity, whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained to this end, since all the other virtues are commanded by charity. Hence the merit of life everlasting pertains first to charity, and secondly, to the other virtues, inasmuch as their acts are commanded by charity. So, likewise, is it manifest that what we do out of love we do most willingly. Hence, even inasmuch as merit depends on voluntariness, merit is chiefly attributed to charity.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex dictis accipi potest, humanus actus habet rationem merendi ex duobus: primo quidem et principaliter ex divina ordinatione, secundum quod actus dicitur esse meritorius illius boni ad quod homo divinitus ordinatur. Secundo vero ex parte liberi arbitrii, inquantum scilicet homo habet præ cæteris creaturis ut per se agat voluntarie agens. Et quantum ad utrumque principalitas meriti penes charitatem consistit: primo enim considerandum est quod vita æterna in Dei fruitione consistit. Motus autem humanæ mentis ad fruitionem divini boni est propriius actus charitatis, per quem omnes actus aliarum virtutum ordinantur in hunc finem, secundum quod aliæ virtutes imperantur a charitate. Et ideo meritum vitæ æternæ primo pertinet ad charitatem, ad alias autem virtutes secundario, secundum quod earum actus a charitate imperantur. Similiter etiam manifestum est quod id quod ex amore facimus, maxime voluntarie facimus. Unde etiam secundum quod ad rationem meriti requiritur quod sit voluntarium, principaliter meritum charitati attribuitur.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.4.ad.1] Charity, inasmuch as it has the last end for object, moves the other virtues to act. For the habit to which the end pertains always commands the habits to which the means pertain, as was said above (Question 9, Article 1).
\n[I-II.q.114.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod charitas, inquantum habet ultimum finem pro objecto, movet alias virtutes ad operandum. Semper enim habitus ad quem pertinet finis, imperat habitibus ad quos pertinent ea quæ sunt ad finem, ut ex supra dictis patet.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.4.ad.2] A work can be toilsome and difficult in two ways: first, from the greatness of the work, and thus the greatness of the work pertains to the increase of merit; and thus charity does not lessen the toil--rather, it makes us undertake the greatest toils, \"for it does great things, if it exists,\" as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxx). Secondly, from the defect of the operator; for what is not done with a ready will is hard and difficult to all of us, and this toil lessens merit and is removed by charity.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod opus aliquod potest esse laboriosum et difficile dupliciter: uno modo ex magnitudine operis; et sic magnitudo laboris pertinet ad augmentum meriti; et sic charitas non diminuit laborem, imo facit aggredi opera maxima; « magna enim operatur, si est, » ut Gregorius dicit in quadam hom., xxx in Evang., §2, col. 1221, t. 2. Alio modo ex defectu ipsius Vulgatæ S. Thomas addit: et vivum; alibi dixerat: et unum. — Ita cum codd. Alcan. aliisque edit. Rom. et Patav.; theologi et Nicolaï: « per quam. » — Ita cod. Paris. et Alcan., et edit. Patav. 1712; al.: « eorum. » Vasquez tenet omnes actus elicitos a virtu-tibus etiam acquisitis esse in justo meritoria vitæ æternæ, absque influxu etiam virtuali charitatis. Suarez et quidam Thomistæ id de acquisitis virtutibus negant, de infusis concedunt. Theologi influxum charitatis saltem virtualem communiter requirunt. operantis; unicuique enim est laboriosum et difficile quod non prompta voluntate facit; et talis labor diminuit meritum, et a charitate tollitur.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.4.ad.3] The act of faith is not meritorious unless \"faith . . . worketh by charity\" (Galatians 5:6). So, too, the acts of patience and fortitude are not meritorious unless a man does them out of charity, according to 1 Corinthians 13:3: \"If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.\"
\n[I-II.q.114.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod fidei actus non est meritorius, nisi fides per dilectionem operetur, ut dicitur ad Galat., v. Similiter etiam actus patientiae et fortitudinis non est meritorius, nisi aliquis ex charitate hæc operetur, secundum illud I ad Corinth., xiii, 3: Si tradidero corpus meum, ita ut ardeam, charitatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that a man may merit for himself the first grace, because, as Augustine says (Ep. clxxxvi), \"faith merits justification.\" Now a man is justified by the first grace. Therefore a man may merit the first grace.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod homo possit sibi mereri primam gratiam. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, Enarr. ii in psal. xxxi, col. 259, t. 4, « fides meretur justificationem. » Justificatur autem homo per primam gratiam. Ergo homo potest mereri sibi primam gratiam.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.5.arg.2] Further, God gives grace only to the worthy. Now, no one is said to be worthy of some good, unless he has merited it condignly. Therefore we may merit the first grace condignly.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Deus non dat gratiam nisi dignis. Sed non dicitur aliquis dignus aliquo bono, nisi qui ipsum promeruit ex condigno. Ergo aliquis ex condigno potest mereri primam gratiam.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.5.arg.3] Further, with men we may merit a gift already received. Thus if a man receives a horse from his master, he merits it by a good use of it in his master's service. Now God is much more bountiful than man. Much more, therefore, may a man, by subsequent works, merit the first grace already received from God.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, apud homines aliquis potest promereri donum jam acceptum; sicut qui accepit equum a domino, meretur ipsum bene utendo eo in servitio domini. Sed Deus liberalior est quam homo. Ergo multo magis primam gratiam jam susceptam potest homo promereri a Deo per subsequentia opera.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.5.sc] The nature of grace is repugnant to reward of works, according to Romans 4:4: \"Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace but according to debt.\" Now a man merits what is reckoned to him according to debt, as the reward of his works. Hence a man may not merit the first grace.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod ratio gratiae repugnat mercedi operum, secundum illud Rom., iv, 4: Ei qui operatur, merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum. Sed illud meretur homo quod imputatur ei secundum debitum, quasi merces operum ejus. Ergo primam gratiam non potest homo mereri.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.5.co] The gift of grace may be considered in two ways: first in the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is manifest that all merit is repugnant to grace, since as the Apostle says (Romans 11:6), \"if by grace, it is not now by works.\" Secondly, it may be considered as regards the nature of the thing given, and thus, also, it cannot come under the merit of him who has not grace, both because it exceeds the proportion of nature, and because previous to grace a man in the state of sin has an obstacle to his meriting grace, viz. sin. But when anyone has grace, the grace already possessed cannot come under merit, since reward is the term of the work, but grace is the principle of all our good works, as stated above (109). But of anyone merits a further gratuitous gift by virtue of the preceding grace, it would not be the first grace. Hence it is manifest that no one can merit for himself the first grace.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod donum gratiae considerari potest dupliciter: uno modo secundum rationem gratuiti doni; et sic manifestum est quod omne meritum repugnat gratiae, quia, ut ad Rom., xi, 6, Apostolus dicit, si autem gratia, jam non ex operibus. Alio modo potest considerari secundum naturam ipsius rei quæ donatur; et sic etiam non potest cadere sub merito non habentis gratiam; tum quia excedit proportionem naturæ, tum etiam quia ante gratiam in statu peccati homo habet impedimentum promerendi gratiam, scilicet ipsum peccatum. Postquam autem jam aliquis habet gratiam, non potest gratia jam habita sub merito cadere: quia merces est terminus operis; gratia vero est principium cujuslibet boni operis in nobis, ut supra dictum est. Si vero aliud donum gratuitum aliquis mereatur virtute gratiae pracedentis, jam non erit prima. Unde manifestum est quod nullus potest sibi mereri primam gratiam.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.5.ad.1] As Augustine says (Retract. i, 23), he was deceived on this point for a time, believing the beginning of faith to be from us, and its consummation to be granted us by God; and this he here retracts. And seemingly it is in this sense that he speaks of faith as meriting justification. But if we suppose, as indeed it is a truth of faith, that the beginning of faith is in us from God, the first act must flow from grace; and thus it cannot be meritorious of the first grace. Therefore man is justified by faith, not as though man, by believing, were to merit justification, but that, he believes, whilst he is being justified; inasmuch as a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly, as stated above (Question 113, Article 4).
\n[I-II.q.114.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in lib. I Retract., c. xxiii, § 2, col. 621, t. 4, ipse aliquando in hoc fuit deceptus, quod credidit initium fidei esse ex nobis, sed consummationem nobis dari ex Deo; quod ipse ibidem retractat; et ad hunc sensum videtur pertinere quod fides justificationem mereatur. Sed si supponamus, sicut fidei veritas habet, quod initium fidei sit in nobis a Deo, jam etiam ipse actus consequitur primam gratiam; et ita non potest esse meritorius primæ gratiae. Per fidem igitur justificatur homo, non quasi homo credendo mereatur justificationem, sed quia dum justificatur, credit, eo quod motus fidei requiritur ad justificationem impii, ut supra dictum est.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.5.ad.2] God gives grace to none but to the worthy, not that they were previously worthy, but that by His grace He makes them worthy, Who alone \"can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed\" (Job 14:4).
\n[I-II.q.114.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deus non dat gratiam nisi dignis; non tamen ita quod prius digni fuerint, sed quia ipse per gratiam eos facit dignos, qui solus potest facere mundum de immundo conceptum semine, Job, xiv, 4.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.5.ad.3] Man's every good work proceeds from the first grace as from its principle; but not from any gift of man. Consequently, there is no comparison between gifts of grace and gifts of men.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod omne bonum opus hominis procedit a prima gratia sicut a principio, non autem procedit a quocumque humano dono; et ideo non est similis ratio de dono gratiae et de dono humano.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that a man can merit the first grace for another. Because on Matthew 9:2: \"Jesus seeing their faith,\" etc. a gloss says: \"How much is our personal faith worth with God, Who set such a price on another's faith, as to heal the man both inwardly and outwardly!\" Now inward healing is brought about by grace. Hence a man can merit the first grace for another.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo possit alteri mereri primam gratiam. Quia super illud Matth., ix, Videns Jesus fidem illorum, etc., dicit Glossa ordin., col. 145, t. 2: « Quantum valet apud Deum fides propria, apud quem sic valuit aliena, ut intus et extra sanaret hominem. » Sed interior sanatio hominis est per primam gratiam. Ergo homo potest alteri mereri primam gratiam.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.6.arg.2] Further, the prayers of the just are not void, but efficacious, according to James 5:16: \"The continued prayer of a just man availeth much.\" Now he had previously said: \"Pray one for another, that you may be saved.\" Hence, since man's salvation can only be brought about by grace, it seems that one man may merit for another his first grace.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, orationes justorum non sunt vacuæ, sed efficaces, secundum illud Jac., ult., 16: Multum valet deprecatio justi assidua. Sed ibidem præmittitur: Orate pro invicem, ut salvemini. Cum igitur salus hominis non possit esse nisi per gratiam, videtur quod unus homo possit alteri mereri primam gratiam.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.6.arg.3] Further, it is written (Luke 16:9): \"Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail they may receive you into everlasting dwellings.\" Now it is through grace alone that anyone is received into everlasting dwellings, for by it alone does anyone merit everlasting life as stated above (2; 109, 5). Hence one man may by merit obtain for another his first grace.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Lucæ, xv1, 9, dicitur: Facite vobis amicos de mammona iniquitatis, ut cum defeceritis, recipiant vos in æterna tabernacula. Sed nullus recipitur in æterna tabernacula nisi per gratiam, per quam solam aliquis meretur vitam æternam, ut supra dictum est. Ergo unus homo potest alteri acquirere merendo primam gratiam.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.6.sc] It is written (Jeremiah 15:1): \"If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people\" --yet they had great merit with God. Hence it seems that no one can merit the first grace for another.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Jerem., xv, 1: Si steterit Moyses et Samuel coram me, non est anima mea ad populum istum; qui tamen fuerunt maximi meriti apud Deum. Videtur ergo quod nullus possit alteri mereri primam gratiam.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.6.co] As shown above (1,3,4), our works are meritorious from two causes: first, by virtue of the Divine motion; and thus we merit condignly; secondly, according as they proceed from free-will in so far as we do them willingly, and thus they have congruous merit, since it is congruous that when a man makes good use of his power God should by His super-excellent power work still higher things. And therefore it is clear that no one can merit condignly for another his first grace, save Christ alone; since each one of us is moved by God to reach life everlasting through the gift of grace; hence condign merit does not reach beyond this motion. But Christ's soul is moved by God through grace, not only so as to reach the glory of life everlasting, but so as to lead others to it, inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, and the Author of human salvation, according to Hebrews 2:10: \"Who hath brought many children into glory [to perfect] the Author of their salvation.\"
\nBut one may merit the first grace for another congruously; because a man in grace fulfils God's will, and it is congruous and in harmony with friendship that God should fulfil man's desire for the salvation of another, although sometimes there may be an impediment on the part of him whose salvation the just man desires. And it is in this sense that the passage from Jeremias speaks.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, opus nostrum habet rationem meriti ex duobus: primo quidem ex vi motionis divinæ, et sic meretur aliquis ex condigno; alio modo habet rationem meriti, secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio, inquantum voluntarie aliquid facimus; et ex hac parte meritum est congruum; quia congruum est ut dum homo bene utitur sua virtute, Deus secundum superexcellentem virtutem excellentius operetur. Ex quo patet quod merito condigni nullus potest mereri alteri primam gratiam, nisi solus Christus: quia unusquisque nostrum movetur a Deo per donum gratiae, ut ipse ad vitam æternam perveniat; et ideo meritum condigni ultra hanc motionem non se extendit. Sed anima Christi mota est a Deo per gratiam, non solum ut ipse perveniret ad gloriam vitæ æternæ, sed etiam ut alios in eam adduceret, inquantum est caput Ecclesiæ, et auctor salutis humanæ, secundum illud ad Hebr., 11, 10: Qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat, auctorem salutis, etc. Sed merito congrui potest aliquis alteri mereri primam gratiam: quia enim homo in gratia constitutus implet Dei voluntatem, congruum est secundum amicitiæ proportionem ut Deus impleat hominis voluntatem in salvatione alterius, licet quandoque possit habere impedimentum ex parte illius cujus aliquis sanctus justificationem desiderat. Et in hoc casu loquitur auctoritas Jeremiæ, ult., adducta.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.6.ad.1] A man's faith avails for another's salvation by congruous and not by condign merit.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod fides aliorum valet alii ad salutem merito congrui, non merito condigni.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.6.ad.2] The impetration of prayer rests on mercy, whereas condign merit rests on justice; hence a man may impetrate many things from the Divine mercy in prayer, which he does not merit in justice, according to Daniel 9:18: \"For it is not for our justifications that we present our prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude of Thy tender mercies.\"
\n[I-II.q.114.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod impetratio orationis innititur misericordiae; meritum autem condigni innititur justitiæ; et ideo multa orando impetrat homo ex divina misericordia, quæ tamen non meretur secundum justitiam; secundum illud Danielis, ix, 18: Neque enim in justificationibus nostris prosternimus preces ante faciem tuam, sed in miserationibus tuis multis.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.6.ad.3] The poor who receive alms are said to receive others into everlasting dwellings, either by impetrating their forgiveness in prayer, or by meriting congruously by other good works, or materially speaking, inasmuch as by these good works of mercy, exercised towards the poor, we merit to be received into everlasting dwellings.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod pauperes eleemosynam recipientes dicuntur recipere alios in æterna tabernacula, vel impetrando eis veniam orando, vel merendo per alia bona ex congruo, vel etiam materialiter loquendo, quia per ipsa opera misericordiae, quæ quis in pauperes exercet, meretur recipi in æterna tabernacula.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that anyone may merit for himself restoration after a fall. For what a man may justly ask of God, he may justly merit. Now nothing may more justly be besought of God than to be restored after a fall, as Augustine says [Cf. Ennar. i super Ps. lxx.], according to Psalm 70:9: \"When my strength shall fail, do not Thou forsake me.\" Hence a man may merit to be restored after a fall.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod aliquis possit sibi mereri reparationem post lapsum. Illud enim quod juste a Deo petitur, homo videtur posse mereri. Sed nihil justius a Deo petitur, ut Augustinus dicit, Enarr. in ps. LXX, col. 881, t. 4, quam quod reparetur post lapsum, secundum illud psal. LXX, 9: Cum defecerit virtus mea, ne derelinquas me, Domine. Ergo homo potest mereri ut reparetur post lapsum.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.7.arg.2] Further, a man's works benefit himself more than another. Now a man may, to some extent, merit for another his restoration after a fall, even as his first grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for himself restoration after a fall.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, multo magis homini prosunt opera sua quam prosint alii. Sed homo potest aliquo modo alteri mereri reparationem post lapsum, sicut et primam gratiam. Ergo multo magis sibi mereri potest ut reparetur post lapsum.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.7.arg.3] Further, when a man is once in grace he merits life everlasting by the good works he does, as was shown above (2; 109, 5). Now no one can attain life everlasting unless he is restored by grace. Hence it would seem that he merits for himself restoration.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, homo qui aliquando fuit in gratia, per bona opera quæ fecit, meruit sibi vitam æternam, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed ad vitam æternam non potest quis pervenire, nisi reparetur per gratiam. Ergo videtur quod sibi meruit reparationem per gratiam.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.7.sc] It is written (Ezekiel 18:24): \"If the just man turn himself away from his justice and do iniquity . . . all his justices which he hath done shall not be remembered.\" Therefore his previous merits will nowise help him to rise again. Hence no one can merit for himself restoration after a fall.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Ezech., XVIII, 24: Si averterit se justus a justitia sua, et fecerit iniquitatem..., omnes justitiæ ejus quas fecerat, non recordabuntur. Ergo nihil valebunt ei præcedentia merita ad hoc quod resurgat. Non ergo aliquis potest sibi mereri reparationem post lapsum futurum.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.7.co] No one can merit for himself restoration after a future fall, either condignly or congruously. He cannot merit for himself condignly, since the reason of this merit depends on the motion of Divine grace, and this motion is interrupted by the subsequent sin; hence all benefits which he afterwards obtains from God, whereby he is restored, do not fall under merit--the motion of the preceding grace not extending to them. Again, congruous merit, whereby one merits the first grace for another, is prevented from having its effect on account of the impediment of sin in the one for whom it is merited. Much more, therefore, is the efficacy of such merit impeded by the obstacle which is in him who merits, and in him for whom it is merited; for both these are in the same person. And therefore a man can nowise merit for himself restoration after a fall.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nullus potest sibi mereri reparationem post lapsum futurum, neque merito condigni, neque merito congrui. Merito quidem condigni hoc sibi mereri non potest; quia ratio hujus meriti dependet ex motione divinæ gratia; quae quidem motio interrumpitur per sequens peccatum; unde omnia beneficia quæ post-modum aliquis a Deo consequitur, quibus reparatur, non cadunt sub merito, tanquam motione prioris gratia usque ad hæc non se extendente. Meritum etiam congrui, quo quis alteri primam gratiam meretur, impeditur ne consequatur effectum propter impedimentum peccati in eo cui quis meretur. Multo igitur magis impeditur talis meriti efficacia per impedimentum quod est et in eo qui meretur, et in eo cui meretur; hic enim utrumque in unam personam concurrit. Et ideo nullo modo aliquis potest sibi mereri reparationem post lapsum.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.7.ad.1] The desire whereby we seek for restoration after a fall is called just, and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration is besought is called just, because it tends to justice; and not that it depends on justice by way of merit, but only on mercy.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod desiderium quo quis desiderat reparationem post lapsum, justum dicitur; et similiter oratio, qua petit ejusmodi reparationem, dicitur justa, quia tendit ad justitiam; non tamen ita quod justitiae innitatur per modum meriti, sed solum misericordiae.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.7.ad.2] Anyone may congruously merit for another his first grace, because there is no impediment (at least, on the part of him who merits), such as is found when anyone recedes from justice after the merit of grace.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliquis potest alteri mereri ex congruo primam gratiam; quia non est ibi impedimentum, saltem ex parte merentis, quod inventur dum aliquis post meritum gratiae a justitia recedit.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.7.ad.3] Some have said that no one \"absolutely\" merits life everlasting except by the act of final grace, but only \"conditionally,\" i.e. if he perseveres. But it is unreasonable to say this, for sometimes the act of the last grace is not more, but less meritorious than preceding acts, on account of the prostration of illness. Hence it must be said that every act of charity merits eternal life absolutely; but by subsequent sin, there arises an impediment to the preceding merit, so that it does not obtain its effect; just as natural causes fail of their effects on account of a supervening impediment.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt quod nullus meretur absolute vitam æternam nisi per actum finalis gratiae, sed solum sub conditione, si perseverat. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur: quia quandoque actus ultimæ gratiae non est magis meritorius, sed minus quam actus præcedentes, propter ægritudinis oppressionem. Unde dicendum, quod quilibet actus charitatis meretur absolute vitam æternam; sed per peccatum sequens ponitur impedimentum præcedenti merito, ut non sortiatur effectum; sicut etiam causæ naturales deficiunt a suis effectibus propter superveniens impedimentum.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that a man cannot merit an increase of grace or charity. For when anyone receives the reward he merited no other reward is due to him; thus it was said of some (Matthew 6:2): \"They have received their reward.\" Hence, if anyone were to merit the increase of charity or grace, it would follow that, when his grace has been increased, he could not expect any further reward, which is unfitting.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod homo non possit mereri augmentum gratiae vel charitatis. Cum enim aliquis receperit præmium quod meruit, non debetur ei alia merces; sicut de quibusdam dicitur Matth., vi, 2: Receperunt mercedem suam. Si igitur aliquis mereretur augmentum charitatis vel gratiae, sequeretur quod gratia Secundum Scotum, opera prius in gratia facta, licet mortificata, non solum ad ea valent ad quæ valent opera in peccato mortali facta, sed insuper ad plura alia; homo perfection, cæteris paribus, citius resurgit, et propter Dei benignitatem merita prædicta ad hoc aliqualiter acceptur. augmentata non posset ulterius expectare aliud præmium, quod est inconveniens.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.8.arg.2] Further, nothing acts beyond its species. But the principle of merit is grace or charity, as was shown above (Question 2, Article 4). Therefore no one can merit greater grace or charity than he has.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nihil agit ultra suam speciem. Sed principium meriti est gratia vel charitas, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo nullus potest majorem gratiam vel charitatem mereri quam habeat.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.8.arg.3] Further, what falls under merit a man merits by every act flowing from grace or charity, as by every such act a man merits life everlasting. If, therefore, the increase of grace or charity falls under merit, it would seem that by every act quickened by charity a man would merit an increase of charity. But what a man merits, he infallibly receives from God, unless hindered by subsequent sin; for it is written (2 Timothy 1:12): \"I know Whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto Him.\" Hence it would follow that grace or charity is increased by every meritorious act; and this would seem impossible since at times meritorious acts are not very fervent, and would not suffice for the increase of charity. Therefore the increase of charity does not come under merit.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, id quod cadit sub merito, meretur homo per quemlibet actum a gratia vel charitate procedentem, sicut per quemlibet talem actum meretur homo vitam æternam. Si igitur augmentum gratia vel charitatis cadat sub merito, videtur quod per quemlibet actum charitate informatum aliquis mereatur augmentum charitatis. Sed id quod homo meretur, infallibiliter a Deo consequitur, nisi impediatur per peccatum sequens; dicitur enim II ad Timoth., 1, 12: Scio cui credidi, et certus sum quia potens est depositum meum servare. Sic ergo sequeretur quod per quemlibet actum meritorium gratia vel charitas augeretur; quod videtur inconveniens, cum quando actus meritorii non sint multum ferventes, ita quod sufficiant ad charitatis augmentum. Non ergo augmentum charitatis cadit sub merito.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.8.sc] Augustine says (super Ep. Joan.; cf. Ep. clxxxvi) that \"charity merits increase, and being increased merits to be perfected.\" Hence the increase of grace or charity falls under merit.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, Super epist. Joan., tract. v, § 4, col. 2014, t. 3, quod « charitas meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici. » Ergo augmentum charitatis vel gratiae cadit sub merito.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.8.co] As stated above (6,7), whatever the motion of grace reaches to, falls under condign merit. Now the motion of a mover extends not merely to the last term of the movement, but to the whole progress of the movement. But the term of the movement of grace is eternal life; and progress in this movement is by the increase of charity or grace according to Proverbs 4:18: \"But the path of the just as a shining light, goeth forward and increaseth even to perfect day,\" which is the day of glory. And thus the increase of grace falls under condign merit.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, illud cadit sub merito condigni, ad quod motio gratiae se extendit. Motio autem alicujus moventis non solum se extendit ad ultimum terminum motus, sed etiam ad totum progressum in motu. Terminus autem motus gratiae est vita æterna. Progressus autem in hoc motu est secundum augmentum charitatis vel gratiae, secundum illud Prov., iv, 18: Justorum semita quasi lux splendens, procedit, et crescit usque ad perfectum diem, qui est dies gloriæ. Sic igitur augmentum gratiae cadit sub merito condigni.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.8.ad.1] Reward is the term of merit. But there is a double term of movement, viz. the last, and the intermediate, which is both beginning and term; and this term is the reward of increase. Now the reward of human favor is as the last end to those who place their end in it; hence such as these receive no other reward.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod præmium est terminus meriti. Est autem duplex terminus motus, scilicet ultimus, et medius, qui est et principium et terminus; et talis terminus est merces augmenti. Merces autem favoris humani est sicut ultimus terminus his qui finem in hoc constituent; unde tales nullam aliam mercedem recipiunt.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.8.ad.2] The increase of grace is not above the virtuality of the pre-existing grace, although it is above its quantity, even as a tree is not above the virtuality of the seed, although above its quantity.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod augmentum gratiae non est supra virtutem præx existentis gratiae, licet sit supra quantitatem ipsius; sicut arbor, etsi sit supra quantitatem seminis, non est tamen supra virtutem ipsius.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.8.ad.3] By every meritorious act a man merits the increase of grace, equally with the consummation of grace which is eternal life. But just as eternal life is not given at once, but in its own time, so neither is grace increased at once, but in its own time, viz. when a man is sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace.
\n[I-II.q.114.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quolibet actu meritorio meretur homo augmentum gratiae, sicut et gratiae consummationem, quae est vita æterna. Sed sicut vita æterna non statim redditur, sed suo tempore, ita nec gratia statim augetur, sed suo tempore, cum scilicet aliquis sufficienter fuerit dispositus ad gratiae augmentum.
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