[II-II.q.9.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the gifts of the Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge implies an effect of natural reason: for the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that a \"demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowledge.\" Therefore knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod confessio non possit esse informis. Dicitur enim Eccli., xvii, 26: A mortuo, velut qui non est*, perit confessio. Sed ille qui non habet charitatem, est mortuus, quia ipsa est animæ vita. Ergo absque charitate non potest esse confessio.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.1.arg.2] Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all holy persons, as stated above (8, 4; I-II, 68, 5). Now Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that \"many of the faithful lack knowledge though they have faith.\" Therefore knowledge is not a gift.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, confessio dividitur contra contritionem et satisfactionem. Sed contritio et satisfactio nunquam possunt extra charitatem fieri. Ergo nec confessio.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.1.arg.3] Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as stated above (I-II, 68, 8). Therefore one gift suffices for the perfection of one virtue. Now the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of faith, as stated above (Question 8, Article 2). Therefore the gift of knowledge does not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear to which other virtue it can respond. Since, then, the gifts are perfections of virtues, as stated above (I-II, 68, 1,2), it seems that knowledge is not a gift.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in confessione oportet quod os cordi concordet; quia hoc ipsum nomen confessionis requirit. Sed ille qui adhuc manet in affectu peccati, quod confitetur, non habet cor ori conforme, quia corde peccatum tenet, quod ore damnat. Ergo talis non confitetur. Non potest dari confessio valida et informis defectu examinis, confessionis, aut absolutionis. Nec etiam defectu doloris, quamvis nonnulli contendant ad substantiam sacramenti sufficere contritionem oris, alii contritionem naturalem, alii inefficacem, alii non universalem.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.1.sc] Knowledge is reckoned among the seven gifts (Isaiah 11:2).
\n[II-II.q.9.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit in libro De incarnat., cap. VII, § 7, col. 872, t. 3: « Deus in carne perfectionem naturæ assumpsit humanæ: suscepit sensum hominis, sed non sensum carnis inflatum. » Sed ad sensum hominis pertinet scientia creata. Ergo in Christo fuit scientia creata.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.1.co] Grace is more perfect than nature, and, therefore, does not fail in those things wherein man can be perfected by nature. Now, when a man, by his natural reason, assents by his intellect to some truth, he is perfected in two ways in respect of that truth: first, because he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure judgment on it.
\nAccordingly, two things are requisite in order that the human intellect may perfectly assent to the truth of the faith: one of these is that he should have a sound grasp of the things that are proposed to be believed, and this pertains to the gift of understanding, as stated above (Question 8, Article 6): while the other is that he should have a sure and right judgment on them, so as to discern what is to be believed, from what is not to be believed, and for this the gift of knowledge is required.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, Filius Dei humanam naturam integram assumpsit; id est, non solum corpus, sed etiam animam; non solum sensitivam, sed etiam rationalem. Et ideo oportuit quod haberet scientiam 4 creatam, propter tria. Primo quidem propter animæ perfectionem. Anima enim secundum se considerata est in potentia ad intelligibilia cognoscenda; est enim sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum; et tamen possibile est in ea scribi propter 2 intellectum possibile, quo est omnia fieri, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 18. Quod autem est in potentia, est imperfectum, nisi reducatur ad actum. Non autem fuit conveniens quod Filius Dei humanam naturam imperfectam assumeret, sed perfectam, utpote qua mediante totum humanum genus ad perfectum erat reducendum. Et ideo oportuit quod anima Christi esset perfecta per aliquam scientiam, quæ esset propria perfectio ejus. Et ideo oportuit in Christo esse aliquam scientiam præter scientiam divinam: alioquin anima Christi esset imperfectior animabus aliorum hominum. Secundo, quia cum quælibet res sit propter suam operationem, ut dicitur in I De Cælo, text. 17, frustra haberet Christus animam intellectivam, si non intelligeret secundum illam: quod pertinet ad scientiam creatam. Tertio, quia aliqua scientia creata pertinet ad animæ humanæ naturam, scilicet illa per quam naturaliter cognoscimus prima principia: scientiam enim hic large accipimus pro qualibet cognitione intellectus humani. Nihil autem naturalium Christo defuit; quia totam humanam naturam suscepit, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo in sexta synodo, act. iv, in Epist. Agath. Pp. ad Imp., damnata est positio negantium in Christo esse duas scientias, vel duas sapientias.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.1.ad.1] Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures, according to the various conditions of each nature. Because man forms a sure judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his reason: and so human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative reasoning. On the other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of truth, without any discursive process, by simple intuition, as was stated in I, 14, 7; wherefore God's knowledge is not discursive, or argumentative, but absolute and simple, to which that knowledge is likened which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, since it is a participated likeness thereof.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Christus cognovit omnia per scientiam divinam operatione increata, quæ est ipsa Dei essentia: Dei enim intelligere est sua substantia, ut probat Philosophus XII Metaph., text. 39. Unde hic actus non potuit esse animæ humanæ Christi, cum sit alterius naturæ. Si igitur non fuisset in anima Christi aliqua alia scientia præter divinam, nihil cognovisset: et ita fuisset frustra assumpta; cum 5 res sit propter suam operationem.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.1.ad.2] A twofold knowledge may be had about matters of belief. One is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning things to be believed from things not to be believe: in this way knowledge is a gift and is common to all holy persons. The other is a knowledge about matters of belief, whereby one knows not only what one ought to believe, but also how to make the faith known, how to induce others to believe, and confute those who deny the faith. This knowledge is numbered among the gratuitous graces, which are not given to all, but to some. Hence Augustine, after the words quoted, adds: \"It is one thing for a man merely to know what he ought to believe, and another to know how to dispense what he believes to the godly, and to defend it against the ungodly.\"
\n[II-II.q.9.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod si duo lumina accipiantur ejusdem ordinis, minus offuscatur per majus; sicut lumen solis offuscat lumen candelæ, quorum utrumque accipitur in ordine illuminantis. Sed 4 si accipiatur majus in ordine illuminantis, et minus in ordine illuminati, minus lumen non offuscatur per majus, sed magis augetur, sicut lumen aeris per lumen solis. Et hoc modo lumen scientiae non offuscatur, sed magis clarescit in anima Christi per lumen scientiae divinæ, quæ est lux vera illuminans omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, ut dicitur Joan., 1, 9.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.1.ad.3] The gifts are more perfect than the moral and intellectual virtues; but they are not more perfect than the theological virtues; rather are all the gifts ordained to the perfection of the theological virtues, as to their end. Hence it is not unreasonable if several gifts are ordained to one theological virtue.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ex parte unitorum ponitur scientia in Christo et quantum ad naturam divinam, et quantum ad humanam; ita quod propter unionem secundum quam est eadem hypostasis Dei et hominis, id quod est Dei attribuitur homini, et id quod est hominis attribuitur Deo, ut supra dictum est. Sed ex parte ipsius unionis non potest poni in Christo aliqua scientia. Nam unio illa est ad esse personale; scientia autem non convenit personæ nisi ratione alicujus naturæ.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine things. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that \"knowledge begets, nourishes and strengthens faith.\" Now faith is about Divine things, because its object is the First Truth, as stated above (Question 1, Article 1). Therefore the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod scientiæ donum sit circa res divinas. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIV De Trinit., cap. 1, § 3, col. 1037, t. 8, quod « per scientiam gignitur fides, nutritur et roboratur. » Sed fides est de rebus divinis, quia objectum fidei est veritas prima, ut supra habitum est. Ergo et donum scientiæ est de rebus divinis.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.2.arg.2] Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than acquired knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine things, for instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore is the gift of knowledge about Divine things.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, confessio ad hoc necessaria est in pœnitentia, ut pœna secundum arbitrium sacerdotis peccato taxetur. Sed sufficiens pœna potest imponi a diversis sacerdotibus de diversis peccatis. Ergo non oportet uni sacerdoti omnia peccata confiteri.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.2.arg.3] Further, according to Romans 1:20, \"the invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.\" If therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems that there is also knowledge of Divine things.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, potest contingere quod post confessionem factam et satisfactionem perfectam recordetur quis alicujus peccati mortalis, quod dum confitebatur, in memoria non habebat; et tunc copiam proprii sacerdotis cui primo confessus fuerat, habere non poterit. Ergo poterit solum peccatum illud alteri confiteri, et sic diversa peccata diversis sacerdotibus confitebitur.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): \"The knowledge of Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of human affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge.\"
\n[II-II.q.9.a.2.sc] Sed contra, hypocrisis est impedimentum pœnitentiæ. Sed dividere confessionem ad hypocrisim pertinet, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. Devera et falsa pœnitit., cap. xv, § 31, col. 1425, t. 6. Ergo confessio debet esse integra. Præterea, confessio est pœnitentiæ pars. Sed pœnitentia debet esse integra. Ergo et confessio.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.2.co] A sure judgment about a thing formed chiefly from its cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the order of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the second, so ought the judgment about the second cause to be formed through the first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first cause through any other cause; wherefore the judgment which is formed through the first cause, is the first and most perfect judgment.
\nNow in those things where we find something most perfect, the common name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short of the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most perfect thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of convertible terms, that which signifies \"what a thing is,\" is given the special name of \"definition,\" but the convertible terms which fall short of this, retain the common name, and are called \"proper\" terms.
\nAccordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment as stated above (Article 1), if this certitude of the judgment is derived from the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is wisdom: for a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows the highest cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of all matters by that cause: and a wise man \"absolutely,\" is one who knows the cause which is absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the knowledge of Divine things is called \"wisdom,\" while the knowledge of human things is called \"knowledge,\" this being the common name denoting certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judgment which is formed through second causes. Accordingly, if we take knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift from the gift of wisdom, so that the gift of knowledge is only about human or created things.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in medicina corporali oportet quod medicus non solum unum morbum, contra quem medicinam dare debet, cognoscat, sed etiam universaliter totam habitudinem ipsius infirmi, eo quod unus morbus ex adjunctione alterius aggravatur, et medicina quæ uni morbo competet, alteri nocumentum præstaret. Et similiter est in peccatis, quia unum aggravatur ex adjunctione alterius, et illud quod uni peccato esset conveniens medicina, alteri incentivum præstaret, cum quandoque aliquis contrariis peccatis infectus sit, ut Gregorius in Pastorali, parte III, cap. III, docet. Et ideo de necessitate confessionis est quod homo omnia peccata confiteatur quæ in memoria habet; quod si non faciat, non est confessio, sed confessionis simulatio.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.2.ad.1] Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal, yet faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. Hence to know what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of knowledge, but to know in themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of union with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites man's mind to God.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod etsi erubescentia sit multiplicior, quando dividit diversa peccata diversis, tamen omnes simul non sunt ita magnæ, sicut illa una qua quis omnia sua peccata simul confitetur, quia unum peccatum per se consideratum non ita monstrat malam dispositionem peccantis, sicut quando est cum pluribus aliis consideratum, quia in unum peccatum aliquis quando ex ignorantia vel infirmitate labitur; sed multitudo peccatorum demonstrat malitiam peccantis, vel magnam corruptionem ejusdem.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.2.ad.2] This argument takes knowledge in the generic acceptation of the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special gift, but according as it is restricted to judgments formed through created things.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod pœna a diversis sacerdotibus imposita non esset sufficiens, quia quilibet consideraret peccatum unum tantum per se, et non gravitatem ipsius, quam habet ex adjunctione alterius; et quandoque pœna quæ contra unum peccatum daretur, esset promotiva alterius peccati; et præterea, sacerdos confessionem audiens vicem Dei gerit, et ideo debet ei fieri hoc modo confessio sicut fit Deo in contritione. Unde sicut non esset contritio, nisi quis de omnibus contereretur, ita non esset confessio, nisi quis de omnibus quæ memoriæ occurrunt, confiteatur.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.2.ad.3] As stated above (Question 1, Article 1), every cognitive habit regards formally the mean through which things are known, and materially, the things that are known through the mean. And since that which is formal, is of most account, it follows that those sciences which draw conclusions about physical matter from mathematical principles, are reckoned rather among the mathematical sciences, though, as to their matter they have more in common with physical sciences: and for this reason it is stated in Phys. ii, 2 that they are more akin to physics. Accordingly, since man knows God through His creatures, this seems to pertain to \"knowledge,\" to which it belongs formally, rather than to \"wisdom,\" to which it belongs materially: and, conversely, when we judge of creatures according to Divine things, this pertains to \"wisdom\" rather than to \"knowledge.\"
\n[II-II.q.9.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quidam dicunt quod quando aliquis recordatur eorum quæ prius oblitus erat, debet etiam ea quæ prius confessus fuit, iterum confiteri, et præcipue si non potest eum-dem habere, cui ante confessus fuerat, qui omnia cognoscit, ut totius culpæ quantitas uni sacerdoti innotescat. Sed Juxta Durandum hæc ratio non videtur necessario conclusionem probare, sed solum quod est valde congruum omnia peccata sua uni sacerdoti revelare. Conclusionem tamen admittit Durandus, hancque aliter et subtilius demonstrat esse veram. hoc non videtur necessarium; quia pecatum habet quantitatem et ex seipso, et ex adjunctione alterius. Peccatorum autem de quibus confessus est, manifestavit quantitatem quam ex seipsis habent. Ad hoc autem quod sacerdos utramque quantitatem hujus peccati cujus fuerat oblitus cognoscat, sufficit quod hoc peccatum confitens dicat explicite, et alia in generali, dicendo quod cum alia multa confiteretur, hujus oblitus fuit.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the third beatitude, \"Blessed are they that mourn,\" does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For, even as evil is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy. Now knowledge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter is known through evil: for \"the straight line rules both itself and the crooked line\" (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod sexdecim illæ conditiones quæ a magistris assignantur, his versibus contentæ, non requirantur ad confessionem: « Sit simplex, humilis confessio, pura, fidelis, Atque frequens, nuda, discreta, libens, verecunda, Integra, secreta, lacrymabilis, accelerata, Fortis et accusans, et sit parere parata. » Fides enim, et simplicitas, et fortitudo sunt per se virtutes. Ergo non debent poni conditiones confessionis.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.4.arg.2] Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge. Now there is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there joy, since it is written (Wisdom 8:16): \"Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness.\" Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond with the gift of knowledge.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, « purum » est quod non habet permixionem, et similiter « simplex » compositionem et mixtionem aufert. Ergo superflue utrumque ponitur.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.4.arg.3] Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation, before operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation, sorrow does not correspond to it, since \"the speculative intellect is not concerned about things to be sought or avoided\" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to correspond with the gift of knowledge.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, peccatum semel commissum nullus tenetur confiteri nisi semel. Ergo si homo peccatum non iteret, non oportet quod sit pœnitentia « frequens. »
\n[II-II.q.9.a.4.sc] Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv): \"Knowledge befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been mastered by the evil which he coveted as though it were good.\"
\n[II-II.q.9.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Hebr., v, 8, dicitur: Cum esset Filius Dei, didicit ex his quæ passus est, obedientiam: Glossa, « id est, expertus est. » Fuit ergo in Christo aliqua experimentalis scientia, quæ est scientia acquisita.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.4.co] Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man's aversion from God is occasioned, according to Wisdom 14:11: \"Creatures . . . are turned to an abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise,\" of those, namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they deem the perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing their last end in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a right judgment of creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of which they may be the occasion), which judgment he exercises through the gift of knowledge.
\nHence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of knowledge.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod dictarum conditionum quædam sunt de necessitate confessionis, quædam de bene esse ipsius. Ea autem quæ sunt de necessitate confessionis, vel competunt ei secundum quod est actus virtutis, vel secundum quod est pars sacramenti. Si primo modo, aut ratione virtutis in genere, aut ratione specialis virtutis, cujus est actus. Ex ipsa autem ratione actus virtutis in genere sunt quatuor conditiones, ut in II Ethic., cap. iv, dicitur. Prima est ut aliquis « sit sciens, » et quantum ad hoc confessio dicitur esse « discreta, » secundum quod in actu omnis virtutis prudentia requiritur. Est autem hæc discretio ut majora cum majori ponere confiteatur. Secunda conditio est ut « sit eligens, » quia actus virtutum debent esse voluntarii, et quantum ad hoc dicit « libens. » Tertia conditio est ut « propter hoc, » scilicet debitum finem, « operetur, » et quantum ad hoc dicit quod debeat esse pœnitentia « pura, » ut scilicet recta sit intentio. Quarta est ut « immobiliter operetur, » et quantum ad hoc dicit quod debeat esse « fortis, » ut scilicet propter verecundiam veritas non dimittat. Est autem confessio actus virtutis pœnitentia. Quæ quidem primo initium sumit in horrore turpitudinis peccati; et quantum ad hoc confessio debet esse « verecunda, » ut scilicet non se jactet de peccatis propter aliquam sæculi vanitatem admixtam. Secundo progreditur ad dolorem de peccato commisso, et quantum ad hoc debet esse « lacrymabilis. » Tertio in abjectione sui terminatur, et quantum ad hoc debet esse « humilis, » ut se miserum confiteatur et infirmum. Sed ex propria ratione hujusmodi actus, qui est confessio, habet quod sit manifestativa; quæ quidem manifestatio per quatuor impediri potest: primo per falsitatem, et quantum ad hoc dicit « fidelis, » id est, vera; secundo per obscuritatem verborum, et contra hoc dicit « nuda, » ut non involvatur obscuritate verborum: tertio per verborum multiplicationem, et hoc dicit quod sit « simplex, » ut contra non recitet in confessione nisi quod ad quantitatem peccati pertinet; quarto per substractionem, ut non subtrahatur aliquid de his quæ manifestanda sunt, et contra hoc dicit « integra. » Secundum autem quod confessio est pars sacramenti, sic concernit judicium sacerdotis, qui est minister sacramenti. Unde oportet quod sit « accusans » ex 1 Ad hanc firmandam sententiam extra omnem aleam positam plura in textu addit Nicolai ex Decretis præsertim ex concilio Tridentino, et ex proscriptione sententiæ oppositæ facta a Clemente VIII, anno 1602, quæ satius est indicasse. parte confitentis, « parere parata » per comparationem ad sacerdotem; « secreta » quantum ad conditionem fori, in quo de occultis conscientiæ agitur. Sed de bene esse confessionis est quod sit « frequens, » et quod sit « accelerata, » ut scilicet sæpe et cito confiteatur.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.4.ad.1] Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except in so far as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper cause of spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy correspond directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of knowledge there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past errors, and, in consequence, consolation, since, by his right judgment, man directs creatures to the Divine good. For this reason sorrow is set forth in this beatitude, as the merit, and the resulting consolation, as the reward; which is begun in this life, and is perfected in the life to come.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non est inconveniens quod conditio unius virtutis in actu alterius virtutis inveniatur, qui ab ipsa imperatur; vel quia medium quod est unius virtutis principaliter, etiam aliæ virtutes per particiationem habent.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.4.ad.2] Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth; yet he may sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he considers: it is thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod hæc conditio, « pura, » intentionis excludit perversitatem, a qua homo mundatur; sed « simplex, » alieni admixtionem.
\n[II-II.q.9.a.4.ad.3] No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far as it consists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude does consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in well-ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the beatitude of a wayfarer. Hence beatitude relating to contemplation is not ascribed to knowledge, but to understanding and wisdom, which are about Divine things.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.9.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod hoc non est de necessitate confessionis, sed de bene esse.
\n