[II-II.q.6.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that \"science begets faith in us, and nourishes, defends and strengthens it.\" Now those things which science begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused. Therefore faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod confessio non sit necessaria ad salutem. Sacramentum enim pœnitentiæ propter remissionem culpæ ordinatum est. Sed culpa per gratiae infusionem sufficienter remittitur. Ergo ad pœnitentiæ de peccato agendam non est necessaria confessio.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.1.arg.2] Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing, seems to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by seeing miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is written (John 4:53): \"The father . . . knew that it was at the same hour, that Jesus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, and his whole house\"; and (Romans 10:17) it is said that \"faith is through hearing.\" Therefore man attains to faith by acquiring it.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, peccatum quod ex alio contractum est, ex alio debet habere medicinam. Ergo peccatum actuale, quod ex proprio motu quilibet commisit, oportet ex seipso tantum habere medicinam. Sed contra tale peccatum ordinatur pœnitentiæ. Ergo confessio non est de necessitate pœnitentiæ.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.1.arg.3] Further, that which depends on a man's will can be acquired by him. But \"faith depends on the believer's will,\" according to Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired by man.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, aliquibus est peccatum remissum sine hoc quod confessi legan-tur, sicut patet de Petro, et Magdalena, et etiam de Paulo. Sed non est minoris efficaciæ gratia remittens peccatum nunc, quam fuit 4. Ergo nec nunc de necessitate salutis est quod homo confiteatur.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.1.sc] It is written (Ephesians 2:8-9): \"By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves . . . that no man may glory . . . for it is the gift of God.\"
\n[II-II.q.6.a.1.sc] Sed contra, Boetius in libro I De consol., prosa iv, col. 614, t. 1, dicit: « Si operam medicantis expectas, oportet quod vulnus detegas. » Sed de necessitate salutis est quod homo de peccatis medicinam acci-piat. Ergo et de necessitate salutis est quod morbum per confessionem detegat. Præterea, in judicio sæculari non est idem judex, vel actor, et reus. Sed judicium spirituale est ordinatius. Ergo pec-cator, qui estreus, non debet esse suiipsius judex, sed ab alio judicari debet, et ita oportet quod ei confiteatur.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.1.co] Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is necessary in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second thing requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things which are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith must needs be from God. Because those things which are of faith surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man's knowledge, unless God reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed by God immediately, as those things which were revealed to the apostles and prophets, while to some they are proposed by God in sending preachers of the faith, according to Romans 10:15: \"How shall they preach, unless they be sent?\"
\nAs regards the second, viz. man's assent to the things which are of faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement, such as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace the faith: neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who see the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and some do not. Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves man inwardly to assent to matters of faith.
\nThe Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man's free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready to assent to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of faith is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe. But this is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act of faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod passio Christi, sine cujus virtute nec originale, nec actuale peccatum dimittitur, in nobis operatur per sacramentorum susceptionem, quæ ex ipsa efficaciam habent. Et ideo ad culpæ remissionem et actualis et originalis requiritur sacramentum Ecclesiæ, vel actu susceptum, vel saltem voto quando articulus necessitatis, non contemptus, sacramentum excludit; et per consequens illa sacramenta quæ ordi-nantur contra culpam, cum qua salus esse non potest, sunt de necessitate salutis: et ideo sicut baptismus, quo deletur originale peccatum, est de necessitate salutis; ita et pœnitentiæ sacramentum. Sicut autem aliquis per hoc quod baptismum petit, se ministris Ecclesiæ subjicit, ad quos pertinet dispensatio sacramenti, ita etiam per hoc quod confitetur peccatum suum, se ministro Ecclesiæ subjicit, ut per sacramentum pœnitentiæ ab eo dispensatum, remissionem consequatur: qui congruum remedium adhibere non potest, nisi peccatum cognoscat, quod fit per confessionem peccantis. Et ideo confessio est de necessitate salutis ejus qui in peccatum mortale actuale cecidit.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.1.ad.1] Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper cause of faith is that which moves man inwardly to assent.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod gratiae infusio sufficit ad culpæ remissionem; sed post culpam remissam adhuc est peccator debitor pœnæ temporalis; sed ad gratiae infusionem consequendam ordinata sunt gratiae sacramenta, ante quorum susceptionem vel actu vel propo-sito aliquis gratiam non consequitur, sicut in baptismo patet; et similiter est de confessione; et ulterius per confessionis erubescentiam, et vim clavium, qui bus se confitens subjicit, et satisfactionem injunctam, quam sacerdos moderatur secundum qualitatem criminum sibi per confessionem innotescentium, pœna temporalis expiatur. Sed tamen ex hoc quod operatur confessio ad pœnæ remissionem, non habet quod sit de necessitate salutis: quia pœna ista est temporalis, ad quam post culpæ remissionem aliquis remanet ligatus; unde sine hoc quod in præsenti vita expiaretur, esset via salutis: sed habet quod sit de necessitate salutis ex hoc quod ad remissionem culpæ modo prædicto operatur.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.1.ad.2] This argument again refers to the cause that proposes outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to believe by words or deeds.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod peccatum quod ex altero contractum est, scilicet originale, potest omnino ab extrin-seco remedium habere, ut in parvulis patet: sed peccatum actuale, quod ex seipso quisque commisit, non potest expiari, nisi aliquid cooperetur ille qui peccavit. Sed tamen non sufficit ad peccatum expiandum ex seipso, sicut sufficienter peccatum commisit, eo quod peccatum ex parte conversionis est finitum, ex qua parte peccator in ipsum inducitur; sed ex parte aversionis habet infinitatem, ex qua parte oportet quod peccati remissio incipiat, quia « quod est ultimum in generatione est primum in resolutione, » ut dicitur in III Eth., cap. v, a med. Et ideo oportet quod etiam peccatum actuale ex alio medicinam habeat.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.1.ad.3] To believe does indeed depend on the will of the believer: but man's will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in order that he may be raised to things which are above his nature, as stated above (2, 3).
\n[II-II.q.6.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum quod etsi non legatur eorum confessio, potuit tamen fieri; multa enim facta sunt quæ non sunt scripta. At præterea, Christus habet potestatem excellentiæ in sacramentis; unde sine his quæ ad sacramentum pertinent, potuit rem sacramenti conferre.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that lifeless faith is not a gift of God. For it is written (Deuteronomy 32:4) that \"the works of God are perfect.\" Now lifeless faith is something imperfect. Therefore it is not the work of God.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod confessio sit de jure naturali. Adam enim, et Cain non tenebantur nisi ad præcepta legis naturæ. Sed reprehenduntur de hoc quod peccatum suum non sunt confessi. Ergo confessio peccati est de jure naturali.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.2.arg.2] Further, just as an act is said to be deformed through lacking its due form, so too is faith called lifeless [informis] when it lacks the form due to it. Now the deformed act of sin is not from God, as stated above (I-II, 79, 2, ad 2). Therefore neither is lifeless faith from God.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, præcepta illa quæ manent in veteri lege et nova, sunt de jure naturali. Sed confessio fuit in veteri lege, ut dicitur Isaiæ, xliii, 26: Narra, si quid habes, ut justificeris. Ergo est de jure naturali.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.2.arg.3] Further, whomsoever God heals, He heals wholly: for it is written (John 7:23): \"If a man receive circumcision on the sabbath-day, that the law of Moses may not be broken; are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the sabbath-day?\" Now faith heals man from unbelief. Therefore whoever receives from God the gift of faith, is at the same time healed from all his sins. But this is not done except by living faith. Therefore living faith alone is a gift of God: and consequently lifeless faith is not from God.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Job non erat subjectus nisi legi naturali. Sed ipse peccata confitebatur, quod patet per hoc quod dicitur Job, xliii, 33: Si abscondi ut * homo peccatum meum. Ergo est de jure naturali.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.2.sc] A gloss on 1 Corinthians 13:2 says that \"the faith which lacks charity is a gift of God.\" Now this is lifeless faith. Therefore lifeless faith is a gift of God.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.2.sc] Sed contra, Isidorus dicit, lib. V Etym., cap. iv, col. 199, t. 3, quod jus naturale est idem apud omnes. Sed confessio non est eodem modo apud omnes. Ergo non est de jure naturali. Præterea, confessio fit ei qui habet claves. Sed claves Ecclesiæ non sunt de jure naturali institutæ. Ergo nec confessio.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.2.co] Lifelessness is a privation. Now it must be noted that privation is sometimes essential to the species, whereas sometimes it is not, but supervenes in a thing already possessed of its proper species: thus privation of the due equilibrium of the humors is essential to the species of sickness, while darkness is not essential to a diaphanous body, but supervenes in it. Since, therefore, when we assign the cause of a thing, we intend to assign the cause of that thing as existing in its proper species, it follows that what is not the cause of privation, cannot be assigned as the cause of the thing to which that privation belongs as being essential to its species. For we cannot assign as the cause of a sickness, something which is not the cause of a disturbance in the humors: though we can assign as cause of a diaphanous body, something which is not the cause of the darkness, which is not essential to the diaphanous body.
\nNow the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the species of faith, since faith is said to be lifeless through lack of an extrinsic form, as stated above (Question 4, Article 4). Consequently the cause of lifeless faith is that which is the cause of faith strictly so called: and this is God, as stated above (Article 1). It follows, therefore, that lifeless faith is a gift of God.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum quod sacramenta sunt quædam fidei protestationes: unde oportet ea fidei esse proportionata. Fides autem est supra cognitionem rationis naturalis; unde et sacramenta sunt supra rationis naturalis dictamina, Et quia « jus naturale est quod non opinio genuit, sed innata quædam vis inseruit, » ut Tullius dicit, lib. II De invent., aliquant. ante fin., ideo sacramenta non sunt de jure naturali, sed de jure divino, quod est supra naturale; quod quando etiam naturale dicitur secundum quod cuilibet rei illud est naturale, quod ei a suo creatore imponitur. Tamen proprie dicuntur naturalia quæ ex principiis naturæ causantur. Supra autem naturam sunt quæ ipse Deus sibi reservat, sive naturæ ministerio operanda, sive in operationibus miraculorum, sive in revelationibus mysteriorum, sive in institutionibus sacramentorum. Et sic confessio quæ necessitatem sacramentalem habet non de jure naturali est, sed divino.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.2.ad.1] Lifeless faith, though it is not simply perfect with the perfection of a virtue, is, nevertheless, perfect with a perfection that suffices for the essential notion of faith.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Adam vituperatur ex hoc quod peccatum suum coram Deo non recognovit: confessio enim quæ fit Deo per recognitionem peccati, est de jure naturali; nunc autem loquimur de confessione quæ fit homini. Vel dicendum quod confiteri peccatum in casu est de jure naturali, scilicet cum quis in judicio constitutus a judice interrogatur: tunc enim non debet peccator mentiri peccatum suum excusando vel negando; de quo Adam et Cain vituperatur. Sed confessio quæ fit homini sponte ad remissionem peccatorum consequendam a Deo, non est de jure naturali.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.2.ad.2] The deformity of an act is essential to the act's species, considered as a moral act, as stated above (I, 48, 1, ad 2; I-II, 18, 5): for an act is said to be deformed through being deprived of an intrinsic form, viz. the due commensuration of the act's circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God is the cause of a deformed act, for He is not the cause of its deformity, though He is the cause of the act as such.
\nWe may also reply that deformity denotes not only privation of a due form, but also a contrary disposition, wherefore deformity is compared to the act, as falsehood is to faith. Hence, just as the deformed act is not from God, so neither is a false faith; and as lifeless faith is from God, so too, acts that are good generically, though not quickened by charity, as is frequently the case in sinners, are from God.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod præcepta legis naturæ manent eodem modo in lege Moysi et in nova lege. Sed confessio quamvis aliqualiter esset in lege Moysi, non tamen eodem modo sicut in lege nova, nec sicut in lege naturæ: in lege enim naturæ sufficiebat recognitio peccati interior apud Deum; sed in lege Moysi oportebat aliquo signo exteriori peccatum protestari, sicut per oblationem hostiæ pro peccato, ex quo etiam homini innotescere poterat eum peccasse, non autem oportebat ut speciale peccatum a se commissum manifestaret, aut peccati circumstantias, sicut in nova lege oportet.
\n[II-II.q.6.a.2.ad.3] He who receives faith from God without charity, is healed from unbelief, not entirely (because the sin of his previous unbelief is not removed) but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing from committing such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently that a man desists from one act of sin, through God causing him thus to desist, without desisting from another act of sin, through the instigation of his own malice. And in this way sometimes it is granted by God to a man to believe, and yet he is not granted the gift of charity: even so the gift of prophecy, or the like, is given to some without charity.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.6.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Job loquitur de illa absconsione peccati quam facit deprehensus peccatum negando, aut excusando, ut ex Glossa ibidem haberi potest.
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